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Combined Meeting Slides for April 22, 2020, Meeting Associated with Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project and Draft Oak Ridge Report on Molten Salt-Fueled Reactor Fuel Qualification Methodology
	ML20112F478
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Issue date:	04/22/2020
From:	Joseph Sebrosky; NRC/NRR/DANU/UARP
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	Sebrosky J,NRR/DANU/UARP,240-500-0614
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Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting on Form and Content of an Application for Non-Light Water Reactors and Discussion of Draft Report on Molten Salt-Fueled Reactor Fuel Qualification Methodology April 22, 2020 Telephone Bridgeline: (888) 989-3418 Passcode: 9074476#

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Agenda 2 of 61

Overview Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP)

Steve Nesbit LMNT Consulting Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting April 22, 2020 3 of 61

2 Outline of Presentation

TICAP Goal and Approach

Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) Safety Case

Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) Fuel Qualification

Key TICAP Products 4 of 61 2

TICAP Goal Develop an endorsable document that outlines the content of an application in a manner that is technology inclusive, risk-informed, performance-based and its scope is limited by LMP methodology and can be submitted to NRC for endorsement

Output will likely be a process for developing content of application as opposed to a specific set of required information

Current content of application requirements are LWR-based

- Advanced reactor safety cases may not require description of certain design features and/or programs (e.g., emergency electrical power, human factors)

Products and schedules are subject to change as the project evolves 5 of 61 3

TICAP Department of Energy cost-shared, Southern Company-led project Guidance for developing content for key elements of the NRC license application Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Development team consisting of owner-operators, advanced

Applicable to all non-LWR designs reactor developers and

Leverages advanced reactor features consultants such as passive safety

Builds on foundation provided by LMP Ultimate product is an NRC-endorsable NEI guidance 6 of 61 document 4

Licensing Modernization Project (LMP)

Department of Energy cost-shared, Southern Company-led project Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Approach to NEI 18-04 Rev. 1, Risk Informed Performance Based

Selection of Licensing Basis Events Guidance for Non-Light Water

Classification of Structures, Systems, Reactor Licensing Basis and Components (SSCs) Development (Aug 2019)

Defense-in-Depth adequacy determination NRC Draft Guide 1353, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based 7 of 61 Approach to Non-Light-Water Reactors (April 2019) 5

LMP Safety Case Use of Fundamental Safety Functions

Fundamental Safety Functions (FSFs) - apply to all designs

PRA Safety Functions

- Design-specific

- Derive from FSFs

Required Safety Functions

- Determine safety-related SSCs

Non-safety Related SSCs with Special Treatment

- Risk-significant functions

- Defense-in-depth adequacy 8 of 61 6

Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Qualification

Fuel is an important SSC for all advanced reactor designs

- Relates to all three FSFs

Oak Ridge National Laboratory will be discussing its draft report on MSR Fuel Qualification

TerraPower will be addressing MSR fuel qualification and the relationship with LMP and TICAP 9 of 61 7

8 Key TICAP Products Fundamental Safety Formulation of Regulation Mapping Functions (FSFs) Technology Inclusive to FSFs Definition Content of Application Differences Between NEI Guidance Document Licensing Paths Annotated Outline Tabletop LMP-Related Safety Case Exercises NEI Guidance Document 10 of 61 8

Questions?

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TICAP Comments on NRC SAR Outline Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP)

Steve Nesbit LMNT Consulting Advanced Reactor Working Group Meeting September 22, 2019 12 of 61

2 Outline of Presentation

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Draft Outline for an Advanced Reactor License Application

TICAP Comments 13 of 61 2

NRC Draft Outline

Developed by NRC with support of Idaho National Laboratory

- Provided for industry review November 2019

- Draft outline of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

- Licensing documents outside the scope of an FSAR

Presented at the December 12, 2019 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting

- Draft outline addresses full scope of a combined license but it could be adapted for other applications

- Starting point is Licensing Modernization Project (NEI 18-04)

- Expectation is that FSAR portion of an application would be more detailed for safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and less detailed for other SSCs 14 of 61 3

NRC Draft Outline (cont.)

