ML20126A429
| ML20126A429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1992 |
| From: | Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126A415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-92-26, NUDOCS 9212210056 | |
| Download: ML20126A429 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1992026
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-382/92-26
Operating License:
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Incorporated
P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana 70066
facility Name:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Inspection At:
Taft, Louisiana
inspection Conducted: October 18 through November 28, 1992
Inspectors:
E. J. Ford, Senior Resident inspector
J. L. Dixon-Herrity, Resident inspector
Approved:
)
/2/W /'7 2._
Wi liam D
ohnson, Chief, Project Section A
Da'te ~
Inspection Summar_y
Areas inspected;
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, operational
safety verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, and followup
on corrective actions for violations.
Results:
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The following conservative practices were noted during containment
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closecut inspection (paragraph 2.1.1):
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the use of contamination controlled areas to reduce dose
accumulation;
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personnel utilizing low dose areas while not actually performing
work;
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engineering evaluations performed for equipment remaining in
containment; and
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the use of paper coveralls to limit the potential for
contamination of decontamination workers.
However, it was also noted that two of these practices were poorly
implemented in that a contamination controlled area sign and barrier
around a steam generator was not well maintained and the coveralls were
9212210056 921216
ADOCK 05000392
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not worn in a manner to fully protect the workers (paragraph 2.1.1).
llousekeeping in containment prior to closcout was very good
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(paragraph 2.1.1).
However, the main steam isolation valve rooms had
poor housekeeping (paragraph 2.1.7).
Allowing wood pallets which were not fire-retardant treated to
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accumulate in the turbine building could create a potential fire hazard
(paragraph 2.1.2).
failure of operations personnel to adequately communicate and unclear
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instructions in a procedure caused misalignment of a throttle valve
(paragraph 2.1.3).
lhe following actions within the operations department were notably
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conservative (paragraph 2.1.3):
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The depressurization of the reactor coolant system by the shift
supervisor prior to operating the misaligned throttle valve;
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The operations management decision to review all procedures
containing valve lineups for throttling instructions; and
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Entry into a 4-hour action statement when it appeared that-
unidentified leakage may have slightly exceeded the limit during a
surveillance (circumstances could have allowed for voiding the
results instead) (paragraph 2.1.10).
The following are observations regarding the~ licensee's chemistry
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control program (paragraph 2.1.4):
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A violation resulted from the failure to_have a procedure to
control consumable materials in the control room, allowing
16 switches on a' safety-related panel to be made inoperable by
cleaning the panel with an unapproved cleaner.
The licensee's initial corrective actions to the inoperable
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switches were marginally satisfactory. They were informal, did
not determine if switches outside the control room horseshoe area
had been affected, and did not assure a root cause determination
or good corrective actions.
A second example of the above violation resulted from the
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identification of nonapproved consumable materials located in the
consumable materials controlled area.-
A crane in_close proximity to safety-related equipment was determined to
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be secured accordin to security requirements (paragraph 2.1.5).
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The door to a temporary enclosure posted as a radiation controlled area
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was left open after decontamination, leaving the doorway temporarily
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unposted and creating a potential for inadvertent entry
(paragraph 2.1.8).-
Management action in response to discovery of an error in the
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calculation of the potential postaccident radiation levels in
the -4-foot level in the reactor auxiliary building wing areas was
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prompt (paragraph 2.2).
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Routine outage work on safety-related electrical busses by maintenance
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technicians was well-conducted and properly controlled,_using good
safety practices.
Operator error and insufficient control of ongoing activities caused
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loss of suction to a charging pump during surveillance activities,
however, the licensee's actions were prompt and sufficient to_ ensure no
damage to the pump (paragraph 4.1).
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Summar_y of Inspection findings:
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Violation 382/9226-01 was opened (paragraph 2.1.4).
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Violations 382/9117-01 and -02 were closed (paragraph 5.1).
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Attachments:
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
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PLANT STATUS
At the beginning of this reporting period, the plant was in Mode 6 with Refuel
Outage 5 in progress,
lhe fuel shuffle was completed on October 12, 1992, and
the plant entered Mode 5 on October 22, 1992.
plant pressurization and heatup
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commenced on November 4, 1992, and proceeded smoothly. The plant reached
100 percent power on November 14, 1992, where it remained through the end of
the reporting period.
2 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
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The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was being
operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and to ensure
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that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the
licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation.
