ML20106A663

Technical Evaluation Rept,Control of Heavy Loads, Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2

ML20106A663
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/24/1984
From:	Bomberger C CALSPAN CORP.
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML20106A667	List: ML20106A663
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07971, TAC-12946, TAC-7971, TER-C5506-332-3, TER-C5506-332-333, NUDOCS 8410100580
Download: ML20106A663 (30)

Text

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4 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-313, 50-368 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07971, 12946 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASKS 332, 333 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia,PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. Sargent Preparedfor Nuclear R6Julatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or impiled, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report.pr represents that its use by such third party would not ininnge privately owned rights.

Prepared by: Reviewe by: Approved by:

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TER-C5506-332/333 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 21 3 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . 24 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 24 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 O

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TER-C5506-332/333 FORENORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coussission (Office of

, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in aupport of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in act:ordance with criteria established by the NRC.

Nr. C. R. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with NESTIC Services, Inc.

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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF RIVIEN This technical evaluation report documents the an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Arkansas Power and Light Company's Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of

, NUREG-0612, " Control of Beavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND 4

Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear

, mogulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 (2) to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Beavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The sta,ff'r, conclusion from this evaluation was that esisting measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be apgraded. ,

In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an aooepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the

'abjective, ashkewed through a set of general guidelines identified in 55130-0412, section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at 7.,

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Tut-C5506-332/333 nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failurs is uniformly ses11 and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. {

The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through . . , 5 is1 5

- to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small .

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four i accident analysis evaluation criteria. i A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probabilities of failure are appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

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define safe load travel paths, through procedures and operator I training, so that, to the extent p.a.:tical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated "el or safe shutdown equipment o

provide sufficient operator train.ng, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 af NUREG-0612.

Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented'at operating plants .

2.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC' BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NaC issued a letter [3J to Arkansas Power and light Company (APL), the Licensee for ANO, requesting that the Licensee review Provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at ANO, evaluate these provisions with r'espect to the guidelines of WUREG-0612, and provide certain l

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TER-C5506-332/333 additional information to be used for an independent detersination of conformance to these guidelines. On February 17, 1981, AP~ . provided the -

initial response [4] to this request. The Licensee provided additional information by letter on June 22, 1981 [5] and by telephone conversation on November 30, 1981 (6). Additional information was provided subsequent to the telephone conversation on November 12, 1982 (7), June 8, 1984 [8], and August 31, 1984 19), and has been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.

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2. EVALUATION This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at ANO with respect to Nta: staff guidelines provided in

EUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Iicensee-provided information is summarised and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the estent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads.

These guidelines consist of the following criteria from section 5.1.1 of EUREG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Faths Guideline 2 - Load Nandling Procedures ,

Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training j Guideline 4 - special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes ,(Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design. ,

i These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling

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systems and programs in order to handle heavy 1oads in the vicinity of the i

reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas j ubere a 2oad drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verifica-tion of the estent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and an evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

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TER-C5506-332/333 2.1.1 , Safe Load Paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-_0612, Article 5.1.l(1)]

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimise the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown en equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load.is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee indicated that safe load patha have been defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, i

to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool or to impact safe shutdown equipment. These load paths are defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and will be clearly marked on the floor in

, the area where the load is to be handled prior to moving the load. Deviations from defined load paths will require written alternative procedures approved by the Plant Safety Committee. In addition, safe load , sones have been developed for the spent fuel shipping casks,.which provide specific bounds for crane movement and delineate pathways where casks are to be carried. The Licensee noted that these load paths will be reviewed when casks are eventually moved and deviations, if necessary, will require the approval of the Plant Safety Committee. .

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b,.~ Evaluation and Conclusion Safe load paths which have been developed at ANO satisfy the criteria of f

Guideline 1, including those load paths which have been developed for spent fuel shipping casks.

4 2.1.2 Load Bandling Procedures { Guideline 2, MUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2)]

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to y- .

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TER-C5506-332/333 Irradiated fuel or. safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures

- should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

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a. Summary of Licens~ee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that " procedures have been developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. These procedures cover handling of loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures include the followings inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of the load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads definition of the safe load paths; other special precautions."