14 chapters in SAR

21 additional portions of applications identified

Next steps (per NRC in December 2019)

- Major focus of discussions in upcoming stakeholder meetings and/or dedicated meetings; coordination with industry-led TI-CAP

- NRC will be interacting with Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

- Staff will revise draft outline as appropriate and provide updated draft outline in March 2020 time frame

- Planned development of a regulatory guide 15 of 61 4

TICAP Comments

Caveats

- These comments are provided on behalf of the TICAP team and do not purport to represent a consensus on the part of the nuclear industry

>> Developed by small team with emphasis on developers and utilities

- TICAP has not developed a preferred organization for an advanced reactor SAR

>> Recommended changes do not always accompany comments

- Comments should be considered in multiple contexts

>> Current 10 CFR Part 50 and Part 52 world

>> Future 10 CFR Part 53 world

- Outlines do not enable a complete understanding of what is desired and/or the expected level of detail

>> The devil is in the details, but so is the salvation - Admiral Hyman Rickover 16 of 61 5

TICAP Comments (General)

Number of attractive attributes of the NRC outline

- Departs from standard format and content guidelines geared toward conventional large light water reactors

- Begins with general plant information

- Safety case first

- Addresses key elements of LMP

>> Selection of licensing basis events (LBEs)

>> Safety classification of structures, systems and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments

>> Defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy 17 of 61 6

TICAP Comments (Specific)

Chapter 1 - General Information

- Should be structured so as to be understandable and useful not only to the NRC but to the broader stakeholder community

- Potential for overlap with other chapters (e.g., Chapter 2 Site Information)

- Need to understand desire for separate sections on analytical codes and methods verification and validation, referenced materials, drawings, and conformance with regulatory guides

Chapters 3 through 5 - LBE Analysis, SSCs, and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs)

- Key elements of LMP

- Optimal organization of this information in a SAR is work in progress for TICAP 18 of 61 7

TICAP Comments (Specific)

Chapter 3 - LBE Analysis

- Need to better understand the scope and intent of Section 3.2 Mechanistic Source Term

- Need to better understand what is expected in Section 3.3 Frequency -

Consequence Criteria

Chapter 4 - SSCs

- By category approach may not be optimal

- Need to understand use of Primary Safety Function term in lieu of Fundamental Safety Function 19 of 61 8

TICAP Comments (Specific)

Chapter 7 - DID

- Not clear separating DID discussion from LBEs and SSCs is optimal

- Need to understand intent of 7.2.5 Technical Specifications to Bound Uncertainties

- Need to understand reason for inclusion of emergency plan information

Chapter 11 - Physical Security

- Need to understand reason for inclusion of security information in the SAR rather than a separate, non-public document (i.e., the Physical Security Plan)

Chapter 12 - Overview of PRA

- Key element of LMP methodology

- Perhaps should be earlier in the document 20 of 61 9

TICAP Comments (Specific)

Chapter 13 Administrative Controls

- Important to limit this section to programs with a nexus to public health and safety

- Intent of 13.6 Change Control Process not clear - different from 10 CFR 50.59?

Separate Licensing Documents

- Generally beyond TICAP scope - did not perform detailed review

- Need to flesh out intent and rationale, particularly for those without established precedent

- Expectations with respect to PRA deserve discussion

>> Document submittal vs. regulatory audit 21 of 61 10

Summary

Important to establish an improved framework for advanced reactor applications

TICAP team appreciates NRCs efforts toward that end and looks forward to additional dialog 22 of 61 11

Questions?

