ML20108C039

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Pump & Valve Operability Assurance Audit, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20108C039
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/08/1985
From: Hodor R, Barry Miller
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20108B987 List:
References
NUDOCS 8503070557
Download: ML20108C039 (19)


Text

- - -,-

i

(

4 RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 j DOCKET NUMBER 50-458 i

PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE AUDIT TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT I

i PREPARED BY i

j BRUCE MILLER AND RUDY H0 DOR i

i r

i BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY FEBRUARY 8, 1985 s

a 8503070557 850227 PDR ADOCK 05000458 A PDR

_ . . _ . .~__ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,

A i

j SUMARY i The Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) pump and valve operability re-1 view team and representatives of the Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) of i the NRC conducted an on-site audit of the River Bend Station' Unit 1, pump and valve operability . assurance program during the week of October 29, 1984. Ten (10) components, three (3) identified as belonging to the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and seven (7) to the Balance of Plant System (B0P), were i

reviewed during the audit. The results of this audit revealed generic

! deficiencies in the applicant's pump and valve operability assurance program j as well as-specific concerns regarding the qualification of eight of the ten i components, i

1. INTRODUCTION
  • To assure that an applicant has developed and implemented a program re-I garding the operability qualification of safety-related pumps and valves, the i Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB) performs a two-step audit. The first step is a-' review of Section 3.9.3.2 of the River Bend Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the description of the applicant's pump and valve operabil-l' ity assurance program. 'The information provided in the FSAR, however, is general in nature and not sufficient by itself to provide confidence in the adequacy of the licensee's overall program for. pump and valve operability qualification. To provide this confidence, the Pump and Valve Operability Re-view Team'(PVORT), consisting of staff from the NRC and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), conducts an on-site audit (second step) of a small represen-
tative sample of safety-related pumps and valves and supporting documentation.

The criteria by which the audit is performed _is described in Section 3.10 entitled, " Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical

Equipment" of the Standard Review Plan (SRP). Conformance with SRP 3.10_is required in order to satisfy the applicable portions of General Design Cri-teria (GDC) 1, 2, 4,14, and 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 as well as Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.

~

2. DISCUSSION i

i' The EQB staff in performing the first step of the audit, reviewed Section 3.9.3.2 of the River Bend Station Unit 1 FSAR. The on-site audit,'or second step, was performed by the PV0RT during the week'of-October'29,1984. The i

purpose of this two-step review process is to determine the extent that the applicant, Gulf States Utilities (GSU), meets the criteria of Section 3.10 of l

the SRP and the GDCs mentioned. A sample of three Nuclear Steam Supply System

, (NSSS) and seven' Balance of Plant (B0P) components were selected to be i - audited.

j In preparation-for this audit,_the applicant's list of safety-related equipment entitled,-_" Seismic.and Dynamic Qualification Summary and Status Report Master List of Safety-Related Equipment" was reviewed and several pieces of equipment were selected as candidates for review. From this list of 4

1-i 1

4 i

_ . .,.r , - - - , . -w_ ,-- - .-. ,---m-,~.,m,, , . _ _ . _ ~ . , . . , , , , - , - c.-, .y- , - , - - - -

candidates, seven (7) components classified as being B0P and three (3) as be-ing NSSS components were selected to be reviewed at the time of the audit as identified in Table 1 entitled " Audited Equipment."

The on-site audit includes a plant inspection of the as-built configura-tion and installation of the equipment, a review of the normal, accident, and post accident conditions under which the equipment and systems must operate, the associated fluid dynamic loads, and a review of the qualification documen-tation (status reports, test reports, analysis, specifications, surveillance programs, and long-term operability program (s), etc.).

Table 1 identifies the equipment audited.

3. SPECIFIC CONCERN A number of concerns were noted during the plant walkdown with some being.

satisfactorily resolved during the audit. The PV0RT made a check of the ap-plicant's documentation system by requesting, at short notice, the appropriate specification test reports, and related qualification documentation for a par-

  • ticular component. GSU response to this request was both thorough and com-plete, in addition to escorting the team on a tour of the documentation or central file at the plant. The following is an example, highlighting the evaluation or audit process of the individual components.