Generic procedures which comply with this criterion have also been developed for the spent fuel shipping casks. As noted for safe load paths, these generic procedures will be reviewed prior to movement of any shipping

. cask, and deviations or revisions, if required, will receive the proper approvals. -

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Load handling procedures have been developed and implemented by APL in a manner consistent with that specified in Guideline 2, including those procedures developed for the spent fuel sisipping cask. This finding is based en APL's verification that these procedures cover handling of all loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612 and satisfy the criteria specified in the guideline.

l 2.1.3 . Crane Operator Training (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)]

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance.with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1975, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [10)."

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Selected ANO employees have been trained and qualified as crane operators in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

APL has also made a commitment to establish appropriate procedures for monitoring operator conduct and assuring proper qualification of crane operators. This program is to include preparation of a training effectiveness evaluation to be administered to crane operators,

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Crane operator training, conduct, and qualification programs being implemented at ANO satisfy the criteria of Guideline 3.

2.1.4 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' (11).

This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads-in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu, of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is

in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device." ,

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee identified the following special lifting devices to be subject to the criteria of Guideline 4:

Unit 1 l

o head and internals handling fixture (tripod) (HIHF) o internals handling adapter (IHA) o laternals handling extension (IEE) o ISI tool lift rig (ARIS)

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TER-C5506-332/333 Unit 2 a

o reactor head maintenance structure lift beam (RNMS LB) o refueling seal plate lift rig (RSP LR) o closure hecd lif t rig (CH LR) o upper guide structure lift rig'(UGS LR) o ISI (PAR) tool lift rig o hydraset A complete list of load bearing co:sponents, actual stresses, yield stress, and ultimate stress has been tabulated. Review of available documentation indicates that all devices were specifically designed for the intended application, and were assigned to either AISC criteria or in-house criteria similar to that of ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF.

. The following are the minimum design factors of safety for each of the devices:

Device Minimum Y.S. Minimum U.S.

Unit 1 HIHF 2.7 4.3 HIA 2.96 3.53 HIE 3.8 6.1 ARIS 2.55 6.38

• Unit 2 CHLR 4.63 9.0

'RHMS LB 3.16 . 5.1 RSP LR 5.2 8.4 UGS LR 3.2 5.06 PAR 2.63 4.73

, Hydraset 3.24 4.94 l

For the Unit 1 head and internals handling fixture, the Licensee stated that actual margins are considered to be acceptable since the design load of the l device is in excess of 300 tons (actual load weight is 81 tons). Similarly for the internals handling adapter, existing values are considered acceptable since design load is nearly three times actual load. For the ISI (ARIS) tool

' lift rig, review of vendor documentation indicates that this device was l designed to meet the intent of NUREG-0612. Although the minimum yield strength of this device is only 85% of ANSI N14.6-1978 criteria, the design I

margin was based upon extreme load conditions, not normal operational loads.

The minisca yield strength of the Unit 2 PAR lift rig is 88% of the specified ANSI design margin, which is also considered to be acceptable. (Dynamic

TER-C5506-332/333

= considerations were applied in the determination of design margins for all devices.)

Based upon a review of design requirements and available documentation, the Licensee reached the following conclusions:

Special lifting devices in use in Unit 1 meet the intent of , ANSI o

N14.6-1978 with the following exceptions:

1. No documentation is available on the load tests performed on the head and internals handling fixture or the handling fixture extension (the internals handling adapter legs were load tested to the full weight of the core barrel assembly) .

2. While. design specifications do not exist, design requirements are adequately documented in design calculations and on design drawings.

o Special lifting devices in use at Unit 2 meet the intent of' ANSI N14.6-1978.with the following exceptions:

1. The closure head lift rig, reactor head maintenance structure lift beam, the refueling seal plate lift rig, and the ISI tool lift rig were not load tested.

As a baseline for future compliance, NDE inspections of all devices have been performed with satisfactory results. (The Unit 1 head and internals lift rig will be inspected; any defects noted will be corrected in accordance with guidance of ANSI N14.6.) . To ensure that these devices will provide continuing reliability, the Licensee plans to incorporate inspections identified in ANSI N14.6-1978 (non-destructive examination [NDE]) into the plant's ISI plan, such that critical welds and components will be inspected over a 10-year ISI interval. -

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b. Evaluation

.Although not originally designed to ANSI N14.6-1978, it is apparent fron l

the Licensee's response that devices in use will provide a high degree of load handling reliability. Design margias employed in these devices satisfy ANSI requirements, with limited exceptions. For the exceptions noted, devices were designed based on design loads in excess of the actual loads lifted, or the design margins are within a reasonable percentage of ANSI values.

