ML20129F201
| ML20129F201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000447 |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1984 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127A304 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-175, FOIA-84-A-66 NUDOCS 8506060704 | |
| Download: ML20129F201 (84) | |
Text
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GEBIEltAL ELB3RIC COIFAIIT PittHtlETAftY Trastment of Fire and Flood Event lineertainty In the GE analyses of fire and flood events, no explicit uncertainty analyses were perf crmed.
Uncertainty analyses were carried out f or the internal ' plant events and for the seismic analysis, it is GE's belief that the fire and flood anclyses are closer to upper bound estimates than best estimates.
As noted in response to NRC staf f questions, conservative evaluations were performed of fire propagation and suppression, evalIabilIty of internal fIood sources and in fire propagation modeling.
Fur-thermore, the driving fcree for fire and flood events (i.e., quantitles of com-bustible materials, available water sources, etc.) are better understood than driving fcrees f or seismic events, leading one to conclude that the uncertain-ties should probably be smaller.
By comparison to the internal events, the contribution to core damage frequency and plant risk associated with.f.Ir.e-and flood-initiated events is small4 ce 3D*
4cc Therefore, based on the preceding Information, it is concl uded that a detailed, quantitative uncertainty analysis is not warranted.
i 8506060704 841203 PDR FOIA CURRAN 84-A-66 PDR
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Quest' ion 720.150 Does the GESSAR II seismic hazard curve represent the best estimate (p. 15)? Describe the procedures used to generate the GESSAR II hazard' curve and the other curves shown in Figure 2.2 of your report.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION i
Question 720.151 (a) In Section 2.3.3 it was indicated that the GESSAR-II seismic hazard curve was constructed as an." arbitrary bounding curve" of four best estimate curves from plant specific studies.
How does your " arbitrary boundary curve" take into account the possibility that hazard curves calculated for other plants in the eastern U.S. may exceed the GESSAR-II seismic hazard curve.
(b) Provide the supporting evidence and calculations used to show that the GESSAR-II seismic hazard curve as stated in your report (p.16) would bound "more than 80% of the potential GESSAR-II sites."
Response
(3) Z'b U CxfCldd that the lii77erick, E/EV)> Ccf.5/Cr C/CC h and Indthn /%wM xibms: facard enke,s o'c gicsenfahie of ca. stem L/.3. sk:s and,7sedde a sense:viab/c repeznfahdn of potenfrist 6ESSMR sfes. The curve does not account dr hofard eartes Hvphnf.s h3 ftae m.skyn 4(3. fhaty exceed the G&1setz.2T sesimk haaord corx. & wever, a.t />oted th the di.Sch.s.sibn of the intended ispksrienfahiv> of the GES.54rl Jedsmk 4rxzitf.sh, a site -ay;nbd6 fxuard cytyc 4a// bc ydcd Sr ewnjwaion /c the 6ESMR E emw bdeterinine the aynchEadi///y of the genedc Q&q<ig.
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KWH: rf/G01031*-2 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.152 Provide the supporting bases for extrapolating the existing seismic hazard curves to obtain as stated in your report on page 13 "a.
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realistic median-centered upper-bound curve" beyond 0.8g (p.15).
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Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.153 Please elaborate on what is meant on page 12 of your report, "the seismic hazard capability, represented her.e as a seismic hazard curve, is unique."
Response
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l GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.155 Describe the procedure by which the specific structural components were selected to evaluate the fragility of the seismic Category I structures (for example, how the flexural capacity of the auxiliary building was derived).
Response
The procedures for the evaluation of the fragility of the seismic Category I structures are described in GESSAR II Section 3.2.3.
For example, the procedure for the evaluation of drywell wall and shield building are given in pp. 36-39.
See also response to question 720.161.
KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-6 1/27/84
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.156 Discuss the possible effects of the interaction between the buildings.
Also, include interact. ion between seismic Category I arid non-Category I
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.157 Discuss the plant-specific features and structures which may need to be evaluated as far as the structural fragility i.'."estigations are concerned.
Provide the interface requirements for piot-specific application (for example, interface requirements for the ;+ eel vessel containment which will be designed by the future applicant referring to GESSAR).
Response
Interface requirements for plant-specific application in 1
support of PRA requirements and coraclusions will be specified in appropriate interf ace documentation between GE and future applications.
For example, the relatively simple requirement that the suppression pool region not be the first locus of containment failure is readily communicated by GE to the future applicant..See also MC resfense. b pheb 72o,174, v) 6f
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.158 The relationship given in the Section 3.2.3.1.3 between the ductility of the dampling.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the interaction between duration, damping and the inelastic energy absorption has been considered.
