ML20153D432
| ML20153D432 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1988 |
| From: | Campbell D, Dycus F, Ellison B, Farquaharson J, Flanagan G, Guthrie V, Kirchner J, Kirkman J, Paula H JBF ASSOCIATES, INC., OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-B-0825, CON-FIN-B-825 NUREG-CR-5021, NUREG-CR-5021-V01, NUREG-CR-5021-V1, ORNL-TM-10604, ORNL-TM-10604-V, NUDOCS 8805090144 | |
| Download: ML20153D432 (192) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:--- ---- _ NUREG/CR-5021 Vol.1 ORNL/TM-10604/V1
. OAK RIDGE L NATIONAL q : LABORATORY a
j USER'S GUIDE FOR PRISIM ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 1 Volume 1 Program for inspectors l D. J. Campbell H. M. Paula l V. H. Guthrie B. C. Ellison J. R. Kirchner F. M. Dycus
. J. O. Kirkman J. A. Farquharson l G. F. Flanagan l
i Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l t Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
; Under Interagency Agreement DOE 40-550-75 8805090144 880331 -
PbH Pib0ct 05800313 OPERATED BY MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEMS. INC. l FOR THE UNITED STATIS OEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
e , , 3 l NOTICE This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, cr assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. i l
= l Available from Superintendent of Documents U.S. Govemment Printing Office Post Office Box 37082 .
Washington, D.C. 20013 7982 and National Techrucal Information Service Springfield, VA 22101
NUREG/CR-5021 Vol. 1 ORNL/TM-10604/V1 Distribution Category RG Engineering Physics and Mathematics Division USER'S GUIDE FOR PRISIM ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 1 Volume 1 Program for Inspectors o D. J. Campbell
- H. M. Paula*
V. H. Guthrie* B. C. Ellison* J. R. Kirchner* F. M. Dycus* J. Q. Kirkman
- J. A. Farquharson*
G. F. Flanagan NRC Monitor: J. C. Glynn Severe Accident Issues Branch Program Manager: G. F. Flcnagan Oak Ridge National Laboratory Principal Investigators: G. F. Flanagan Oak Ridge National Laboratory D. J. Campbell , JBF Associates, Inc. Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Under Interagency Agreement DOE 40-550-75 NRC FIN No. B0825 Date Published: March 1988 e
*JBF Associates, Inc.
Knoxville, TN 37932 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 operated by MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEMS for the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY under Contract No. DE AC05-840R21400
iii e i ABSTRACT This user's guide is a two-volume document designed to teach NRC inspectors and NRC regulators how to access probabilistic risk assessment information from the two Plant Risk Status Information Management System (PRISIM) programs developed for Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit One (ANO-1). Volume 1 describes how the PRA information available in Version 1.0 of PRISIM is usefdl for planning inspections. Using PRISIM, inspectors can quickly access PRA information and use that information to update risk analysis results, reflecting a plant's status at any particular time. Volume 2 describes how the PRA information available in Version 2.0 of PRISIM is useful as an evaluation tool for regulatory activities. Using PRISIM, regulators can both access PRA information and modify the information to assess the impact .these
, changes may .have on plant safety. Both volumes are stand-alone i documents; each volume presents several sample computer sessions designed to lead the user through a variety of PRISIM applications used to obtain PRA-related' information for monitoring and controlling plant ;
risk. ; h 1 0 > I L I l l
v CONTENTS Section fagg ABSTRACT........................................................ iii LIST OF FIGURES................................................. vii LI ST O F TAB LES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PREFACE......................................................... Xi
- 1. INTRODUCTION................................................ 1
- 2. PRISIM USER CONTR0LS........................................ 3 2.1 Controls Associated with Accessing Information in the
. PRISIM Modules......................................... 3 1 2.1.1 Controls Associated with the PRISIM Control Screen.......................................... 3 2.1.2 Controls Associated with the PRISIM DBM Routine. 7 2.1.3 Controls Associated with the PRISIM PRA Update Routine......................................... 8 2.2 Controls Associated with Obtaining Hard Copies of PRISIM Screens......................................... 10
- 3. PATHS FOR ACCESSING PRA-RElATED INR)RMATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 e 3.1 Inspection Procedure Path.............................. 12 3.2 Direct Access Path..................................... 16 i
- 4. CATECORIES OF SAFETY-REIATED INFORMATION (AND SAMPLE COM PUT ER S ES S I ON S ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1 Updated PRA Information................................ 24 l 4.1.1 Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status. 24 4.2 Preprocessed Information............................... 32 4.2.1 Dominant Accident Sequences..................... 37 4.2.2 Safety Related Systems.......................... 40 4.2.3 Safety Related Subsystems....................... 44 4.2.4 Safety Related Components....................... 51 4.2.5 Support System Interfaces....................... 55 4.2.6 Component Failure Data.......................... 58 4.2.7 System Testing / Surveillance..................... 63 4.2.8 Operator Actions................................ 63 l APPENDIX A - OBTAINING MARD COPIES OF GRAPHICS SCREENS PROVIDED BY PRISIM.......................................... A1 APPENDIX B - DIAGRAM OF THE PRISIM INFORMATION HIERARCHY........ B1
