ML20129H555

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Proposed Tech Specs,Consisting of Proposed Amend 115,adding Several Administrative Controls to Prevent or Reduce Likelihood of Low Temp Overpressure Incident
ML20129H555
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 07/16/1985
From:
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20129H537 List:
References
TAC-59325, NUDOCS 8507190234
Download: ML20129H555 (14)
v • d • e


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. RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPEC 1FICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Section Page 3.1.6 Leakage 3-12 3.1.7 Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity -

3-15 3.1.8 Low Power Physics Testing Restrictions 3-15b 3.1.9 Control Rod Operation 3-16 3.2 HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION, CHEMICAL ADDITION AND LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSUKE PROJELTION (L10P) SYSTEMS 3-17 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING, REACTOR BUILDING EMERGENCY COULING, ANU REALTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTEMS 3-19 3.4 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 3-23 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS 3-25 3.5.1 Operational Safety Instrumentation 3-25 3.5.2 Control Rod Group and Power Distribution Limits 3-31 3.5.3 Safety Features Actuation System Setpoints 3-34 3.5.4 Incore Instrumentation 3-36 3.6 REACTOR BUILDING 3-39 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 3-41 3.8 FUEL LOADING AND REFUELING 3-44 3.9 Deleted 3.10 SECONDARY SYSTEM ACTIVITY 3-47 3.11 REACTOR BUILDING POLAR CRANE AND AUXILIARY H0IST 3-49 3.12 SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) 3-51 3.13 AIR FILTER SYSTEMS 3-52 3.14 FIRE SUPPRESSION 3-53 3.14.1 Instrumentation 3-53 3.14.2 Water System 3-53 3.14.3 Spray and Sprinkler Systems 3-56 3.14.4 CO2 System 3-56 iii Proposed Amendment 115 8507190234 850716 2 DR ADOCK 050

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.2 HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION, CHEMICAL ADDITION, AND LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) SYSTEMS Applicabili ty Specification 3.2.1 applies to the operational status of the high pressure injection and chemical addition systems. Specification 3.2.2 applies to the operational status of the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

Systems when the RCS temperature falls below 350* F and is not open to atmosphere, which includes the Reactor Vessel head removed, any one of the 4 OTSG manways open , the pressurizer heater bundle removed, or the pressurizer manway removed.

Objective Specification 3.2.1 provides for adequate boration under all operating conditions to assure ability to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition. Specification 3.2.2 defines the necessary conditions for preventing an excessive overpressure transient to occur at low temperatures.

Specification 3.2.1 The reactor shall not. remain critical unless the following conditions are met:

3.2.1.1 Two pumps capable of supplying high pressure injection are operable (also see Specification 3.3.2).

3.2.1.2 The borated water storage tank and its flow path to the reactor for high pressure injection are operable.

3.2.1.3 A source of concentrated boric acid solution in addition to the borated water storage tank is available and operable. This requirement is fulfilled by tne concentrated boric acid storage tank. This tank shall contain at least the equivalent of 10,000 gallons of 7,100 ppm boron. System piping and valves necessary to establish a flow path for high pressure injection shall also be operable and shall have at least the same temperature as the boric acid storage tank. One associated boric acid pump is operable. The concentrated boric acid storage tank water shall not be less than 70F, and at least one channel of heat tracing shall be operable for this tank's associated piping.

The concentrated boric acid storage tank boron concentration shall not exceed 8,500 ppm Doron.

Proposed knendment No. 115 3-17

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.2.2 The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System will require the following conditions:

3.2.2.1 LTOP will be manually enabled prior to the Reactor Coolant System temperature dropping below 350*F during

' plant cooldown.

3.2.2.2 All HPI Systems will be locked out whenever the RCS temperature is below 350*F. This shall be done by opening and tagging the circuit breakers for tne four HPI Motor-0perated Valves (Loop A: SFY-23809, SFV-23811; and Loop B: HV-23801, SFV-23812) with the valves in the closed position.

3.2.2.3 The makeup tank water level is to be less than 86 inches.

3.2.2.4 The pressurizer water level will be maintained at or below 220 inches at system pressures above 100 psig and less than 275 inches for pressures less than or equal to 100 psig except durin~g RCS filling and draining.

3.2.2.5 The core flood tank discharge valves are closed and the circuit breakers for the motor operators are racked out before the RCS pressure is decreased to 600 psig.

