ML20133G076

Provides Commission W/Recommendations for Expediting & Improving Implementation of App R Re Fire Protection.Fire Protection License Conditions Should Be Removed from Future Licenses If Fire Protection Plan Incorporated in FSAR

ML20133G076
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/17/1985
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
TASK-RINV, TASK-SE CCS, SECY-85-306, NUDOCS 8510150157
Download: ML20133G076 (101)

Text

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.g September 17, 1985 SECY-85-306 RULEMAKING ISSUE (Notation Vote)

For:

The Commissioners From:

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50

Purpose:

To. provide the Commission with recommendations for expediting and improving the implementation of Appendix R (Fire Protec-tion), and to provide a discussion of related issues raised by a member of OGC and by several fire protection staff members.

Background:

The initial inspections for compliance with the safe shutdown provisions of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, at facilities where compliance with Appendix R was believed to be complete by the licensee, revealed a number of instances of noncom-pliance and enforcement actions were being proposed.

In late 1983, the ED0 initiated a consultation between headquarters and the regions which concluded that uncertainty still existed over the staff requirements and suggested that a series of regional workshops be organized to discuss fire protection and answer questions from the licensees. The Nuclear Utility Fire Protection Group (NUFPG) organized a meeting to precede these workshops to solicit industry experience in fire protec-tion programs and compile for the NRC questions which they felt needed answering.

The NUFPG also initiated discussions with the staff on whether a licensee may propose an alternative means of complying with certain Appendix R issues covered by Generic Letter 83-33, if backed by a technical justification.

In such cases, an exemotion would not be needed if an alternative means of

Contact:

W. Johnston Ext. 27331 SECY NOTE:

This subject is scheduled for discussion at an open Meeting at 10:00 a.m.,

Thursday, October 3, 1985.

An advanced copy of this paper was provided, Commissioner Offices on September 17.

s The Comissioners compliance is provided in areas where Appendix R is non-specific. The result of these discussions was a document called " Interpretations of Appendix R."*

The workshops were held in the spring of 1984. At these workshops a package of NRC guidance was distributed to each attendee which included NRC staff responses to industry questions and the " Interpretations" document. The cover memo for the package explained that it was a draft package which would be issued in final form via a generic letter following the workshops.

I During the same timeframe, the staff began to develop enforce-ment guidance on Appendix R.

Draft guidance was developed in the spring of 1984 and it was determined that, until the guid-ance and the interpretations of the rule were completed, enforcement actions based upon Appendix R should be placed on hold.

Four cases arising in late 1983, early 1984 and two more recent cases were and still are in this status.

On May 30, 1984, the staff briefed the Comission on the status of the implementation of Appendix R and discussed the issues raised by several NRC fire protection engineers in a Differing Professional Opinion (DP0) and by a member of OGC. At this meeting, the Comission requested that the implementation guidance be submitted for Comission approval prior to its issuance to industry.

Following the Comission meeting, NRR was requested by the EDO to form a Steering Comittee on Fire Protection Policy to examine all current licensing, inspection and technical issues, and to develop policy recomendations aimed at expediting Appendix R compliance for pre-1979 plants. The Steering Committee drew its membership from three of the Regions, IE, and ELD. Richard Vollmer, then of NRR, was Chairman.

Follow-ing a series of meetings, which included discussions with all agency fire protection engineers, the Steering Committee issued a report to the EDO (Enclosure 1) in October 1984 containing a number of recommendations for improving the consistency of the levels of fire protection safety and for enhancing the implementation of Appendix R.

Following comment by the Program Offices and the regions, the ED0 directed in December 1984 that the Steering Committee Report be issued for public comment.

Comments were received from the NUFPG, utilities, and consultants. On May 3, 1985, the Fire Protection Steering Committee issued updated recommendations which reflect resolution of these comments (Enclosure 2).

• This document was later disputed by a member of OGC, and several staff members initiated a differing professional i

opinion.

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s The Comissioners Current Status Although Appendix R became an effective rule in 1981, approximately half of the operating reactors still have outstanding material in for staff review and some facili-ties are not currently scheduled for compliance until the late 1980s. This situation, as discussed with the Comis-sion in May 1984, has arisen partially because of the com-plexity of achieving compliance with the Rule for older facilities despite the exemption provisions, and partially because industry did not manage its approach to Appendix R effectively, r.or did the NRC fully anticipate the impact of Comission-required backfitting of certain portions of Appendix R.

The staff believes that implementation of this guidance, which has been generated in response to industry defined needs, will help bring to closure outstanding issues.

The backlog of licensing review extends well into 1986. Some of this could be given back for licensee action, based on this guidance. However, the staff recognizes that additional review work may also be generated.

As discussed previously, the development of this guidance and regional meetings in 1984 resulted from early inspections showing noncompliance with Appendix R.

This situation has changed somewhat for the better. Based on a larger sample of ten pre-1979 and twenty post-1979 safe shutdown inspections, improvement has recently been noted in licensee understanding of the analyses needed to establish required post-fire safe shutdown capabilities.

Recent inspections have resulted in a significant reduction in the number of deficiencies observed.

Some of this is attributable to a better understanding of the requirements as discussed in the regional workshops.

In the past year, we have been inspecting NT0L plants prior to issuing an operating license specifically for the safe shutdown items of Appendix R.

Based on the information given out at the workshops, the applicant usually makes a submittal prior to the inspection identifying additional deviations from Appendix R or the staff guidelines.

The staff then uses the time before or during the inspection to come to resolution on these deviations.

The increased understanding since the workshops has reduced significantly the open items to be resolved at the time of licensing. The inspection results for these new plants show substantial compliance with regulatory requirements.

Discussion:

The staff proposes to adopt, in large part, the positions recommended by the Fire Protection Policy Steering Comittee for the guidance of the licensees in the implementation of Appendix R.

s The Commissioners 4-The Steering Committee's principal recommendations are as follows:

1.

Promptly issue a generic letter (Enclosure 3) informing all licensees that:

I a.

Extensions to 50.48c schedules will no longer be granted except where a licensee has an approved "living schedule."

b.

Inspections will include plants with uncompleted modifications as well as plants with completed modifications.

In addition, licensees may request an inspection to help avoid costly design and implementa-tion decisions with which the staff may disagree.

c.

Documentation of valid analysis supporting fire protection features must be available for inspection.

d.

Quality assurance measures should be in effect to assure that fire protection systems will function as intended.

e.

Licensees are required to notify the NRC when deficiencies are discovered pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 1

and 50.73.

f.

A standard fire protection license condition is available which will clarify the licensee's options in making modifications to the fire protection program.

2.

Accompany the generic letter with the following guidance documents:

i o Interpretations of Appendix R (Enclosure 4).*

o Appendix R Questions and Answers (Enclosure 5).

o Fire Protection License Condition (Enclosure 6).

3.

Adoption of proposed Guidance For Enforcement Actions Concerning Fire Protection Requirements (Enclosure 7).

Further consideration of the positions taken by the Steering Committee regarding extensions to 50.48(c) schedules and a proposed standard fire protection license condition have raised policy and legal issues which are worthy of the Commission's attention.

• These interpretations represent staff positions, and should not be considered as official agency interpretations issued by the General Counsel. See 10 CFR 1.32; 10 CFR Part 8.

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4 The Comissioners Schedular Exemptions 4

The Steering Committee's position is that the Appendix R 3

implementation schedule was established by the Commission in 10 CFR 50.48(c), promulgated together with Appendix R in November of 1980. Allowing time to evaluate the need for alternative or dedicated shutdown systems, which require prior NRC approval before installation, and time for design of and NRC review of such systems, the Commission envisioned that implementation of Appendix R would be complete in four to five years, or approximately by the end of 1985. The schedule for many fire protection modifications was initially tolled by the filing of exemption requests under 50.48(c)(6).

This delay was anticipated by the rule.

In addition, the staff has issued numerous exemptions to 50.48(c) deadlines pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. The latest completion date approved so far is in 1987. Some licensees have proceeded expedi-tiously to implement Appendix R and are now finished or nearly finished with that effort. Others have engaged in lengthy negotiations with the staff while continuing to file requests for schedule extensions, and thereby have barely begun Appendix R modifications needed to comply with Sections III.G and III.L. Schedule extension requests have been received seeking implementation dates of 1990 and beyond.

4 As the 50.48(c) schedule was intended to be a one-time schedule comencing in the 1980-1982 time frame and ending in the 1985 where major modifications remain to be completed)(undermine time frame, extensions well beyond this schedule particularly the purpose of the schedule which was to achieve expeditious compliance with NRC fire protection requirements. The staff believes that further wholesale extension of fire protection schedules via exemption from 50.48(c) requirements is legally unsound and could expose the Commission to a court challenge.

On the other hand, there are a number of considerations favor-ing granting additional schedular exemptions where a genuine hardship can be established. Recent PRA's have shown that i

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the congributiog of fires to core melt probabilities is in the 10~ to 10- range for reactors with no alternate shut-dun capability, and about a factor of 20 improvement if fully protected. Recent inspections are showing greatly improved compliance, a large percentage of the necessary i

changes have already been completed, and defense in depth provides knowledge that individual deficiencies do not cause significant safety effects. As a consequence of these con-siderations, the generic letter has been modified to state that additional schedular exemptions may be requested under 10 CFR 50.12, but such requests will be granted sparingly based on an evaluation using the following criteria:

The Comissioners 1.

The utility has, since the promulgation of Appendix R in 1980, proceeded expeditiously to meet the Comis-sion's requirements.

2.

The delay is caused by circumstances beyond the utility's control.

3.

The proposed schedule for completion represents a best effort under the circumstances.

4.

Adequate interim compensatory measures will be taken until compliance is achieved.

License Conditions Most licenses contain a fire protection license condition.

License conditions for plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, contain a condition requiring implementation of modifications comitted to by the licensee as a result of the reviews against the Branch Technical Position. These license conditions were added by amendments issued between 1977 and February 17, 1981, the effective date of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R.

In April 1981, the Comission decided that, until a fire protection rule for future plants was approved, "new licenses (those issued after January 1, 1979) should contain a condition requiring compli-ance with comitments made by an applicant and agreed to by the staff."

Because of the evolving nature of the approach to fire pro-tection, license conditions for plants licensed after Janaury 1, 1979, vary in scope and content. Some only list open items that must be resolved by a specified date or event, such as exceeding five percent power or the first refueling outage.

Some reference a commitment to meet Appendix R; some reference the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and/or the NRC staff's SER. These variations have created problems for licensees and for NRC inspectors in identifying the operative and enforceable fire protection requirements at each facility.

These license conditions also create difficulties because they do not specify when a licensee may make changes to the approved program without requesting a license amendment.

If the fire protection program comitted to by the licensee is required by a specific license condition, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 may not be applied to make changes without prior NRC approval.

Thus licensees may be required to submit amendment requests even for relatively minor changes to the fire protection program. One means of reducing this diversity and to increase i

The Comissioners uniformity is to propose a uniform license condition which clearly identifies the approved fire protection program for the facility and specifies the conditions under which it may be modified. The Steering Committee has proposed that this be recommended as an option to the licensees and remain a requirement for new plants.

Some industry opposition has been expressed and the CRGR expressed the view that it is doubtful that many operating plants will voluntarily exercise this option.

At the time that the Commission.equired the license condition on new plants it was expected to be an interim measure until a fire protection rule was developed. Since that time, the staff has recomended and the Commission has agreed that a rule for new plants was not needed. An alternative approach, recommended by CRGR, which also has the virtue of clearly identifying the approved fire protection program and specifying the conditions under which it may be modified, but without elevating fire pro-tection to a status above that of other safety related plant features, is to incorporate the fire protection program for all plants into the FSAR for the facility and remove the requirement for a license condition.

In this manner, the fire protection program, including the systems, the administrative controls, l

the organization, and other plant features described in the FSAR will be on a consistent status with other plant features described in the FSAR. The provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 would then apply directly for changes the licensee desires to make in the program.

Some questions of enforceability have been raised with regard to this approach.

The generic letter has been modified to state that licensees should include the fire protection program in the next update of their FSAR with the intent that thereafter modifications to the program could be made in accord with 10 CFR 50.59. One proviso would be necessary, that the " accident previously con-sidered" in the context of the unreviewed safety question determination under 10 CFR 50.59 be the postulated fire in the fire hazard analysis for the fire area affected by the change.

The staff would then entertain application for amendment to remove the fire protection license condition.

The staff is continuing to evaluate various other approaches to the elimi-nation of the license conditions, including the need for a rule which would require compliance with the fire protection plan described in the FSAR.

Such a rule could be a means for elimi-nation of present license conditions and technical specifications.

For the plants remaining to be licensed the staff proposes to require that the fire protection program be submitted as part of the FSAR. Changes under 10 CFR 50.59 would then be allowed under the groundrules discussed above.

No license condition would then be required.

The Comissioners Interpretations Document The Steering Committee carefully reviewed the " Interpretations" and concluded that they will provide an improved means of achieving compliance with Appendix R.

Concurrence with this position was received from the Regional Administrators and l

there were no substantive coments on this document received i

from the public. The Appendix R Questions and Answers include the questions posed by the industry and are supplemented with additional questions identified at the regional workshops.

These responses may be used as guidance for design, review, and inspection activities. Minor revisions have been made in consideration of public coments and for consistency with the

" Interpretations" document.

i Trubatch Coments The Consnission also requested that the staff coment on the OGC memorandum and the dif fering professional opinions.

Mr. Trubatch raises objections to five parts of the Inter-pretations document:

fire boundaries, cold shutdown, automatic detection and suppression, fire damage, and alternate shutdown. A response to Mr. Trubatch's legal concerns has been prepared by OELD (Enclosure 8).

j Two comments from Mr. Trubatch relate to the staff's handling of fire damage and alternate or dedicated shutdown. The

, staff has not changed its position regarding the need for licensees to consider the effect of suppressants when assuring i

that "the structure, system, or component under consideration is capable of performing its intended function during and after i

the postulated fire, as needed." The purpose of this inter-pretation of fire damage is to clarify that cosmetic damage, which does not interfere with the above capabilities, would not be a basis for rejection of an exemption request.

The position of the staff has also not changed in regard to the need for adequate separation of alternative shutdown equipment from normal shutdown equipment.

However, Appendix R in mentioning " room, or zone" in addition to " area," clearly implies that compliance may be ichieved by other than separation by fire areas. The staff has recognized this 2

and has granted exemptions in the past. What is changing is the recognition that compliance with Appendix R can be i

established with adequite justification and exemptions need not be requested. The " room" concept must be justified by preparation of a detailed fire hazards analysis that demon-strates that a single fire will not disable both normal shutdown equipment and the alternate shutdown capability.

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The Commissioners Staff DP0 The staff DP0 is primarily concerned with Section 4, Fire Area Boundaries, and Section 5, Automatic Detection and Suppression, of the Interpretations of Appendix R.

The Interpretations allow penetrations in fire area boundaries and partial area coverage for fire suppression and detection if it can be established by analysis that adequate protection is provided for the fire hazards associated with the area. Such analyses have previously been approved by the staff as exemptions.

By contrast, the " Interpretations" do not require submission of fire hazards analyses for staff review or the filing of exemption requests prior to fire protection inspections; but the analysis must be available for NRC audit. The DP0 states that not requiring exemption requests is in conflict with Generic Letter 83-33 which was issued previously to clarify staff positions on these and other issues, and which is deemed preferable.

The Steering Comittee has reviewed the positions defined in the " Interpretations" and has concluded that they are techni-cally and legally consistent with the requirements of Appendix R.

It is expected that the DP0 will be resolved accordingly.

However, formal resolution of the DP0 is being deferred pend-ing Comission action on the recomendations of the Steering Comi ttee.

Sumary and The Steering Comittee on Fire Protection Policy established

==

Conclusions:==

by the EDO has made a number of recomendations for improving the consistency of the levels of fire protection safety and for enhancing the implementation of Appendix R.

These recom-mendations, having received public coment, have been incorporated in a generic letter with attachments which the staff proposes to send to the licensees. The staff believes that the recom-mendations, with changes discussed above, will provide the most consistent and workable means of enhancing the implementation of Appendix R and intends to proceed expeditiously with their issuance.

Recommendations: That the Commission direct the staff to:

1.

Issue the generic letter with attachments (Enclosures 4, 5 and 7 to this paper).

2.

Conduct fire protection inspections in accordance with currently allocated fire protection resources and as described in Section B of the generic letter.

The Commissioners '

3.

Utilize the guidance in Enclosure 7 as the criteria for enforcement of Appendix R requirements and pro-ceed to evaluate and issue pending enforcement cases in accordance with this guidance.

4.

Remove the fire protection license condition from future licenses if the fire protection plan is incorporated in the FSAR.

5.

Evaluate the appropriate approach and need for fire protection Technical Specifications in conjunction with the ongoing effort on Technical Specification improvements.

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William 8. Dircks Executive director for Operations

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Enclosures:

J 1.

Memo dtd 10/26/84 to Dircks fm Fire Protection Policy Steering Committee 2.

Memo dtd 5/3/85 to Denton fm Vollmer 3.

Generic Ltr on Fire Protection 4.

Interpretations of Appendix R 5.

Appendix R Questions & Answers 6.

Fire Protection License Condition l

7.

Guidance for Enforcement Actions l

Concerning Fire Protection Requirements 8.

Memo dtd 6/27/84 to Vollmer fm Olmstead 9.

Steering Committee Resolution of Public Comments i

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Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, October 4, 1955.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Friday, September 27, 1985, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OPE OI OCA OIA OPA REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ELD ACRS.

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. L 2m.g j f msm=ctos, o. c.mu s.;. m j OCT 2 61984 t

MEMORANDUM FOR:

William J. Dircks

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Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Fire Protection Policy Steering Comittee

SUBJECT:

REC 0fmENDED FIRE PROTECTION POLICY AND PROGRAM ACTION Introduction At an August 27, 1984 meeting on fire protection, you directed that a 1

review of current fire protection issues be conducted and that recomenda-tions for resolution of these issues be made within two months.> This effort was to examine all current licensing, inspection, and technical issues t6 develop policy recomendations aimed at expediting Appendix R compliance for elder plants and assuring consistent levels of fire protection safety at all plants.

i By your memorandum dated September 13, 1984 (Enclosure 1) to the NRR and IE Office Directors and the Regional Administrators, you confirmed this direction and approved a Steering Conniittee to provide appropriate recom-i mendations.

You indicated that, among the issues to be considered, were:

adequacy of current guidance to industry; interpretation of Appendix R requirements; treatment of technical and schedular exemptions; comparisen of Appendix R and current NTOL plants for fire pro-tection safety; adequacy of current inspection practices; and identification and resolution plan for any outstanding technical issues.

In response to this direction, the Fire Protection Policy Steering Comittee (SC) has considered the broad range of fire protection issues necessary to arrive at policy recomendations. The SC has reviewed docussents which provide the basis for current fire protection policies and which discuss many of the issues that could significantly delay Appendix R compliance and question consistency in fire protection safety at all plants.

i The SC held six meetings. These included meetings with the Senior NRC Managers, the NRR and IE 0ffice Directors, and the fire protection engineers from NRR, IE, and the Regions. At the latter meeting, the candid views of the ir.dividuals intimately invclved in the fire protection issues j

were solicited and received. A record of the SC meetings is included as L

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William J. Dircks 2

OCT 2 s 1984 1

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Finally, the SC received significant input frem Thomas Wambach, who acted as Secretary to the SC, and the Working Group, headed by Faust Rosa, NRR, and composed of V. Benareya, C. Grimes, and Y. Moore of NRR; S. Richardson, IE; W. Shields, OELD; and C. Anderson T. Conlon, and W. Little of Regions I,11 and III respectively.

l The reconnendations of the SC are provided below. We believe that this responds to your direction, and when fully implemented, represent actions that will indeed expedite Appendix R compliance and assure consistent levels of fire protection safety at all plants. The SC is aware that not all parties will be fully satisfied with these actions. Nor have our recommendations been reviewed by the cognizant Offices or Regions. However, we believe that they represent sound judgments balanced with other competing safety priorities, and that with your approval the plan can'and should be initiated promptly.

Recomendations To expedite Appendix R compliance and ass.ure consistent levels of fire protection safety at all plants, the Fire Protection Steering Comittee recomends that the fo11cwing actions be taken:

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1.

Promptly issue the enclosed Generic Letter'(Enclosure 2) infoming all licensees that:

1 (a) Extensions to the 50.48(c) schedules will no longer be granted; (b) An expedited fire protection inspection program will be instituted; (c) Documentation of valid analyses supporting fire protection features must be available for inspection; I.

(d) Quality assurance applicable to fire protection systems is that required by GDC.1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50; I

and (e) The interpretations of Appendix R. (Enclosure 3) which shculd facilitate industry implementation of Appendix R and the official agency position on all issues covered. responses to in It should be l

noted that The Comission requested these documents for their review prior to issuance to industry.)

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OCT 2 6 US4 William J. Dircks 4 2.

Conduct fire protection inspections within CY 1985 at ors and NTOLs to include at least one site per licensee not subject to-a previous Appendix R fire protection inspection. These inspections-will assess the degree of fire safety, steer and promote licensee compliance, and take enforcement action where appropriate. A l

Telnporary Instruction for this program will be issued by 11/15/84 To make this program of inspection most effective:

(a) A workshop for the ins'pection teams will be conducted in mid December with SC,-NRR, IE and Regional participation to assure comon understanding of the objectives, scope and technical issues. Followup workshops will be held as n,eeded; (b) Th'e fire protection inspections will utilize new guidance for enforcement actions (Enclosure 4);

(c) The processing of current fire protection enforcement actions will be expedited;-and (d) A referee will be established to promptly resolve significant differences between the inspection teams and licensees.

3.

Upgrade regulatory documents and procedures to achieve an appropriate level of fire protection safety while maintaining consistency among plants.

