ML20126K272
| ML20126K272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/20/1980 |
| From: | Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Ahearne J, Gilinsky V, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126K250 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-336 NUDOCS 8105120496 | |
| Download: ML20126K272 (13) | |
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M NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y WASHINGTON. D. C. 70555 p
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June 20,1980 [*j W a ,a f; MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Ahearne Comissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Comissioner Hendrie Comissioner Bradford FROM: Carlton Kamu >r, Di k or Office of Affairs
]
SUBJECT:
EXPORTATION OF NUCLEAR FUEL TO INDIA FOR THE TARAPUR POWER PLANT On June 19, 1980, the Senate Conmittees on Foreign Relations and
( Governmental Affairs resumed their hearings on the exportation of enriched uranium to India to fuel the Tarapur Reactor. According to the agenda, the witnesses were to be Mr. Warren Christopher Deputy Secretary of State; Mr. Gerald Smith, Ambassador-at-Large for Nuclear Non-Proliferation; and a panel consisting of James Barnes of the Center for Law and Society, Jacob Scherr of the National Resources Defense Fund and Richard Betts of the Brookings Institute. Mr. Christopher and Mr. Smith were the only witnesses to come before the Comittee during this segment of the hearing.
Before Mr.' Christopher gave his opening remarks, Mr. Percy (R-IL),
Mr. Glenn (D-OH), Mr. Pell (D-RI), and Chainnan Church (D-ID) made it clear that the Senate Comittee on Foreign Relations had jurisdiction in this matter and that those from the Cormittee on Governmental Affairs were included in order to provide assistance as to the intent of the original Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Also before Mr. Christopher spoke, Mr. Church, Mr. Percy and Mr. Glenn stated their concerns about the Administration's apparent intention of allowing the export of the nuclear fuel by Executive Order.
Interestingly enough, Mr. Christopher began his statement by saying:
I wish to inform you that the President has decided to authorize the exports in question and is transmitting to the Congress today an Executive Order and a Message explaining why he believes the exports should be made.
I would like to use this opportunity to explain the geopolitical and non-proliferation concerns that underlie j
, the President's decision.
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Please find attached Mr. Christopher's entire prepared message to the Comittees. After giving a short history of the events stemming from the 1963 agreement for nuclear cooperation between the U.S. nd. India, Mr, Christopher assured the Senators that India would not go beyond l Mrs. Ghandhi's statement concerning her intention to possibly continue !
" nuclear experiments."
As presented by the Deputy Secretary, the Administration's rationale for authorizing the shipments to India consisted of two essential arguments 1) U.S. foreign policy concerns would most favorably be served by allowing the export, and 2) this unique situation would not
-serve as a precedent for further emasculation of the NNPA. If the U.S.
chose not to ship the nuclear fuel, the Indians could possibility consider themselves free from the obligations of the 1963 agreement and from the obligations of the safeguards agreement. By authorizing the shipments, the U.S. has bound the Indian Government to the require-ments of the previous nuclear cooperation agreements.
Furthermore, the granting of the Indian requests wculd contribute to '
the solidification of a constructive bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India. The importance of an improved relationship ,
between these two nations is emphasized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the turmoil in Iran. According to the State Department, there is a real possibility that the USSR will replace the U.S. as India's supplier of nuclear fuel if the U.S. refuses India's applications.
The Carter Administration professes that this decision will not be a i precedent for further emasculation of the U.S.'s policy of nuclear non-proliferation.
The State Department openly disputed the NRC's interpretation of the Congressional intent of the NNPA, specifically concerning the grace period. As explained by Mr. Christopher, the Administration believed that the applications should be accepted without a consideration of full-scope safeguards since the applications were l filed before September 10, 1979 and the shipment was reasonably expected l to be shipped before March 10, 1980. Since these requests fall within l wh.at the Administration considers the grace period, a precedent for
, future applications would not be established.
However, the State Department did acknowledge that within the next two years the Indian GU,ernment will once again request the export of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur facility.
In response to Mr. Christopher's opening remarks, Mr. Church expressed his dismay over the entire sale of fuel to India and the' President's hasty issuance of the Executive Order. Mr. Percy pointed out that India and the Soviet Union have just concluded a 17 year, $1.6 billion
. arms agreement and that the immediate authorization of the fuel shipments was not the most prudent' course for the U..S. at the present time.
