ML20126J783

Forwards Evaluation of Each Area Where Structural Steel Calculations Revealed That Fire Durations & Temps Exceed Structural Steel Temp Acceptance Criteria

ML20126J783
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	06/06/1985
From:	Boyer V PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Thompson H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20126J788	List: ML20126J783 ML20126J825 ML20126J840 ML20126J858 ML20126J886 ML20126J909 ML20126J926 ML20126J952 ML20126J976 ML20126J990
References
NUDOCS 8506100696
Download: ML20126J783 (13)

Text

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 V. S. BOY ER SR. VICE PRESIDENT NUCLE AR POWE R Mr. Hugh L. Thcmpson, Jr. Docket Nos. 50-277 Division of Licensing 50-278 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Structural Steel Survivability Analysis

References:

(1) Letter V. S. Boyer to H. L. Thompson, Jr.,

dated March 29, 1985 (2) Letter G. E. Gears to E. G. Bauer, Jr.,

dated March 18, 1985

Dear Mr. Thompson:

1. The reference (1) letter transmitted the structural steel calculations for Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. Included with the submittal was a suTmary of plant areas which the structural steel calculations revealed had fire durations and temperatures exceeding the structural steel temperature acceptance criteria. Attachment No. 1 details c ur evaluation of each area, including proposed fixes.

2. In addition to the area evaluations, the following evaluations were performed:

a) A structural evaluation was made of the steel framing in several areas; including the Diesel Bays, the Fan Room, and the High Pressure Service Water Ptmp Bays; to evaluate the effects on the adjacent walls should the structural steel in the ceilings of the areas fall. The ceilings in these rooms are not Appendix R III.G.2 fire barriers; however, the walls at certain locations are.

The conclusion of the evaluation was that structural steel failure alone will not affect the walls separating fire areas. It is important to note that 'he structural evaluation performed was subjective in that it included the predicted actual behavior of a steel framing system at elevated temperatures and asstmed failure modes leading to collapse of the steel.

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- b) Failures of particular members of safe shutdown fire barriers due to localized effects were evident in 7 plant areas and included a total of 25 beams plus the entire Cable spreading Room. We are proposing the

'following alternatives to remedy these problems:

1) Where cable trays cross the axis of a beam in a

-perpendicular direction, we propose to coat the beam three feet in each direction from the area of flame impingement with fire proofing material or provide solid tray covers of a similar length for the cable tray. We have determined that cable derating -is not required if we install tray covers.

Since the problem associated with localized effects is direct flame' impingement; fire proofing or solid tray covers will protect the beam.

2) When a cable tray runs parallel to and beneath a beam, the entire bean will be coated with a three foot overlap at the ends or tray covers will be provided.

3) Beams that are Jeopardized by vertical trays will be coated five feet in each direction fr m the area of flame impingement.

4) The Jeopardized structural menters will be evaluated to detennine their structural significance. If the menters are not required structurally, no protection will be provided.

5) Structural steel protection will not be provided in the Cable Spreading Room. The area temperature did not cause a structural problem when based on cmbustible loading; however, every beam failed due to localized effects because of the close proximity of raceway to the ceiling. The Cable Spreading Room ceiling is not a III.G.2 fire barrier.

Automatic carbon dioxide is provided for the rom.

The CO system is actuated by cross-zoned smoke 2

detectors. Early warning from one of the .

twenty-three smoke detectors and automatic actuation of the CO system will assure control of a fire in the area.2

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We have not asked for specific exemption requests for each'

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problem fire area or Individual problem beam. -The-Structural Stec1. Survivability Analysis has shcwn~that the structural steel fonning a part of or supporting' III.G.2 ._

fire barriers, either by itself or with associated installed fire protection and r.ecurity features, provides "a fire

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. resistance . equivalent to that required of the' barrier";

.otherwise we have upgraded the steel protection to meet Appendix R'Ill.G.2 requirements.

. i+ . :We have included as Attachment No. 2 additional calculations perfonned for plant areas not. covered in the initial scope.

This should complete.the evaluation of all III.G.2 fire barriers. A new calculation sumnary has been included

. also..