2.1
plant Tours
2.1.1
Containment Closeout
On October 24, 1992, the inspector toured the containment building to observe
activities taking place in preparation for containment closure at the end of
the outage and to observe the general conditions inside containment.
Personnel in containment were waiting in low dose areas when not performing
some task.
The inspector observed that there was a great deal of activity and
containment was quite cluttered, but no more than would be expected during
preparations to remove excess material and equipment from containment.
However, two discrepancies were identified. A contamination controlled-area
sign and rope were found down at the top of a ladder that provided access from
the +46-foot level to a catwalk around Steam Generator 1.
Although this was
considered to be unsatisfactory, it was not a procedure violation, since
contamination controlled areas are not controlled by Administrative-
Procedure HP-001-219, " Radiological Posting Requirements." These areas were
conservatively posted by radiation protection personnel to limit the dose
accumulated during the outage.
The inspector also noted a_ used disposable
shoe cover in a nonsafety-related cable tray below a step-off pad at the east
end of the +35-foot level.
This was retrieved by the. licensee during
subsequent clean-up activities.
On November 4,1992, the inspector completed.a walkdown of containment after
management completed their initial walkdown and before the plant entered
Mode 4 _ Management's final walkdown was to take place prior to entering
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Mode 2.
Overall, containment looked very good from a housekeeping standpoint.
Closure preparations and cleanup were still ongoing, but there was marked
improvement compared to_ conditions observed on October 24.
Most of the-
scaffolding had been removed.
All of the contamination controlled area
postings had been removed.
Most of the trash that had been accumulating had
been removed with other trash and equipment staged near the personnel hatch
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for removal.
Equipment that was to remain in containment had been chained
down and secured. All of the plastic sheeting had been removed from the floor
gratings.
The only task that was observed during the tour was the decontamination of the
D-rings.
The inspector noted that the decontamination personnel were wearing
the health physics required paper coveralls and considered this a conservative
practice. However, several of the personnel doing this work had allowed their
disposable plastic shoe covers to bag at the ankle and the paper suit to ride
high, exposing their anticontamination clothing.
This reduction of the
offectiveness of the paper coveralls was discussed with the lead health
physics supervisor for operations.
In addition to this concern, the inspector
identified the following:
The drains in and near the Reactor Coolant Pump 18 cell were dismantled.
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No one was working in this cell.
A nitrogen bottle was chained on its side to the floor grating on the
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north end of the +21-foot level near the containment fan cooler adjacent
to Reactor Coolant Pump 2A,
it was labeled "Do Not Remove "
Other items labeled "Do Not Remove" included a 5-gallon bucket and a
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piece of paper taped to the wall on the +21-foot level.
Ladders and scaffolding were found unsecured in various places.
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Retest tags were on Valves MVAAA3098 and 310A, the sample line valves
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for Safety injection Tanks 18 and 2A.
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The inspector discussed these items with the licensee and received the
following explanations. The drains were properly installed during the-
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management tour on November 7, 1992.
The nitrogen bottle was not removed
prior to replacing the equipment-hatch and, in the-interest of personnel
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safety (carrying the bottle up the stairs to the personnel hatch, then back
down again), the licensee intended to leave the bottle in containment until
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Refuel.0utage 6,
An engineering evaluation had been completed, the valve'on
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the bottle opened, and the bottle secured.
Before this issue could be
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resolved, the containment coordinator independently had the bottle removed.
Any equipment that did remain (ladders and scaffolds,. for example) had to have
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engineering evaluations and had to be secured.
The retest on the sample line
valves could not be completed until the safety injection tanks were refilled.
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All of these items were verified removed or checked during the licensee's-
final walkdown.
The above items marked."Do Not Remove" had been removed. .The-
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only problem identified during the final walkdown was some trash in the
pressurizer cubicle.
This was removed prior to closure.
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2.1.2 Wood Pallets in Turbine Building
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On October 26, 1992, the inspector noted a number of wood pallets with
materials on them stored across from the spare low pressure turbine rotor in
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the northeast corner on the +15-foot level of the turbine building.
The
pallets did not appear to be treated with fire-retardant chemicals.
The
inspector noted that a similar finding in the reactor auxiliary building had
been identified as a violation during the 'ast report period (NRC Inspection
Report 50-382/92-23).
Subsequently, the inspector discussed the finding with
the operations and maintenance manager and the technical services manager.
They indicated that this was not a normal site practice and that untreated
wood should not be stored anywhere in the protected area.