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. . l Perhaps the most vocal opponent to the Administration's position was Mr. Glenn, who co-sponsored the NNPA of 1978. Since the Indians have 18 nonths of fuel on hand, he advocated the position of waiting one more. year before allowing the export. He felt that the U.S. was under no obligation to sustain the continuous operation of the fuel fabrica-tion plant near the Tarapur site under the 1963 Agreement. This facility would be shut down without the fuel shipment, but the power plant could continue to operate. Mr. Glenn was in complete concurrence with the NRC's interpretation of the NNPA and stated that.the Adminis-tratio'n should amend the law if it wished to continue its case-by-case examination of applications for the sale of nuclear fuel. 'Mr. Glenn suggested that since NNPA seemed to be ineffective, perhaps American business should be allowed to reenter the international market, unhindered by non-proliferation requirements.
The hearing took an' interesting twist when Congressman Markey (D-MASS),
who sits en the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, obtained permission from Mr. Church to give his remarks and question Mr. Christopher.
Essentially, Mr. Markey told the Deputy Secretary that he was introducing a Concurrent Resolution of Disagreement in opposition to the Executive Order and that the resolution was being co-sponsored by 35 congressmen.
Mr. Markey termed the Administration's new policy as " selective proliferation."
Please find attached Mr. Markey's Concurrent Resolution. '
According to the NNPA, the Congress has 60 days in which to review the President's authorization of the nuclear fuel shipment by Executive Order. If both Houses agree, by a majority vote, to such a concurrent resolution, the shipment can be stopped, and the President has no authority to veto the concurrent resolution.
Before the hearing was aojourned, Mr. Percy requested that Mr. Christopher l submit the complete legal basis for the President's decision, even i though it most probably would have to be done on a classified basis.
Before declaring the adjournment, Mr. Church stated that the hearing would continue in the near future.
Just after the hearing ended, Mr. Markey and Mr. Waxman (D-CA) held a press conference on behalf of those Congressmen sponsoring the resolution. Both claimed that their support was bipartisan and that their motives were not explicitly political. On page one of the Washin t Post of Friday, June 20, 1980, it was reported that Mr. Bingham
.(D-NY)g onChairman of the House. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, would also co-sponsor a Concurrent Resolution of Disagreement. Please find attached Mr. Markey's and Mr. Waxman's statements made at the press conference. ;
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- . ,,. . . 1 Later Thursday afternoon, June 19, 1980,- the Executive Order and the President's Messcge became available to the NRC. It was circulated late yesterday, and pidase find it attached to this subsequent -
memorandum. The President's explanation is similar in content to Mr. . Christopher's remarks made at the hearing.-
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The' Concurrent Resolution will now be referred to the House Committee l on Foreign Affairs, and when one is introduced in the Senate, it will go to the Committee on Foreign Relations. According to a staff member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, full committee hearings or, the. resolution could begin as early as next week, June 23-27. It is not presently known if _the NRC will be requested to appear before either committee.
Attachments:
As stated I
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IN 1963 THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, !
THE.U.S. AGREED TO SUPPLY ALL OF THE ENRICHED URANIUM-NEEDED TO FUEL THE REACTORS AT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION DURING THEIR ESTIMATED THIRTY-YEAR LIFETIME. IN l RETURN }NDIA AGREED THAT IT WOULD USE ONLY U.S. SUPPLIED FUELAYIARAPUR,THATSAFEGUARDSWOULDBEMAINTAiNEDON THE FUEL, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE REPROCESSED WITHOUT U.S.
AGREEMENTS AND THAT THE SUPPLIED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE USED ONLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND NOT FOP.
" ATOMIC WEAPONS OR FOR ANY OTHER MILITARY PURPOSE."
IN 1974 THE U.S. 0BTAINED FROM INDIA AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT THAT U.S. FUEL SUPPLIED TO IARAPUR WOULD BE USED AT IARAPUR FOR THE NEEDS OF THE' POWER STATION, AND THUS NOT FDP ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
THUS FAR, THE U.S. HAS SUPPLIED UNDER THE AGREEMENT MORE THAN 200 TONS OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM TO FUEL THE 1
TARAPUR REACTORS. THE FUEL IS UNDER SAFEGUAP.DS AND HAS NOT BEEN REPROCESSED) AND INDIA HAS MET ALL OF ITS OTHER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1963 AGREEMENT.
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- + e 3-J THE NUCLEAR NO -PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 PR THATs AFTER A' GRACE PERIOD, A RECIPIENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS MUST HAVE ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNDER-INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AS'A CONDITION OF CONTINUED
' EXPORT.
INDIA HAS ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS ON IARAPUR AND OTHER FACILITIES THAT CONTAIN MATERI L SUPPLIED FROM ABROADs BUT IT HAS A NUMBER OF INDIGENOUSLY DEVELOPED FACILITIES THAT ARE NOT UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARD INDIA TAKES THE POSITION THAT IT WILL ACCEPT SAFE ON ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES ONLY WHEN ALL OTHER STATES, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, DO THE SAME.
