ML20116L272
| ML20116L272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1985 |
| From: | WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116L245 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-57641, TAC-57642, NUDOCS 8505030553 | |
| Download: ML20116L272 (21) | |
Text
,
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Section_
Title Page; 15 TECHNICAL. SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES t
15.1 Definitions 15.2.1-1 15.2.0 Safety Limits and Limiting Safety System Settings 15.2.1-1 15.2.1 Safety Limit, Reactor Core 15.2.1-1 15.2.2 Safety Limit, Reactor Coolant System Pressure 15.2.1-1 15.2.3 Limiting Safety System Settings Protective Instrumentation 15.2.3-1 15.3 Limiting Conditions for Operation 15.3.0 15.3.0 General Considerations 15.3.0-1 15.3.1 Reactor Coolant System 15.3.1-1 15.3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 15.3.2-1 15.3.3 Emergency Core Cooling System, Auxiliary Cooling Systems, Air Recirculation Fan Coolers, and Containment Spray 15.3.3-1
-15.3.4 Steam and Power Conversion System 15.3.4-1 15.3.5 Instrumentation System 15.3.5-1 15.3.6 Containment System 15.3.6-1 15.3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems 15.3.7-1 15.3.8 Refueling 15.3.8-1 15.3.9 Effluent Releases 15.3.9-1 15.3.10 Control Rod and Power Distribution Limits 15.3.10-1 15.3.11 Movable In-Core Instrumentation 15.3.11-1 15.3.12 Control Room Emergency Filtration 15.3.12-1 15.3.13 ShockSuppressors(Snubbers) 15.3.13-1 15.3.14 Fire Protection System 15.3.14-1 15.3.15 Overpressure Mitigating System 15.3.15-1 15.3.16 Reactor Coc h t Syr. tem Pressure Isolation Valve 15.3.16-1 15.4
.Sur'.e111ance Requirements 15.4.1 15.4.1 Operational Safety Review 15.4.1-1 15.4.2 In-Service Inspection of Safety Class Components 15.4.2-1 15.4.3 Primary System Testing Following Opening 15.4.3-1 15.4.4 Containment Tests 15.4.4-1 15.4.5 Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Cooling System Tests 15.4.5-1 15.4.6 Emergency Power System Periodic Tests 15.4.6-1 15.4.7 Main Steam Stop Valves 15.4.7-1 15.4.8 Auxiliary Feedwater System 15.4.8-1 15.4.9 Reactivity Anomalies 15.4.9-1 15.4.10 Operational Environmental Monitoring 15.4.10-1 15.4.11 Control Room Emergency Filtration 15.4.11-1 15.4.12 Miscellaneous Radioactive Materials Sources 15.4.12-1 15.4.13 Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 15.4.13-1 15.4.14 Surveillance of Auxiliary Building Crane Lifting Devices 15.4.14-1 15.4.15 Fire Protection System 15.4.15-1 15.4.16 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves Leakage Tests 15.4.16-1 Unit 1 Amendment No. 63 15.1 Unit 2 Amendment No. 68 50 g g tember 20, 1982
15.3.8 REFUELING Applicability:
Applies to operating limitations during refueling operations.
l Objective:
To ensure that no incident could occur during refueling operations that would affect public health and safety.
Specifications:
During refueling operations:
1.
The equipment hatch shall be closed and the personnel locks shall be l
capable of being closed. A temporary third door on the outside of the l
personnel lock shall be in place whenever both doors in a personnel lock are open (except for initial core loading).
I 2.
Radiation levels in fuel handling areas, the containment and spent fuel storage pool shall be monitored continuously.
3.
Core suberitical neutron flux shall be continuously monitored by at least two neutron monitors, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment l
available whenever core geometry is being changed. When core geometry is not being changed at least one neutron flux monitor shall be in service.
4.
At least one residual heat removal loop shall be in operation.
However, if refueling operations are affected by the residual heat removal loop flow, the operating residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to one hcur per eight hour period.
5.
During reactor vessel head removal and while loading and unloading fuel from the reactor, a minimum boron concentration of 1800 ppm shall be maintained in the primary coolant system.
15.3.8-1 o.
6.
Direct communication between the control room and the operating floor of the containment shall be available whenever changes in core geometry are taking place.
7.
