ML20116D786
| ML20116D786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1996 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116D790 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9608020324 | |
| Download: ML20116D786 (173) | |
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l Duke Power Company i
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION l
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
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4 StPPLEMENTAL IPEEE FIRE ANALYSIS REPORT i
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I Duke Power Company
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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION SUPPLEMENTAL IPEEE FIRE ANALYSIS REPORT AUGUST 1,1996
SUPPLEMENTAL IPEEE FIRE ANALYSIS I.
INTRODUCTION On June 4,1996, Duke personnel met with NRC staff and contractors at their offices in Rockville, MD to 1) discuss the concerns in the McGuire and Catawba IPEEE draft l
technical evaluation report pertaining to the fire analysis and 2) present benchmarking B
and sensitivity study information that Duke had completed to respond to the concerns.
I The meeting provided an opportunity for the NRC staff contractors to elaborate on their concerns and for Duke to state its position regarding the individual concerns and meeting the overall objectives of the IPEEE program. In several areas, some of the concerns were alleviated by further clarifying the characteristics of our plants and providing more detail on the level ofeffort and steps that went into the McGuire and Catawba fire analysis.
There were several open issues that remained as a result of the meeting. NRC staff asked that Duke take several action items to address these issues and report the results for McGuire and Catawba in 60 days. These action items are:
1.
Develop fire accident sequences and determine fire damage scenario g
frequency (cutsets) for these fire areas that were screened from further g
review on the basis that the fire damage scenario frequency was less than the internal event frequency for the selected equipment in the area.
2.
Perfonn a sensitivity study by truncating the fire event tree at the end of propagation, P1, and ncalculating core damage frequency results. The l
output will be a table showing the expanded base case (includes additional 5
sequences from action item 1) and sensitivity study results for all critical fire areas.
3.
Review non-safety cable routing to confirm that potential plant trip initiators have been considered in all areas where these cable are routed. In l
addition to the non-safety cables, component cooling (KC), nuclear service water (RN), safety injection (NI), chemical and volume control (NV), and residual heat removal (ND) cables should also be considered.
This report presents the summary of these supplemental IPEEE fire investigations.
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II.
ANALYSIS OF FIRE SEQUENCE PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED TO BE SUBSUMED BY OTHERINITIATORS 1
Fire accident sequences were developed for those areas that were previously screened from further fire review (because they were considered to be subsumed by other l
initiators). The following is a list of areas which were not previously quantified that have now been included in the fire analysis for this particular study:
l McGuire 1)
Lower Switchgear Room (El. 733 Aux. Bldg.)
2)
Space 649 (Nuclear Service Water Pumps) 3 3)
Room 926 (Reactor Trip Switchgear) 5 4)
Diesel Generator Room 5)
Turbine Building (2 cases)
E 6)
Service Building E
Catawba 1)
Lower Switchgen Room (El. 560 Aux. Bldg.)
2)
Room 571, Reactor Trip Switchgear 3)
Battery Room (El. 560 Aux. Bldg. Actually, the Vital I & C area was evaluated) j 4)
Diesel Generator Room I
5)
Turbine Building 6)
Service Building l
7)
Nuclear Service Water Pump Structure The mechanical equipment rooms (contaming HVAC equipment) were not evaluated because HVAC sequences were dismissed qualitatively (as insignificant) in the intnaal g
l events PRA. The same conclusion is valid for fire sequences for the HVAC equipment g'
room.
l The component cooling pump area at McGuire was not evaluated for fire because there were no internal event sequences greater than the truncation limit. This will also be the l
case for fire sequences in this area.
For each fire area included in the fire analysis, the fire initiated accident initiator frequency is determined by considering the area / component fire frequency and the three-g stage fire detection-suppression-propagation event tree parameters presented in the IPEEE report. Appendix 1 lists the event tree models. Tables II-l and 11-2 contain the resulting fire initiated accident initiators for McGuire and Catawba, respectively.
These fire induced accident initiators are solved for core damage frequency by requantifying the integrated PRA event tree-fault tree solution (RMQS file) for the plant.
In performing this analysis, any component failures occurdng in the mitigating systems as I
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a result of the fire are assigned a failure probability of 1.0. For example, for the switchgear room B, the SSF is assumed unavailable so the failure probability of the SSF is set at 1.0.
Turbine Building Fire Sequences involving non-recoverable loss of offsite power events are recovered with event POPXCONRHE. This represents credit for cross connecting power from the other unit. This recovery is not modeled in the McGuire or Catawba internal events PRA although implicit credit for this is taken in the Catawba PRA. This recovery is possible for both stations. The actual cross connect of power to the other unit may happen at an early stage in the event, perhaps before the arTected generator is lost.
Event POPXCONRHE is assigned a value of 0.04 based on timing considerations and a consideration of the action (or execution) phase of the event.
The tables in Appendix 2 contain the resulting accident sequences (cut sets). For the final results, the cut sets are truncated at the conventional limit of IE-08 and listed in Tables III-3 and III-4 for McGuire and Catawba, respectively. The results are listed under the
" expanded base case fire CDF." The " expanded base case" includes the additional fire sequences and in the case of McGuire also includes changes to the fire suppression parameter.
For Catawba, the fire core damage frequency (CDF) for the new expanded. base case is approximately the same as listed in the IPEEE report (4.69E-06 vs. 4.57E-06). The small difference is due to rounding error. Thus, the additional fire sequences had an insignificant impact.
4 For McGuire, first, the base case was updated by changing the early suppression parameter, S1, to reflect an assumption of 10 minutes to respond to a fire rather than 3 minutes (This difference was identified in the IPEEE report but was not quantified). This change increased the CDF to 6.47E-07 from 2.3E-07 in the IPEEE report. After adding the additional fire sequences, the CDF increased to 6.74E-07.
Thus, there were no significant sequences obtained from the additional events. Most of the additional sequences fell below the truncation limit of IE-08. The only exceptions to this were sequences associated with the "all consuming" Turbine Building fire scenarios at both stations (CNS - 1.52E-08, MNS - 5.11E-08) and the 1ETB switchgear room fire scenario at Catawba (2.21E-08).
For each fire area included in the fire analysis, a brief description of the fire sequences considered along with fire initiation frequency and core damage frequency is provided below. Appendix 2 provides a complete listing of the accident sequences.
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E Switchcear Room ETB The frequency of a fire induced loss of the 4KV switchgear is calculated to be 8.7E-07/yr for McGuire and 8.9E-07/yr for Catawba. Since the SSF cable passes through this room, the SSF is assumed to be unavailable for the mitigation of this event.
It is assumed that the operating RN, KC, and NV pumps are powered from this switchgear. This event can lead to core damage sequences due to independent failures of the unaffected train. Considering cut sets above IE-08, the core damage frequency for this g
event is calculated ;o be 2.21E-08/yr for Catawba. For McGuire, all the cut sets were g
below 1E-08/yr.
Diesel Generator Room A The frequency of a fire induced failure of Diesel Generator A is calculated to be 2.15E-03 5
for McGuire and 1.55E-02 for Catawba. Normally, the failure of a Diesel Generator R
would not lead to a plant transient. The Technical Specifications allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the Diesel Generator to an operable status before additional actions are necessary. For Catawba, this event has been analyzed by considering the possibility of a random loss of offsite power during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The resulting CDF for Catawba is less than IE-08/yr. For McGuire, Diesel Generator 1A room contains the control cables for two MSIVs. Therefore, a fire event is assumed to lead to a reactor trip due to MSIV closure.
The resulting sequences are resolved and the core damage frequency is calculated to be less than 1E-08.
Turbine Buildine t.
The frequency of a large Turbine Building fire, with potential to cause loss of both main feedwater pumps or loss of offsite power, is estimated to be 1.7E-05/ reactor year. The i
g loss of offsite power is more limiting than the loss of main feedwater event, and, gj therefore, this event is analyzed as a non-recoverable loss of offsite power event. The Turbine Building fire is also assumed to fail the SSF. The core damage sequences are g!
analyzed considering independent failure of the Diesel Generator, auxiliary feedwater and 3l nuclear service water system. The resulting CDF is 5.11E-08/yr for McGuire and 1.52E-08/yr for Catawba.
i Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumn Room This room contains the auxiliary shutdown panels. The limiting event for a fire in this room is considered to be the loss of nuclear service water for McGuire and the loss of component cooling for Catawba, with an estimated frequency of 2E-08 (5.94E-06/yr for gl fire initiated in the auxiliary shutdowr. panels) for McGuire and 1.69E-08 for Catawba.
The core damage cutsets are below IE-08 for both plants.
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Nuclear Service Water Pumo Room
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The frequency of a fire induced loss of nuclear service water event is calculated to be 5.72E-08/yr for McGuire and 1.33E-07/yr for Catawba. The core damage frequency for this event is calculated to be less than IE-08 for both plants.
Control Room For McGuire the limiting event is the loss of nuclear service water with an estimated frequency of 2.14E-06/yr. For Catawba, the limiting event is the loss of component cooling, with an estimated frequency of 2.14E-06/yr. The resulting core damage frequency is less than 1E-08/yr for McGuire and 1.52E-07/yr for Catawba.
Reactor Trin Switchaear Room The frequency of a fire induced reactor trip is calculated to be 1.78E-04/yr for McGuire and Catawba. For both plants the resulting core damage cut sets are less than IE-08/yr.
Cable Room For a fire in the cable room, the limiting event for McGuire is the loss of nuclear service water with an estimated frequency of 9.36E-06/yr and for Catawba is the loss of KC, with an estimated frequency of 9.56E-06/yr. For McGuire, the resulting core damage frequency is 1.16E-08/yr. The corresponding Catawba core damage frequency is 6.96E-07/yr.
Vital I&C Room For a fire in the vital I&C room, the initiating event of concem is the loss of nuclear service water at McGuire, as a result of damage to the cables of the operating RN pump.
Fire induced failure of the de control power for the other train is conservatively assumed to lead to a loss of RN. The calculated frequency of this event is 4.42E-04/yr.
Independent failure of the containment ventilation cooling water (RV) system, the unit 2 RN system, and the SSF lead to core damage sequences. The calculated core damage frequency for this event is 6.47E-07/yr.
For Catawba the corresponding initiating event is the loss of one train of the de control power system for engineered safeguards equipment with a frequency of 1.78E-04/yr.
