05000458/LER-1991-008-04, Forwards LER 91-008-04,documenting Addl Case of Improper Cable Separation Discovered as Result of Followup Safety Sys Functional Insp
| ML20128G251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1993 |
| From: | Odell W GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128G257 | List: |
| References | |
| RBG-38103, NUDOCS 9302120218 | |
| Download: ML20128G251 (2) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4581991008R04 - NRC Website | |
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4-GULF STATES - UTILITIES COMPANY AM 4 itFND STA1 ION POST Of fk:E 801220 Sf. f MANCtSW.ti LOV1%iANA 70776 ARE A CDDE 6'A f,% tr004 3AS8651 February 5,.1993 RBG 38103 File Nos, G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Please find enclosed Supplement 4 to Licensee Event Report No.91-008 for River Bend Station - Unit 1.
This supplement is submitted to document an additional case of improper cable separation discovered as a n:sult of a follow-up safety system functional inspection (SSFI). The supplemental text is. indicated -
with change bars, the remaining text was curn:nt.as of the : dates of ' prior submittals.
4 Sincerely, j
N kV.H. Odell Manager - Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group 1
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Ik)x 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 INPO Records Center 1100 Circle Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 3064 Mr. C.R. Oberg Public Utility Commission of Texas 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 Nonh Austin, TX 78757 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Nuclear Energy Division P O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135 ATIN: Administrator 1
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i NRC FORM 366 U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION APPROVED BY ONiB NO. 3150-0104 m et EXPinES 5/31/95 CSTtMATED surOEN.PER MSFONSE TQ COMPT,Y WTH M$
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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PAGE pj RIVER BEND STATION 05000 468 10F 11 m W FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS DEFICIENCIES INCLUDING LACK OF FIRE WHAP /
INADEQUATE FIRE BARRIER EVENTbE (5)
LER NUMDER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7)
OTHER "ACILITIES INVOLVED (8) uoNTH cAv yt AR YrA4 UONTH DAV YEM 00 5 Auulv NAML DOCWET NUMBER 04 15 D1 91
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L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING (504) 381-4145 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
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ADSTRACT (umit to 1400 spaces. t e, approximately 15 smgle-spaced typewnnen lines) (16)
At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br /> on 4/15/91, with the reactor at full power in Operational Condition 1, it was discovered that -
~ electrical cables located in Dre area ET-2, which may cause spurious operation of valves 1E51*MOVF063 (RCIC inboard steam isolation valve) and IE51*MOVF078 (RCIC vacuum breaker valve), did'not have fire wrap contrary to Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) requirements.. At 1300 on 4/23/91,. additional cables, which 4-could cause the same problem were found in Gre areas AB-2, C-2 and C-6. RCIC is required by the FH A for -
safe shutdown in these fire areas. Since these valves are required not to change position for operation of RCIC ~
and fire damage to these cables may cause loss of RCIC, the cables would require wrapping in these fire areas.
Upon discovery of this condition, the affected cables were treated as having missing 6te barriers and the action 4
statement prescribed in Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, " Fire Rated Assemblies", was implemented for areas-y containing these cables. Errors made during the original development of the FH A were the cause for the identified cables not being wrapped in the identified Gre areas. Additional denciencies were discovered and resolved as a result of the FHA review. As a follow-up to the resolution of the deficiencies in the Fire Hazards Analysis, a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) was performed. This effort has resulted in identifying an additional case of improper cable separation. Corrective actions have been developed to address this condition.
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NQC FORM J66A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSloN APPROVEo BY OMB NO. 3150 0104 -
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P AGE pp H GUENitAL FCVSUN NUMBER NVVBER 05000 oF 008 04 2
11 RIVEll BEND STATION
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.. ~. -, - - on REPORTED CONDITION At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br /> on 4/15/91, with the reactor at full power in Operational Condition 1, it was reported to the shift supervisor that certain electrical cables associated with valves IE51*hiOVF063 (*ISV*)
(RCIC inboard steam isolation valve) and IE51*MOVF078-(*VTV*) (RCIC vacuum breaker valve) located in fire area ET-2 (Electrical Tunnel "B" West), did not have fire wrap. This discovered condition is contrary to requirements contained in the FHA. While working on resolution of this issue, additional cables which could cause the same problem were found in Gre areas AB-2, C-2 and C-6. At 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on 4/23/91, these additional areas of concern wem reported to the shift supervisor. The FHA lists Method I as the analyzed method of shutdown for fire areas AB-2, C-2, C-6 and ET-2. Method I shutdown is identified as using 3 safety relief valves (SRVs) (*RV*) for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (*JE*) pressure control, RCIC for RPV level control, and RHR-A for suppression pool cooling and shutdown cooling. The FHA lists these valves as " Passive Valves" required for Method I shutdown which means the valves must not change position due to Gre damage on their cables. The FHA states the identified cables for these valves should be wrapped in these fire areas.
The affected cables did not have the required fire wrap (fire barrier) since plant startup; therefore, the fire barrier is considered inoperable per Technical Specification 3/4.7.7 and this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Technical Specification.
Additional reportable conditions were discovered as a result of the FHA review. These conditions concerned Appendix R separation, the discovery of a previously unidentined fire area, and safe shutdown equipment omitted from the main control room fire analysis.
As a follow-up to the resolution of the deficiencies in the Fire Hazards Analysis, a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) was performed. During the SSFI, an area was identined in which cable separation was such that a single fire could have disabled both methods of monitoring spent fuel pool temperature. In this case, Thermo-Lag fire barrier material was not installed.
INVESTIGATION The River Bend Station - Unit 1 A
.naix R Data Management System lists equipment, raceways, and cables by Gre area. A reviet i this data base found inconsistencies between the data base and the FHA for the identined cables which may cause spurious operation of valves IE51*MOVF063 and lE51*MOVF078. The FHA indicates the cables should be wmpped in these fire areas but the 4
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