ML20129C067
| ML20129C067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1983 |
| From: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129B955 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-210 NUDOCS 8506050398 | |
| Download: ML20129C067 (8) | |
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ELAS4%I UNITEC STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.E REGION IV
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ARUNGTON. TEXAS 76011
//
b, 611 RYAN PLAZA oRIVE. sulTE 1000 D 2 31983 3I MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Office of the Executive Director of Operations FROM:
John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, RIV
SUBJECT:
OIA REPORT " REVIEW OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR SOUND ENERGY ABOUT CONDUCT OF REGION IV INVESTIGATIVE / INSPECTION" I have reviewed the OIA report on concerns expressed by the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) concerning Region IV.
I would comment that i
Region IV has been placed in an advisary role due to the full time involvement i
of the RIV staff in the Comanche Peak Hearing.
There is only one part of the report that I would like to make specific comment and that is with regard to confidentiality.
In 1980 time frame, it was felt that confidentiality was generally offered to protect an employee from an employer.
How confidentiality was applied during that same time frame also varied in all regions.
For example, in one Regional Office the alleger and other persons contacted were identified in the investigative report unless specific confidentiality was requested.
Region IV in the 1980 Policy Guide choose not to identify allegers or other persons contacted during an investigation except as individual A, B, C, etc.
The Region IV Policy Guide referenced by OIA addresses only the withholding of names within an investigative report.
It did not address the board policy issues of confidentiality.
With regard to Mr. Atchison, there was never any written agreement or documented acknowledgement of a request for confidentiality.
His
. confidentiality was at best only implied.
His identity was not provided to the licensee while he was in the employment of the licensee's contractor. The Senior Resident Inspector only provided his identity to the licensee after he was terminated.
There was no broad policy provided the Senior Resident Inspector either by Region IV or the NRC regarding confidentiality.
With regard to Region IV divulging Mr. Atchison's identity in written prefiled testimony and oral testimony during the July 1982 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) hearings, Mr. Atchison in his July 16, 1982, prefiled testimony states that he contacted the NRC Region IV Investigator on the next day after he was fired in 1982 and. in Mr. Atchison's July 19, 1982, prefiled supplemental testimony, he stated that he went to the NRC investigator with the 1980 Chicago Bridge and Iron defective weld allegations.
His supplemental CV 8506050398 841227 PDR FOIA GARDEB4-210 PDR
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J. Dircks' testimony discussed in broad details his 1980 allegations.
Region IV's prefiled testimony, which identified Mr. Atchison as the 1980 alleger, was filed on July 19, 1982, concurrent with the filing of Mr. Atchison supplemental testimony and subsequent to his July 16, 1983, profiling of-his original testimony. In as much as Atchison identified himself in his July 16 & 19, 1982, prefiled testimony as having contacted the NRC investigators, Region IV does not consider that Mr. Atchison's identity was improperly divulged during the July 1982 ASLBP hearing.
Region IV also feels that there are other circumstances surrounding the divulgence of Atchison's identify; however, we have been unable to reconstruct the details.
I am aware that the Commissioners are reviewing the subject of confidentiality.
I feel that an overall policy guide for the NRC should be established to include but not limited to internal handling, requests for confidentiality, written agreements with allegers, disclosure during hearings, replies to Congressional requests, and FOIA requests.
W k
ohn T. Collins Regional Administrator cc:
R. DeYoung, IE G. Mulley, OIA D. Oriskill, OIA:RIV Attachments:
1.
Atchisons July 16, 1983, Prefiled Testimony Pages 1 and 43 2.
Atchisons July 9, 1983, Prefiled Supplemental testimony, Pages 1, 3, 5, and 6 w-
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7/19/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of i
Docket Nos. 50-445 APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES and 50-446 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES) i SUPPLEMENTARY TESTIMONY OF' CHARLES A. ATCHISON WITNESS FOR INTERVENOR CASE (CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR S00fiD EflERGY)
Q.
Mr. Atchison, since filing your testimony on July 16, 1982, have you thought of additional concerns regarding the Comanche Peak nuclear plant?
A.
Yes. I have.
Q.
Could you tell us what those concerns are?
A.