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Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP)

NRR/DANU - Advanced Reactor Policy Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Commission with Support from Idaho National Laboratory April 22, 2020 24 of 61

Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP)

Staffs draft outline was discussed on Dec. 12 and is found in ADAMS at Accession No. ML19325C089

Draft outline addresses Sections 1 through 14

- Final safety analysis report (FSAR) portion of application

Staffs draft outline has now been annotated to suggest additional background and clarification regarding FSAR section content

- Annotated outline is found in ADAMS at Accession No. ML20107J565

- Continues to include a summary listing of other (non-FSAR) portions of an application for consideration 2

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Informing Content of Applications Outline (FSAR) with major licensing modernization project Additional Portions of Application (LMP) areas highlighted

Technical Specifications

Technical Requirements Manual Introduction

Quality Assurance Plan (design)

1. General Information*

Fire Protection Program (design)

2. Site Information

PRA

Fuel qualification report

3. Licensing Basis Event (LBE) Analysis*

Exemptions

4. Integrated Plant Analysis*

Quality Assurance Plan (construction and operations)

5. Description and Classification of SSCs*

Emergency Plan

6. Design Basis Accidents Analysis (10 CFR 50.34)*

Physical Security Plan

SNM (special nuclear materials) physical protection program

7. Defense in Depth (DID)*

SNM material control and accounting plan

8. Control of Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents and

Cyber Security Plan Solid Waste

New fuel shipping plan

Fire Protection Program (operational)

9. Control of Occupational Dose

Radiation Protection Program

10. Human Factors Analysis*

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

11. Physical Security

Inservice inspection/Inservice testing (ISI/IST) Program

12. Overview of PRA*

Environmental Report

Site Redress Plan

13. Administrative Control Programs* (special treatment)

Exemptions, Departures, and Variances

14. Initial Startup Programs* (special treatment) 3 26 of 61

Format and Content Question on International Alignment (e.g., CNSC, IAEA)

Industry interest in pursuing alignment ?

I. Introduction II. General Plant Description III. Management of Safety IV. Site Evaluation V. General Design Aspects VI. Description of Plant Systems VII. Safety Analyses VIII. Commissioning IX. Operational Aspects X. Operational Limits and Conditions XI. Radiation Protection XII. Emergency Preparedness XIII. Environmental Aspects XIV. Radioactive Waste Management XV. Decommissioning and End of Life Aspects 4

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Format and Content Questions for ARCAP Content

Is the general direction incorporated into the ARCAP outline consistent with the Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP) direction?

Should ARCAP scope include construction permit guidance

- What should ARCAP include in this area?

- Does TICAP include a construction permit process?

Should ARCAP include guidance for microreactors?

Does the ARCAP draft annotated outline have an appropriate level of detail?

Are there other topics that should be included in the draft?

Are there items in the draft that are inconsistent with LMP?

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Format and Content Questions for ARCAP Content

Should the outline be updated to allow LMP concepts to be used in other sections of the outline that are not typically associated with the process? (e.g., risk inform quality assurance program, radioactive waste management).

- Should performance-based criteria for inspection of Part 20 requirements be used vice a licensing review?

Routine release and ALARA requirements (contained in 10CFR20, App. B, and 10CFR50, App. I, respectively) are based on LWR technology. How should ARCAP address these performance-based requirements for non-LWR technology?

What non-LMP topics traditionally found in the FSAR should be relocated from the FSAR to a separate (non-50.59 controlled) application document?

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Format and Content Questions on Alignment for Technical Specifications (10 CFR 50.36)

Construct of Technical Specifications Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs), Surveillance Requirements Associated 4 Criteria LCOs represent the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation Design Features, Administrative Controls Use exemptions or guidance?

Replace or define Significant Safety Function language in 50.36?

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Format and Content Questions on Alignment for Technical Specifications (10 CFR 50.36) o Scope of Technical Specifications (TS)

Should LCOs address only requirements for safety-related structures, systems and components (SSCs) or also address non-safety-related with special treatment?

Relationship between TS, safety classification, and requirements associated with adequate protection and safety enhancements?

Which events should LCOs address? [All, or a subset of licensing basis events (e.g., Design Basis Accidents)]?