Provide discussion to indicate how individual factors of safety and the logarithm of the standard deviation accounts for interrelationship between these parameters.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.159 The general fragility model is based on the simple assumption of the multiplicative model which implies. independence between individual factors of safety. As this method has been unverified, discuss how did you assure that the overall factor of safety resulting from that approach and associated standard logarithm deviation are reasonable.
Response
As sne Me-of #e-ad appmach, the inah6ficaNe mode /
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPkIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.160 i
It should be noted that duration effects are dependent upon the magnitude of.the earthquake, how did you consider this relationship.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.161 Provide detailed calculations supporting fragility values presented in Tables 3-2 through 3-19.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
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Question 720.162
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The applicant should discuss the considerations given to the pertinent geotechnical parameters in developing factors of safety associated with fragility analyses.
Specifically, the applicant should address the contributions of the geotechnical parameters to the degree of uncertainty associated with each factor of safety.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.163 The applicant should discuss the uncertainties associated with the following potential site-specific external-events-related failures on the core-melt probabilities:
(i) liquefaction of site soils, (ii) differential settlements affecting structures, systems and component failures, (iii) consideration of dynamic earth pressures beyond those considered in the design, and (iv) slope failures affecting performance of ultimate heat sink functions.
The seismic loading to be considered in the analyses of items mentioned abvve should reflect loading beyond the seismic input considraid.in the GESSAR II design (up to 0.95g).
The applicant should also justify the applicability of these analyses on a generic basis to all potential sites meeting GESSAR II design criteria.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.164 It is not clear that the applicant has considered the possible failure of non safety related structures or equipment which could impact on safety-related items.
The applicant is requested to provide a description of the procedure of evaluating the effects of failures of noq-safety related structures or equipment on safety related structures and safety-related piping systems and components and their supports, which could lead to a possible core meltdown.
Response
The design basis for safety related items is to ensure that the failure of non safety items cannot impair the function of the safety related items.
For example, mechanical and divisional separation help to preclude the total loss of any required safety function.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.165 It is not clear that the applicant has considered the possible failurs. of piping systems and components due to differential movement or tilting of structures.
In addition, it is r;ot clear how the applicant has considered the failure modes of buried piping which may be influenced by geotechnical parameters, e.g.,
soil amplificat. ion.
The applicant is requested to confirm that these effects which could eventually lead to a core meltdown, have been considered and included in its evaluation. ' Alternatively, provide the basis for not considering them.
Response
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(ii) There is no seismic Category I pipes buried in soil in the standard GESSAR, design and therefore the effects stated M not
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u GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.167 There are several essential piping systems which are required to deliver rated flow and be designed to retain dimensional stability when stressed to the allowable limits associated with the emergency and faulted conditions, e.g., the functional capability of the piping is required to be demonstrated.
It is not clear that the applicant has considered the functional capability in its evaluation of piping failure modes.
The applicant is requested to assess its evaluation given the above concern.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION j
Question 720.168 i
There are several safety systems connected to the reactor. coolant pressure boundary-that have design pressure below the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure.
There are also some syste.as which are rated at full reactor pressrue on the discharge side of pumps-but have pump suction below RCS pressure.
In order to protect these systems from RCS pressure, two or more isolation valves are placed in series to form the interface between the high pressure RCS and the low pressure systems.
Failure of these isolation valves (from either excessive leakage or rupture' will allow the high pressure reactor coolant to communicate with the low pressure piping outside of containment.
Rupture of the low pressure system would result in loss of coolant outside of containment and possible core meltdown.
It is not clear how the applicant has considered the above concern in its evaluation of valve failure modes.
The applicant is' requested to assess its evaluaticn given the above concern.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.169 Hiah fragility values.of. structures and components are indicateo.
Inese values should initiate an overall fai. lure mode such as foundation failure, a ground stability problem etc.
There should be a cap on structures and components fragility level that is consistent with an overall failure mode.
Response
The use of high f ragility values is not inter.ded to suggest that these values will actually be realized in the event of,an extraordinary earthquake.
Clearly there will be some other structure or component which will limit overall behuvior.
These have been ident.ified in the analyses: the relative values provide an index of resistence and potential failure mode.
Potential foundation failure or ground stability problems have not been included because they depend on site specific information f or analy sis.
KWH:rf/G01031*-20 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.170 Fragility estimates for components whose seismic failure could lead to a cpre melt should be examined in some detail.
This could be accomplished by looking at similar components from an actual plant /
reference plant.
In addition, sensitivity of the seismic contribution to core melt due to a shift in the capacities of those components that are very near the capacities of the critical components should provide greater insights into the robustness of GESSAR design, for' example shroud support, CRD Guide Tube, Hydraulic Control Unit, Electrical Power etc. A detailed look at fragility estimates should highlight the local response values in terms of accelerations and corresponding frequency range of critical / controlling components such as relays, contactors, breakers, control logic elements etc.
