ML20128Q231

Forwards Addendum to Fire Protection Exemption Request 1-003 for Fire Protection Area 72,providing Detailed Justification for Exemption from 10CFR50.48(c)(3).Rev 2 to Exemption Requests 2-019 & 2-036 Also Encl

ML20128Q231
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/19/1985
From:	Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8507260621
Download: ML20128Q231 (17)

Text

, Milling Address Alabama Power Company

• 600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090 R. P. Mcdonald

%%ek'*"fo*"' Alabama Power July 19, 1985 Docket Nos. 50-348 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. S. A. Yarga Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 10CFR50.48 and 10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Protection Exemption Requests Gentlemen:

By letter dated March 13, 1985, Alabama Power Company submitted for NRC approval technical exemption requests from the provisions of 10CFR50, Appendix R for fire areas in Unit 2 and fire areas shared by Units 1 and 2.

On July 8,1985, it was determined that adequate circuit coordination is not provided between 125V DC safe-shutdown circuits and associated nonsafe-shutdown circuits in the service water intake structure. A fire could cause a loss of power to one of the 125V DC distribution panels in the service water intake structure. Consequently, a technical exemption is requested, pursuant to 10CFR50.12, from the requirement of 10CFR50.48( c) (3) . Attached is an addendum to exemption request 1-003, fire area 72, that provides in detail justification for the exemption.

In addition, typographical errors were discovered in exemption requests 2-019 revision 1 and 2-036 revision i submitted by letter dated June 26, 1985. Attached is revision 2 to these exemption requests.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Yours very tr y, 5072go g 80 0 R. P. Mcdonald RPM /DHJ:gri-D30 Attachments cc: Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves A d g [,

Mr. W. H. Bradford /f

ADDENDUM TO EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-3, FIRE AREA 72 EXEMPTION: Request an exemption from Section III.G.2 to the extent it requires safe-shutdown equipment to be isolated from associated non-safety circuits.

CONDITION REQUIRING EXEMPTION:

An associated circuit review indicated that adequate coordination is not

, provided between safe-shutdown circuits and associated nonsafe-shutdown

- circuits . powered from 125V DC Distribution Panels 1N, 2N, IM, 2M. The safe-shutdown circuits from these distribution panels provide control power for safe-shutdown breakers. A short circuit in an associated cable from one

.of the distribution panels could result in a loss of power to the panel, and

! therefore, a loss of control power to the safe-shutdown breakers powered from the affected panel.

JUSTIFICATION:

A loss of power to one of the 125V DC Distribution Panels 1N, 2N,1M or 2H

' will result in the loss of breaker control power for the following

' safe-shutdown loads controlled from that panel as shown below.

! Distribution Panel IN: 4 kV Breaker DLO2 to Load Center L 600 V Load Center Tie Breaker ELOS Service Water Pump 1C Service Water Pump 1D Service Water Pump 1E 600V Load Center Breaker ELO9 4 kV Tie Breaker DG02 Distribution Panel 2N: Service Water Pump 2C

Service Water Pump 2D Service Water Pump 2E 4 kV Breaker DLO2 to Load Center L

' Distribution Panel 1M: 4 kV Breaker DK02 to Load Center K 600V Load Center Tie Breaker EK05 Service Water Pump 1A Service Water Pump 1B Service Water Pump 1C 600V Load Center Breaker EK03 Service Water Pump 2A Distribution Panel 2M: Service Water Pump 28 Service Water Pump 2C l

4 kV Breaker DK02 to Load Center K 4 kV Tie Breaker DF02 i

_ , , _ . , _ , -- . _ - _ . _ , , . _ , _ _ . - , _ . . _ . _ . _ , _ , . . _ _ . _ . , _ , _ , , , . , _ _ . . - , - _ _ , _ - - . - - .__,._..,m.,...,__- _ _ _ -

Addendum to Exemption Request 1-3, Fire Area 72 Page 2 I

)

A loss of breaker control power from the single effected panel will not interrupt the operation of the load powered by the breaker. However, electrical control of the breaker including breaker protection circuits and handswitch operation will not be functional. A loss of power to one of the subject DC distribution panels will not preclude any necessary control and operation of safe-shutdown equipment. Should the need arise, manual operation of the affected breaker would be possible.