3.2.2.6 When LIOP is required, only one HPI pump will be operated except during the transition of pumps that will supply Reactor Coolant Pump seals and makeup flow for the RCS.

Proposed Amendment No. 115 3-17a

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1  !

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

  • l l

l Limiting Conditions for Operation l i

storage tank during critical operations. The minimum volume for the borated water storage tank (390,000 gallons of 1800 ppm boron), as specified in section 3.3, is based on refueling volume requirements and easily satisfies

the cold shutdown requirement. The specification assures that the two

! supplies are available whenever the reactor is critical so that a single

! failure will not prevent boration to a cold condition. The minimum volumes of boric acid solution given include the boron necessary to account for xenon i decay.

I 1 The quickest method allows for the necessary boron addition in less than one i hour. The primary method of adding boron to the primary system is to pump the l concentrated boric acid solution (7100 ppm boron, minimum) into the makeup 1 l tank using the 50 gpm boric acid pumps. Using only one of the two boric acid i pumps, the required volume of boric acid can be injected in less than 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The alternate method of addition is to inject boric acid from the borated water storage tank using the high pressure injection pumps.

Concentration of boron in the concentrated boric acid storage tank may be 4 higher than the concentration which would crystallize at ambient conditions.

l For this reason and to ensure that a flow of boric acid is available when

! needed, this tank and its associated piping will be kept above 70F (30F above the crystallization temperature for the concentration present). Once in the high pressure injection system, the concentrate is sufficiently well mixed and diluted so that normal system temperatures ensure boric acid solubility. The i value of 70F is significantly above the crystal!ization temperature for a solution containing 12,200 ppm boron.

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The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOP) consists of both an active and a passive subsystem. The active subsystem utilizes the l

ElectroNatic Operated Valve (EMOV) which provides overpressure protection during nonnal plant operation. The EMOV actuation circuitry has been modified i to provide a second setpoint (500 psig) that is used during low-temperature ,

operations. The low setpoint is manually enabled at 350*F by positioning a  !

key-operated switch in the Reactor Control Room. An alarm will sound in the i Reactor Control Room if the reactor coolant pressure falls below 450 psig and

, the key-operated switch is not selected for low-temperature operation. After

! selection of low temperature operation, additional alarms will occur if either

HPI pump breaker is not racked out; if either Seal Injection flow is greater l than 42 gpm or makeup flow is greater than 135 gpm; if HPI valves are not

! closed; and if the EMOV block valve HV-21505 is not open. The passive l subsystem is based on the plant design and operating philosophy that precludes

! the plant from being in a water solid condition (except for system j hydrotests) . The Rancho Seco Reactor Coolant System always operates with a steam or gas space in the pressurizer; the. steam bubble is replaced with i nitrogen during plant cooldown when system pressure is reduced. The l

requirements for a maximum pressurizer level provides for a sufficient vapor space in the pressurizer to retard the rate of increase of RCS pressure, as l compared to a water solid system for all mass and heat input transients. In j this manner, the operator will have time to recognize that a pressure j transient is in progress and take action to mitigate the incident. For these i reasons the pressurizer water level will be maintained at or below 220. inches  ;

i Proposed Amendment No. 115 l

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation at system pressures above 100 psig and less than 275 inches for system i pressures less than or equal to 100 psig. The only exception to these requirements will be when the RCS is being filled or drained. During the i filling process the pressurizer is filled with water up to the 320 inch level. The High Point Vents are opened and nitrogen is injected into the pressurizer hence forcing the coolant into the loops. Subsequently, the High

! Point Vents are closed, a steam bubble is drawn and the nitrogen is released through the pressurizer vents. During the draining process, the pressurizer is depressurized, the High Point Vents and RCS Hot Leg Vents are opened thus reducing the RCS to atmospheric pressure. The loop coolant level and i pressurizer level equalize at 320 inches and draining can then take place.