Fire Protection
Procedure FP-001-017, Revision 8, " Transient combustibles and Designated
Storage Areas," establishes controls for the handling, storage, and use of
transient combustibles in safety-related areas and recommended practices for
other areas of the site.
The fire protection and safety supervisor and the inspector discussed the
concern and the supervisor indicated that he had found 24 pallets stored ir.
the area the inspector identified.
In addition, he pointed out that
Procedure FP-001-017 was ap)licable to safety-related areas, which excluded
the turbine building, and taat it was only a recommended practice for other
areas of the site.
After additional discussion with the inspector, he stated
that construction personnel had been instructed to remove the pallets but that
this was not required by the procedure.
The inspector stated that allowing
the untreated wood to be kept there, even if allowed by the procedure, but
contrary to the recommended practice, was noncon.ervative and could create a
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potential fire hazard.
The inspector noted that, due to the short period of
time that passed since plant management became anare of the violation, full
corrective actions had not been put into effect 'or the previous incident.
Concerns in this area should be alleviated when this happens.
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2.1.3
Inadequate Communication During Line-up
The operations superintendent indicated, at the plan-of-the day. meeting on
October 27, 1992, that operations had found a valve out of alignment in the
chemical and volume control system after a valve-alignment and verification
had taken place.
In discussions with the operations superintendent, the
inspector learned that the valve was closed when it was supposed to be
throttled and that the situation was discovered-by control room operators when-
the reactor coolant pump seals all went to the same pressure (350 psi) while
they were pressurizing-the reactor coolant system.
The shift supervisor's
immediate response was_ to depressurize the reactor ' coolant system until the
misalignment was corrected. . This was a conservative and safety-minded action
asiall of the seals are rated at full reactor coolant system pressure.
Personnel responsible for the lineup and verification stated that the cause of
the problem was the use of the term " throttled" in the procedure.
The
immediate corrective action taken was to change the procedure that was used
and to fill out a precursor trending program card.
The licensee also
committed to check additional procedures to verify that the term " throttled"
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was not used without additional instruction to better identify the correct
valve position.
The licensee checked all 260 procedures that contained valve
lineups within 2 days of the incident, identified 14 procedures (2 safety and
12 nonsafety) that contained the same wording, and committed to correct these
items.
Both the shift suaervisor and the operations management displayed
notcble conservatism in t1eir corrective actions.
A second concern in this incident was the action taken by the personnel
performing the lineup. The operations superintendent stated that they
questioned the word " throttled" but did not query control room personnel
during the lineup, and a request to improve the procedure was not completed
after the lineup.
Had the question been asked, the incident might have been
prevented.
The operations superintendent said that he had stressed asking
questions and maintaining a questioning attitude in talks with his personnel
in the past and would continue to do so.
He also planned to address this
particular incident in the lessons learned for Refuel Outage 5.
The shift
supervisor indicated that the operations superintendent holds discussions with
shift personnel regularly, either on shift or during time set aside in the
training week. He also said that maintaining a questioning attitude and the
requirement to self-check were common topics for these discussions.
2.1.4 Control Board Switches Made Inoperable by cleaner
The inspector attended the operators' morning shift meeting on October 28.
During this meeting, a lessons-learned briefing was given on the use of
cleaning materials in the control room. An operator had used a commercial
contact cleaner for coin machines and electronic equipment to clean Engineered
Safeguards Control Panel CP-8 on October 25, 1992.- Within approximately
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the solvent caused the plastic parts of 16 safety-related control
switches to glue or bond together making the switches inoperable.
The
affected switches included:
the engineered safety feature Trains A and
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B pumps' suction valves from the refueling water storage pool; the control for
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High Pressure Safety injection Pump B; and the flow controls for the Low
Pressure Safety injection Pump A into Cold leg 2A and Low Pressure Safety-
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Injection Pump B into Cold Legs IA and-18. With the unit in cold shutdown,
the inoperable handswitches did not impact operability of equipment required
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by Technical Specifications. Under different plant conditions, the safety
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impact could have been much more significant. The licensee's immediate
corrective action was to complete an operational experience report, write a-
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condition identification (No. 283138) to cause the switches to be replaced,
inform the operating shifts on duty of what had happened to prevent a
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recurrence of the incident, and inspect the panels in the control room
horseshoe area for additional damage.
The operational experience report is an
informal internal operations tool used to pass information to the other
shifts. There was no requirement for any action to take place as a result of
this report other than to suggest that operators review the reports.