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TER-C5506-332/333 Although all lif ting devices have not been load tested, the Licensee has provided assurances of fabrication practices and reliability of the devices

- based upon the well-established design margins and the extensive inspections and NDE performed on these devices.

Lastly, the Licensee has provided reasonable assurances that these devices will continue to perform their functions in a highly reliable manner.

NDE of critical welds on a periodic basis is consistent with the intent of the ANSI standard based upon the limited frequency of use, sole-purpose design, and' controlled storage of these devices.

c. Conclusion Design of special lifting devices at ANO, as well as implementation of programs which ensure their continued reliability, is. consistent with the intent of Guideline

• 4.

2.1.5 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) (Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5)]

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [9].

However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only i- certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with

[ which they may be used."

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a. Susunary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions l.

l APL made a commitment to establish a suitable program for use and installation of slings, with respect to inspection, replacement, and other L safe operating practices, which will satisfy the requirements of ANSI l

B30.9-1971. The Licensee also stated that selection and marking of slings will incorporate dynamic loading as identified in the general guideline.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion APL satisfies the requirements of this guideline based on their verification that a program will be etablished for installation and use of slings which complies with ANSI B30.9-1971 and the dynamic loading criteria identified in this guideline.

2.1.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, 5

Section 5.1.l(6)]

"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use).*

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A program has been developed which natisfies the criteria of Guideline 6 for inspection, testing, and maintenance of overhead and gantry cranes.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion

, The Licensee satisfies the criteria of Guideline 6, based on the verifica-tion of such compliance by APL of its crane inspection, testing, and mainten-ance program.

2.1.7 Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(711 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and

guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of AteSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [13). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

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m. Susmary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee evaluated the following ANO cranes to determine design compliance with CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976:

o Unit 1 and Unit 2 polar cranes o fuel and'new fuel handling cranes o auxiliary fuel handling crane o intake structure gantry crane.

The Licensee stated that the ANO Unit 2 polar crane (2L2) and new fuel handling crants (2L35) were both designed and constructed to CHAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 specifications. Both cranes, therefore, comply with the criteria of Guideline 7.

The auxiliary fuel handling crane is a 2-ton standard manufacturer's motorized-trolley hoist, which is suspended from an I-beam welded to one of the-main bridge girders of the fuel handling crane. Since the hoist is integral with the fuel handling' crane, the Licensee states that certain CMAA and ANEI. requirements should be met by the hoist, particularly where the structural integrity of the fuel handling crane is affected.. The auxiliary fuel handling crane was also revjased by ANO to verify conformance with the requirements of ANSI B30.11-1973, " Monorail Systems and bnderhung Cranes" 114], and ANSI B30.16-1973, " Overhead Hoists" [15), and were found to comply with the intent of both standards.

The ANO Unit 1 polar crane (L2) and fuel handling .zane (L3) were designed and constructed prior to the issuance of,CHAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976. Both cranes were constructed in accordance with ROCI-61, " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" [16), whidh was then superseded by CMAA-70.

The Licensee stated that the intake structure gantry crane was also designed and constructed prior to the issunace of CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 Smt was built to BOCI-61. APL performed a point-by-point

• review of CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 requirements. The intake structure gantry crane was found to be in nonWiance with only one criterion (2-1.3.1.d) of ANSI B30.2-1976, which specifies that outdoor storage gantry cranes shall be

provided with remotely operated rail clamps or equivalent devices and equipped

I i

TER-C5506-332/333 with a wind indicating device which'provides an audible and visual alarm at a predetermined wind velocity. The installed crane does not have renc,tely operated rail clamps or a wind indicating alarm. However, the crane does have a storm lock. ANO procedures require that crane operation be terminated, the crane load block placed on the ground or anchored upwind, and the storm lock set upon receipt of a Severe Weather Warning from the National Weather Service (NWS) ir.dicating a high probability of a tornado or winds in excess of 40 knots in the area. Therefore, the Licensee stated that the intent of this ANSI requirement is met by existing design (storm lock) and by weather warnings which are readily available from the NWS, so that a potentially hazardous load handling condition does not result from specific non-compliance with this criterion.