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KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-23 1/27/84-
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.171 In order to understand the influence of earthquakes on the course and consequence of a severe accident it should be clear in our minds whether or not the earthquake happens before or after the accident.
If the accident occurs after an earthquake, we should consider the effect of the earthquake on the consequences of the accident, for example the failure of the stack may cause ground level release of radioactivity, buckling of steel containment can affect its ability to prevent leakage through large penetrations.
Should the accident occur prior to the earthquake, fragility levels for certain parts of containment can be substantially affected because of the accident loading. Provide. sn asse.csinmf of t/se, nnpact of afters / veno I
en Severe earthquake, ori Care c/sinap frv gaca
Response
The seisin5 ereirt sna/ysa anyh<ed Geisnai-s,*hikd we domap nests. MEY Therek Conyoned and s+ruch/rd fxl/ vies tsere mesged bwd m -Mie /M shock and the we deme 9e fh)}rtSC/b/1, p/dj CdlCa/dW.MGM 'i 8/JC at ?&'W, 2
KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-24 1/27/84
7 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.172 Assumptions regarding leak path and behavior of locks, seals and 0-rings are very much influenced by time at temperature.
- Also, certain types of details can be more prone to deterioration due to temperature.
Inflatable seals are generally exposed to local temperature effects such as in personal airlocks for some plants.
Detailed discussion regarding leak path and orientation and design of critical penetrations is necessary to assess the protection available in the GESSAR design against severe accident.
Response.
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KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-25 1/27/84
3 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.173 Identify any new equipment and modification to specific plant j
features that if int.orp. orated have a high poten,tial for risk reduction relating to seismic events, fire, and internal floods.
Response
The hijh Ital bf piv/ec.Adn affeclectby t/re, f ESSRR. JT deuyn pr admQ.fde-anc/ //ood ikl4iakd events is ewHencref by de ibW
&n+r:bulion lo Core dainafe freguincy from Such ini/infors. Therepre, no add:Auss or rnoO'E('cafins k fAe 6GssAteX deshn are needed h lower 44e d/resdy 6njmfy,xy risk and none have been /W&di)G?c/.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.174 Ind'icate what interface performance specifications are envisioned to compensate for the lack of design detail in the 80P features.
' Response The interface performance specifications are delineatec in the GESSAR II' Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0979) Section 1.10.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.175 Provide basis for not considering variation ~s in the construction material of the containment basemat or variatior.s in the ultiinate strength of containment.
-Response e
Section 3.2.3.1.2 Strength Margin, F of the Seismic Event
-Analysis does-include a discussion of the effects of variations in the ctrength properties of :the~ construction materials included in the
.cubject analyses.
It is'further noted that the Codes and Standards which control the construction material properties are all based on establishing minicus requirements.
The practical cutcone of this practice is to effectively cut off the low end of any property distributica curve.
Actually most such curves based on naterials used in nuclear gewer
. plants will be very narrow based.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.177 The ultimate capacity calculations by GE for the steel containment based on limit analysis using the ultimate. strength of SA 516 grade 70 steel may be questionable.
Please provide justification for such an approach.
Response
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KWH:rf/G01031*-28 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.178 The discussion on fracture, especially in weldments is not presented in a manner that could be evaluated.
The contention that cracks will develop only when stresses are between yield and ultimate' strengths should be justified.
Response
The materials which are used for the plate elements and the welding materials for steel containment structures are tough, ductile materials. The procedural controls for welding include, among other things, appropriate preheating requirements; the objective of course, is to produce weldments which have material properties close to those of the base plate materials.
In addition the structure is neither restrained nor acted'upon by external straining devices which produce high local strains which might lead to local cracking.
'It is our belief that our assumptions are reasonable, conservative' and well within demonstrated engineering practice.
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KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-31 1/27/84
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.179 The use of Equation G.8.25 for calculation of buckling of the knuckle region geometry should be justified.
It is also not clear-how thermal effects are factored into the calculation.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.180 In reviewing the pressure time curves for hydrogen detonation (i.e.,
Fig. G.10-1) with the BNL accident analysis group, we were told that the figure'may not represent the time pres ~sure phenomenon accurately.
Any impact due to the inaccuracy of the time pressure phenomenon on the containment capacity should be further assessed.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIE*ARY INFORMATION M ion 720.181 The use of dynamic load factors to represent the dynamic effects of H, detonation in the analysis of complex structural systems undergoing large plastic deformations is questionable.
Provide a discussion to justify such a usage.
Response
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KWH:rf/G01031*-32 1/3/83
GENERAL' ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.182 i
PP.597:
The loss of integrity has been assut.ed to occur wher, either the ultimate tensile strength in the high stress region is reached or cracks develop.
Raasons for not using other criteria, e.g.,
maximum strain in the steel containment, are not given.
Please discuss the basis for not using other failure criteria.
