ML20054H881
| ML20054H881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1982 |
| From: | Stickley T EG&G, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054H876 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8206250132 | |
| Download: ML20054H881 (23) | |
Text
.
.m.
o CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER P!. ANTS RIVER BEND STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket No. [458/459]
AUTHOR T. H. Stickley Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley EG&G Idaho, Inc.
i May 1982 82062501:52 820615 PDR ADOCK 05000458 A
PDR n
ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction.
This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for River Bend Station (RBS), Units 1 and 2.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
4
-River Bend Station does not totally comoly with the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
In general, compliance is insufficient in the following areas:
Satisfactory action on Guidelines 1, 2, and 6 has been promised o
but not completed Gulf States Utilities Company has not satisfactorily responded to o
Guidelines 3, 4, and 5 The main report contains recommendations which will aid in bringing the above items into compliance with the appropriate guidelines.
' ~*
/
k
-... ~ _. -.... -
~
..:.....~..-...-
CONTENTS Section
. Title Page ABSTRACT............................................................
4!
EX EC UT I V E S U MMA RY....................................................,/,
1.
INTRODUCTION.................................................... /
1.1 Purpose of Review......................................... /
1.2 Generic Background........................................ /
1.3 Plant-Specific Background................................
3 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................
$/
2.1 Overview.................................................. 4/
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems...................... 4/
2.3 General Guidelines........................................ 6 3.
CON C LUDING S UMMARY.............................................. / g4 3.1 Applicabl e Load Handl ing Systems.......................... / g4 3.2 Guideline Recommendations................................. / $4 3.3 Interim Protection........................................ /;7 4
REFERENCES......................................................
/7 TABLES 3.1 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix River Bend Station 1 and 2 2*O s
4
.4a 4
e TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT
[03 RIVER BEND STATICN, UNITS 1 AND 2 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purcose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho Inc. review of general load handling policy and proceduras at RBS 1 and 2.
This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.
1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criterta and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information l
concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control o,f Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this avaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, ao not* adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.
i
)
__.-.._._--..._-.:..-..s-.--
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines cesigned to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general l
/
go4d 1ines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that l
3, all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines iden'tified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5 is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in.significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:
o provide sufficient operator training, handling system
~
design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.
define safe load travel paths through procedures and o
operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment provide mechanical stops or electrical interlock.s to prevent o
movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
S2
... - =
a :
...i..
.~.
n _ _
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.
1.3 Plant-Soecific Background In December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Gulf States Utilities Co (GSU), the Licensee for RBS 1 and 2 requesting that the j
Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at RBS 1 and 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.
On June 24, 1981, GSU provided the initial response (4] to this request.
e e
N *,'
/
e
2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize GSU's review of heavy load handling at RBS 1 and 2 accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions and recommendations to the licensee for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0G12. Gsu's review of the facilities does not differentiate between the two units so it is assumed that both units are of identical design. The licensee has not indicated the weight of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2).
EG&G has assumed the nominal heavy load for a BWR to be 1200 pounds.
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems 9
This section reviews the licensee's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above mentioned list.
2.2.1 Sceoe
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation frem any load-impact point and any.
safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
~
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements
~-
"The only overhead handling system from which a load drop may result in damage to safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment is the reactor building polar crane (RSPC). The equipment of
-+- -
+
" ~ - '
- ..- w.
.. ce,=ce...s== m
- +. c. e =r%.e=
=,4-*=-e.
% - m ew *. *~~ - * *
" "'**" ~
_~~~~***"*T*_
'~
......m--
- - a -- =
-. ~ =
~ w -...
.-~:..--. ----
concern with regard to the RBPC srs containment unit coolers (1HVR*UCIA,B; el 162'3")", hydrogen mixing fans (CPM *FNIA,8; el l
162'3")I, hydrogen recomoiners (IHCS'RBNRIA,B; el 186'3")',
and various containment atmosphere monitoring isolation valves and their respective lines. A polar crane load drop analysis is currently being performed and will be incorporated into the FSAR in a future amendment, as per FSAR Section 9.1.4.3."
"The definition of heavy load, a loac whose weight is greater than the com ined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool, as promulgated by NUREG-0612 precludes the consideration of: Jib crane located adjacent to the containment fuel storage pool; channel handling boom; and various containment cranes including the refueling and auxiliary platforms and the fuel building's fuel handling platform. All cranes mentioned above are not expected to carry loads heavier than a spent fuel assembly.
The fuel building bridge crane (FBBC,15 ton) and the spent fuel cask trolley (SFCT,125 ton) carry no loads over safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment and are precluded from consideration (the attached FSAR text and figures elaborate).
The radwaste building overhead crane, turoine building crane, and intake structure gantry crane do not carry heavy loads over safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment."