DURING THE GRACE PERIOD PROVIDED IN THE 1978 ACT, TWO SHIPMENTS OF ENRICHED URANIUM HAVE BEEN MADE TO i
INDIA.
i IWO ADDITIONAL EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS WER
! FILED'DURING'THE GRACE PERIOD: ONE IN SEPTEMBER 1978, AND'ONE IN AUGUST 1979.
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IF WE DISAPPROVE THESE SHIPMENTSs INDIA IS VERY LIKELY TO CONSIDER ITSELF FREE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1963 AGREEMENT. IN THAT EVENT, INDIA MIGHT. REPROCESS THE U.S.-ORIGIN FUEL IN INDIA AND USE THE PLUTONIUM IN THE IARAPUR REACTORS.
THIS WOULD BE AN UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENTS BECAUSE IT WOULD BE SEEN BY SOME AS A DEMONSTRATION THAT THERMAL RECYCLE IS A PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE, AT LEAST AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, TO AVOID DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL SUPPLY.
IF WE DISAPPROVE THESE SHIPMENTS, INDIA MIGHT ALSO WITHDRAW FROM THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND MIGHT DECIDE TO DISREGARD OUR VETO OVER ANY OTHER USE OF THE MATERIAL ALREADY SUPPLIED BEYOND ITS USE AS FUEL FOR IARAPUR. IT ALSO COULD END THE PRESENT U.S. VETO OVER ANY RETRANSFER TO ANOTHER COUNTRY OF THIS MATERIAL.
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THESE SHIPMENTS ARE APPROVED, WE WILL AT A MINIMUM HAVE PRESERVED INDIA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDERTHEEXISTINGAGREEMENTSFORkNOTHERYEARORTWO.
WECANUSETHATTIMETOGOODkDVANTAGEINCONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. '
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3EYOND OUR NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS, A REFUSAL AT THIS TIME TO FULF.ILL OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SUPPLY AGREEMENT [WOULDCASTALONGSHADOWONOUROVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA. INDIA IS THE' LARGEST DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD. ITS GOVERNMENTS LIKE OURSs RESTS ON THE
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CONSENT OF THE.GOVERNEDs EXPRESSED AGAIN IN JANUARY IN THE MOST MASSIVE POPULAR ELECTION THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN.
WE, SHARE WITH INDIA A FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTSs A BELIEF IN THE RULE OF LAW, kND A PRIDE IN STRONG DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.
i THE TURMOIL IN IRAN AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE HEIGHTENED U.S. SECURITY CONCERNS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA. WE CONSI' DER IT VITAL TO
' BOLSTER OUR RELATIONS WITH THIS REGION; PARTICULARLY WITH THOSE COUNTRIES, SUCH AS INDIA; WHICH CAN PROMOTE
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SECURITY AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASI A.
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, i U.S.-INDI A RELATIONS HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SMOOTH.
00R POLICY PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS DO-NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE. AT THE:SAME TIMEi WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IN' PURSUING'ITS'INDEP'ENDENT COURSE,.MRS. GANDHI'S GOVERN, MENT HAS TAKEN POSITIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT
' MATTERS WHICH WE WELCOME AND HAS SIGNALLED TO US THAT IT WANTS A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. -
-- INDIk HAS MOVED FROM kN UNCRITIC L VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN TO ONE OPPOSING THE SOVIET INVASION AND' CALLING FOR PROMPT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.
-- MRS. GANDHI HAS PERSONALLY SPOKEN AGAINST CRITICS OF THE.lRAN RESCUE MISSION.
-- INDIA HAS SOUGHT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTkN.,ANDHASSENTTWOHIGHLEVELEMISSARIESTO ISLAMABADTODISbUSSREGIONALPROBLEMSWITHTHEPAKISTAN GOVERNMENT.
-- IT HAS CONTINUED TO PLAY A MODEPATE ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
-- INDIA HAS SIGNALLED THAT IT WANTS TO DEVELOP A CLOSERRELATIONSHIPWITHTHEb.S. CLARK CLIFFORD AND AvERELL HARRIMAN HAVE HAD CANDID AND USEFUL SESSIONS '
WITH MRS. GANDHI; ANDS kSYOUKNOW,SHEHASWARMLY L
WELCOMED SEVERAL OF YOUR CONGRESSIONAL COLLEAGUES TO l- INDIA..
