ML20126B966

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Forwards Advance FSAR Submittal to Facilitate NRC Review in Areas of Essential Equipment Classification & Break Postulation Criteria.Encl Matl Will Be Incorporated in FSAR Amend 87 Scheduled for Submittal in Dec 1992
ML20126B966
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  
Issue date: 12/17/1992
From: William Cahill, John Marshall
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TXX-92592, NUDOCS 9212220299
Download: ML20126B966 (24)
v • d • e


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W Log # TXX-92592 m,

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907.5 (clo) 918 (clo) 7t/ELECTP/C Ref. # 10CFR50.34(b)

Wluiam J. (.'ahill. Jr.

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December 17, 1992 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-446 AND 50-446 ADVANCE FSAR SUBMITTAL - ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT CLARIFICATION AND BREAK POSTULATION CRITERIA Gentlemen:

The attachment to this letter provides an advance CPSES FSAR submittal to f acilitate NRC Staf f review of the subject area in support of licensing Unit 2.

The attachment is organized as follows:

1.

A description / justification of each change.

2.

A copy of the revised FSAR pages (changes are indicated in the margin by a revision bar and "87").

The attached material will be incorporated in CPSES FSAR Amendment 87 which is currently scheduled for December,1992.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Carl Corbin at (214) 812-8859.

Sincerely.

William J. Cahill, Jr.

By:

J. S. Marshall Generic Licensing Manager CBC/grp Attachnent c-Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV Resident Inspectors. CPSES (2)

Mr. T. A. Bergman, NRR Mr. B.

E. Holian, NRR 9212220299 921217 PDR ADOCK 0500044S P

PDR SU N. OUve Street LB. 81 Daun.Texn 75201 O

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_.m FINAL SAFETY. ANALYSIS REPORT-(FSAR)

-AMENDHENT / REVISION 87 l

~ Attachment to,TXX-92592 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 1 OF 23 L

Prefix Page (11 geended)

Group Description j

3.6B-2 2

Clarifies discussion in Section 3.6B.I.1(C) to l'

indicate that some of the primary plant systems are used to mitigate the effects of a HELB outside l

containment.

Clarification Seventy two hours is. considered sufficient time to allow repairs to portions of the primary plant ventilation and associated chilled water.

These i

portions are then credited to-mitigate the long term effects of HELB's.

Change Request Number-

SA-92-744.12 Commitment Register Number :

Related SER : 3.6

_SSER :22 3.6.2 l

SER/SSER Impact

No I

-3.6B 3 2

Add clarification to 3.68.1.1 " Design Basis" j-discussing-large and small bore high energy lines i

seismic classifications Clarification This change provides as-built clarification required by DBD-ME-007. Rev.3 and. corrections and, updates HEL seismic criteria discussed in TXX-4092.

Change Request Number-

SA-92 744.1 Commitment Register Number :

j Related SER : 3.6 SSER :6 3.6 SER/SSER Impact

. : Yes TXX-4092 dated January 5, 1984, as referenced in SSER=

6 (Section 3.6.2) is changed by this FSAR change.

.3.6B-15 2

Revises exceptions to Seismic I requirements and adds i

reference to Section 7.6.12 for detection and mitigation equipment exceptions to. seismic Category I 4

i requirements.

Revision This change revises the exceptions to seismic Category-I-requirements and. adds a reference to Section!7.6.12 for. clarification-of detection and mitigation equipment exceptions.

Change Request Number

SA192-744.2-Commitment Register Number-:

p

-Related SER : 3.6-SSER :22 -3.6

-SER/SSER Impact-

No i

l Table 3.6B-1 4

_-See Sheet No(s) :1. 21, 22. 23, 24 25, 27, 31 and 32

-Add " roof" to the building locatien for the' safeguards

' building on specific high energy. lines in the-High L

Energy Line List. Table 3.6B-1.

Clarification L

This change indicates the location.of'certain lines on.

the-roof of the safeguards. building. This change g.

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FINAL' SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR)

Attachment tg TXX-92592 AMENDHENT / REVISION 87 Page 2 0F 23 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Prefix Page (n amendid)

Stoyn Description provides clarification as to the location of certain 5

4 high energy lines only.

Change Request Number

SA 92-744.4 Commitment Register Number :

Related SER : 3.6 SSER::22 3.6 SER/SSER Impact

No Table 3.6B-1 4

See Sheet No(s) :30, 31. 35 and 54 Add note 24 to clarify the location of a high energy

~

line in a safety related area and-that no detailed seismic design was performed.

l Addition Note 24_~ explains location and discussion on the.

l seismic design of the lines identified with the note.

The~ note is explainatory to help clarify information contained in the table.