Response
The,struchral mfabdij uWuoe'f aezs tw?d/cled as a paid of du meds kmer /E4 skot'f. As.xxh, -the tawiMnmarf am&<ic ftvfroh ses mf iMended ab be on exhatuMe a/udy of at/possibk
.s/nickrol aspech of ceviMrmwr/ khawk. Langt, iaz.rimb/c andwidersAxndable o.1samphths see inost h pmoore a.
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cat /d /Jouc leen inrot. 4/30, ase of mo.rimum strain cideria E:r liailure criferia asi//pwksblefgik ontwexs wy c/ose k thase iesathy frein this skid;.
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KWH:rf/G01031*-33 1/3/83
GENERAL CLECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.183 rd PP.6004 Details of determining the crack size in concrete 3 d, are not provided.
Provide the basis for the crack size 4 '-
' oetermination.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.184 PP. 607:
Temperature range that was considered in the analysis has not been identified.
Please identify the range and the basis thereof.
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.185 PP.609:
Details of stress calculations in the knuckle region (Table 6.2-1) are not given.
Provide details of the stress calculation.
Response
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KWH: rf: cal /G01031*-38 1/27/84
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.186 PP. 609:
Formula for a in the column for P should be pr/2h instead of pr/h.,In the same column o should be rIplaced by o.
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Response
The corrections have been noted.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
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Question 720.188 PP. 611:
The ring-stiffeners and the crane girder used in the
. finite element mc.:el (Figure G.2-2) are not described in the report.
Please describe trese items in sufficient detail for use in analysis.
Response
The details in question have been provided. b 4L [tTVdM submutal dakd 9-9-13
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question-720.189 PP. 616:
The calculations for P in Region 4, and for Pg+Pb I"
Regions 1, 3 and 4 need to be el rified.
Responst See the response to question 720.185.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.190 PP. 619:
It is not clear what the compatibility condition (Eq.
G.4-3) represents.
Provide a discussion.
Response
Eq. G-4-3 represents compatibility of radial displacements of the-inner shell and the outer shell.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.191 PP. 620:
Details of the pressure carrying capability of the ECCS lines are not given.
Please provide a more detailed discussion.
Response
Tl1c Crkinalpra'sSyre-Cartcjlng Capab 4
ad ArcA diameter Schafule 40 pphp 5 ye// As trCess of 300 psi).
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.192 PP.- 655: The details of the calculation for p = 1.056 x 10 3 should be provided.
Response-Details are provided in G.8.1 of Appendix 15D.3.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION I
Question 720.193 PP. 655 & 656: The notation used in Eq. G.9-2 is not consistent with Eq. G.9-3.
In Eq. G.9-2, (F (s) should be replaced by f (s) and x should be replaced by s:
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Response
The correchias here. ken nelen:/.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.194 PP. 656:
How was the expression for the ultimate moment [i.e., 1.5 Mo + (S
/Sy - 1) Mo] derived?
ult
Response
Giben fft h//owthg cross..sechbn and stress o'sshbahen A
L et 1 i-a s,
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.195 PP. 656: What do the cases A, B and-C represent? Please explain.
Respon'se Please replace " cases A, B and C" by " cases with gradual pressurization".
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.196 PP. 659: What is the basis for X = 51 psig shown in Fig. G.9-1?
Please provide a justification.
-Response f '.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPAN(
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.197 PP. 659: What is the definition of " normal deviation" in Fig. G.9-1 and Fig. G.9-2?
Response
Please delete " normal derivation" from Fig. G.9.1 and Fig. G.9.2.
The scale for " normal derivation" was not shown.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.198 How does the Appendix G fit into PRA analysis? How are the results of Appendix G utilized in PRA? What specific and products of Appendix G are required by PRA?
Response
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anebud a~d Ara *# # #
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.199 Provide bases and calculations that backed up the results of pressure capabilities listed in Tables G.1-1,an.d__G.1-2.
Also explain how the 3jfj conclusion that 4
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% m ved at.-
Response
Table G.1.1 is the summary of results presented'in section G.2, G.3, G.4 and G.5.
Table G.l.2 is the summary of results presented in Section G.6.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY l
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1
Question 720.200 Provide backgruend information of the ASHSD computer program (Ref.
G.2-1).
Car this program, which is based on axisymmetrical' finite
. element shell model, be used for non-axisymmetrical loading? If yes, please explain how it is achieved.
Response
ASHSD is a computer program for structural analysis of elastic, axisymmetric structures using the finite element method.
It can deal with both axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric loads and the loadings can be static or-time-varying forces or ground acceleration.
By approximating a three-dimensional deformation (due to non-axisymmetric loading) with Fourier series of sine and cosine functions of the circumferential coordinate, the program reduces the three-dimensional problem to an equivalent set of two-dimensional solutions and combines them to yield the three-dimensional solution.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.201 Indicate the significance and location where various stresses listed in Table G.2-1 occurred, such as P,,
P, P ' Q, etc.