The main
point made during the training was that the labels on any material: should be
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r'ead prior to using it in the control room.
The label.on.this particular
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material was slightly misleading and one could not tell that it was harmful
until reading the bottom of the label on the back of the can.
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The inspector contacted an engineer in the chemistry department to determine
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whether there was a procedure in place to prevent the incident.
The engineer
identified Adreinistrative Procedure UNT-007-003, Revhion 8, " Control of
Consumable Materials," as the procedure that controlled consumable materials
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in some areas of the plant, but indicated that the control room was exempted
from this procedure.
The procedure's original and primary purpose was to
establish controls for the use of consumable materials at Waterford 3 in order
to regulate consumable materials that are not compatible with plant mechanical
systems or equipment.
The product was not en the list of approved consumables
for use in the consumable materials controlled a,eas.
These areas included
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all of the turbine building and the nuclear island with the exception of labs,
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of fice areas, and the control room.
The switchgear rooms in both tha nuclear
island and the turbine building were included.
Criterion V, " Instruction, Procedures, and Draw mgs," requires that activities
affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures.
The failure of the
existing procedure to control the use of this chemical on the controls for
safety-related equipment in the control room is an example of a violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (VIO 9226-01).
The inspector was concerned with the adequacy of the licensee's initial
corrective actions in response to this incident.
The controls for a number of
safety-related components were made inoperable in
manner that could not be
detected on the control panel until one tried to use them.
No action was
taken procedurally to prevent a recurrence of the incident.
Af^er questions
were raised by the inspector concerning tn~ e potential for commoi mode failure,
the licensee inspected a 50 percent samp e of control panels in the plant
(including the diesel panels and the remt te shutdown panel) to ensure that the
chemical had not been used elsewhere.
S,gnificant Occurrence Report 92-019
was completed to document that the inc' dent had occurred, investigate the
incident, and identify the root cause and corrective actions necessary to
prevent recurrence.
Standing Instruetion 92-11 was written to identify the
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only approved cleaner for th( contro' panels.
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2.1.5 Security Observation
On November 6, 1992, the inspector notet a mobile crane located in close
proximity to the Train A cooling tower. Closer investigation revealed that
the vehicle was unlocked and that no key was readily evident.
The vehicle was
up on stabilizers, so it could not move, but the crane could be moved over the
vital area if it were operable.
The inspector contacted the security and
general support manager and explained the concern. Through discussion with
him and the individual responsible for the crane, it was determined that the
vehicle and the crane were both rendered immobile and inoperable without the
key.
2.1.6 Control Room Observation
The inspector observed control room operations on November 9, 1992. The
operators were rolling the turbine :n preparation for synchronizing to the
grid.
The operators performed well and followed procedures.
The only concern
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noted was the number of personrel in the control room during this time. The
inspector noted that there were a large number of people in the horseshoe area
around the operator performing the r ocedure.
Further review of the situation
revealed that the additional personnel were on hand in response to problems
the operator was having with throttle valve leakage while rolling the turbine.
2.1.7 Main Steam Isolation Valve Rooms
On November 11, 1992, the inspector completed a tour of the east and west main
steam isolation valve rooms where work appeared to be in progress.
Tarpaulins
had been draped to cover scaffolding to provide a prote W work area (the
room is open to the elements).
Both rooms were in pe
n "Jition with respect
to housekeeping.
Equipment and hoses had been left on tne catwalk around
These, and the cover plates and trash bags on
the catwalk around the feedwater isolation valve actuator, made walking on the
catwalks hazardous.
The floor under the main steam isolation valve hydraulic
actuator was covered with a pool of water and what appeared to be hydraulic
fluid. This made climbing ladders in the vicinity hazardous.
The rest of the
space was also covered with puddles of water. This could be expected for_a
space exposed to the weather, but the only drain sighted by the inspector had
its cover removed and was full of trash.
There was used plastic sheeting and
trash on the floor, along with several parts and-tools.
The space also
appeared to be a storage location for scaffolding.
This was stored
haphazardly, some in areas marked for storage, some not. The general
condition of the rooms was discussed with the shift supervisor. He initiated-
immediate corrective actions.
2.1.8 Radiation Barrier Posting
On November 11, 1992, the inspector identified one t;ncern in Switchgear
Room B.
The door to the temporary enclosure instalied in the room over the
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access plug to the letdown containment isolation valve'was ope.