Review has identified the following items where revisions incorporated i into CMAA-70 were different from criteria contained in BOCl-61. However, actual design of the Unit 1 polar, fuel handling, and intake otructure gantry cranes complies with the more restrictive standards of CMAA-70. These criteria are identified as follows:

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1. Impact allowance. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane I

design calculations include an impact allowance of 0.5% df the load per foot per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 154. EOCI-61 specifies only a r

minimum allowance of 154. Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in l wucess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under BOCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70. ANO satisfies the criteria of CM4A-70 and EOCI-61 since main hoist speeds do not exceed 30 fpm.

2. Torsional forces. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires _that twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the

l. horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance l-l between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. BOCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated wita reference to girder center of gravity.

For girder sections sysmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this review), the l

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~s' TER-C5506-332/333 shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements.

Such is not the case for nonsymme-trical girder sections (e.g., channels). Box girders were used in the manufacture of cranes at ANO, satisfying the CMAA-70 requirebents.

3. Allowable W ressive stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive stresses of.approximately 50% of yield strength of the reconsended structural material (A-36) for girders where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c

' ratio) is less than or equal to 38.

Allowable compressive stresses decrease linearly for. b/c ratios in excess of 38. BOCI-61 provides a similar method for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio exceeds 41.-

Consequently, structural members with b/c ratios in the general range of 38 to 52 designed under EOCI-61 will allow a slightly higher compressive stress Shan those designed under CM4A-70.

Ratios for cranes at ANO are less than 33.6 and therefore satisfy this criterion.

4.

Bridos brake design. CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at

' least 75% of bridge motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations. A cab-on-trolley control crrangement is not used on ANO cranes subject to this review.

5. Restart protection.

CNAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires. that cranes not i

equipped with spring-return controllers,or momentary-contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. ANO cranes subject to this review are designed with spring-return controllers.

6. Longitudinal stiffeners.

i CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1 specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location ar.d l

Cinimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of f longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. Longitudinal i

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TER-C5506-332/333 4

stiffeners were not used on the intake structure craner stiffeners used on the i

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Unit 1 polar crane and fuel handling crane were chosen to satisfy seismic loading criteria and substantially meet CMAA-70 requirements, j

7. Fatique considerations. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by . indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated: loads.

BOCI-61 does not address fatigue failure. (CMAA-70 provides allouable stress ranges for loading cycles in excess of 20,000) and are not generally subjected to stress reversal (CNAA-70 allowable stress range is reduced to below the basic allowable stress for only a limited number of joint configurations) .

Fatigue failure is not a factor of consequence based on the allowable stress level for the ANO cranes.

Boist rope requirements. CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the 8.

capacity load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. BOCI 61 requires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of

, the published rope breaking strength. Boist rope capacities for the ANO cranes each exceed 20% of breaking strength and therefore satisfy CMAA-70 criteria.

9 .' Drum design. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. BOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined. Drum designs of these

, cranes satisfy CMAA-70 criteria. ,

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10. Drum design. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove >

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depth and pitch; EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. Drum groove d*Pth and pitch of the intake structure crane satisfy CMAA-70 requirements. For the auxiriary hoists of both the Unit 1 polar crane and the fuel handling crane, 1:

l this minimum depth is not met (deviations noted are 11.1% for the fuel handling crand and 6.78 for the polar crane). It is the Licensee's position i that the actual hoist groove depths provide sufficient margin of load handling safety.

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TER-C5506-332/333

11. Gear design. CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower rating'be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards i j

and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. BOCIe61 provides no similar guidance. Gear horsepower ratings for each crane satisfy CMAA-70 criteria. ,

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12. Boist brake desion.. CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist hd1 ding brakes, when used with a method of contrcl braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque.

BOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without; regard to the type of control brake employed.

For the intake structure crane, two 150% holding brakes are installed. For the polar and. fuel handling cranes, the vendor states CMAA-70 criteria are I satisfied. ,

13. Bumpers and stops. CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. Bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for the intake structure crane satisfy CMAA-70. For restaining cranes, the vendor indicates that cranes comply with CMAA-70 (no bridge bumpers installed on polar crane).