vii LIST OF FIGURES Firure Zagg ; 2.1 PRISIM Interfaces......................................... 4 i 2.2 PRISIM Control Screen (Initial Entry into the Program).... 6 2.3 PRISIM Control Screen (Following a Session)................ 6 , 2.4 Sample Text Menu.......................................... 9 ; 2.5 Sample Schematic Menu..................................... 9 , 2.6 PRISIM Control Screen (Picture Number Check).............. 11 3.1 PRISIM Menu Hierarchy Diagram............................. 13 ; 3.2 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information............ 14
. 3.3 PRISIM Inspection Procedure Path...................... ... 14 3.4 Inspection Procedures. Addressed Specifically in This Program................................................... 15 3.5 Decision and Information Menu for Inspection Procedure >
71707, Operational Safety Verification.................... 15 3.6 Which Subsystem Walkdowns Should Be Emphasized 7........... 17 3.7 Subsystems Grouped by Safety Significance Importance...... 17 3.8 Decision and Information Menu for Inspection Procedure i 71707, Operational Safety Verification.................... 19 3.9 Which Tag outs Should Be Emphasized 7...................... 20 ' 3.10 Front Line Systems Ranked by Risk Sensitivity Importance.. 20 1 3.11 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.12 Categories of Safety-Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 l e 3.13 Information Available for Safety-Related Systems.......... 23 [ 3.14 Front Line Systems Ranked by Risk Sensitivity Importance.. 23 4.1 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information............ 27-4.2 Categories of Safety-Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.3 Options Available for Selecting Out-of-Service Components. 28 r 4.4 Safety Related Systems for Which Schematics Are Available. 28 4.5 North Battery and Switchgear Rooms Emergency Cooling System Schematic - Rooms 99, 95, and 149.................. 29 4.6 Safety Related Systems for Which Schematics Are Available. 29 4.7 Emergency Feedwater System Schematic...................... 30 7 4.8 Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status........... 30 ' ] 4.9 Ranking of Equipment Not Known To Be Out of Service. . . . . . . 31 1 4.10 Safety Implications of the current Plant Status........... 33 . 4.11 PRISIM Control Screen..................................... 33 4.12 Emergency Feedwater System Schematic...................... 34 a 4.13 Safety Related Systems for Which Schematics Are Available. 34 l 4.14 Service Water System Pump Trains Schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.15 Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status........... 36 . i 4.16 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information............ 38 4.17 Categories of Safety Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.18 Dominant Accident Sequence Selection List................. 39 , j 4.19 Description of Accident Sequence #2....................... 41 i 4.20 Dominant Scenarios for Accident Sequence #2............... 41 4.21 Recovery Information for Scenario 2-1, Accident Sequence i d2........................................................ 42 4 4.22 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information............ 45 l i n i t i
- - - . . - _ _ . , - . - . - -..,.- ,~ - . _. ,.. .,. ,-. . - . , . , , - . - . .. . - - !
viii LIST OF FICURES (continued) Firure Eggg 4.23 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. 45 4.24 Information Available for Safety-Related Systems.......... 46 4.25 Front Line Systems Ranked by Risk Reduction Importance.... 46 , 4.26 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . 47 , 4.27 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. 47 J 4.28 Information Available for Safety Related Subsystems....... 48 4.29 Subsystems Grouped by Risk Significance Importance........ 48 . 4.30 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related. Information. . . . . . . . . . . . 52 4.31 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. 52 4.32 Information Available for Safety Related Components. . . . . . . 53 4.33 Options Available for Selecting Out-of-Service Components. 53 ; 4.34 Safety Related Systems for k'hich Component Information Is 1 Available................................................. 54 4.35 Emergency Feedwater System Schematic...................... 54 1 4.36 Available Information Based on Pump P7A Being Out of Service................................................... 56 4.37 Most Likely Single Failure Events for the Emergency Feed-water System k' hen Pump P7A Is Out of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.38 Support System Interfaces for Emergency Feedwater Pump P7B....................................................... 57 4.39 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information............ 59 , 4.40 Categories of Safe ty-Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 59 4.41 Types of Support System Interface Information Available... 60 , : 4.42 Support Systems for k'hich Information Is Available. . . . . . . . 60 ) 4.43 Emergency AC Power System Component / Function List......... 61 ! 4.44 Components Dependent on 480 V AC Bus B5................... 61 4.45 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information. . . . . . . . . . . . 62 I 4.46 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. i 4.47 Component Failure Data Available.......................... 62 64
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< 4.48 Component Categorins for k'hich Plant-Specific LERs Ace t Available................................................. 64 4.49 LERs Involving Turbine-Driven Pumps....................... 65 1 4.50 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information............ 66 !