Although not part of the justification for this exemption request, a design change has been initiated to improve the breaker coordination. This design change is currently scheduled to be installed prior to the end of the Unit i seventh refueling outage in 1986. Upon completion, the potential for the fire damage will no longer exist.

DHJ/gri-D30

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT ~

.3 '

10CFR50 APPENDIX 'R" J.,- FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION w.

EXEMPTION REQUEST: 2-19 Rev. 2

_A

) FIRE AREA: 2-009 LOCATION:

TRAIN-B INSIDE CABLE CHASES, AUXILIARY BUILDING EXEMPTION:

Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire -rating.

CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION:

Instrument Air a Fire area cable 2-009 contains electrical Train-B power and control raceways. The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon cabling shows that the plant could lose the y

entire electrical Train-B system. Due to loss of the electrical Train-B system, the following redundant safe shutdown valves J could become inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT m FUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B

[ Q2B13BV2228-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room '

Q2831PCV0445A-A Backup Air /Na Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q2831PCVO444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q2E21HV8145-N

~

Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Il2P19HV3885-B and N2P19HV3825-A.In addition, Fire Area 2-009 contains in theposition.

closed area upon these cables shows the valves could become inopera Reactor Coolant Boundary _

r Fire area 2-009 pressurizer power contains operated control relief cables and blocking for thevalves Train-B

]- Q2831PCV0444B-B and Q2B13MOV8000B-B, valves Q2B13SV2213B-B and Q2B13SV2214B-B.and thecables The subject reactor head vent i

j cre associated control board. with A firecontrol induced fromfailure both the having hot shutdown and main multiple hot shorts and couldhead reactor causeventthepaths.

reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV f Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary feedwater isolation valves Q2N23MOV3764B, Q2N23MOV3764C, j

from the point of view that they isolate flow in redundantand Q2N23MOV3 cuxiliary feedwater supply lines.

p valves are routed through the fire area. Control cables for all three The analysis of the potential effects of a fire on these control cables shows that '

D 2-19-1 Rev. 2  !

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, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION O

~

tpurious operation of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves could occt{r.

Component Cooling Water .

Fire area 2-009 contains a control cable for the CCW heat cxchanger 2B service water discharge valve (Q2P16SV3009-B). A fire induced failure resulting in a hot short from adjacent i

cables in the same raceway, could energize the solenoid and l close the valve.

JUSTIFICATION:

l Instrument Air - Justification Failure of valve Q2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the Pressurizer Aux. Spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS. Pressurizer PORY's Q2831PCV0445A-A and Q2831PCV04448-B provide another means of achievir.g RCS depressurization. Valves N2P19HY3885-8, Q2813HY2228-B and N2P19HY3825-A could fail in the closed position as a result of fire damage. This will isolate the instrument air supply to the Pressurizer PORY's Q2B31PCV0445A-A i

and 02831PCV0444B-B. PORY Q2831PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B DC power supply. However, the Train-A DC supply to PORY Q2831PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area. Since only one of the PORV's is required for RCS depressurization and RCS ilepressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HY3885-8 and N2P19HV3825-A.

Once air is restored, PORV Q2B31PCVO445A-A will be operable to cchieve RCS depressurization.

Roactor Coolant Boundary - Justification Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control ccbles for Q2B31PCVO444B-B power operated relief valve, Q2B13SV2213B-B, and Q2B13SV2214B-B reactor head vent valves cculd result in the valves to be energized to open. The power cperated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control etbles in the shared raceway) occuring, this condition can be 2-19-2 Rev. 2

m J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION

, mitigated raceway. by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared This can be. accomplished by opening breaker on the

- 125 V-de switchgear distribution panels,bus 2B (Q2R42B001B-B) for 125 V-dc 2D, 3E, and 2F.