14. Static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for l magnetic control systems only. Control systems used on all cranes conform t

-with applicable requirements of CMAA-70. ,

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b. Evaluation i The Unit 2 polar crane and the new fuel handling crane satisfy the I

i criteria of Guideline 7 based upon the Licensee's verification that both

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cranes were originally designed and constructed to CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 standards. -

i Design of the auxiliary fuel handling crane satisfies the criteria of this guideline based upon the Licensee's verification that this crane conforms to the requirements of applicable industry standards.

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a TER-CS506-332/333 Although the ANO Unit 1 polar crane, fuel handling crane, and intake structure gantry crane were not designed in accordance with MAA-70, original i design in accordance with EOCI-61 indicates that they were designed in accordance with existing industrial standards, irurthermore, the Licensee performed a detailed comparison of existing design with the more restrictive.

criteria of CmA-70 and determined that existing design conforms with i

CMAA-70.

Therefore, design of these cranes is also consistent with that l identified in this guideline.

For the intake structure gantry crane, the Licensee's response that criterion 2-1.3.ld of ANSI B30.2-1976 is satisfied by the existing crane storm lock and use of APL's administrative procedures to terminate load handling operations in the event of severe weather conditions is acceptable based upon the fact that suitable procedural and administrative measures have been identified to verify that the dispatcher will notify the operator, load '

handling operations will be terminated, and the storm lock will be applied in the event of a Severe Weather Warning from the NWS.

c. Conclusion '

Design of cranes' at ANO is consistent with Guideline 7.

2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to pedvide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent feel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications y ..

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TER-C5506-332/333

2. sgecial review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection esasures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 gichnical Specifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(1))

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Sterage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel ' for BWR's, to prohibit ,

handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

a. Evaluation j Tec.hnical specifications implemented by the Licensee (Technical i- Specification 3.8.15 at ANO Unit 1 and 3.9.7 at ANO Unit 2) state the following: " Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." These technical specifi-cations satisfy the criteria of Interim Protection Measure 1.

b. Conclusion ANO complies with Interim Protection ~ Measure 1.

l 2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5) I l

" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] .. .

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of (NUREG-0612] ."

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a. Susmary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions l -

Susmasries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, ar d 2.1.6.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusions Evaluations, and conclusions, are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.6.

1 1

2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(6)]

"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, arid content of procedures."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Special attention will be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy leads over the core,

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Based upon the Licensee's verification, the criteria of this interim protection measure will be satisfied at'ANO.

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TER-C5506-332/333

3. CONCLUSION This stamary is provided to consolidate the resultr of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Arkansas Nuclear One. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other ar.eas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown huipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Arkansas Nuclear One can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in~a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include: the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit 1 -

TER-C5506-332/333 the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.13 a review of load-handling procedures and operator trainings and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure.

The evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that ANO complies with the staff's measures for interim protection.

e END

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TER-C5506-332/333

4. REFERENCES a

1. NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 ,

2. V. Stello,-Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all licensees

Subject:

. Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads '

Near . Sperit Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978

3. NRC Generic letter. 81-07 to Arkansas Nuclear One 22 December 1980

4. David C. Trimble (APL)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants 15 May 1981

5. David C. Triabile (APL)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants 22 June 1981

6. Dennis Taylor (APL)

Telecon with F. Clemenson (NRC) and I. Sargent (FRIC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads at Arkansas Nuclear One 30 November 1981

7. John R. Marshall (APL)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads

. 12 November 1982 ,

8. John R. Marshall (APL) ~

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NBC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads 8 June 1984

9. John R. Marshall (APL)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads 31 August 1984

10. ANSI B30.2-1976 ,,

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1976 e ,- . , . - . -, .w,---- - - , --.w*, w--+,,-,- ,- .,.,----+-y-mme..,__ e, ,,"vg wwr-=w---e-w-=9-t-e-'-='----* =WWw-y - ' ' ' - -

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11. ANSI N14.6-1978

" standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" American National Standards Institute, Inc.

15 February 1972

12. ANSI B30.9-1971

" Slings" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1972

13. CMAA-70

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.

1975

14. ANSI B30.11-1973

" Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes" 1

15. ANSI B30.16-1973

' Overhead Hoists"

16. Electric Overhe'ad Crane Institute

- Specification No. 61, " Spec'ifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" l

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