ML20117K459
| ML20117K459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1996 |
| From: | Steven Bloom NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20117K461 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9606110276 | |
| Download: ML20117K459 (15) | |
Text
O 0%
0" UNITED STATES j
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, o.C. 205S4001 44.....,o PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-275 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 1 i
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.113 License No. DPR-80 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
I A.
The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company
-(the licensee) dated April 3, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR i
Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
i 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:
)
i 9606110276 960528 PDR ADOCK 05000275 P
PDH d
_=.
4 *
(2)
Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revi' sed i
through Amendment No. 113, are hereby incorporated in the 1
license.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
o Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
May 28, 1996 t
fa nto u
y*
4 UNITED STATES g
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 4
o 9.....g PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-323 DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 111 License No. DPR-82 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated April 3, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety'of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:
l I
)
i
- (2)
Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No.111, are hereby incorporated in the license.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- s. I t'
' Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV l
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 28, 1996
~
4 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO.113 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 AND AMENDMENT NO. 111 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-14 3/4 7-14 3/4 7-17 3/4 7-17 3/4 9-13 3/4 9-13 3/4 9-14 3/4 9-14 8 3/4 7-10 B 3/4 7-10 B 3/4 7-11 B 3/4 7-11 B 3/4 9-3 8 3/4 9-3 l
l l
i
!I i
{
PLANT SYSTEMS j
3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5.1 The Control Room Ventilation Systee* shall be OPERABLE ** with two l
separate trains with each train consisting of one main supply fan, one filter i
booster fan, one pressurization supply fan and one HEPA Filter and Charcoal Adsorber System.
APPLICABILITY: All ICDES.
s i
ACTION:
l
{
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4:
With one Control Room Ventilation System train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODES 5 and 6:
With one Control Room Ventilation Systen train inoperable, restore a.
the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the OPERABLE Control Roon Ventilation System train in the recirculation mode.
b.
With both Control Room Ventilation System trains inoperable, or with the OPERABLE control Room Ventilation System required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION a. not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS 4.7.5.1 Each Control Roos Ventilation Systes train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 120*F;
- The Control Roon Ventilation System is common to both units.
bulk chlorine gas is stored within the SITE BOUNDARY.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-13
\\
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.
At least once per 31 days by:
1)
Initiating flow through the HEPA Filter And Charcoal Adsorber System and verifying that either redundant set of booster and pressurization supply fans operate for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating, 2)
Verifying that each Ventilation System redundant fan is aligned J
to receive electrical power from a separate OPERABLE vital bus, and 3)
Starting (unless already operating) each main supply fan, booster fan, and pressurization supply fan, and verifying that it operates for I hour.
c.
At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
1)
Verifying that the cleanup system sathtfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedure guidance in ANSI N510-1980, and the system flow rate is 2100 cfm 10%;
2)
Verifying within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing i
criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 70% R.H. for a methyl iodide l
penetration of less than 1%; and 3)
Verifying a system flow rate of 2100 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested-in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
d.
After 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of.a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 70% R.H. for a l
methyl iodide penetration of less than 1%;
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 36,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 34,111
ELANT SYSTEMS i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 1)
Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedure guidance in ANSI N510-1980, and the system flow rate is 73,500 cfm i 10%;
2)
Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory i
analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in j
a:cordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 70% R.H. for a methyl iodide l
penetration of less than 6%; and 3)
Verifying a system flow rate of 73,500 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
c.
After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 70% R.H.
l for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 6%;
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 3.7 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 73,500 cfm i 10%,
2)
Verifying that flow is established through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber bank on a Safety Injection test signal, and 3)
Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 i 5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
4)
Verifying that leakage through the Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System Dampers M2A and M2B is less than or equal to 5 cfm when subjected to a Constant Pressure or Pressure Decay Leak Rate Test in accordance with ASME N510-1989.
The test pressure for the leak rate test shall be based on a maximum operating pressure as defined in ASME N510-1989, of 8 inches water gauge.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-17 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 80,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 79,111
PLANT SYSTEg5 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)
After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by e.
verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and hypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 73,500 cfm i 10%; and f.
After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydro-carbon test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 73,500 cfm i 10%.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-17a Amendment Nos.80 & 79 l
l t
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 Two Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in the spent fuel pool.
ACTION:
a.
With one Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System inoperable, fuel movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool may proceed provided the OPERABLE Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System is capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source and is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
b.
With no Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool until at least one Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System is restored to OPERABLE status, c.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.9.12 The above required Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes; b.
At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
1)
Visually verifying that, with the system operating at a flow rate of 35,750 cfm i 10% and exhausting through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, the damper valve M-29 is closed; 2)
Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedures guidance in ANSI N510-1980, and the system flow rate is 35,750 cfm j
i 10%;
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 66,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 64,111
-m
,v.
REFUELING OPERATIONS 4
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) 3)
Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 95% R.H. for a methyl l
iodide penetration of less than 4.3%; and 4)
Verifying a system flow rate of 35,750 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
c.
After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D3803-1989 at 95% R.H. for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 4.3%;
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 4.1 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 35,750 cfm i 10%,
2)
Verifying that on a high radiation test signal, the system automatically starts (unless already operating) and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks, and 3)
Verifying that the system maintains the spent fuel storage pool area at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
e.
After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 35,750 cfm i 10%; and f.
After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydro-carbon test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 35,750 cfm i 10%.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No.113 Unit 2 - Amendment No.111
l PLANT SYSTEMS,
j BASES 1
3/4.7.1.7 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING. BYPASS AND ISOLATION VALVES (Continued) or feedwater line rupture, thereby limiting the Reactor Coolant. System cooldown 1
and limiting the total energy release to the containment; or (2) a feedwater i
system malfunction, thereby limiting Reactor Coolant System cooldown.