3.1 E12-C002C - Residual Heat Removal Pump (NSSS)

This pump is located in the Auxiliary Building at the 70 foot elevation.

The normal function of the component is fuel pool, suppression pool, and re-actor shutdown cooling. Its safety function is to supply water to the core in the event of an accident, and suppression pool cooling. The component nor-mally is in a standby condition, and must operate approximately 100 days fol-lowing an accident.

The components are qualified by both analysis and _ testing. Pursuing the basis for the acceptance criteria for in-plant pump performance, it was dis-covered that manufacturer's data and acceptance criteria were not utilized.

The specific question that was asked, to which there was no reply, is "How is pump performance (curves, vibration levels, bearing temperatures, etc.) estab-lished without the use of manufacturer's data / acceptance criteria?"

A list of qualification documents in GSU possession and a list of tests performed at vendor, GE, and GSU were provided upon request. Clarification regarding the discrepancy between the serial number on the component and that of the long form was presented.

While reviewing the qualification documents, it appeared that two GE specifications were pertinent: GE specification 21A3504, Revision 1 and 21A3504BV, Revision 0. However, one specification does not list the IEEE-standards as guides for qualification. The questions asked, to which there 2

Table 1. Audited Equipment.

Plant 1.0. NSSS Number or BOP Description Component Manufacturer Model E22-F015 NSSS 20-inch motor oper. Valve Anchor Darling A/O Drawing ated gate valve 150a No. 2994-3 Actuator Limitorque 58-1-40 B33-F060A NSSS 20-inch flow control Valve Hammel Dahl BWR-6-20 valve assembly c:

ISWP-P2A BOP Standby service water Pump Hayword Tyler 18X23VSN1 pump (vertical centrifugal)

Driver Siemens-Allis Frame 588vP IE12-MOVF21 BOP 14-inch motor oper. valve velan B19-1074C-ated globe valve 02TS Actuator Limitorque $98-3-60 1HYC-MOV1B BOP 24-inch riotor oper. Valve Post-Seal Not ated butterfly valve specified Actuator Limitorque SMB-005 H2BC ICCP-MOV138 BOP 10-irch motor oper- Valve Velan B16-0054B-ated gate valve 02TS Actuator Limitorque SMB-0-25 B21-A0VF- BOP 20-inch check valve Valve Attwood and Swing check 32A Morril valve with air assist closure E33-50V14 BOP 2-inch solenoid oper- Valve Target Rock 77KK-005 ated globe valve (102/010-3)

E12-CC02C NSSS RHR pump (centrifugal Pump Byron Jackson 28DX18.5CKIL three stage VMT)

Driver General SK6336XC322A Electric E12-PC003 BOP RHR subsystem fill Pump Gould 3196ST pump (horizontal centrifugal)

Driver Westinghouse TBFC (From No. 184T) -

3

I

~

were no reply, were " Clarify the difference between the two specificati ns.

Is this component designed and qualified to IEEE standards, and if not, why and what is the means of qualification?"

GE answered the concerns regarding the aging effect of elastomers by ref-erencing the " Mechanical Equipment Environmental Report" NEDC.30717 (pump) and NEDC 30614 (motor). However, GSU was asked "How will or have they identified parts sensitive to aging mechanisms and how would they be tracked?" No re-sponse was received.

During the plant walkdown, it was observed that the discharge pressure transmitter associated with this component had a reject tag and an as-built acceptance tag? GSU was asked to clarify, to which there was no response, the difference between the two tags, the reason, and how they affect the qualifi-cation of the component.

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed, the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification for this component.

3.2 B21-A0VF-32A inch Check Valve (B0P)

This valve is a containment isolation valve in the feedwater system. It is located in the auxiliary building at the 122 foot elevation. The function of this valve is to prevent loss of coolant and release of radioactivity in the event of a feedwater line break outside of the containment.

While reviewing the PVORT long form and the purchase specification, it was discovered that the parameters specified in these two documents were not in agreement. It was later discovered that Revision 5 of the specification which was presented to the audit team, is not the latest revision. Reviewing the latest revision, number ll, satisfied the concerns regarding the operat-ing parameters.