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Response
Pm is the membrane stress through the region.
P, P and Q ccur at f b the locations of discontinuities.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.202 At,the lower port, ion of containment shell the 8' concrete shall has been treated as " thin" shell (Equations G.4-2 and G.4-3).
What magnitude of error has been introduced by this assumption? Compare the calculated capability pressure of 74.9 psi (p. 15.D.3-619) with the calculation of the stress in the steel shell when the concrete wall is treated as thick shell.
Response
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~ GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.204 NE 3133 of ASME Section III code consists of design formulas and procedures.for shells under external pressure.
It is not clear what is meant by "the~ buckling-criteria given in NE 3133."
(p. 15.D.3-638).
Response
ASME NE 3222 " Buckling stress values" refers to NE 3133.
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1 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.205 It is not clear how the failure mode of maximum shear be considered.
It is mentioned in Section G.2, but not in G.8.
Response
7h: moxt}num sheat -theory assaines 7h/ yie/dj Qih.s when ihe. irk 1xdnum chear abrss ex/ds af the fiddpush/ in asm)/t k.c/,
airke the maxdnum aber abrss sh 7he traviarial 4 gmt k sne br//
the diWeenes k/ ween the manhwin and mihiinum pahapal she.szc.
The cmc /a.sdvsgkn ni G8 h cashbrf wi/h thh Mery. Thefashi yid /d4 o'en/ qed ti; ths knueble regAn asAex 1h hay die.ss Q h th compressan and Me merk/ din.r/ Shr.ss Wp h th k:nsidn. 7 hey seen irwifar in sech62 G.2 (p9e iSD. 3-ka) o.s we//as ih seefan G.6 (page /3.0. 3-62/).
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.206 Define X in Eq. G.8.10 and P in Eq. G.8.25.
Is Q in Eq. G.8.4 transverIeshearorinplanef5 ear? There are mixed-ups of notations *in App. Gia hor been used for stress and standard deviations; P for pressure, load, and probability; and stress can be a, s, or f.
Response
m th ystbein 6.8./O showAdbe y/eard by $m X
P,, sh yaArn 6s.2S h de/wied as it>e back/ny pesswc of M>e bisphencal de//.
.Q th yakio G.8.4 4 the han.werse a;4 eor force y aoW A />9 i.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.207 What is the relation between loss of integrity and failure? What is the difference between " fracture" and " crack"? What is " plastic yi' eld"? It is something different from " yield" or " elastic yield"?
Response
(1).
In this study, failure implies breach of containment, or other-structure in question.
Loss of integrity implies the same.
(ii). The terms " fracture" and " crack" are synonymous.
- Also,
" plastic yield", " yield" and " elastic yield" imply the same in this report.
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GENERAL Ei.ECTRIC COMFAN.
PROPRIETARY INTORMATION Question 720.208 What are the bases of making the following assumptions?
Structural capability d' pends only on geometrical dimen'sion and a.
e yield strength of material.
b.
Normal distribution of probability of yield and ultimate strength at testing.
Probability of developing cracks varies linearly between 5 and c.
Sult
- d.
Only o = 0.1 X and o = 0.15 x are considered.
x x
Response
(a) yh Q} h bouws en the, concle.ston fem the wwk p.swrhwr' t
(b) See Ref. G.9.1.
(c) A simple assumption to reflect that the higher the stress the higher the probability of having cracks in the region of consideration.
(d) Ex = Standard deviation h=Coefficientofvariation=0.1or0.15forsensitivity purpose, Wh*L I /3 the mean H2/ac e/yg x,.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.209 What is the physical significance that OLF is less than 17 Stould it be required that static load be used when OLF is less than 1 such as the case indicated in Table G.10-5?
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.210
-Describe how and why does a local detonation affect the structural response (e.g., location and distribution of the pressure pulse, shock wave propagation and refraction / reflection, thermal effects) and how are the dynamic load factors obtained.
Indicate locations of potential failures in containment or at drywell and the probability corresponding to each failure.
Response
See section G.10.3 for detailed explanation on the effects jU from a local detonation.
Locations and potential failures in the
.,1 containment or at the drywell are discussed in Sections G.3 thru f,/t G. 7.
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GENERAL ELECTR'IC COMPANY PROPRTETARY INFORMATION Question 720.211 In assessing the response to non-condensible gas generation or to local and global hydrogen combustion, it is stated that loss of containment integrity would eventually occur in the torispherical dome region (15.0.3-661, 662). What are the ' physical failure boundaries? How would it affect the release of radioactive material to the environment?
Response
The physical f ailure boundaries are primarily in' tt:e knuckle region.