Following this event, the independent failures of the other engineered safeguards train and SSF (operator failure and hardware failure) lead to a core damage sequence but the frequency of the sequence is less than 1E-08/yr.
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I Turbine Buildine - Main Feedwater Pumo Area For McGuire a large fire in the area of the main feeedwater pumps has the potential to damage the offsite power system cables, thus leading to a non-recoverable LOOP. The l
frequency of this event is calculated to be 1.46E-05/yr. Following this event, the independent failures of the Diesel Generators or other safety systems lead to a core damage condition. However, all the resulting cut sets are below the truncation limit.
This event does not apply to Catawba since the power cables are not in the vicinity.
Service Buildine A fire in the service building can lead to a loss ofinstrument air event. The frequency of this event is calculated to be 2.19E-05/yr for McGuire and 1.04E-04/yr for Catawba. For this event all core damage cut sets are below the truncation limit for both plants.
Catawba KC Pumo Room The frequency of a fire in the KC pump room causing a loss of KC event is calculated to be 4.78E-05/yr. Subsequent failures in the standby shutdown facility (SSF) lead to a core damage condition. The resulting core damage frequency is calculated to be 3.74E-06/yr.
III.
SENSITIVITY STUDY ON DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION PARAMETERS The existing fire event trees listed in Appendix 1 take credit for several stages of fire detection and suppression. A sensitivity study has been performed to take credit for only early detection and suppression by truncating the fire event tree at the end of propagation, gl P1, and recalculating core damage frequency results. The truncated event trees are g
provided in Appendix 3.
The " stage 2" (AB) frequencies from these trees were multiplied by existing ignition frequencies to obtain the fire frequencies for the sensitivity study. Fire barriers and hot j
shorts were treated the same as in the original fire analysis. These fire initiated accident 3
initiator frequencies are listal in Tables III-l and III-2 for McGuire and Catawba, E
respectively. The accident sequences using the revised fire initiator frequencies are provided in Appendix 4. Tables III-3 and III-4 provide a comparison of the expanded base case and sensitivity study results for each fire initiator well as well as overall fire CDF.
For McGuire, the sensitivity study CDF increased to 5.71E-06 from 6.74E-07 in the expanded base case. For Catawba, the sensitivity study CDF increased to 7.27E-06 from 4.57E-06 in the expanded base case.
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I Sensitivity study CDF increased by about an order of magnitude over the expanded base case for McGuire. Sensitivity study CDF increased by about a factor of 1.6 over the 1
expanded base case for Catawba. The "all consuming" Turbine Building fire scenario (both stations) and the IETB switchgear room scenario (Catawba only) are the only scenarios significantly impacted by the change to the truncated event tree.
IV.
RE-REVIEW OF CABLE ROUTING All fire areas within the plants were walked down as part of the IPEEE effort to verify that the assumptions and inputs in the McGuire and Catawba fire PRAs were valid. The results of these walkdowns for each fire area were documented on standard, comprehensive walkdown checklists developed for the project. For each fire area, the determination was made and documented as to whether the area contained equipment that, if affected by a fire, could cause one of the defined plant initiators. The initiators of interest, as identified in the IPEEE fire protection walkdown checklist, include the I
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Plant trip Loss of offsite power l
Loss of main feedwater i
Loss of nuclear service water Loss of component cooling water Loss of 4160 emergency bus Loss of 125 V dc /120 V ac vital instrument and control power system Loss ofinstrument air and loss of coolant accident i
Cables are included in the definition of" equipment" located within the fire area.
In order to confirm that non-safety cable routing at McGuire and Catawba was adequately addressed by the walkdown checklist process, areas where non-safety cables are located were re-reviewed to reconfirm that potential plant trip initiators have been considered in all areas where cables are routed. Also reviewed were power and control cable routes for component cooling pumps (KC), safety injection pumps (NI), centrifugal charging pumps (NV), residual heat removal (ND), nuclear service water pumps (RN) and reactor coolant pumps.
The locations of non-safety cables associated with the turbine generator (including the hydraulic controls system, condensate system and instrument air system) at both Catawba and McGuire were reviewed. Cables associated with the turbine generator and the condensate system are supplied from the non-essential auxiliary power supply switchgear j
located in the turbine building (s). Cables associated with the instrument air system are routed through the unit I turbine building to the basement of the service building where
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instrument air compressors are located. All of the control cables merge into a common i
cable "right of way" that includes all cable trays containing cables which are routed from I
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non-safety related areas into the control room. In the basement of the service building, these cables enter the (non-safety related) " cable spreading room" or the switchgear room ll below. The (non-safety related) cable spreading room and the switchgear room are located in the service building basement between column lines 35-37 at Catawba and between column lines 33-34 at McGuire. Cables are routed through these rooms into the l
cable room (from the cable spreading room} where safety related cables are located or the l
I battery room area (from the switchgear room). Cables in the battery room area are routed I
through the ceiling into the cable room. These cables are then routed into the control room which is directly above the cable room [as a note of clarification, the " cable gi spreading room" contains only non-safety related cables; it is located to the west of the 5
" cable room" at Catawba (to the south at McGuire), which contains all cables which are routed into the control room]. The (non-safety related) cable spreading room and g
switchgear rooms are separated from the safety related cable room and battery room area 5
located between column lines AA and EE in the auxiliary building by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier.
Review of walkdown checidist sheets for turbine and service buildings of both Catawba and McGuire confirmed that the potential for unit trip due to fire is properly evaluated.
The evaluated PRA fire scenario for a turbine building fire is a plant trip with a long term loss of offsite power and instrument air. The evaluated PRA fire scenario for a service building fire is a long term loss ofinstrument air.
For both Catawba and McGuire, essential equipment auxiliary power cables from offsite power are routed through the turbine Mding to cable enclosures and into cable shafts located between the turbine building ano me auxiliary building. From these shafts, train A and train B cables are routed directly into their respective essential switchgear rooms.
Reactor coolant pump cables are then routed through the switchgear rooms into their respective electrical penetration rooms and directly into the reactor buildings.
Review of walkdown checklist sheets for the turbine and service buildings, and the essential switchgear and electrical penetration rooms of both Catawba and McGuire confirmed that the potential for unit trip due to fire is properly evaluated.
ag Discussion of 4160V Cable Routes at Catawba The residual heat removal pumps (ND) are located in fire area 1 (elevation 522'). Both trains of ND power cables are routed through the ceiling of each room into fire area 4 (elev 543') above. Centrifugal charging (NV) and safety injection (NI) pumps are located in fire area 4. Cables of these pumps are routed through the ceiling to fire area 11 (elev 560') above. Both trains A and B of unit I component cooling water (KC) pumps are located in fire area 11. The boundary of fire areas 11 at column EE is adjacent to the l
control complex which contains the battery rooms (elev 560'), cable rooms (elev 577')
and control room (elev 594'). Train B cables of each system are routed across column EE into the battery room corridor and into the train B essential switchgear. Train A cables of each of these systen.s are routed across column EE into cable shafts, up to the next I
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elevation (elev 577'), through cable room corridors and into the train A essential switchgear room. Unit 2 KC pumps are located in fire area 18 (elev 577'). Train A cables for these pumps are routed across column EE into the cable room corridor and into the train A switchgear room. Train B cables are either routed directly down into fire area 11,
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or are routed into train B cable shafts at column EE. They are then routed through the battery room area corridor into the train B essential switchgear room. RN pump power f
cables are routed from their respective switchgear rooms into the exterior cable shaft mentioned above and then routed through trenches outside to the RN pump structure.
Review of walkdown checklist sheets for fire areas 1,4,11,18, battery room area, cable room conidors of both units, and the RN pump structure confirmed that the potential for unit trip due to fire is properly evaluted.
There is no identified trip potential or PRA fire scenario for the ND pump room area at Catawba.
In the existing PRA analysis for elevations 560' and 577' at Catawba, the following fire-initiated events have been considered:
560' Loss of B train essential switchgear 560' Loss of Unit 1 Component Cooling 577' Loss of Vital Instrumentation and Control Power (bus EDD) 577' Loss of Component Cooling due to Cable Room fire In addition to these, the control room, reactor trip switchgear (room 571), diesel generator IA room, auxiliary feedwater pump room, turbine building and service building have been fully requantified, as discussed in section II of this report.
During plant walkdowns, it was verified for each fire area that PRA scenarios adequately account for cable routing.
Discussion of 4160V Cable Routes at McGuire The residual heat removal pumps (ND) are located in fire area 1 (elev 695'). Both trains of ND power cables are routed through the cei!ing of each room into fire area 4 (elev 716') above. Centrifugal charging (NV) and safety injection (NI) nuclear service water pumps (RN) are located in fire area 4. Cables of these pumps are routed through the ceiling to fire area 14 (elev 733'). Both trains of unit I component cooling water pumps are located in fire area 14. The boundary of fire area 14 at column EE is adjacent to the control complex which contains the battery rooms (elev 733'), cable rooms (elev 750')
and control room elev (767'). Train B cables of each system are routed across column EE into the battery room corridor and into the train B essential switchgear. Train A cables of each of these systems are routed across column EE into cable shafts, up to the next elevation, through cable room corridors and into the train A essential switchgear room.
Unit 2 KC pumps are located in fire area 21 (elev 750'). Train A cables for these pumps i
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I are routed across column EE into the cable room corridor and into the train A switchgear l
room. Train B cables are routed directly down into fire area 14. They are then routed through the battery room area corridor into the train B essential switchgear room.
I Review of walkdown checklist sheets for fire areas 1,4,14,21, battery room area and cable room corridor that the potential for unit trip due to fire was properly evaluated.
There is no identified trip potential or PRA fire scenario for the ND pump room area at McGuire.
In the existing PRA analysis for elevations 716',733' and 750' at McGuire, the following fire-initiated events have been considered:
716' Loss ofNuclear Service Water 733' Loss of B train essential switchgear 733' Loss of Unit 1 Component Cooling g
733' Loss of Nuclear Service Water (due to fire in the Vital I&C area) 577' Loss of Nuclear Service Water (due to fire in the Cable Room)
In addition to these, the control room, reactor trip switchgear (room 926), diesel generator I A room, auxiliary feedwater pump room, turbine building and service building have been fully requantified, as discussed in section II of this report.
During plant walkdowns it was verified for each fire area that PRA scenarios adequately e
account for cable routing.