In particular:

(a)

Impose a standard fire protection condition (Enclosure 5) in each operating license (already being implemented);

(b) Reevaluate all fire protection guidance for consistency with the SC recomendations and compare fire protection requirements for ors and NTOLs, both under the auspices of the Working Group; (c) Develop appropriate revisions to the Standard Review Plan and Standard Technical Specifications by March 31, 1985; and (d) Designate the Director, Division of Engineering, Np.R as the central point of contact for interoffice / region fire protection issues.

4.

To assure timely and on-track completion of these reconcended actions, the SC will review progress at least quarterly, make mid-course corrections if appropriate, and report to the EDO.

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William J. Dircks OCT 2 6 584 s

Discussion Tne recommended actions are grouped into three main areas dealing with guidance to industry, (2) an expedited program of fire protection inspec-I tions, and (3) a general upgrading of regulatory documents to reach and maintain consistent fire protection safety.

This discussion section will focus broadly on what the SC found during its deliberations to warrant the focus of these recossendations and will indicate how this satisfies th i

agenda of issues cited in your memo of September 13.

Details on these issues are provided in the record of. the SC deliberations contained in With regard to guidance to industry, the SC concludes that adequate tech-t nical guidance had been issued but that there were areas where confusion i

could arise.

However, a diligent reading of Appendix R and other staff do 4

provide the basis for the sittisfactory implementation of Appendix R at Calvert Cliffs.

priate to develop new guidance, rather, bringing current tech Tech Specs, and licenses consistent would suffice. implement The Generic Letter makes clear (1) that extensions to the 50.48(c) schedules will no longer be granted.(2)thatanexpeditedinspectionprogramwillbeinstitutedtosee(

what fire protection fixes are in place and give licensees the inspection the licensee judgements must be backed by documente The SC believes that this will demonstrate to the licensee what act must take and what our inspections will look for.

The Generic Letter notes that, although the 50.48(c) schedules will not be extended, the relative safety priroities of fire protection modifications need to be considered in the development of "living schedules."

in the Generic Letter that had not been uniformly disseminated is that theOne QA appitcable to fire protection features is that required by GDC-1.

would not attempt to backfit any QA requirements.

This Rather it would assure that future design, procurement, installation, testing and maintenance of fire protection features would receive high industrial quality attention.

The SC believes that this initiative fully responds to the first three issues in your memo of September 13.

Turning now to the inspection program, the SC found that the current inspections are generally satisfactory but that steps must be taken to indicate NRC's view of the importance of expediting implementation of Appendix R.

develop a sound policy for fire protection enforcemThese steps are to would help expedite Itcensee compliance because %ent action issue enforcement actions currently pending. Th ste;L in our view, it would raise industry's I

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William J. Dircks

-5 OCT 2 61954 asareness to NRC's resolve in this area and, more importantly, would allow the teams to judge the current direction (for licensees still designing or installing fixes) and advise the licensee on its acceptability. This should save both industry and staff resources in the long run. In the short run, that is 1985, the SC believes that' adequate resources exist for the inspection teams (one for R-I, R-II and R-III, and one for R-IV/V) to be i

taken from regional staff, augmented by contractor, NRR, and IE assistance.

While this would take a modest amount of reprograming in the regional inspection program, we suggest that it's worth the effort to get Appendix R implementation behind us.

Prior to the 1985 inspection, a several-da be held to discuss the inspection program,y inspection team workshop would the technical issues and reach a comon understanding on acceptability of various con, figurations and required documentation. Since this workshop cannot solve all potential problems the inspection teams will encounter, a team at HQ would be set up to promptly resolve significant differences between the inspection per-sonnel and the licensee.

This referee team would be headed by NRR (SES level) and would have an NRR, an IE and a regional technical member. Their decision would be issued in one week and would be sent to all teams for their information.

The SC believes that this program of expedited inspections, aimed at reaching ors and NTOLs and to include at least one site from each licensee not previously subject to a fire protection inspection, coupled with denial of future schedular exemptions and a fire enforcement policy will result in a fair and uniform speed up of Appendix R compliance.

Further, since.the resource cost is believed to be modestly above the already-programed fire protection inspections, we believe the cost is well worth it and will even benefit industry by correcting false starts in Appendix R implementation i

where they are,found.

Although we found the current inspections adequate i

(fifth item in your memo of September 13), this program will continue to be focussed on safe shutdown, will be implemented more expeditiously, and will build on the resolution of other initiatives considered by the SC.

A Temporary Instruction for this inspection program has been drafted and is undergoing final revisions. It will be in final fann by November 15, 1964 and will include the elements discussed above, for example, the team set up to resolve inspection differences with the licensee.

Finally, the SC considered means to assure and maintain consistent levels of fire protection safety at all plants.

The Working Group researched the guidance docunents currently available and how these are applied to old.and i

new plants.

The SC discussed findings of the reviewers and inspectors who are close to the issues. !As a result,.of,this wort..the SC found that the.

veqeirements for old and new' plants were generally the same but that '

discrepancies do exist.- The application of guidelines, both in the review process and the inspection process, leaves room for interpretation. The SC concluded that several steps needed to be taken in addition to those described above some of which were to assure and maintain consistency.

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These steps are to9 develop and implement 3d t( fire protection' lice'nse

.aonditions, Standard'Riview Plan..and' Standard (Tehh Specs

• for all plants.

The license con'dition developed for this is along the lines of,ii the security -

plan and QA program (Enclosure 5).

.Stan in R i,dar(lly inclu'ded.JtavtavJ.lan~s ould ne sinimum nvision to assure that Ap a

s fu e Tech crNyer,yill, require more research and development by (1.

e Working We need to assure'that the Tech Specs"arfsoundly based to assure p.

functioning of fire protectiert. features.but which require only those activities which are compensurate with other Tech Spec items in terms of importance to safety. As part of the above tasksi all fire protection i

gridance needs review and' culling to assure that.oaly'a consistent and gppropriate set remain's.

This complete set of guidance will be referenced In the Standard Review Plan revision. A last step in achieving uniform technical requirweents is the SC recommendation to designate an office as t

responsible for awareness and resolution of interoffice / region fire protection issues.

This is felt to be needed since current fire protection review is conducted within three divisions within NRR and one in IE.

Although there is a lead branch responsibility, it is not always kept informed and involved. Therefore, the SC believes that the Director, Division of Engineering in NRR should be designated'as the central point of Contact.

s Conclusion ff<f h

The Fire otection policy Steering Committee concludes that the actions descri above will ac.complish the goals set forth in your memo of

" 7::.'n; Appendix R compliance for older plants and assuring consistent

~

levels of fire protection safety at all plants." We believe that these actions will facilitate industry implementation of Appendix R through the use of the " interpretations" and a consistent set of guidance, yet will provide the necessary regulatory tools to guide, monitor, and, where i

appropriate, enforce this implementation orocess. We feel strongly that the actions we propose are syner completed to be most effective. gistic and therefore all need to be The Fire protection Policy Steering Committee has found the assignment to be challenging and rewarding. We would be pleased to brief you on our efforts at your earliest convenience.

i l

Fire Protection Policy Steering Connittee a.

1 n

U William 4. Dircks.

DCT 2 g w l

' FIRE PROTECTION POLICT STEIRING COMMITTEE s

a

. Nelson Grace, Director Quality Assurance Safeguards & Inspectio

n Programs Office of Inspection.and Inforcement de -~ 4

'ThomasT. Martin,Direcpr Division of Engineering"and Technical Programs Region I

,j C.J Fed : William J. 61hstead, Director and Chief Counsel Regulations Division Office of the Executive Legal Director

.s n A. Olshinski, Director N

ivision of Reactor Safety Region II Richard L. Spessar y Director Division of Reactor Safety Region III Alichard H. Vollmer, DirectoA Division of Engineering

' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Chair =an) t 4

e t

t i

l l

William J. Dircks 007 2 6 EkH; I

i

Enclosures:

i 1.

Memo to H. Denton et al on Review of I

NRC Fire Protection Policy and Programs.

2.

Generic Letter on Fire Protection 3.

Interpretations of Appendix R 4.

Guidance for Enforcement Actions Concerning Fire Protection Requirements 5.

Fire Protection License Condition 6.

Appendix R Questions and Answers 7.

Steering Comittee Memoranda.

W n

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o.

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4, ENCLOSURE 2 pa aecg fl UNITED STATES y

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

wasumotos, o. c. 2osss o,

a MAY 0 31985 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Harold R. Denton, Director Division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:

Richard H. Vollmer, Chairman Fire,Prote,ction Policy Steering Comittee

SUBJECT:

UPDATED RECOMMENDATIONS ON FIRE PROTECTION POLICY AND PROGRAM ACTIONS

Background:

In a memorandum to Mr. Dircks dated October 26, 1984, the Fire Protection Policy Steering Comittee (SC) provided recomendations designed to resolve a number.o.f issues associated with fire protection policy and imple-mentation of fire protection features for nuclear power plants. In response to the Committee's recomendations, Mr. Dircks directed certain actions by memo-randum to you and Mesars. Stello and DeYoung dated December 10, 1984, including release of the SC's work for public comment. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you the SC's recomendations and guidance documents for your action in completing items one and 'four of the memorandum of December 10. The SC's recomendations and guidance documents on fire protet. tion have, to some extent, been altered by the actions directed and the current status of the issues involved.

Discussion:

1.

The report of the SC was released to the public, and as of April 15, 1985, 13 letters of public coment had been submitted. The individual public coments, except for four that were received very late, and their reso-lution have been reviewed by the Steering Comittee and are included in.

As a result of these coments, those received from NRC Offices and Regions, and in consideration of the current status of some of the issues, a number of changes to individual SC recomendations have been made.

The SC has carefully evaluated its previous recomendaticn regarding an expedited inspection program for reviewing fire pr'otection compliance.

Although we still believe that an expedited fire protection inspection wcula be beneficial, because of resource constraints the SC has modified its recommendation to place more emphasis on the priority selection of plants to be visited within current resources allocated for fire protec-tion. The SC recomends that, while continuing the present program of inspection of plants completing their Appendix R modifications and those plants close to raceiving an operating license, the regions be given flexibility to inspect plants where implementation problems are believed to exist. In addition, the staff should support a licensee's request for an inspection which may avoid' costly design and implementation decisions i

j with which the staff may disagree. This is particularly important since l

the Interpretations of Appendix R gives the licensee more implementation flexibility without prior staff review.

l

j

~

~~

Harold R. Denton 2

MAY 0 31985 2.

The proposed Generic Letter on Fire Protection to be issued as,a generic letter to all licensees and operatins license applicants has been revised in several areas:

e (a) The inspection program discussion reflects the recommendations indicated above.

(b) Documentation necessary to show compliance with fire protectfon requirements has been clarified.

(c) The application of quality assurance to fire protection has been clarified. Although the SC believes that the QA requirements of GDC-1 are applicable to fire protection features, the QA provisions in most fire protection programs, in addition to the recent proposed rulemaking on important to safety, provide sufficient near and long term assurance in this area.

(d) Section F has been added to provide rationale for a standard license condition and to request licensees t~o submit this standard fire protection condition as a license amendment.

The revised Generic Letter is included as Enclosure 2.

3.

Very minor changes have been made to the Interpretations of Appendix R and the Guidance for Enforcement Action concerning fire protection require-ments. These revised documents are included as Enclosures 3 and 4 4.

A number of changes to the question and answer package have been made as a result of public comments and comments from other NRC offices. The revised guidance document is included as Enclosure 5.

5.

The SC has reviewed and approved a proposed standard license condition and several proposed technical specification changes based on fire protection requirements. These changes were developed in order to promote consistency of fire protection recuirements at all operating reactors whether they are covered under Appendix R or not. These documents are included as Enclosures 6 anc 7.

Recommendations:

a.

Promptly issue the enclosed Generic Letter (Enclosure 2) with the Interpretations of Appendix R, Responses to Industry's Questicns, and the Fire Protection License Condition as enclosures. Note that the Commission wishes to review this guidance before it is issued to industry, b.

Conduct fire protection inspections in accordance with currently allocated fire protection resources. Regional workshops should be conducted in order to provide latest information to inspection teams. A referee team should be established to promptly settle disagreements between the licensee and inspection teams.

1 I

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~

O Harold R. Denton 3

MAY 031cg3 c.

Endorse a standard fire protection license condition in accordance with to all future operating, licenses and encourage licensees to review their licenses to conform.

o d.

Utilize the proposed technical specifications where appropriate in future operating licenses and as guidance to the NRR tech spec Improve-ment Project for inclusion in their current effort.

e.

A.dopt the guidance in Enclosure 4 as the agency criteria for enforce-ment of fire protection requirements. Following adoption of this guidance, pending fire protection enforcement cases should promptly be processed by IE.

To keep you informed of status on approved recommendations and other fire protection matters, the Steering Connittee will make periodic reports to you on this matter.

For the Fire Protection Policy Steering Consnittee:

$ 7- ^ -y r

Richard H. Vollmer, Chairman

Enclosures:

1.

Resolution of Comments on Recommendations of the Fire Protection Steering Committee 2.

Revised Generic Letter 84-01 3.

Revised Interpretations of Appendix R 4

Revised Enforcement Guidance on Fire Protection Requirements 5.

Proposed Standard License Condition Regarding Fire Protection Requirements 6.

Proposed Revised Technical Specifications Regarding Fire Protection 7.

Revised Questions and Answers Regarding Fire Protection cc w/ enclosures:

F. Rosa, NRR N. Grace, RII W. Shields, ELD T. Martin, RI T. Wambach, NRR W. Olmstead ELD W. Johnston, NRR J. Olshinski, RII l

V. Benaroya, NRR L. Spessard, RIII l

S. Richardson, IE cc w/o enclosures:

W. Dircks EDO T. Rehm, EDO V. Stello, DEDROGR l

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ENCLOSURE 3 GENERIC LETTER ON FIRE PROTECTION TO ALL LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS In the Spring of 1984, the Comission held a series of Regional Workshops on the implementation of NRC fire protection requirements at nuclear power plants.

At those workshops, a package of recently-developed NRC guidance was dis-tributed to each attendee which included NRC staff responses to industry questions and a document titled " Interpretations of Appendix R."

The cover memo for the package explained that it was a draft package which would be issued in final form via Generic Letter following the workshops.

The guidance approved by the Commission is appended to this letter, and is in the same format as the draft package, i.e., " Interpretations of Appendix R" and responses have been modified from the draft package, and a number of in-dustry questions raised at or subsequent to the workshops have been added and answered. This package represents recent staff assessment of these questions and provides guidance as to acceptable methods of satisfying Comission regu-latory requirements. Other methods proposed by licensees for complying with Comission regulations may also be satisfactory and will be considered on their own merits. To the extent that this guidance may be inconsistent with prior guidance (including Generic Letter 83-33), it is intended that the current letter takes precedence.

If you have any questions, you should contact the NRC Project Manager for your facility.

In the lettered sections below, some additional topics are covered which also bear on the interpretation and implementation of NRC fire protecticn require-ments. The topics are:

(A) schedular exemptions, (B) revised inspection program, (C) dccumentation required to demonstrate compliance, (D) quality assurance requirements applicable to fire protection systems, and (E) notifi-cation of the NRC when deficiencies are discovered.

A.

Schedular Exemotions The Appendix R implementation schedule was established by the Commission in 10 CFR 50.48(c), promulgated together with Appendix R in November of 1980.

Allowing time to evaluate the need for alternative or dedicateo shutcown systems, which require prior NRC approval before installation, and time for design of and NRC review of such systems, the Commission envisioned that implementation of Appendix R would be complete in four to five years, or approximately by the end of 1985. Many schedule extensions were granted by the staff under the " tolling provision," 50.48(c)(6), and under 10 CFR 50.12, the longest of which now extends into 1987.

Some licensees have proceeded expediticusly to implement Appendix R and are now finished or nearly finished with that effort. Others have engaged in lengthy negotiations with the staff while continuing to file requests for schedule extensions, and thereby have barely begun Appendix R modifications needed to comply with Sections III.G

. and III.L. Schedule extension requests have been received seeking implementa-tion dates of 1990 or beyond.

As the 50.48(c) schedule was intended to be a one-time schedule commencing in the 1980-1982 time frame and ending in the 1985 time frame, extensions well beyond this schedule (particularly where major modifications remain to be completed) undermine the purpose of the schedule, which was to achieve ex-peditious compliance with NRC fire protection requirements.

For that reason, additional schedular exemptions may be requested under 10 CFR 50.12, but such requests will be granted sparingly based on the following criteria:

1.

The utility has, since the promulgation of Appendix R in 1980, proceeded expeditiously to meet the Commission's requirements.

2.

The delay is caused by circumstances beyond the utility's control.

3.

The proposed schedule for completion represents a best effort under the circumstances.

4.

Adequate interim compensatory measures will be taken until com-pliance is achieved.

The NRC is currently reviewing all dockets of plants covered by the 50.48 schedule to determine schedule deadlines. When this review is completed, each licensee will be informed of the deadlines.

B.

Revised Inspection Program In 1982, the NRC developed an inspection program to verify compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R.

This program was primarily oriented towards reviewing safe shutdown features of those pre-1979 licensees that had completed Appendix R modifications and selected NTOL plants.

From 1982 to the present, a number of Appendix R compliance inspections have been performed.

In many of the initial inspections it was found that licensees had made significant errors in implementing a number of Appendix R requirements.

The NRC will continue to conduct inspection of fire protection features.

In the case of completed modifications, the inspection team will review com-pliance with applicable requirements.

In the case of incomplete modification, the inspection team will review licensee approach to compliance, plans and schedules for completing such modifications. The NRC will attempt to review l

implementation of fire protection features on a schedule that will minimize the chances of licensees implementing features in a manner that does not meet with staff approval. Additionally, requests for this review and/or inspection by licensees will be granted within NRC resource contraints.

i

. C.

Documentation Required to Demonstrate Compliance The " Interpretations" document attached to this letter states that, where the licensee chooses not to seek prior NRC review and approval of, for example, a fire area boundary, an evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer (assisted by others as needed) and retained for future NRC audit.

Evaluations of this type must be written and organized to facil-itate review by a person not involved in the evaluation.

Guidelines for what such an evaluation should contain may be found in:

(1)Section II.B of Appendix R and (2) Section C.1.b of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 Rev. 2 dated July 1981. All calculations supporting the evaluation should be available and all assumptions clearly stated at the outset. The NRC intends to initiate enforcement action where, for a given fire area, compliance with Appendix R is not readily demonstrable and the licensee does not have available a written fire hazard analysis for the area. The term "readily demonstrable" includes situations where compliance is apparent by observation of the potential fire hazard and the existing protective features.

D.

Quality Assurance Requirements Applicable For fire protection systems the licensee should have and maintain a quality assurance program that provides assurance that-the fire protection systems will be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, maintained and operated so that they will function as intended.

Fire protection systems are not

" safety-related" and are therefore not within the scope of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, unless the licensee has committed to include these systems under the Appendix B program for the plant.

NRC guidance for an acceptable quality assurance program for fire protection systems, given in Section C.4 of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 Rev. 2 dated July 1981, has generally been used in the review and acceptance of approved fire protection programs for plants licensed after January 1,1979.

For plants licensed prior to January 1,1979, similar guidance was referenced in footnotes 3 and 4 to 10 CFR 50.48. They are contained in BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix A thereto and in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Admini-1 strative Control and Quality Assurance" dated June 14, 1977.

E.

Notification of the NRC When Deficiencies are Discovered Licensees are reminded of their obligation tc notify the NRC of fire protection deficiencies which meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 as applicable.

F.

Addition of Fire Protection Program into FSAR Most licenses contain a section on fire protection. License conditions for plants licensed prior to January 1,1979, contain a condition requiring imple-mentation of modifications comitted to by the licensee as a result of the BTP review. These license conditions were added by amendments issued between 1977 and February 17, 1981, the effective date of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R.

. Two points should be noted in regard to these conditions:

(1) they did not explicitly cover required fire protection features where modifications to the existing plant configuration or procedures were not required, and (2) some of the provisions in these conditions could have been superseded by Sections III.G, J, 0, and L of Appendix R.

License conditions for plants licensed after January 1,1979 vary widely in scope and content. Some only list open items that must be resolved by a specified date or event, such as exceeding five percent power or the first refueling outage. Some reference a commitment to meet Appendix R; some reference the FSAR and/or the NRC staff's SER. These variations have created problems for licensees and for NRC inspectors in identifying the operative and enforceable fire protection requirements at each facility.

These license conditions also create difficulties because they do not specify when a licensee may make changes to the approved program without requesting a license amendment.

If the fire protection program consnitted to by the licensee is required by a specific license condition or is not part of the FSAR for the facility, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 may not be applied to make changes without prior NRC approval. Thus licensees may be required to submit amendment requests even for relatively minor changes to the fire protection program.

The aforementioned problems, in general, exist because of the many submittals that constitute the fire protection program for each plant. The Commission believes that the best way to resolve these problems is to incorporate the fire protection program, including the fire hazards analysis, into the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the facility.

In this manner, the fire pro-tection program, including the systems, the administrative controls, the organization, and other plant features associated with fire protection would be on a consistent status with other plant features described in the FSAR.

Also, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 would then apply directly for changes the licensee desires to make in the fire protection program.

In this context, the determination of the involvement of an unreviewed safety question defined in 150.59(a)(2) would be made based on the " accident....previously evaluated" being the postulated fire in the fire hazards analysis for the fire area affected by the change.

Therefore, each licensee should include, in the FSAR update required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) that will fall due more than 12 months after the date of this letter, the incorporation of the fire protection program that has been approved by the NRC including the fire hazards analysis that forms the basis for the fire protection program. This incorporation may be by reference to specific previous submittals and the NRC approvals where appropriate.

Upon completion of this effort, including the certification required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)(2),

the licensee may apply for an amendment to the operating license which deletes the present license condition regarding the fire protection program and completed fire protection features.

