ML20126K322
| ML20126K322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/26/1979 |
| From: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126K250 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-336 NUDOCS 8105120540 | |
| Download: ML20126K322 (2) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g ';
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I am circulating.vlews.at this time in order to assist in arriving
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.m is simply'a statement of points that seem to me to be of possible 3{ f$
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interest r~.It is by.n.o means complete, and more may follow next' week:
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My. views have:not' fundamentally changed since the decision I
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on XSNM-1050.
Consequently, the position set forth in the opinion in that case is. s.till the one that I hold.
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The staff analysis set fortjtin SECY-78-596A (including the separate ELD analysis)' is a work of L
[ y3 the Gilinsky-Bradford separate opinion]on the last Tarapur export Nor are the points made in
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The terms " currently" and " prospectively" are undefined, and this invites confusion as to whether the word " pro-
.E spectively" should be read to mean " perpetually." The question is L [.!
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not whether any of the safeguards against reprocessing, retransfers, and explosives will continue in force perpetually, but whether they
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No one would argue"(I trust) that the criteria were met if we knew that one or more of the safeguards would clearly not be in' force W
within a few weeks.. By the same token, no one is arguing that we must have assurance that the safeguards will be in force for the hi:
length of time in which plutonium produced by the export might be
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used in a weapon.
For the analysis to be of any use, it should be ogG dealing not with two artificially clear adverbs, but with the degree of uncertainty that.is present in this case and with the 1.pG legal significance of that uncertainty L
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Both criterion 2 and criterion 5 (no explosives pledge and reprocessing) 6 lose all meaning if they are not read to require a level of confidence
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extending at least a year, or two into the future.
There will simply be r.o spent fuel to reprocess, nor any plutonium to make an 1
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explosive out of until after the fuel has been fabricated and hE irradiated. These two criteria have no meaning if the safeguards pp M' ;
required bv,, them need only be in force at the time the LEU is ig..
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Several events since 'our consideration of XSNM-1050 seem worthy. -
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. contradicted the Gilinskyy'-Bradford analysis of the applicability of
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of note..,For one-thing, neither Congress nor the President have h
the criteria..Indeed,. Senator Glenn, whose words are cited in
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supp' ort of the staff recommendation, went out of his way to state 1 '.5
.that:we.had not misapplied the criteria. "The same is true of the-T E'i5
' HousEInternational Relations Committee;* As far as I know, only'
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Senator McClure. has. expressed a contrary view in.the Congr'ess.
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No legal analysis has addressed the significance of the fact (5) 5)
that Congress provided the Presidential approval route for cases in If in fact the criteria are to be rF which the criteria were not met.
so tortured as to accommodate Executive Branch speculation about Indian behavior in place of concrete assurances, then it is hard to see just what the purpose of the. track involving Presidential L..
approval would be.
It bears repeating that a failure on the Commission's part to
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find that the criteria are met is not at all the same thing as U::
either a refusal.to send the export or a finding that it would be inimical to the common defense and security.
A finding that some 0]
of the criteria are unmet does not involve any dispute over the
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propriety of the President's sending the export for whatever
$:7 rE reasons he deems necessary.
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