Discussion of Control Cables Control cables for all of the 4160V components (RN, KC, NI, NV, ND) at both stations are routed in the following manner:
For train A, these cables pass from the control room to the cable room to the cable g
room corridor to the train A switchgear room.
5 For train B, these cables pass from the control room to the cable room to the cable g
room corridor and into a cable shaft where they drop one level. From there they W
pass through the battery room area and into the train B switchgear room.
Review of walkdown checklist sheets for these areas confirmed that the potential for unit trip due to fire was properly evaluated.
I Attachment I contains McGuire layout drawings which depict location of power cables for the residual heat removal pumps. These drawings illustrate an example of the detailed information used to determine the potential for initiating events and potential l,
contributions to core damage due to fire in each individual fire area.
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The IPEEE walkdown checklists for all the areas listed above have been re-reviewed.
This exercise revalidated the process used to identify fire areas where a fire induced plant g
transient concern could occur.
- V.
CONCLUSIONS This supplemental IPEEE fire analysis produced a more complete quantification of the fire induced core damage sequences by explicitly analyzing each fire area. The resulting overall induced core damage risk is, however, not significantly different from that reported in the IPEEE submittal report. The additional sequences are in the frequency range ofless than 1E-08 to 5.11E-08.
A sensitivity study of the fire induced core damage risk has been conducted by varying the effectiveness of the fire detection-suppression-propagation system. In this case, the "all consuming" Turbine Building fire was found to be an important fire sequence due to the assumption of the frequency of the "all consuming" fire.
With the reduced effectiveness of the fire detection-suppression-propagation parameters, the fire induced sequences produced core damage sequences equal to or greater than IE-06 in the following fire areas:
Catawba KC Pump Room (4.85E-06)
Turbine Building (1.09E-06)
McGuire Turbine Building (4.07E-06)
The difference of approximately a factor of 4 between the McGuire.and Catawba "all consuming" Turbine Building fire sequence is mainly from the difference in the random Diesel Generator failure probabilities (start failure and run failure) at the two plants.
The overall fire induced core damage frequency for the two plants for this sensitivity study case is about the same (5.71E-06 at McGuire and 7.27E-06 at Catawba).
With respect to the question on the impact of cables, a brief description of the process used to assess the impact of cable routing in the IPEEE fire walkdowns is presented.
Included in this discussion is a description of the non-safety and the safety cables (4KV -
and control) at the two plants. This re-review confirmed that the fire-induced accident initiators ofconcem due to cable routing have been adequately considered and identified.
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Table II-1: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, McGuire Page 1 of 3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequency D
E DXE lETB Swg. Rooom FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.8E-04 (A,B,C) /
8.71E-07 4.84E-03 Aux. Shutdown FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire 1.8E-04 (A,B) /
5.94E-06 Panel Causes a Loss of RN 3.30E-02 Aux. Feedwater TD FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss 4.28E-04 (A,B,C) /
2.00E-08 Pump Room ofNuclear Service Water 9.21E-03 BARRIER I.0E-02 (A) 5.08E-01 (Next Component )
l Main Feedwater FMFP Main Feed Pump Fire 4.28E-03 (A,B,C) 1.46E-05 i
Pump Area Initiating Event 3.42E-03 Control Room FCR Control Room Fire Causes A 4.28E-03 (A,B) 2.14E-06 Loss of RN 2.49E-03 IIOT SIIORT 0.2
- Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged)
Table II-1: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, McGuire Page 2 of 3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequency D
E DXE Cable Room FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a 1.4E-03 (A,B) 9.36E-06 Loss of Nuclear Service 3.34E-02 Water HOTSHORT 0.2 Vital I & C Area FVIC Vital 1 & C Fire Causes a 1.4E-03 (A.B) 4.42E-04 Loss ofIEDF 3.16E-01 Nuclear Service FRN Fire in RN Pump House 1.4E-03 (A,B,C) 5.72E-08 Water Pump Area Causes a Loss of RN 4.09E-03 BARRIER 1.0E-02 1 A Diesel FDG Fire Causes a Loss of the A 2.57E-02 (A,B) 2.15E-03 Generator Train Diesel 8.38E-02 Main Turbine FACTB All Consuming TB Fire 1.43E-03 (A,B,C)
(8.21E-05)
Initiating Event 5.74E-02 Used I.7E-05 Based on no oCCurences in the data base.
- Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged)
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W W
W W
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M M
M M
M M
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i Table II-1: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, McGuire Page 3 of 3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequency D
E DXE Service Building FSVCBLD Service Building Fire 5.37E-03 (A,B,C) 2.19E-05 G
Initiating Event 4.09E-03 Reactor Trip FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of the 3.68E-04 (A) 1.78E-04 Switchgear Room Reactor Trip Switchgear 4.84E-01 l
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+-Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged)
Table II-2: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, Catawba Page1of3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequency D
E DXE 1ETB Swg. Room FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.84E-04 (A,B,C) / 4.84E-03 8.91E-07 Aux. Shutdown FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire 1.8E-04 (A,B,C) /
1.69E-08 Panel Causes a Loss of KC 1.94E-02 BARRIER 1.0E-02 (A) 4.84E-01 (Next Component)
Control Room FCR Control Room Fire Causes A 4.28E-03 (A,B) 2.14E-06 Loss of KC 2.49E-03 HOT SHORT 0.2 Cable Room FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a 1.4E-03 (A,B) 9.56E-06 Loss of Component Cooling 3.34E-02 Water HOTSHORT 0.2 VitalI & C Area FVIC VitalI & C Fire Causes a 3.68E-04 (A) 1.78E-04 Loss of1EDD 4.84E-01
- Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged)
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M
Table II-2: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, Catawba Page 2 of 3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequency l
D E
DXE Nuclear Service FRN Fire in RN Pump House 1.43E-03 (A,B,C) 1.33E-07 Water Pump Causes a Loss of RN 1.94E-02 Structure BARRIER 1.0E-02 I
(A) 4.84E-01 (Next Component)
Component Cooling FKC KC Pawer Cable Initiating 1.43E-03 (A,B) 4.78E-05 l
Cable Area Event 3.34E-02 1
Diesel Generator FDG Fire Causes a Loss of the A 2.57E-02 (A) 1.55E-02 Train Diesel 6.02E-01 Main Turbine FACTB All Consuming TB Fire 1.43E-03 (A,B,C)
(8.21E-05)
Initiating Event 5.74E-02 Used 1.7E-05 Based on l
no occurences in the data base (see Oconee PRA update document).
'-Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged) 9
= _-
i Table II-2: Derivation of Expanded Base Case Fire Frequencies, Catawba Page 3 of 3 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Base Case Event Base Case Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Tree End State */
Fire Event Value Initiating Event Frequercy D
E DXE Service Building FSVCBLDG Service Building Fire 5.37E-03 (A,B,C) 1.04E-04 Initiating Event 1.94E-02 Reactor Trip FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of the 3.68E-04 (A) 1.78E-04 Switchgear Room Reactor Trip Switchgear 4.84E-01
- -Event Tree End States :
0-No Components Disabled A-First Component Disabled A, B Comp. Plus Adj. Disabled A,B,C - Large Fire (Barrier Challenged)
W W
M M
W W
W W
M M
M M
M m
m ma e
a
Table III-1: Derivation of Sensitivity Study Fire Frequencies, McGuire Page 1 of 2 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Sensitivity Sensitivity Study Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Study Event Fire Initiating Event Tree
- Value Event Frequency D
E DXE 1
l 1ETB Swg. Rooom FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.8E-04 0.209 3.76E-05 Aux. Shutdown FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire 1.8E-04 4.18E-02 7.69E-06 Panel Causes a Loss of RN Aux. Feedwater TD FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss 4.28E-04 2.99E-01 1.28E-06 Pump Room ofNuclear Service Water BARRIER 1.0E-02 Main Feedwater FMFP Main Feed Pump Fire 4.28E-03 1.34E-01 5.73E-04 Pump Area Initiating Event Control Room FCR Control Room Fire Causes A 4.28E-03 3.13E-03 2.68E-06 Loss of RN HOTSHORT 0.2 Cable Room FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a 1.4E-03 4.18E-02 1.17E-05 Loss of Nuclear Service HOT SHORT Water 0.2 Vital I & C Area FVIC Vital 1 & C Fin: Causes a 1.4E-03 4.18E-01 5.85E-04 Loss of1EDF
- See Figures in Appendix 3 l
Table III-1: Derivation of Sensitivity Study Fire Frequencies, McGuire Page 2 of 2 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Sensitivity Sensitivity Study Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Study Event Fire Initiating Event Tree
- Value Event Frequency D
E DXE Nuclear Service FRN Fire in RN Pump House 1.4E-03 3.54E-01 5.06E-06 Water Pump Area Causes a Loss of RN BARRIER 1.0E-02 1 A Diesel FDG Fire Causes a Loss of the A 2.57E-02 4.56E-01 1.17E-02 Generator Train Diesel Main Turbine FACTB All Consuming TB Fire 1.43E-03 7.91E-01 1.13E-03 Initiating Event Service Building FSVCBLD Service Building Fire 5.37E-03 3.54E-01 1.90E-03 G
Initiating Event Reactor Trip FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of the 3.68E-04 4.18E-01 1.54E-04 Switchgear Room Reactor Trip Switchgear i
- - See Figures in Appendix 3 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
Table III-2: Derivation of Sensitivity Study Fire Frequencies, Catawba Page 1 of 2
~
Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Sensitivity Sensitivity Study Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Study Event Fire Initiating Event Tree
- Value Event Frequency D
E DXE 1ETB Swg. Room FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.84E-04 0.21 31/8E-05 Aux. Shutdown FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire 1.8E-04 4.18E-01 7.69E-07 Panel Causes a Loss ofKC BARRIER 1.0E-02 Control Room FCR Control Room Fire Causes A 4.28E-03 3.13E-03 2.68E-06 Loss of KC HOT SIIORT 0.2 Cable Room FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a 1.4E-03 4.18E-02 1.19E-05 Loss of Component Cooling HOTSh0RT Water 0.2 Vital I & C Area FVIC VitalI & C Fire Causes a 3.68E-04 4.18E-01 1.54E-04 l
Loss of1EDD Nuclear Service FRN Fire in RN Pump IIouse 1.43E-03 4.18E-01 5.98E-06 Water Pump Causes a Loss of RN BARRIER Structure 1.0E-02 Component Cooling FKC KC Power Cable Initiating 1.43E-03 4.18E-02 5.98E-05 Cable Area Event
- - See Figures in Appendix 3 9
Table III-2: Derivation of Sensitivity Study Fire Frequencies, Catawba Page 2 of 2 Fire Area Fire Description of Fire Ignition Sensitivity Sensitivity Study Description Initiating Initiating Event Frequency Study Event Fire Initiating Event Tree
- Value Event Frequency D
E DXE Diesel Generator FOG Fire Causes a Loss of the A 2.57E-02 4.56E-01 1.17E-02 Train Diesel Main Turbine FACTB All Consuming TB Fire 1.43E-03 7.91E-01 1.13E-03 Initiating Event Service Building FSVCBLDG Service Building Fire 5.37E-03 3.54E-01 1.90E-03 Initiating Event Reactor Trip FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of the 3.68E-04 4.18E-01 1.54E-04 Switchgear Room Reactor Trip Switchgear
- - See Figures in Appendix 3 W
M M
M M
W W
W W
M M
M M
m mm m
m M
ww w
Table III-3: McGuire Fire IPEEE Review Page l'of 2 PRA Review Results l
Fire Fire Initiating Event Frequency Corresponding InternalInitiator Frequency of Expanded Sensitivity Initiating Description ofFire Internal Description Corresponding Base Case Study Event Initiating Initiating Event Internal Fire CDF Fire CDF Event Initiator FETB ETB Fire Initiating 8.71E-07 Til Loss of 0perating 8.0E-03
<1E-08 1.55E-08 Event 4160 V Bus FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes 2.0E-08 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 a Loss ofNuclear Service Water Service Water FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel 5.94E-06 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03
<l.0E-08 1.75E-07 Fire Causes a Loss of Service Water Nuclear Service Water FRN RN Area Fire Causes a 5.72E-08 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03
<l.0E-08 1.31E-08 Loss ofNuclear Service Water Service Water FCR Control Room Fire 2.14E-06 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 Causes A Loss of Service Water Nuclear Service Water