Inclusion of the fire protection program in the FSAR will be a prerequisite for licensing for all applications now under review.

No license condition would then be required.

ENCLOSURE 4 INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R*

1.

Process Monitoring Instrumentation Section III.L.2.d of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 states that "the process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control" the reactivity control function.

In I&E Information Notice 84-09, the staff provides a listing of instrumentation acceptable to and preferred by the staff to demonstrate com-pliance with this provision. While this guidance provides an acceptable method for compliance with the regulation, it does not exclude other alter-native methods of compliance. Accordingly, a licensee may propose to the staff alternative instrumentation to comply with the regulation (e.g., boron concentrationindication). While such a submittal is not an exemption request, it must be justified based on a technical evaluation.

2.

Repair of Cold Shutdown Equipment Section III.L.5 of Appendix R states that when in the alternative or dedicated shutdown mode, " equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and main-tain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />." This is not to be confused with the requirements in Section III.G.1.b of Appendix R.

Section III.G.I.b contains the requirements for normal shutdown modes utilizing the control room or emergency control station (s) capabilities. The fire areas falling under the requirements of III.G.1.b are those for which an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is not being provided.

For these fire areas,Section III.G.I.b requires only the capability to repair the systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, not the capability to repair and achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as required for the alternative or dedicated shutdown modes by Section III.L (noted above).

With regard to areas involving nomal shutdown, however,Section I of Appendix R states that repairs must be made using only onsite capabilities.

After repairs are made, cold shutdown can be achieved on a reasonable schedule using any available power source.

3.

Fire Damage Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 utilizes the term " free of fire damage."

In pro-mulgating Appendix R, the Commission has provided methods acceptable for assur-ing that necessary structures, systems and components are free of fire damage (see Section III.G.2a, b and c), that is, the structure, system or component

• These interpretations represent staff positions, and should not be considered as official agency interpretations issued by the General Counsel. See l

10 CFR 1.32; 10 CFR Part 8.

. under consideration is capable of performing its intended function during and after the postulated fire, as needed.

Licensees seeking exemptions from Section III.G.2 must show that the alternative proposed provides reasonable assurance that this criterion is met.

(Note also that Section III.G.2 applies only to equipment needed for hot shutdown. Therefore, an exemption from III.G.2 for cold shutdown equipment is not needed.)

4.

Fire Area Boundaries The term " fire area" as used in Appendix R means an area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated with the area and, as necessary, to pro-tect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area.

In order to meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling, wall-to-wall boundaries. However, all unsealed openings should be identified and considered in evaluating the effectiveness of the overall barrier. Where fire area boundaries were not approved under the BTP process, or where such boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-ceil-ing boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the fire rating required of the boundaries, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire boundaries ~in their plants to determine if the boundaries will withstand the hazards associated with the area and protect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area. This analysis must be performed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Al-though not required, licensees may submit their evaluations for staff review and concurrence.

In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licen-sees for subsequent NRC audits.

5.

Automatic Detection and Suppression Sections III.G.2.b and III.G.2.c of Appendix R state that "In addition, fire detectors and automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area..."

Other provisions of Appendix R clso use the phrase " fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area..."

(see e.g.,Section III.G.2.e).

In order to comply with these provisions, suppression and detection sufficient to protect against the hazards of the area must be installed.

In this regard, detection and suppression providing less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation. Where full area suppression and detection is not installed, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of partial suppression and detection to protect against the hazards in the area. The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Although not required, licensees may submit their evaluations to the staff for review and concurrence.

In any event, the evaluations must be retained for subsequent NRC audits. Where a licensee is providing no suppression or detection, an exemption must be requested.

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l 6.

Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for " alternative or dedicated shut-down capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration." While

" independence" is clearly achieved where alternative shutdown equipment is outside the fire area under consideration, this is not intended to imply that alternative shutdown equipment in the same fire area but independent of the room or the zone cannot result in compliance with the regulation. The

" room" concept must be justified by a detailed fire hazards analysis that demonstrates a single fire will not disable both normal shutdown equipment and the alternative shutdown capability.

6

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ENCLOSURE 5 e

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS i

1 APPENDIX R QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1.

INTRODUCTION 2.

OVERVIEW 3.

III G, FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 3.1 Fire Area Boundaries 3.1.1 Fire Area Definition 3.1.2 Previously Accepted Fire Area Boundaries 3.1.3 Exterior Walls 3.1.4 Exterior Yards 3.1.5 Fire Zones 3.1.6 Documentation 3.2 Fire Barrier Qualifications 3.2.1 Acceptance Criteria 3.2.2 Deviations from Tested Configurations 3.2.3 Fire Door Modifications 3.3 Structural Steel 3.3.1 NFPA Approaches 3.3.2 Previously Accepted Structural Steel 3.3.3 Seismic Supports 3.3.4 Cable Tray Support Protection 3.4 Automatic Suppression System 3.4.1 Water Density 3.4.2 NRC Consultation 3.4.3 Sprinkler Location 3.4.4 Fixed Suppression System In Fire Area 3.4.5 Sprinkler Head Location 3.4.6 Previously Approved Suppression Systens 3.5 Separation of Redundant Circuits 3.5.1 Twenty-Foot Separation Criteria 3.5.2 Floor-to-Floor Separation 3.6 Intervening Combustibles 3.6.1 Negligible Quantities of Intervening Combustibles 3.6.2 In Situ Exposed Combustibles 3.6.3 Unexposed Combustibles APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 1

3.7 Radiant Energy Shields 3.7.1 Fire Rating 3.8 Design Bases 3.8.1 Fire Protection Features NFPA Conformance 3.8.2 Design Basis Fire 3.8.3 Redundant Trains / Alternate Shutdown 3.8.4 Control Room Fire Considerations 4.

III J, EMERGENCY LIGHTING 4.1 Illumination Levels III L, ALTERNATIVE AND DEDICATED SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 5.

5.1 Safe and Alternative Shutdown 5.1.1 Previously Accepted Alternative Shutdown Capability 5.1.2 Pre-Existing Alternative Shutdown Capability 5.1.3 III L Backfit 5.2 Procedures j

5.2.1 Shutdown and Repair Basis

5. 2. 2 Post Fire Operating Procedures 5.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Capability 5.2.4 Post Fire Procedures Guidance Documents 5.3 Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage 5.3.1 Circuit Failure Modes 5.3.2

" Hot Short" Duration 5.3.3 Hot Shutdown Duration 5.3.4 Cooldown Equipment 5.3.5 Pressurizer Heaters 5.3.6 On-Site Power 5.3.7 Torus Level Indication 5.3.8 Short Circuit Coordination Studies 5.3.9 Diagnostic Instrumentation 5.3.10 Desian Basis Plant Transients 5.3.11 Alternate / Dedicated Shutdown vs. Remote Shutdown Systems 6.

III 0, CIL COLLECTION SYSTEMS FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 6.1 Lube Oil System Seismic Design 6.2 Container 7.

BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION CHEB 9.5-1 7.1 Fire Protection and Seismic Events 7.2 Random Fire and Seismic Events I

APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 2

8.

LICENSING POLICY 8.1 Fire Hazards Analysis / Fire Protection Plan Updating 8.2 Fire Protection License Condition 8.3 III G. J and 0 Exemotions for Future Modifications 8.4 Future Changes 8.5 Schedular and Blanket Exemptions 8.6 Trivial Deviations 8.7 Revised Modifications 8.8 Smallest Oaening in a Fire Barrier 8.9 NFPA Code )eviations 8.10 " ASTM E-119" Design Basis Fire 8.11PlantsLicensedAfterJanuarkabIlity 1 1979 8.12 Cold Shutdown Equipment-Avai 8.13 Guidance Documents 8.14 Deviations from Guidance Documents 8.15 Staff Interpretations of Ap]endix R 8.16 Dissemination of New Staff )ositions 8.17 Equivalent Alternatives 8.18 Coordination Study Updates 8.19 Exemption Request Threshold 8.19.1 Penetration Designs Not Laboratory Approved 8.19.2 Individual vs. Package Exemptions 8.19.3 Exemption Request Supporting Detail 8.19.4 50.12 vs. 50.48 Exemption Requests 8.20 Post January 1,1979 Plants and Exemption Requests 8.21 NRC Approval for BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations 9.

INSPECTION FOLICY 9.1 Safety Implications 9.2 Uniform Enforcement-9.3 NT0L Inspections 9.4 Future Tl 2515/62 Revisions

9. 5 Documentation Supplied by Licensee 9.6 Subsequent Inspections f

9.7 NRC List of Conforming Items 9.8 Inspection Re-review 9.9 List of Shutdown Equipment i

4

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l APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 3

1.

INTRODUCTION AmajorfiredamagingsafeshutdowneguipmentoccurredattheBrownsFerry Nuclear Station in March 1975.

The fire damaged over 1600 electrical cables and caused the temporary unavailability of some core cooling, systems.

Because this fire did substantial damage, the NRC established a S)ecial Review Group which initiated an evaluation of the need for improving tie fire protection pro-4 grams at all nuclear power plants.

The group found serious design inadequacies regarding fire protection at Browns Ferry, and its report, " Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire" (NUREG-0050, February 1976), contained over fifty recommendations regarding improvements in fire prevention and control in exist-ing facilities.

The report also called for the development of specific guidance for implementing fire protection regulations, and for a comparison of that guid-ance with the fire protection program at each operating plant.

NRC developed technical guidance from the technical recommendations in the Special Group's report, and issued those guidelines as Branch Technical Position AuxiliaryandPowerConversionSystemsBranch9.5-1(BTPAPCSB9.5-1),l/" Guide-lines for Fire-Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." This guidance did not apply to plants docketed ~at that time.

Guidance to o)erating plants was provided later in Apaendix A $/ to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 which, to tie extent practicable, relies on BTP A?CSB 9.5-1.

In May 1976, the NRC asked licensees to compare operating reactors with BTP APCSB 9.5-1, and in September 1976, those licensees were informed that the guidelines in Appendix A would be used to analyze the consequences of a fire in each plant area.

In September 1976 the licensees, were also requested to i

provide a fire hazards analysis that divided the plant into distinct fire areas and show that redundant systems required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are adequately protected against damage by a fire.

Early in 1977 each licensee responded with a Fire Protection Program Evaluation which included a Fire Hazard Analysis.

These evaluations and analyses identified aspects of licensees' fire protection programs that did not conform to the NRC guidelines.

1/Ratherthanservingasinflexible,legalrequirementsthatmustbefollowed by licensees, issuances such as regulatory guides and branch technical posi-tions are meant to give guidance to licensees concerning those methods the staff finds acceptable for implementing the general criteria embodied in the NRC's rules.

See, e.

CLI-78-6 7 NRC 400, 406 (1978)g., Petition for Emeroency & Remedial Action, Station,,

Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Units 1 and 2) ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 (1977).

2/ Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976.

t l

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 1

l Thereafter, the staff initiated discussions with all licensees aimed at achieving implementation of fire protection guidelines by October 1980.

The staff held many meetings with licensees, conducted extensive correspondence with them, and visited every operating reactor.

As a result, many fire protection items were resolved, and agreements were included in Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports issued by the NRC.

Several fire protection issues remained unresolved with a number of licensees.

i By early 1980, most operating plants had implemented most of the guidelines in A)pendix A.

However, as the Commission noted in its Order of May 23, 1980, t1e fire protection program has had some significant problems with implementa-tion.

Despite the staff's efforts, several licensees had expressed continuing disagreement with, and refused to adopt recommendations relating to several i

generic issues, including the requirements for fire brigade size and training, water supplies for fire suppression systems, alternate and dedicated shutdown i

capability, emergency lighting, qualifications of seals used to enclose places where cables penetrated fire barriers, and the prevention of reactor codlant pump lubrication system fires.

To establish a definitive resolution of these contested subjects in a manner consistent with the general guidelines in Appen-dix A to the BTP and to assure timely compliance by licensees, h was described the Commission issued a proposed fire protection rule and its Appendix R, whic as setting out minimum fire protection requirements for the unresolved issues (45 Fed. Reg. 36082 May 29, 1980).3/ The fire protection features addressed included protection of safe shutdown capability, emergency lighting, fire bar-riers, associated circuits, reactor coolant pum) lubrication system, and alter-nate shutdown systems.

The Commission stated tlat it ex (exce-)t for alternate and dedicated shutdown capability)pected all modifications to be implemented by Novem)er1,1980.!/

As originally proposed (Federal Register Vol. 45 No. 1&S, May 22, 1980), Appendix R would have applied to all plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979 including those for which the staff had previously acce)ted other fire protection modifications.

After analyzing comments on the rule, t1e Commission determined that only three of the fifteen items in Appendix R were of such safety significance that they should apply to all plants, including those for which alternative fire protection actions had been approved previously by the staff.

These items are protection of safe shutdown capability (including alternate shutdown systems), emergency lighting, and the reactor coolant pump lubrication system.

Accordingly, the final rule required all reactors licensed to o)erate before January 1, 1979 to comply withthesethreeitemseveniftheiRChadpreviouslya)provedalternativefire protection features in these areas (45 Fed. Reg. 76602 lov. 19, 1980).

However, the final rule is more flexible than the proposed rule because Item III.G now provides three alternative fire protection features which do not require anal-ysis to demonstrate the protection of redundant safe shutdown equipment, and reduces the acceptable distance in the physical separation alternative from fifty feet to twenty feet.

In addition, the rule now also provides an exemp-tion procedure which can be initiated by a licensee's assertion that any required fire protection feature will not enhance fire protection safety in the facility or that such modifications may be detrimental to overall safety (10CFR50.48(c)(6)).

If the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation determines 3/11NRC707,718(1980) f/Id. at 719 APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 2

that a licensee has made a prima facie showing of a sound technical basis for such an assertion, then the implementation dates of the rule are tolled until final Comission action on the exemption request.

Most licensees requested and were granted additional time to perform their reanalysis, propose modifications to improve post fire shutdown capability and to identify exemptions for certain fire protection configurations.

In reviewing some exemption requests, the staff noted that some licensees had made significantly different interpretations of certain requirements.

These differences were identified in the staff's draft SER's.

These differences were also discussed on several occasions with the cognizant licensee as well as the Nuclear Utility Fire Protection Group. These discussions culminated in the issuance of generic letter 83-33.

2.

OVERVIEW Section 50.48 Fire Protection of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that each operating nuclear power plant have a fire protection plan that satisfies General Design Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

It specifies what should be contained in such a plan and lists the basic fire protection guidelines for this plan.

It requires that the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report which has been issued for each operating plant state how these guidelines were applied to-each facility.

Section 50.48 also requires that all plants with operating licenses prior to January 1,1979 satisfy the requirements of Section III.G, III.J and III.0, and other Sections of Appendix R where approval of similar features had not been obtained prior to the effective date of Appendix R.

By a separate action, the Commission approved the staff's requirement that all plants to receive their operating license after January 1,1979 also satisfy the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J and III.0 and that a fire protection license condition be established. Deviations from Appendix R requirements for pre-1979 plants are processed under the exemption process. Deviation from other guidelines are identified and evaluated in the Safety Evaluation Report.

The Regions initiated inspections of operating plants and identified several significant items of non-compliance. The Nuclear Utility Fire Protection Group requested interpretations of certain Appendix R requirements and provided a list of questions that they thought should be discussed with the industry. The NRC held workshops in each Region to assist the industry in understanding the NRC's requirements and to improve the Staff's understanding of the industry's ccncerns.

This document presents the NRC's response to the questions posed by the industry and supplemented with additional questions identified at the workshops as being of interest to the industry or the staff.

These responses may be used as guidance for design, review and inspection activities. The questions have been reformatted according to their applicability to Sections of Appendix R, BTP CMEB 9.5-1, licensing policy or inspection policy.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 3

3.

SECTION III G, FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 3.1 Fire Area Boundaries 3.1.1 Fire Area Definition QUESTION Section III.G states the fire protection features required for cables and equipment or redundant trains of systems reguired to achieve and maintain hot shutdown that are located within the same fire area.

Is the fire area of Section III.G, the same fire area referred to in BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A; and the supplementary guidance of September 1976?

RESPONSE

The definition of a fire area given in the BTP is somewhat more restrictive than that given in Section #4 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

Clearly, where a licenste has reviewed its facility using the BTP criteria, this would meet Appendix R requirements.

The BTP criteria may continue to be used as guidance $4ofthe" Interpretations."but the minimum requirements for fire area bo Section

~

3.1.2 PreviouslyAcceptedFireAreaBoundaries-QUESTION hazards analysis (FHA)y was described as a rated barrier in the 1977 fire, no ope If a fire area boundar and the barriers have not been altered, then need those barriers be reviewed by licensees or the Staff under Appendix R?

RESPONSE

If a fire area boundary was described as a rated barrier in the 1977 fire hazards analysis, and was evaluated and a.cepted in a published SER, the fire area boun-dary need not be reviewed as part of the re-analysis for compliance with Sec-tion III.G of Appendix R.

Openings in the fire barriers, if any, should have been specifically identified and justified in the fire hazards analysis per-formed in the Appendix A process.

If openings in the fire area boundaries were erformed as a basis for assessing compliance with Appendix R.not previously evaluated, such an evaluatio See Items #4 and tions of Appendix R," and the response to question 3.1.1.

In BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Fire Barrier is defined as:

" Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, and roofs) that are rated by approving laboratories in hours for resistance to fire to prevent the spread of fire.

The term " fire area" as used in Appendix R means an area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated with the fire area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within the fire area from a fire outside the area.

In order to meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 4

sealed with floor to ceiling and/or wall-to-wall boundaries.

Where fire area boundaries were not approved under the Appendix A process, or where such bound-aries are not wall-to-wall or floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the fire rating required of the boundaries, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries will withstand the hazards associated with the area and protect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area.

This analysis must be performed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer.

Although not required, licensees may submit their evaluations for Staff review and concurrence.

In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees for subsequent NRC audits.

3.1. 3 Exterior Walls QUESTION i

Must exterior walls to buildings and their penetrations be qualified as rated barriers?

RESPONSE

Exterior walls and their penetrations should be qualified as rated barriers when (1) they are_ required to separate a shutdown-related division (s) inside the plant from its redundant (alternate) counterpart outside the plant in the immediate vicinity of the exterior wall, (2) they separate safety related areas from non-safety related areas that present a significant fire threat to the safety related areas, or (3) they are designated as a fire barrier in the FSAR or FHA.

Usually exterior walls are designated as a fire area boundary; therefore, they are evaluated by the guidelines of Appendix A.

A FHA should be performed to determine the rating of exterior walls, if required by the above criteria.

3.1.4 Exterior Yards QUESTION How should a utility define the boundaries of fire areas comprising exterior yards?

RESPONSE

An exterior yard area without fire barriers should be considered as one fire area.

The area may consist of several fire zones.

The boundaries of the fire zones should be determined by a FHA.

t The protection for redundant / alternate shutdown systems %ithin a yard area would be determined on the bases of the largest " design basis fire" (see response to question 3.8.2) that is likely to occur and the resulting damage.

The boundaries ofsuchdamagewouldhavetobejustifiedwithafirehazardsanalysis.

The analysis should consider the degree of spatial separation between divisions presence of in-situ and transient combustibles, including vehicular traffic; the i

grading;icality of the shutdown related systems.available-fireprotection I

and crit See Sections #3, #4 and #6 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

l APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 5

i I

i

-a e

g 1

3.1.5 Fire Zones QUESTION Appendix R,Section III.G.3 states " alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area room or zone under consideration...." What is the implied utilization ofaroomorzoneconceptunderSectionIII.GofApgendixR? The use of the phraseology " area, room or zone under consideration is used again at the end of the '3ection III.G.3.

Does the requirement for detection and fixed supares-i dicate that the recuirement can be limited to a fire zone rather tlan sion n

throughout a fire area? lnder what conditions and with what caveats can the fire zone concept be utilized in demonstrating conformance to Appendix R?

RESPONSE

Section III.G was written after NRC's multi-discialine review teams had visited all operating power plants.

From these audits, tie NRC recognized that it is not practical and may be impossible to subdivide some portions of an operating plant into fire areas.

In addition, the NRC recognized that in some cases where fire areas are designated, it may not be possible to provide alternate shutdown capability independent of the fire area and, therefore, would have to be evaluated on the basis of fire zones within the fire area.

The NRC also recognized that because some licensees had not yet performed a safe shutdown analysis, these analyses may identify new unique configurations.

To cover the large v~ariation of possible configurations, the requirements of Section III.G were presented in three parts:

Section III.G.1 requires one train of hot shutdown systems be free of fire damage and damage to cold shutdown systems be limited.

Section III.G.2 3rovides certain separation, suppression and detection requirements witlin fire areas; where such requirements are met, analysis is not necessary.

Section III.G.3 requires alternative dedicated shutdown capability for configurations that do not satisfy the requirements of III.G.2 or where fire suppressants released as c result of fire fighting, rupture of the system or inadvertent operation of the system may damage redundant equip-ment.

If alternate shutdown is provided on the basis of rooms or zones, the )rovision of fire detection and fixed suppression is only required in tie room or zone under consideration.

Section III.G recognizes that the need for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability may have to be considered on the basis of a fire area, a room or a fire zone.

The alternative or dedicated capability should be independent of the fire area where it is possible to do so (See Supplementary Information for the final rule Section III.G).

When fire areas are not designated or where it is not possible to have the alternative or dedicated capability independent of the fire area, careful consideration must be given to the selection and location of the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to assure that the performance requirement set forth in Section III.G.1 is met.

Where alternate or dedicated shutdown is provided for a room or zone, the capability must be physically and APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 6

electrically independent of that room or zone.

The vulnerability of the ecuip-ment and personnel required at the location of the alternative or dedicatec shutdown capability to the environments produced at that location as a result of the fire or fire suppressant's must be evaluated.

These environments may be due to the hot layer, smoke, drifting suppressants, common ventilation systems, common drain systems or flooding.