Because of the scrubbing function of the supression pool is.taintained release of radioactive products is' negligible.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.212 If the pressure-carrying capability in the torispherical region is significantly higher than that predicted by th.e analysis, what would be the worst impact on steel containment due to~a hydrogen detonation?
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.213 The specific GESSAR design seems to have minimized the possibility of a fire causing both an initiating event and disabling the mitigation systems. The analysis performed by GE indicates that the dominant contribution to failure of mitigation' systems will be due to random failure of components rather than the impact of fire.
Hence, for a fire PRA performed under this condition it is necessary to include all the areas for which a fire can cause initiating events into any study of the estimations of proper residue core melt probability, regardless of the impact of fire on the mitigation systems.
Provide an assessment of the impact on the core damage frequency from such consideration.
Response
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(N. SC(Centby j1rverst phtJ t/ Sect k idenh Cr:Wcal locahJns by he fde analysh. Soms Q<tas were excluded as crika/ /oca6&s Sn-one or /nore of '>%e fo //oWing rL*SJons.*
d 4he fr'e frequency Wds Vt'rg sinot/
- 4) de locah'an factno safe 4 re/a/edqupmexl' Fue eyansple, the.rafe s/mfdun /sh'en juz>saMp snos //'r nh. all power an'/ab/e is too +sws dan pthen )w' ann.1 ond' 4 are imJsaha' de.
If all foue Blants'ns o/ puee ote annua.lo4/e' the dare damote (requency it AMU"""' N N 1' 0 Q 171c u n Y e /
comhan:bie mstera/j/ntt/
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.214 Due to the fact that the GESSAR fire PRA takes credit for rated barriers as a strong fire propagation prevent measure, it is important that the adequacy of barriers and penetrations be systematically analyzed.
Provide an assessment of the impact due to such considerations on the core damage frequency.
Response
The GESSAR design is, in effect, a " pod" design. That is, the emergency core cooling equipment is grouped in adjacent rooms to form a pod within that area of the plant.
Individual pods may be broken down into subcompartments by walls, floors or ceilings which are rated as fire barriers.
Raceways do not nomally penetrate from a pod (fire area) of one safety divisiontoapod(firearea)ofanothersafetydivision. Where crossovers between divisions do occur it is because a redundant division must monitor the operating state of the opposite division.
The only time this happens is if there is a sensor from a different divis. ion located within a given fire area to determine if the system within that area is functianing properly. Failure of the intruding division sensor concurrent with failure of the redundant division within the given fire area is assumed and analyzed to verify that the situation is acceptable.
In addition, the penetrations are rated barriers which have been qualified by type test. The propagation of a fire across the fire barrier is hfh/g dnpithab/e..
therefore ht-lCH [fdpenG h Ccre g/pinafe h) /dC -InIbbW eents an be arYr:4aN A> nse caissd/eraks.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.215 Since almost half of the cabling in the GESSAR plant is routed through conduit embedded in concrete, it is important to consider fire propagation to adjacent areas through migration of combustible vapors in conduit.
Provide an assessment of the impact due to such considerations on the core damage frequency.
Response
._.. - The statement that half of the cat, ling in the GESSAR plant is routed through conduit embedded in concrete is not true. Less than 10% would be a more likely number.
However, where embedded conduit is used, it nonnally starts in an area of a given division and ends in an area of the same division.
For example, the division 3 embedded conduit between the control building and the diesel generator building starts in the division 3 diesel generator building and ends in the division 3 termination cabinet.
in the control building. There is no propagation patn to any other divis,f on.
Also there are intermediate pull boxes along the conduit runs and'the conduits are sealed to prevent water flow along them. This water seal will also prevent propagation of combustion products down the conduit.
Even if the seal is destroyed for a conduit end in the fire area, the other end which is remote from the fire area will remain sealed. The probability of the propagation of a fire beyog*d gc d re ama in i,d ch th fi m e
originates is considered to be the tran$ission of combustible vapors.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.216 For a plant design such as GESSAR it is strongly recommended that a fire area adequacy matrix be constructed to assess effects of high fuel load areas contiguous to critical areas.
Provide an assessment of the impact due to such considerations on the core damage frequency.
Responst With the exception of the diesel buil' dings, there are no fire areas which contain a "high fuel load". The fire barriers which are basically walls, ceilings and floors are designed to have a capability in excess of that required by the relatively low fuel loading within any given area. The high fuel load in the diesel generator buildings is within the safety area and has therefore been evaluated along with other failures within the area. Therefore, there are no high fuel load areas adjacent to safety areas in the GESSAR design which could impact the considerations on core damage frequency.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.217 Smoke propagation to the control room or the remote shutdown panel should be considered.
Provide an assessment of the impact due to such considerations, including human error probability, on the core damage frequency.