4.51 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. 66 l 4.52 Safety-Related Systems for k'hich Information Associated
- with Periodic Testing / Surveillance Requirements is Available................................................. 67 4.53 Periodic Testing / Surveillance Requirements - High Pressure .
- I nj e c t i o n S y s t e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 l 4.54 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information............ 70 4.55 Categories of Safety-Related Information.................. 70 4.56 Information Available for Operator Actions................ 71
, 4.57 Operator Recovery Actions Grouped by Risk Significance i Importance................................................ 71 1 4.58 Recovery Information for Restoring EFS Motor Drivc.n Pump.. 72 l B.1 Diagram of the PRISIM Information Hierarchy............... B2 4
l,
ix LIST OF TABMS Table Par.e 2.1 Keyboard Controls Defined................................. 5 4.1 Measures of Importance and Their Interpretation........... 43 O 8 t ti
)
l I e O l
~ . . _ .
t xi PREFACE Volume 1 is the user's guide for Version 1.0 of the Plant Risk Status Information Management System (PRISIM) designed for the Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 (ANO 1) Nuclear Power Plant. PRISIM is a computer program that operates on a personal computer and makes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information and information from other safety studies useful to inspectors during inspection planning. This version of PRISIM is based on a Level 1 PRA of ANO 1 performed by ; JBF Associates, Inc. The Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) study of ANO-1* was used to the . extent possible as a basis for the
- PRA. However, changes in the plant design and operating procedures, as i well as improvements in the state-of-the-art of PRA methodology, led to-significantly different results for the new PRA and at times precluded use of the IREP. '
The FRA results in PRISIM are based on core damage frequency. PRISIM does not incorporate the results of assessments of plant damage, containment responses, or public health consequences. Only point estimate PRA results are presented in PRISIM; uncertainty bounds are not included. Many of the results presented in PRISIM do not reflect the effects of i operator recovery actions. Recovery actions are actions operators can
, take to maintain core cooling during accidents involving failures of :
the designed emergency cooling systems. These actions include restoring offsite power, restoring failed equipment to service, or . providing temporary support services to safety related equipment during ' accident conditions. The effects that recovery actions would have on ' plant risk are presented separately in PRISIM. - l This guide is not an attempt to explain all possible uses of PRISIM for inspection planning at ANO 1, to provide the results that would be obtained for all possible applications, or to interpret how results provided by PRISIM can affect plant safety. The purposes of this guide , are to teach NRC inspectors how to access PRA-related information and to define, in very general terms, how this information is useful. , *G. J. Kolb et al., Interim Reliability Evaluation Program: Analysis of the Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant, USNRC Report NUREG/CR-2787, June 1982. I a
1- , USER'S CUIDE FOR PRISIM ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 1 Volume 1 Program for Inspectors I 3 ' I
- l. INTRODUCTION
, This guide describes the use of the Plant Risk Status Information Management System (PRISIM), a personal computer program designed for the Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 (ANO-1) Nuclear Power Plant, that will help you gain rapid access to PRA-related information .useful for -
inspection planning. PRISIM is a user-friendly and decision-oriented , program designed to run on an IBM PC/XT or AT with a 640 K memory, a i math coprocessor, a 20 megabyte hard disk, an Enhanced Graphics , Adapter, and an Enhanced Graphics Display. It is compatible with DOS Version 2.1 and any later versions of DOS. The program is designed with protective features that prevent the user from damaging the program or destroying the data base. l Using PRISIM for inspection planning offers several advantages over l other media that can be used to present PRA-related information. The l i following are two of the main advantages: i
- 1. PRISIM will allow you to quickly access needed information without >
having to sort through a lot of irrelevant information. l 2. PRISIM can be used to update risk analysis results, reflecting a l plant's status at any particular time. To operate PRISIM, you do not need to be an expert in the use of PRA ! methodology; the program presents information without using PRA jargon. , Also, cperating the program does not require previous computer l' j experience. The information offered by PRISIM can be easily accessed by making selections from a series of menus on the screen.