In addition, other interactions between the locations may be possible in unique configurations.

If alternate shutdown is provided on the basis of rooms or zones! the provision of fire detection and fixed suppression is only required in the room or zone under consideration.

Compliance with Section III.G.2 cannot be based on rooms or zones.

See also Sections #5 and #6 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

~3.1.6 Documentation QUESTION AppendixAtoBTP9.5-1toestablishtheratingofthebarrier.guidancein In Generic Letter 83-33 at pg. 2 the NRC Staff referred to the What level of documentation must be provided to verify that the fire area meets the require-,'

ments of Appendix.R?

RESPONSE

The documentation required to verify the rating of a fire barrier should in-clude the design description of the barrier and the test reports that verify its fire rating.

Reference can be made to UL listed designs.

3.2 Fire Barrier Qualification 3.2.1 Acceptance Criteria QUESTION Recently the Staff has applied a 325 F cold side temperature criterion to its evaluation of the accept.bility of one-hour and three-hour fire barrier cable tray wraps.

This criterion is not in Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A as an acceptance criterion for fire barrier cable tray wraps and is not contained in Appendix R.

It appears to represent post-Appendix R guidance.

What is the origin of this criterion and why is it applicable to electrical cableswhereinsulationdegradationdoesnotbeginuntiljackettemperatures reach 450 F to 650 F?

RESPONSE

Fire barriers relied upon to protect shutdown related systems to meet the re-quirements of III.G.2 need to have a fire rating of either one or three hours.

S 50.48 references BTP APCSB 9.5-1, where the fire protection definitions are found.

Fire rating is defined:

" Fire Rating - the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines I

point in behavior is observed (see NFPA 251)."posure before the first critical the period of resistance to a standard fire ex l

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 7

The acceptance criteria contained in Chapter 7 of NFPA 251, " Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," pertains to non-bearing fire barriers.

These criteria stipulate that transmission of heat through the barrier "shall not have been such as to raise the temperature on its unexposed surface more than 250 F above its initial temperature." The ambient air tem-perature at the beginning of a fire test usually is between 50 F and 90 F.

It isgenerallyrecognizedthat75Frepresentsanacceptablenorm.

The resulting 325 F cold side temperature criterion is used for cable tray wraps because they perform the fire barrier function to preserve the cables free of fire damage.

It is clear that cable that begins to degrade at 450 F is free of fire damage at 325 F.

During the Appendix A review, licensees began to propose fire barriers to enclose cable trays, conduit, fuel lines, coolant lines, etc.

Industry did not have standard rating tests for such components or for electrical, piping or bus duct penetrations.

The NRC issued a staff position giving acceptance criteria for electrical penetration tests.

These criteria require an analysis of any temperature on the unexposed side of the barrier in excess of 325 F.

In the past, manufacturers designed their own qualification tests.

Nuclear Insurers, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers have issued tests for some of these components.

These tests usually exposed the component to the ASTM E-119 time temperature curve, but all had different acceptance criteria.

Conduit.and cable tray enclosure materials accepted by the NRC as 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier prior to Appendix R (e.g. some Kaowool and 3M materials) and already installed by the licensee need not be replaced even though they may not have met the 325 F criteria.

However, for newly identified conduit and cele trays requiring such wrapping new material which meets the 325 F crite-rion should be used, or justification should be provided for use of material which does not meet the 325 F criterion. This may be based on an analysis demonstrating that the maximum recorded temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature.

3.2.2 Deviations from Tested Configurations QUESTION Due to obstructions and supports, it is often im)ossible to achieve exact dupli-cation of the specific tested configuration of tie one-hour fire barriers which

-are to be placed around either conduits or cable trays.

For each specific in-stance where exact replication of a previously tested configuration is not and cannot be achieved, is an exemption necessary in order to avoid a citation for a violation?

RESPONSE

No.

Where exact replication of a tested configuration cannot be achieved, the field installation should meet all of the following criteria:

1.

The continuity of the fire barrier material is maintained.

2.

The thickness of the barrier is maintained.

3.

The nature of the support assembly is unchanged from the tested configuration.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 8

4.

The application or "end use" of the fire barrier is unchanged from the tested configuration.

For example, the use of a cable tray barrier to protect a cable tray which differs in configuration from those that were tested would be acceptable.

However, the use of structural steel fire proofing to protect a cable tray assembly may not be acceptable.

5.

The configuration has been reviewed by a qualified fire protection engineer and found to provide an equivalent level of protection.

3.2.3 Fire Door Modifications QUESTION Where labeled and rated fire doors have been modified to incorporate security?

hardware or for flooding protection, is an exemption from Appendix R required

RESPONSE

Where a door is part of a fire area boundary, and the modification does not effect the fire rating (for example, installation of security " contacts"), no If the modifications could reduce the further analy(sis need be performed.for example, installation a vision panel), the fire fire rating door should be reassessed to ensure that it continues to provide adequate mar-gin considering the fire loading on both sides. -Since this reassessment per-tains to the establishment of a valid fire area boundary, an exemption is not required.

See Section #4 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

3.3 Structural Steel 3.3.1 NFPA Approaches QUESTION Does the NRC's definition of structural steel supporting fire barriers com-pletely accommodate approaches described in NFPA guidance documents and standards?

RESPONSE

The NRC does not define the structural steel supporting fire barriers.

This steel is identified by the licensee.

Our position regarding the need to protect the structural steel, which forms a part of or supports fire barriers, is con-sistent with sound fire protection engineering principles as delineated in both NFPA codes and standards, and The Fire Protection Handbook.

3.3.2 Previously Accepted Structural Steel OVESTION Is it necessary to protect structural steel in exisitng fire barriers where those barriers were approved in an Appendix A SER?

RESPONSE

i No.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 9

3.3.3 Seismic Supports QUESTION Does structural steel whose sole purpose is to carry dynamic loads from a seismic event require protection in accordance with Section III.G.2a of Appendix R?

RESPONSE

No, unless the failure of any structural steel member due to a fire could result in significant degradation of the fire barrier.

Then it must be protected.

3.3.4 Cable Tray Support Protection QUESTION Should cable tray supports be protected if there is a sprinkler system in the fire area? Under what conditions may cable tray supports be unprotected? Do unprotected supports require an exemption?

RESPONSE

In general, cable _ tray supports should be protected, regardless of whether there is a sprinkler system.

However, they need not be protected if (1) the qualifi-cation tests were performed on wrapped cable trays with unprotected supports, and the supports are shown to be adequate, or (2) an analysis is performed, which takes into account the fire loading and automatic suppression available in the area, and which demon-strates that the unprotected support (s) will not fail and cause a loss of the cable tray fire barrier required for the postulated fire.

An exemption is not required; however, the qualification tests and applicability or the structural evaluation should be documented and available for audit.

3.4 Automatic Suppression System 3.4.1 Water Density QUESTION Staff guidance provided in Generic Letter 83-33* concerning automatic suppression coverage of fire areas interprets the phrase "in the fire area" in Section III.G as meaning "throughout the fire area." What delivered water density or occupancy standard as specified in NFPA-STD-13 must be achieved to meet this guidance?

RESPONSE

Individual plant areas are diverse in nature.

The designer should determine the particular water density or occupancy classification.

Those areas which contain a limited quantity of in-situ and anticipated transient combustibles

• Superseded by Generic Letter 85-01, however the response to the question is useful for other considerations.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 10

and which feature contents such as tanks and ')iping, may be considered as

" Ordinary Hazard (Group 1)," as defined by NF)A Standard No. 13.

For those areas containing large amounts of cables or flammable licuids, an occupancy classification of " Extra Hazard" may be warranted.

The cecision as to which classification should be applied should be made by a qualified fire protection engineer.

Once the occupancy classification is determined, the minimum water density should be based on the Density Curves in table 2.2.1(B) of NFPA 13.

Any den-sity egual to or in excess of the curves would be in conformance with our guidelines as delineated in Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

3.4.2 NRC Consultation QUESTION Section 4.1.2 of NFPA-STD-13 allows for " partial installations" or partial coverage. Thestandardstatesthat"theauthorityhavingjurisdictionshall be consulted in each case." With the NRC as authority in this instance, must consultation occur only through the exemption process?

RESPONSE

No.

The staff is'hlways available to consult with utility representatives and provide guidance as to the acceptability of a particular fire protection con-figuration in individual plant areas.

See also Section #5 of the "Interpreta-tions of Appendix R."

3.4.3 Sprinkler Location QUESTION

~

How does a su)pression system designer know whether the term "throughout the area" means tlat sarinkler heads must be above or below cable trays when, in hisjudgment,thelazardofconcernisafloorbasedfire?

RESPONSE

SectionC.6.c(3)ofBTPCMEB9.5-1 states:

"(3) Fixed water extinguishing systems should conform to requirements of appropriate standards such as NFPA-13, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA-15, " Standard for. Water Spray Fixed Systems"."

This question pertains to those sprinkler systems covered by NFPA-13.

Chapter 4 of NFPA-13 3rovides guidance as to the location of sprinkler heads in relation to common o)structions.

In general, to achieve complete area-wide coverage, sprinklers should be located at the ceiling, with additional sprinklers provided below significant obstructions such as wide HVAC ducts and " shielded" or solid bottom stacked cable trays.

To the extent that an existing or proposed sprin-justified by a fire hazards analysis.kler system design deviates from this concept, n would have to be See also Section tions of Appendix R."

APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 11

4 3.4.4 Fixed Suppression System In Fice Area QUESTION Are fixed suppression systems required by Section III G.3 to be throughout the fire area, room or zone under consideration?

RESPONSE

No, but partial coverage must be properly justified and documented.

See Item #5 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

... suppression less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation.

Where full area suppression and detection is not installed, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy and necessity of partial suppression and detection in an area.

The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer.

Although not required, licensees may submit their evaluations to the staff for review i

and concurrence.

In any event, the evaluaticas must be retained for subsequent NRC audits..."

3.4.5 Sprinkler Head Location QUESTION If stacks of horizontal or vertical cable trays extend from ceiling to. floor, are sprinkler heads required (1) under the lowest horizontal trays, near the floor for vertical trays; (2) at some intermediate level between the floor.and ceiling, and (3) at the ceiling?

RESPONSE

Sprinkler heads should be located at the ceiling.

Sprinkler heads at other locations may be necessary depending upon the hazard and the cumulative effect of the obstructions to the discharge of water from the sprinkler head.

The sprinkler system design should meet NFPA 13.

3.4.6 Previously Approved Suppression Systems QUESTION Must suppression systems approved and installed under BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appen-dix A be extended or altered to meet the total area requirements of Section III.G (as interpreted by the Staff) or does this " requirement" only apply to new installations?

4

RESPONSE

1 Suparession systems installed in connection with Appendix A may or may not have to 3e extended as a result of III.G.

The licensee must analyze each area where suppression is required by III.G, and where only partial suppression has been provided, determine if the coverage is adequate for the fire hazard in the area.

The licensee may consult with the staff during this review.

In any event, the APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 12

P Appendix R analysis showing that the suppression provided is adequate must be retained and available for NRC audit.

See also Section #5 of the "Interpreta-tions of Appendix R."

3.5 Seoaration of Redundant Circuits 3.5.1 Twenty-Foot Separation Criteria j

QUESTION Assuming that a licensee is utilizing the 20-foot separation for circuit protec-tion, could an exemption request be granted for a portion of the circuit that did not maintain the 20-foot minimum separation if that portion was protected by one-hour barrier until 20-foot was achieved? This barrier would not be firewall-to-firewall, and the circuit protection would not be claimed under the one-hour barrier rule.

RESPONSE

With the erection of a partial qualified one-hour rated barrier for portions of the circuits with less than 20 ft. separation, if 20 feet of horizontal separation existed between the redundant unprotected portions of the circuits without intervening combustibles or fire hazards, and if the fire area was pro-tected by automatic fire detection and suppression, compliance with Section III.G.2.b would be achieved.

These types of configuration have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the NRC.

3.5.2 Floor-to-Floor Separation QUESTION Where redundant circuits are se)arated by floor elevation but are within the same fire area due to open hatcways, stairs, etc., what is the NRC's position with regard to separation criteria?

If train A is located twenty feet from an open hatchway on the lower elevation and train B is located ten feet from the same opening on the next elevation, would this be considered adequate separation?

RESPONSE

Ifawallorfloor/ceilingassemblycontainsmajorunprotectedopeningssuch as hatchways and stairways, then plant locations on either side of such a bar-rier must be considered as part of a single fire area.

Refer to Section #4 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

As to the example provided, if train A was separated by a cumulative horizontal distance of 20 feet from train B, with no intervening combustible materials or fire hazards, and both elevations were provided with fire detection.and suppres-sion, the area would be in compliance with Section III.G.2.b.

4 APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 13

4 3.6 Intervening Combustibles 4

3.6.1 Negligible Quantities of Intervening Combustibles QUESTION Twenty feet of separation with absolutely no intervening combustibles is a rare case in most nuclear plants. What is the most acceptable method of addressing intervening combustibles? Howarevariousutilitiesaddressingthissubject, andwhatwouldbesufficientjustificationtosupportanexemptionrequest?

RESPONSE

If more than negligible quantities of combustible materials (such as isolated cable runs) exist between redundant shutdown divisions, an exemption request should be filed.

[ Negligible cuantity" is an admittedly judgmental criterion, and this judgment should be mace by a qualified fire protection engineer and l

documented for later NRC audit.] Justifications for such exemptions have been based on the following factors:

1.

A relatively large horizontal spatial separation between redundant divi-sions; all cables qualified to IEEE-383.

~

2.

The presence of an automatic fire suppression system over the intervening combustible (such as a cable tray fire suppression system);

i 3.

The presence of fire stops to inhibit fire propagation in intervening cable trays; 4.

The likely fire aropagation direction of burning intervening combustibles I

in relation to tie location of the vulnerable shutdown division; 5.

The availability of compensating active and passive fire protection.

Any future changes in the cable configuration due to modifications could be handled under 50.59.

See the provisions of the license condition in the response to question 8.2.

3.6.2 In-Situ Exposed Combustibles QUESTIONS Within Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b, the phrase " twenty feet with no interven-ing combustible or fire hazards" is utilized.

What is the definition of "no intervening combustible?"

Is the regulation focused predominantly on the absence of fixed combustibles?

RESPONSE

There is no specific definition of "no intervening combustible." The regulation is focused on the absence of in-situ exposed combustibles.

Non combustible materials would not be considered as intervening combustibles.

In BTP CMEB 9.5-1, noncombustible material is defined as:

l

- APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 14 i

I

" Noncombustible Material a.

A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flamma-ble vapors when subjected to fire or heat.

b.

Material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in a., above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame i

"pread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test s

Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials."

In Generic letter 83-33, we state:

" Staff Position:

Section III.G.2.b requires the " separation...with no inter-vening combustibles..." Tomeetthisreguirement,alasticjacketsandinsula-tion of grouped electrical cables, including those w1ich are coated, should be considered as intervening combustibles."

For fire protection, "no intervening combustibles" means that there is no sig-nificant quantities of in-situ materials which will ignite and burn located between redundant shutdown systems.

The amount of such combustibles that has significance is a judgmental decision.

As with other issues, if the licensees fire protection engineer is concerned that the guantity of combustibles between shutdown divisions may not be considered insignificant by an independent reviewer, an exemption could be requested, or the staff consulted.

Transient materials are not considered as an intervening combustible; however, they must be considered as part of the overall fire hazard within an area.

Cables that are in cable trays which are either open or fully enclosed should also be considered as intervening combustibles.

Cables coated with a fire retard-ant material are also considered as intervening combustibles.

However, cables coated with a fire retardant material, or cables in cable trays having solid sheet metal bottom, sides and top, if protected by automatic fire detection and suppression systems and if the design is supported by a fire hazards analysis, have been found acceptable under the exemption process.

3.6.3 Unexposed Combustibles QUESTION Are unexposed combustibles, such as oil in sumps, closed cans, or sealed drums, or electrical cable in conduits, considered as intervening combustibles?"

RESPONSE

Only oil in closed containers which are in accordance with NFPA 30 or electrical cables in metal conduits are not considered as intervening combustibles.

In situ oil in open sumps is considered to be an intervening combustible; in-situ oil in closed sumps equivalent to NFPA Standard-30 containers is not considered to be an intervening combustible.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 15

3.7 Radiant Energy Shield 3.7.1 Fire Rating QUESTION Recently, the NRC Staff indicated that non-combustible radiant energy shields should be tested against ASTM-TD-E-119 based, apparently, on the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Rev. 3, a document issued after Ap)endix R was promulgated.

This new requirement would not appear to be required )y Appendix R or BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A.

Could the Staff clarify the requirements in this area?

RESPONSE

During the Appendix A reviews, we observed that inside some containments, there were large concentrations of cables converging at electrical penetration areas.

In some cases, where the penetrations were grouped by division, shields were placed between the divisions so that radiant energy from a fire involving the cables of one division would not degrade or ignite cables of the other divisions.

These shields also directed the convective energy from the fire away from the surviving division.

These shields were usually constructed of 1/2-inch marinite board in a metal frame.

Appendix R Section III.G.f refers to these shields as "anoncombustible.radiantenergyshield." The guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.a(1)b. indicate that these shields should have a fire rating of 1/2 hour.

In our opinion any material with a 1/2 hour fire rating should be capable of performing the required function.

The guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 relating to a firerated radiant energy shield are being considered in our current reviews of NT0L plants.

However, to the extent that an applicant can justify that a pro)osed radiant energy shield can achieve an equivalent level of safety, we have 3een acce) ting shields that have not been tested against the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-119.

In our Apaendix R reviews, we have accepted non-fire rated radiant energy shields tlat have been demonstrated by fire hazards analysis to provide an acceptable level of protection against the anticipated hazard of a localized fire within the containment.

We have also accepted fire-rated metal-sheathed mineral insulated cables, as a radiant energy shield in specific configurations.

3.8 Design Bases 3.8.1 Fire Protection Features NFPA Conformance QUESTION Should the fire protection features required by Section III.G conform to the NFPA Codes?

RESPONSE

Yes.

For example,Section III G.2 requires an automatic suppression system.

Our guidelines would recommend that the system be in accordance with an NFPA Code.

If deviations are made from the Code, they should be identified in the FSAR or FHA.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 16

4 3.8.2 Design Basis Fire QUESTION Why isn't the industry allowed to design to protect against a design basis fire?

RESPONSE

Neither the industry nor the Staff has been able to develop criteria for esta-blishing design basis fire conditions for a single " design basis fire" because the in-situ and potential transient combustibles vary widely in different areas of the plant.

However, the establishment of a specific " design basis fire" for individual fire areas or zones is a prerequisite to performance of a valid fire l

hazards analysis (See Appendix R Section II.8(1) and BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Sections C.b(1) and(2)).

3.8.3 Redundant Trains / Alternate Shutdown QUESTION Confusion exists as to what will be classified as an alternate shutdown system and thus what systems might be required to be protected by suppression and detection under Section III.G.3.b.

For example, while we are relying upon the turbine-building condensate system for a reactor building fire and the RHR sys-tem for a turbine building fire, would one system be considered the alternative to the other.

If so, would suppression and detection be required for either or both systems under III.G.3.b? An explanation of alternative shutdown needs to be advanced for all licensees.

RESPONSE

If the system is being used to provide its design function, it generally is considered redundant.

If the system is being used in lieu of the preferred system because the redundant components of the preferred system does not meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2, the system is considered an alter-native shutdown capability.

Thus, for the example above, it appears that the condensate system is providing alternative shutdown capability in lieu of sepa-i rating redundant components of the RHR System.

Fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system would be required in the area where separation of redundant components of the RHR system is not provided.

However, in the event of a tur-bine building fire, the RHR system would be used for safe shutdown and is not i

considered an alternative capability.

However, one train of the RHR system must be separated from the turbine building.

i 4

3.8.4 Control Room Fire Considerations QUESTION What considerations should be taken into account in a control room fire? What is the damage that is considered? What actions can the operators take before evacuating the CR? When can the control room be considered safe after a fire for the operator to return?

APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 17

RESPONSE

The control room fire area contains the controls and instrumental redundant shutdown systems in close proximity (i.e. usually separation is a few inches).

i Because it is possible to provide shutdown capability that is 3hysically and electrically independent of the fire area, it is our opinion tlat alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits for the control room be independent of the cables system and components in the control room fire area.

l The damage to the system in the control room for a fire that causes evacuation of the control room cannot be predicted.

A bounding analysis should be made i

to assure that safe conditions can be maintained from outside the control room.

This analysis is dependent to the specific design.

The usual assumptions are:

^

1.

The reactor is tripped in the control room.

2.

Offsite power is lost as well as automatic starting of the onsite a.c.

]

generators and the automatic function of valves and pumps whose control circuits could be affected by a control room fire.

a The analysis should demonstrate that ca) ability exists to manually achieve safe shutdown conditions from outside t1e control room by restoring a.c. power to designated pumps, assuring that valve lineups are correct, and assuming that any malfunctions of valves that permit the loss of reactor coolant can be corrected before unrestorable conditions occur.

Note that the only manual action in the control room prior to evacuation usually given credit for is the reactor trip.

For any additional control room actions deemed necessary, prior to evacuation, a demonstration of the capability of per-forming such actions would have to be provided.

Additionally, assurance would have to be provided that such actions could not be negated by subsequent spur-i ious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire.

After the fire, the operators could return to the control room when the follow-ing conditions have been met:

4 l

1.

The fire has been extinguished and so verified by appropriate fire protec-tion personnel.

2.

The control room has been deemed habitable by appropriate fire protection personnel and the shift supervisor.

3.

Damage has been assessed and, if necessary, corrective action has been taken to assure necessary safety, control and information systems are functional (some operators may assist with these tasks) and the shift

]

supervisor has authorized return of plant control to the control room.

4.