Role of administrative controls in maintaining configurations and reliability of SSCs consistent with licensing basis events and frequency-consequence targets 8

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LMP-Based Safety Case Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP)

Jason Redd Southern Nuclear Development NRC Public Meeting April 22, 2020 32 of 61

2 Outline of Presentation

TICAP Definition of Safety Case

LMP-Based Safety Case

Fundamental Safety Functions-centered LMP-Based Safety Case Development

Scope of LMP-Based Safety Case

LMP-Based Safety Case Inputs and Outputs

Next Steps 33 of 61 2

TICAP Definition of Safety Case

IAEA-TECDOC-1814 defines the safety case of a nuclear facility as follows:

a collection of scientific, technical, administrative and managerial arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a [nuclear] facility covering the suitability of the site and the design, construction, and operation of the facility, the assessment of radiation risks and assurance of the adequacy and quality of all the safety related work associated with the [nuclear] facility.

TICAP intends to adopt the above definition of safety case for the purposes of this specific project.

The LMP-Based Safety Case is a key element of demonstrating that a non-LWR design provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the health and safety of the public.

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LMP-Based Safety Case

The LMP-Based Safety Case is an affirmative safety case.

The LMP-Based Safety Case is based on satisfying the three technology-inclusive fundamental safety functions (FSFs) which underpin all regulations within the scope of the LMP-Based Safety Case:

- Retaining Radioactive Materials

- Controlling Reactivity

- Removing Heat from the Reactor and Waste Stores 35 of 61 4

FSF-centered LMP-Based Safety Case Development

Satisfaction of the FSF is the common element that stretches throughout the LMP RIPB process and LMP-Based Safety Case.

As shown in the following figure, the nuclear facility features created by the designer are incorporated into the design-specific PRA model, then design-specific safety functions flow logically to the design-specific SSC and their attributes which are then incorporated in the content of an application.

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FSF-centered LMP-Based Safety Case Development Required Required Safety SR SSC Design Functional Design Functions (RSFs) Criteria (SRDC)

Criteria (RFDC)

SR SSC SR SSC Special Safety Related (SR) SSCs Performance Treatment Targets Requirements Safety Functions Provided in the Design Design Basis External Hazard Other Risk Levels (DBEHLs)

Significant Safety Functions Fundamental PRA Modeled Input to Safety Functions Safety Functions Non-Safety NSRST SSC NSRST SSC Special Design and (FSFs) (PSFs) Related with ST Performance Treatment (NSRST) SSCs Targets Requirements Content of Application Other Safety Functions for Adequate DID Safety Functions Non-Safety Not Meeting Risk Related with Significance or DID No ST SSCs Criteria (NST) 37 of 61 6

Scope of LMP-Based Safety Case

As stated in NEI 18-04, Section 1.3, the LMP RIPB guidance describes acceptable processes for selection of LBEs; safety classification of SSCs and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of DID adequacy

The LMP-Based Safety Case does not address all regulations which are applicable to a nuclear facility application, i.e. financial qualifications of the applicant, material control and accountability, etc.

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LMP-Based Safety Case Inputs and Outputs

Successful implementation of the LMP RIPB process and construction of the LMP-Based Safety Case requires a multitude of inputs to produce actionable outputs to inform the design and technical content of applications.

- Input such as reliability data, design information, analytical programs, and tools such as a probabilistic risk assessment;

- Analyses and evaluations to generate and select the Licensing Basis Events (LBEs), classify Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs),

and determine defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy;

- Output such as tables of LBEs by frequency groups; Tables of SSC with classifications and special treatments as required, and the baseline evaluation of DID for the facility.

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Next Steps

Drafting of Rev. A of report in progress.

Report to be provided to the NRC for review and comment in Late Summer 2020.

Report to be completed Fall 2020.

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Break Meeting/Webinar will begin shortly Telephone Bridgeline: (888) 989-3418 Passcode: 9074476#

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Fuel Salt Qualification Method Overview Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting (On-line)

David Holcomb, George Flanagan, and Mike Poore April 22, 2020 ORNL is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC for the US Department of Energy 42 of 61

Fuel Qualification is an Element in Achieving Sufficient Understanding of Fuel Behavior Fuel qualification is a process which provides high confidence that physical and chemical behavior of fuel is sufficiently understood so that it can be adequately modeled for both normal and accident conditions, reflecting the role of the fuel design in the overall safety of the facility.