. There are two maj or portions of the PRISIM computer program that provide you with useful PRA related information: the Data Base Management (DBM) Routine and the PRA Update Routine. The PRISIM DBM routine contains preprocessed information that is useful regardless of i the plant's status. Examples of preprocessed information available from PRISIM include system piping and instrument diagrams, summaries of selected plant licensee event reports (LERs), information on equipment j realignment for testing or maintenance, and information on operator
- recovery actions. ,
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- ~ . ,- , , , - - , - , w -- - - ,- - .--,,e =rr- - - _ , , , ,,-.,r,_.- ~- ,--, - m . , , , . - . - - - - , - . , - ,
2 The PRA update routine allows you to specify the plant's status (operating configuration) at any particular tima and to then receive updated PRA infortnation. This portion of the program permits evaluation of the risk associated with equipment outages (either planned or unplanned) as they occur at the plant. PRA related information can be accessed through an inspection procedure path and through a direct access path. The inspection procedure path is a tutorial path designed to "guide" an inexperienced PRISIM user through a decision making process. The direct access path is a nonexplanatory route an experienced PRISIM user can take to obtain quicker access to the same PRA-related information available via the inspection procedure path. . This guide provides the novice user with all the information necessary for successful operation of PRISIM. If you are using PRISIM for the first time, you should first scan through Section 2 to become familiar with the keyboard controls you will use to access PRISIM information and then scan through Section 3 to become familiar with the two paths available for obtaining information from PRISIM. Next, read Section 4 carefully to gain an understanding of the types of information available in PRISIM and how this information can be accessed. We also recommend you work through the sample computer sessions in Section 4 at your keyboard to become more proficient with the use of your keyboard controls. Two appendixes to this guide provide additional information on the use of the PRISIM computer program. Appendix A explains how to obtain hard copies of the graphics screens provided by PRISIM. Appendix B details the information provided via each of the two PRISIM access paths. 9
3
- 2. PRISIM USER CONTROLS As indicated in Figure 2.1, the PRISIM program consists of three distinct modules: (1) the control screen, (2) the DBM routine, and (3) the PRA update routine. You enter the program through the control screen and, from that point, enter the DBM routine. The DBM routine allows you to view preprocessed PRA information valuable for controlling plant risk. It also allows you to specify out-of-service components and
, then access PRISIM's PRA update routine to receive information on the plant's safety status when the specified components are out of service.
During any PRISIM session (chat period of time between entry into and e escape from the program) and while in any of the three PRISIM modules, you can control the information provided by PRISIM through the use of several function keys (user controls) on the computer keyboard. Because it is not feasible to explain in detail all of the actual steps (and hence the user controls) that would be involved in all of the various applications of PRISIM, this section of the user's guide provides an overview of PRISIM vser controls, giving you an idea of how you can "move about" in the */RISIM program. Table 2.1 provides definitions of the PRISIM keyboard controls. Use this table for quick reference to the keyboard controls discussed in the remainder of this section. 2.1 Controls Associated with Accessing Information in the PRISIM Modules , 2.1.1 Controls Associated with the PRISIM Control Screen One of the first screens presented by PRISIM is the control screen (Figure 2.2). It offers three options (Begin, Escape, and Load) when you first enter the program. Pressing the letter "B" allows you to begin your new sess bn, which will take you into the DBM routine. Pressing the letter "L" allows you to call up and load (make available for playback) a previously saved session. Pressing the "Esc" key takes you out of the program. A slightly different version of the control scree- (Figure 2.3) appears ; any time you load a previously saved session oc return to the control screen during a PRISIM session; at this time, the control screen , provides three additional user control option 1 Pressing the letter "R" l allows you to resume the current session. lessing the letter "P" lets , you play back the current session. (And pressing the "+" or " " keys allows you to decrease or increase the speed at which the session screens are played back.) Pressing the letter "S" lets you save the current session.
TOAD
~> SEss!ON VEW PREPROCEssED
-p\ 5Nf0 vtE W eECN -
_p des 1RCO
! SES90" RESULTs
}
DATA DASE \ upoATE PRA CONTROL -> MANAGEMENT --> pp > UPDATE - SCREEN ROUTlNE REsotis ROUTlNE j RETURN TO _p RE** '"E - CONTROL session - >{ SCREEN sEtEcT OUT-OF- . sERVtCc, I k CCuPONENTs I sAvE
-> session RETURN TO c-CONTROL
->{ SCREEN
-P. PtAY BACK sEs90N
-> ENO session Figure 2.1 PRISlg Interfaces e
- e ' a %
5 Table 2,1 Keyboard Controls Defined Applicable Module of Keyboard the PRISIM Symbol Progrem* Function of Key P1 D Master - Calls up the Master Menub . F2 D Previous - Calls up the previously displayed screen F3 D Last Branch Point - Calls up the last screen that displayed multiple menu options e Esc C Escape - Lets you exit the program Esc D Escape - Calls up the PRISIM control screen Esc P Escape - Returns you to the Selection Menu (Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status) B C Begin New Session - Lets you enter the program and begin a new session L C Load Session - Calls up and loads a previously saved session P C Playback - Plays back the current session R C Resume - Lets you resume a session in which PRA data were changed or return to the program after checking a picture number to obtain a hard copy e S C Save Session - Saves the current session PrtSc, D,P Prints the currently viewed text screen Shitt" e D Return - Takes you to the selected menu option Home P Returns you to the first of the "Ranking of safety related equipment" or "Ranking of core damage scenarios" list DP Lets you move the cursor in the "reverse" direction P Lets you scroll up if viewing the
- Ranking of safety related equipment" or "Ranking of core damage scenarios" list C Increases the playback speed
+ C Decreases the playback speed
. D,P Lets you move the cursor in the "forward" direction P Lets you scroll down if viewing the "Ranking of safety related equipment" or "Ranking of core damage scenarios" list I
""D" denotes the PRISIM data base management routine, "C" donctes the control screen, And "P" denotes the FRA update routine.
b ihe Master Menu is the first selection menu presented when you enter *,he program.