Yes.
One concerned a vendor audit which was done about February 1982 of Tennessee Wall, Tube and Metal by Jerry Walker of Texas Utilities and a job-shopper who was a Houston corporate Brown & Root auditor.
They found that Japanese-made steel was being used to manufacture the instrumentation ' tubing.
This was not supposed to be allowed. They came back and wrote a draft audit de-ficiency against it.
The company then had thirty days in which to respond, i
then the auditors either accepted or rejected it.
In this case, it all created quite a stir.
Prim Lahote went back to the company and someone performed tests on that one particular last batch of instrumentation tubing and presumably it
)
met some of the chemical requirements, and it was closed out. Jerry Walker made g,
f the statement that he would never sign his name to it to close out the audit gel '
j d'eficiency.
-r x
a deficiencies and took some pictures of it where they were not doing the proper
. inspection on the welds.
This caused quite a controversy when he got back on site, so they sent' a' group back out there from Brown & Root and the second trip they actually caught CB&I falsifying documentation on inspection reports.
John
-Maxwell was the lead auditor on that audit.
He was onsite for Brown & Root, an NDE Level III and auditor. He's now with TUGCO, I believe.
Q.
What other action was taken?
A.
Two or three of the people at CB&I were fired and a couple of them demoted because'of it. A 50.55(e) report (a report of a reportable deficiency) and an NCR was written on it.
Ron Tolson and Jim Hawkins were trying to get things calmed down -- they didn't seem to be too concerned about ttotheNhf I
H it and talked to the investigators ab came to the jobsite the same day that three truckloads of the products came in.
The NRC.made them go through a backfit program -- the utility comitted to it.
A CB&I inspector I
came down to the jobsite; after two weeks on the jobsite, they couldntt get them properly ground, welded and put back together, and the three truckloads h
were rejected and sent back.
/
Q.
Who was involved with all that?
A.
Well, Don Beddingfield was one of the Quality Assurance Engineers at the time and was the head of the site surveillance group; John Maxwell was site l
!!DE Level III, and I was working for both of them.
The NRC interviewed them and me and a couple of others about it.
Q.
Do you have anything else in that regard?
}
A.
There was another incident that was partially related to it.
Rose Klimist was the Brown & Root Quality Assurance Manager regarding anything to do with ASME, safety-related items.
She would fight Ron Tolson when he would try to i
m,a
been inspected and had been welded properly.
When you go in to do a vendor audit..you look at the documentation program, the QA program, you follow it step-
.by-step through the facility.
If there are parts there for a current contract, you look at. those parts too.
You don't 0.K. the inspection on them, but you look at them for acceptability of the documentation.- He got out there and there was slag that had never been cleaned off of any of the we.lds, yet.CB&I had the paperwork documenting that it had been completely checked by mag particle and liquid penetrant tests.
And they hadn't even been touched.
The next morning he came back out there and the parts he had looked at had been sitting outside in the snow'in 320 weather, yet the inspection report had been signed off where they had been inspected with. liquid penetrant.
The thing is, you can't do a liquid penetrant inspection unless the part is at least 600 temperature.
And they still had snow on~them from the day before and had never been moved, yet they had inspection reports filled out on them.
Q.
What k,ind of parts are we talking about?
A.
These were moment restraints, which is a sister item to pipe whip restraints.
The CB&I inspector admitted he didn't actually look at the parts himself, but that he was just handed the paperwork, told they were ready, and he signed it.
When John Maxwell got back to the plant site, there was a meeting which Jim Hawkins, Ron Tolson, Rose Climist, and John Maxwell all attended.
John Maxwell told me about it.
They discussed the problem, then turned around and John Maxwell, Jack Henline, and Greg Benetsan (spelling ?), I believe it was, went back to CB&I a short time later on two other audits.
'After all that the procedure was changed.
They'd go out and have a
.~ 3. -,-
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number of them ready to be shipped in and they'd have a complete drawing, purchase order copy, piece and item number, and would do them piece by piece.
They'd sign for them and actually check off which ones they actually looked at and physically released from CB&I.
That stopped after Rose Klimist left'.
John Maxwell told me that the documentation at-CB&I had been falsified and that he actually took some Polaroid picture of the. parts himself.
