ML20127M402

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Proposed Tech Specs Consisting of Proposed Changes 194 & 59, Respectively,Modifying TS 3.6.2.2,CRSS,to Address Respective ESF Subsystem Availability & to Remove Expired 6,000 Gpm Curve
ML20127M402
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 11/16/1992
From:
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20127M360 List:
References
NUDOCS 9211300166
Download: ML20127M402 (25)


Text

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i ATTACHMENT A-1 J

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 l

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 194 i

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Revise the Technical Specification as follows:

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MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE

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1 CONTAINAENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMZNT RECIRCUIATION SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Four separate and independent containment recirculation spray subsystems, each composed of a spray pump, associated heat oxchanger and flow path shall be OPERABLI.

AEPLICABILIII:

MODES 1, 2,

3 and 4.

ACTIQM:

a,With one containment recirculation spray subsystem inoperable, I

restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within'7 days or be in HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b. With two containment recirculation spray subsystems inoperable restore at least one inoperable subsystem to OPERAPLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each containuent recirculation spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLZ:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each accessible valva (ma.7ual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path not

locked, sealed or otherwise i

wecured in position, is in its correct position; b.

When tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, manually start each recirculation spray pump and verify the pump l

shaft rotates; l

c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a 1

Containment Pressure-High-High

signal, the recirculation spray pumps start automatically as follows:

RS-P-1A and RS-P-2B 210 1 5 second delay RS-P-2A and RS-P-1B 225 5 second delay d.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, verify that on recirculation

flow, each pump develops the required differential pressure and flow rate as shown below when testsd pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

l RS-P-1A and RS-P-13 1 127 paid at 1 2000 gpm RS-P-2A and-RS-P-2B 1 132 paid at 1 2000 gpm i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-13 fAoR95ED

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVbILIANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) e.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path l

actuates to its correct position on a test signal.

3.

Initiating flow through each River Water subsystem and its two associated recirculation spray heat

changers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 8000 gp j

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At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray i

nozzle is unobstructed.

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Thi; previelen i; Only ;pplicable until th; eigh" (Oth) r;f;;1ing ;;t;;;.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 fR0f0 SED

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ATTACHMEllT A-2 1

Beaver Valley Po'rer Station, Unit 11o. 2 i

Proposed Technical Specification Change 11o. 59 Revise the Technical Specification as follows:

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j CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM J

LIu!'INC. CONDITION FOP OPERATION

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3.6.2.2 Four separate and independent containment recirculatior, spray subsystems, i

each composed of a spray pump, associated heat exchanger and flow path shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

For subsystems containing recirculation spray pumps 2RSS-P21A or l

a.

2RSS-P21B: With one containment recirculation spray suosystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STAN08Y within-the Mxt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore i

the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status thin the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the nex' 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

lJA/SMT b.

For subsystems containing recirculation spray pump) 2RSS-P21C or 2RSS-P210:

See action statements in Specificatio; 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4

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4.6.2.2 Each containment recirculation spray subsystes shall be demonstrated j

OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (sanual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

)

b.

When tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, manually start each recirculation-spray pump and verify the pump shaft rotates; c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a Containment Pressure-High-High signal, each recirculation spray pump starts automatically after a 628

  • 5 second delay.

d.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying, that d'g on meirculation flow, each recirculation spray pump develops a differential pressure of 1 112 paid at a flow of 1 3500 gpe.

Yo Td At least once per 18 months durirg shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valire in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full trcvel.

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IllSERT

c. For subsystems containing recirculation spray puups 2RSS-P21A and 2RSS-P21C, or 2RSS-P21B and 2RSS-P21D, apply Action a above to inoperable subsystem 2RSS-P21A (or B), and apply Action b above to inoperable subsystem 2RSS-P21C (or D).

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ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 194/59 Revision of Specification 3.6.2.2 and DV-1 Figure 3.6-1 A.