" Attached are figures locating spent fuel and safety-related equipment."
8.
EG&G Evaluation The Licensee has not supplied a statement of the actual weight of a " heavy load" for RBS 1 and 2.
The figures supplied are small and of poor quality and hence do not supply sufficient information for EG&G to corroborate the statements quoted in 2.2.1A.
A chart showing loads which will be handled by the Reactor Building Polar crane was supplied in the submittal.
s ye s
a.
Safety related equipment.
.b~
l l
l C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EG&G EBEB conclude that the Licensee has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply witn the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.
2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1.
EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.
The NRC has established seven general guidlines which must be met in '
order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads.
These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
A.
Guideline 1--Safe Lead Paths B.
Guideline 2--Load Handling Procedures C.
Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training O.
Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices E.
Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed)
~
F.
Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)
G.
Guideline 7--Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of s
4 O q,4
'b
- Y.
__**'*'I_.I
" " ' " * ~ '
.. w -.
L.
-.........w..a....-..-...-.-a-------~
-. a the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.
2.3.1 Safa Load paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(1)]
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated', fuel in tne reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
A.
Summary of Lice.1see Statements
" Attached are figures locating spent fuel and safety-related equipment. Safe load paths will be defined pending the completion of the polar crane load drop analysis."
8.
EG&G Evaluation No evaluation is possible.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) Safe load paths hcve not been developed at RBS 1 and 2 and, consequently, RBS 1 and 2 are not in compliance with Guideline 1.
(2) GSU should develop safe load paths in accordance with Guideline 1, and submit them to NRC in sufficient time that they may be reviewed and approved before fu,el loading.
7
2.3.2 Load Handling procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(2)1
" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum procedures should cover nandling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures should include:
identification of required euqipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements "Having defined safe load paths after due consideration of the results of the polar crane load drop analysis, measures ensuring observance of these paths will include operator training and written procedures."
GSU has also stated that procedures covering the handling of loads by the Reactor Building Polar Crane will be written prior to fuel load.
B.
EG&G Evaluation When GSU produces the promised procedure they will be in compliance with Guideline 2.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) Procedures have not been developed at RBS 1 and 2 and, consequently, RBS 1 and 2 are not in compliance with Guideline 2.
(2) GSU should develop the required procedures, in accordance with Guideline 2, before fuel loading.
e a
ege 4
m ow
-+-me E __ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
_ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
.~
i 2.3.3 Crane Ocerator Training [ Guideline 3. NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)]
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,
' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [5]."
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements "The guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1975 will be followed, where applicable, with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct."
8.
EG&G Evaluation The qualifier "where applicable" is not in accordance with Guideline 3.
Departures from the requirements of ANSI 4
B30.2-1976 should be specifically justified to NRC.
C.
EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations GSU will be in compliance with Guideline 3 by taking the following action:
(1) Commit to compliance with the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 before fuel Joading (2) Specifically justify any exception taken to the requirements of ANSI B30.2 1976.
2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI B30.2 1976.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..3.4 Soecial Lifting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.I(4)1
~:
"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSk N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [6]. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Y
Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements
" ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI B30.9-1971 do not pertain to the REPC, the dryer / separator strongeack, or the head /strongback carousel. Any use of slings will comply with ANSI B30.9-1971."
B.
EG&G Evaluation EG&G feels that the devices mentioned above do meet the definition of "special lifting device" per page 1-2 of NUREG 0612, although no drawings illustrating the devices in 2.3.4A. were supplied.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) GSU should submit an analysis of special lifting devices as required by Guideline 4 and ANSI N 14.6-1978.
(2) The submittal should be provided in a timely manner so that it may be reviewed and approved before fuel loading.
2.3.5 Liftino Devices (Not Soecially Desicned) (Guiceline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)J
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [7]. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static loac' wnich produces the maximum static and
/0
$ 6 66 mW*' *WIWW *,46 6e=P elumfum s
.ma h=m e me.
e
.__..,,.___m_.~.-.m_....---.-
dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."
l A.
Summary of Licensee Statements
" ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI B30.9-1971 do not pertain to the RBPC, the dryer / separator strongback, or the head /strongeack carousel. Any use of slings will comply with ANSI B30.9-1971."
3.
EG&G Evaluation Compliancs with ANSI B30.9 is not sufficient. Guideline 5 modifies the rated load requirements and requires sling marking.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) GSU should commit to compliance with Guideline 5 and complete the required action before fuel loading.
2.3.6 Cranes (Inscection, Testing, and Maintenance) fGuideline 6.
NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(6)1 l
l "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overnead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and I
test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified l
inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR l
containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during I
refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.
For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."
s
//
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements
" Inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976."
8.
EG&G Evaluation GSU has committed to complying with the requirements of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, without the modifications permitted by Guideline 6.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations RBS 1 and 2 will be in compliance with Guideline 6 if this program is in effect before fuel loading. Actually, the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedure should begin as soon as the cranes are installed.