I don't know who has the pictures now.
The NRC did see the pictures, though.
The NRC. investigation, Don Driscoll, was there with the three-man team along with
.the~ f;RC when the three truckloads pulled in from CB&I.
Q.
Is the company still buying parts from CB&I?
A.
Yes, primarily moment and pipe whip restraints.
Q.
Is the paperwork 0.K. now?
A.
Nobody really knows for sure. The receiving inspectors aren't Level 11 inspectors, so they can't visually check the welds when the parts come in.
After Rose K11 mist was te-minated, Jim Hawkins became QA manager and the whole subject was dropped. They still have a bunch of contracts for pipe whip restraints.
O.
Is there anything else about CB&I?
A.
One other related thing which concerns me is that normally you go into the Comanche Peak permanent record vault and you have a receiving inspection report number to get to CB&I's records.
On the pipe whip restraints, for example, that I rejected and brought to their attention regarding these same type of defects, I went to the permanent plant record vault after I found receiving and inspection reports and there was just a note in there that'all the NDE records would remain at CB&I until completion of the entire contract, so there are no actual inspection records there at the Comanche Peak job site of what has been done at CB&I.
- Also, l
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[p 7/16/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPtilSSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD -
In the Matter of-Docket Nos.50-44S i
and 50-446
- APPLICATION ~0F TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR
= AN OPERATINGL LICENSE 70lI COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC
-STATION UNITS #1 AND #2
~
(CPSES)
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. ATCHISON, WITNESS FOR INTERVENOR CASE Q.
Please stat'e your name, residence and educational and work background.
A.
Charles Alsie Atchison, 744 Timber Oak, Azle, Texas 76020.
A state-
, ment of my educational and work background is attached hereto as Attachment 1.
Q.
Are you presently egloyed?
A..
No.
Q.
What is your educational background?
A.
I obtained a GED (a general education test); I'm a high school graduate.
I attended Tarrant County Junior College, Texas Wesleyan College in Fort Worth
}'
for a special instructor seminar, and Weatherfor Junior College for a special radiological monitoring course under the Texas Civil Defense (about 1958-59).
I've also attended Fort Worth Drafting College in basic drafting.
Q.
When did you graduate frcmi Weatherford?
t A.
It would be 1960. The GED was obtained in 1961 at Texas Christian University and a' subsequential diploma from Weatherford High School.
f Q.
Did you get college credits for the radiological monitoring course?
l A.
No.
1 Q.
You graduated from high school and now attend a college toward an advanced degree 7 A..I first attended Tarrant Ccunty Junior College on a part-time student basis in 1968. I believe it was, until the end of, the semester of 1971.
~
see if they're in' the same condition.
In the field they have already been installed and there are others that 'are being installed like these have been.
And they did not want to address them.. As of this point I started talking about going to' the Site Nuclear Regulatory Comission Inspector with this problem.
t-Q.
And did you?
A.
I didn't have a chance.
- Q. Why?
A.
I got fired.
Q. Did that stop you from going to the NRC Inspector?
A.
At 5:15 in the afternoon when I was fired I attempted to see him, but he had gone for the day.
Q.
Did you attempt to see him the next morning?
A.
Yes, but not on site.
I had to go through the Arlington office. Here
- 1 talked with Mr. Don Driscoll, not the site inspector.
Q. Mr. Driscoll is with the NRC ir "irlington?
A.
Yes, he is.
Q.
Did you talk to Mr. Taylor, the NRC site inspector?
A.
No'.
Q. Why not?
A.
He wasn't available to me; he was on a job site, and I was fired fmm the
~
job site, and I had no concern to go back.
Q.
Could you telephone him?
A.
I probably could have.
Q. Why didn't you?
A..Well, my personal opinion-is that while Mr. Taylor's credentials and stuff may be impeccable, he is short on work force; he's one man trying to watch 4,000 crafts and 200 inspectors do a job, and he may not consider this a concern.