Further
investigation revealed that it was still posted as a radiation controlled
This posting was on the door and could not be seen when the door was
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open.
The inspector closed the enclosure door to prevent inadvertent entry by
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other personnel.
Before leaving the area, the inspector discussed the finding
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with the health physics technician who had just entered the area. 'h
indicated that decontamination personnel had just finished decontaminating the
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area and that he had been assigned to verify that'it was decontaminated and to
depost the area so that the temporary. enclosure could be disassembled and
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removed. The inspector contacted the radiation protection superintendent,
informed him of the situation, and verified that the explanation given_was
correct. This appeared to be an isolated incident.
2.1.9 Unapproved Consumable Materials
On November 17, 1992, while touring the reactor auxiliary building, the
inspector noted two consumables without labels identifying them as approved
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items for use in the consumable materials controlled area.
The items were a
spray can of odor counteractant and a tube of glue.
The inspector also noted
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numerous items with labels in areas where work was not in progress.
The
inspector asked the shift supervisor about the two items without labels.
The
shift supervisor did not know if they were approved for the area but had them
removed and requested that the list of approved materials, the Plant
Consumable Materials Report, be provided to the control room for future
reference.
In addition, he stated that oc9rators would be watching for
unapproved consumables in the consumable materials controlled areas.
On November 19, 1992, the inspector identified a can of insecticide without a
label on a scaffold next to Main Steam Isolation Valve 1.
The inspector
discussed the three products with the engineer in the chemistry department
responsible for the consumable materials control program the next day.
He
found that the three products were not on the Plant Consumable Materials
Report.
The procedure (UNT-007-003) requires that only approved consumable
materials be used in the consumable materials controlled area.
This is a
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second example of failure to follow procedures as required by 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V (VIO 9226-01).
The engineer stated that leaving the labeled products at the work site after
work was complete was a poor housekeeping practice.
The current procedure
(UNT-007-003) had been revised in March 1992 to incbde 01 of the nuclear
block (with some exceptions, including the control room), t'e turbine
building, and other spaces on site. All the doors on the c.fected buildings
had postings that stated that the space was a con,unble materials controlled
The procedure placed the responsibility for ensuring that unapproved
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consumables are not brought into these areas on the workers. . Personnel have
been educated on consumable materials through general cmployee training. The
key point made in the training was that products must be labeled with blue or
orange labels for use in the consumable materials controlled areas.
The chemistry department had recognized the deficiency in the program and was
making an effort to improve it prior to the inspector's finding.
Their
corrective action was a request that the different maintenance departments
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review a list of unapproved consumables in the warehouse and identify those
products used in areas outside the consumable materials controlled areas. The
goal was to remove products which were unapproved and not used from the
warehouse to make them unavailable.
2.1.10 Unidentified Leakage
On November 23, 1992, the shift supervisor informed the inspector'that they
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had entered Technical Specification 3.4 5.2. due to unidentified leak rate
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greater than 1 gpm (1.0577 gpm).
The inspector went to the control room to
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gain additional information and observe activitit s. . The control room
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operators had secured the chemical and volume cortrol system gior to starting
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the surveillance to allow operators to make a containment entry.
Removing
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this system from service, coupled with problems with the pressur !zer heaters,
caused a pressure transient which lasted approximately four times as long as
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normal.
Charging Pump B, which was running and had beeti previously identified
that day as having a slightly degraded seal, provided a possible leak path.
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The operators conservatively elected to enter the 4-hour action statement in
lieu of voiding that run and repeating it due to the known transient.
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addition, two auxiliary operators were dispatched to enter containment and
look for possible leaks.
The control room operators allowed the plant to
stabilize and isolated Charging Pump B, then repeated Surveillance
Procedure OP-903-024, Revis;on-8, " Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory
Salance," and found that the unidentified leak rate had been reduced to
0.32 gpm.
Charging Pump B was left out of service until the seal was
repaired.
This was another example of electing a conservative option by an
operating crew.
2.2 Radiation Level Calculations Following_a Loss of Coolant Accident
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Valve CC-710 is the containment isolation valve inside containment for
Component Cooling Water Train AB to the reactor coolant pumps.
It fails in
the open position and closes upon receipt of a containment spray actuation
signal using instrument air.
Upon failure of instrument air, a 10-hour
accumulator is used to ensure the valve remains closed. With the most
recantly measured accumulator leakage rate (5.48 psi /hr), it was estimated
that Valve CC-710 would drift open 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a postulated loss of
instrument air.