Additionally addressed were questions regarding the internal / external allowable leakage criteria, the qualification test performed (hydrostatic shell, disc, seat leakage, air cylinder operational, and pneumatic seat leak-age) and the establishment of the acceptance criteria for qualification.

The applicant has demonstrated qualification operability for the component.

3.3 E22-F015 inch Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS)

This valve is a containment isolation valve in the high pressure core spray system. It is located in the auxiliary building at approximately the 70 foot elevation. Its function, in addition to containment isolation, is to open in response to either a suppression pool high-level signal or a low con-densate tank level.

4

The operability of this component was by analysis only. No testing was performed. Additional questioning regarding what fluid dynamic and seismic loads were utilized in the analysis were not addressed. In response to the concerns regarding qualification of this valve, the applicant indicated that a similar valve was presently undergoing a qualification program which included testing. Operability of this valve would be reestablished based upon a simi-larity analysis with the valve presently undergoing testing and that it would also consider the fluid dynamic and seismic effects to which this valve would be subjected under normal, accident, and post-accident conditions.

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed, the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification for this component.

3.4 E33-S0V014 inch Solenoid Operated Globe Valve (B0P)

The valve is identified as being a containment isolation valve in the main steam positive leakage control system. During normal operation, the valve is closed. Its safety function is to provide initial pressurization of the main steam positive leak control system. Upon completion it closes. The valve is located in the auxiliary building at the 141 foot elevation.

As a result of the plant walkdown and review of qualification documenta-tion, it was discovered that the valve was not installed as per the qualifica-tion documentation and manufacturer's recommendation. These documents indi-cated that the working pressure should be above the seat, but the installation orientation has the working pressure under the seat. In response to the in-quiry as to how installation orientation affects qualification and operabil-ity, the applicant indicatet that an evaluation of these findings would be performed.

Based upon the design and operation of the valve, concerns were raised regarding the quality and quantity of air and working fluid required for the valve. Specifically, the questions asked that the qualification documentation did not address or the applicant responded to were (1) "What is the minimum air pressure required to open the valve and is it in agreement with the opera-ting conditions / requirements experienced by the valve?" and (2) "What assur-ance is there that the quality of the air delivered to the valve is in agree-ment with the manufacturer's requirements?"

Similar concerns, also not addressed, had to do with the capability of the spring to close the valve. Specifically asked was the question "Are the forces delivered by the spring capable of closing the valve against the maximum loads of the working fluid?"

Based on the finding discussed above, the basis by which GSU determined qualification / operability was pursued. The questions specifically asked, to which there was no response was (a) "What tests were performed by GSU to date or will be performed in-the future that has or will demonstrated operability?"

and (b) "How is or will GSU track manufacturer's recommendations regarding 5

4

maintainability of components subject to aging, insuring long-term operabil-ity?"

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed, the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification for this component.

3.5 E12-PC003 - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Subsystem Fill Pump (B0P)

This pump is located in the auxiliary building at the 78 foot 6 inch ele-vation. The normal and safety function of this pump is to insure that the RH1 system piping is filled and ready for startup of the main RHR pump.

The plant walkdown revealed that the pump takes its suction from the in-let side of RHR pump E12-PC002C. The purchase specification indicates that the primary work fluid is demineralized water. Since pump E12-PC002C may take its suction from the suppression pool, the applicant was asked as to what effect does this nondemineralized water have on the qualification and oper-ability (e.g., wear ring, seal, impellers, bearings, etc.) of the pump. The response to this concern centered on conductivity, chloride, pH, and total in-solubles. However, it is concluded that the applicant has not addressed the concerns regarding operability / qualification when considering (a) normal, accident, and post-accident operating condition; (b) source of water; and (c) factors contributing to degradation, etc.

During the review of the long form and test manual, it was observed that the stalled current was 26.5 amp while the specification indicated 32 amps.

The applicants indicated that the specification data sheet should reflect the test data of 26.5 amps and that it would te revised accordingly.

In response to the concerns regarding the basis for the bearing tempera-ture acceptance criteria, when performing the test, the applicant indicated that the vibration and bearing temperature test procedure (report 6237.160-108.0006A) uses the manufacturer's acceptance criteria. The resulting discus-sion and response satisfies the concern in this area.