}

Auxiliary Feedwater - Justification '

The. control cable associated with at least one of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves has been protected by two 1-in.

layers of Knowool blanket with an overall la or it will be rerouted out of the fire area.yerThe of Zetex subject fabric valves E

and associated cables are as follows:

Q2N23MOV3764B: 2VBFV-M5C Q2N23MOV3764C: 2VBFV-Y2C Q2N23MOV3764E: 2VBFV-R2C Component Cooling Water - Justification be in the oligned open position to electrical Train A.only when the swing CCW pump 2B isTh In the unlikely event of such hot shorts resulting in the closed position of the service water discharge valve, the valve'can be manually repositioned.

Plant o fire procedures in area 2-009. will be revised to include the above action for FIRE PROTECTION:

A cresmoke detection provided systemthe throughout and automatic water suppression system chase. In addition, water hoses and portable extinguishers located in rooma 2185 (area 2-6) and 2319 (crea 2-42) are available for use in the area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION:

• ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE MAXIMUM TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL FIRE LOAD FIRE QUANTITY _(Btu /ft8) SEVERITY Rooms 2117, 2198, 2247, B Cable Insul. 4,489 lb 2,921,199 <9 h 2338 Cable Chase i

2-19-3 Rev. 2 w_ . -

= _

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3 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION w

ROOM NUMBERS_ TRAIN TITLES / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD MAXIMUM

_ MATERIAL QUANTITY FIRE Rooms 2246, (Btu /ft") SEVERITY B

l 2344 Cable Cable Insul. 2,135 lb 180,180 <2-1/2 h Chase DESIGN FEATURES:

Construction: Floor, ceiling, boundary are of reinforced concrete.and walls forming the area Doors:

and 2185 (area 2-6) and between rooms 2338 and 233 -

l -

an airtight (area 2-41).UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2344 and 2343 Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or NelsonAll penetrations throug fittings.

1 j

Ventilation:

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been providedThere is no Floor Drains:

There are no floor drains.

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L i

2-19-4 Rev. 2

• B J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 2-36 Rev. 2 FIRE AREA!- 2-001 LOCATION: UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 83 FT - 0 IN., 100 FT - 0 IN., AND 121 FT - 0 IN.

i Fire area 2-001 consists of the following rooms:

, El 83 Ft - 0 In.

R:om 2101 Waste Decay Tank Room R;om 2102 Valve Compartment Room R:om 2103 Corridor R:om 2104 Passageway to Unit 1 Room 2105 Catalytic Ha Recombiner-A Room R:om 2106 Catalytic Hz Recombiner-B Room R:om 2108 Waste Monitor Tank Room l R:om 2109 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Room i

Room 2110 Monitor Control Panel Room R:om 2111 Containment Spray Pump Room A R om 2112 Access to Tendon Access Gallery

{ Room 2113 Valve Encapsulation

! R:om 2114 Pipe Chase .

R om 2115 Hallway

R

om 2118 Floor Drain Tank Room j R:om 2119 Waste Holdup Tank Room

~

Rtem 21?O corridor R om 2121 Floor Drain Tank Pmr.p Room

) R om 2122

)

Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room R:om 2123 Pipe Chase R:om 2124 Valve Encapsulation R:om 2125 Containment Spray Pump Room B R om 2126 Pipe Chase R om 2127 Pipe Chase R:om 2128 RHR Heat Exchanger Room

) R:om 2129

) RHR Low Head Pum p Room B R:om 21'30 -- Pipe T,hase --

R om 2131 RHR Low Head Pump Room A

)

y El 100 Ft - 0 In.

R:om 2183 Tendon Access Gallery Entrance R:om 2184 Piping Penetration Room R:om 2169 Pipe and Duct Chase R om 2196 Tendon Access Gallery I

2-36-1 '

Rev. 2

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 3

El 121 Ft - 0 In.