Response
The control room and remote shutdown panels are in two completely different buildings.
Each building has its own ventilation system and smoke venting system and is capable of being operated in the buttoned-up mode where there is no make-up air being taken in from the outside. The remote shutdown panels are in the auxiliary. building and the control room in the control building. There is a three hour fire rated wall between the two buildings. The remote shutdown system is divided into two divisions with two separate remote shutdown areas within the auxiliary building.
Each remote shutdown area has its own HVAC system and smoke removal system. This in actuality provides three independent control areas insofar as smoke propagation is For this reason it is considered that there is as neg iglh/c.
l concerned.
['3 impact on the probability of core damage from smoke propagation to e
control areas.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.218 How was the screening analysis performed?
Response
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r GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.219 The probability of loss af offsite power together with the probability of fire in the diesel generator when running has to be considered (not standby agde).
The probability of diesel catching fire /per demand = 7.3x10.
Probability of loss of offsite power 2.1x10_4= 0.3/ year. LOSP x fire in one diesel generator room =
(LOS P)
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.220 The P factor is not an appropriate parameter to be incorporated since it does not relate the GESSAR plant to the data source.
If used at all the factor should relate the available fuel surface area (not projected area) of the GESSAR geometry to the same quantity in areas from which fire initiating data was taken.
In other words to use the GESSAR plant-specific P-factor, the plant-specific P-factor from which the fire-frequency data was culled should be factored into the area-specific frequency estimates.
Response
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e k dafit dd/ no/ ihelude a, p-facy Z + o x a ic/'
be ihtoneef k anuine 4/uti ewy hie shinaE"'
in a room saanid thelve the combaswe fuet ioadinj ih. -thal room, A v e yn m p le, a (,;e ar pom syns'ironf fuelJoaxes woa/d
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.e GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.221
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,Then it is not clear why only the Zone-1 Corridor is included in the analysis and the Zone-2 is excluded.
Response-So,,8
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.222 It is claimed that the resultant ignition frequencies as defined in this report are more conservative relative to those defined in the Limerick evaluation (P-2-11). That may not be true in all cases.
For example, in the control equipment room there are 14 power generation control complexes and termination cabinets, hence 1
14:2.2x10 4 m3.0E-03 where GESSAR used,'
36 4h Pfc Vi d o A. It5" E 4 C4e1 in Wha'ck te.b s'n SOSA non @ wieWa h and qssess as g'mpa d.
Response
"In oje nero. l S c.
GEs.sAR. E fik iniHechdn -fregue.tcies y
are conservedh re la.fh 4c he deMecl in 4t. lime (ich eva(wahk. There mm.3 6e.
Speci.f.E values wa. are /wr h -Nsc v. sed in Limevicic & af desujn doNerYrco, koakr nd -iteessardy non-conservabhe.
%ese valu.es es th
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.223 It is not clear how fire growth time was estimated to be 12 times suppression time for fire propagation through a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall, 50 ft.
of control room and another 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall. -One possibility is to p3 stimate growth time as 360 min. for the 2 three hour barriers plus, about 90'~ minutes for the separation (30 minutes to each 20 ft.).
This, combined with use of an overall average suppression time of 39 minutes would result in a growth / suppression time ratio of 11.5 minutes. Was this the reasoning used?
Response
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e-GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION puestion 720.224 Onpage2-13shouldgheprobabigityforfir9damagetoredundant divisions be 0.5x10- = 2.5x10- or 2.5x10- as stated? Explain?
Response
There is a fpogrsphds/ ernr.
7he number skned be. a..se-4 u>hdA is +he number-used ih Kglue, D-10 to oWak 1./ E-9 per year, s,. ~.,
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GEhERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.225 In control room and control equipment room the fire scenario is not clear.
The suppression probabilities and growth times are similar
.to the Limerick Fire PRA for the situation where a cabinet fire propagates out of the cabinet and ignites cabling at the top.
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However, this situation seems not to exist in the above mentioned zones.
A.
Why is propagation to cables considered? Are these exposed cables or are the cables considered internal to the adjacent panel?
8.
What rational was used to conclude that panel propagation has a higher probability then cabinet propagation?
C.
Where is Figure A referenced on Page 2-14?
D.
The cited Limerick calculation for transient combustibles (paper) considered the ignition of cable insulation located 10 ft. above the fire.
How does this relate to the cabinets and panels in these areas?
Response
A, B, 0.
W,
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GENERAL ELECTRIC Ce # ew PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.226 In the electrical equipment room the cited COMPBRN evaluation of the Limerick PRA, yielding a 10 minute fire growth and a fire probability to suppress o.f 0.4, considers a self-ignited cable tray fire propagating to another cable tray 5 ft. above.
However, there are no exposed cables in this room.
Explain the scenario?