The name plate and test data sheets revealed at full load a RPM value of 3,485, while the long form and specification indicated 3,500/3,600. The applicant, indicated that the name plate and test data sheets reflected actual values for the full load condition, while the specification data sheet lists the nominal pump rpm. This response satisfies the staff concerns in this area.

When reviewing the qualification documentation, there was no reference regarding the capabilit.y of the motor at reduce voltages. Specifically asked, to which there was no reply "At reduced voltages (the minimum voltage delivered) what is the capability of the pump / motor and does it meet the-requirements of the system?"

6

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed, the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification for this component.

3.6 ICCP-MOV138 inch Motor Operated Gate Valve (B0P)

This motor operated valve is located in the auxiliary building at the 114 foot elevation. The functional requirement of the valve is to isolate the containment and to interrupt the water flow of the reactor plant component cooling water system (RPCCW) to the nonregenerative heat exchanger.

Operability of this valve is demonstrated by a combination of analysis and test. The functional qualification of this valve as a candidate valve was accomplished by demonstrating design similarity to a previously qualified parent valve with ratio analysis used to show similarity.

The document review demonstrated that parameters affecting valve function had been evaluated with appropriate analysis and or test. Temperature and flow conditions for this valve are 105'F normal and 1,200 gpm, respectively and should not have any significant effect on valve operability. Test records showed that the valve had been subjected to a hydrostatic shell test and seat leakage test with satisfactory test results.

The parent valve was also subjected to a cyclic test with seismic loads, demonstrating operability without binding and leakage within specification.

The preoperational test procedure and test results were reviewed and found satisfactory.

During the walkdown inspection, the valve serial number was checked-a pinst the PV0RT form. Two serial numbers were found on the valve, one of which was on the "N" stamp tag and agreed with the PV0RT form and the other was later identified as the manufacturer's tag valve identification serial number. The inspection and test record form listed the manufacturer's tag valve serial number which does not agree with the PV0RT form. The staff's concern is with the possibility of errors in value identification caused by the fact that two serial numbers are on the valve. Another valve on the audit list (MOVF021) was checked and the PV0RT form listed the manufacturer's serial number and the N-Stamp number in brackets. Gulf States Utilities (GSU) should reexamine the assignment and use of component serial numbers and implement changes to minimize the possibility of identification errors.

Another item noted by the PV0RT walkdown team was that the actuator motor had been removed from M0V138. GSU responded after the walkdown stating that the removal had been authorized by GSU trouble ticket number CCP.002-11, the reason being a low megger reading on the motor. Near the end of the audit GSU indicated that the motor had been removed to a bench area for trouble shoot-ing, was repaired and reinstalled with a satisfactory megger reading. Docu-mentation was not provided to ensure that the motor would be returned to its operational status.

7-

During the documentation review, the staff noted that Revision 2 to the MOV checkout procedure 1-G-EE-18 was initiated to correct excessive torque values listed in Revision 1. Comparing Revision 1 to Revision 2, the torque values appear to be the same. GSU should review these documents and correct if necessary.

In reviewing the specification data sheets for this component, the staff observed that the valve closure time was 30 seconds, compared to 20 seconds on the PVORT form and 22 seconds listed in the " Inspection and Test Record Pro-cedure." The applicant indicated that the 20 seconds listed on the PV0RT form was correct, however, the specification sheets and Inspection and Test Record Procedure should be revised if the 20 seconds is correct. The staff's concern with the variations observed is that changes in valve closure time during the "In Service Test Program" might not be interpreted correctly. The specifica-tion data sheets listed requirements for stem leakoff which did not appear to be in place on the valve. The applicant should review the requirements and if correct, verify that stem leakoff requirements have been provided.

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification require-ments for this valve.

3.7 B33-F060A - Flow Control Valve (NSSS)

This 20-inch rotary ball valve's normal function is flow control of the recirculation pump to maintain desired reactor power, with its safety function being maintenance of pressure boundary integrity.

During the walkdown inspection, the PV0RT team noted a reject tag on the valve. Responding to a request by the staff for information concerning the nature of the rejection, GSU quickly produced the applicable nonconformance and disposition report.