I Change Request Number

SA 92-744.3 Commitment Register Number-:

i Related SER : 3.6 SSER :22 3.6 SER/SSER 1mpact.

No

~ Table 3.6B-1 4

See Sheet No(s) :30 and 31-Delete "TB" from the;" Building" column in Table 3.6B-1, on sheets 30'and 31.

Editorial This is an editorial-change as the "TB" (Turbine Bldg.)

is not associated with any high energy line on this l

sheet'.

i Change Request Number

SA-92-744.5 Commitment Register Number :

Related SER : 3.6 SSER :22 3.6-SER/SSER Impact

No 1

. Table 3.60-1 4

See Sheet No(s) :31 and 32 Correct line numbers.

Editorial s

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This change corrects the line numbers to reflect-the

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as-built numbering in the plant.

--Change Request Number

SA-92-744.7-if_

Ceminitment Register Number :

{i ;

v4 Related SER : 3.6 SSER :22 3.6 SER/SSER Impact

No Table 3.6B-A

-3 See Sheet No(s) :31 and 32 i

Add-line numbers-34MS-1-07-1302 G. 34MS 1-12-1302 G.

34MS-1-17-1302-G. and_34MS-1-22-1302-G to the high energy _line list.

Addition These lines are added to reflect the as-built condition of.the plant as discussed in the design basis documents Change Request Number

SA-92-744.8.

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR)

Attachment to.TXX-92592 AMEN 0 MENT-/ REVISION 87 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 3 0F.23 1

)

Prefix.Page (a1 amended)

Group Descr.iotion Comtitment Register Number :

Related SER : 3.6 SSER :22 3.6 l

SER/SSER Impact

No 7.6-29 3

Add the switch numbers X-PS-3226A, 3226B, 3227A, and 3227B to Section 7.6.12.1 in the discussion on the

_ switches.

Add explaination and additional discussion j

describing the classification of the switches and isol.' valves and being Non Class 1E and Non Seismic Cat. I.

Clarification

~ eb This change is consistent with Table 212.68 3 and l

describes in more detail the location of the switches and updates the FSAR to the as-built condition of the plant.

Change Request Number

SA-92-744.6 Commitment Register Number :

'Related SER :-7.6 SSER :24 7.6 SER/SSER Impact

No 7.6 31 4.

Add the switch numbers to paragraph 7.6.12.2 to clarify 1

which_ switches are being discussed and-describe where they are found in the FSAR Figures. - They are also described-as-Non-1E and Non-Seismic Category I.

Section 10.4.8-is referenced for the SGBD isol, valves.

Clarification e

This change references other FSAR sections to help clarify the discussion.

The-switches and the SGBD valves are described elsewhere in the FSAR, as is the classification of the valves-and switches.

Change _ Request Number

.SA-92-744.9 Commitment Register Number :

l Related SER : 7.6 SSER :24 7.6-SER/SSER Impact

No 7.6 31 4

Adds to Section 7.6.12.3 the switch numbers PS-5385 1and PS-5385A and the FSAR Figure they;are found and

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classification Non-Class IE and Non-Seismic Cat. I.

Reference section 9.3.4 for_CVCS description _and i

reference Figure 9.3-10 for the isolation valves 8152 and 8160.

Clarification _ :

This change clarifies _the 1E and seismic classification of the switches and valves discussed in Section 7.6.12. 3. :The reference to'the other FSAR sections is a' clarification to the text.

Change Request Number

SA-92-744.10-Commitment Register Number :

Related'SER : 7.6 SSER':24' 7.6

.SER/SSER'1mpact

No

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j FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT.(FSAR) l

' Attachment to.TXX-92592 AMEN 0 MENT / REVISION 87 4

l Page 4 0F 23-1 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Prefix Page (a_s amended)

Group Description Figure 9.3-7 2

See Sheet No(s) :01 Update configuration of vents and drains in the j

auxiliary building.

i Update l

This change reflects the as-built configuration of the l

plant.

Change Request Number

SA 92-744.11 Commitment Register Number :

Related SER : 9.3 SSER :6-9.3.3

~

SER/SSER Impact

No O&R 010-29a 2

Clarifies the response to 0010.21 to identify that the backwater valves are used to mitigate flooding for j

some postulated pipe railures, j.

Clarification This change clarifies that backwater-valves are used i

to mitigate the effects of certain piping failures / breaks.

1 Backwater valves are credited for mitigation of I

flooding of the RHR Pump rooms (Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 1) j at elevation 773' 0" for breaks postulated.in 4

accordance with Section 3.6B.

Also, the' backwater check valves between room 113 and-rooms 115A and-115 (Figure 9.3-7. Sheet 1) are credited-for mitigation of postulated piping failures.