In conjunction with the enablement of LTOP at 350*F and the subsequent restriction on pressurizer level, analysis has shown that the HPI system is not needea when RCS temperature falls below 350"F. The requirement for a maximum makeup tank level limits the mass input available from the tank should 1 the makeup valve fail open.

i When LIOP conditions are required, only one of the two HPI pumps or the makeup pump will be allowed to operate Rancho Seco normally operates with the makeup pump supplying makeup and seal injection. Should, in the unlikely event, degradation of this pump occur while in the LTOP mode, it would be necessary to start one of the HPI pumps before stopping the makeup pump. This scenario would result in a brief overlap time period where an increase in flow through j the makeup line would occur. However, because the operator is aware of the LTOP conditions, it is expected that this brief transition stage would not significantly increase the level of the pressurizer and the probability of an over-pressurization incident.

J' Separate power supplies are provided for the EMOV circuitry and LTOP alarms which alert the operator of an overpressurization event so that a single power

source failure will not disable the ENOV and LTOP alarms. This assumes the 4

operator is alerted so he can take action to terminate an event even if the EMOV is disabled. These alarms are high pressurizer level, high - high pressurizer level, and high makeup tank water level.

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! REFERENCES I

1 FSAR subsections 9.2 and 9.3.

2 FSAR Figure 6.2-1.

3 Technical Specification 3.3.

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l Proposed Amendment No.115 3-18a e_.. .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - __ _ ._

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards TABLE 4.1-2 MINIMUM EQUIPMENT TEST FREQUENCY ltem Test

1. Control roos Rod drop times of all Each refueling shutdown full length rods
2. Control rod Movement of each rod Every two weeks movement
3. Pressurizer code Setpoint 1 each refueling safety valves interval
4. Main steam safety Setpoint 2 per steam generator valves each refueling interval
5. Refueling system Functional Each refueling interval interlocks prior to handling fuel.
6. Turbine steam stop Movement of each valve Monthly val ves
7. Reactor coolant Leakage Calculated inventory system weekly Leakage check daily.
8. Charcoal and high Charcoal and HEPA Each refueling interval and efficiency filters filter for iodine at any time work on filters and particulate could alter their integrity.

removal efficien-cies. 00P test on HEPA filters.

Freon test on charcoal filter units.

9. Fire pumps and Functional Monthly power supplies
10. Reactor Building Functional Each refueling isolation trip interval
11. Spent fuel Functional Each refueling cooling system interval prior to fuel handling
12. Turbine Overspeed Calibration Each refueling Trips interval e-Proposed Amendment No. 115 4-8

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards TABLE 4.1-2 MINIMUM EQUIPMENT TEST FREQUENCY Item Test 13.. Internals Vent Manual actuation,1 Each refueling Valves remote visual inspection,2 interval verify valve not stuck open

14. Reserved for Proposed Amendment 83, Supplement 2, Revision 2
15. Low Temperature Functional 3 Prior to less than Overpressure 350*F Protection (EMOV)
1. Verifying through manual actuation that the valve is fully open with a force of < 400 lbs. (applied vertically upward).

2.- Check visually accessible surfaces to evaluate observed surface i rregularities.

. 3. EMOV block valve closed during test.

i Proposed Amendment No. 115 4-8a

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RANGNU SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) tilSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

Channel Description Check Test Calibrate Remarks

57. Voltage Protection S(1) H R (1) Coupare voltmeter readings t

) a. Undervoltage M R

b. Overvoltage H R
c. Time Delay SU. Reserved for Proposed Amenduent 8J, Supplement 2, Kevision 2 Reserved for Proposed Amendment 83, Supplement 2, Revision 2
59. I Reserved for Proposed Amenoment 83. Supplement 2. Revision 2
  • i 60.

. bl. Reserved for Proposed Amendment 83, Supplement 2, Revision.2 b2. Reserved for Proposed Amend.nent 83, Supplement 2. Revision 2 .

63. Low Temperature Over- N/A (2) R (2) Prior to cooldown pressure Protection (EMGY)

S = Each shift M = Honthly P = Prior to each startup if not done previous week D . Daily y = yuarterly R = Unce during the refueling interval W . Weex1y SY . Seuiannual f Proposed Amendment No. 115 a-7c m

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.iRC letter dated 11/2/77. Docket 50-312 104363 U/A .

IE Information Norice No. 82-45 dated 11/19/82

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. CESCRIPTION OF THIS CHANGE >

I paioviet A oETA ED DEsCMPTION ANO TT5 EPPEc7 oN PLANT OPERATION. WC:.uot SEETCHEs ANO oTNER PEWnNENT INPomasATION TO COMPLETELY ossemat ANo tu.usrnATE wow cwAMot is To suNenoN As wEu. As n.LusTnATE wTumpAcEisi wrTN ExisTmc EQutPMENT. WO6CATE WMAT NEW '

cowooNENTrsi AmE mEcuinEn. onawacs Ap*EcTtD AND ESTIMATED TOTAL Cost or peoJECT.