Another request by the staff for the manufacturer's production test re-port and preoperational test plan was quickly complied with and upon staff review, these documents were found to be satisfactory.

The staff's finding is that the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated operability qualification for this valve.

3.8 ISWP-P2A Standby Service Water Pump (B0P)

This electrically driven vertical turbine-type pump is required to pro-vide cooling water for safety-related equipment if normal service water is lost (Reference 3.B.2a,b). The equipment is located in the standby service water pumphouse with the main support at El. 118 feet.

The pumps are required to operate during three modes of operation, .if the normal service water system is inoperative:

8

1. For the first 10 minutes after the LOCA, one pump is required at a flow of 3,430 gpm and a discharge head of 106 feet.
2. 10 minutes after a LOCA, a second pump is required in parallel with the first pump, for a combined flow of 12,020 gpm at a discharge head of 145 feet.
3. The third mode occurs during a loss of site power condition, when two pumps are required in parallel for a combined flow of 15,380 gpm at a discharge head of 170 feet. Each pump must be capable of delivering 7,690 gpm at 170 feet head.

This pump is manufactured by the Hayward Tyler Pump Company whose pumps are the subject of IE Bulletin number 83-05 that recommends users of HTPC pumps conduct pump performance / endurance tests to ensure reliability of the pumps.

In response to the staff's request for the status of the applicant's com--

pliance with the recommendations in IE Bulletin number 83-05, the utility pro-duced a letter from GSU to the Region IV Office of Inspection and Enforcement dated August 16, 1983 that provides a description of the test plan for the pump performance / endurance test. The letter also includes a statement that GSU is developing a pump and valve in service test program in compliance with the rules of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWP. GSU indicated in the letter that the system hydrostatic pressure tests for the pump had not been performed as required by the ASME code, however, the letter included details of the pressure test procedure to be used for the pump.

The staff finds the test plans developed by GSU for this pump satisfac-tory, however, satisfactory completion of the performance / endurance test in particular is required to provide confidence in the pump's operability.

Documentation provided for staff review included factory performance test results, vibration test results from a coupled run, preliminary alignment data, and various test procedures.

The performance data agreed with specification requirements, however, the staff notes that the vibration data presented used peak velocity in inches /

second and the General Machinery Vibration Severity Chart for acceptability as opposed to the pump specification requirement that peak to peak vibration amplitudes, are not to exceed the limits shown in Figure 66 of the Hydraulic Institute Standards. The staff's concern is that this inconsistency in the use of vibration parameters can lead to errors when comparisons are made with baseline data, also, the acceptance criteria used by GSU in conjunction with the General Machinery Vibration Severity Chart appear to be less conservative than the limits found in Figure 66 of the Hydraulic Institute Standard, i

9 I

m-. --

Staff review of preliminary alignment data presented by GSU raised a con-cern over the fact that the pump shaft indicated runout of .004 inches was larger than the manufacturer's specified maximum coupled runout of .002 inches.

The staff finds that the applicant's operability program for this pump is comprehensive, however, operability qualification is subject to resolution of the staff concerns particularly successful completion of the tests outlined in IE 83-05.

3.9 ,1E12-M0VF021 inch Globe Valve (B0P)

This valve remains closed during normal plant operation. It is opened remote manually when RHR pump test operations are performed.

This component was picked at the start of the audit to determine the applicant's ability to retrieve documents and to ascertain the completeness of the central files.

After the walkdown, the staff requested documentation applicable to a nonconformance tag observed on the actuator motor. A review of the documenta-tion provided indicated that the motor starter housing had been welded to the motor flange. The disposition was to use the motor temporarily while awaiting a replacement. The staff agrees with the disposition, however, they remain concerned with the possible effects of weld heat en the mating flange and shaft.

Other documents produced by the applicant and reviewed by the staff indi-cated satisfactory test results for tests that included a hydrostatic shell test, wedge test, seat test, oack seat test, and packing test. A review of the valve specification data sheets listed requirements for valve steam leak-i off, which did not appear to be in place on the valve. The applicant should review the requirements and if correct, verify that the stem leakoff require-ments have been met.

Subject to the resolution of the concerns listed, the staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the operability qualification re-quirements for this valve.