However these valves are not required to be seismic since a seismic event is-not assumed to be coincident l

with the piping failures / breaks.

Change Request Number

SA-92-744.13 j

Commitment Register Number :

Related SER : 9.3 SSER :6' 9.3.3 SER/SSER Impact

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Attachment to TXX-92592 CPSES/FSAR Page 5 0F 23 308), ESF equipment, cable penetrations and their interconnecting cables.

f HVAC equipment required for safe shutdown will be protected.

87 Portions of Primary Plant Ventilation and associated chilled water are credited after 7.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to mitigate the long term effects of HELBs outside containment.

This is sufficient time to effect required repairs.

83 0.

Instrumentation required for post accident monitoring will be protected as described in Section 7.5.1.3.1.3.

E.

Containment leaktightness will be maintained.

F.

LOCA breaks will not propagate to steam and/or feed water line breaks and vice versa.

G.

A non-LOCA break will not be allowed to propagate into a LOCA.

H.

LOCA break propagetion to the unaffected Reactor Coolant System loops will be prevented.

15 I.

LOCA propagation in the affected loop is permitted, but is limited as discussed in Section 3.68.1.2.2.

J.

In-core instrumentation lines will be protected.

l The criteria for determining the location of pipe breaks is given in section 3.68.2.1.

A discussion of the effects of pipe failure on each system and typical piping runs with the location of failure points shown on drawings is given in subsection 3.6B.2.5 for high energy systems.

A list of high energy lines that are considered for pipe rupture analysis is included as Table 3.68-1.

l Amendment 87 3.6B-2 December 18, 1992

Attachment to TXX-92592 CPSES/FSAR Page 6 0F 23 All large bore High Energy Lines in safety related structures are 87 Seismic Category I and II.

Small bore High Energy Lines in safety related structures are Seismic Category I or 11 except for the main steam line drip pot drain lines in the Safeguards Buiicing, Main Steam and Feedwater Penetration Area.

See Table 3.68-1 for applicable line numbers.

3.68.1.2 Descriotion Essential systems are defined as those systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of the pipe break for a given postulated piping break.

3.68.1.2.1 Protection Criteria Depending upon the type and location of the postulated pipe break, certain safety equipment may not be classified as essential for the particular event.

Some safety equipment will be essential for almost all cases.

This category includes service water to the ultimate heat sink and the pressurizer level instrumentation. The containment 40 integrity and leak tightness will be maintained for any LOCA break.

The effects of a postulated piping failure, including environmental conditions resulting from the escape of contained fluids, will not preclude habitability of the control room or access to surrounding areas important to the safe control of reactor operations needed to cope with the consequences of the piping failure.

Accordingly, protection from the effects of pipe rupture will be provided for only that safety-related equipment considered as essential on a case-by-case basis.

The systems or portions of systems and equipment for which protection against postulated pipe failures is required are identified below.

However, in general, protection from pipe failure need not be provided if any of the following conditions exists:

3.6B-3 Amendment 87 December 18, 1992

Attachment to TXX-92592 CPSES/FSAR j

Page 7 0F 23 i

All essential systems, components, piping, component enclosures.

87 protective structural barriers and structures supporting pipe whip restraints are designed to seismic Category I requirements, with the following exceptions.

The moderate energy spray shields have structural supports that are designed to Seismic Category I, however, the shielding is constructed of a plastic type material and as such has no seismic pedigree. Architechtural features (e.g. doors),

87 tornado dampers, HEL5 mitigation dampers, ductwork, penetration seals, and certain backwater valves of the floor drain system are non-seismic category I.

Primary plant ventilation (Section 9.4.3) supply (Figure 9.4-9, Sh. 3) and associated chilled water (Section 9.4E) are non-seismic category I.

Also see Section 7.6.12 for detection and mitigation equipment exceptions.

3.6B.2 DETERMINATION OF BREAX LOCATIONS AND OYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINHENT)

The design bases for locating postulated breaks and cracks in piping inside and outside of the Containment, the procedure used to define the jet thrust reaction at the break or crack location and the jet impingement loading on adjacent structures, equipment, systems, and components are described as follows.

3.68.2.1 Criteria Used To Define Break And Crack location And Confiauration l

This section provides criteria for the location and configuration of 61 l

postulated pipe breaks in high energy piping systems.

l 3.68.2.1.1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Main Loop Piping 61 The generic Leak-Before-Break technology described in NUREG-1061 61 Volume 3 (18] has been applied to the CPSES Units 1 and 2 RCS main loop piping.

This application of Leak-Before-Break methodology, allowed under the modified GDC-4, is discussed in reference (19].