E
V I
8 "4%
UNITED ST ATLS 0
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f g-f REGloN IV REVISED COPY - 12/2/83 i
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUlit 1000
\\,
,8 ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76011 November 23, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations FROM:
John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV
SUBJECT:
DIA REPORT ENTITLED " REVIEW 0F CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR SOUND ENERGY ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF REGION IV INVESTIGATIONS / INSPECTIONS" I have reviewed the OIA report regarding concerns expressed by the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) concerning Region IV.
As you are aware, Region IV has been placed in an advisory role due to the full-time involvement of the Region IV staff in the Comanche Peak hearing.
My specific comments on the report deal with the matter of confidentiality.
In 1980 it was felt that confidentiality was generally offered to protect an employee from an employer.
How confidentiality was applied during that time also varied from Region to Region.
One Regional Office identified by name the alleger and other persons contacted in the investigative report unless specific confidentiality was requested, whereas Region IV's policy was to identify those individuals only as A, B, C, etc. This policy, set forth in the Region IV Policy Guide cited by OIA, addresses only the withholding of names within an investigative report.
It did not address the broad policy issues of confidentiality.
With regard to Mr. Atchison, there was never any writter) agreement or documented acknowledgment of a request for confidentiality.
His confidentiality was, at best, only implied.
His identity was not provided to the licensee while he was in the employment of the licensee's contractor. The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) provided his identity to the licensee after he was terminated.
No broad policy was provided to the SRI either by Region IV or Headquarters regarding confidentiality.
Another issue raised in the report involves Region IV aivulging Mr. Atchison's identity in written prefiled testimony and oral testimony during the July 1982 A'tomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) hearings.
Mr. Atchison, in his July 16, 1982, prefiled testimony states that he contacted the NRC's Region IV investigator on the day af ter he was fired in 1982. Mr. Atchison, in his July 19, 1982, prefiled supplemental testimony, stated that he went to the NRC investigator with the 1980 Chicago Bridge and Iron defective weld allegations.
His supplemental testimony discussed his 1980 allegations in great detail.
Region IV's prefiled testimony, which identified Mr. Atchison as the 1980 alleger, was filed on July 19, 1982, concurrent with the filing of Mr. Atchison'sC]$
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es
~
William J. Dircks November. 23, 1983 supplemental testimony, and subsequent to his July 16, 1983, prefiling of his original testimony.
Inasmuch as Mr. Atchison identified himself in his July 16 and 19, 1982, prefiled testimony as having contacted the NRC investigators, Region IV does not consider that his identity was improperly divulged during the July 1982-ASLBP hearing.
Region'lV also feels that there are other circumstances surrounding the divulgence of Mr. Atchison's identity; however, we have been unable to reconstruct the details.
As the Commissioners are currently reviewing the subject of confidentiality, I
feel that an overall policy guide for the NRC should be established to include, but not be limited to, internal handling of requests for confidentiality, written agreements with allegers, disclosures during hearings, and replies to Congressional and F0IA requests.
, av. /
0
( ohn T. Collins Regional Administrator
' Attachments:
1.
Atchison's July 16, 1983, Prefiled Testimony, Pages 1 and 43 2.
Atchison's July 9, 1983, Prefiled Supplemental Testimony, Pages 1, 3, 5, and 6 cc:
R. DeYoung, D/0 IE v/. Mulley, OIA-G D. Driskill, 01: RIV 4
.y
~
7 ;..:
- h h 7/19/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD s
- In t.he Matter of i
i Docket Nos. 50-445 APPLICATION OF TEXAS-UTILITIES and 50-446 GENERATING-COMPANY,.ET-AL. FOR
~
AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS #1-AND #2 (CPSES)
{
SUPPLEMENTARY TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. ATCHISON WITNESS FOR INTERVENOR CASE (CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR SOUND ENERGY)
Q.
Mr. Atc.hison, since filing your testimony en July 16, 1982, have you thought of additional concerns regarding the Comanche Peak nuclear plant?
f-A.
Yes, I have.
'Q.
Could you tell us what those concerns are?
A.
Yes.
One concerned a vendor audit which was done about February 1982 of Tennessee Wall, Tube and Metal by Jerry Walker of Texas Utilities and a job-shopper who was a Houston corporate Brown & Root auditor.
They found that Japanese-made steel was being used to manufacture the instrumentation ' tubing.