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WEBELIEVETHkTTHEBESTWkYTOEhtb00RAGEINDIAto PURSUE POLICIES HARMONIOUS WITH U.S. INTERESTS IS TO BUILD A F.RAMEWORK OF CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICHUNDERSCbiRESU[S.CONSTANbYANDRELIABILITY. THE IARAPUR ISSUE IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD. M.ANY ININDIAbEEIT S.kNINDEXOFU.S.INTERESTIN MAINTAlh11NG.GOODRELATIONSkNDOFOURRECOGNITIONOF THEIMPORTkNbEbFbONSTRUCTIVEUSS.-INDIATIESTOOUR <
BROADER FOREIGN POLI'CY CONCERNS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA.
A POSITIVE DECISION ON IARAPUR WILL ENCOURAGE INDIA
- IN THE LONG TERM TO ACT IN WAYS CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTERESTS AS IT FACES UP TO THE NEW SITUATION POSED FOR s SOUTH' ASIA BY THE PROSPECT OF A' PROLONGED SOVIET PRESENCc.
IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WILL ALSO HELP ALLAY INDIAN APPREHENSIONS
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ABOUT U.S. POL'ICIES IN AREAS SENSITIVE TO INDIA.
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BEFORE' CONCLUDING, } WOULD LIKE BRIEFLY TO ADDRESS THE CONCERN SOME HAVE EXPRESSED THAT APPROVAL OF THESE EXPORTS'WOULD FRUSTRATE THE INTENT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT THAT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS BE
. REQUIRED AS AN EXPORT. CRITERION. IHIS Q0NCERN IS UNWARRANTED. THE STATUTE PROVIDES A GRACE PERIOD BEFORE THIS ADDITIONAL EXPORT CRITERION -- FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS -- BECOMES APPLICABLE. THE NRC HAS ADOPTED A MORE' RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GRACE PERIOD THAN WE BELIEVE IS WARRANTED BY EITHER THE TEXT OR THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THE TWO LICENSE APPLICATIONS IN THIS CASE FALL WITHIN.THAT GRACE PERIOD. IN ANY EVENT, I CAN ASSUPE YOU THAT THE l ADMINISTRATION WILL REGARD THESE TWO SHIPMENTS AS WITHIN THE GRADE PERIOD AND NOT AS A PRECEDENT FOR DECISIONS ON APPLICATIONS FILED AFTER $EPTEMBER 10, 1979. THEREFORE, APPROVAL OF THESE EXPORTS WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENT.
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WE HAVES IN FACTS MADE NO DECISION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF U.S.-INDIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION BEY'ND O THESE PENDING APPlaCATIONS, AND DO NOT EXPECT TO DO SO UNTIL NEXT YEAR OR LATER. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT RULE OUT THE PdSSIBILITY OF' ADDITIONAL SUPPLY. IT IS UNNECESSARY TO MAKE A FIRM DECISION NOW ON AN ISSUE THAT WE WILL -
PROBABLY NOT FACE FOR AT LEAST A YEAR WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY HAVE CHANGED.
I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THIS kCT' ION SHOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A WEAKENING OF U.S. PURSUIT OF ITS NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OF OUR INTENT TO CARRY OUT THE MANDATE AND INITIATIVES OF THE NUCLEAR HON-PROLIFERATION ACT. THESE OBJECTIVES ARE OF PERMANENT IMPORTANCE TO U.S. N TIONAL SECURITYs AND WE WILL CONTINUE
.TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THEM IN A MANNER THAT BEST SUPPORTS U.S.
INTERESTS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE CONGRESS BUILT FLEXIBILITY INTO THE LAW, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR A GRACE PERIOD AND FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTION WHEN NECESSARY TO HANDLE DIFFICULT EXPORT DECISIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. INTERESTS.
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CERTAINdY THERh Rh,PL USIBLh ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDESOFTHIbDIFFICULTISSUE. BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE WEIGHT OF THESE ARGUMENTS' LIES DECISIVELY ON THE SIDE OF GOING FORWARD.
IFWEDONOTPR0bEhD,WhbbubDCdbShTHEDOORON ANY OPPORTUNITY'FOR INFLUENCING INDIA'S FUTURE NUCLEAR
, ACTIVITIES.
WhWOULDRISKLOSINGOURVETOOVERINDIA'bUSEOF SPENT FUEL FROM THE REACTORS WE HAVE PROVIDED.
WE WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING OURRELATIONSWITHINDIA'--ANINFLUENTIkLDEM0bRACYIN A CRITICAL REGION AT A CRUCI AL TIME.
IF WE DO NOT.GO FORWARD, IT WOULD BENEFIT, NOT CURSELVES,BUTTHOSEWHOWOULDMOVEINTOTHhBREACH.
l WE HOPE WE WILL HAVE YOUR SUPPORT ON THIS MATTER OFREkLIMPORTdNCETOAMERICANINTERESTS.
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