Room 2223 Piping Penetration Room All of the fire area boundary walls, floors, and celiings are 1 rated as 3-h fire barriers except for a non-rated steel hatch cover between 2163 (area *-4). the ceiling of room 2103 and the floor of room for a 3-h rating. All electrical and piping penetrations sealed 1 Class-A or Class-B rated.All doors in the boundary walls are UL EXEMPTION:

1.I the extent it requires one train of redundant safe shutdownAn exem cable to be automatic enclosed fire suppression.by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and

=

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTIONS:

Exemptions equipment asare required described for safe shutdown related cable and below.

Instrument Air Isolation A fire induced failure in control cables for instrument air isolation valve Q2P19HV3611 and N2P19HY3825-A may cause the valve to fail closed.

{ A loss of instrument air causes the normal charging line j isolation valve Q2E21HV8146 and the alternate charging line isolation valve Q2E21HV8147 to fail open.

It may be necessary to close these valves during the course of shutdown to isolate charging flow.

l A fire induced backup air /W failure in the control cable for the pressurizer PORV 1 closed. 2 supply valve Q2B13HV2228-B may cause the valve to fail h If instrument air isolation valve Q2P19HY3611 or N2P19HV3825-A and the pressurizer PORY backup air2/Nsupply valve Q2B13HY2228-B in the closed position. fail closed, the pressurizer PORY's will be inoperable required to achieve depressurization of the RCS. Operation of the pressurizer PO Initiation of Safety Signals l

Fire area 2-001 the following channels, redundant contains containmentinstrumentation pressure instrumentcables associated with i

PT950-P1 CTMT Pressure Channel 1 PT951-P2 CTMT Pressure Channel 2 PT952-P3 CTMT Pressure Channel 3 PT953-P4 CTMT Pressure Channel 4 I .

2-36-2 Rev. 2 '

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=s J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION ll '

These instrument loops are not required for post-fire safe shutdown,,.but due to fire induced failures, the circuitry could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CI, and CVI). i Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Control cables associated with the three redundant atmospheric relief valves are routed through fire area 2-001. An analysis of potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that the subject position. valve could become inoperable in the closed Charging Pump Miniflow Power and control cables associated with charging pump miniflow isolation valve MOV8106-A are routed through fire area 2-001.

An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown pump miniflow thatline.

MOV8106-A could close and isolate the charging Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity control cables for the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief tnd blocking valves Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B13MOV8000A-A, and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213A-A and Q2B135V2214A-A are located in fire area 2*Q01. The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel Q2H21NBAFP2605G-A.

In addition control cables which shift via the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A are inA this area.centro fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor paths. inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent ,

s j

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTIONS:

)

Instrument Air Isolation - Justification equipped with a handwheel to facilitate In the manual operation i event the valves fall closed an operator can manually open them.

actionand valves willtherestore instrument pressurtzer charline isolation This PORV's. air to the 1tng l

i Q2B13NY2228-8,to be taken on the pressurizer PORY 2 supply valve backup afr/NConseque 1

1 2-36-3 m.2

_ _ __.__w-*-e-- - - * - "

I @ a ,M J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Initiation of Safety Signals - Justification l

t

, Fire induced cable failures in fire area 2-001 to non-post-fire cafe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system. Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.

Main Steam Atmospheric Relief - Justification one of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its rolated steam generator are required to be operable to achieve oteam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually

• cpened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric rolief valves by closing the manual air control valvoz to icolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be cccessible despite a fire in area 2-001. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system tcmperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric rolief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequuntly, a fire in area 2-001 would not prevent the operation of at least one rcdundant atmospheric relief valve.

Charging Pump Miniflow - Justification Volve Q2E21MOV8106-A is required to be maintained open to Cstablish charging pump miniflow. In the event this valve fails closed, miniflow will be discontinued. The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gpm i of seal injection flow for a period of up to I h. This will cllow the operator time to take manual action to open the valve and re-establish miniflow. .