The scenario of concern was a -large break loss of coolant accident with the
assumption of loss of offsite power.
This would cause a loss of instrument
air.
The component cooling water piping to the. reactor coolant pumps is not
protected from jet impingement and pipe whip and wac assumed to break. A
failure of the outside containment isolation valve (CC-713) to close was also
assumed, causing containment isolation to be provided solely by Valve CC-710.
The licensee determined that the probability of this sequence of events was
less than lx10" per. year.
The solution would have been .to have an operator enter the -4-foot . level
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reactor auxiliary building wing area and manual?y close Valves CC-713 and
CC-641 (Valve CC-641 is the containment isuiation valve on the inlet of the AB-
-component cooling water train into containment).
After finding that the
accumulator for Valve CC-710 failed to meet the 10-hour l requirement, design
engineering discovered that the radiation-levels in the wing areas-following a
recirculation actuation ,ignal would be significantly higher than originally
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calculated.
This was caused by the failure of the original calculations to
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take into account the recirculation of highly contaminated' coolant from the
sump through the containment spray and high pressure safety injection-systems.
There is a 10-inch containment spray line and two 3-inch high pressure safety
injection lines in the wing area. The exposure rate calculations, based on
final safety analysis report source terms, showed exposure rates too high to
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allow valve operation-while maintaining operator exposure to less than 5 rem;
The licensee installed temporary shielding on the referenced lines so that an
operator could enter the wing area and receive less than 5 rem (approximately
4.1 rem) using preliminary calculations generated on site. Other strategies
identified included the possibility of restoring instrument air to service or
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of closing the referenced valves prior to receipt of a recirculation actuation
signal.
The accumulators for Valves CC-713 and CC-641.had leakage rates which
would allow them to remain closed for greater than the required 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
The
licensee intends to repair the accumulator during Refuel Outage 6 or during
the next forced outage when in Mode 5.
The planned long-term corrective-
action was to install permanent shielding in place of the temporary shielding.
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2.3
Surveillance of the Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
On November 24, 1992, the licensee declared Emergency Feedwater Pump AB out of
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service after failing to meet the initial conditions for steam pressure
required as part of the acceptance criteria in Surveillance
Procedure OP-903-046, Revision 9, " Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check."
Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 required pump restoration within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The acceptance criteria could not be met due to the new practice of operating
at a lower hot leg temperature in the steam generators to reduce corrosion.
This had been implemented after Refuel Outage 5.
The lower temperature
resulted in a steam pressure less than required for testing.
The. problem with
this Technical Specification had been identified and a change request had been
submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but the review had not been
completed.
The licensee had scheduled this test to coincide with a power reduction
associated with turbine valve and control element assembly testing.
For some
reason, yet to be identified by the licensee, the test was run at . full power
when the required steam pressure could not be achieved. After
licensee-initiated discussions, a representative of the Office lof Nuclear
Reactor Regelation agreed that the test was invalid and did not indicate pump
inoperability.
The licensee stathd that the surveillance test would be
performed under the proper conditions prior to expiration of the surveillance
interval.
2.4 Conclusians
Workers were observed waiting in low dose areas when not directly
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performing a task.
Areas near the top of the steam generators were_ conservatively posted as
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a contaminated controlled area to limit' outage-related dose.
Poor implementation of a conservative practice was noted in containment
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with regard to control of a contamination controlled area' sign and
barrier rope.
Housek!eping in containment was very good,
o
Health pnysics exhibited a good practice by requiring decontamination
o
personnel inside containment to wear paper overalls over their
protective clothing.
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Decontamination personnel failed to wear paper coveralls in a manner to
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minimize potential for contamination.
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Although corrective actions in response to a violation regarding
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transient combustibles in the safety-related switchgear area were not
yet fully implemented, allowing a large number of untreated wood pallets
to accumulate in the turbine building was not conservative,
Failure of operations personnel to adequately communicate and unclear
o
instructions in a procedure caused misalignment of a throttle _ valve.
The depressurization of the reactor coolant system by the shift
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supervisor, prior to operating the misaligned throttle valve, was
notably conservative, as was the management decision to review all
procedures containing valve lineups,
The licensee did not have a procedure to control consumable materials in
o
the control room.
Switches on a safety-related panel were damaged by
cleaning the panel with an unapproved cleaner.
A second example of improper consumable material control was the
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identification of nonapproved consumable materials located in the
consumable materials controlled area.