Table III-3: McGuire Fire IPEEE Review Page 2 of 2 PRA Review Results Fire Fire Initiating Event Frequency Corresponding InternalInitiator Frequency of Expanded Sensitivity Initiating Description of Fire Internal Description Corresponding Base Case Study Event Initiating Initiating Event Internal Fire CDF Fire CDF Event Initiator FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of 1.78E-04 Tl Plant Trip 2E+00
<l.0E-08
<1.0E-08 the Reactor Trip Switchgear FCBLR Cable Room Fire 9.36E-06 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03 1.16E-08 1.46E-08 Causes a Loss of Service Water Nuclear Service Water FVIC VitalI & C Fire 4.42E-04 T9 Loss ofNuclear 3.0E-03 6.47E-07 9.14E-07 Causes a Loss of Service Water Nuclear Service Water FDG Fire in the l A Diesel 2.15E-03 Tl with a Loss Plant Trip with a Loss TI-2.0E+00
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 Initiating Event ofDiesel ofDiesel LODG ~ 0.4 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump 1.46E-05 T3 Loss of Offsite Power 7.0E-02
<l.0E-08 4.85E-07 Fire FACTB All Consuming TB 1.7E-05 T3 Loss of Offsite Power 7.0E-02 5.11E-08 4.07E-06 1
Fire Initiating Event FSVCBLD Service Building Fire 2.19E-05 T12 Loss ofInstrument Air 3.0E-01
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 Initiating Event Totals 6.74E-07 5.71E-06 W
M M
M M
W W
W W
W W
W M
M M
M W
W W
Table III-4: Catawba Fire IPEEE Review Page 1 of 2 PRA Review Results Fire Fire Initiating Event Frequency Corresponding InternalInitiator Frequency of Expanded Sensitivity Initiating Description ofFire Internal Description Corresponding Base Case Study Event Initiating Initiating Event Internal Fire CDF Fire CDF Event Initiator FETB ETB Fire Initiating 8.91E-07 Tl1 Loss of Operating 2.0E-03 2.21E-08 9.38E-07 Event 4160 V Bus j
FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel 1.69E-08 T10 Loss of Component 2.2E-04
<l.0E-08 4.21 E-08 i
Fire Causes a Loss of Cooling Water KC l
FCR Control Room Fire 2.14E-06 T10 Loss of Component 2.2E-04 1.52E-07 1.72E-07 Causes A Loss of KC Cooling Water FRTSWG Fire Causes a Loss of 1.78E-04 Tl Plant Trip 2.8E+00
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 4
the Reactor Trip Switchgear l
FCBLR Cable Room Fire 9.56E-06 T10 Loss ofComponent 2.2E-04 6.96E-07 8.86E-07 Causes a Loss of Cooling Water Component Cooling I
Water FVIC Vital I & C Fire 1.78E-04 T14 Loss of Vital 5.0E-02
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 Causes a Loss of Instrumentation and 1EDD Control
Table III-4: Catawba Fire IPEEE Review Page 2 of 2 PRA Review Results Fire Fire Initiating Event Frequency Corresponding InternalInitiator Frequency of Expanded Sensitivity Initiating Description of Fire Internal Description Corresponding Base Case Study Event Initiating Initiating Event Internal Fire CDF Fire CDF Event Initiator FRN Fire in RN Pump 1.33E-07 T9 Loss of Nuclear 1.8E-04
<l.0E-08 3.06E-07 Ilouse Causes a Loss Service Water ofRN FKC KC Power Cable 4.78E-05 T10 Loss of Component 2.2E-04 3.74E-06 4.85E-06 Initiating Event Cooling Water (KC)
FDG Fire Causes a Loss of 1.55E-02 N/A (Loss of N/A LODG ~ 0.25
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 the A Train Diesel Diesel)
FACTB All Consuming TB 1.7E-05 T3 Loss of Offsite Power 3.5E-02 1.52E-08 1.09E-06 Fire Initiating Event FSVCBLD Service Building Fire 1.04E-04 T12 Loss ofInstrument Air 1.0E-01
<l.0E-08
<l.0E-08 Initiating Event Totals 4.57E-06 7.27E-06 W
W M
M M
M M
M M
W W
W W
W W
W W
W W
APPENDIX 1 EVENT TREE MODELS l
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CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Late Late Late Late Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Propagation Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 D2 S2 P2 S3 8.21E-01 0
3.48E-02 A
7.45E43 A,B 8.80E42 s'2 83 S1 00E42 4.36E44 A,B 46 3.56E42 A
p, 1.0 7.13E-02 A
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9.00E-14 AB p2 10 1.00E42 A
p3 McGuire Feed Water Pump Fire Event Tree
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SEQ. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Late Late Late Late Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Propagation Suppression IGN D1 St P1 D2 S2 P2 S3 9.41E-01 0
4.65E-04 A
8.39E-05 AB 10 8' 1
^' '
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1.60E44 A
2.88E45 A,B 10 80 3.20E46 A,B,C 33 p[
6.08E-04 A,B 5.60E49 A,B,C 1.00E-02 1.00E44 pf 7.44E-08 A,B pf 9.20E-03 A
s Catawba Control Room Fire Event Tree
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CLASS Ignition Early Early Propegation Late Late Late Late Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Propagation Suppression IGN D1 St P1 D2 S2 P2 S3 1.80E-01 0
6.77E-03 A
1.22E-03 A,B 63
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1.0 1.52E-03 A
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Catawba Cable Room Fire Event Tree
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i SEQ. PROB.
CLASS ignition Early Early Propagation Late Late Late Late Detection Suppression Detection Suppression Propagation Suppression IGN DI St P1 D2 S2 P2 S3 2.66E41 0
1.12E-01 A
1.26E42 A,B 10 20 1.40E-03 A.B.C jg 33 St 1.40E42 A,B P2 45 pj 1.14E-01 A
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A pg Catawba DG Fire Event Tree
.\\ ETA 2;CDG.TRE 7-22-96
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APPENDIX 2 l
l EXPANDED BASE CASE SEQUENCES I
I I
I I
I I
E E
E
~
U M i
mumm nuy-Table 1: McGuire IETB Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.44E-10 8.71E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event i
2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train I A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 8.71E-11 8.7IE-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Eve-nt 1.00E-03 WRNPBFSDHE Operator Fails to Start RN Pump 1A 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection y
1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 2.72E-11 8.71E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liqirid 1
2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train I A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 2.42E-11 8.71E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Resent After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train 1 A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 5.52E-02 FCA0TDPTPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient Total:
<l.0E-08
m Table 2: McGuire TDP Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.00E-11 2.00E-08 FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 2.52E-12 2.00E-08 FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire s
's 1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 1.24E-12 2.00E-08 FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 1.12E-12 2.00E-08 FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total:
<l.0E-08 c'
Table 3: McGuire ASP Fire Sequ:nces Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 5.94E-09 5.94E-06 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 7.48E-10 5.94E-06 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore 1 fain Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire S
1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 3.68E-10 5.94E-06 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear S,ervice Witer 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 3.31E-10 5.94E-06 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total:
<1.0E-08 l
.. ~
Table 4: McGuire Nuclear Service Water Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.14E-10 5.72E-08 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.44E-11 5.72E-08 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip
~
1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient
.i 1.40E-02 FCA0TDNPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 7.09E-12 5.72E-08 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water l.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backtp to RN 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 6.38E'-12 5.72E-08 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss cf Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 6.20E-03 FCA0TDNPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total:
<l.0E-08
w --
Table 5: McGuire Control Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.14E-09 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 2.70E-10 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-D1 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing i-1.33E-10 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 1.19E-10 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Yrip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start
Table 6: McGuire Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.98E-12 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Fire Causes Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear 1.40E-06 WRNABPRCOM Common Cause Run Failure of Both RN Pumps 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 2.85E-15 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Fire Causes Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 1.78E-04 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip S
1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failum of CA Assured Sources i
1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotgell 3.20E-13 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Fire Cau.e:: Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 7.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-02 TFBLD01DHE Operators Fail To Establish Feed-and-Bleed Cooling 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell Total:
<l.0E-08 6
\\
u
~
Table 7: McGuire Cable Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 9.36E-09 9.36E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA)
'I.18E-09 9.36E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 5-1.40E-02 FCA0TDITPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing i
~
5.80E-10 9.36E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service yater 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 5.22E-10 9.36E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDITPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start
. Total:
1.16E-08
Table 8: McGuire Vital I and C Fire Sequences Page1of3 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.42E-07 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 5.57E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fim Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Contml During a Fire 1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 2.74E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 2.47E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failum to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start h
M M
W M
M M
M' W
W W
W M M M
M M
M W
Table 8: McGuire Vital I and C Fire Sequences Page 2 of 3 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.20E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failum to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fim 5.52E-03 FCA0TDFTPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.99E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 9.00E-03 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown System Flow Components in Maintenance 1.19E-08 4.42E-04 FVic Vital I & C Fim Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water l
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 3.00E-03 FCA0TDPLHE Latent Human Error Fails CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train 1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0433VVT Manual Valve INV433 Transfers Closed l
l l
l
i i
Table 8: McGuire Vital I and C Fire Sequences Pago 3 of 3 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDRUC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0437ViT Manual Valve INV437 Transfers Closed 1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fim 4.87E-03 NNV0435VVT Manual Valve INV435 Transfers Closed i
1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0446VVT Manual Valve INV446 Transfers Closed Total:
6.47E-07 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
w -- --
Tcbla 9: McGuire DG Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.15E-09 2.15E-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiating Event l.00E-03 PACBOFIDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 5.00E-02 ACO2DGSREC Off-site Power Not Restored Prior to Seal LOCA CM - 2S 5.12E-10 2.15H-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiating Event 1.00E-63 PACBOFFDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run i
7.00E-03 AC01DGRREC Off-site Power Not Restored Prior to Seal LOCA CM - IS, IR 3.01E-10 2.15E-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiating Event 1.00E-03 PACBOFTDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 7.00E-03 AC01DGRREC Off-site Power Not Restored Prior to Seal LOCA CM - IS, IR Total:
<l.0E-08
Table 10: McGuire Main Feedwater Pump Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.97E-09 1.46E-05 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event.