R: actor Coolant Boundary Integrity - Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the p: war operated relief and blocking valves and the reaction head 1

. I 2-36-4 Rev. 2

i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R"  ;

FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 3

vent valves, alignment, to the remote hot shutdown panel.to shift from their normal main cont 3 Subsequent fire induced fhilures (hot shorts for adjacent control cables in the operatedraceway) shared relief valve, of Q2B13SV2213A-A, the control cables for Q2B31PCV044SA-A, power head open. vent valves could result in the valves being energized toand 2B13SV2214A-A rea The power relief blocking valve olectrically inoperative in the open pos(MOV) could become cvent of the multiple hot shorts occuring, ition. In the unlikely l citigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manualthis condition can be cperation (handle) of the effected relay, thereby shifting control to the main control board.

Plant procedures for fire-area 2-001. will be revised to include the above actions FIRE AREA INFORMATION:

[ ROOM NUMBERS /

TITLES SHUTDOlIN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD MAXIMUM TRAIN ___ MATERIAL FIRE QUANTITY (Btu /ft8) r SEVERITY Room 2101 -

[ Waste Gas Cable Insul. 29 lb 1,2 51 * *

• Decay Tank <30 min,

Room Room 2102 Cable Insul.

Volve Ccmpartment Room Rcom 2103 B f Corridor Cable Insul.

Rcom 2105 B Catalytic Cable Insul. 490 lb'*' 7,634'**

I Ha Re- Panels 28 lb <30 min'**

ccmbiner-A Rcom Room 2106 -

Catalytic Cable Panels Ha Re-ccmbiner-B Room (0)

Applies to rooma 2101 and 2102 collectively.

(b)

Applies to rooms 2103, 2105, and 2106 collectively.

2-36-5

• Rev. 2 I

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 AP'ENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1

MAXIMUM 1 ROOM NUMBERS TITLES $ / SHUTDOWN COMBtJSTIBLE

_ TRAIN MATERIAL FIRE LOAD FIRE QUANTITY _(Btu /ft8) SEVERITY Room 2104 B

} Passageway to Unit 1 Cable Insul. '

Room 2109 B 1 Waste Monitor Cable Insul. 417 lb 5,742'**

Tank Pump Lube 011 0.25 gal <30 min'**

Room

) Room 2110 l Monitor Cable Insul.

Panels 14 lb Control Panel 1 Room Room 2108 Cable Insul.

Waste Monitor Charcoal 75 lb 19,457 <30 min Tank Room 375 lb Filter

. Room 2169 -

None Duct and -

0 0 Pipe Chase .

Room 2118 l Cable Insul.

Floor Drain 22 lb 831 <30 min Tcnk Room Room 2119 W2ste Holdup Cable Insul. 60 lb 2,711 <30 min Tcnk Room Room 2120 B, C l Carridor Cable Insul. 42 lb 5,540 <30 min I R om 2121 B, C i Floor Drain Cable Insul. 287 lb 21,402 l Tcnk Lube 011 0.25 gal <30 min I Pump Room Rcom 2122 B, C W0ste Cable Insul. 287 lb 21,402 Evaporator Lube Oil 0.25 gal <30 min Fccd Pump Room (c)

Applies to rooma 2104, 2109, and 2110 collectively.

I 2-36-6 R ev. 2

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' ] J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION r

] ROOM NUMBERS /

TITLES SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE ,

_ TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY FIRE LOAD (Btu /ft8)

MAXIMUM FIRE Room 2127 S_EVERITY B, C None Pipe Chase O O O Room 2128 A, C RHR Heat Cable Insul. 454 lb 2,607 3 Exchanger <30 min Room

] Room 2129 RHR Low B, C Cable Insul. 217 lb 3,837

<30 min Head Pump Room B Room 2130 -

Pipe Chase None 0 0 0 3 Room 2131 -

RER Low Head Cable Insul. 222 lb 6,332 Pump Room A <30 min Room 2126 -

Pipe' Chase None 0 0 0 '

Room 2124 -

Valve Cable Insul. 7 lb 6,329 Encapsulation <30 min Room 2125 -

Cable Insul.