If you'have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us. Our.

- plan is to, proceed with the necessary modifications as soon as we

- receive PRC approval of;our proposed plan..

P Very truly yours, I e t

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ATTACFNENT NO. 1 The structural steel survivability analysis identified 27 plant areas which had expected fire durations and structural steel temperatures which did not meet the steel temperature acceptance criteria. Our evaluation of these areas is as follows:

1. Radwaste Building, el. 135, Medical Station and corridor, calc.

1. 10 - A review of the Peach Bottcm safe shutdown analysis and fire barrier drawings revealed that the ceilings of these areas are not Appendix R, III.G.2 fire barrlers, and therefore structural steel protection is not required.

2. Radwaste Building, el. 135, Unit 2 M-G Set Room, calc. #19 - The M-G set rocm did not pose a problem with one door open for a ventilation controlled fire. Area gas tenperatures for case nuTber 1 only reached 762oF. Case nunter 2 with two doors open did reach a gas temperature of 1272CF with the steel reaching the failure temperature at the 135 minute mark. We do not feel it is credible to have two supervised security doors open for any extended length of time. For that matter, we do not feel it is credible to have one supervised security door open for any length of time. However, due to the large quantity of conbustible liquid in the area, we propose to extend an existing sprinkler system provided for the fluid drive and the generator to the entire floor area. Due to the existence of energized load centers in the room, the extended sprinkler system will be installed to provide floor area coverage for an oli spill fire only. The sprinkler system will be designed and installed by a quallfled fire protection engineer with " System Interaction" concerns a major consideration. The installation will not be a strict NFPA area sprinkler system.

3. Turbine Building, el. 135, Emergency Switchgear Rooms (eight rocms), calc. #20 - We do not plan to provide structural steel protection in these rooms. The steel survivability calculations indicate that for a one door open fire scenario the steel does not reach the critical steel temperature for 30 minutes. The doors to the switchgear rooms are electrically supervised security doors with a card reader at the entrance to monitor access. These door locations are also located in fire barriers. Should one of these dcors be left open, a security guard would be dispatched to the location inmediately. If it is necessary to leave the door open during modification work, a fire watch would be provided in accordance with plant technical specifications. .

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In addition, these rooms have been sealed under the recent penetration sealing program, and uncontrolled air flow necessary  ;

to support ccrrbustion, into and out of the rooms is an absolute I mininun, i

Early warning smoke detectors are also provided in the rooms which alarm in the Control Room at elevation 165, assuring prompt i response to any fire condition.

]

Thereforo, there is no foreseeable circtsnstance by which a door could be left open or a fire situation develop that would not be inmediately Identified.

The existing fire protection and security features assure that the_ exposed steel is sufficient to provide a fire resistance j equivalent to that required of the barrier.

4. Radwa::,te Building, el .165, Fan Room, calc. #22 - This particular ceiling is' not a safe shutdown barrier; therefore structural steel protection is not required.

-5. Cire. Water Ptsop House, High Pressure Service Water Pump Bay (two rooms), calc. #26 - The fire barrier of concern in these areas is a 1/4 to 3/8" thick built up steel plate wall between the two service water ptanp bays. We do not plan to provide steel protection for this barrier. This barrier was approved as acceptable by the NRC in the 1979 Peach Bottczn Safety Evaluation Report. That position was reaffirmed by the NRC in reference (2) when an exemption request was granted to Appendix R Section III.G.3 based on _ low ccrrbustible loading and the premise that a fire would be extinguished in a very short time.

i

6. Diesel Generator Building, Diesel Generator Rocms (four rooms),

calc. #27 - The ceilings of these rooms'are not III.G.2 fire barriers and therefore do not require fire protection of structural steel. However, these rooms are provided with a fire detection system and an automatic carbon dioxide system vAlch would quickly detect and control a diesel vault fire.

7. Diesel Building, Cardox Rocrn, calc. #28 - The ceiling of this room is not a III.G.2 fire barrier; therefore structural steel protection is not required.

i

8. Reactor Building, el. 88, Unit 2 HPCI Room, calc. #30 - The HPCI room is provided with early warning fire detection as well as an automatic carbon dioxide fire protection system. The automatic C09 system will assure that a fire in the HPCI rocm is pronptly dl5 covered and controlled and the structural steel in the room will not be Jeopardized.

