ML20132E778
| ML20132E778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1984 |
| From: | Mark Resner NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132E314 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-419 NUDOCS 8510010168 | |
| Download: ML20132E778 (2) | |
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U... NucLd AR REGUL ATORY COMMisslON office of Impector an: Auditor Sectc-ter 25, 1954 o.i..ir..........
Report of Interview Albert F. Gibson, -Chief, Operations Branch (GB), Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region II, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, was interviewed concerning his knowledge of the deficiencies in the Reactor Operator Training Program (ROTP) at Grand Gult Nuclear Station (GGNS) as they relate to the restart of GGNS on September 25, 1983.
He also w's interviewed with respect to a September 23, 1983, meeting between Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L) and Region !! officials wherein MP&L allegedly refused to submit a letter they brought to the meeting for the purpose of providing it to NRC. He provided the following infomation:
In general, he noted that in his official capacity, he would have been the individual to provide the input at the Regional level with respect to the competence of licensed operators at GGNS. Concerning the September 25, 1983, restart of GGNS, he does no.t recall beino specifically asked about the compe-tence of the licensed opera. tors. However, he was aware that low power testing
> s going to start on September 25, 1983, and would have spoken up if he i<slieved the operators were not competent to operate the plant.
In his essessment of.tche. discrepancies with ROTP, most of the evidence indicated that the problem was mismanagement on the part of MP&L as opposed to incompetence of the licensed operators.
He recalled that,the discrepancias in ROTP were first disclosed during an NRC training assessment at GGNS on February 15-17, 1983.
It was believed at that time that the discrepancies were a problem related to misplaced or missing documentation.
An operational readiness inspection on August 15-September 1,1983, at GGNS -
tollowed up on the discrepancies note'd in the initial training assessment.
As a result of the findings in this inspection which indicated the discrepancies were more serious than originally believed, an enforcement panel was convened in Region II en September 20, 1983.
The panel discussed the deficiencies in the qualification cards for Reactor Operators (RO) with respect to an appropriate enforcement action. Tha panel deadlocked on a decision in that regard. The panel also discussed the discrepancies in the sense that they were a Material False Statement (MFS).
Because the panel which was comprised of John Michae.1 Puckett, Director, Enforcement and Investigative coordination Start, Richard C. Lewis, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, and himself, could not reach a decision with respect to enforcement action, the matter was elevated to James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator, for a decision.
It was decided on September 20, 1983, that the violation involved was Severity Level III and that the issue concerning an MFS on the part of MP&L would be referred to the Office of Investigations (01).
8510010168 850923 PDR FOIA REBERB5-419 PDR 84-35 Se=tenber 13, 1994 Atlanta, Georcia
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S a erber 25, 1984 Twls COCUWENT IS emoet mTY Os NaC es (C ANED TO ANCTwsm AGENCv et AND 175 CONTENTS Amt NOT TO 88 DISTaisvTE Ovtsect Tat mtCliveNG AGENCv vettwow? *E muisse0N 08 TMt OF *ect os ens *ECTom AND Avoitom.
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2-With respect to the deficiencies in ROTP at GGNS, he not'ed that October 4, 1953, was the first date that he care to the realization that the problems l
He recalled that on that date, MP&L were more than just a paper work problem.
n II officials to brief them on MP&L's incuiry into the training met with Regio.
deficiencies. " Based on the information MP&L provided on October 4,1983, and additional information in that regard that Recion II had develo d, he had OB, DRS, discussions with i
f operator icenses at G NS.
It was
'about suspension anc/or revocat on o resolved from the discussions that there was no strongievidence to indicate operator incompetence, and in consideration of the fact that there was fuel in N
the reactor, it was prudent not to suspend or revoke operator licenses.
He noted that it was not unusual for MP&L to review draft MP&L letters with Region II at meetings.
The purpose for reviewing the draft letters is an It is not a
' effort on the licensee's part to be more responsive to NRC.
method of doing business that Region II encourages, however, MP&L routinely practices business with Region 11 in this manner.
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