2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.34E-09 1.46E-05 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVESFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 W J.x w R H E Faibr e to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 l.38E-09 1.46E-05 FMSP Wu Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event l.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM C%nmon Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 1.70E-01 NEEdX3S3R SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 P O C " D. Z '1 Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.21E-09 1.46E-05 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 5.20E-02 NSSF0DGTRM SSF Diesel Generator Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Test 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
~ Total:
<l.0E-08
W mW W
mW M'W Table 11: McGuire All-Consuming Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.72E-08 1.70E-05 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 9.45E-09 1.70E-05 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failum of Emergency Diesels to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 8.57E-09 1.70E 05 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Resent After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.93E-09 1.70E-05 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator l A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Cenect Offsite Power From Unit 2 Total:
5.llE-08
Table 12: McGuire Service Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.24E-11 2.19E-05 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train IB Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 2.64E-04 WRN001AWPR RN Pump 1 A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.00E00 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN (RV is in the SVCBLDG) 9.86E-12 2.19E-05 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 RVIBACKDHE Operators Fail to Align Backup Nitrogen to PORVs s*
1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources i
1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell
~.
1.97E-12 2.19E-05 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell 1.97E-12 2.19E-05 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 1.00E-02 TFBLD01DHE Operators Fail To Establish Feed-and-Bleed Cooling 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell Total:
<l.0E-08 h
W W
M M
m M
W mM M
M M
M M
M M
M m
.~
Table 13: McGuire Fire Sequence Total (Sequences >E-08)
Page 1 of 3 Sequence Event Event-Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.42E-07 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 5.57E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire
.i.
1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing
.a
^
2.72E-08 1.70E-05 FACrB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator IA Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDOR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.74E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Contml During a Fire l.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection
Table 13: McGuire Fire Sequence Total (Sequences >E-08)
Page 2 of 3 l
l Sequence Event Event Event l
Probability Probability Name Description 2.47E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Servic'e Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 2.20E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip
,S 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 5.52E-03 FCA0TDPTPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run i
1.99E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Wa'ter 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 9.00E-03 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown System Flow Components in Maintenance 1.19E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 3.00E-03 FCA0TDPLHE Latent Human Error Fails CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train 1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN M
m W
m W
m M
M M
M mm m
mm a
m m
m
u --
v Table 13: McGuire Fire Sequence Total (Sequences >E-08)
Page 3 of 3 I
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description l
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire l
4.87E-03 NNV0433VVT Manual Valve INV433 Transfers Closed J.08E-08 4.42F-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0437VVT Manual Valve INV437 Transfers Closed 1.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water S
1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN i
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0435VVT Manual Valve INV435 Transfers Closed l.08E-08 4.42E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0446VVT Manual Valve INV446 Transfers Closed Total:
6.74E-07
n Table 1: Catawba 1ETB Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Pr,obability Probability Name Description 1.51E-08 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event l.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.28E-09 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 4.80E-03 KKC001BTRM KC Train I A in Maintenance (no affect on RN) 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 2.67E-09 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-03 KKC001BLHE Latent Human Error on KC Train 1 A a
1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection
~
2.45E-11 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 8.18E-12 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.20E-02 FCA0TDPTPS CA TDP Fails to Start Total 2.21E-08 E
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
m mM m
e a
ee
Tcbla 2: C:.tawba Aux Shutdown Pcn:1 Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 5.07E-10
. l.69E-08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC
^
3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 4.39E-10 1.69E-08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 6.76E-11 1.69E-08, FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve 1NV865 Fails to Open 3
6.76E-11 1.69E-08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2
4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 5.07E-11 1.69E-08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-03 NSS0SSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 3.82E-11 1.69E-08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.26E-03
. NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 3.21E-11 1.69E 08 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand Total
<1.0E-08
Table 3: Catawba Control Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 6.42E-08 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 5.56E-08 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 8.56E-09 2.14E-06,
FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open i
8.56E-09 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open t
6.42E-09 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 4.84E-09 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 4.07E-09 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand Total 1.52E-07
Table 4: Catawba Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description l
l l
3.20E-12 1.78E-04 FRTSWO Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip 1.80E-06 WRNABPRCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Pump to Run 1.00E-02 NNVSSFADHE Operator Fails to Start SMP in Time to Prevent Seal LOCA (Po l
2.40E-12 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip j
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip l
1.00E-02 TFBLD01DHE Operators Fail to Establish Feed and Bleed Cooling l
1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Sources Due to Clams l
3.00E-03 FCAORNOLHE Latent Human Error Causes Swap to Assured Suction Source s
j 2.40E-12 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip l
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip l
1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation l
1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Sources Due to Clams l
3.00E-03 FCA0RNOLHE Latent Human Error Causes Swap to Assured Suction Source l
2.40E-12 1.78E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip
)
4.50E-07 KKCPABR.COM Common Cause Failure of KC Pumps to Run l
3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDIIE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1 Total
<1.0E-08 l
Table 5: Catawba Cable Room Fire Sequences Page 1 of 2 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.87E-07 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a1.oss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 2.49E-07 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFFRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 3.82E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Lors of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open 5
3.82E-08 9.56E-Co FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 2.87E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 2.16E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 1.82E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
Table 5: Catawba Cable Room Fire Sequences Page 2 of 2 1
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.55E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDIYrPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run Total 6.96E-07 5
f 4
e 0
9 a
m.
Table 6: Catawba Vital I and C Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.28E-10 1.78E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Area Fire Causes Loss of IEDD 2.40E-05 KKC001AHXF KC Hx 1 A Fails to Function 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Statt SSF (Loss of KC) 1.11E-10 1.78E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Area Fire Causes Loss of 1EDD 2.40E-05 KKC001AHXF KC Hx 1 A Fails to Function 2.60E-0.2 NNVOSSFIRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance Total
<1.0E-08 e,
3 e
b b
e l
M M
M M
M M
W-Tablo 7: Catawba RN Pump House Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.46E-09 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 1.33E-09 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 1.00E-02 NNVSSFADHE Operator Fails to Start SMP in Time to Prevent Seal LOCA 5.32E-10 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 4.00E-03, NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open S
5.32E-10 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN a
4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open 3.99E-10 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 3.01E-10 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLP Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 2.53E-10 1.33E-07 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand Total
<1.0E-08
Table 8: Catawba KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Page 1 of 3 l
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.43E-06 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1.24E-06 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 1.91E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open 1.91E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open s
1,.43E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 1.08E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 9.08E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire InLiating Event 1.90E-03 NNV0SMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand 7
7.74E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run E
E E
E E
E E
E M
M E
W M
M g
3 m
g g
u-
~
Table 8: Catawba KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Page 2 of 3 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.10E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0877MVT Motor Operated Valve 1NV877 Transfers Position 4.10E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0876MVT Motor-Operated Valve INV876 Transfers Position 2'.87E-08 4.78E d5 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-04 NNVOSMPDPR SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Run
- ,s 2.70E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Inidating Event 5.64E-04 NACGF4FCLT 600 V ac Breaker SMXG-F4F (SSF SMUP) Transfers Qpen 2.58E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.20E-02 FCA0TDITPS CA TDP Fails to Start 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0884KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV884 Transfers Position 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0885KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV885 Transfers Position
.n Table 8: Catawba KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Page 3 of 3 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Desedption 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0883KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV883 Transfers Position 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable FireInitiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0882KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV882 Transfers Position Total 3.74E-06 g
i e
.A Table 9: Catawba Diesel Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.07E-11 7.67E-03 TIDEX ReactorTrip in a 24 Hour Period l.00E-03 PACBOFFDEX Blackout Following Trip 3.00E-03 KKC001BLHE Latent Human Error on KC Train IB 1.55E-02 FDG Fire Causes a Loss of the A Train Diesel 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC)
Total
<1.0E-08
'A 1
e e
e
Table 10: Catawba Turbine Building Fire Sequences Seqs ace Event Event Event Probasility Probability Name Description 8.23E-09 1.70E-05 FACTB All Consuming TB Fim Initiating Even:
1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 1.10E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.22E-09 1.70E-05 FAGB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 4.30E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A In Meintenance Or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failum to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.22E-09 1.70E-05 FAGB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 4.30E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB In Maintenance Or Testing 1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fim Event Fails SSF Seal Injection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.24E-10 1.70E-05 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 7.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails To Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 Total 1.52E-08 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
e m
u---
Table 11: Catawba Service Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 7.28E-11 1.04E-04 FSVCBLDG Service Building Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 7.00E-03 RNCOSRVRVC SRV Fails to Rescat on a Transient 1.00E-02 TNCQST2DEX SRV Opens on T2,T3,T4,T7,T12, PACBOFTDEX When PORVS Are Closed 1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation Total
<1.0E-08 9
J n.
g 3
e w
0
Table 12: Catawba Fire Sequences Page 1 of 4 All Sequences >E-08 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description l.43E-06 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1.24E-06 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 2.87E-07 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 2.49E-07 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 1.91E 07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open 1.91E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 1.43E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 1.08E-07 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
m m
m e
a m
m
~.