2.3.7 Crane Desian fGuideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)1 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements l
"THe RBPC design includes the applicable design requirements of AWS 01.1, NEC Article 610, NEMA MG1-18.501 through MG1-18.518', and CMAA Specification No. 70 as a Service Class
~
s r
I
/2 1
i
(
- ~ ~... -...
L
A-1 crane. The REPC is designed to Seismic Category I i
requirements. 29CFR17, Part 1910.179 (including amendment l
dated July 1, 1973) and ANSI B30.2.0 are also incorporated into the crane design."
8.
EG&G Evaluation EG&G has accepted, based on very limited information, the concept that GSU has included all appliable hoists and cranes in 2.2.1A, above. Having accepted the statement that the RBPC is the only applicable hoist or crane, EG&G g conclude 5that this crane is in compliance with Guideline 7.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recomendations The RBPC is in compliance with Guideline 7.
1 e
O "q.*
l
/3
~
3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
3.1 Aoplicable Load Handling Systems The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the Licensee as being subject to the, provisions of NUREG-0612 is probably adequate (see Section 2.2.1).
However, EG&G does recommend that a more thorough justification be provided for excluding those cranes which are not included.
3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling (Section 2.3) are partially satisfied at R85 1 and 2.
This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
Specific recommecations to aid in compliance with the intent of these guidelines are provided 4
as follows:
s
.s If
.....-.a_.
....s t
Guideline Recommendation
- 1. (Section 2.3.1) a.
Safe load paths should be developed in accordance with Guideline 1, and suomitted to NRC in sufficient time that tney may oe reviewed and approved before fuel loading.
- 2. (Section 2.3.2) x a.
Develop the required procecure, in accordance with Guideline 2, before fuel loading.
- 3. (Section 2.3.3) a.
Commit to compliance with the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 before fuel loading.
- 4. (Section 2.3.4) a.
Submit an analysis of special lifting devices as required by.
Guideline 4 and AN'SI*N 14.6-1978.
/7
Guideline Recommen,cg on
- 5. (Section 2.3.5) a.
Connit-to compliance with Guideline 5 and complete the required action before fuel loading.
- 6. (Section 2.3.6) a.
Compliance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI 830.2-1976 should be in effect before fuel loading.
b.
Compliance should begin when the cranes are installed.
e
- 7. (Section 2.3.7) a.
The RBPC is in compliance with Guideline 7.
e b
Opp
/
=
I4 69 9-*g>,w@ %_qg
- a:>gus_
--mh-- - -
s..
- ... :. a '
_n.--
p 3.3 Interim Protection EG&G's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that the six NRC staff measures for interim protection at [ Plant] are met:
Interim Neasure Recommendation Interim measure EG&G recomends that GSU commit to bringing RBS 1 were not addressed and 2 into compliance with NUREG 0612 Guidelines before fueling.
If this is not accomplished, it will be necessary to address interim measures.
4 s
O e s,e
/
e
/7
4.
REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants NRC 2.
V. Stallo, Jr. (NRC)
Letter to all ifcensees.
Subject:
Request for Acditional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978 3.
USNRC Letter to Gulf States Utilities.
Subject:
NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 22 December 1980 4
Gulf States Utilities Letter to Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, RBG10 10,612, File No. G9.11 5.
" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" s
s
\\%
-x--
1 6.
" Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials" 7.
" Slings" 8.
CMAA-70
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes"
.i e
s Oy
/
/7
l TAllt f 1.1.
tillRf G 0612 ColFil Afiff IIAIRit RIVER BElN) SIAll0ll5 1 A!N) 2 lleigh t Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 or Crane Special Cra ne. les t Equiprrat Capacity Safe load Operator lifting and l
_ lleavy Loads (tons)
Paths Procedures Training Devices Slings Inspection Crane Design
_ Designation l
Reactor Building 100/5 R
R NC llc IIC R
C l
Polar Crane i
Drywll llead 56 l
RPV llead 84 i
Steam Dryer 36 l
Steam Separator 49 Portable Refueling 20 Shield
}
RPV llead 15 Insulation add j
Support Frame
(
b l
c - 4c m.se n a
A~,
a.mp ba, a.A; Mvxaa oa/2 l
/\\/C =
decs no/ c-n>p/y a s/4 JVvM4 O&/2 K = 4 c-o.sae sr.,
,o,,,,,.r a nw,, a r, Sn,4,ng.,, /.
comp /7 w.46 4% e4 os/2 j
T=
Z~v~ sws/ciar Zx~ faemariais t%ais eo a./ di e es,.r a e ke 0]l
$O S/
- /)
O fW Y Ok
- e t
4 0
\\
S.
i l
_ _ _. __