Turnover procedures which assure an orderly transfer of control from the alternate shutdown panel to the control room has been completed.

j After returning to the control room, the operators can take any actions compa-tible with the condition of the control room.

Controls in any area (cabinet) 4

{

where the fire occurred would not be available.

Smoke and fire suppressant APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 18 i

i

--,-.-,m

--..,-...nn.

damage in other areas (cabinets) must also be assessed and corrective action taken before controls in such cabinets are deemed functional.

Controls in undamaged area (cabinets) could be operated as required.

Minor modifications inside the control room may be performed to reach cold shutdown.

4.

EMERGENCY LIGHTING 4.1 Illumination Levels QUESTION What is the requisite intensity level for emergency lighting for egress routes and areas where shutdown functions must be performed? What are the bases for determining these levels of lighting?

RESPONSE

The level of illumination provided by emergency lighting in access routes to and in areas where shutdown functions must be performed is a level that is sufficient to enable an operator to reach that are: and perform the shutdown functions.

At the remote shutdown panels the illumination levels should be sufficient for control panel operators.

The bases for estimating these levels of lighting are the guidelines contained in Section 9.5.3 of the Standard Review Plan, which are based on industry standards (i.e., Illuminating Engineering Society Handbook).

Where a licensee has provided emergency lighting per Section III.J Appendix R, we would expect that the licensee verify by field testing that this lighting is adequate to perform the intended tasks.

5.

ALTERNATIVE AND DEDICATED SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 5.1 Safe and Alternative Shutdown 5.1.1 Previously Accepted Alternative Shutdown Capability QUESTION As part of the Appendix A review process, some plants had committed to an alter-native shutdown system in the form of a remote shutdown panel or remote shutdown system.

Footnote 2 to Appendix R describes alternative shutdown capability as being associated with " Rerouting, relocating, or modifying of existing systems."

To the extent that.a existing remote shutdown system previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 does not require modifications or relocating of existing systems, are the requirements of Section Ill. rerouting, L of Appendix R backfit?

RESPONSE

Yes.

Existing remote shutdown capabilities previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 do not categorically comply with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.

Licensees were requested to re-analyze their plants to determine compliance with Section III.G.

If the licensee chooses to use the APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 19

i option of III.G.3 for provision of safe shutdown capability for certain areas, the criteria of Section III.L are applicable to that capability for that area.

See also the response to 5.1.3.

5.1. 2 Pre-Existing Alternative Shutdown Capability QUESTIONS Some licensees defined safe shutdown capability for purposes of analysis to Section III.G criteria as being composed of both the normal safe shutdown capability and the pre existing redundant or remote safe shutdown capability which was previously installed as part of the Appendix A process.

This defini-tion often took the form of two " safe shutdown trains" comprising (1) one of the two normal safe shutdown trains, and (2) a second safe shutdown train capa-bility which was being provided by the pre-existing remote shutdown capability.

This definitional process, which was undertaken by a number of licensees, makes a significant difference in the implementation of Ap)endix R.

Under such a definition, doesSection III.L criteria apply when tie Commission did not call out Section III.L as a backfit?

RESPONSE

The definitional process mentioned considers an alternative shutdown capability provided under the Appendix A review as a redundant shutdown capability under the Appendix R review.

This definitional process is incorrect.

For the pur-pose of analysis to Section III.G.2 criteria, the safe shutdown capability is defined as one of the two normal safe shutdown trains.

If the criteria of Section III.G.2 are not met, an alternative shutdown capability is required.

The alternative shutdown capability may utilize existing remote shutdown capa-bilities and must meet the criteria of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R.

See also the response to 5.1.3.

5.1. 3 III.L Backfit QUESTION Why do the Staff interpretive memoranda regarding the criteria for satisfaction of Section III.L form the auditable basis for determining compliance to Appen-dix R when the Commission failed to backfit this section to all plants?

RESPONSE

Although 10 CFR 50.48(b) does not specifically include Section III.L with Sections III.G, J, and 0 of Appendix R as a requirement applicable to all power reactors licensed prior to January 1, 1979, the Appendix, read as a whole, and etal.v.NRC,673F2d.525(D.C.Cir.ppendix,Temonstratethatsection111.L the Court of Appeals decision on the A Connecticut Light and Power

,1982),

applies to the alternative safe shutdown option under Section III.G if and where that option is chosen by the licensee.

This does not preclude licensees fromproposingandjustifyingothermethods,e.g.,seeSection#1,ProcessMoni-toring Instrumentation, of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 20

1 1

5.2 Procedures 5.2.1 Shutdown and Repair Basis QUESTION With regard to the term " post-fire procedures" the Commission states that it is impossible to predict the course and extent of a fire.

Given this, how does one write post-fire shutdown and repair procedures that are both symptomatic and usable to an operator?

RESPONSE

Safe shutdown capabilities including alternative shutdown capabilities are all designed for some maximum level of fire-damage (system unavailabilities, spur-ious actuations).

Since the extent of the fire cannot be predicted, it seems i

prudent to have the post-fire shutdown procedures guide the operator from full i

system availability to the minimum shutdown capability.

As for repair arocedure, similar conditions exist.

A repair procedure can be written based on tie maxi-mum level of damage that is expected.

This procedure would then provide shut-down capability without accurately predicting likely fire damage.

l 5.2.2 Post Fire Operating Procedures QUESTION i

Does the NRC have any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating proce-dures should be based upon fire areas, systems, or be symptom-based?

RESPONSE

i The NRC does not have requirements, nor do we propose any requirements regard-ing whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fire areas,sys-tems or be symptom-based. Wesuggestthatthepost-fireshutdowncapabilif.1es designs be reviewed with the plant operation staff and procedures written with their input.

See also responses to 5.2.1 and 5.2.3.

j 5.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Capability QUESTION j

Is it acceptable to develop, post-fire operating arocedures only for those areas where alternative shutdown is required?

(For otler areas standard emergency i

operatingprocedureswouldbeutilizedinthepresenceofpotentialfiredamage to a single train.)

RESPONSE

Yes.

The only requirement for post-fire operating procedures is for those areas where alternative shutdown is required.

For other areas of the alant, shutdown would be achieved utilizing (one of the two normal trains of slutdown system.

Shutdown in degraded modes one train unavailable) should be covered by present operator training and abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

If the degraded modes of operation are not presently covered, we would suggest APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 21

that the operation staff of the plant determine whether additional training or procedures are needed.

5.2.4 Post Fire Procedures Guidance Documents QUESTION Do any NRC Staff guidance documents exist relative to the extent, form, nature, etc. of Appendix R post-fire operating procedures?

RESPONSE

No.

Other than the criteria of Section III.L, no specific post-fire shutdown procedure guidance has been developed.

See also responses to 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.

The inspection process will be flexible in this regard as long as the licensee can show compliance with the criteria of Section III.L.

5.3 Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage 5.3.1 Circuit Failure Modes QUESTION What circuit failure modes must be considered in-identifying circuits associated

,by spurious actuation?

RESPONSE

Sections III.G.2 and III.L.7 of Appendix R define the circuit failure modes as hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground.

For consideration of spurious actuations, all possible functional failure states must be evaluated, that is, the component could be energized or de-energized by one or more of the above failure modes.

Therefore valves could fail open or closed; pumps could fail runningornotrunning;electricaldistributionbreakerscouldfailopenor closed.

For three phase AC circuits, the probability of getting a hot short on all three phases in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is considered sufficiently low as to not require evaluation except for any cases involving Hi/Lo pressure interfaces.

For ungrounded DC circuits, if it can be shown that only two hot shorts of the proper polarity without grounding could cause spurious a)eration, no further evaluation is necessary except for any cases involving ii/Lo pressure interfaces.

5.3.2 " Hot Short" Duration QUESTION If one mode of fire damage involves a " hot short" how long does that condition exist as a result of fire damage prior to terminating in a ground or open circuit and stopping the spurious actuation?

RESPONSE

We would postulate that a " hot short" condition exists until action has been taken to isolate the given circuit from the fire area, or other actions as l

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 22

appropriate have been taken to negate the effects of the spurious actuation.

We do not postulate that the fire would eventually clear the " hot short."

5.3.3 Hot Shutdown Duration i

QUESTION Since hot shutdown cannot be maintained indefinitely, hot shutdown equipment needs to be protected for only a limited period of time.

How long must a plant remain in that condition in order to meet the requirement for achieving hot shutdown with a single train of equipment?

RESPONSE

Section III.G.1 requires that the one train of systems needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown be free of fire damage.

Thus, the systems needed are to be completely protected from the fire regardless of time.

If the intent of i

the question concerns how long these systems must operate, these systems must be capable of operating until the systems needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are available.

5.3.4 Cooldown Equipment QUESTION Certain equipment is necessary only in the cooldown phase when the plant is neither in hot nor cold shutdown condition as defined by technical specifica-tions.

Is this equipment considered hot or cold shutdown in nature?

RESPONSE

As stated in Section III.G.1, one train of systems needed to achieve and main-tain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage.

Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Thus, if this certain ecuipment necessary only in the cooldown phase, is used to i

achieve cold shutcown, it can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

If the certain equipment is maintaining hot shutdown while repairs are being made, one train i

must be free of fire damage.

See also Section #2 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

5.3.5 Pressurizer Heaters l

QUESTION Most PWRs do not require pressurizer heaters to maintain stable conditions.

In fact, the Commission does not consider heaters to be important to safety and they are not required to meet Class IE requirements.

Are they required for hot shutdown under Appendix R?

If yes, then how does a plant meet the separation requirementsofSectionIII.G.2.d,e.orfwithoutmajorstructuralalterations to the pressurizer?

l l

i APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 23

]

RESPONSE

One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage.

PWR licensees have demonstrated the capability to achieve and maintain stable hot shutdown conditions without the use of pres-surizer heaters by utilizing the charging pump and a water solid pressurizer for reactor coolant pressure control.

5.3.6 On-Site Power QUESTION Appendix R,Section III.L.4 states in aart, "If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by bot1 on-site and off-site electrical power systems because of fire damage, an independent on-site power system shall be provided." Again, in Appendix R,Section III.L.5, the statement is made "If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electrical power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided."

An interpretation is needed of the meaning and the applicability of these two quotes relative to alternative shutdown capabilities.

RESPONSE

These statements are meant to indicate that the alternative shutdown capability should be powered from an onsite power system inde and physically) from the area under consideration. pendent (both electrically Further, if the normal emergency onsite )ower supplies (diesel generators) are not available because of fire damage, tien a separate and independent onsite power system shall be provided.

As an example, some plants are utilizing a dedicated onsite diesel generator or gas turbine to power instrumentation and control panels which are a part of the alternative shutdown capability.

5.3.7 Torus Level Indication QUESTION For BWRs, I&E Information Notice 84-09 suggests that licensees need to have torus level indication post-fire.

If an analysis shows that a level does not change significantly during,any operational modes or worse case conditions, is level indication still required?

Is an analysis in file adequate or is an exemption request required?

RESPONSE

It continues to be our position that torus (suppression pool) level indication is the preferred post-fire monitoring instrumentation in order to confirm the availability of t'le torus (suppression pool) as a heat sink.

We recognize that existing analyses indicate that suppression pool level is not significantly changed during emergency shutdown conditions.

However we believe the operator should be able to confirm that spurious operations or o,ther unanticipated occur-rences have not affected the torus function.

An analysis of torus level change by itself is not considered an acceptable basis.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 24

5.3.8 Short Circuit Coordination Studies QUESTION Should circuit coordination studies consider high impedance faults?

RESPONSE

To meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R, high impedance faults should be considered for all associated circuits located in the fire area of concern.

Thus, simultaneous high impedance faults (below the trip point for the breaker on each individual circuit) for all associated circuits located in the fire area should be considered in the evaluation of the safe shutdown capability.

Clearing such faults on associated circuits which may affect safe shutdown may be accomplished by manual breaker trips governed by written procedures.

Circuit coordination studies need not be performed if it is assumed that shutdown capability will be disabled by such high impedance faults and appropriate written procedures for clearing them are provided.

5.3.9 Diagnostic Instrumentation QUESTION What is diagnostic instrumentation?

RESPONSE

Diagnostic instrumentation is instrumentation, beyond that previously identified in Attachment 1 to I&E Information Notice 84-09, needed to assure proper actua-tion and functioning of safe shutdown equipment and support equipment (e.g.,

flow rate, pump discharge )ressure).

The diagnostic instrumentation needed 1

depends on the design of t1e alternative shutdown capability.

Diagnostic in-strumentation, if needed, will be evaluated during the staff's review of the licensee's proposal for the alternative shutdown capability.

5.3.10 Design Basis Plant Transients QUESTION i

What plant transients should be considered in the design of the alternative or dedicated shutdown systems?

RESPONSE

Per the criteria of Section III.L of Appendix R a loss of offsite power shall be assumed for a fire in any fire area concurrent with the following assumptions:

l a.

The s'afe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by any one spurious actuation or signal resulting from a fire in any plant area; and l

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 25

b.

The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by a fire in any plant area which results in the loss of all automatic function (signals, logic) from the circuits located in the area in conjunction with one worst case spurious actuation or signal resulting from the fire; and c.

The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by a fire in any plant area which results in spurious actuation of the redundant valves in any one high-low pressure interface line.

5.3.11 Alternative / Dedicated Shutdown v. Remote Shutdown Systems QUESTION What is the difference between the alternate / dedicated shutdown systems required for fire protection and the remote shutdown systems recommended under Chapter 7 of the SRP?

1

RESPONSE

The remote shutdown systems recommended under Chapter 7 of the SRP are needed to meet GDC 19.

These remote shutdown systems need to be redundant and physi-cally independent.of the control room in order to meet GDC 19.

For GDC 19, damage to the control room is not considered.

Alternate shutdown systems for Appendix R need not be redundant but must be both physically and electrically independent of the control room.

6.

OIL COLLECTION SYSTEMS FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 6.1 Lube Oil System Seismic Design I

QUESTION If the reactor coolant pump lube oil system and associated appurtenances are seismically designed, does the lube oil collection system also require seismic design?

Is an exemption required?

RESPONSE

Where the RCP lube oil system is capable of withstanding the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the analysis should assume that only random oil leaks from thejointscculdoccurduringthelifetimeoftheplant.

The oil collection system, ti;erefore, should be designed to safely channel the quantity of oil from one pump to a vented closed container.

Under this set of circumstances, i

the oil collection system would not have to be seismically designed.

An exemption is required for a non-seismically designed oil collection system.

The basis for this exemption would be that random leaks are not assumed to occur simultaneously with the seismic event, since the lube oil system is designed to withstand the seismic event.

However, the Rule, as written, does j

not make this allowance.

i i

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 26 l

.e 6.2 Container QUESTION It would appear that a literal reading of Section III.0 regarding the oil col-lection system for the reactor coolant pump could be met by a combination of seismically designed splash shields and a sump with sufficient capacity to con-tain the entire lube oil system inventory.

If the reactor coolant pump is seismically designed and the nearby piping hot surfaces are protected by seis-mically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only o,ld surfaces, does this design concept conform to the requirements of the rule?

l

RESPONSE

If the reactor coolant pump, including the oil system, is seismically designed and the nearby hot surfaces of piping are protected by seismically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only cold surfaces, and it could be demonstrated by engineering analysis that sump and splash shields would be capable of preventing a fire during normal and design basis accidentconditions,thesafetyobjectiveofSectionIII.0wouldbeachieved.

Such a design concept would have to be evaluated under the exemption process.

The justification.for the exemption should provide reasonable assurance that oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage points would be safely collected and drained to the sump.

The sump should be shown capable of l

safely containing all of the anticipated oil leakage.

The analysis should-j verify that there are no electric sources of ignition.

7 BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION CMEB 9.5-1 7.1 Fire Protection and Seismic Events QUESTION For which situations other than the reactor coolant pump lube oil system are seismic events assumed to be initiators of a fire?

]

RESPONSE

i The guidelines for the seismic design of fire protection systems which cover other general situations is delineated in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 C.1.C(3) and (4):

"(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas contain-ing equipment required for safe plant shutdown following the safe shutdown earthquate (SSE).

In areas of high seismic activity, the staff will con-sider on a case-by-case basis the need to design the fire detection and i

suppression systems to be functional following the SSE.

(4) The fire protection systems should retain their original design capability for (a) natural phenomena of less severity and greater frequenc most severe natural phenomena (approximately once in 10 years) y than the such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or small-intensity earthquakes l

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 27 1

i

~.

that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b) potential man-made site-related events such as all barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.

The effects of lightning" strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program.

We have considered California as being a high seismic activity area.

For those plants reviewed under Appendix A, our position is (A.4):

" Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena."

Our guidelines on the seismic design of fire protection systems installed in safety related areas are delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.29 " Seismic Design Classification," paragraph C.2.

The failure of any system should not affect a system from performing its safety function.

Our guidelines on the seismic design of hydrogen lines is delineated in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.d(5):

(5) Hydrogen lines in safety-related areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved such that the outer pipe is directly vented to the outside, or should be equipped with excess flow valves so that in case of a line break, the hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2L All PWR's have a hydrogen line going to the Volume Control Tank (Make-up Tank) that needs to be protected.

To identify plant specific situations in which seismic events could initiate a fire in a specific plant area, the fire protection engineer and systems engineer

]erforming the fire hazards analysis should be concerned with in-situ combusti-ale materials which can be released in a manner such that they could contact in-situ ignition sources by a seismic event.

An example of this would be the rupture of the RCP lube oil line directly above the hot reactor coolant piping.

The fire protection engineer should also be concerned with seismic induced ignition sources, electrical or mechanical, which could contact nearby in-situ combustible materials.

i It should be noted that the guidelines cited above from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 are not 72 Ran om ir dS cE t

QUESTION l

Is a random fire to be postulated concurrent with a seismic event?

RESPONSE

Our position, as stated in Section C.1.6 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, is " Worst case fire need not be postulated to be simultaneous with nonfire-related failures

(

in safety systems, plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena."

APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 28 l

l

Where plant systems are designed to prevent the release of combustible materials caused by a seismic event, such as a dike around a fuel oil tank transformer, or seismic supports for hydrogen lines, then no fire need to be arbitrarily assumed to take place in the fire hazards analysis.

Because it is impossible to completely preclude the occurrence of a seismically induced fire, Section C.6.c(4) of CMEB 9.5-1 states:

I

" Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earth-quake. The piping system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to ensure system pressure integrity.

The piping and valves for the portion of hose stand-pipe system affected by this functional requirement should, as a minimum, satisfy ANSI 831.1, ' Power Piping.'

The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water sys-tem such as the essential service water system.

The cross connection should be (a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the seismic Category I water system."

The post-seismic procedures should include a damage survey, and a determination of whether any fires were initiated as a result of the seismic event.

See also the response to Question 7.1.

It should be noted that the guidelines cited above from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 are not applicable to plants reviewed and approved under BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

8.

LICENSING POLICY 8.1 Fire Hazard Analysis / Fire Protection Plan Updating QUESTION What constitutes the fire protection plan recuired by 50.48(a)? Should licens-ees have programs to maintain the fire hazarcs analysis and the fire protection plan current or updated periodically? How often should the plan be updated?

Must revisions be provided to the NRC?

RESPONSE

The basic elements required in the fire protection plan are described in 10 CFR 50.48(a).

The fire protection program that implements that plan should include the details of the fire hazards analysis.

The plan and program may be separate or combined documents and must be kept current with the fire hazards analysis updated prior to making modifications.

We would expect that the fire protection plan and program will be incorporated as part of the FSAR and therefore, would be updated and submitted to the NRC in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 29 L

8.2 Fire Protection License Condition QUESTION 1

What is the significance of the fire protection license condition?

I

RESPONSE

For those plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979 (Appendix R plants), the license condition is the legally enforceable requirement for the fire protection features other than those required by III.G, III.J and III.0 that were accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

For those plants licensed after January 1, 1979, the license condition is the legally enforceable requirement for all fire protection features at the facility.

In either of the above cases when the licensee incorporates the approved fire protection program in the FSAR and completes implementation of all aspects of i

the program, a license condition is unnece sary.

8.3 III G, J and 0 Exemptions for Future Modifications QUESTION Is an exemption required from Ap]endix R Sections other than III.G, III.J and III.0 for future modifications t1at do not comply with such sections?

e j

RESPONSE

Yes, for plants licensed prior to January 1,1979 and for those modifications 4

which deviate from the previously accepted fire protection configurations.

The exclusion of the applicability of Sections of Appendix R other than III.G, III.J, and III.0 is limited to those features " accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 reflected in staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to the effective j

date of the rule." No reanalysis is required exce)t for proposed modifications j

which would alter previously approved features.

T1is position is based directly l

onCFR50.48(b).

Also see response to Question 8.1.

8.4 Future Changes QUESTION Will future changes (no matter how minor) to approved configurations be required j

to be reviewed by the Staff in an exemption request? At what point may the process of 10 CFR 50.59 be invoked?

I

RESPONSE

If a future modification involves a change to a license condition or technical specification, a license amendment request must be submitted.

When a modifica-l tion not involving a technical specification or license condition is planned, l

APPENDIXRQUESTIONS& ANSWERS 30 l

l

the evaluation made in conformance with 10 CFR 50.59 to determine whether an unreviewed safety question is involved must include an assessment of the modi-fication's impact on the existing fire hazards analysis for the area.

This part of the evaluation must be performed by the person responsible for the fire safety program for the plant.

The assessment must include the effect on com-bustible loading and distribution and the consideration of whether circuits or components, including asociated circuits, for a train of equipment needed for safe shutdown are being affected or a new element introduced in the area.

If this evaluation concludes that there is no significant impact, this conclusion and its basis must be documented as part of the 50.59 evaluation and be avail-able for future inspection and reference.

If the evaluation finds that there is an impact that could result in the area either not being in conformance with Appendix R, or some other aspect of the approved fire protection program, or being outside the basis for an exemption that was granted for the area involved, the licensee must either make modifications to achieve conformance or justify and request exemption (or, for the post 1979 plants, approval) from the NRC.