'These two keys must be depressed simultaneously when you want to print a hard copy of a text screen.
l I
6 I [ D Byte Binder RUN TIME DATA BASE CONTRCtLER I Copyright, Eastern Technical Engineering Corp.,1985 87 I Rev P0.41 Serlat # 006012 Lic:ARKNUC1 C0NTR0L $CREEW l B egin new sessice. L oad Session ESC to exit e Brade Supported S0, Pg 1 N } Figure 2.2 PRISIM Control Screen (Initial Entry into the Progran.) Byte Binder RUN TIME DATA BASE CONTROLLER Copyright, Eastern Technical Engineering Corp.,1985 87 Rev P0.41 Seriet # 006012 Lie:AtoiUC1 C0NTR0L $CREEN 8 egin new session L oad Session S ave Session i R eswe this session P tay Back Current Session +- Playback Speed 1 Sec. ESC to exit 1 I
)
i a Brade supported Green override
$1, Pg 2,P 45 .
l N ) i Figure 2.3 PRISIM Control Screen (Following a Session) l l 1 1 l
7 The "Resume" option will allow you to do tw o- things. First, the "Resume" option will return you to the program anytime you exit the program to obtain a hard copy of a PRISIM screen. (The use of the "Resume" option for this purpose is discussed in detail in Section 2.2 of this guide.) Second, it will let you resume a session after specifying out-of-service components and obtaining updated safety information. That is, after you have specified components out of service and viewed the updated PRA results, you must return to . the control screen. Then the "Resume" option will send you back to the last schematic or menu used in the DBM routine (while retaining in memory the components previously specified as being out of servie -) . 'I you want to re enter the program with no components out of 5 m ica, use the ., "Begin" option. The "Playback" option will let you replay the DBM routine screens viewed in the current session in the same order in which they were originally viewed. PRA update rot. cine screens, however, will not be displayed. As previously mentioned, you can select the speed at which the screens are played back using the "+" key or the " " key to decrease or increase the screen viewing time. The viewing time options are rapid scan (less than ene second per screen); l, 2, 3,4, 5 , 10 , 15 , 20 , 25 , or 30-second scan; and "manual step" scan (a scan that is controlled by the user with the return key). k'hile you have the freedom to select the speed at which you view screens using the "Playback" option, once you have selected this option you cannot stop or again change the speed of a the playback; you must view every screen before you can change the screen viewing time. The "Save" option will let you store the current session for future playback. This option will not save information on components specified as being out of service, nor will it save PRA update screens. PRISIM will ask you to identify the session to be saved using a unique, single-character alphanumeric identifier (e.g., 1, 2, 3 . , , a, b, c ...) and a password so that this session may be loaded at some future dato. If you specify an identifier that has already been used, PRISIP will give you the option of writing ever the previously saved session or saving the current session using a different identifier. 2.1.2 Controls Associated with the PRISIM DBM Routine
- PRISIM's DBH routine provides rapid access to several types of preprocessed information. To get to the information of interest in the DBM routine, you use a cursor, which is controlled by the "t" and "4" keys, to make a series of selections from menus shown on the screen, k' hen the cursor is positioned on the selection of interest, you simply press the return key and the PRISIM data base manager will find and quickly display the appropriate screen.
8 Three function keys allow you to "back-track" in the DBM routine. These functions are PREVIOUS - Pressing the "F2" key calls up the previously displayed screen IAST BRANCll POINT - Pressing the "F3" key calls up the last screen that displayed multiple menu options MASTER - Pressing the "F1" key calls up the PRISIM Master , : Menu
- l PRISIM uses both text menu screens (Figure 2.4) and schematic menu screens (Figure 2.5) to help you obtain PRA-related information. . '
Schematic menus are included in the program to give you an alternate way of selecting components of interest. On a schematic menu, you select the component for which you want to obtain information by moving the i cursor until the component is highlighted on the system schematic menu and then pressing the return key. On a text menu, you obtain the i desired information by moving the cursor to the desired selection and then pressing the return key. 2.1.3 Controls Associated with the PRISIM PRA Update Routine While in the DBM routine, you may decide that you would like to know the plant's safety status when certain components are out of service. You can specify a plant condition by selecting any combination of out of.
- service components using the cursor keys and the component selection menus. Then, you can select the "END OF INPUT" option on the component !
selection menu and the program will take you into the PRA update , J routine. This routine will then calculate (in approximately 7 seconds) ' and display a significance factor, which is the factor of increase in the instantaneous core damage frequency that is due to the specified components being out of service. (The significance factor is a useful index for quickly evaluating the safety implications of a plant state. If this factor is large, a degradation in plant safety can be assumed.) The same screen that displays the plant's significance factor gives you the option of returning to the control screen or seeing additional information based on the plant's status. Specifically, PRISIM's PRA j update routine provfdes the following types of information, updated to l reflect the plant status:
- 1. A list of components ranked according to their relative contributions to the instantaneous core damage frequency. .