The system recuired to be installed under this ECN is for protecting the Reactor Vessel l from overpressurization at low temperature of RCS. A portion of this system has been l installed under ECN A-3652A, B, and G; A-4329; and A-4792 to provide desired function and l protection at low temperature of ECS. The remaining work will be accomplished during h 1985 and 1986 refueling outages. The work that must be acco=olished in 1985 is outlined below:

1. Provide an alarm from pressurizer relief block valve HV-21505 to alarm in the control room via IDADS ccmputer if t.he valve is closed and,LTOP is selected. Install cable from HV-21505 to nearest channel 3 multiplexer. i

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2. Provice an ilarm from HPI pump circuit breakers 34A04 and 54307 if either breaker. is not racked out of its cell, when LTOP has been selected at H1RC. Install cable from S4A04 co UCOAR3 and f n.u Gw* i.o H4CDAR5.
3. P'rovide an alarm in the control room via IDADS computer from HPI to RCS loop 'B' 2 lI valve HV-23801 if the valve is open and LTOP is selectgd. -stall cable from H2SFB (valve HV-23801) to channel B multiplexer H4CDAR5,9, #/2rr .
4. Program the IDADS cemputer to provide alarms as shown on sheet o2 'f 2 of this l ECN - LTOP LOGIC DIAGRAM. j

-Drawings affected: E-203, sheets 58D and 60C; E-700 , series; E-337, sh'eet 15; P n'" ** '

i Total cost for 1984 outage:

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  1. ## g6lpSS HLRC ALARM - RC S PRESSURG 44S~J PSI 6 pq go, RCS PRESSUAG Loo! N ' ZGL EC.T LTOP P T- 2 10 5 I

. PLANT WORK HAS pagog 2CS PRESSURE Loop a' BEEN COMPLETED p7-2105'O ON JUN 01 1985 c RANCHO SEC

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2e p.trpose of this design change is 'to provide a cc::guter alarm via l Interim Data Acqaisition and Display System (IDADS) when the Reactor Coolant System ,(RCS) pressure (PT-21050 and Fr-21051) gets below 450 psig if Is Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTCP) is not selected. '

tis design change will correct the potential problem of a single power source failure disabling an overpressure protection system alarm.

Additional computer alarms are provided via IDADS to preclude the p ssibility of overpressurizing the RCS when IE P is selected. Rese i additional alarms are pressurizer relief block valve (BV-21505) closed, .

High Pressure Injection (EPI) pu::ps (P-238A and P-23%) notor breakers i not racked out, EPI to RCS inlet valves (SN-23809, SW-23810, SW-23811, and SW-23812) not closed, the long term cooling valve {

(EV-23801) not clcsed, and high flow (PT-23603 and FT-23606) to RCS. I i

e These additional computer alar =s regaire IDADS ccmputer software I prograrmirig.

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II. Dmm Col"'ron ce:  ;

i A. All circuitrv and cable between the pressurizer relief block valve and nultiple$cer E4CDARS (channel B) shall be CA Class 1. Ib  !

B. All circuitry and cable between the EPI p.:::p circuit breaker cells (in S4A04 and S4B07) and E4CDAR3 and E4CDARS shall be CA Class 1. ld i C. All circuitry and cable for the long term cooling valve 57-23801 between E2SFB and.E4CDAR9 (Channel B) shall be CA C:sss 1. ] .

D. W e following codes and standards are applicable to'this design '

change: I m nsor Rrter 9siec*

ISA S.S.1 Instru:entation Symbols and Identification NEMA NC3 Rubber Insulated Wire and Cable Transmission and hC E Distribution of Electrical ON JUN 01 1985 Energy (I'iCEA-S-19-81)

RANCHO SECO SITE DOCUMENT CONTROI.:,

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g E. Other ; W 11 cable Design Criteria;

1. Cable tray fill shall not exceed 40% by the addition of new cables to existing trays.
2. All exposed conduits for the power and control cables shall be ,

rigid steel.