See also responses to Questions 8.1 and 8.2.

8.5 Schedular and Blanket Exemptions QUESTION If an exemption is warranted and at the same time the provisions of the rule indicate that the appropriate schedular deadlines have passed, should a sched-uler exemption be filed at the same time as the technical exemption request?

If as part of the exemption request the utility is proposing to make modifica-tions to achieve a reasonable level of conformance with Appendix R, and if the associated " clock" has run out for that type of modification, should the tech-nical exemption request and the description of the modification be filed with a schedular exemption?

When filing a schedular exemption under S50.12, it is not always clear from what specific paragraphs of $50.48 an exemption should be sought.

Is it ac-ceptable to request a blanket exemption from the schedular provisions of 10 CFR 550.48 without a specification by paragraph?

If an exemption request is submitted to meet newly published interpretations of Appendix R, when does the licensee need to be in compliance?

Is the sched-ule presented in Appendix R still the guideline or must a new schedule be developed under a different criteria?

RESPONSE

In response to the first two questions above, once the time period allowed by a schedule in 150.48 has run out, the schedule cannot be reinstituted by exemption.

In such a situation the licensee is in violation of the regula-tion and should notify the Region proposing compensatory measures and a schedule for gaining compliance either with the provisions of Appendix R or with the provisions of an approved technical exemption.

If a technical exemption is involved but is not yet applied for, the schedule for that action should be included and the licensee runs the risk that if the techni-cal exemption is denied, a violation of the regulation has been incurred.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 31

i 1

4 1

i Requests for schedular exemptions may be made under 10 CFR 50.12, but such requests will be granted sparingly based upon the following criteria:

5 1.

The utility has, since the promulgation of Appendix R in 1980, proceeded expeditiously to meet the Commission's requirements.

i 2.

The delay is caused by circumstances beyond the utility's control, or immediate implementation would cause undue hardship (e.g., plant shut-down to effect a minor modification).

l 1

3.

The proposed schedule for completion represents a best effort under the circumstances.

j 4.

Adequate interim compensatory measures will be taken until compliance is achieved.

i This policy is further explained in the generic letter transmitting this package.

8.6 Trivial Deviations QUESTION i

What guidance can"the NRC Staff give the industry regarding when a deviation from the literal interpretation of Appendix R is sufficiently trivial as to not require a specific exemption?

i

)

RESPONSE

i Thesignificanceofadeviationmustbejudgedaspartofafirehazardsanal-ysis.

The conclusion of this analysis is always subject to review by the NRC inspector.

i 8.7 Revised Modifications i

QUESTION i

What is the process for altering configurations not yet implemented for plants with Appendix R SERs?

RESPONSE

4 l

If licensees propose changes to their NRC approved modifications, they must sub-l mit their new proposal and revised schedule for implementation for NRC approval.

Thischangemustbejustifiedasto(1)thereasonforthechange,(2)the j

basis for the revised schedule, and (3) the interim measures that will be pro-vided to assure post fire shutdown capability until the final modifications are implemented.

Whether or not enforcement action will be taken based upon con-tinued noncompliance with Appendix R will be decided by the NRC Regional l

Administrator in consultation with NRC Headquarters.

l APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 32

i 8.8 Smallest Opening in a Fire Barrier I

QUESTION What is the smallest opening allowed in a fire area barrier for which an exemption request is not needed?

RESPONSE

Unsealed openings in the configuration for which approval was obtained by an approved laboratory or the NRC staff would be acceptable.

Our position on openings is given in Section 5.a(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1:

"(3) Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should be sealed or closed to provide a fire' resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself.

Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration.

Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed on each side of the fire barrier and sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with non-combustible material to prevent the passage of smoke and hot gases.

Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions."

The unsealed opening (s) allowed in a fire area boundary or a barrier which separates redundant shutdown divisions should not permit flame, radiant energy, smoke and hot gases to pass'through the barrier and cause damage to redur. dant shutdown divisions on the other side.

The licensee should assess the adequacy of existing protection and should determine the minimum size based on a fire hazards analysis and conservative fire protection engineering judgment.

If the significance of openings in fire barriers is marginal, a. formal exemption request could be submitted or the staff consulted.

The basis for. the lack of signifi-cance should be available for review by NRC Inspectors.

Our acceptance of unprotected openings in fire barriers would depend upon the quantity and nature of combustible materials on either side of the barrier; the location of the opening (s) in relation to the ceiling (for openings in walls);

the location, vulnerability and importance of shutdown systems on either side of the barrier; and compensating fire protection.

See also Section #4 of the " Interpretations of Appendix R."

t 8.9 NFPA Code Deviation QUESTION Is an exemption / deviation required for deviations from NFPA Codes?

RESPONSE

Deviations from the codes should be identified and justified in the FSAR or FHA.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 33

/

An exemption is not required for NFPA codes.

NRC guidelines reference certain NFPA codes as guidelines to the systems acceptable to the staff, and therefore such codes may be accorded the same status as Regulatory Guides.

When the applicant / licensee states that its design " meets the NFPA codes" or,

" meets the Intent of the NFPA Codes" and does not identify any deviations from such codes, NRR and the Regions expect that the design conforms to the code and the design is subject to inspection against the NFPA codes.

8.10 " ASTM E-119" Design Basis QUESTION Is an exemption / deviation required, if components are designed to withstand an

" ASTM E-119" fire?

RESPONSE

Some cables are being developed for high temperature (e.g., 1700 F) applications.

i An exemption would be required if such cable is used in lieu of the alternatives of III.G.2 or III.G.3 in a pre-1979 plant.

A deviation from the guidelines would be required for similar applications in a post 1979 plant.

8.11 Plants Licei1 sed After January 1, 1979

~

QUESTION 1

What fire protection guidelines and requirements apply to the plants licensed after January 1,1979?

RESPONSE

Post-1979 plants are subject to:

GDC 3 10CFR50.48(a)and(e)

The guidelines identified in the footnotes to 50.48(a)

Guidelines documents issued after January 1, 1979.

Commitments made to meet the requirements of Appendix R; or specific sec-tions such'as III.G, III.J, III.0; or Appendix A to BTP APSCB 9.5-1; or BTP CMEB 9.5-1, which includes the requirements of Appendix R* and the previous guidance documents incorporated into the Branch Technical Position.

The license for each plant licensed after January 1, 1979 contains a license condition which identifies by reference the approved fire protection program for that plant.

• A deficiency in the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 has been noted in that a requirement in Appendix R Section III.G.3.b to provide alternative or dedicated shutdown cap-ability in an area where both redundant safe shutdown trains could be damaged APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 34 t

l by suppression activities or inadvertent operation or rupture of fire suppres-sion systems is not included.

This requirement will be addea in the next revi-sion of the BTP.

8.12 Cold Shutdown Eauipment Availability QUESTION A.

Can a licensee achieve compliance with III.G.1(b) by demonstrating that one train of cold shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage?

B.

In demonstrating that one train of cold shutdown equipment will remain free of fire damage, is a licensee limited to the three alternatives in III.G.2?

RESPONSE

A.

Yes.

B.

No.

8.13 Guidance Documents QUESTION i

Please list all NRR guidance documents and position papers issued since Appendix R was promulgated.

RESPONSE

Fire Protection Guidance Issued Since January 1, 1975:

IE Information Notices No. 83-41:

Actuation of fire suppression systems causing inoperability of safety related equipment.

No. 83-69:

Improperly installed fire dampers at nuclear power plan'ts.

No. 83-83:

Use of portable radio transmitters inside nuclear power plants.

4

• No. 84-09:

Lessons Learned From NRC Ins Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R) pections of Fire Protection Safe Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, Rev. 1 Fire Protection System, dated 5/1/76 9.5.1, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Program, dated 03/78 9.5.1, Rev. 3 Fire Protection Program, July 1981.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 35 1

~. _.. _ _,,

Regulations 10 CFR Part 50:

Proposed fire protection program for nuclear power plants operating prior to January 1, 1979, dated May 29, 1980.

Federal Register Vol. 45, No. 105, 36082.

10 CFR Part 50:

Fire protection program for operating nuclear power plants, dated November 19, 1980.

Federal Register Vol. 45, No. 225, 76602.

\\

10 CFR Part 50:

Fire protection rule corrections, dated September 8, 1981.

Federal Register Vol. 46, No. 173, 44734.

Generic Letters NOTE:

The following documents were obtained from the Palisades file Docket No. 50-255.

Similar documents should be in the file for other operating facil-ities.

The dates may vary slightly.

1.

Letter dated 9/28/76 - Enclosing App. A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and supplementary guidance on information needed for fire protection program evaluation.

2.

Letter dated 12/1/76 - Enclosing sample Technical Specifications and an errata sheet.

3.

Letter dated 8/19/77 - Enclosing " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance."

4.

Letter dated 6/8/78 - Re:

Manpower requirements for operating reactors.

5.

Letter dated 9/7/79 - Re:

Minimum fire brigade shift size.

6.

Letter dated 9/14/79 - Enclosing staff positions - safe shutdown capability.

7.

Letter dated 10/31/80 - Enclosing new 10 CFR 50.48 regarding fire protection schedules for operating nuclear power plants.

8.

Letter dated 11/24/80 - Enclosing a copy of revised 10 CFR 50.48 and new App. R to 10 CFR 50, and a summary of open items from the SER for the BTP APCSB 9.5-1 review.

9.

Letter dated 2/20/81 - Generic Letter 81-12 identifying information needed for NRC review cf modifications for alternative shutdown capability.

10.

Letter dated 4/7/82 - Provided clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 and guidance on information needed for NRC review of exemption requests.

11.

Letter dated 10/6/82 - Generic Letter 82-21; provided criteria for annual, biennial, and triennial audits required by Technical Specifications.

• 12. Letter dated 10/19/83 - Generic Letter 83-33; NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 36 i

Staff Generic Positions 1.

Letter, Denton to Bernsen, dated 4/20/82 - Control room fires.

• 2.

SECY 83-269, dated July 5, 1983 - Attachments B and C.

3.

Memo, Eisenhut to Olshinski, dated 12/30/83 - Physical independence of electrical systems.

4.

Memo, Eisenhut to Jordan, dated 10/24/83 - Bullet resistant fire doors.

• Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the " Interpretations of Appendix R".

8.14 Deviation From Guidance Documents QUESTION If a utility determines that a deviation fron a guidance document exists, does an exemption request need to be filed?

If so, what is the legal basis for this requirement?

RESPONSE

No.

~

8.15 Staff Interpretation of Appendix R QUESTION How does the Staff initiate interpretations of Appendix R in a manner which ensures their technical cdequacy and consistency with the rule's objectives etc.)? presentation to ACRS, issue for comment as in draft regulatory guides, (e.g,

RESPONSE

Staff positions are initiated when our experience shows that generic issues are identified that require clarification.

These positions are reviewed for accuracy and consistency by the cognizant Division Directors.

Usually, they are not issued for comment.

However, Generic Letter 83-33 was commented on by the NUFPG since it was initiated, in part, at their request.

8.16 Dissemination of New Staff Positions QUESTION Will licensees be automatically sent a copy of new Staff position papers as they are developed?

RESPONSE

The Staff positions on generic subjects are considered for issuance in Generic Letters from ONRR and Information Notices or Bulletins from OI&E.

Staff APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 37

positions issued for specific questions on specific plants are not given generic promulgation because they normally involve plant specific design considerations.

8.17 Equivalent Alternatives QUESTION How does a licensee demonstrate that alternative measures are equivalent to the measures of Section III.G.2 in order to obtain an exemption lacking a formal definition of the term " free of fire damage"?

RESPONSE

See Item #3 of " Interpretations of Appendix R."

8.18 Coordination Study Update QUESTION Circuit modifications are an ongoing process.

How recent must a coordination study be in order to be valid in protecting circuits associated by common power source?

RESPONSE

We would expect that as circuit modifications are made, the design package would address the electrical protection required and the effects of this protection on the coordination of the protection for the power distribution system.

This type of consideration should be included in the evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests and Experiments.

The design package and modification evaluation could not be complete without consideration of the coordination study.

Therefore, we would expect that the coordination studies would be current with the last circuit modification made.

8.19 Exemption Request Threshold QUESTION (a) What is the threshold for exemption requests?

(b) Is it necessary to file a request for each and every possible deviation from Appendix R?

RESPONSE

Typical examples are discussed in the response to Questions 8.19.1 through 8.19.4.

(a) The licensee must develop its criteria for an exemption request threshold.

(b) No.

i 8.19.1 Penetration Designs Not Laboratory Approved APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 38

QUESTION Where penetration designs have been reviewed and ap3 roved by NRC but have not been classified by an approval laboratory, will it ae necessary to submit an exemption request?

RESPONSE

No.

8.19.2 Individual vs. Package Exemptions QUESTION How do we submit future modification exemption requests, etc.? Would NRC prefer them individually, or developed and submitted in packages for review and approval?

RESPONSE

Future exemptions should be submitted individually, if they are independent of each other.

~

8.19.3 Exemption Request Supporting Detail QUESTION When an exemption request is filed, what criteria are used to determine the level of detail needed to support the request?

RESPONSE

See Enclosure 2 of NRC's letter to all licensees dated April-May 1982.

8.19.4 50.12 vs. 50.48 Exemption Requests QUESTION l

With regard to exemption requests for future modifications, will they be 1

submitted under 50.12 or 50.48?

RESPONSE

10 CFR 50.12.

8.20 Post January 1, 1979 Plants and Exemption Requests QUESTION l

Do plants licensed after January 1, 1979 which have committed to meet the requirements of Section III.G, III.J and III.0 and are required to do so as a license condition, need to request exemptions for alternative configurations?

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 39 l

l l

1 -

RESPONSE

No; however, deviations from the requirements of Section III.G, III.J and III.0 should be identified and justified in the FSAR or FHA and the deviation would probably require a license amendment to change the license condition.

See responses 8.1 and 8.2.

8.21 NRC Approval for BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations QUESTION Do future deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 guidelines require approval by the NRC? Do such deviations constitute a violation of license conditions?

RESPONSE

Compliance with guidelines in the BTP is only required to the extent that they were incorporated in the approved Fire Protection Program as identified in the license condition.

(See Response 8.2) 9.

INSPECTION POLICY 9.1 Safety Implications QUESTION Since the Commission states that fire damage cannot be defined and fire spread cannot be p"redicted, how does the Commission determine which Appendix R viola-tions have important safety implications?"

RESPONSE

III.G.2 provides alternatives to ensure that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage.

Fire spread within one area cannot be predicted, but damage is limited to one fire area.

Determination of the Appendix R violations that have "important safety implica-tions" are based on the equipment, components, and systems that are located in the same fire area that are needed for safe shutdown or can adversely affect safe shutdown, and are not protected by the features of III.G.2, III.G.3 or an approved alternative.

9.2 Uniform Enforcement QUESTION How does the Commission ensure that violations of the rule are uniformly treated between regions?

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 40 t

RESPONSE

Each Region evaluates violations in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.

The Policy provides guidance for the determination of appropriate enforcement sanctions for violations.

The Office of Inspection and Enforcement provides guidance for and monitors Regional implementation of the Policy to ensure a uniform application.

In addition, the policy requires that all escalated enforcement actions be approved by the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.

9.3 NTOL Inspections QUESTION Will NT0Ls be subject to an Appendix R audit now being performed on plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979? Or, will the current review and analysis being performed by the Staff be satisfactory?

RESPONSE

Yes, NT0Ls will be subject to the Appendix R audit; the TI 2515/62 is being revised to reflect the appropriate requirements for NT0Ls' and it is our intent to conduct such inspections prior to issuing the operating license.

10 CFR 50.48 requires each such plant to have a fire protection plan.

Their operating license will contain a specific license condition to implement their approved fire protection program which must identify deviations from Appendix R.

The fire protection inspections will be against the particular license conditions.

9.4 Future TI 2515/62 Revisions QUESTION Does the NRC plan to issue a new or revised version of Temporary Instruc-tion 2515/62 for future Appendix R audits?

RESPONSE

Yes.

9.5 Documentation Supplied by Licensee QUESTION Temporary Instruction 2515/62 provided a list of documentation that the NRC needs to review as part of the audit process.

In past audits, the NRC has requested additional information other than that contained on the list.

Will a new list of documentation be developed?

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 41

RESPONSE

The documentation listing provided in TI-2515/62 does not restrict the inspection team from enhancing inspection efficiency by requesting a licensee to provide additional relevant documentation.

A new listing of documentation for TI-2515/62 is not being developed.

9.6 Subsequent Inspections QUESTION To what extent will Appendix R issues be raised at future Regional I&E Fire Protection Audits after a successful Appendix R audit? For example, if an area has already been reviewed and no noncompliance found, will it be subject to later review and reinterpretation by the Staff?

~

RESPONSE

The Appendix R inspections are conducted on a sample basis.

These inspections do not certify that all possible items of noncompliance with Appendix R have been identified.

The inspection results do provide a basis'for a determina-tion of the adequacy of a licensee's Appendix R reanalysis, modification and preparation.

t When a noncompliance with Appendix R requirements is identified, a notice of violation will be issued to ensure adequate corrective action. -In those cases in which the licensee believes that the staff has invoked a reinterpretation of adequacy in areas which had previously been reviewed, NRC's procedures for appeal would be applicable.

9.7 NRC List of Conforming Items QUESTION At.the end of the audit, will the NRC provide a list of items that had been reviewed and found in conformance with Appendix R? To date, only areas of nonconformance have been specifically identified in exit interviews.

RESPONSE

Subsequent to an Appendix R inspection, the NRC will not provide a list of items reviewed and found to be in conformance with Appendix R.

We do list the areas inspected and where non-compliances were not found.

1 APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 42

9.8 Inspection Re review QUESTION Where assumptions are made and clearly stated within the analysis submitted to NRR for review, will such assumptions be subject to a second review by 01&E during the inspection process?

Whereassumptionsaremadeinconjunctionwiththeanalysis,shouldexemption requestsbefiledjusttoprovideprotectionforthelicensee?

If NRR accepts a licensee's selection of equipment and shutdown paths as being sufficient to meet the Appendix R shutdown criteria, will 0I&E review and have the right to challenge the approved shutdown paths and approved equipment selet-tion? Or will they only check the shutdown paths and equipment in question to see that they meet the Appendix R requirements, i.e., separation?

RESPONSE

To the extent that a licensee's submittal to NRR is comprehensive and suffi-ciently detailed, the basis for the OI&E Appendix R inspection will be the assumptions, shutdown paths and equipment selections approved by NRR.

If the inspection results in new information that casts doubt upon the approved con-figuration, the Regional inspectors have the responsibility to resolve such doubts.

9.9 List of Shutdown Equipment QUESTION What lists of shutdown equipment will be used by the Regional inspectors, if the shutdown analysis has not been reviewed and approved by NRR?

RESPONSE

Regional Inspectors will use the lists of shutdown equipment the licensee has identified in his fire protection plan.

Generic Letter 81-12 and its clarification documents expect licensees to show how they will shutdown if a fire area is not provided with redundant train separation.

Inherent within this expectation is the assumption that the licen-see will identify the equipment to be used.

It is because the licensees have not had fire hazard analyses at all for non-alternative shutdown fire areas that the inspectors to date have resorted to using the only lists available (the alternative shutdown equipment list used by NRR in their reviews).

It is unlikely there would not be a list of at least those systems to be used for alternate shutdown, since 10 CFR 50.48 requires NRR review and approval of the means of alternate shutdown.

APPENDIX R QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 43 l

l

ENCLOSURE 6 FIRE PROTECTION LICENSE CONDITION 1.

The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility (or as described in submittals dated--------) and as approved in the SER dated--------(and Supplements dated--------) subject to provisions 2 and 3 below.

2.

The licensee may make no change to the approved fire protection' program which would significantly decrease the level of fire protection in the plant without prior approval of the Comission. To make such a change the licensee must submit an application for license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, 3.

The licensee may make changes to features of the approved fire pro-tection program which do not significantly decrease the. level of fire protection without prior Commission approval provided (a) such changes do not otherwise involve a change in a license condition or technical specification or result in an unreviewed safety question (see 10 CFR 50.59), and (b) such changes do not result in failure to complete the fire protection program approved by the Comission prior to license issu-ance. The licensee shall maintain, in an auditable fonn, a current record of all such changes, including an analysis of the effects of the change on the fire protection program, and shall make such records avail-able to NRC inspectors upon request. All changes to the approved program shall be reported annually to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, along with the FSAR revisions required by 10 CFR 50.71(e).

ENCLOSURE 7 GUIDANCE FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS CONCERNING FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENT 5 1.

General Guidance A.

Fire protection requirements are delineated by 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 3,10 CFR 50.48,10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

Facility License Conditions, facility technical specifications and other legally binding requirements, as applicable. A Notice of Violation will be issued for violation of requirements. How-ever, failure to meet fire protection connitments other than re-quirenents will be designated as deviations.

B.

Failures to meet regulatory requirements for protecting trains of equipment required for achieving and maintaining safe hot or cold shutdown are serious violations. The specific violations should be reviewed individually and as a group to determine their root cause(s).. This guidance gives examples of violations at various severity levels and should be used to determine the appropriate enforcement action. For purposes of this guidance, required structures, systems, and components are those which are necessary to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown and which require the application of fire protection features as described in the licensee's fire hazards analysis report and NRC's safety evaluation report.

C.

Fire protection violations may involve inoperable or inadequate:

fire barriers, separation, suppression or detection systems, re-pair parts, procedures or other conditions or items required to prevent fires, protect safe shutdown equipment from fire and/or permit the operation of safe shutdown equipment during a fire or to restore safe shutdown equipment to service following an actual fire.

D.

Numerous violations of fire protection requirements which in-dividually may be classified at lower severity levels may cumulatively be classified at a higher severity level due to inadequate implementation of the fire protection program.