The containment vent and purge system, including the radiation monitors.which initiate isolation shall be tested and verified to be operable immediately prior to refueling operations.
8.
If any of the specified limiting conditions for refueling are not met, refueling of the reactor shall cease. Work shall be initiated to correct the violated conditions so that the specified limits are met, and no operations which may increase the reactivity of the core shall be made.
l e
15.3.8-2
Basis The equipment and general procedures to be utilized during refueling are discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Detailed instructions, the above specified precautions, and the design of the fuel handling equipment
^
incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety.( }
Whenever changes are not being made in core geometry one flux monitor is sufficient. This permits maintenance of the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels (A2 above) and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition. The residual heat pump is used to maintain a uniform boron concentration.
The shutdown margin indicated in Part A5 will keep the core suberitical, even if all control rods were withdrawn from the core. During refueling, the reactor refueling cavity is filled with approximately 275,000 gallons of borated water.
The boron concentration of this water is sufficient to maintain the reactor 15.3.8-3
suberitical approximately by 10% AK/K in the cold condition with all rods inserted, and will also maintain the core suberitical even if no control rods were inserted into the reactor.(2) Periodic checks of refueling water boron concentration insure that proper shutdown margin is maintained. Part A6 allows the control room operator to inform the manipulator operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.
During the refueling operation a substantial number of station personnel and perhaps some regulatory people will be in the containment. The requirements are to prevent an unsafe amount of radioactivity from escaping to the environment in the case of a refueling accident, and also to allow safe avenues of escape for the personnel inside the containment as required by the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations. To provide for these requirements, the personnel locks (both doors) are open for the normal refueling operations with a third temporary door which opens outward installed across the outside end of the personnel lock.( ) This hollow metal third door is equipped with weather stripping and an automatic door closer to minimize the exchange of inside air with the outside atmosphere under the very small dif ferential pressures expected while in the refueling condition. Upon sounding of the containment evacuation alarm, all personnel will exit through the temporary door (s) and then all personnel lock doors shall be closed. As soon as possible, the fuel transfer gate value shall be closed to back up the 30 foot water seal to prevent escape of fission products.
The spent fuel storage pool at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant consists of a single pool with a four foot thick reinforced concrete divider wall which separates the pool into a north half and south half. The divider wall is notched to a point sixteen feet above the pool floor to allow transfer of assemblies from one half of the pool to the other.
15.3.8-4 j
Unit 1 Amendment 35 April 4, 1979
suberitical approximately by 5% AK/K in the cold condition with all rods in-serted.( ) Periodic checks of refueling water boron concentration insure that proper shutdown margin is maintained. Part A6 allows the control room operator to inform the manipulator operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movement.
During the refueling operation a substantial number of station personnel and perhaps some regulatory people will be in the containment. The requirements are to prevent an unsafe amount of radioactivity from escaping to the environment in the ca'e of a refueling accident, and also to allow safe s
avenues of escape for the personnel inside the containment as required by the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations. To provide for these requirements, the personnel locks (both doors) are open for the normal refueling operations with a third temporary door which opens outward installed across the outside end of the personnel lock.(3) This hollow metal third door is equipped with weather stripping and xa autcmatic door closer to minimize the exchange of inside air with the outside atmosphere under the very small differential pressures expected while in the refueling condition. Upon sounding of the containment evacuation alarm, all personnel will exit through the temporary door (s) and then all personnel lock doors shall be closed. As soon as possible, the fuel transfer gate value shall be closed to back up the 30 foot water seal to prevent escape of fission products.
The spent fuel storage pool at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant consists of a single pool with a four foot thick reinforced concrete divider wall which separates the pool into a north half and south half. The divider wall is notched to a point sixteen feet above the pool floor to allow transfer of assemblies from one half of the pool to the other.
15.3.8-4 Unit 2 Amendment 90 October 5, 1984
Previous Technical Specifications in this section had addressed maximum load limits and limitations on load movements by the auxiliary building crane over a spent fuel pool. These specifications were deleted upon modification of the crane to meet the single-failure-proof criteria outlined in NUREG-0612.
e e
15.3.8-5
a References (1) FSAR - Section 9.5.2 (2) FSAR - Table 3.2.1-1 e
15.3.8-6
15.4.14 SURVEILLANCE OF AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE LIFTING DEVICES l
Applicability:
Applies to surveillance requirements for the auxiliary building crane special lifting devices and slings before handling heavy (>1750 lbs.) loads cirried over or near the spent fuel pool.