] Containment Spray Pump Room B Lube Oil 261 lb O.25 gal 3,569 <30 min I

Room 2114 3 Pipe Chase Cable Insul. 7 lb 3,885

<30 min Room 2111 -

containment Cable Insul. 101 lb 3,469 Spray Pump Lube Oil 0.25 gal <30 min i Room A

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L 2-36-7 Rev. 2 I '

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION J

MAXIMUM

] ROOM NUMBERS /

TITLES SHUTDOWN

_ TRAIN COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL QUANTITY FIRE LOAD (Btu /ft")

FIRE SEVERITY Room 2113

]

Cable Insul. 6 lb 3,333 <30 min Valve '

Encapsulation Room 2115 -

Cable Insul. 4 lb 1,655

] Hallway <30 min Room 2112 Cable Insul.

]

4 lb 175 <30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery Room 2196 -

Cable Insul. 4 lb , 175 Access to <30 min Tendon Access Gallery Room 2123 -

None 0 0 Pipe Chase 0

' Room 2183 A Cable Insul. 1,050 lb'** 6,405888 Tendon Access <30 min

Gallery Entrance Room 2184 -

Cable Insul.

] Piping Penetration Room, El J 100 Et - 0 In.

Room 2223 A, B Cable Insul. 16,663 lb 40,625 <1 h

,] Penetration Room El Charcoal 400 lb 121 Et - 0 In.

J J

(d) Applies to rooms 2183 and 2184 collectively.

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2-36-8 Rev. 2

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i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l

I 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION

] DESIGN FEATURES:

Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. The ceiling of room 2223 has tendon access openings to room 2334 (area 2-34). Steel plates with'3-h rated l} coatings and which are topped by removable concrete slabs have been installed over the tendon access openings. ;fhe steel h'tch a cover located in the el 100 ft - 0 in, floor slab between room 2103 l (area 2-001) and 2163 (area 2-004) is protected by a suppression system designed for extra hazards to limit the i spread of fire to adjacent fire areas.

Doors: An airtight,'UL Class-B door is installed between room

, 2223 and stairway No. 2. The door between room 2184 and room 2162 (area 2-4) is an airtight UL Class-A door. Nonairtight I, Class-B stairway doors No. 2.are installed between room 2110 and 2115 and Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through the

]-

area boundary are sealed wi,th silicone foam. Three-h rated fire -

dampers are installed between 2169 and 2163 (area 2-4).

Ventilation: No normal ventilation exists. Fixed smoke removal

- capability has not been provided.

y Floor Drains: Twenty-one 4-in. diameter floor drains with a j

100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the area. Sumps are provided in rooms 2103, 2111, 2125, 2128, 2129, and 2131.

u The sumps contain two 100-gal /m pumps each. The sump pumps

} discharge to the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank. The floor drains tank. above el 77 ft - 83 in. drains to the floor drain The other floor drains drain to the sumps.

f FIRE PROTECTION:

P A detection system covers the majority of the area. Exceptions to this2169, 2130, coverage are rooms 2112, 2114, 2115, 2123, 2126, 2127, and 2196.

s The western half of the piping penetration room on el 121 ft - 0 in is the only part of fire area 2-001 covered by automatic suppression.

p Portable extinguishers, smoke removal equipment, and water hose cabinets are located throughout the fire area for use by the fire brigade.

} -

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B

[ 2-36-9 Rev. 2 0 -

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION J  !

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:

The rooms in fire area 2-001 without detection (2112,' 2114, 2115, 2123, 2126, 2127, 2130, 2169, and 2196.) contain little  ;

or no combustible material and contain no safe shutdown cable or equipment. The western half of the piping penetration room on

,] el 121 ft - O in. is the only part of fire area 2-001 covered by an automatic suppression system. This is the only part of fire area 2-001 that has cables or equipment that are associated with

] redundant hot shutdown systems. One train of redundant cables are provided with fire barriers consisting of two 1-in. layers of Knowool blanket with overall layer of Zetex cloth within this

} area.

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0397n 2-36-10 Rev. 2

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