Table 12: Catawba Fire Sequences Page 2 of 4 All Sequences >E-08 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 9.08E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand 7.74E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat Alter Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCN)0lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 6.42E-08 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 5.56E-08 2.14E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss af KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 4.10E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0877MVT Motor Operated Valve INV877 Transfers Position 4.10E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0876MVT Motor-Operated Valve INV876 Transfers Position 3.82E-08 9.56E-M FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open
Table 12: Catawba Fire Sequences Page 3 of 4 All Sequences >E-08 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.82E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 2.87E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 2.87E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-04 NNVOSMPDPR SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Run 2.70E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event i
5.64E-04 NACGF4FCLT 600 V ac Bmaker SMXG-F4F (SSF SMUP) Transfers Open l
2.58E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event i
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid l
5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip l
1.20E-02 FCA0TDPTPS CA TDP Fails to Start 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0884KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV884 Transfers Position 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0885KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV885 Transfers Position 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0883KVT Kerotest Mamial Valve INV883 Transfers Position M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
. Tabla 12: Catawba Fire Sequ:nces Page 4 ef 4 All Sequences >E-08 Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Namie Description 2.33E-08 4.78E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0882KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV882 Transfers Position 2.16E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 1.82E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand 1.55E-08 9.56E-06 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF0001 REC Failum to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.51E-08 8.91E-07 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection Total 4.57E-06
APPENDIX 3 TRIINCATED EVENT TREE MODELS USED FOR SENSITIVITY STUDIES i
a
-ua--_-a_ya_._m-.-_s%.e-wm a.w pa44m...mga.um-mmm.am,&as, as m_,a.ma-4.
A h,m%d wd.Jp Am % A h,4h A.m A..e.N
'M~
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l I
l 1
1 a
J l
l' I
I; i
l I
I i
i I
i I
I I
I I
I
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 1.80E-01 0
1.69E-01 A,B
.80 1.0 S1
.76 5.51 E-01 A
IGN P1 4.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1
.60 6.00E-02 A
pj l
l l
McGuire ETB Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\M1 ETB_S.TRE 7-22-96 l
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 5.08E-01 0
2.27E-01 A,B
.45 S1
.45 1.0 1.85E-01 A
P1 IGN 7.20E-02 A,B 8.00E-02 D1
.10 8.00E-03 A
p1 McGuire TD Pump Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MTDP_S.TRE 7-22-96
' us sum 85 5 EMB 8 55 Eum EEE EMI mus em sur sus aim sui muu aus em sum aus s
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 1.80E-01 0
3.38E-02 A,B
.80 1.0 S1
.95 6.86E-01 A
IGN P1 8.00E-03 A,B
.10 p')
9.20E-02 A
McGuire ASP Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MASP_S.TRE 7-22-96
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 3.17E-01 0
2.74E-01 A,B
.65 S1
.53 1.0 3.09E-01 A
P1 IGN 8.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1
.20 2.00E-02 A
p1 McGuire RN Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MRN_S.TRE 7-22-96 mm um sus e
e e
usa em e
e en ge e
sus en amm aus aus e
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression l
IGN D1 S1 P1 9.41 E-01 0
5.00E-02 2.33E-03 A,8 1.0 S1
.95 4.72E-02 A
IGN P1 1.00E-02 8.00E-04 A,B D1
'92 9.20E-03 A
P1 McGuire Control Room Fire Sensitivity Study
.\\ ETA 2\\MFCR_S.TRE 7-22-96
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 1.80E-01 0
3.38E-01 A,B
.80 S1
.53 1.0 3.82E-01 A
P1 IGN 8.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1
.20 2.00E-02 A
pj McGuire RT Switch Gear Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MRTSWG_S.TRE 7-22-96 l
M M
m m
M M
M M
M m
m m
e e
e e
e e
m
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 1.80E-01 0
3.38E-02 A,B
.80 p')
6.86E-01 A
8.00E-03 A,B l
.10 D1
.92 9.20E-02 A
p5 I
1 l
McGuire Cable Room Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MCBLR_S.TRE 7-22-96
SEO. PROB.
CLASS l
Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 1.80E-01 0
3.38E-01 A,B i
.80 S1
.53 1.0 3.82E-01 A
P1 IGN 8.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1
.20 2.00E-02 A
pj McGuire Vital I & C Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MVIC_S.TRE 7-22-96
11Il l
1 1
1 l
i i
ll SS 69 A
L B,
B, 2
C 0
A A
A A
2
-7 BO 1
1 1
1 2
R 0
0 0
0 0
E P.
E E
E E
E R
O 5
8 7
8 0
T.
E 7
6 3
8 2
S_
S 3
1 1
2 3
G D
M
\\
n 2
o A
i T
ta E
g 1
a P
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po rP 5
4 1
1 P
P n
e o
e is r
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lr e 1
ar S
y Ep d
p u
u t
S S
54 y
1 t
S iv i
t isne S
no yi e
t r
lr c 1
i ae D
F Et e G
D D
2 e
3 1
r D
iuGc M
no N
i t
G in I
g I
0 N G
1 I
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 8.21 E-01 0
4.36E-02 A,B 8.80E-02 1.0 S1
.45 3.56E-02 A
IGN P1 9.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1 1.00E-02 A
P1 McGuire Feed Pump Fire Sensitivity Study
.\\ ETA 2\\MFDWP_S.TRE 7-22-96 IEE MER mm M
WEB m
m em num sus e
e e
en e
em um e
m
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 7.04E-02 0
7.13E-02 A,B
.65 0
S1
.45 5.83E-02 A
pj 7.20E-01 A,B t.80 8.00E-02 A
i P1 1
I McGuire Turbine Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
.\\ ETA 2\\MTURB_S.TRE 7-22-96 2
s
l i
SEO. PROB.
CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression
]
i IGN D1 S1 P1 3.17E-01 0
2.74E-01 A,B
.65 8I 3.09E-01 A
l P1 8.00E-02 A,B
.10 D1
.20 2.00E-02 A
p1 McGuire Service Building Fire Sensitivity Study
.\\ ETA 2\\MSVBLD_S.TRE 7-22-96
SS 69 A
L B,
B, 2
C 0
A A
A A
2-7 BO 1
1 1
2 2
R 0
0 0
0 0
E P.
E E
E E
E R
Q 0
9 1
0 0
E 8
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CLASS Ignition Early Early Propagation Detection Suppression IGN D1 S1 P1 7.04E-02 0
7.13E-02 A,B
.65 S1
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IGN 7.20E-01 A,B
.80 D1 8.00E-02 A
P1 Catawba Turbine Fire Sensitivity Study Tree
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APPENDIX 4 SENSITIVITY STUDY SEQUENCES l
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McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 1: 1ETB Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description-1.05E-08 3.76E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train I A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 3.76E-09 3.76E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.00E:03 WRNPBFSDHE Operator Fails to Start RN Pump 1 A 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection S
1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN i
1.05E-09 3.76E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liqbid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train 1 A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 5.52E-02 FCAGTDPTPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.17E-10 3.76E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Resent After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train I A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 6.20E-03 FCA0TDI'rPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit I During Transient Total 1.55E-08 E
E E
E M
M M
M M
M M
mammg g
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McGuire Fire IPEEE Senritivity Study Table 2: TDP Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.28E-09 1.28E-06 FFDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.61E-10 1.28E-06 FFDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-D1 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 3
7.94E-11 1.28E-06 FFDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 7.14E-11 1.28E-06 FTDP TDP/ ASP Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total
<1.0E-08
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 3: ASP Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Propability Probability Name Description t
IA,lE-07 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 11/3E-08 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water i;
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid f
2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip
~
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire
,'s 1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing i
8.7 lE-09 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 7.87E-09 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fim Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total 1.75E-07 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M W
W m
m m
m
McGuire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 4: McGuire Nuclear Service Water Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.01E-08 5.06E-06 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.28E-09 5.06E-06 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E 01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient
,S 1.40E-02 FCA0TDirrPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing A
6.27E-10 5.06E-06 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 5.65E-10 5.06E-06 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total 1.31E-08
m McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 5: Control Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.86E-09 2.86E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 3.60E-10 2.86E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire
,S 1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 1.77E-10 2.86E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water l.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 1.60E-10 2.86E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total
<l.0E-08 W
W W
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
W W
W W
W W
McGuire IPEEE Fire Sensitivity Study Table 6: Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.31E-12 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Fire Causes Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear 1.40E-06 WRNABPRCOM
- Common Cause Run Failure of Both RN Pumps 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time _(SSFA) 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 2.77E-13 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Fire Causes Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear
^
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip s
i 1.00E-02 TFBLD01DHE Operators Fail To Establish Feed-and-Bleed Cooling a
1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotw> ell 2.13E-15 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Fire Causes Loss of Reactor Trip Switchgear 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 1.54E-04 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE
' Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell Total
<l.0E-08
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McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 7: Cable Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.17E-08 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.47E-09 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire
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1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 1
7.25E-10 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service yater 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 6.53E-10 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLOREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start Total 1.46E-03 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
l h
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of 4 Table 8: VitalI and C Fire Sequences l
i Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Namie Description 5.85E-07 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN l
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire
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2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operatum fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 7.37E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip i
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire I
1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 3.63E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 3.26E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 7
2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDirFPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start i
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McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 4 Table 8: Vital I and C Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.91E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 5.52E-03 FCA0TDPTPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run 2.63E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fim Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 9.00E-03 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown System Flow Components in Maintenance 1.58E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 3.00E-03 FCA0TDPLHE Latent Human Error Fails CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0433VVT Manual Valve INV433 Transfers Closed M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 4 t
Table 8: VitalI and C Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0437VVT Manual Valve INV437 Transfers Closed 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0435VVT Manual Valve INV435 Transfers Closed 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0446VVT Manual Valve INV446 Transfers Closed 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV0849MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV849A,C Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV1013MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV1013 Fails to Open
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 4 of 4 Table 8: Vital I and C Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN i
5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4
4.00E-03 NVWODM2 DMO Damper DM-2 Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV0842MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV842 Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NVWODM1 DMO Damper DM-1 Fails to Open Total 9.14E-07 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M
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McGuire Fire IPEEE Sendtivity Study Table 9: DG Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.72E-09
_ l.72E-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiating Event 1.00E-03 PACBOFIDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 5.00E-02 ACO2DGSREC Off-site Power Not Restomd Prior to Seal LOCA CM - 2S i
4.09E-10 1.72E-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiatirig Event 1.00E-03 PACBOFTDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run S
1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 7.00E-03 AC01DGRREC Off-site Power Not Restored Prior to Seal LOCA CM - IS,1R i
2.41E-10 1.72E-03 FDG Fire in the 1 A Diesel Initiating Event l.00E-03 PACBOFFDEX Blackout Following Trip 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 7.00E-03 AC01DGRREC Off-site Power Not Restored Prior to Seal LOCA CM - IS,1R Total
<l.0E-08
m McGuiro Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of 3 Table 10: Main Feedwater Pump Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.46E-07 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event -
2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 8.59E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1
2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3
5.08E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event l.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 4.47E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 5.20E-02 NSSF0DGTRM SSF Diesel Generator Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Test 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.18E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator 1 A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 m
W W
W W
W W
W m
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sendtivity Study Page 2 of 3 Table 10: Main Feedwater Pump Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.18E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fim Initiating Event,
2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator IA Fails to Run-4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.99E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event l
1.39E-02 JDGI ARNCOM -
Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 s
l.87E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR-Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.87E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.55E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 5.20E-02 NSSF0DGTRM SSF Diesel Generator Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Test 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
.. ~. -. - -...