3.101HVC-MOV1B inch Butterfly Valve (BOP)

The normal function of the valve is to circulate outside air to ac units used for the control room, with its safety function being to close and isolate the main control room from the outside environment during a LOCA.

During the PV0RT team walkdown, it was noted that the actuator had a dif-ferent serial number than that listed on the PV0RT form. In checking, the applicant found that the serial number observed during the walkdown was that of the actuator adaptor and that the actuator itself was correctly serial-ized. The staff's concern is the possibility of identification error as had occurred during the walkdown.

10

e At the staff's request, the applicant produced documentation demonstrat-ing that the hydrostatic shell test, main seat leakage test, and cold cyclic tests had been performed in accordance with specification requirements.

When questioned about a low value of seal torques use in the static analysis, the applicant quickly produced the calculations, verified that there was an error in the seal torque value used, however, even when corrected, ample stress margin remained.

The staff finds that the applicant has satisfactorily completed the oper-ability requirements for this valve, subject to resolution of the staff concerns.

4 CONCLUSIONS The staff concludes that GSU has assembled a group of dedicated personnel involved in the design, qualification, installation, and testing of the plant equipment. During the PVORT review, a number of generic and specific com-ponent concerns were raised. Some specific component concerns were satisfac-torily resolved by either supplying additional information, or by demonstrat-ing that appropriate commitments are already addressed by administrative controls. However, numerous generic and specific component qualification con-cerns still exist and are summarized in the following section entitled,

" Generic Concerns" Section 3 of this report and in Table 2 entitled " Audit Findings." In general, it was concluded that a more systematic approach should be developed to perform the acceptance review of safety-related equipment.

GENERIC CONCERNS In many instances, it was observed that evidence of complete qualifi-cation is lacking and currently unavailable. More recent documenta-tion packages were incomplete and appeared to be put together without checking.

During the acceptance review of equipment, a procedure should be de-veloped to identify limited life parts and ensure their replacement at appropriate intervals.

The PVORT long forms contained numerous inconsistencies ranging from serial numbers, capability, and qualification information of the actual equipment.

Procedures should be established to return tested equipment to its qualified status.

Components were .found to be incorrectly or improperly installed. Pro-cedures should be established verifying equipment installation re-quirements and qualification. i

't 11 I

..----.-- =. - -- - -- - - -

l All pumps and valves important to safety have had their required

. pre-operational -tests conpleted prior to fuel loads.

All pumps and valves important to safety are qualified prior to fuel loads.

None of the new loads applicable to pumps and valves important to ,

safety exceed those loads originally used to qualify the equipment.

I I

'J i

d I

- 6 J

K

c. y __,,, , ,._ __ .- , --r

Table 2. Audit Findings.

Page 1 of 6 Plant I.D.- Safety Number Description Function Findings / Resolution Status Remarks E22-F015 20-inch Open in re- The operability of Open motor oper- sponse to the valve was estab-ated gate either a sup- lished using analysis valve pression pool only. A test program (NSSS). high-level is presently being signal or a performed and.a simi-low condensate lar analysis with a tank level - similar valve which containment was tested will be isolation. submitted as demon-stration of operabil-ity and qualifica-tion.

.ISWP-P2A Standby ser- Provide cool- - Clari fy vibration Open

[; vice water ing water for acceptance criteria-pump (B0P). safety-related (displacement velo-equipment if city)?

normal service - Coupling runout Open water is lost. value (driven member) is inconsistent with alignment require-ment.

- Pump's weight incor- Open rect on PVORT sheets.

- Final qualification Open subject to compliar.ce with endurance test-ing recommended in I&E Bulletin 83-05.

B33-F060A 20-inch flow Maintain pres- Satisfactory Closed control sure boundary valve integrity.

(NSSS).

-- . . _ _ = _ . - - -. .. - ___ _ -- _ - . . - _ . _ __ - - .-.

Table 2. Audit Findings (Cont'd.)

a Page 2 of 6 Plant I.D. Safety Number Description Function Findings / Resolution Status Remarks IE12-MOVF021 14-inch Containment - Have sten leakoff Open motor oper- isolation. requirements been ated globe met?

, valve (B0P). - N&D No. 6189 motor Open

starter housing weld-ed to motor flange.

llave possible effects

! of welding on valve flange and valve shaft assembly been considered?