*The Master Menu is the first selection menu presented to the PRISIM user upon entry to the DBM routine.
l L l
l 9 i f \ CATEGORIES OF SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION i
- 1. Safety laplications of the current plant status
- 2. Dominant accident sequences 1
- 3. Safety related systems
- 4. Safety related subsystems a 5. Safety related cecponents
- 6. Support system interfaces
- 7. Corponent f ailure data e
- 8. System testing /surveittance
- 9. Operator actions
( ) Figure 2.4 Sample Text Menu , i e CORE FloccaNG Sr5Tru SCHEuATIC ' p+ L""a'A . . ib"m' A
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Figure 2.5 Sample Schematic Menu i ) i i
10
- 2. A list of the most important failure scenarios (minimal cut sets) for core damage.
- 3. An "improvement from repair" option, which shows the factor of decrease in the instantaneous core damage frequency associated with returning each disabled component to service.
You select the information you want to obtain from the selection menu or return to the control screen by moving the cursor to the desired , position and pressing the return key. You can scroll up or down the event or scenario importance lists using the "t" or "4" keys. The "Home" key may be pressed to return to the first item on the list. Pressing the "Esc" key when you are in the PRA update routine will . return you to the selection menu so you can either request other safety information or return to the PRISIM control screen. 2.2 Controls Associated with Obtaintne liard Contes of PRISIM Screens If you want to obtain a hard copy of a text screen while in either the DBM or PRA update portion of the program, simultaneously pressing the "PrtSc" and "Shift" keys will command your printer to print a copy of the screen being viewed. If you want to obtain a hard copy of a graphics screen being viewed while you are in the DBM routine, you must use the "Esc" key to first return to the PRISIM control screen. The control screen will appear, and at the bottom of the screen a "picture number" will be displayed. (See Figure 2.6, which is an example of a
- control screen called up for a schematic with an assigned picture number of 9006.) Using the picture number displayed on the control screen, you can then locate the appropriate schematic in Appendix A and make a ,
photocopy of the schematic. Anytime you leave the PRISIM DBM routine to check a picture number and obtain a hard copy of a graphics screen, selecting the "Resume" option on the control screen will take you back to that graphics screen. At that point, you may continue your PRISIM session. O
11 f I [ \ Byte Binder RUN TIME DATA BASE CONTROLLER . Copyright, Eastern Technical Engineering Corp.,1985 87 Rev P0.41 serial # 006012 Lic:ARENUCI CONTR0L SCREEN o B egin new session L oad Session S ave session R esuw this $ession - i e P lay Back Current Session +
- Playback Speed : 1 Sec.
ESC to exit ! e s h Brade supported Green override
$5, Pg 352,P 9006 ,
I ( ) i Figure 2.6 PRISIM Control System (Picture Number Check) S P l
- 1 '
v 1 I 4 1 l a . I
12
- 3. PATilS FOR ACCESSING PRA-RE!ATED INFORMATION There are two paths for obtaining PRA-related information from PRISIM:
the inspection procedure path and the direct access path. The inspection procedure path is a tutorial path designed to "guide" an inexperienced PRISIM user through a decision making process. It allows the user to specify an inspection task (procedure) he wants to perform. Then, the program "leads" him through a series of informative text screens and menu selection screens to the PRA-related information that will be useful for making decisions about where to focus efforts to , enhance plant safety. The direct access path is a nonexplanatory path designed for the experienced PRISIM user who is more adept at accessing PRA related information that will be relevant to the inspection procedure (s) of interest. This path provides an experienced user
- quicker access to the same PRA related information available via the inspection procedure path.
Figure 3.1 stumarizes the information provided via cach of the two PRISIM paths. The figure in Appendix B the diagram of the PRISIM information hierarchy details the information provided via cach of these two paths. The following sections, 3.1 and 3.2, describe how you can use each of the two paths to obtain in f orma tion useful for inspection planning. 3.1 IIppection Procedure Path If you are a new user of PRISIM who is unfamiliar with the types of PRA
- information presented, you should first use the PRISIM inspection procedure path. Choosing this path provides you casy access to information relevant to decisions associated with specific inspection ,
procedures. This path will let you simply select an inspection procedure of interest from a menu and then select the decision you need to make or supplemental information from the next menu that appears. If you select a decision, a PRA related information Icad in screen will appear. This screen will contain a swunary of the types of PRA related information provided and why this information will be helpful to someone interested in the specified inspection procedure. After you have read this screen, you can select the "CONTINUE" option and receive the PRA-related information. The following example illustrates how you could obtain preprocessed information via the inspection procedure path. When you first enter the program, you will be given the option of obtaining safety related information through the direct access path or through the inspection procedure path (Figure 3.2). If you select the inspection procedure path, as in this example, you will first see . a screen that defines the PRISIM inspection procedure path (Figure 3.3) and then a screen that lists the inspection procedures addressed in PRISIM (Figure 3.4). In this example, you select Precedure 71707 and are then presented with the decisions associated with that procedure for which PRA information is available (Figure 3.5).