9. Reactor Building, el. 88, Unit 3 HPCI Room, calc. #35 - See item nterber 8.

. p 310. ~ Reactor Building, el . 91'-6, . Unit 2,; C RHR Ptenp and HX Room,-

calc. #47 - The calculatlon.for this area Indicates that It Is-necessary for three access doors to be~left open.to provide sufficient air to produce a fire that would Jeopardize the steel' in the room. The doors to the room are all inside secure areas.

The area is also a radiation' area requiring Health Physics examination prior to entry. Smoke detection is provided in the room. . Based on the above, no structural steel protection will be provided.

11. ,Radwaste. Building, e1. 135, Unit 3 M-G Set Room, calc. #53 - See

- Item nwber. 2.

'12. .Radwaste Building, el. 135, Radwaste Control Room, calc. #54 -

See. Item nwber 1.

13. . Turbine Building, el. 135, Battery Room (four rooms), calc. #90 -

These rooms are similar to the switchgear rooms. evaluated under item nmber 3. .The walls are fire barriers; the doors are

. electricai sy supervised and require card reader access. There is little' ilkelihood of any access door being left open without a  ;

' fire watch posted per technical specification requirements..

These rooms have also been sealed under the penetration sealing program and uncontrolled airflow into or out of.the. rooms is an absolute minimtm. . Additionally, smoke detectors are provided in each room; and the electrolyte in the batteries would provide a quenching effect :In the event of a fire in the rocms. Based on the above, we do not plan to' provide structural steel protection for this area.

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PL C wisi-i ass c.,,ica.1,,c. - ,s e-m so - 2.~18 DEACH BOTTOM STRUCTURAL STEEL SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS 1

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f Submitted: May 30, 1985 l

7922 West Chester Pike

• Upper Darby, Pa. 19082 * (215) 853-1700

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83 L ECT: ,C, 153' 543 RX : 1 N3 CD S STIBLES f4 ? RXS 165 ISOL. VLPVE CCST. ND CC CLSTIslS 851 . A13 - 2 1E5'. RE5ENERATIVE bX M NO STEEL 86 . RX5 . 2 165' SACK 4 ASH REC. TA M NO CO S STIBLES

- 87 ' 1 RX3 2- 150', . N. EV1E NO CCaiUSTIB ES CO#MRTrENT

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FEK B3TTC* STREML STEEL SuWIVRBILITY MALYSIS

' rd # PLD3 (NIT ELEV-- CREA DESC Ck52 CASE DESC -FIRE D A FIRE TEC LDC, WIB. REGES GEN. HT3. O a kS

< E8 RX3 2 1905 ; S. W VE NO C M USTIB IS CC*ERTPENT 83 2XB 2' 224r. REFG LING FL. NC CCMFJSTIBLES 4

SO ~ TB. C- 125' BAU ERf RDCS ~! VENTILATION E2 E646 Ad. STEEL FAILS

.(TYPICAL) CCNTR1 LED' .

91 TB- C 116' RADIATICN C:-EM i.AB -1 h3 CO*PUSTIELE3 92 T3 C 115'. CCWENTIONAL 1 NO CC"?USTIBLES CHEM LEB

, S3 ' TS .C 115' bEALTH FHYSICS i N3 C0r20STIF ES UTILITY ROO*.

94 :- TB- C 115' COUNTI G R:0 1 ' W CC? BUST!B_ES 55 CLEAN CLOT 43 ROCM i h3 Car 3USTIBLES TB : C' _ - 116' 95 - T3 . C- 1 NO C072uST!3;ES 115' ._TC:LET AiEA 57 TB C: 11E' ' J m ITER R00*  ; 50 C0"BLSTIELES 93 T? 2- 91.5' CONDENSATE E E G SK 1 NO STEEL TANK ROCM 99 ' T3 3 91.!' CCNDEN5 ATE E C M SH 1 N0 STEEL TAM R005 i

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