The analysis of excessive RCS heat removal due to a feedwater system malfunction assumes that a control system malfunction or operator error causes a MFRV and associated bypass valve to open fully, resulting in a step increase in feedwater flow to one steam generator. The analysis assumes a feedwater isolation signal is generated by a high-high steam generator level.
Feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of the MFRV and associated bypass valve closing as a result of the feedwater isolation signal.
Rupture of a steam line is analyzed to calculate the response of the reactor core and to determine the resulting mass and energy releases. Two separate analys6s are performed since conservative assumptions for the core response analysis are different than the conservative assumptions for the mass and energy release analysis. The core response analysis credits feedwater iso-lation as a result of the safety injection signal which results in a feedwater isolation signal.
Feedwater isolation is assumed'to occur as a result of closure of all MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves.
The mass and energy release analysis consists of several cases. The analysis assumes feedwater isolation occurs as a result of the safety injection signal which results in a feedwater isolation signal.
Some cases are analyzed that assume a MFRV fails and feedwater isolation occurs as a result of closure of the MFIV.
For cases with other single failure assumptions, feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of closure of all MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves.
The core response and mass and energy releases that would result from a rupture of a main feedwater line are bounded by the analyses of the rupture of a main steam line.
The OPERABILITY of the MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRV bypass valves within the closure time of the surveillance requirements is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. When these valves are closed, they are performing their safety function.
The APPLICABILITY of this specification is MODES 1, 2, and 3.
The basis for this is that in MODES I and 2 there is significant energy and in MODE 3 there may be significant energy in the Steam Generators. With significant energy in the Steam Generators the valves are needed for isolation of the Steam Generators in the event of a secondary system pipe rupture.
The ACTION statement requires that an inoperable valve either be restored to an OPERABLE condition or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Closing the valve fulfills the safety function of feedwater isolation so the ACTION Statement can be DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-g Unit 1 - Amendment No.106 l
Unit 2 - Amendment No.105 Deceraber 26, 1995
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.7 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING. BYPASS AND ISOLATION VALVES (Continued) exited.
If a MFRV or a MFRV bypass valve is inoperable, another option is available to isolate the inoperable valve with at least one closed valve wi.hin t
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. This option is not available for the MFIVs since the MFIVs are in the Class I feedwater piping and there are no other valves, other than check valves, in the Class I piping that could be closed to isolate the Class I portion of the feedwater line.
3/4.7.3 VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Vital Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.4 AUXILIARY SALTWATER SYSTEM j
The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Saltwater System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.5 CONTROL R09M VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Ventilation System ensures that:
(1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.
Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is j
sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing, except laboratory testing of charcoal shall be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-10 Unit 1 - Amendment No M6,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. M6,111
l.
1 i
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES l
3/4.7.6 AUXILIARY BUILDING SAFEGUARDS AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the auxiliary building following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the i
environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity for at'least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient j
to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations were assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used i
as a procedural guide for surveillance testing, except laboratory testing of charcoal shall be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
3/4.7.12 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK i
The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System and the components that it cools is ensured if the CCW temperature remains equal to or less than j
132*F during any condition assumed in ' tie safety analysis. One CCW heat exchanger is required in service when the ocean temperature is 64*F or less.
Two CCW heat exchangers are required in service when the ocean temperature is 3
i greater than 64*F.
If the reactor coolant temperature is less than 350*F (MODE l'
4), one CCW heat exchanger in service is adequate even if the ocean temperature d
is greater than 64*F.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 7-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No. Erl06,113 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 55,105,111 l
l
REF'JELING OPERATIONS J
BASES 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment ventilation penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation l
levels within the containment. The OPERASILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and SPENT FUEL POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.
The minimum water level for movement of fuel assemblies (23 feet above the vessel flange) assures that sufficient water depth is maintained above fuel elements being moved to or from the vessel. With the upper internals in place, fuel assemblies and control rods cannot be removed from the vessel.
Operations involving the unlatching of control rods with the vessel upper
)
internals in place may proceed with less than 23 feet of water above the i
vessel flange provided that 23 feet of water (12 feet above the flange) is maintained above all irradiated fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.
3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses.
Transfer of system operation into the iodine removal mode (exhaust through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers) is initiated automatically by either the new fuel storage or spent fuel pool area radiation monitors required by Specification 3.3.3.
Following insta11aticn of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation exhaust radiation monitors, the automatic function of the fuel storage area monitors will be removed. Transfer of system operation into the iodine removal mode will be by either of the two Fuel Handling Building Ventilation exhaust radiation monitors required by Specification 3.3.3.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing, except laboratory testing of charcoal shall be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CASK MOVEMENT The restriction on spent fuel shipping cask movement ensures that no fuel assemblies will be ruptured in the event of a spent fuel shipping cask accident. The dose consequences of this accident are within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100.
j 3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE The restrictions placed on spent fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool ensure that keff will not be greater than 0.95 under normal conditions, as discussed in TS 5.6.1.a.
The requirement for 2000 ppm boron concentration ensures that k-eff will not be greater than 0.95 under accident condi ions.
The spent. fuel storage has been designed and analyzed for a maximum ent ichment of 5.0 weight percent U-235.
DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-3 Unit 1 - Amendment 45,70,104,113 Unit 2 - Amendment '5,50,103,111
,