. 2.

Severity Categories A.

Severity I.

Violations of fire protection requirements estab-listed to protect or enable operation of safe hot shutdown equip-ment concurrent with an actual fire which damages that equipment such that safe hot shutdown could not be achieved or maintained using the equipment identified in the f. ire hazards analyses for this purpose.

B.

Severity II. Violations of fire protection requirements established to protect or enable operation of safe cold shutdown equipment concurrent with an actual fire which damages that equipment such that safe cold shutdown could not have been achieved and maintained using the equipment identified in' the fire hazards analyses for.this purpose in accordance with the applicable requirements.

C.

Severity III. Violations of fire protection requirements established to protect or enable operation of safe shutdown equipment such that a fire in the area could damage that equipment to the extent that safe hot or cold shutdcwn could not have been achieved and maintained using the equipment identified in the fire hazards analyses for this purpose in accordance with applicable requirements. Failure to have an adequate written evaluation available for an area where compliance with Appendix R is not apparent will be taken as an indication that the area does not comply with NRC requirements and may result in enforcement action at this Severity. level.

1 D.

Severity IV.-

Violations of one or more fire protection requireme'nts that do not result in a Severity Level I, II or III violation and which have more than minor safety or environmental significance.

E.

Severity V.

Violations of one or more fire protection requirements that have minor safety or environmental significance.

1 I

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[ro uw%o UNITED STATES ENCLOSURE 8

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JI W A5m NG T ON. D. C. 20555

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JUN 2 71984

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OELD S/T l Index8_

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--l ME110RANDih* FOR: Richard H. Vollmer, Director 3

Division of Engineering I'

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

FROM:

William J. Olmstead Director and Chief Counsel Regulations Division Office of the Executive Legal Director FIRE ' ROTECTION - RESPONSE TO TRUBATCH MEMO ON APPENDIX

SUBJECT:

P R GUIDANCE In a June 8,1984 Memorandum from S. Chilk to the EDO, the Comission requested staff coment on a Memorandum from Sheldon Trubatch to the Comissioners' assistants dated May 29, 1984. Many of the points which should be made in response to the memo are of a -technical / policy nature, and are therefore appropriate for NRR response. We have responded to the legal points made in the memo. However, you may wish to add other points or suggest alternative positions. You can incorporate this response as appropriate into the SECY paper requested by the Comission as a result of the May 30 Commission meeting.

The Interpretation of Appendix R a.

Fire Boundaries Mr. Trubatch's point appears to be that the " Interpretation" allows use of fire area bounduries with nonunifom ratings, and that this is directly contrary to the Commission's intent in promulgating Appendix R. He argues that this acceptance of nonuniform boundaries "would substantially undo much of what the Comission wanted to accomplish by promulgating Appendix R."

Mr. Trubatch is apparently not aware that the staff has been accepting fire barriers, including barriers which form the boundary between two fire areas, which have a nonuniform fire rating and may be rated at considerably less than three hours. This acceptance has been based upon low fire loads and the presence of ccmpensating fire protection features such as detection and suppression. The Commission was fully informed of this in SECY-63-269, dated July 5, 1983. Prior to development of the " Interpretations" document, an exemption from Appendix R was required for each instance where a fire area boundary deviated from the complete, 3-hour barrier concept (except for fire areas specifically approved during the Appendix A review). Since Appendix R does not define " fire area," however, the " Interpretation" takes the position that a licensee can achieve compliance with the rule in this regard provided

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. I the licensee meets the criteria which have been applied in previously-granted exemptions, i.e., fire loading, compensating fire protection features, etc.

In view of these facts, it is not possible for this portion of the

" Interpretations" to contradict the Commission's intent. In'a June 9,1982, memorandum to William Shields of ELD, (Enclosure 1) Mr. Trubatch argues that exemptions to Appendix R should meet the following criterion:

The staff's criterion for evaluating exemptions is whether the licensee's proposals " represent an acceptable level of safety to that which would be achieved with compliance with the requirements of...

Appendix R..."

I believe that this criterion would 1

be consistent with the Court's criterion if the word

" acceptable" were replaced with the word " equivalent."

1 Moreover, I suggest that the word " equivalent" means the same predicted survivability of redundant safe shutdown equipment in the event it experiences a fire.

Since this "Inteipretation" would only accept, by way of " compliance" rather than " exemption," the same fire area boundaries which have been accepted by the staff in exemptions, equivalence to the intent of Appendix R must follow. Should a licensee be unable to make this showing of equivalence during an inspection, corrective action will be required and enforcement action may be taken if it appears the licensee did not attempt to apply the criteria in good faith. Whether this process, as opposed to the exemption process, will result in delay is a matter of debate.

Industry representatives have argued that a reduced reliance on the exemption process will accelerate compliance.

It should be clear, however, that the

" Interpretation" makes no substantive change in the " equivalence criterion and therefore, by Mr. Trubatch's own argument above, does not do violence to the intent of Appendix R.

b.

Cold Shutdown We are unable to determine, absent specific citations, the source of Mr.

i Trubatch's statement concerning the " generally accepted view... that cold shutdown had to be attained no later than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a fire." Our i

analysis of the 72-hour issue proceeds from the language of Appendix R itself.Section III.G.1.b states as a criterion that " systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown... can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />."

Section III.L.1 states as a criterion the ability to " achieve cold shutdown conditions with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />." Whatever might have been in the minds of individuals at the time Appendix R was developed, it is clear that these l

requirements are not the same.

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The difference between the requirements does not, as Mr. Trubatch argues, divide plants into two classes. Application of one or the other requirement

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h proceeds on an area-by-area basis for each plant.

In an area where III.G.2 is being met, the 72-hour repair criterion applies.

In an area alternative shutdown is being provided in lieu of meeting III.G.2, the 72-hour cold shutdown criterion applies.

In any event there is little, if any, safety distinction to be made between having the capability to achie,ve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and having the capability, at the end of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, to proceed to cold shutdown.

In either case the plant has safely ridden through a major fire and cold shutdown can be achieved when it is prudent to do so. In a number of cases, the staff has granted exemptions to the III.L criterion where it is clear that this figure, which 1,s admittedly nominal, does not sensibly apply to the circumstances at the plant. The rationale for these exemptions was also discussed in SECY-83-269.

4 Mr. Trubatch's remarks that the above reading of III.G and III.L might require further notice and comment fail to account for the language of the 1

rule itself, language in the proposed and final rules, and the exemptions noted above. The clear difference in language in the final rule has already been noted. In the proposed version of Appendix R Section III.G did not contain a "72-hour" provision provision.Section III.L.1 stated:

...the shutdown capability provided for each (critical) area shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby conditions...for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

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This language is essentially identical to existing Section III.L. Section j

III.L.3 of the proposed rule, however, stated:

...the equipment and systems comprising that means of hot standby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the equioment reouired to achieve and maintain cold shutcown is not available cecause of fire camage.

(empnasis added) i l

The underscored language expressly contemplates that under some plant conditions, cold shutdown may not be attainable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In the final rule, this provision was reworded substantially and moved to Section III.G. It was therefore subject to public comment, and the position taken in the " Interpretation" is consistent with both the proposed and final rules. Finally, since the staff has granted exemptions even from the more restrictive Section III.L requirement, and these exemptions have been published in ti.e Federol Px9 ster, the interpretation that " cold shutdown i

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />" is not an absolute minimum level of protection under Appendix R has been a matter of public record.

Indeed, to take a contrary

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positicn at this point, i.e., that repair of cold shutdown equipment within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, but not cold shutdown itself, cannot provide an adequate level of protection, would require rutlic cus. tut, i.m particulurly L.cause this interprr ttiiion uopld directly t enird.ct ti e lahyuo9e of the, rule itself.

d.

Autoratic Cetection and Suppression In this area also,11r. Trubatch fails tu address the language of the rule.

Section III.G requires, where applicable, detection and suppression "in" the area of concern. Until recently, the staff insisted that whenever licensees proposed.less than full area coverage, an exemption from Appendix R was required. The " Interpretation" takes the position.that less-than-full coverage may noretheless amount to compliance with Section III.G provided that the hazard has been adequately evaluated and addressed according to sound fire protection principles. The staff has granted many exemptions from full-area coverage (usually in regard to suppression). The only purpose of this aspect of the " Interpretation" was to permit licensees to achieve compliance without having to file exemption requests. As noted in connection with the " fire boundaries" discussion, meeting the " equivalence" criterion for exemptions should mean that the intent of Appendix R i.as been met by Mr. Trubatch's earlier memo.

Ue are unaware of any "special exemption procedure for fire protection requirements" mentioned by fir. Trubatch.

Exemptions frcm the substantive requircrcr.ts of Appenai). F. cre filed and evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. Section 50.48(c)(6) contains certain criteria to be met if the licensee sought a tolling of the 50.48(c) schedule.

Filings under this provision are no longer timely.

Willium J. Olmstead Director and Chief Counsel Regulations Division Office of the Executive Legal Director DISTRIBUTION:

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ENCLOSURE 9 STEERING COMMITTEE RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIRE PROTECTION POLICY STEERING COMMITTEE (50FR2056 JAN. 15, 1985; G.L. 85-01) 1.0 PUBLIC COMMENTS:

1.1.

Nuclear Utility Fire Protection Group: Letter from J. M. McGarry j

to H. R. Denton dated February 14, 1985.

1.1.1 Coment (A.1):

Schedular Relief "The discussion at pages 1-2 of the draft Generic Letter indicates that schedular relief under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.48 can no longer be obtained. The Group is concerned that this discussion could be read as precluding the filing of schedular exemption requests under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.12.

It is the Group's understanding from discussions with the Staff that schedular exemptions under 10 C.F.R. 5 50.12 continue to be available despite the expiration of the Section 50.48 deadlines..To avoid any misunderstanding, the Group would recommend that the Staff's Generic Letter state explicitly that the filing of a schedular exemption request under Section 50.12 is not pre-cluded by the expiration of the Section 50.48 deadlines."

Resolution:

The NUFPG coment indicates a misunderstanding of the Steering i

Committee recommendation on schedular exemptions, which have always been issued under 10 CFR 50.12. The Steering Committee recommended l

that no further schedular exemptions be granted, and that schedules (for licensees whose 50.48 deadlines have passed) will be set in the enforcement context. Therefore, their understanding that schedule exemptions would still be available if this recommendation l

1s adopted is not correct. However, this does not preclude the filing of a schedular exemption request under 10 CFR 50.12 based on a justified "living schedule" which has been approved by the NRC.

The proposed Generic Letter has been revised to clarify this point.

1.1.2 Comment (A.2):

Inspection Process a)

This coment addresses the Steering Committee recommendation for an accelerated fire protection inspection program and presents reasons why such inspections should be postponed until the new guidance package has been reviewed and approved by the Commission. The conclusion of this coment states:

"For these reasons, we believe that the most efficient use of Staff and licensee resources would result from postponing the inspections (absent a safety concern or an indication of readiness on the part of the licensee) until the new inter-pretations and guidance have been reviewed and approved by i

the Commission. 2/"

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-2 b) The above cited footnote states:

"2/ In connection with the discussion of the inspection process, the Group strongly supports the Steering Committee's recormendation regarding the establishment of a referee team, headed by senior NRR management, to resolve significant differences between inspection personnel and the licensee. The Group understands that the resolution of such differences will be accomplished expeditiously by the referee team, with a decision issued generally within one week, but in any event before the inspection report would be released."

Resolution:

a) The inspection program will be conducted as expeditiously as present resources allow with priority given to utilities not yet inspected and those requesting early inspections.

b) The understanding of the NUFPG regarding the composition and expected performance of the " referee" team is correct.

If the recommendation for formation of a-referee team is approved by the Commission, the substance of this ccmment will be in-cluded in its Charter.

1.1.3 Comment (A.3): Documentation Required to Demonstrate Compliance

---The proposed Generic Letter states (at page 3):

Failure to have such an evaluation available for an area where compliance with Appendix R is not readily demonstrated will be taken as prima facie evidence that the area does not comply with NRC requirements, and may result in enforcement action. 3/ (Emphasis added.)

It is the Group's understanding from our discussions with the staff that the term "readily demonstrated" is intended to include situations where compliance is apparent by observation. Thus, if compliance with Appendix R is apparent by observation of the features in question, failure to have an evaluation available will not be considered evidence of noncompliance. With this understanding expressly incorporated into the Generic Letter, the Group has no objection to this part of the proposed Generic Letter."

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1 Resolution:_

The understanding is correct. The proposed Generic Letter and the Guidance for Enforcement Actions have been revised to incorporate the NUFPG understanding.

1.1.4 Comment (A.4): Quality Assurance Requirements This comment takes exception to the introductory sentence to section D of the proposed Generic Letter which states: " Fire protection systems must meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50."

Specifically, the objection is to the citation to GDC 1 because this impacts the current rulemaking regarding the safety classification issue, i.e.,

the important-to-safety vs. safety-related controversy.

It further states that the QA guidance provided in BTP CNEB 9.5-1 (also cited in the proposed Generic letter) is adequate for this purpose and has generally been followed in the industry. Therefore, it recom-mends deletion of the citation to GDC-1.

Resolution: ~

This comment is considered valid. The references to GDC-1 can be deleted without loss of the point being made regarding adequate QA for fire protection equipment. The rulemaking now in progress on the safety classification issue will clarify that licensees are l

expected to carry out QA comitments already present in the FSAR and other licensing documents. The proposed Generic Letter has been revised to delete reference to GDC 1 and to more completely describe the appropriate QA guidance.

1.1.5 Comment (B.1): Size of the Fire i

This comment recommends that the Interpretations of Appendix R be revised to include guidance concerning the size of an assumed initiating fire.

Specifically, it is recommended that.the following footnote be added to Section 3, Fire Damage:

"For purposes of the fire protection program, Staff practice has been to assume a relatively small amount of combustible naterial as the initiation source, i.e., absent special considerations indicating high or low potential combustible initiators, typically in the range of 5 gallons of flamable liquid."

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Resolution:

We do not concur in this recommendation. Guidance concerning the size of an assumed initiating fire could be helpful in evaluating the fire severity within a fire area in a mechanistic way.

How-ever, the proposed guidance is not representative of expected transient combustibles in most plant areas, does not specify the configuration of the transient fuel an;i incorrectly states the staff practice.

The expected transient combustibles vary throughout the plant.

For example, in some areas, the expected transient combustible may be oil; however, the amount and configuration of the oil would be dependent on the reason for it to be there.

In the control room, paper (drawings and computer runs) and plastic scrap is the expected transient.

In cable spreading rooms, cables and cable drums have been the most prevalent transient combustibles identified. On the refueling deck, wood and polyethylene sheets would be expected.

In other areas, drums of plastic (protective clothing) are present.

Each configu. ration of these transient combustibles poses a different threat because of the differing characteristics of fire growth, fire duration and heat release rate.

The present guidelines recommend that the appropriate transient com-bustible for the particular area be consideret.

The Fire Hazard Analyses are based on this assumption. Therefore, the proposed addition was not incorporated.

1.1.6 Coment (8.2): Fire Area Boundaries This comment questioned whether each individual unsealed opening in a fire barrier must be evaluated, and stated that it was their understanding ".... that the staff would permit an evaluation of openings by groups, e.g., according to size of the openings and distance from combustible material."

Resolution:

The stated understanding is not correct.

Unsealed openings should be grouped by the fire barrier which they penetrate.

The evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the barrier should then consider the size and distribution of these openings, the combustible loading, and the proximity of such loading on both sides of the barrier.

A clarifying revision to the Interpretations has been made.

1.1.7 Comment (C.1): General Guidance l

The comment stated the understanding that Section IB of the Guidance l

for Enforcement Actions Concerning Fire Protection Requirements does not require a separate list of safe shutdown equipment; that "the necessary equipment need only be identifiable from the fire hazards analysis and SERs."

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. Resolution:

This understanding is correct.

The response to Q 9.9 has been revised to state this explicitly.

1.1.8 Comment (C.2): Severity Categories The comment stated the understanding that the word " dedicated" used in Sections 2.A, 2.B and 2.C of the Guidance for Enforcement Actions Concerning Fire Protection Requirements "is meant to refer to the equipment identified in the fire hazards analysis for safe hot or cold shutdown."

Resolution:

This understanding is correct.

A clarifying revision to that effect has been made.

1.1.9 Comment (D.1): Current Requirements The comment states that the proposed license condition is unnecessary for plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979 because license condi-tions were issued upon completion of the staff's review of con-formance to the positions in Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; that for plants licensed after January 1,1979, a license condition has been imposed; that all modifications must be reviewed and reported pur-suant to 10 CFR 50.59; and that 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 provide relevant reporting requirements.

Therefore, adequate enforceability is already present without additional actions.

The comment also recommended that the response to Question 8.3 (which inquired whether an exemption is required from Appendix R sections other than III.G, III.J and III.0 for future modifications that do not comply with such sections) be changed from "yes" to "no."

This was based on the interpretation of Appendix R as not requiring exemptions for modifications that were made to features which were approved by the staff under Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

The Statement of Considerations to Appendix R (45FR76602, Nov. 19, 1980) j was cited to support this.

Resolution:

A standard license condition is considered necessary for the following l

reasons.

The license conditions which were imposed on plants l

licensed prior to January 1, 1979 only addressed the modifications that were required.

Those parts of a plant's fire protection program including the fire hazards analysis, found acceptable by l

the staff in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report with no modifications necessary were not addressed by the license condition.

. The NRC has found during inspections that some licensees do not con-sider the Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 items of their fire pro-tection programs as binding and have either changed them or ignored them.

For plants licensed after January 1, 1979, while all such plants have a license condition regarding fire protection, the scope of what is covered by the condition and the wording of the condition varies widely. This results in varying degrees of compliance and uneven enforcement. Therefore, we believe that a " standard license condition" is necessary for consistent and fair regulation. How-4 ever, the license condition has been revised to include specific identification of the documents providing the basis for the license condition.

Regarding the applicability of 10 CFR 50.59, in many cases, includ-ing all plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, the fire protection program and the fire hazards analysis are not described in the FSAR.

Therefore, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 are not directly appli-cable. Accordingly, the license condition has been revised to specify the applicabilit of 10 CFR 50.59 for the evaluation pro-cess and 10 CFR 50.71(e)y(2) for the reporting process.

Addf-tional revisions are described in comment resolutions 1.1.10 and 1.1.11.

Regarding the comment on Question 8.3, this comment is not con-sidered valid. The cited Statement of Considerations does not address the applicability of Appendix R in regard to modifica-tions made to features previously approved by the staff. The staff position in this regard is clearly supported by 10 CFR 50.48(b). A revision to the response to Question 8.3 has been made to clarify this point.

1.1.10 Comment (D.2): Hearing Requirements Under the proposed license condition, any change to the program must be analyzed for its effect on overall fire protection safety.

Even minor modifications such as adding one cable to a room or a change in the location of a fire extinguisher would have to be analyzed, and, if found to lower the level of fire protection, no matter how minor, would require a license amendment with full notice and hearing rights, an expensive and time-consuming process with-out a commensurate benefit to safety. Therefore, the proposed license condition should not be adopted.

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Resolution:

The proposed license condition has been revised to make it clear that only those changes to the fire protection program that "significantly" decrease the level of fire protection would require prior Commission approval and a license amendment; changes which do not "significantly" decrease the level of fire protection may be l

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. made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and reported annually with FSAR revisions as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e).

1.1.11 Coment (D.3): Section 50.59 In regard to paragraph 3 of the proposed license condition the coment states:

" --that the requirement to submit the supporting analyses a) would impose an undue paperwork burden on both the licensees and the Staff. Significantly, Section 50.59 does not require actual submittal of the analyses performed in accordance with pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 50.71(e) (2) port to the NRC annually that section.

Instead, licensees re on what Section 50.59 changes have been made. We would recommend that a similar procedure be used for fire protection changes, and therefore would recomend not imposing a requirement for actual submittal l

of the analyses."

b)

---there is no safety reason to require that "All changes to the approved program" be reported to the NRC annually.

For example, changing the location of a fire extinguisher or adding one cable to a room may have no practical bearing on safety.

Yet, pursuant to the license condition as postured, it may need to be reported. We maintain that such a requirement is unjusti-fied and unwarranted."

y Resolution:

a) The proposed license condition has been revised to remove the requirement for submittal of the analyses and to specify the applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50.71(e).

b)

It is not intended that changes that "---have no practical bear-ing on safety" be reported; it is expected that licensees would exercise reasonable judgment in this regard. A revision was made to indicate this intent.

1.1.12 Coment (E): Standard Technical Specifications The comment supports the Steering Comittee effort to revise the fire protection Technical Specifications to the extent that it is directed toward simplifying and generalizing them to be more workable.

It recomends that any proposed TS changes be reviewed as part of the overall staff consideration of Technical Specifications in general, and requests an opportunity to coment on proposed changes.

Resolution:

The course of action to be followed should be defined by the Steering Committee.

The options available are:

i (1) Include the revised fire protection Technical Specifications in the package being submitted for CRGR review and subsequently for Commission approval.

t This option would provide a complete package for " resolution" of the fire protection issue; the " Commission approved" fire protection TS could then be incorporated in the STS without delay, and implementation in OLs and ors could proceed immediately.

(2) Handle the fire protection Technical Specifications ' separately

'(from the CRGR/ Commission package), i.e., submit the proposed revision to the Technical Specification Review Group (TSRG)

(E. Butcher) for eventual inclusion in the STS.

It is our understanding that the TSRG is presently revising the STS to include all clarifying changes which reflect present practice and which will not require CRGR review. The TSRG intends to make substantive type changes, which will then be submitted to the'CRGR on a single issue basis, at a later date.

The proposed fire protection TS changes are in this second 3

category. Therefore, CRGR approval and subsequent implementa-tion of the TS on OLs and ors would be delayed significantly.

y Also, the direct Commission approval affntded by option (1) would not be available to support backfitting the revised TS i

5 on ors.