This was not supposed to be allowed.
They came back and wrote a draft audit de-ficiency against it.
The company then had thirty days in which to respond, then the auditors either accepted or rejected it.
In this case, it all created quite a stir.
Prim Lahote went back to the company and someone perfonned tests on that one particular last betch of instrumentation tubing and presumably it JerryWalkermade) met some of the chemical requirements, and'it was closed out.
the statement that he would never sign his name to it to close out the audit pl My d'eficiency.
pq=
+e 4
Na
.~
,~
t 3-deficiencies and took some pictures of it where they were not doing the proper inspection on the welds.
This caused quite a controversy when he got back on site, so they sent a group back out there from Brown & Root and the second trip they actually caught CB&I falsifying documentation on inspection reports.
John Maxwell was the lead auditor on that audit.
He was onsite for Brown & Root, an NDE Level III and auditor.
He's now with TUGCO, I believe.
Q.
What 'other action was taken?
A.
Two or three of the oe:ple at CE&l were fired and a couple of them demoted f
because of it.
A 50.55(e) report (a recort of a reportable deficiency) and an NCR was written on it.
Ron Tolson and Jim Hawkins were trying to get things calmed down -- they didn't seem to be too concerned about it.
}wenttotheNRjj tith it and talked to the investigators about it they came to the jobsite the same day that three truckloads of the products came in.
The NRC made them go through a backfit progra -- the utility com.mitted to it.
A CS&I inspector came down to the jobsite; after two weeks on the jobsite, they couldn't get thc properly ground, kelded and put t scL together, and the three truckloads were rejected and sent back.
Q.
Who was involved with all that?
A.
Well, Don Beddingfield was one of the Quality Assurance Engineers at the time and was the head of the site surveillance group; John Maxwell was site NDE Level III, and I was working for both of them.
The NR; interviewed them and mc and a couple of others about it.
Q.
Do you have anything else in that regard?
I A.
There was another incident that was partially related to it.
Rose Klimist was the Brown & Root Quality Assurance Manager regarding anything to do with ASME, safety-related items.
She would fight Ron Toison when he would try to' g
w-
, - +,, - -
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w m-
e..
L
- .s-been inspected and had been welded properly.- When you go in to do a vendor
~
audit,'you look at the documentation program, the QA program, you follow it step-
~
by-step _through the facility.
If there are parts there for a current contract, you look at those' parts too.
You don't 0.K. the inspection on them, but you
-look at them for acceptability of the documentation.
He got out there and there was slag that had never been cleaned off of any of the welds, yet CB&I had the paperwork documenting that it had been completely checked by mag particle ~ and licuid -
penetrant tests.
And they hadn't even been tou:hed.
The next morning he came back out there and the parts he had looked at had been sitting outside in the-snow in 320 weather, yet the inspection report had been signed off where they had been inspected viith liquid penetrant.
The thinc is, you can't do a liquid penetrant inspection unless the part is at least 600 temperature.
And they still had snow on them fro ; the day before and had never beeh moved, yet they had inspection reports
.iled out on them.
Q.
What k,ind of parts are we talking about?
A.
Ths:e wert ' trent restraints, which is a sister itt, to pipe whip restraints.
The CEi: inspector admitted he didn't actually look at the parts himself, but that he was just handed the papenecrk, told they were ready, and he signed it.
When John Maxwell got back to the plant site, there was a meeting which Jim Hawkins, Ron Tolson, Rose Climist, and John Maxwell ali attended.
Jchn Mt.xwell told me about it.
They discussed the probicm, then turned around and John Maxwell, Jack Henline, and Greg Benetsan (spelling ?), I believe it was, went back to CB&l a short time later on two other audits.
After all that the procedure was changed.
They'd go out and have a
.g
.w m
- md
7- -.,,
7
- -s.
number of tr.em ready to be shipped in and they'd have a complete drawing, purchase order copy, piece and item number, and would do them piece by piece.
They'd sign for.them and actually check off which ones they actually looked at and physically released from CBLI. That stopped after Rose Klimist' left'.
John Maxwell told me that the documentation at CB&I had been falsified and that he actually took some Polaroid picture of the parts himself.