Objective:
To verify that special lifting devices and slings used in conjunction with the auxiliary building crane are operable prior to their use in supporting heavy loads over the spent fuel pool.
Specification:
1.
All slings and special lifting devices which will be used in supporting heavy loads from either the main or auxiliary hoist of the auxiliary building crane shall be inspected immediately prior to use.
Basis:
The auxiliary building crane has been modified to conform with single-failure-proof criteria. This modification evolved as a result of concern over the movement of heavy loads over or near the spent fuel pool when spent fuel is stored there. The crane is designed to not allow a load drop as a result of any single constituent component failure. As the slings and special lift-ing devices are, by their nature, an integral part of the load bearing path, their surveillance is necessary to ensure against a load drop as a result of deficient rigging.
Reference:
1.
15.4.14-1
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EDERER ERM INCr3 RP O R ATED WASHINGTON CRANES APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT TO GENERIC LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT EDR-l
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER INCORPORATED FOR WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE P.O NO. B-15166-S EDERER S.O. NO. F-1440 REVISION 2 I/31/84 Prepared:
Holloran Asyociat Checked: 4.
%Cib)ddik l
i Design E6gineerV Eder Incorporated Reviewed:
A afA/
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Qup(t/'ypssurance Manger Edo epncorporated Approved:
(f bar,-
Chief Engineer Ederer incorporated 2925 FIRST AV EN U'd SOUTH, BOX 24708. SEATTLE. WA 98124 (206) 622-4421
- TWX: 910-444-2211
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e Revision 2 I/3I/84 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS Description Page No.
Revision Title Page i
2 I/3I/84 Table of Contents and Revision Status il 2 1/31/84 iii 2 1/31/84 Topical Report Section Ill.C(C.I.a) i I 8/5/83 Ill.C(C.l.b) i Ill.C(C.2.b) & Ill.E.4 I
lil.C(C.3.e) 2 I 8/5/83 Reg. Guide 1.104 (C.3.f) 2 lil.C(C.3.h) & lil.E.11 3
2 1/31/84 Ill.C(C.3.i) lil.C(C.3.J) 4 I 8/5/83 lil.C(C,3.k) 5 2 I/3I/84 Reg. Guide 1.104 (C.3.o) 5 Reg. Guide 1.104 (C.3.p) 5 Reg. Guide 1.104 (C.3.q) 6 2 1/31/84 Ill.D. I 6
ii
Revision 2 I/31/84 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE TABLE OF CONTENTS AND REVISION STATUS Topical Report Section Page No.
Revision Ill.D.2 7
2 1/31/84 Ill.D.3 7
til.D.5 7
Ill.D.6 -
7 8
2 1/31/84 lil.F.I 8
9 2 1/31/84 4
l i
-lii
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Revision 1 8/5/83 Page B-l EDR-l APPENDlX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical
- 9".f
'Y Report Information to be Provided -
Specific Crane Data p
Section C. I.a lil.C (C. l.a) 1.
The actual crane duty classifica-1.
The crane has a Class C crane duty classif-tion of the crane specified by ication in accordance with CMAA Specifi-the applicont.
cation #70.
C.I.b lil.C (C.I.b) 1.
The minimum operating temper-1.
The trolley was designed and fabricated for ature of the crane specified by a minimum operating temperature of 40 the opplicant.
degrees F.
C.2.b lil.C (C.2.b) 1.
The maximum extent of load I.
The main hoist is designed such that the Ill.E.4 motion and the peak kinetic maximum load motion following a drive energy of the load following a train failure is less than.5 foot and the drive train failure.
maximum kinetic energy of the load is less than that resulting from.5 inch of free fall of the maximum critical load. The auxil-iory hoist is designed such that the maxi-mum load motion following a drive train failure is less than I foot and the maximum kinetic energy of the load is less than that resulting from 2 inches of free fall of the maximum critical load.
t Revision i 8/5/83 Page B-2 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical pg ;f.
'Y Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data
- 9 Section 2.
Provisions for octuating the 2.
Provisions for automatically octuating the Emergency Drum Broke prior to Emergency Drum Broke prior to traversing troversing with the load, when with the load are not required since the required to accommodate the maximum amount of load motion and load motion following a drive kinetic energy con be accommodated by train failure.
the facility design.