The licensee's initial corrective actions after identifying the-
o
inoperable switches were marginally satisfactory.
They were informal,
did not determine if switches outside the control- room horseshoe area
had been affected, and did not assure a root cause determination or good
corrective actions.
A crane in close proximity to safety-related equipment was determined to
o
be secured according.to security requirements.
The main steam isolation valve rooms had poor housekeeping.
o
The door'to a temporary enclosure posted ~as a radiation controlled area
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was left open after decontamination, leaving the doorway temporarily
unposted and creating a potential for inadvertent entry,
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A-second example of operator conservatism occurred when-the shift
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supervisor entered a 4-hour action statement when it appeared that
unidentified leakage may have slightly exceeded the limit during a
surveillance (circumstances would have allowed for voiding the results).
Management action in response to discovery of an error in the calcula-
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tion of the potential postaccident radiation levels in the -4-foot level
irtthe reactor auxiliary building wing areas was prompt.
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3 MONTHLY KAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703)
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and
components listed below were observed and documentation reviewed to ascertain
that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved work
authorizations, procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry
codes or standards.
3.1 Maintenance on 480V Motor Control Center
On October 29, 1992, the inspector observed portions of ongoing work on the
Train A safety bus. Motor Control Centers 312A and 313A were opened, cleaned,
and inspected. Contacts and fuses were checked. The applicable work
authorization numbers were 01095995 and 01095996.
The electricians appeared
knowledgeable and were following the procedures.
The cabinet interiors were
clean and contained no trash. Appropriate safety practices were observed
during the work. The buses are taken out for maintenance every other outage.
Both Busses A and AB were completed during Refuel Outage 5.
No concerns were
identified.
3.2 Troubleshootina Feedwater Pump Turbine Speed Controller
The inspector observed the completion of the work authorization which included
troubleshoot:ng the controller for feedwater pump turbine speed on
November 10, 1992. This problem had been identified by an operator while the
inspector was observing the rolling of the turbine on November 9,1992. The
instrument and controls technician had identified a loose pin in the
connector. While observing the replacement of the controller, the inspector
e
noted that the interior of the panel was neat with no trash present.
It was
noted that cables and devices were labeled on the interior of the panel. The
personnel completing the task were knowledgeable in their trade and-did not -
handle the controller after reinstallation. They had the operator test to see
that it was installed correctly and operable.
No concerns were identified.
3.3 Conclusions
Routine outage work on safety-related electrical busses by maintenance-
technicians was well-conducted and properly 1 controlled and good safety
practices were observed.
4 BIMONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (61726)
The inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and
components listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in
accordance with the licensee's programs and the Technical Specifications.
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4.1
Enaineered Safety Feature Actuation System Subaroup Relay Test
On November 4, 1992, the inspector observed a portion of Surveillance
Procedure OP-903-094, Revision 7, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating."
The operators performing this task were versed in what they were doing and
were following the procedure.
The surveillance was to be completed before the
plant could proceed from Mode 4 to Mode 3.
The operators were doing portions
of the procedure as the opportunity arose.
When a window opened to do Train B
Position 4, Relay K108, the operators approached the operator on the
associated board to see if the surveillance could be completed. That operator
was concerned about tripping the charging pump he was running while restoring _
the volume control tank hydrogen blanket.
The operators completing the surveillance verified that Charging Pump AB would
not be tripped. The operator assigned to the board agreed to allow the
surveillance to be performed.
He switched the selector switch from A-B to
B-AB, according to the first step in the surveillance procedure. At this
point, the indicator lit up to show that the Charging Pump B was tripped.
As
this was not the desired response, the operator then positioned the switch to
A-B and proceeded to determir.e what was wrong. The shift supervisor was
called over to look into the problem.
The operator then instructed a nuclear
plant operator to go and check on Pump AB, which was still operating.
Further
review of the board revealed that the suction path for the charging pumps had
been closed. The operator at the pump indicated that the pump was still
running but seemed to be vibrating more than normal and that the seals looked
abnormal.
The shift supervisor's interpretation of the situation was that the operator
had been in the process of switching from draining to filling the volume
control tank for the hydrogen restoration (burping) process when the operators
doing the surveillance approached him.
In attempting both procedures, he had
missed opening the valve _from the refueling water storage pool to provide a
suction path before assisting with the surveillance.