Response
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.227 It is not clear why in some scenarios barrier failures are considered when in others they are not.
For example, in the control equipment room the possibility of barrier failure and propagation of fire ~to the electrical equipment room has not been considered.
What is the criteria for barrier failure?
Response
There is no criteria for barrier failure.
In the example cited, the equipment in the electrical equipment room is the power supplies for the control equipment located in the control equipment room. Loss of equipment function in either or both rooms has the same effect. One division of safety equipment becomes nonfunctional. The' wall between these two areas is not required for safety considerations.
It is there to provide a degree of sub-compartmentalization so as to minimize the amount of equipment which might be affected by fire.
Sub-compartmentalization is a feature which has been utilized throughout the GESSAR design.
A significant portion of the fire barriers within the GESSAR design are between areas of the same division and are not required to meet the safety design criteria for the plant. They are provided to minimize the amount of equipment affected by a fire. The considerations for this were plant availability and cost of recovery.
From a strict safety standpoint, the breach of these barriers would not result in the loss of any additional safety systems.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 270.228 It is not clear which initiating events are associated with each critical fire area.
Response
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c GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.229 In the auxiliary building electrical equipment room and the cable tunnel the necessity of considering transient combustible exposure fires is indicated in Table 2-1., but no analyses are presented.
Response
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KWH: rf/G01031*-78 1/3/83 L
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.230 For all critical locations considered in the analyses given in Section 2.4.2, explain the following:
Which initiating event (transient) results as a consequence of a.
the fire?
b.
Which transient mitigating systems (if any) are disabled by the fire? This information should be given for the case in which j
the fire is suppressed and for the case it is not suppressed.
c.
Do the fires in their critical locations disable cables which supply the PCS?
Response
B.
b.
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KWH: rf/G01031*-79 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.231 In page 2-14 is is stated that the control room is assumed to be nonfunctional during a fire in the room. However, in the corresponding event tree (Fig. 2.7) it is assumed that the control room is non-functional only if the fire is not suppressed.
Explain this difference.
Response
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4 KWH:rf/G01031*-80 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.232 In event tree for the control room (Fig. 2.7) and for the control equipment room (Fig. 2.8) it is assumed that for a shutdown from the
' remote shutdown panel all systems (HPCS, RCIC, CPCI, RPCS, CIS, ADS, PCA, and RHR) are potentially operable from that panel.
However, in the GESSAR-II SAR the only systems control from the remote shutdown panel are: RCIC, one RHR loop and 3 non-ADS SRVs.
Explain this difference.
Response
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- y' KWH:rf/G01031*-81 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.233 In page 2-15 it is stated that the " failure to the remote shutdown panel was taken to be 1x10 gafely shutdown from from NUREG-1278".
Explain how this value was obtained.
Response
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i KWH:rf/G01031*-82 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.234 In Figures 2.14 and 2.15, the unavailabilities used for the HPCS (2.5E-2) and for the RCIC (8.2E-2) are smaller than the ones used in the GESSAR-II internal events PRA.
Explain this difference.
Response
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KWH: rf/G010318-83 1/3/83
-l GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Question 720.235 In Figures 2.14 and 2.15, the unavailability of the ADS with loss of one division of power (Division 1 for Fig. 2.14, and Division 2 for Fig. 2.15) is 8.0E-5.
Is the 120V AC NSPS bus E(F) (Gate EAC120NSE(F) in GESSAR-II EPS FT in Fig. D.2-14) assumed to be lost when one division of power is lost?
If so, explain the value obtained from the ADS unavailability.
If not, explain what is meant by loss of one division of power.
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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
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PROPRIETARY INFORMATION t
Question 720.334 Provide an assessment in terms of core damase frequency and risk of an inadvertent operation of the fire sprinkler system as a cotential initiating event of internal fToccing in the 3ESSAR-II design, given the fact that there is present a larce number of electrical ecuipment which is net qualified for adverse envirenrsntal conditions in eut vicinity of tne scrin'ler system.
Response
The sprinkler systems UTILIZE CLOSED HEADS.
The piping is charged with water continually. Actuation of a sprinkler head is by melting of a thermal link in each individual head. Therefore inadvertent actuation of the sprinkler system requires the failure of an individual head. This is equivalent to a pipe leak in that area. The compartmentalization of the GESSAR 11 design is such that a pipe leak in any given area containing sprinklers can only affect one safety division. Therefore, the consequences of a sprinkler head failing open is the same as a pipe leak. The probability of a sprinkler head failure is not considered to be highir than that of the failure of a piping
,1' system.
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KWH:rf/G01031*-16 1/3/83
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 239 Question 720. E
?rovice an assess: ent in tems of co e dana:e frecuency anc risk of tne ficoding of diesel generator and urbine buildings foli: wing a severe eartnoate and a loss of offsite :ower.
Response
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