ML20132E376

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Ofc of Inspector & Auditor Rept of Investigation Entitled, Congressman Markey Ltr of 840727 Re Region II Actions Re Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Two Issues Concern Training Assessment/Insp.Portions Deleted
ML20132E376
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/19/1984
From: Connelly S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
To: Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20132E314 List:
References
FOIA-85-419 NUDOCS 8510010071
Download: ML20132E376 (3)
v • d • e


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ -

Q .v , ;,,

~

[_ y -

_. c . 4  %,- .

k

?_. ,

cc- *__ 19, 1984 MEnoRANDUM FOR: Chaiman Palladino ,

Comissioner' Roberts ~

Comissioner Asselstine ..

Connissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech 1

5'haron R. Connelly, Director -

FROM:

Office of Inspector and Auditor hA

SUBJECT:

CONGRESSMAN KARKEY'S LtiiER DATED JULY 27, 1984, REGARDING REGION II ACTIONS RELATING TO GRAND GULF

. NUCLEAR STATION ,

L '

Attached for your information is the Office of Inspector and Auditor (01A)' .

Report of Investigation entitled " Congressman Markey's Letter-of July 27, .

1984, Regarding Region II Actions -Relating to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station."

~

l The investigation focused on the two issues identified in Congressman Markey's l July 27, 1954, letter to Chairman Palladino. More specifically, the issues as stated in the letter are: (1) "[D]id Region II officials unnecessaril and/cr inappropriately $ bare informatio,n with the licensee?" and (2) "[yD]id -

Region 11 officials auth6rize a return to operations, and/or allow continued operation, subsequent to learning that the qualifications of Grand Gulf reactor operators were probably falsified and the operaGrs potentially unqual'ified?"

  • The two issues identified stem from a training assessment / inspection,-docu ' ' l mented in Report #50-416/E3-06,.of reactor operator training at the Grand Gulf

- Nuclear Station (GGNS) which was conducted by Region II from February 15 through 17, 1953. The findings of that assessment showed that all of the training records for licensed operators could not be located. Region 11

~

initially believed that the discrepancies with the training records were

' attributed to missing or misplaced documents. However, as time progressed toward the restart of GGNS cn September 25, 1953, through the October / November 1983 timeframe, the broadening scope and increasing severity of the discrep-ancies with the training reportedly became more apparent to Region II. Region II actions relating to the sequence of events briefly described above are the

~

subject, of, Congressman. Markey,'s , concerns.

CONTACT: Mark E. Resner, OIA 492 t.452 - - ,' -

3I 851001oo71 e50923 PDR FOIA REBER85-419 PDR .

" ' " > ................... ....................... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~.- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .~.-~~~~,~~~

. ~ . ~ . .

~ A ........................................ .......~...~. .: ~ .....~...~ ~ - .

"* .................. .. ........ _ .c. . . . . . . . . . . . . .E ML.

E0 My. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FCL SE DHY Withrespec(tothefirstissue,theinvestigatidndisclosedthataRegionII official .did q,dvise Mississippi Power and Licht (MP&L) officials on August 19 1953, that discrepancies with reactor operator training records at GGNS were ,

censidered to be a deviation and could potentially be censtrued as Material False Statements (MTS). Additionally, on Septenber 23, 1983, at least one Region II official verbally cautioned an MP&L Vice Presicent that the discrep-ancies in the training records were considered to be an MFS and not a de-viation as Region II had first believed. The September 23, 1953, disclosure by the Region II officiel was subsequent to discussions on September 20, 1983, among Region II staff, wherein a decision was made to refer the MFS matter to the Office of Investigations (01). On October 18, 1953 Recion 11 formally requested 01 to conduct an investigation of this matter.

opined that if Region II had enter-l tained any thougn es i s n .. e r 3,19S3, of referring this matter to 01, there shculd have been no further discussion of the MFS between Region II and the licensee unless there were health and safety concerns involved. He noted, that to his knowledge, there were no such concerns at that time. The Director, Enforcement and Investigative Coordination Staff. F 11 noted that the heaTth and safety considerations were ninimal. The believes that the- disclosure by Region II caused the objective of the investigation to be.made known prematurely to MP&L and resulted in an element '

of preparedness on the part of certain MP&L officials. From that perspective, he believes..there was a compromise of the OI investigation. i Region II believes .that no improper action was taken by them concerning the  !