m L
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 3 Table 10: Main Feedwater Pump Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.08E-08 537E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event.
9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator IA Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.40E-02 FCA0TDIYrPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 Total 4.85E-07 N
5
[
1 b
4
m_
c1 e
r, w
e r
r,___r, McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1of4 Table 11: All-Consuming Turbine Building Fire Sequences
-Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Namie Description 1.81E-06 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 6.28E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Emergency Diesels to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.70E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator IA Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.40E-02 FCA0TDirrPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.94E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 4 Table 11: All-Consuming Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.94E-07 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power Fmm Unit 2 5.42E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDGt DI ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 6.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generator IB Fails to Start i
1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.42E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails to Start 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF Seal Injection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 4.43E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train IB Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 1.40E-03 WRN001AWPS RN Pump 1 A Fails to Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M W
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 4 Table 11: All-Consuming Turbine Building Fim Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.62E-08 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 JVDDSFDDMO Damper 1-DSF ID Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.0CE-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.62E-08 1.i3E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-Oi JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 JRN171AMVO Motor-Operated Valve RN171 A Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.62E-08 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 WRN152BMVO Motor-Operated Valve RN152B Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 4 of 4 Table 11: All-Consuming Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.01E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 6.20E-03 FCA0TDPTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 Total 4.07E-06 l
1 m
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
~
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 12: Service Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.81E-09 1.90E-03 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train IB Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 2.64E-04 WRN001AWPR RN Pump 1 A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.00E00 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN (RV is in the SVCBLDG) 8.55E-10 1.90E-03 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 RVIBACKDHE Operators Fail to Align Backup Nitrogen to PORVs e,
1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1
1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell 1.71E-10 1.90E-03 FSVCBLD Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 1.00E-02 TRECIRCOHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressum Recirculation 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of CA Assured Sources 1.00E-03 FCAHOTWDHE Failure to Throttle During CA Suction From the Hotwell Total
<l.0E-08
l McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of11 Table 13: Study Totds (Sequences >E-08)
Seqv m -
Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.81E-06 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 6.28E-07 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Emergency Diesels to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.85E-07 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 5.70E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00EcDI JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.40E-02 FCA0TDPTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
r, r,
e c,
c, e-,
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.94E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event i
4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.94E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.46E-07 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.4 IE-07 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA)
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 8.59E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 7.37E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 5.85E-08 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC OperMors Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failere to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 5.42E-08 1.13E-03 FACTD All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 6.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generator IB Fails to Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sentitivity Study Page 4 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08) j Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 5.42E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails to Start 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 5.08E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failum to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 4.47E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 5.20E-02 NSSF0DGTRM SSF Diesel Generator Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Test 4.00E-02 POPXCONRIIE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 4.43E-08 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train IB Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 1.40E-03 WRN001AWPS RN Pump I A Fails to Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power Fru n Unit 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _
(
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 5 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Seq. _ aces >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.63E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fim Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.24E-02 NNVRCPSLHE Latent Human Error Fails Reactor Coolant Pump Injection 3.62E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 JVDDSFDDMO Damper 1-DSF ID Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.62E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 JRN171AMVO Motor-Operated Valve RN171 A Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cmss Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.62E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-03 WRN152BMVO Motor-Operated Valve RN152B Fails to Open 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF Seal Injection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failum to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sennitivity Study Page 6 cf11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.26E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 6.20E-03 FCA0TDFTPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 3.18E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator 1 A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.18E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator 1 A Fails to Run 4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator 1B in Maintenance or Testing 1.70E-01 NSS00DGSDR SSF Diesel Generator Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.99E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 7 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.91 E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Reseat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failum to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 5.52E-03 FCA0TDI'TPR CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Run 2.63E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 9.00E-03 NNVOSSFFRM Standby Shutdown System Flow Components in Maintenance 1.87E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 4.36E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A in Maintenance or Testing 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.87E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.36E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator 1B in Maintenance or Testing 1.00E-01 NNVSSFBDHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFB) 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M
v s
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 8cf11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event
- Probability Probability Name Description 1.78E-08 1.41E-04 FASP Aux. Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failn:e iv Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 1.40E-02 FCA0TDNPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 1.58E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 3.00E-03 FCA0TDPLHE Latent Human Error Fails CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train 1.55E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 1.39E-02 JDGIARNCOM Common Cause Failure of Diesel Generators to Run 5.20E-02 NSSF0DOTRM SSF Diesel Generator Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Test 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0433VVT Manual Valve INV433 Transfers Closed
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 9 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0437VVT Manual Valve INV437 Transfers Closed 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0435VVT Manual Valve INV435 Transfers Closed 1.42E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.87E-03 NNV0446VVT Manual Valve INV446 Transfers Closed 1.17E-08 1.17E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA) 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV0849MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV849A,C Fails to Open M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M
i rI r,
rt ro r
mumu mums imms umm-McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 10 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV1013MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV1013 Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 or Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NVWODM2 DMO Damper DM-2 Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 er Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NNV0842MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV842 Fails to Open 1.17E-08 5.85E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 5.00E-02 FIRFLDREC Failure to Use Unit 2 e-Local Control During a Fire 4.00E-03 NVWODM1 DMO Damper DM-1 Fails to Open 1.01E-08 5.06E-06 FRN RN Area Fire Causes a Loss of Nuclear Service Water 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 2.00E-01 NNVSSFADHE Operators Fail to Initiate SSS Operation in Time (SSFA)
I l
McGuire Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 11 of11 Table 13: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.01 E-08 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming Turbine Building Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator l A Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator iB Fails to Run 6.20E-03 FCA0TDI'TPS CA Turbine-Driven Pump Fails to Start 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.08E-08 5.37E-04 FMFP Main Feedwater Pump Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails to Rescat After Relieving Liquid 2.00E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator lA Fails to Run 2.00E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails to Run 1.40E-02 FCA0TDFTPM CA Turbine-Driven Pump Train In Maintenance or Testing 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.05E-08 3.76E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 2.80E-02 WRNTRNBTRM RN Train I A Unavailable Due to Maintenance or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.00E-01 RNUNIT2 REC Operators Fail to Align Unit 2 RN to Unit 1 During Transient 1.00E-01 WRNRVBKREC Operators Fail to Align RV Backup to RN Total 5.71E-06
-- J
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 1: 1ETB Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 6.43E-07 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.81E-07 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 4.80E-03 KKC001BTRM KC Train I A in Maintenance (no affect on RN) 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.13E-07 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event n>
3.00E-03 KKC001BLHE Latent Human Error on KC Train I A A
1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.04E-09 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 3.60E-02 FCA0TDIrrPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run Total 9.38E-07
~
\\
T
l Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 2: Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.26E-08 7.52E-07 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1.96E-08 7.52E-07 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFFRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance Total 4.21E d8 f
1 t
t I
l l
i M
M m
W W
W m
m m
m m
m m
m
W m_ m M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M W
M M-W m
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 3: Control Room Fire Sequences i
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 8.04E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC -
3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 6.97E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Contro! Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM SS.ndby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 1.07E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC
)
4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open
? ?
1.07E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open Total 1.72E-07 k
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 4: Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 2.77E-12 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip 1.80E-06 WRNABPRCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Pump to Run 1.00E-02 NNVSSFADHE Operator Fails to Start SMP in Time to Prevent Seal LOCA 2.08E-12 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fin: Causes Reactor Trip 9.00E-01
-TNCO5RVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-02 TFBLD01DHE Operators Fail to Establish Feed and Bleed Cooling 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Sources Due to Clams 3.00E-03 FCAORNOLHE Latent Human Error Causes Swap to Assured Suction Source 2.08E-12 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation 1.00E-02 FCACLMSCOM Common Cause Failure of RN Sources Due to Clams 3.00E-03 FCA0RNOLHE Latent Human Error Causes Swap to Assured Suction Source 2.08E-12 1.54E-04 FRTSWG Reactor Trip Switchgear Fire Causes Reactor Trip 4.50E-07 KKCPABRCOM Common Cause Failure of KC Fumps to Run 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Lass of KC)
Total
<1.0E-08 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
m-
~
Cetawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of 2 Table 5: Cable Room Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event l
Probability ProbabiHty Nanne Description 3.57E-07 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 3.09E-07 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 4.76E-08 1.19E-05,
FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open
?
>?
4.76E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2
4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open
~.
3.57E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 2.69E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 2.26E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand l.93E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF0001 REC Failum to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR
' Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 1
,n Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 2 Table 5: Cable Room Fire Sequences Seqt$ence Event Event Event P.robability Probability Name Description 1.02E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 8.57E-04 NNV0877MVT Motor Operated Valve INV877 Transfers Position 1.02E-08 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 8.57E-04 NNV0876MVT Motor-Operated Valve INV876 Transfers Position
~
L Total 8.86E-07
??
D-1 l
i e
b,
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 6: Catawba Vital I and C Fire Sequences Sequence Event.
Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.1IE-10 1.54E-04 FVIC Vital I & C Area Fire Causes Loss of IEDD 2.40E-05 KKC001AHXF KC Hx 1 A Fails to Function 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 9.61E-11 1.54E-04 FVIC VitalI & C Area Fim Causes Loss of IEDD 2.40E-05 KKC001AHXF KC Hx 1A Fails to Function 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance Total
< 1.0E-08 s.
e
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Studies Table 7: Catawba RN Pump House Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.55E-07 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN ~
2.60E-02 NNV0SSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 5.98E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 1.00E-02 NNVSSFADHE Operator Fails to Start SMP in Time to Prevent Seal LOCA 2.39E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 2.39E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open 4
l.79E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 1.35E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 1.14E-08 5.98E-06 FRN Fire in RN Pump House Causes Loss of RN 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand Total 3.06E-07 E
E E
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M m
M m
a M
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of 5 Table 8: KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.79E-06 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1.55E-06 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 2.39E-07 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open n
2.39E-07 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 4
1.79E-07 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-03 NSSOSSFLHE Latent Human Error Fails The SSF 1.35E-07 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.26E-03 NNVSMUPFLF Filter (Standby Makeup Pump) Restricts Flow 1.14E-07 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand 9.69E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 5 Table 8: KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 5.12E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0877MVT Motor Operated Valve 1NV877 Transfers Position 5.12E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0876MVT Motor-Operated Valve INV876 Transfers Position 3.59E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-04 NNVOSMPDPR SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Run g
337E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 5.64E-04 NACGF4FCLT 600 V ac Breaker SMXG-F4F (SSF SMUP) Transfers Qpen 3.23E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.20E-02 FCA0TDNPS CA TDP Fails to Start 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable FireInitiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0884KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV884 Transfers Position 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event l
4.87E-04 NNV0885KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV885 Transfers Position
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 5 Table 8: KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability
-Name Description 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0883KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV883 Transfers Position 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0882KVT Kerotest Manual Valve 1NV882 Transfers Position 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0492CVO Check Valve INV492 Fails to Open n
1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0867CVO Check Valve INV867 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0071CVO Check Valve INV0071 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0878CVO Check Valve INV878 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0495CVO Check Valve INV495 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.006-04 HNV0082CVO Check Valve INV0082 Fails to Open
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 4 of 5 Table 8: KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0881CVO Check Valve INV881 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0049CVO Check Valve INV0049 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0060CVO Check Valve 1NV0060 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0874CVO Check Valve INV874 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0494CVO Check Valve INV494 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0879CVO Check Valve INV879 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0493CVO Check Valve INV493 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0880CVO Check Valve INV880 Fails to Open M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
l Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 5 of 5 Table 8: KC Power Cable Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.08E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event -
1.80E-04 NVKAHUICRR SSF Air Handling Unit Fails to Run Total 4.85E-06 4
1 4
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 9: Diesel Fire Sequences 3
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description l
1.97E-11 1.55E-02 TlDEX ReactorTrip in a 24 Hour Period 1.00E-03 PACBOFFDEX Blackout Following Trip 3.00E-03 KKC001BLHE Latent Human Error on KC Train IB 1.41E-02 FDG Fire Causes a Loss of the A Train Diesel 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC)
I Total
<1.0E-08 t
I i
i E
M M
M M
M M
M M
M E'M M
M M
M M
M M
[
Catawba IPEEE Fire Sensitivity Study Pege 1 cf 3 Table 10: Catawba Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 5.47E-07 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 1.10E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.14E-07 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator 1B Fails To Run 4.30E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator l A In Maintenance Or Testing l
1.00E+00 FSSF Fim Event Fails SSF Seal Injection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.14E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 4.30E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB In Maintenance Or Testing
[
1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failum to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 i
3.48E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event
.. iOE-01 JDG001BDCR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 7.00E-03 JDG00!ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails To Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection e
4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2
Catawba IPEEE Fire Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 3 Table 10: Catawba Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.48E-08 1.13E-03 FAC1'B All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 7.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generator IB Fails To Start 1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.77E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pmssurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.36E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 7.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generator 1B Fails To Start 4.30E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator 1 A In Maintenance Or Testing 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
m m
m m
m m
.~
Catawba IPEEE Fire Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 3 Table 10: Catawba Turbine Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.36E-08 1.13E-03 FACFB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 4.30E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB In Maintenance Or Testing 7.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails To Start 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 Total 1.09E-06
~
m i
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Table 11: Catawba Service Building Fire Sequences Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.33E-09 1.90E-03 FSVCBLDG Service Building Fire Causes a Loss ofInstrument Air ~
7.00E-03 RNCOSRVRVC SRV Fails to Reseat on aTransient 1.00E-02 TNCQST2DEX SRV Opens on T2,T3,T4,T7,T12, PACBOFTDEX When PORVS Are Closed 1.00E-02 TRECIRCDHE Operators Fail to Establish High Pressure Recirculation Total
<1.0E-08 g
s e
~-
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 1 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.79E-06 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 1.55E-06 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 6.43E-07 3.78E-0.5 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance i
1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection i
5.47E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.57E-07 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 3.54E-07 3.86E-02 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Reseat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02 TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.20E-02 FCA0TDPTPS CA TDP Fails to Start
\\
n Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 2 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 3.09E-07 1.19E-05 FCBLR Cable Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance 2.14E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run 4.30E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A in Maintenance Cr Testing 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 2.14E-07 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 4.30E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB In Maintenance Or Testing l.10E-01 JDG001ADOR Diesel Generator 1A Fails to Run 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.81E-07 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 4.80E-03 KKC001BTRM KC Train I A in Maintenance (no affect on RN) 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 1.13E-07 3.78E-05 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event 3.00E-03 KKC001BLHE Latent Human Error on KC Train lA 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 9.69E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid M
M M
M M
M M
W W
M M
m m
m e
e e
e
c Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 3 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Dewription 5.00E-02 TCF0001 REC Failure to Restore Main Feedwater After Plant Trip 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run l
8.04E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC) 6.97E-08 2.68E-Ofi FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNV0SSFTRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance n*
6.56E-08 3.86E-02 FETB ETB Fire Initiating Event '
1.70E-02 WRNKC00TRM RN Train A & KC Train A in Maintenance 1.00E+00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection l
l 1.00E-04 ZCISMLLLHE Latent Human Error Results in a Small CI Failure 5.12E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0877MVT Motor Operated Valve 1NV877 Transfers Position 5.12E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 8.57E-04 NNV0876MVT Motor-Operated Valve INV876 Transfers Position
~.
3.59E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 6.00E-04 NNVOSMPDPR SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Run 3.48E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event -
1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator IB Fails To Run -
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 4 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 7.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator I A Fails To Start 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 3.48E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 7.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generaior IB Fails To Start 1.10E-0.1 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 n
m 3.37E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 5.64E-04 NACGF4FCLT 600 V ac Breaker SMXG-F4F (SSF SMUP) Transfers Qpen 3.23E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 5.00E-02
' TCF000lREC Failure to Restore Mnin Feedwater After Plant Trip 1.20E-02 FCA0TDPTPS CA TDP Fails to Stut 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0884KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV884 Transfers Position 7
2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0885KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV885 Transfers Position 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable FireInitiating Event t-
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 5 ef 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 4.87E-04 NNV0883KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV883 Transfe~rs Positio'n 2.91E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 4.87E-04 NNV0882KVT Kerotest Manual Valve INV882 Transfers Position 2.26E-08 7.52E-0.7 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 3.00E-02 NNVSSFEDHE Operator Fails to Start SSF (Loss of KC)
N 1.96E-08 7.52E-07 FASP Aux Shutdown Panel Fire Causes a Loss of KC 2.60E-02 NNVOSSFfRM Standby Shutdown Facility Flow Components in Maintenance
~
1.77E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event 9.00E-01
-TNCOSRVDEX Pressurizer SRV Fails To Rescat After Relieving Liquid 3.60E-02 FCA0TDPTPR Turbine Driven Pump Fails to Run 1.10E-01 JDG001BDGR Diesel Generator 1B Fails To Run 1.10E-01 JDG001ADGR Diesel Generator I A Fails to Run 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.36E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire In tiating Event 7.00E-03 JDG001BDGS Diesel Generator IB Fails To Start 4.30E-02 JDG001ATRM Diesel Generator I A In Maintenance Or Testing 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 m
r
-. -. _.,. ~ =
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Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 6 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.36E-08 1.13E-03 FACTB All Consuming TB Fire Initiating Event' 4.30E-02 JDG001BTRM Diesel Generator IB In Maintenance Or Testing 7.00E-03 JDG001ADGS Diesel Generator 1 A Fails To Start 1.00E00 FSSF Fire Event Fails SSF SealInjection 4.00E-02 POPXCONRHE Failure to Cross Connect Offsite Power From Unit 2 1.90E-03 NNVOSMPDPS SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump Fails To Start On Demand 1,20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0492CVO Check Valve INV492 Fails to Open n
3 l.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0867CVO Check Valve INV867 Fails to Open 4
1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0071CVO Check Valve INV0071 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0878CVO Check Valve INV878 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0495CVO Check Valve INV495 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0082CVO Check Valve INV0082 Fails to Open M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M m
m m
m
t_r w n
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r, v.
r e
e m
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 7 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08)
Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0881CVO Check Valve INV881 Fails to Open l'20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0049CVO Check Valve INV0049 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0060CVO Check Valve INV0060 Fails to Open n>
1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0874CVO Check Valve INV874 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 HNV0494CVO Check Valve INV494 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0879CVO Check Valve 1NV879 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event
~
2.00E-04 HNV0493CVO Check Valve INV493 Fails to Open 1.20E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event 2.00E-04 NNV0880CVO Check Valve INV880 Fails to Open 1.07E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC
n.
Catawba Fire IPEEE Sensitivity Study Page 8 of 8 Table 12: Study Totals (Sequences >E-08) l Sequence Event Event Event Probability Probability Name Description i
4.00E-03 NNV0865MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV865 Fails to Open i
1.07E-08 2.68E-06 FCR Control Room Fire Causes a Loss of KC 4.00E-03 NNV0872MVO Motor-Operated Valve INV872A Fails to Open 1.08E-08 5.98E-05 FKC KC Power Cable Fire Initiating Event l.80E-04 NVKAHUICRR SSF Air Handling Unit Fails to Run
~
Total 7.27E-06 6
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