3.6B-15 Amendment 87 December 18, 1992

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11. Thi. 11 is com.id.r.d to b. Eigh E cgy up to.or.any lock.d-alo d e.1v.198-054.

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r,y u i. 1.o.t.d i..a,.ty r. ut.d r,.o d. tau.d.a . d..ig. . -r,or d. .u...u a - r.,.,r.d,or l, mitig. tion ar. 1 aaany d.1..a..d/or.upport.d. l 9 I Am..d nt 47 L D.c.ed).r 18, 1992 l r Attachment to TXX-92592 CPSES/FSAR-Page 20 0F 23 7.6.12 MITlGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF PIPE BREAKS-40 OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 40 i 1 An environmental analysis of the compartments outside containment as a 40 result of pipe breaks was perforced for CPSES Units 1 & 2, as described in Section 3.6. The results showed that with detection and mitigation added for three systems, Auxiliary Steam (SA), Steam Generat'orBlowdown(SGB)andChemicalVolumeandControl(CVCS), minimal environmental effects would be imposed on the safety-related and non-safety related equipment and structures required for safe-shutdown. 1 From the analysis, the environmental conditions of the equipment 40 required for shutdown was identified. Alternate shutdown paths were evaluated when essential equipment was not qualified for the harsh environmental conditions. Where alternate shutdown paths could not I be found, mitigation of the pipe break as described below was'used to insure an adequate environment for equipment required for safe shutdown. i -7.6.12.1 Auxiliary Steam System Line Break Mitigation 40 Two (2) redundant Auxiliary Steam pressure switches are provided for 40 each of two (2) Auxiliary Steam header lines where the break is postulated to occur. These pressure switches (X-PS-3226A, 32268, 87 3227A, 32278) are located remote from the environment resulting from the postulated Auxiliary Steam line break. These switches, shown on Figure 10.4-16(Sh.3), are Non-Class 1E and Non-Seismic Category I. See Section 10.4.13 for a description of the Auxiliary Steam l System. The isolation valves, shown on Figure 10.4-16(Sh.2),-are - also Non-Class 1E and Non-Seismic Category I. Instrument air (non-Class 1E, non-seismic category I).and offsite 87 power are essential for auxiliary P eam system line break mitigation. 7.6-29 Amendment 87 December 18, 1992 Attachment to TXX-92592 CPSES/FSAR ,Page 21 0F 23 7.6.12.2 Steam G:nerator Blowdown (SGS) System Line Break 40 One (1) flow indicating switch (FIS) is provided for each of the four 40 (4) SGB lines. Each SGB line is provided with two isolation valves in series, between the SG and the postulated break. Extremely high flow measurement on three (3) FIS occurs as a result of a line break downstream or upstream of the FIS in any of the four (4) SGB lines. Any one of the four (4) FIS is designed to automatically close all of the SGB isolation valves. In addition, the SGB system alarm and the HELB comon trouble alarm are activated at the main control board. The FIS are located remote from the environment resulting from a SGB line break. These switches (FIS-5175, 5176, 5177 and 5178), shown 87 on Figure 10.4-10(Sh.1), are Non-Class 1E and Non-Seismic Category 1. See Section 10.4.8 for a description of the Steam Generator Blowdown 87 System. The isolation valves, shown on Figure 10.3-1(Sh.1) are Nuclear Safety Related, Seismic Category I. 7.6.12.3 Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) Line Break 40 For a CVCS line break, mitigation is accomplished by detection and 10 40 minute operator action to isolate the system. Rapid depressurization occurs as a result of a CVCS line break. Two 73 pressure switches have been provided for the CVCS system to detect low system pressure. Each low pressure signal activates an alarm at the 76 main control board and the operator manually isolates the system. The pressure switches are located remote from the environment 73 resulting from a CVCS line break. These switches (PS-5385 and 87 5385A), shown on Figure 9.3-10(Sh.2), are Non-Class 1E and Non-Seismic Category I. See Section 9.3.4 for a description of the CVCS. The isolation 87 valves (8152 and 8160), shown on Figure 9.3-10(Sh.1) are Nuclear Safety Related, Seismic Category I. 7.6-31 Amendment 87 December 18, 1992 1 i 4 Attachment to TXX-9259? Page 22 0F 23 .w. '-O 4 .A ~ 4 ru'e l - i -r t x; 19. fi.i ' i 1 1 ,1 tI it . _ - - -.i

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' Attachment to TXX-92592 Page 23 0F 23 Although, some backwater valves are credited to operate 87 for the-mitigation of-postulated piping failures per l

FSAR Section 3.68, a seismic event is not assumed in the analysis of these piping failures.

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