3. All new cables shall be identified with new scheme cable
  • nunbers. ,
4. Raceway, cable, and wire markers shall be of the same type as those orginally provided at Rancho Seco.
5. Existing conduits, terminal boxes, cable trays, etc., shall be '

used where possible.

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III. cArcarATIots AND DESIGN INFXwATIOm ['

A. A currently spare limit switch contact 433-5 on pressurizer relief valve block valve 87-21505 shall be wir d and connected to nultiplexer H4CDARS. The limit switch will be actuated (contact '

opens) when the HV-21505 valve starts to open. Shielded pair cable '

shall be used. ,

B. An alarm will occur in the control room via IDADS displays if the i HV-21505 valve is closed when L"CP is selected at the ERC console.

( IDADS programing and above wiring is required to be acconplished prior to startup of cycle 7. . ,

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. I C. Spare cell position switches for HPI pump circuit breakers 54A04 and i S4B07 will be wired to E4 Q AR3 and H4CDARS respectively. Shielded pair cable shall be used.

D. An alarm will occur in the control room via IDADS displays if  ;!

breakers S4A04 and S4B07 are not racked out of their resW:ive cells when LE:P is selected at the ERC console. IDADS prograuming and ,abcVe wiring is required to be accomplished prior to startup of cycle 7. .

E. A limit switch contact 433-7 for valve HV-23801 at H2SFB (across red light) shall be wired to nultiplexer H4CDAR9. The limit switch will be actuated (contact closes) when the HV-23801 valve starts to open.

d Shielded pair cable shall be used.

, F. 'a alarm will occur in the control room via IDADS displays if either of the HPI to RCS inlet valves SW-23809, SW-23811 ard W-23812 are not closed when IIIOP has been selected at the ERC console. An alarm will occur in the control room via IDADS displays if both the ,

long %rr. cooling valve 57-23801 and SW-23810 are not closed when

  • LTOP has been selected at ERC console. Necessary cabling and connections were rade to SW-23809, SW-23810, SW-23811, and SW-23812 during the .1983 outage. IDADS pre. gram % pgAge@ W l
  • . be conpleted prior to ststup of cycle 7. EEEN COMPLETED

.ON JUN 011985 2 of 4 RANCHO SECO SITE DOCUMENT CONTROLL

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G. An alarm will occur in the control room via I R S displays if either Seal Injction Flow exceeds 42 gpn or RCS Inlet Flew exceeds 135 gpn when L':UP has been s.*1ected. at the ElRC console. Necessary cabling l and connections were rada to m23606 and PT-23603 respectively ,

during the .983 outage. IDADS programing is reqaired to be completed prior to startup of cycle 7. ,

i H. An alarm will occur in the control room via IDADS displays if either '

RCS pressure (PT-21050 or PT-21051) goes below 450 psig when L'ICP has not been selected at the ElRC console. Necessary cabling and'

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connections,were completed during the 1983 outage. IDADS programing is regaired to be completed prior to startup of cycle 7. '

I. Software iogic for these alarms is per attached sheet.

IV. FATimr ovmE: , ,

Failure of egaignent installed by this design change will only affect alarms provided in the control room by this change. All previous alarms and status lights associated with L'IOP will be available. The circuit (power supply) for status lights associated with valve HV-23801 is protected. Existing operating procedures are also backup to these d ,

alarms, since proper exercise of the operating procedures should alleviate the need for all the alarms.

a V. MJ1 VMEWI"2 CEMTVM"S:

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l This design change meets the~ intent of NRC letter dated Noverber 2, i 1977. i VII. sv-tal ceL'eAmr ormTur"EN"s: -

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Cognizant Engineer,A e / M Date

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ALAAm- HP.T pump 9238 A OR &

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Pows 1 AVAILA6LG* _ . _ _ _

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R- -- ----- - - - - - - . - . - - - - -

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g ;cg Lont 76mp QVERPRES30R9 CROT $fLGCTfD 661:ss M1*C 1 ALARM MIGH FLota 70 RC SY17CM gggy SEAL I^/JEC.TDN Mi&M Flotsi >42Gpm FT-23606 m pgggy R.C. INL E T Mi&M Ft. cal y 135 Gem Q ,

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-10 0 2. . - - - . . -. . . . . - . . - -

po H Di' TO LOOP'A ' V A L V6 NDT C LC$6B -

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