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would modify Specification 3.6.2.2, Containment Recirculation Spray

System, to address respective engineered safety feature (ESP) subsystem availability and in addition BV-1 Figure 3.6-1 has been modified by removing the expired 6000 gpm curve that was only applicable for Cycle 8.

B.

BACKGROUND The recirculation spray system (RSS) for each unit consists of four 50 percent capacity subsystems each composed of a spray

pump, associated heat exchanger and flow path.

For BV-1, two of the RSS pumps and motors are located outside containment (RSP-2A and RSP-2B) and two pumps and motors are located inside containment (RSP-1A and RSP-1B).

The flow path from each pump is piped to an individual 180* RSS spray header inside containment.

Train "A"

electrical power and river water is supplied to the RSP-1A and RSP-2A subsystems.

Train "B" electrical power and river water is supplied co the RSP-1B and RSP-2B subsystems.

For BV-2, all RSS pumps and motors are located outside containment and supply flow to two 360* RSS spray ring headers located in containment.

One RSS spray ring is supplied by the "A" train 2RSS-P21A and the "B' train 2RSS-P21D subsystems with the other RSS spray ring being supplied by the "A" train 2RSS-21C and the "B" train 2RSS-21B subsystems.

BV-1 Figure 3.6-1,

" Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Air Pressure Versus River Water Temperature" and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 were revised by Amendment 156 to allow continued plant operation with reduced river water flow through the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) heat exchangers.

The reduced flow was acceptable provided additional operating restrictions were applied to the containment internal air partial pressure.

This change was only applicable for the remainder of Cycle 8

which has since been completed, therefore, these changes are being deleted.

C.

JUSTIFICATION Specification 3.6.2.2 requires four containment RSS subsystems, each composed of a

spray

pump, associated heat exchanger and related flow path.

The technical specification (TS) action statements only address one inoperable subsystem and do not differentiate between train related operability requirements.

The standard technical specifications (STS) only address the RSS requirements with respect to operability of two independent RSS subsystems.

The STS action statements were written based on a

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ATTACHMENT B, continusd Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 194/59 Page 2 design different from that installed in the Beaver Valley plants.

Therefore, the Beaver Valley action statements have been revised to address more than one inoperable subsystem.

Since even with two subsystems inoperable two other subsystems would be available to supply 100 percent of the required RSS

flow, Attachment D

provides an action table and system figure for each d

unit.

BV-1. Figure 3.6-1 includes an additional curve to restrict plant operation when river water flow through the RSS heat exchangers i

is. limited to between 6000 gpm and 8000 gpm.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 includes-an note to clarify the restriction on Figure 3.6-1.

These changes were temporary restrictions that expired at the end of cycle 8 and are no longer applicable, therefore, these changes are being deleted.

D.

SAFETY ANALYSIS The current. action requirements of Specification 3.6.2.2 address i

the inoperability of one containment RSS subsystem.

Since there are four containment RSS subsystems install (3 in each plant with each subsystem capable of supplying 50% of the required flow, an additional action statement has been added to address inoperability of two subsystems.

Due to differences in system design the action statements for the j

two plants have been modified to reflect those differences.

In the BV-1 design two of-the RSS subsystems are located inside containment and two are located outside containment with each subsystem supplying flow to its own 180*

spray ring.inside containment.

The BV-2 design consists of four RSS subsystems located outside containment with the A and D subsystems supplying flow to one 360*

spray ring inside containment and the B and C.

j subsystems supplying flow to another 360* spray ring, also inside containment.

-In addition, when the water in the RWST has-reached i

a predetermined extreme low

level, the C and D subsystems are automatically switched to the cold leg. recirculation-mode of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) operation.

A new BV-1 Action statement b.

has been added to address inoperability of two subsystems.

Action b. requires restoring at least one inoperable suosystem-to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i

or placing the plant in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in. cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

This conforms-1 with the safety philosophy applied to other. technical specification-systems in' that up >to 50%

of a system may be inoperable for a finite time period before having to change plant i

mode.

This action requirement is consistent with the design of the-system described in UFSAR-Section 6.4 and does not affect the I

accident analyses described in Section 14 since with two subsystems-inoperable the remaining subsystems are available to supply 100 percent of the required flow.