C.3.e Ill.C (C.3.e) 1.
The maximum cable loading fol-.
1.
The maximum cable loading following a lowing a wire rope failure in wire rope failure in either the main or terms of the acceptance criteria auxiliary hoist meets the maximum allowed established in Section Ill.C by the acceptance criterio established in (C.3.e.)
Section lil.C (C.3.e).
C.3.f 1.
Maximum fleet angle 1.
3.5 degrees.
2.
Number of reverse bends 2.
None, other than the one between the wire rope drum and the first sheave in the lood block.
3.
Sheave diameter 3.
Per CMAA Specification //70
.1
~
Revision 2 1/31/84 Page B-3 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT l
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE d
Topical Regulatory I
Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section 1
C.3.h Ill.C (C.3.h) 1.
The maximum extent of motion I.
The main hoist is designed such that the l
Ill.E.1 I and peak kinetic energy of the maximum load motion following a single I
lood following a single wire rope wire rope failure is less than.5 foot and j
failure.
the maximum kinetic energy of the load is less than that resulting from.5 inch of free fall of the maximum critical load.
The ouxiliary hoist is designed such' that the maximum lood motion following a single wire rope failure is less than one foot and the maximum kinetic energy of the load is i
less than that resulting from 2 inches of free fall of the maximum critical load.
i l
C.3.i Ill.C (C.3.i) 1.
The type of lood control system 1.
The existing Westinghouse Class22-506 specified by the opplicant.
and Class22-501 A-C thyristor static-step-less crane drive units have not been j
replaced.
The maximum lowering ' speed permitted by the auxiliary hoist controls is i
17.8 FPM, which is greater than the IS FPM maximum recommended by CMAA i
- 70.
l j
2.
Whether interlocks are recom-2.
The crane will not be used to lift fuel i
i mended by Regulatory Guide elements from the reactor core or spent l.13 to prevent trolley and fuel rocks. Therefore, interlocks to pre-bridge movements while fuel vent trolley and bridge movements while i
l elements are being lif ted and hoisting have not been provided.
whether they are provided for i
this opplication.
Revision i 8/5/83 Page B-4 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical ho*9
'Y Report Information to be Provided Specific Crone Data Section C.3.]
Ill.C (C.3.j) 1.
The maximum cable and machin-1.
The Energy Absorbing Torque Limiters ery loading that would result in (EATL) were designed such that the max-the event of a high speed two imum machinery lood, which would result blocking, assuming a control in the event of a two blocking occurs while system malfunction that would lif ting the rated lood at the rated speed allow the full breakdown torque that allows the full breakdown torque of of the motor to be opplied to the the motor to be opplied to the drive shaft, drive motor shaf t.
will not exceed twice the mochinery's design rating. -
In oddition, the EATL designs do not allow the maximum cable loading to exceed the acceptance criterio established in Section Ill.C (C.3.e) during the _obove described two-blockings.
2.
Means of preventing two block-2.
The auxiliory hoist has the some X-SAM ing of. ouxiliary hoist, 'if pro-features os the main hoist to prevent two vided.
blockings and to protect the crone and load in the event that one occurs.
s e
Revision 2 I/31/84 Page B-5 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Report Information to be Provided Specific Crone Data
'Y Section C.3.k lil.C(C.3.k) 1.
Type of drum safety. support 1.
The alternate design drum safety restraint provided.
shown in figure Ill.D.4 of EDR-l is oug-mented with brockets that counter any upward forces imposed by the drive gear.
These brackets act on the lower portion of the inside diameter of the gear end of the drum.
The alternate design restraint 'is also used for the auxiliary hoist.
Since output shaft of the gear case also serves as the drum shaf t, the alternate type of re-straint has been extended to completely encircle the drum shell at both ends.
C.3.o 1.
Type of hoist drive to provide 1.
The existing Westinghouse Class22-506 incremental motion..
and Class22-501 A-C thyristor static-step-less crone drive units, which have not been replaced, provide incremental food motion.
1.
Maximum trolley speed.
1.
50 FPM C.3.p 2.
Maximum bridge speed.
2.
The maximum bridge. travel speed permitted by the existing crone controls is 75 FPM, compared to the 50 FPM maximum recommended by the 1975 Revision of CMAA #70.