The shift supervisor
quickly determined that the cause was that too rauch was geing on and said that
the surveillance would have to wait until after the higher priority equipment-
line-ups were complete.
In addition to this immediate action, a condition identification was generated
to diagnose and repair the suspected low pressure switch that failed on
Charging Pump AB (which should have tripped it upon loss of a suction source).
The inspector noted that Pump B correctly tripped and Pump A was out of
service.
The shift supervisor also determined that poor communications and
the number of ongoing activities (the plant had just gone to Mode 4 and was
heating up for Mode 3), contributed to the problem.
A mechanic who had worked on the pump in the past and was in the vicinity of
-the pump at the time was asked to check the pump while it was running.
Operators also ensured that the flow and other parameters were normal.
The
mechanic determined qualitatively that vibration was acceptable and seals were
in good condition.
The shift supervisor talked to the operator to ensure that
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he did not repeat his mistake.
The operator filled out an operational
experience report on November 7, 1992.
A precursor trending program card was
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also completed.
Subsequently, vibration tests were completed on the pump and
found to be normal.
No other concerns were identified.
4.2 Operability Check of Charging Pumo AB
On November 10, 1992, the inspector observed a portion of the operability
check on Charging Pump AB per Surveillance Procedure OP-903-003, Revision 8,
" Charging Pump Operability Check." The auxiliary operator had Charging Pump A
secured several minutes prior to the vibration test on the Charging Pump AB.
The calibration date was verified and recorded for both the vibration
7
instrument and its probe.
After the Pump AB had run for 5 minutes by itself,
the personnel completing the test took readings from several marked points on
the motor and the pump.
Review of the results later in the control room
indicated that the readings were well within the acceptable range for the
pump.
No concerns were identified.
4.3 Conclusions
Operator error and insufficient control of ongoing activities caused
o
loss of suction to a charging pump.
The licensee's actions were prompt and sufficient to ensure no damage to
o
the pump.
5 FOLLOWUP ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS (92702)
5.1
(Closed) Violation 382/9117-01 and -02:
Failure to Ensure Proper
Isolation Boundaries for Maintenance and Changed Scope of Work
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Authorization Without Proper Authorization
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee in
response to the violations.
The event involved the failure of the shift
supervisor or control room supervisor to ensure the establishment of proper
isolation boundaries for maintenance on High Pressure Safety Iniection
Valve SI-512A being worked under Work Authorization 01065402 and the failure
of the mechanical maintenance supervisor to obtain proper authorization prior
to initiating a change to the scope of the subject work authorization. The
result of the incident was a loss of shutdown cooling for 19 minutes when the
low pressure safety injection pump became air bound upon the removal of the
bonnet for Valve SI-512A. This caused a 10*F increase in the core
temperature. The corrective actions taken included: developing and
implementing training for appropriato operations, maintenance, and planning
and scheduling personnel prior to refueling outages; revising administrative
and work controls; revising Maintenance Procedure MD-001-026, " Maintenance
Department Work Center Planning;" instituting requirements to maintain a
reactor coolant system perturbation log; and developing a composite isometric
drawing of the shutdown cooling system.
Based on records review and
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discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector determined that the
corrective actions were satisfactorily completed prior to entering shutdown
cooling during Refuel Outage 5, as specified in the response to the violation.
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ATTACMMENT 1
1
PERSONS CONTACTED
1.1
Licensee Personnel
R. E. Allen, Security and. General Support Manager
- R. G. Azzarello, Director, Design Engineering
R. F. Burski, Director, Nuclear Safety
T. J. Gaudet, Operational Licensing Supervisor
J. G. Hoffpauir, Maintenance Superintendent
- A. L. Holder, Supervisor, Fire Protection and Safety
- J. B. Houghtaling, Director, Plant Modification and Construction
- B. R. Loetzerich, Engineer, Licensing
- L. W. Laughlin, Licensing Manager
- T. R. Leonard, Technical Services Manager
- A. S. Lockhart, Quality Assurance Manager
D. E. Harpe, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- D. f. Packer, General Manager, Plant Operations
R. D. Peters, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
R. G. Pittman, Instrumentation & Controls Maintenance Superintendent
J. A. Ridgel, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- R. S, Starkey, Operations and Maintenance Manager
- D. W. Vinci, Operations Superintendent
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the above
personnel, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection
period.
2 EXIT MEETlHG
-The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 1, 1992, with
those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee acknowledged the
inspectors' findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during-this inspection.
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