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ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specificatior. Change Nos. 194/59 Page 3 A

new BV-2 Action statement c.

has been added to address inoperability of two subsystems.

Action c.

provides for two inoperable subsystems in the same train and requires the application of Action

a. to inoperable subsystem A or B and the application of Action b.

to inoperable subsystem C or D.

This conforms with the safety philosophy applied to other technical specification systems in that up to 50%

of a system may be inoperable for a finite time period before having to change plant mode.

This action requirement is consistent with the design of the system described in UFSAR Sect 3 a 6.2 and does not affect the accident analyses described in Section 15 since with two subsystems inoperable the remaining subsystems are available to supply 100 percent of the required flow.

4 Amendment No.

156 incorporated temporary changes to BV-1 Figure 3.6-1 and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 to allow continued plant operation for the remainder of Cycle 8.

This cycle has been completed, therefore, these changes are no longer applicable and have been deleted.

Figure 3.6-1 has been revised by deleting the additional curve applicable when river water flow through the RSS heat exchangers is limited to between 6000 gpm and 8000 gpm.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 has been revised by deleting the note which clarifies the restriction on Figure 3.6-1.

These changes restore the requirements in affect prior to Amendment No.

156 and do not introduce any new or different requirements.

These changes will improve the consistency of the technical specifications by modifying the action statements to reflect the safety philosophy applied to other technical specification safety related systems.

These changes are consistent with the UFSAR system descriptjon and accident analyses and provide appropriate action times to allow adequate time to repair inoperable equipment.

Therefore, the proposed changes are considered to be safe and will not reduce the safety of the plant.

E.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a

facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1)

Involve a

significant increcse in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

4 ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 194/59 Page 4 The following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards.

1.

Does the change involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

A now BV-1 Action statement

b. has been added to address inoperability of two subsystems.

Action b.

requires restoring at least one inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or placing the plant in hot standby within the next 6

hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

This conforms with the safety philosophy applied to other technical specification systems.

It is also consistent with the design of the system described in UFSAR Section 6.4 and does not affect the accident analyses described in Section 14.

A new BV-2 Action statement

c. has been added to address inoperability of two subsystems.

Action c. provides for two inoperable subsystems in the same train and requires the application of Action a. to inoperable subsystem A or B and the application of Action b.

to inoperable subsystem C or D.

This conforms with the safety philosophy applied to other technical specification systems.

With two subsystems inoperable the remaining subsystems are available to supply 100 percent of the required flow.

This action requirement is consistent with the design of the system described in UFSAR Section 6.2 and does not affect the accident analyses described in Section 15.

j These actions conform with the safety. philosophy applied to safety related systems in that op to 50% of a system may be inoperable for a

finite time period.

With two subsystems inoperable the other two operable subsystems are available to supply 100% of the required flow.

d Amendment No.

156 incorporated temporary changes to BV-1 Figure 3.6-1 and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 to allow continued plant operation for the remainder of Cycle 8.

This cycle has been coppleted, therefore, these changes are no longer applicaole and have been deleted.

Figure 3.6.1 has been revised by deleting the additional curve applicable when river water

!1ow through the RSS heat 3

exchangers is limited to between 6000 gpm and 8000 gpm.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 has been revised by deleting the note which clarifies the restriction on Figure 3.6-1.

These changes restore the requirements in nffect prior to Amendment No. 156 and do not introduce any new or different requirements.

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ATTACHMENT B, continusd proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 194/S9

'page 5 These changes will modify the Action statements to reflect the safety philosophy applied to other safety related systems.

Thesa changes are consistent with the UFSAR system description and accident analyses and provide appropriate action time to allow adequate time to repair inoperable equipment.

Therefore, the proposed changes do r.ot involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The RSS is designed to reduce the containment temperature and return the containment pressure. to subatmospheric following a

break in either the primary or secondary system L

piping inside containment.