- Dates of issue on Open

- . . qualified documents

  • very recent (i .e.,

ST-7003 " Operability Test Procedure" is dated 11/2/84 which was the exit meeting date). Completeness and approval re-quired.

1HVC-MOV1B 24-inch M0 Isolate main - Actuator is serial- Open butterfly control room ized (260880), adap-valve (B0P). during LOCA. ter plate is also serialized (260953).

PVORT. form picked up the adapter serial no. in place of the actuator no. Clarifi-cation required.

o Table 2. Audit Findings (Cont'd.)

Page 3 of 6 >

Plant I.D. Safety Number Description Function Findings / Resolution Status Remarks ICCP-MOV138 10-inch Outboard con- Valve has serial no. Open motor oper- tainment iso- 809 (1980) on "N" ated gate lation valve. stamp tag. Manufac-valve (B0P). turer's name plate serial no, is 1413-2. PV0RT form lists valve serial no. as 809 (1980).

Inspection and test record form lists serial no. as 1413.

Clarification re-quired.

- Stroke time re- Open

quirements need clari fication, they vary from 30 sec.

(spec. sheet) to 22

.sec. (inspection and test record) to 20 sec. (PVORT form).

- Have stem leakoff Open requirements been provided?

- Have space heaters Open been removed?

- Rev. 2 to MOV Open Checkout Procedure 1 1-G-EE-18 initiated due to excessive torque values in Rev. 1. Comparing Rev. I and 2, the torque valves appear to be the same?

c Table 2. Audit Findings (Cont'd.)

Page 4 of 6 Plant I.D. Safety Number Description Function Findings / Resolution Status Remarks B21-A0VF32A 20-inch Containment Satisf actory Closed check valve- isolation and (80P). reactor cool-ent pressure bounda ry.

E33-SOV14 2-inch Provide ini- - Valve installation Open solenoid tial pressuri- contradicts note 18 operated zation of main of FSAR Fi g. 6.7-1, globe valve steam positive qualification docu- '

(BOP). leak control mentation and manu-system. facture recc.1menda-tions.

EI - If the working Open fluid (air) provides opening force; what is the minimum air pressure required to open the valves?

- Are the forces de- Open livered by the spring capable of closing the valve against the loads of the working fluid?

- What assurance is Open there that the de-livered air quality is in agreement with the manufacturer's requirements?

C Table 2. Audit Findings (Cont'd.)

c Page 5 of 6 Plant I.D. Safety Number Description Function Findings / Resolution Status ~ Remarks E33-S0V14 - List tests per- Open (Cont'd.) formed by GStl to date or to be performed in the future.

- How is or will GSU Open track manufacturer's recommendations re-garding maintain-ability of components subject to aging?

E12-C002C RHR pump Supply water - How is pump perfor- Open (NSSS), to the core in mance (curves, vibra-t; the event of tion levels, bearing an accident. temp., etc.) estab-Supression lished without the pool cooling, use of manufacturer's data / accept er.ue cri-teria?

- Discharge pressure Open transmitter has a.re-ject tag and as built acceptance tag?

Clarify difference and the reason for the reject tag and the action taken.

- Serial number on Open motor qualification documentation and long form disagree.

l Table 2. Audit Findings (Cont'd.)

Page 6 of 6 (

Plant I.D. Safety Number Description Function. Findings / Resolution Status Remarks E12-C002C - Clarify the differ- Open (Cont'd.) ences between G.E.

specification 21A3504, Rev. I and 21A3504BV, Rev. 0 (e.g., removal of IEEE Standards - is this component built  ;

to IEEE, if not just-i fy why.

- Clarify how GSil Open will or has identi-fled parts sensitive to aging mechanism 5; and how they will be tracked.

E12PC003 RHR - sub- Maintain RHR - The specification Open system fill system piping specifies demin, water pump (B0P). filled and on data sheet while ready for RHR the pump actually pump startup. takes suction from suppression pool..

What effect does this have on operability, performance, life of wear rings, bearings, seals, impellers, etc.

- At reduced voltages Open what is the capabil-ity of the pump /

motor, and does it meet the requirements of the system?