! sharing of infomation with the licensee. 'They' contend that it is connon i

practice for Region II, when conducting management _ or enforcement meetings '

with the licensee, to remind the licensee of the necessity to submit accurate and factual information to NRC. Region II believes that it is not appropriate

' for NRC to use entrapnent or stealth in order to trick the licensee into making additional MFS or allow the licensee to continue in unsatisfactory performance of safety-related activities for the purpose of supporting poten-tial enforcement actions.

that Region II staff is provided with guidance concerning the handling of 1 serious matters, to include MFS. The guidance is provided in the context of how such matters relate to all allegations and enforcement actions. However, OIA also noted that no specific documented guidance is provided to the Region 11 staff concerning.what comunications with the licensee are considered i

appropriate s --

or inappropriate when handling an MFS matter being referred to 01.

s . ...,. .. ,.

_ _ .. . . . m _.cw ; : 4

^. ..

..p.% C'

, A*'cz' =.

~

1. ', . l .

" . W ;* ( N ." y r.,;;.y w- :. b b-2  %

f --

- " ~

==--l?E'/ ^ .

[^

The second issue essentially concerns Region II actions with respect to the operation of GGNS subsequent to becoming aware in February 1983 that discrep-ancies in licensed operator training records at GGNS existed.

051 US! DU i

The investigation showed that subsequent to the initial training assessment by Region II in February 1953, the extent of the discrepancies in the training program became apparent to Region II over.approximately a nine to ten month period. From the information developed by Region II during this period, the '

discrepancies in the training program indicated the prcblem was management and administration of the licensee's operator training program as opposed to the 1 ccmpetence of the individual licensed operators. Although there were varying degrees to the severity of the discrepancies in the, training program, l

Region II knew that the operators involved had been exanined and licensed by NRC and believed there was no basis for suspension or revocation of their licenses. OIA noted that Region II officials told the licensee on August 19, 1953, that if Region II knew the Jrainin candfdates committed-to in the 1Renseeg s Finalfor reactor Safety operator Analysis Report license had not been accomplished, the operator exams would not have been conducted until the training had been completed. DIA also noted that NUREG-1021,'" Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," which sets forth the eligibility requirements for reactor operator and senior reactor operator license candidates includes .

training prerequisites.

At the tire of the September 25, 1983, restart of GGNS, Region 11 believed that the operators were. competent. However, during a second Region 11 train-ing assessment conducted from October 31 through November 4, 1983, Region II concluded that-three licensed operators were deficient in their knowledge of In addition, another licensed operator had discrepancies in his the plant.

training records. Consequently, on November,4, 1983, Region II effected the receval of these four operators from their restictive duties.

Finally, the' problers identified with the licensed operator training cul-minated with Region II requiring a recertification by MP&L of the training program for the operating staff at GGNS. t

Attachment:

Report of Investigation ec: iam J. Dircks, EQO, w/ attach

! Sen B. Hayes, Direct &, 01, w/ attach

- Walter A. Magee, OCM, w/attabh I -

\ ,

v -

e 0

m -.

,,,--.-e--.g, . , - - - ,-,,,-,,,,,,,.,-p n,,,, . - , , , ,-----.--.-..,.---,----,-.,,.-,---.-,.,----,..-,,,,g-m-g

. . , > - , , - .,. , -p--- ., - . , - n-,----- , , - - - - - ,

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20132E376&oldid=3458188"