Heat is removed from the containment sump by the transfer of heat to the recirculation spray coolers.

The. moclifications to the action statements will-not change the function of the RSS or the operation of the system during an accident.

These changes provide additional guidance to the plant operators when up to two of the four installed subsystems are inoperable.

These changes are consistent with the design of the system and will not affect the reliability of the RSS.

Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new of different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to BV-1 Figure 3.6-1 and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 restore the requirements in affect prior to Amendment No.

156 and will not affect _the reliability of the system.

Therefore, this change will not create the possibility of a

new or different-kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3, Does the_ change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?_

The accident analyses assume at least two RSS subsystems will operate following-a LOCA.

The action statements have been modified to address conditions with up to two inoperable subsystems.

This ensures at least two subsystems are available to supply the required flotis, therefore,.the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Restoring Figure 3.6-1 and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 to reflect the requirements prior to Amendment No.

156 is consistent with the system design and will not affect the accident analyses.

Therefore, these changes will not involve a sigificant reduction in a margin of safety.

ATTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 194/59

'Pcge 6 F.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)

and, accordingly, a

no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

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i "I'TACHMENT C-1 l

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 194 1

Typed Pages:

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3/4 6-13 j

3/4 C-14 l

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NOTES:

j 10.6

1. RWST TEMPERATURE BETWEEN 45 'F AND 55 'F.

10.5

~

2. MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 105 'F, 10.4

~~

3. MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CONTAINMENT 4

a-AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE 8.0 PStA.

4 4

10.3

4. MAXIMUM RIVER WATER i

g 7

. TEMPERATURE 90*F.

F< _10.2 i

@ <510.1 l

D n.B UNACCEPTABLE O uJ 10.0

-~

OPERATir N uja-CONTAINMENT ccb9'9 TEMPERATURE 2 75 *F 3<co 4

uJ g S E

,g

\\-

3

-.I

9.7 ACCEPTABLE OPERATION

@E9.6 l

2k g

9.5 I

2 9.4 s

\\

I 9.3 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 2 95 *F -

9.2 wq 9.1 s0 4

8.9 I 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 l-RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE (*F) 88 FIGURE 3.6-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/46-7 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

.,m

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-*erm?e'N**

""M'~**~r

i DPR-66 l

l C'ONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPL_I SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Four separate and independent containment recirculation spray subsystems, each composed of a spray pump, associated heat exchanger and flow path shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With one containment recirculation spray subsystem inoperable, l

restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT STANDLY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, b.

With two. containment recirculation spray subsystems inoperable restore at least one inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each containment recirculation spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each accessible valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path not

locked, sealed or otherwise secured-in position, is in its correct position; l

b.

When tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, manually start each recirculation spray pump and verify the pump shaft rotates; c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a

Containment Pressure-High-High

signal,

.the recirculation spray pumps start automatically as follows:

RS-P-1A and RS-P-2B 210 i 5 second delay RS-P-2A and RS-P-1B 225 i 5 second delay l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-13 Amendment No.

PROPOSED l

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1 DPR-66 CONTAINMENT SYJIDisi SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) d.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, verify that on recirculation

flow, each pump develops the required differential pressure and flow rate as shown below when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

RS-P-1A and RS-P-1B 2 127 psid at 2 2000 gpm RS-P-2A and RS-P-2B 2 132 psid at 2 2000 gpm e.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1.

Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2.

Veritying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.

3.

Initiating flow through each River Water subsystem and its two associated recirculation spray heat exchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 80no l

gpm.

f.

At least once per 5

years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 Amendment No.

PR3 POSED

i ATTACHMENT C-2 i

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit.

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Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 59 I

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j Typed Page:

3/4 6-12 l

3/4 6-13 I

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NPF-73 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

4 3.6.2.2 Four separate and jndependent containment recirculation spray subsystems, 9ach composed of a spray pump, associated heat exchar.ger and flow p_ch shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

For subsystems containing recirculation spray pumps 2RSS-P21A or 2RSS-P21B:

With one containment recirculation spray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6

hours; restore the inoperable l

spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

4 b.