Uncertainties are defined so that calculated fission product releases include the appropriate margins to ensure conservative calculation of radiological dose consequences. -

ML17220A315 43 of 61 2 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

No Qualification Method Appropriate for Liquid Salt Fuel Currently Exists Safety Functions

Existing fuel qualification Solid Fuel Liquid Salt Fuel methodology is based upon the Retain radionuclides Retain some radionuclides characteristics and safety Maintain coolable Provide decay heat functions of solid fuels geometry removal Provide net negative Provide net negative

Role of liquid fuel salt in plant prompt reactivity reactivity feedback safety is significantly different from feedback solid fuels

- Physical and chemical behaviors are significantly different

Stakeholders have indicated that significant confusion and delay would result from attempting to apply a solid fuel-based methodology to liquid salt fuel 44 of 61 3 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Key Issue is What Constitutes Fuel Salt?

Fuel salt does not come in discrete elements (rods or assemblies) and moves independently of its container during normal operations

- Cladding and fuel assembly structures are qualified as part of solid fuel

Fuel salt includes all of the material containing fissionable elements or radionuclides that remain in hydraulic communication, but not the surrounding systems, structures, or components

- Salt vapors and aerosols remain part of the fuel salt system until they become trapped adequately

- Container corrosion products become part of the fuel salt

- Fresh and used fuel salt in on-site storage are within scope 45 of 61 4 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Qualification is Based Upon Understanding the Chemical and Physical Properties of Representative Fuel Samples

Liquid state significantly changes the physical behavior of fuel

- Liquids do not accumulate internal stresses

No history dependent properties

- Flow homogenizes fluid properties

No position dependent properties

No size dependent properties

Chemical and physical properties are set by elemental composition and temperature

- Independent of isotopic content Small non-radioactive liquid fuel salt samples provide representative physical and chemical properties 46 of 61 5 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Liquid Fuel Salt Qualification Establishes Acceptable Salt Composition Range That Maintains Safety Functions

Liquid fuel salt is a Newtonian fluid

- Heat transfer and fluid flow behave in well known manners

- Continuous variance in physical properties with composition

Reasonable assurance of adequate protection derives from a combination of measured salt composition and knowledge of consequent chemical and physical properties

A liquid fuel salt property database would capture the relationship between fuel salt composition and properties 47 of 61 6 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Liquid Salt Property Database Relates Composition to Physical and Chemical Properties

Database development underway under DOE-MSR campaign

- Salt property measurement program in progress

Not currently including minor constituent transuranic elements (Am, Cu)

- Requires appropriate quality assurance for both new and existing data

Database initially sparsely populated

- Safety evaluations / accident models performed with bounding values to establish acceptable performance range

Additional data added to database over time

Goal is to eventually only require salt composition measurement at operating plants and look up properties from database 48 of 61 7 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Database and Measured Properties Combine To Support Safety Function Demonstration Retain Radionuclides Retain in Liquid Release to Cover Tritium Plate Out Salt Gas Trap in Trap in Heat Secondary Strip from Salt Vapor Phase Mist Formation Trap On Graphite Onto Metals Exchanger Coolant Strip from Deposit onto Trap in Salt on Retain on Carbon Trap in Scrubber Trap on Filter Containment Surfaces Carbon Bed MSR Fuel Safety Function Atmosphere Bottle (85Kr)

Net Negative Reactivity Feedback Adequate Heat Doppler Delayed Neutron Periodically Transfer Broadening Precursor Motion Measured Solubility (Plate Moderator Decay & Salt Property Density Out - Fouling) Density (Spectral Removal Neutron Database Shift) Absorbers Miscibility (Phase Heat Capacity Fuel Thermal Breeding or Separation)

Expansion Burning Thermal Gas Solubility Viscosity Absorber Conductivity (Bubble Production Formation)