13 I _v M ASTER UENU I I y v CATEGOR;ES INSPECTION OF SAFETY-
- PROCEDURE RELATED INFO MENU MENU v
DECIS)ONS ASSOCIATED WTH SFECIFIED PROCEDURE MENU N . ( , y v _v v PREPROCESSED SELECT FR A-REL A1ED OU T- Cf-SER VCE tNFORM ATlON CCMPONENT(S) y
;NFC6V ATiON BASED ON 4_
UPDATED PLANT ST A TUS y ADDITION AL TNFORM AT10N uENu Figure 3.1 PRISIM Menu Hierarchy Diagram
i 14 l [ ) PATHS FOR OSTAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMAll0N
- 1. Direct access path
> 2. Inspection procedure path l
l l 1 o ( ) Figure 3.2 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information 1 e PRIS!M INSPECTION PROCEDURE PATM 9 l l This section of PRI$1M directs you to PRA information that (1) is useful ! for making speelfic decisions associated with specific inspection proce-dures or (2) is useful for awareness of specific PRA related information that may ernance inspections associated with a particular procedure. A list of inspection procedares addressed specifically in the program witt be presented. Upon selecting one of these procedures, you will I see (1) e List 3f PRA supported decisions associated with the proced;re I and/or (2) a list of supplemental information useful when performing the I procedure. If you select one of the decisions, you will be presented first with a screen th3t describes how PRA information can aid the de-cision, then with the relevant Information. If you select a supplemental Information item, you will be presented directly with that information. P
> CONF 1NUE N )
l Figure 3.3 PRISIM Inspection Procedure Path t
15 ( D INSPECTION PROCEDURES ADDRE$$ED SPECIFICALLY IN TN!S PROGRAM 41701 Licensed operator Training 42700 Plant ProcedJtes 61701 Comtex survelttance 61726 Monthly Surveltlance observation ' 4 62700 Maintenance 62703 Monthly Maintenance observation p 71707 Operational Safety verification 71710 ESF System Watkdown 90712 In of fice Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities 93702 onsite Followup of Events at operating Power Reactors ( ) Figure 3.4 Inspection Procedures Addressed Specifically in This Program i e [ ' DEclSION AND INFORMAfl04 MENU FOR INSPECTION e PROCIDURE 71707. OPERAfl0NAL $AFETY VERIFICATION L I DECl$10NS i What ecchasis should be given to the existing plant status? V h Which s esystem walkdowns should be e@hasized? Which tag outs should be e@hasized? SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
?
Support requirements for front line system comonents ( ) Figure 3.5 Decision and Information Menu for Inspection , Procedure 71707, Operational Safety Verification b _ _ . . 6 -
- 16 Procedure 71707 requires that you confirm the operability of a selected safety related subsystem. You will want to inspect all safety related subsystems over a period of time. But to maximize the impact of performing this procedure, you will want to inspect those subsystems that are most significant with respect to safety more of ten than those subsystems that are less significant. Thus, one of the questions you would want to ask when performing this inspection procedure would be, "Which subsystem walkdowns should be emphasized?"
Af ter you select this decision, a lead in screen will appear (Figure . ; 3.6) followed by screens with the appropriate FRA information for this decision. (Figure 3,7 contains the first four screens in this series.) Using the information provided, you will be better able to make an ' informed decision on the proper allocation of your time when performing Inspection Procedure 71707. Suppose you are now interested in tag-out activities. To get back to the list of decisions associated with Procedure 71707, you would press the "IAST BRANCH POINT" function key (F3) on your keyboard and you would be returned to the last screen that displayed multiple menu options. (See Figure 3.8.) Procedure 71707 requires that you verify that a safety-related tag ou': was properly prepared and conducted. To maximize the impact of performing this procedure, ycu will stant to emphasize those tag. outs that are most significant with respect to safety. Thus, one of the , ; questions you would want to ask when performing this inspection 1 procedure would be, "What tag outs should be emphasized?" After you select this decision, a lead in screen will appear that discusses the relevant PRA information useful in making this decision (Figure 3.9). The discussion includes a description of what in-formation will be provided and the rationale for providing such information. Figure 3.10 is an example of the information you will find useful for making decisions about how to best allocate your time when performing inspection activities related to tag-outs. 3.2 Direct Access Path All of the information in PRISIM accessible through the inspection procedure path is also available through the direct access path. Once , J you become familiar with FRISIM, its contents, and its uses, you can i expedite your access to the information you want by using the direct l access path. If you choose to obtain information via the direct access path, you will specify the desired information by making cursor , selections on a series of menus. The following example illustrates how you can use the direct access path to obtain quicker access to the same l information presented in the inspection procedure path example (Section 1 3.1). l l I l l 1