Revision 2 I/31/84 Page B-6 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical R
a ory Report information to be Provided Specific Crane Data p
Section C.3.p 3.
Type of overspeed protection for 3.
Both the ' trolley and bridge drives are the trolley and bridge drives.
powered by AC motors that con inherently not overspeed, since their maximum speed is limited by the 60 HZ line frequency.
Therefore, overspeed sensors that actuate the trolley and bridge drive brakes have not been provided.
C.3.q 1.
Control station location.
l._
The complete operating control system, including the emergency stop button, is located on a pendant.
Ill.D.I 1.
The type of Emergency Drum I.
A single pneumatically released band broke Broke used, including type of will be used in each hoist.-
release mechanism.
2.
The relative location of the 2.
The Emergency Drum Brcke engages the Emergency Drum Broke.
wire rope drum in each hoist.
3.
Emergency Drum Broke Capacity.
3.
The Emergency Drum Broke in each hoist has a minimum capacity of 130% of that required to hold the design rated load.
(
Revision 2 1/31/84 Page B-7 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Report Information to be Provided Specific Crone Data
- 9
'I pg ;
Section l
lil.D.2 1.
Number of friction surfaces in EATL.
l.
The EATLs have 21 friction surfaces.
2.
EATL Torque Setting.
2.
The specified EATL torque setting is approximately 130% of the rated motor torque at the design rated speed that cor-responds to lif ting the design rated load.
l Ill.D.3 1.
Type of Failure Detection System.
l.
A totally mechanical drive train continuity detector and emergency drum broke l
octuator have been provided in accordance with Appendix G of Revision 3 of EDR-l in each hoist.
1 i
Ill.D.5 1.
Type of Hydraulic Load Equal-1.
In both hoists, the Hydraulic Load Equali-ization System.
zotion System includes both features described in this section.
Ill.D.6 1.
Type of hook.
l.
Both the main and auxiliary hooks have o single load path.
i 2.
Hook design load.
2.
The main book design lood is 125 Tons with o 10:1 factor of safety on ultimate.
The auxiliary book design lood is 20 Tons with a 10:1 factor of safety on ultimate.
d Revision 2 1/31/84 Page B-8 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided-Specific Crane Dato -
Positim Section i
lil.D.6 3.
Hook test load.
3.
The test load for each load path of the-I main hook will be 250 Tons.
The test load for each load-path of the auxiliary hook will be 40 Tons.
lil.F. I 1.
Design rated lood, l.
Main hoist
- 125 Tons.
Auxiliary hoist
- 20 Tons.
}
2.-
Maximum critical load rating.
2.
Main hoist
- 125 Tons.
Auxiliary hoist
- 20 Tons.
i 3.
Trolley weight (net).
3.
95,000 lbs. (including hooks) 4 4.
Trolley weight (with food).
4.
345,000 lbs.
l 1
5.
Hook lif t.
5.
Main book
- 68 feet Auxiliary hook
- l 14 feet I
f 6.
Number of wire rope drums.
6.
The main and the auxiliary hoists each have one wire rope drum.
J 9
Revision 2 I/31/84 Page B-9 EDR-l APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR POINT BEACH AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE g3].
'Y Re t
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Section I
Ill.F. I 7.
Number of poris of wire rope.
7.
Main hoist
- 8 parts per wire rope.
Auxiliary hoist
- 4 parts per wire rope.
8.
Drum size (pitch diameter).
- 8. - Main hoist
- 45 inches.
Auxiliary hoist
- 23.75 inches.
l 9.
Wire rope diameter.
9.
Main hoist
- l 1/8 inch.
Auxiliary hoist
- 5/8".
- 10. Wire rope type.
- 10. 6x37 class IWRC.
I1. Wire rope material.
I1. Stainless steel.
- 12. Wire rope breaking strength.
- 12. Main hoist
- 135,700 lbs.
Auxiliary hoist
- 43,100 lbs.
- 13. Wire rope yield strength.
- 13. Main hoist
- 108,600 lba.
Auxiliary hoist
- 34,500 lbs.
- 14. Wire rope reserve strength.
- 14. Main hoist
.661 Auxiliary hoist
.57 l
- 15. Number of wire ropes.
- 15. The main and ouxiliary hoists each have two ropes.
-