(3) Defer action on fire protection TS until some action is taken by NRR on the recommendations of the Technical Specification Improvement Project (TSIP) (S. Bryan [formerly under D. Beckham]) which are scheduled for September 1985.

g This option has the same detrimental aspects in regard to implementation of the TS as option (2) except that the delay involved would probably be greater.

It is recommended that option (1) be selected.* It is also recom-mended that the TS not be issued for public comment, unless so directed by the Commission.

Substantive changes to Technical Specifications normally only require CRGR review.

• The Steering Committee recommended instead that the proposed TS be used as

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appropriate in future OLs, and that they be transmitted to the TSIP.

However, NRR is forwarding only the latter portion of this recommendation for l

Commission approval.

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1.1.13 Comment (F.1): Question 3.2.3 (Fire Door Modifications)

The comment notes that according to UL and FM any modification of a fire door will invalidate its label.

Therefore, the following portion of the response to Q3.2.3, "An exemption is required if fire doors installed in a fire barrier used to satisfy Section III.G.2 are modified such that the labeled rating no longer applies," could be interpreted to require an exemption for modifi-cations to incorporate security hardware or flooding protection.

It is recommended that the response be revised to state that an exemption is required only after a boundary analysis which considers the fire loading on both sides of the boundary shows that adequate margin no longer exists.

Resolution:

The comment is valid.

To be consistent with Section #4 of the

" Interpretations," the response to Q3.2.3 has been revised to in-dicate that evaluation of fire door alterations is part of a fire boundary analysis not requiring an exemption.

1.1.14 Comment (F.2): Question 3.6.2 (Intervening Combustibles)

The comment notes that the response to Q3.6.2 classifies cables in covered cable trays as " intervening combustibles" while the response to Q3.6.3 states that cables in conduit are not considered inter-vening combustibles.

It is recommended that the response to Q3.6.2 be revised to state that "--cable in fully enclosed cable trays does not constitute an intervening combustible for Appendix R purposes."

Resolution:

The response to Q3.6.2 has been revised to affirm that cables in cable trays which have solid sheet metal bottom sides and top (and cables coated with a fire retardant material) are considered intervening combustibles.

However, the response also describes the design and documentation conditions under which these " intervening combustibles" have been found acceptable under the exemption process.

1.1.15 Comment (F.3): Question 3.6.3 (Unexposed Combustibles)

"The response to this question states that oil in closed containers that conform to NFPA Standard 30 is not considered an intervening combustible, while oil in sumps is so considered.

The Group believes that oil in closed sumps should be treated as equivalent to oil in NFPA Standard 30 containers, and therefore should not be classified as an intervening combustible.

The Group does not object, however, to classifying oil in open sumps as an intervening combustible."

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. Resolution:

The comment is valid. The requested revision has been made.

1.1.16 Comment (F.4): Question 5.3.8(HighImpedanceFaults)

The comment questioned the need for including multiple high impedance faults in associated circuits subject to fire damage in short circuit coordination studies;Section III.G.2 of Appendix R was cited as expressly "not" requiring consideration of multiple i

high impedance faults.

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Resolution:

The comment is not valid.Section III.G.2 does require considera-tion of " hot shorts" and " shorts to ground." and these terms encom-pass high impedance faults. Given a major cable fire.' multiple high simpedance faults will probably occur. However, the response to i

QS.3.8 was revised to clarify staff practice in regard to when short circuit coordination studies need or need not be performed. The revision also corrected the typographical error identified in the comment.

1.1.17 Comment (F.5): Question 8.11 (Plants Licensed After January 1,1979)

"The response to Question 8.11 states that plants licensed L

after January 1.1979 are subject to, inter alia BTP CMEB l

9.5-1.

Some plants in this category, however, were licensed l

to the APCSB version of BTP 9.5-1 rather than the CMEB version.

There are some material differences between the two versions.

[

F and if a plant that was licensed to the APCSB version were required to follow the CMEB version, exemption requests and modifications could be necessary. We expect the response P

was merely an oversight on the Staff's part. We would recommend

[

modifying the response to Question 8.11 to read: 'BTP CMEB 9.5-1 or BTP APCSB 9.5-1, if so provided as part of a license condi-tion or licensing commitment, which includes....'"

I Resolution:

The comment is valid. A revision has been made to clarify this point.

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1.1.18 Comment (F.6): Question 8.19(a) (Exemption Requests)

"There appears to be an oversight in the response to Question 8.19(a)..That response contains a cross-reference to the responses to Question 8.21.1 through 8.21.6 but the responses referred to do not appear in the document. We understand that the Staff will add the promised responses.

The Group reserves the right to comment when these responses are provided."

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, Resolution:

The cited cross-reference has been corrected to read "--response to Questions 8.19.1 through 8.19.4."

1.2 Duke Power Company: Letter from H. B. Tucker to the Secretary of the Commission dated February 14, 1985.

(Endorses the NUFPG comments and provides the following specific comments) 1.2.1 Comment (1): Quality Assurance Requirements The comment states that reference to GDC 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 in Section D of the proposed Generic Letter is clearly inappropriate, and that "The QA program for fire protection should be reviewed to requirements of the GDC 3, BTP or SRP as applicable."

Resolution:

• This is included in the resolution of comment 1.1.4 above.

1.2.2 Comment (2): Question 3.2.1 (Fire Barrier Qualification -

1 Acceptance Criteria

" Staff Position is that maximum heat transfer (sic) across a penetration seal, subjected to ASTM-E119 Fire Endurance test, is 325*F.

l Comment - 1) ASTM-#119 criteria is 250*F above ambient which frequently is greater than 75*F.

2) Appendix R,Section III.M. states acceptance criteria for temperature as

'...sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temper-ature...'.

This interpretation (the staff's position [added])

is clearly contrary to the intent and verbage of Appendix R."

Resolution:

1) The response to Q3.2.1 clearly states that 75*F is generally recognized as an acceptable norm.

No revision is warranted.

2) Question 3.2.1 addresses criteria for qualification of cable l

tray fire wrap material while Section III.M.2 of Appendix R addresses criteria for qualification of cable penetration seals.

While Section III.M.2 is not explicitly applicable to cable wrap material, applicability is implied.

Therefore, we have revised the response to Q3.2.1 to clarify that a qualifi-cation criterion different than 325*F may be justified by an l

analysis demonstrating that the maximum recorded temperature is l

sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature.

Also see resolution 1.3.1.

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. 1.2.3 Comment (3): Question 3.3.4 (Cable Tray Support Protection) protected regardless (emphasis added)y supports should be

" Staff Position is that '... cable tra of whether there is a sprinkler system... '.

There is no technical basis for this arbitrary position.

If a sprinkler system is provided and functions (as it is apparently given credit in reducing fire barrier rating from 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to I hour), the environment will be cooled below the temperature at which cable tray supports will be affected by heat fatigue.

In addition, each area should be reviewed individually to assess combustible loadings and other factors to detemine if a potential fire could generate sufficient heat to affect cable tray supports."

Resolution:

The comment is not entirely justified in that the quoted portion of the staff position is preceded by "In-general," and is followed by two conditions (one based on qualification tests perfomed and the other on structural analysis performed) under which cable tray supports need not be protected.

However, the staff agrees that a clarification regarding the analysis to be performed is desirable.

The response to Q3.3.4 has been revised accordingly.

1.2.4 Comment (4): Question 3.8.4 (Control Room Fire Considerations)

The staff position in the response to Q3.8.4 does not reflect staff practice during Appendix R inspections.

"The Staff Position is '...that the only manual action usually credited in the control room by this analysis is the reactor trip. Any additional control room actions deemed necessary would have to be justified under the exemption process.'

Comment - During a recent Appendix R inspection we demonstrated the control room abandonment portion of our Hot Standby Opera-tions procedure to Region II, ONRR and BNL representatives.

We demonstrated reactor trip, turbine trip and main feedwater manual trips (in case automatic signals did not function i

properly). This is reasonable since the control room does j

not instantly become uninhabitable. There was no question during the inspection about the capability to trip all of the subject systems therefore the new interpretation should be changed to agree with actions which have been reviewed and accepted."

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Resolution:

The comment is only partly valid in that it does not present the complete staff position on this issue.

In the Appendix R inspection cited, although the actions taken in the control room prior to evacu-ation were demonstrated and found acceptable, this was conditioned on assurance being provided that such actions would not be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire. Additionally, because of problems outside the control room, a successful demonstration of a smooth departure from the control room to the Safe Shutdown Facility to attain and maintain hot stand-by conditions was not accomplished. Therefore, the overall issue of control room evacuation is an open item in this Appendix R inspection.

The response to Q 3.8.4 has been revised to clarify the staff posi-tion including the removal of the sentence "Any additional control room actions deemed necessary would have to be justified under the exemption process."

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1.2.5 Comment (5): Question 5.1.3 (III.L Backfit)

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"The question is Why do Staff Interpretation memoranda (emphasis added) regarding the criteria for satisfaction of

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Section III.L. fann the auditable basis for determining com-pliance to Appendix R...?

5 Coment - The response fails to address the rationale for considering Staff interpretative memoranda as part of the Rule.

If necessary, the Rule should be so amended."

Resolution:

The response does provide the basis for the applicability of Section III.L of Appendix R.

Because the bases cited in the response are deemed sufficient, there is no need for a rule change. Addition-ally, it should be noted that the explicit portions of " interpretive memoranda" describe methods acceptable to the staff for demonstra-ting conformance to Appendix R.

This does not preclude licensees from proposing and justifying other methods, e.g., see Section 1, Process Monitoring Instrumentation, of the Interpretations of Appendix R.

1.2.6 Comment (6): Question 5.2.4 (Post Fire Procedures Guidance Documents)

"The question pertains to Staff guidance documents of post fire operating procedures. The response is that there is no guidance other than criteria of Section III.L.

L

. Coment - Licensees need to know the criteria used for evaluating In addition, without criteria how post fire shutdown procedures.

do various inspection teams plan to conduct consistent reviews?"

Resolution:

It is our judgement that the responses to Questions 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3 are appropriate and that the criteria for operating procedures in III.L are sufficient. As indicated in the aforementioned responses the methods for meeting these criteria are the option of The inspection pmcess will be flexible in this each licensee.

regard as long as the licensee can show compliance with the criteria of Section III.L. The preceeding sentence has been added to the re-sponse to Q5.2.4.

1.2.7 Coment (7) Question 9.3(NTOLInspections)

' Response states that NTOL's will be subject to Appendix R

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inspections.

k Coment - This is inappropriate for stations reviewed to technical requirements of Standard' Review Plan 9.5.1 which q

differ significantly from requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L."

Resolution:

The staff is aware of only one significant difference between Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix R and the corresponding posi-g tions in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 which is part of Standard Review Plan 9.5.1.

See response to Question 8.11 in " Appendix R Questions and Answers."

1.2.8 Coment (8): General Question l

be modified to meet these new interpretations (pection resu ts "For stations previously inspected, will ins i.e., will addi-g.

tional findings evolve based on new published interpretations)?"

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Resolution:

" For plants previously inspected and which have no remaining open h

, fire protection items in an Inspection Report already issued, the j"-

For previously inspected plants where open items answer is no.

remain in an issued Inspection Report, the new interpretations will t

be used in subsequent inspections performed to close out the open

.f items.

In plants where an inspection has been made but the i'

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Inspection Report has not yet been issued, the new interpretations

'.will be used as a basis for any findings.

It is recomended that the Steering Comittee include the preceeding resolution in its report.

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. 1.3 Toledo Edison Company: Letter (#1127) from R. P. Crou'se to H. R. Denton dated February 14, 1985.

(Endorses the NUFPG coments and provides the following specific coments) 1.3.1 Comment (1): Question 3.2.1 (Acceptance Criteria)

"The discussion in response to Question 3.2.1 of the draft Generic Letter 85-01 states as follows (page 14):

' Conduit and cable tray enclosure materials accepted f

by the NRC as I hour barrier prior to Appendix R (e.g.,

some Kaowool and 3M materials) and already installed by the licensee need not be replaced even though'they may not have met the 325'F criteria. However, new material should meet the 325'F criterion. Justification 4

of temperatures which exceed 325'F is required.'

i It is Toledo Edison's detemination that the final quoted

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sentences should be modified to read

'However, newly identified conduit and cable trays requiring such wrapping should use new material which meets the 325'F criterion or justification should be provided of temperatures ex-ceeding the 325'F criterion.'

Utilizing the different wording wculd prevent situations occurring, such as one conduit undergoing repair being partially wrapped by two differing materials."

Resolution:

The comment is valid. The proposed revision, with an editorial change, has been made. Also see resolution 1.2.2.

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1.3.2 Coment (2): Question 5.3.8(ShortCircuitCoordinationStudies)

"The response to Question 5.3.8, concerning Short Circuit Coordination Studies, states:

' Clearing such faults on non-essential circuits may be accomplished by manual breaker trips l

governed by written procedures.'

The word non-essential may allow misinterpretation with regard to essential vs non-essential circuits, Class IE vs. Non-Class IE circuits, etc.

It is Toledo Edison's understanding that all loads not recuired to achieve and maintain safe shutdown, which may fault anc, cause high impedance ground fault tripping of the j

. sJpply breaker may be opened allowing reenergizing of the bus supply power. Toledo Edison, therefore, recommends that the words 'non-essential circuits' be removed and replaced by

' associated circuits which may effect safe shutdown'."

Resolution:

The recommended revision has been made. Also see resolution 1.1.16.

1.4 Boston Edison Company: Letter (BECo 85-037) from W. D. Harrington to H. L. Thompson, Jr. dated February 22, 1985.

(Requests a 30-day extension of the coment period and provides the following specific coments) 1.4.1 Coment (1): Schedular Relief The comment points out that a "living schedule" including fire pro-

• tection modifications beyond the 10 CFR 50.48 deadlines has been approved oy the NRC. And that, therefore, "The Steering Committee recomendation to follow the schedule dictated by 10 CFR 50.48 without granting the extensions already filed with the NRC will make the fire protection modifications the highest priority. This will preclude the evaluation of other safety issues which could be equal or higher in safety priority than fire protection."

Resolution:

f The comment is valid. Section A of the proposed Generic Letter has been revised to clarify that schedular exemptions based on NRC approved "living schedules" are available and would be issued under 10 CFR 50.12. Also see resolution 1.1.1.

1.4.2 Coment (2): Question 3.6.2(InterveningCombustibles)

Same as coment 1.1.14.

Resolution:

Same as resolution 1.1.14.

1.4.3 Coment (3): Question 4.1 (Illumination Levels)

"Section 4.1, " Illumination Levels", the clarification states

'where a licensee has provided emergency lighting per Section III.J of Appendix R, we would expect that the licensee verify by field testing that this lighting is adequate to perfonn the j

intended tasks'.

The term ' adequate lighting' could be inter-preted differently by the licensee and the NRC inspection staff."

l

Resolution:

It is expected that the licensee and NRC inspection staff would use reasonable engineering judgement to arrive at a mutually acceptable assessment of " adequate lighting." No revision to the Q4.1 response was deemed necessary.

1.4.4 Coment (4): Question 7.1 (Fire Protection and Seismic Events)

" Item 7.1 of Enclosure 5 clarifies the guidelines for the seismic design of fire protection systems in relation to the reactor coolant pump lube oil system, and those situa-tions where seismic events are assumed to be initiators of a fire. The NRC response does not address the intent of the question but establishes guidelines for the seismic design of fire protection systems.

Boston Edison takes exception to this clarification and states that a seismic event is not considered concurrent with a fire and the fire protection systems are not seismically designed."

Resolution:

It is agreed that all or parts of fire suppression systems are not seismically designed. The BTP positions cited indicate what con-siderations should be given to seismic design of these systems (Also, see response to Q7.2). Certain items, such as the RCP lube oil system and the hydrogen lines, were addressed specifically with regard to seismically induced fire.

In both these cases, the fire j

protection measures specified do not involve a fire suppression system. The BTP CMEB 9.5-1 cited in the response does not apply to plants reviewed and approved prior to the issuance of that BTP.

The responses to Q7.1 and 7.2 have been revised to make this clear.

1.5 Northeast Utilities: Letter (A04606) from W. G. Counsil to H. R. Denton dated March 1, 1985.

(Endorses the NUFPG coments and provides the following specific comments) 1.5.1 Comnant (1): Proposed License Condition a) This comment quotes the following excerpt from Section II.

Regulatory Philosophy of NUREG-0885 Issue 4, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Policy and Planning Guidance 1985:

"The Comission intends to shift its regulatory emphasis away from detailed, prescriptive requirements toward general design and performance criteria."

s and states that "While much of the fire protection policy steering comittee report runs contrary to the above quoted Commission policy, the proposed license condition is the most significant one."

b) Section 2 of the proposed license condition would require a license amendment for minor changes to the fire protection l

program having no safety significance (Essentially the same l

as connent 1.1.10).

c) Section 3 of the proposed license condition would impose reporting and review requirements for fire protection greater than those associated with other elements of operating a I

nuclear facility (Essentially the same as connent 1.1.11).

Resolution:

e) The staff acknowledges the merit of the cited Comission policy guidance in general. However, it should be recognized that in the case of fire protection GDC-3 has provided " general design

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and perfonnance criteria", and that the regulation of fire protection requirements solely on that basis has proven in-effective.

As a result, the Commission determined, after analyzing the re-sults of the Browns Ferry fire, that the more prescriptive re-quirements embodied in the BTP and subsequently in Appendix R i

to 10 CFR 50 were necessary, and established the present regulatory requirements. The proposed license condition adds no new requirements.

It only identifies in the license the i

fire protection program committed to by the licensee and ac-

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cepted by the staff in previous reviews.

It also includes an allowance for changes to be made to that program by the licensee I

without Connission approval, and a method for keeping record of such changes.

b) See resolution 1.1.10.

c) See resolution 1.1.11.

1.5.2 Coment (2)/ Resolution: Schedular Relief Same as comment 1.1.1, and same resolution.

1.5.3 Comment (3)/ Resolution: Quality Assurance Requirements Same as coment 1.1.4,.and same resolution.

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. 1.5.4 Connent (4)/ Resolution: Documentation Required to Demonstrate Compliance Same as comment 1.1.3, and same resolution.

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1.5.5 Comment (Sa)/ Resolution: Question 3.2.3(FireDoorModifications)

Same as comment 1.1.13, and same resolution.

1.5.6 Comment (Sb): Question 3.1.1 (Fire Area Definition)

"The response to this question, referring to 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.3.b. indicates that, for safety-related equipment and associated cabling the licensee must '(p)rovide the design criteria for protection of such equipment against inadvertent operation, careless operation or rupture of extinguishing systems

In contrast the regulation itself addresses

' rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.'

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Reference (3? quoting 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 3 LGDC) states '(f) ire fighting systems shall be designed to ensure that their rupture or inadvertent operation f

does not significantly impair the safety capability' of safety-related equipment. We believe that the inclusion of

. the additional criterion of ' careless operation,' is inappropri-4-

ate.

It is not clear what additional concern the NRC intends for licensees to address by inclusion of this term."

Resolution:

}

The comment is valid. The words " careless operation" have been deleted.

I 1.6 KHC, Inc.: Letter from P. F. Riehm to H. R. Denton dated February 14, 1985.

Comment / Resolution:

Same as comment 1.1.4, and same resolution.

1.7 Virginia Power: Letter (85-113) from W. L. Stewart to H. R. Denton dated February 14, 1985.

Comment:

The comment focused on the approach the Commission should take in achieving its fire protection goals rather than on specific mech-anisms for doing so.

It states, based on experience, that fire protection "---is a living evolving issue that does not lend itself to definitive guidance nor swift compliance."

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l Favorable views on the Steering Comittee recomendations are expressed as follows:

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"We are encouraged by such recomendations as: establishing referees to resolve significant differences that arise during inspections, inspection team workshops, expediting inspections n

to obtain a clearer understanding of the status of industry in

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achieving compliance, and designating a central point of con-p tact within NRC to resolve internal conflict. We believe that recomendations such as these reflect not only our experience with fire protection, but indicate that NRC also recognizes that guidance must continue to evolve, that interpretations will change, and that exceptions to the regulations will arise and need to be addressed."

.However, the following reservations in regard to the recommendations are cited:

"On the other hand, we are concerned by such recomendations as: elimination of schedular exempt, ions, more aggressive and expedited enforcement actions, and more regulation (i.e.

standard license conditions) and apparent new requirements (e.g. meeting GDC-1). We believe that recommendations such as these fail to recognize the nature of the fire protection issue.

It is not reasonable to expect that fire protection issues will be resolved and compliance will be achieved solely through mandate. The history of fire protection in the nuclear industry provides ample evidence to support this.

Rather, they will be resolved and achieved through better understanding and continued active comunication between NRC and industry. The issuance of the Steering Committee's policy recommendations for coment is a positive step in that direction and we encourage the NRC to continue in this manner."

In summary, the coment states:

---and we encourage the NRC to adopt the Steering Comittee's policy recommendations that support resolution of fire protection issues through understanding and comunications."

Resolution:

The comment is acknowledged. The approach being taken by the Steering Comittee is, we believe, in accord with the thrust of this comment and is consistent with the overall fire protection objectives of the Comission.

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1.8 New York Power Authority: Letter (IPN-85-08,JPN-85-15)frem C. A. Ncheill to H. R. Denton dated February 23, 1985.

(Endorses

~the NUFPG comments and provides the following specific comments).

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Coment/ Resolution:

The comments are essentially the same as coments 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 (and 1.2.8), and 1.1.3, and the same resolution.

1.9 Georgia Power Company: Letter (NED-85-088) from L. T. Gucwa to H. R. Denton dated February 14, 1984.

(Endorses the NUFPG coments and provides the following specific comment).

Coment/ Resolution:

Same as cobnt 1.1.2, and the same resolution.

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