I don't kno.v wno has the pictures nov..
The NRC did see the pictures, though.
The NRC investigation, Don Driscoll, was there with the three-man team along with the'UR" when the threc truckloads pulled in f rom CE&l.
O.
Is the company ttill buying parts from CB&I?
A.
V::, primarily comer.t and pipe whip restraints.
O.
Is the paperwork O.K. now?
A.
Nobody really knows for sure.
The receiving inspectors aren't Level 11 1r.::ccters, so they car,'t visually check the wsids when the parts come in.
Af ter Rose Klimist was terminated, Jim Hawkins became QA manager and the whole t :*c:t ws: dropped. iney still have a but.u.f contracts for ripe whip restreints.
O.
Is there anything else about CSlii A.
Dr.e other related thing which concern: me is that normally you go into the Cemanche Peak permanent record vault an; yuu have a receiving inspection report number to get to CELI's records.
On the pipe whip restraints, for example,
' rejected and brought to their atter. tion regarding these same type of defects, trat I went to the permaner.: plant-record vault after 1 found receiving and inspection reports and there wn! just a note in therc that all the NDE records would remain at CE&l until completion of the entire centract, so there are ne actual inspection records there at the Comanche Peak job site of what has been done at CB&l.
- Also,
7/1L/52 Uti!TED STATES OF A.' ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tHISSION BEFORE THE 1.TOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of I
Docket Nos. 50-445 a
and 50-446 APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES n
GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR a
-AN OPERATINGLLICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC i
STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 i
(CPSES) i TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. ATCHISON, WITNESS FO:i INTERVENOR CASE Q.
Please state your name, residence and edu:ational and work background.
A.
Charles Alsie Atchison, 744 Timber Oak, Azle, Texas 76020. A state-ment of my educational and work background is attached hereto as Attachment 1.
Q.
Are you presently employed?
A.
No.
Q.
What ir yeu educationr1 bacLground?
A.
I obtained i GED (a generci ecucation test); I'm a high school graduate.
I attended Tarrant Ccunty Junior College, Texas Wesleytn College in Fort Worth f or a special ir.:1-. t or s c.ini.r, t r..' ' z r therfor Jc-Col '. t ;.- for a sp::iti radiological monitoring course under the Texas Civil Lefense (about 1955-59).
I've also attendei Fort Worth Draf tir.g College in basic c af ting.
Q.
When did you graduate fr:r. Weatherford?
A.
It would bc 1960. The GEr v:ar obtained in 190: at Texas Christian University and t subequential dipic.c frem Weatherford High School.
O.
Did you get college credits for the radiological monitoring course?
A.
No.
Q.
You graduated from high schoci and nos attend a college toward an advanced degree?
A..I first attended Tarrant Ccunty Junior College on a part-time student e th samuter of 1971.
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L ce. if they're in' the same condi tion.
In the field. they have aircady been
. installed and there are 'others that 'are being installed like these have been.
. And they did not want to address them.
As of this point I started talking au'but going to the Site' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspector with this problem.
t
- Q.
And did you?
~ '
A.
I didn't have a chance.
- Q. Why?
A.
I got fired.
Q.
Did that stop you from going to the NRC Inspector?
~. 'A. At 5:15 in the afternoon when I was fired I attempted to see him, but he had gone.for the day.
Q.
Did you attempt to see him the next morning?
A.
Yes, but not on site.
I had to go through the Arlington office. Here I talked with Mr. Don Driscoll, not the site inspector.
Q.
Mr. Drisec11 is with the NRC in Arlincton?
- f..
Ycs, he 11
. Q.
Did you tait to Mr. Taylor, the NT.C site inspect:r?
A.
N o'.
L.
Ur.y noti A.
He wasn't available to me; he was or, a job site, and I was fired from the j:. site, and I had ne concern to go ba:k.
O.
Could you telephone him?
A.
I probably c;.:id have.
l Q.
Why didre't you?
A.. Well, my por:onal opinion is that while Mr. Tayior's credentials and stuff may be impeccabic, he is short on work force; he's one man trying to watch 4,000 crafts and 200 inspectors do a job, and he may not consider this a concern.
l l
i-