Melting Point Boiling Point Fuel Addition or Vessel Thermal Removal Expansion 49 of 61 8 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Fuel Salt Properties Support Modeling Reactor Performance Under Normal and Accident Conditions

Heat transfer in Newtonian fluids is determined primarily by density, viscosity, and heat capacity

- Thermal conductivity and radiative heat transfer parameters can become important in specialized situations 50 of 61 9 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Periodic Fuel Salt Property Assessment Will Be an Element of Reactor Operations

Analogous to material surveillance coupons

- Compare measurement to prediction

Frequency of property measurement depends on potential rate of change and how close salt composition is to allowable limits

- Chromium composition was measured weekly at MSRE

- Uranium content was inferred from reactivity impact

- MSRE did not accumulate sufficient fission products to require reassessing most properties: density, viscosity, etc.

51 of 61 10 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Fuel Salt Properties are a Significant Part of Establishing a Mechanistic Source Term

SECY-92-092 (ML040210725) establishes requirements for advanced reactors to employ MST

1) The performance of the reactor and fuel under normal and off normal conditions is sufficiently well understood to permit a mechanistic analysis.

2) The transport of fission products can be adequately modeled for all barriers and pathways to the environs, including specific consideration of containment design.

3) The events considered in the analyses to develop the set of source terms for each design are selected to bound severe accidents and design-dependent uncertainties.

52 of 61 11 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Fuel Salt Qualification is an Element of MSR Safety Evaluation

DG-1353 or maximum hypothetical accident approach can be used to Source Term identify licensing basis events1

- Accident progression models and tools

- Barrier performance

Advanced reactor siting criteria based upon radiological consequences from design-specific characteristics2

- Bounding simplifications may be possible3 Fuel Licensing Qualification Basis Events 1 Non-Light Water Review Strategy Staff White Paper Draft, ML19275F299, 2 NRC Staff White Paper, Population-Related Siting Considerations for Advanced Reactors, ML19163A168 3 ACRS Review of Draft SECY Paper, Population-Related Siting Considerations for Advanced Reactors, ML19277H031 53 of 61 12 NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder - April 22, 2020

Todays Presentation

Review Molten Salt Fuel Qualification

Discuss the Regulatory Framework

Describe how the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) and Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP) provide input to Molten Salt Fuel Qualification 55 of 61 Copyright© 2020 TerraPower, LLC. All Rights Reserved. 2

Objective and Elements of Fuel Qualification Fuel Qualification Objective:

Demonstrate with high confidence that physical and chemical behavior of fuel is sufficiently understood so that it can be adequately modeled during both normal and accident conditions, reflecting the role of the fuel design in the overall safety of the facility.

Key Elements May Include:

Regulatory Framework

A Fuel Salt Property Database

Regulatory Framework

NUREG 0800, Section 4.2 was written for Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel

The regulatory framework needs to be reconsidered for molten salt

The evaluation of the regulatory framework will support fuel qualification by identifying licensing basis events (LBEs) and establishing acceptable fuel characteristics.

LMP/TICAP Input to Fuel Qualification How does LMP relate to fuel qualification?

LMP provides a systematic Risk Informed Performance Based (RIPB) option for selecting the required LBEs to be modeled to establish acceptable fuel specifications for bounding conditions

LMP provides a process to help demonstrate reasonable assurance of adequate protection How does TICAP add value to fuel qualification?

TICAP provides focus on the safety case and information needed to sufficiently demonstrate reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.

Summary

The goal of Fuel Qualification is to demonstrate physical and chemical behavior of fuel is sufficiently understood so that it can be adequately modeled for normal and accident conditions, reflecting the role of the fuel design in the overall safety of the facility.

The current regulatory framework for fuel needs to be reconsidered for molten salt

LMP provides a systematic RIPB option for selecting the required LBEs

References

1. An Approach to Fuel Development and Qualification, Douglas C.

Crawford, et el.

2. ML20072M206, Draft MSR Fuel Salt Qualification Methodology 5Mar2020 version, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) regarding molten salt reactor fuel qualification.

ML20112F478

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