For subsystems containing recirculation spray pumps 1

j 2RSS-P21C or 2RSS-P21D:

See action statements in i

Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.

c.

For subsystems containing recirculation spray pumps 2RSS-P21A and 2RSS-P21C, or 2RSS-P21B and 2RSS-P21D, apply

?

Action a

above to inoperable subsystems 2RSS-P21A (or B),

and apply Action b above to inoperable subsystem 2RSS-P21C (or D).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.6.2.2 Each containment recirculation spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per -31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; j

b.

When tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, manually start each recirculation spray pump and verify the pump shaft rotates; c.

At leact once per 18 months by verifying that on a

Containment Pressure-High-High

signal, each recirculation spray pump starts automatically after a

628 i 5 second delay.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-12 Amendment No.

PROPOSED 1

i

1 NPP-73 CONTAINMENT J_YSTEMS SURVEILLAtCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i d.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying, that on recirculation flow, each recirculation spray pump develops a differential pressure of 2 112 psid at a flow of 2 3500 gpm.

e.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1 1.

Cycl.ing each power operated (excluding. automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

l 2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path i

actuates to its correct position on a test signal.*

3.

Initiating flow through each Service Water-subsystem j

and its two associated recirculation spray heat i

exchangers, and verifying a

flow rate of at least 11,000 gpm.

f.

At least once per 5

years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

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  • The specified 18-month surveillance interval du

'.ng tha first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

BEAVER. VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-13 Amendment No.

PROPOSED

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l ATTACHMENT D j

Beaver Valley Power Stat 8on, Unit Nos,1 and 2.

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Proposed Technical Specification Change No.194/59 l

RSS Information l

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i BV-1 Action Table System Figure BV-2 Action Table l

System Figure i

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l BV-1 RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM LOSE FLOWPATHS LOSE ELEC OR RW TIME TO ACTION i

AVAILABLE MODE FLOWPATH TRAIN RESTORE STATEMENT 1B,2A,2B 1-4 1A 7 DAYS a

1A,2A,2B 1-4 1B 7 DAYS a

1A,1B,22 1-4 2A 7 DAYS a

1A,1B,2A 1-4 2B 7 DAYS a

1B,2B 1-4 1A,2A A

72 HOURS b

1A,2A 1-4 IB,2B B

72 HOURS b

2A,2B 1-4 1A,1B 72 HOURS b

2A,1B 1-4 1A,2B 72 HOURS b

1A,2B 1-4 1B,2A 72 HOURS b

1A,1B 1-4 2A,2B 72 HOURS b

t BV-1 RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM r

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i "B" R.W.

"A" R.W.

"A" R.\\.

"B" R.W.

I INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT i

RSP-2A RSP-2B RSP-1 A RSP-1 B

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"A" TRAIN "B" TRAIN "A" TRAIN "B" TRAIN ELEC ELEC ELEC ELEC t

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BV-2 RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM LOSE FLOWPATHS LOSE ELEC OR SW SI FLOWPATH TIME TO ACTT.ON AVAILABLE MODE FLOWPATH TRAIN AVAILABLE RESTORE STATEMEliT B,C,D 1-4 A

C,D 72 HOURS e

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A,C,D 1-4 B

C,D 72 HOURS a

A,B,D 1-3 C

D 72 HOURS b

A,B,D 4

C D

NO LIMIT b

A,B,C 1-3 D

C 72 HOURS b

A,B,C 4

D C

NO LIMIT b

B,D 1-4 A,C A

D 72 HOURS c

A,C 1-4 B,D B

C 72 HOURS c

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3-INSIDE CONTAINMENT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

SAFETY INJECTION

l "A" S.W.

"B" S.W.

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t "A" S.W.-

"B" S.W.

l 2RSS-P21A 2RSS-P21C 2RSS P21B 2RSS-P21D b)

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"A" TRAIN "A" TRAIN "B" TRAIN "B" TRA!N -

ELEC ELEC ELEC FlFC

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