_ . . . ~ t 17 l j [ ) VMlCH $US$YSTEM WALCDOWNS SMOULD St (MPMAS12tD? 4 I It is logical to plan to walk down risk f rportant subsystems more of ten , than less leportant subsystems if til other factors are equal. Two risk ' leportance measures can aid a decision involving which safety related stbsystems to esphasitet (1) the contribution each s esystem failure , meLes to plant risk and (2) the sensitivity of plant risk to each sub. system failure. When ccebined, these two (Fportance measures of fer an-other valuable measure of the inportance of plant equipment, a measure referred to as the equipment's risk sigaf ficance leportance. The e following tables show safety related subsystems grouped according to [ subsystem risk significance leportance, i e ! d
> CokilMUt
( ) l Figure 3.6 Which Subsystem Walkdowns Should Be Emphasized? ; i l [ \ l $US$YSTEMS GRDUPID Bf RISC $lGN!PICANCE IMPORTANCE MICH RISC SlCNIFICANCE ' tmergency Feed =ater System 'urbine Driven Pum Train i Green AC Power Creen DC Power 1 Nigh Pressure injection Stan&y Ptrp (P36C) i LowPressureInjectionTrain4 j Low Pressure Injectir.c Train B I j North Battery and Switchgear Roca Cooling System Chilled Water Unit (Train A) [ North Switchgear Room (toom 99) Coollrg ! i I y
> (COWfikUED) 1 0
( ) l I Figure 3.7 Subsystems Grouped by Safety Significance ; l Importance 4 1 1
18 o [ D
$U85YSTEMS CROUPED ST RISK $1GNIFICANCE IMPotfANCE (CONTINUED)
MIGH RISK $1GNIFICANCE (continued) Pressuriger Safety Relief Valves fall to open Pressuciter Safety Relief Yalves**falt to reclose teactor Protection Systee Chamel A Reactor Protection Systee Channel 8 . [ Reactor Protection Systee Channel C l Reactor Protection System Channel D e j ted AC Power 4 1 l Service Water System Loop 1 Service Water system L M 2
> (CONT! wtD)
( ) Figure 3.7 (cont.) :
- l r
$U65Y$ttMS Ce0UPID BY RISC $1GNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONTINUED) m MICN tl$K $!CNIFICANCE (continued)
South Battery and Switchgear Room Cooling System Chitted Water Unit (Train B) South Switchgear Room (Roora 100) Cooling MacitATE RISK SIGNIFICANCE Emergency Feedwater System Motor Driven Ptrp Train Engineered safeguards Actuation System Digital Channel 1 Engineered Safeguards Actuatim System Digital 1 (cormon equipwnt f or Digital Channets 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9)
> (CONilWED)
( ) Figure 3.7 (cont.)
19 + I ( ) ' SUBSTSTEMS CRCUPED BY tl$C $lCNIFICANCE IMPotTANCE (CONIlNVED) MCCERAf t RISC $1CNIFICANCE (continued) i l Migh Pressure Injection Normally Operating and Aligned f l $tandby Pteps (P368 and P36A) ; Red DC Power 9 I
, LCW tl$C $!CNIFICANCE !
Core Flood Systera Train A l Core Flood Systera Train B e Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System Control / Vector I Trains A and D (Motor Driven Ptep Train) , Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control $ystem Control / Vector Trains 5 and C (Turbine Driven Ptry Train) (CONTINVED) k ) Figure 3.7 (cont.) i l
. [
4 , 5 [ ) CEClll0N AND INFORMATION MENV FOR INSPECTION 4 PROCEDutt 71707, opftAflohAL $AFETY VttIFICAfl0N a i CEtt$10N$ [ W at ecphasis should be given to the existing plant status? Wich sitsystem walkdowns should be ecphastred? (
> Wich tag outs should be ecphastred? l 4
j $UFPLEMENTAL INFORMAf!ON ! I - j Support requirements for front line system cocponents [ l ' a . I i ! 1 t > I 4 l Figure 3.8 Decision and Infornation Menu for Inspection ! -l Procedure 71707, Operational Safety ! j Verification I d 1
30 f 3 VMICH TAG CUTS SHOULD St (MPMAll!!D? An Irproperly performed tag out can lead to the associated system being out of service, thus, it is leportant to inspect tag outs involving cwponents in systems which, if f at ted, would contritute the sont to plant rist (i.e., those systems. to which the plant risk is most sensi-tive). The following tables show safety related systems rar*ed accord-Ing to their risk sensitivity Ipportances. e
> CONTINUE k )
Figure 3.9 Which Tag Outs Should Be Emphasized? [ FRONI Llht SYSTEM 1 RANKED SV R!$K SEN$lilVITY IMPORTANCE R!sK Sth$litvlTY SY$f!M IMPORTANCE Pressuelter Safety tellef System 2 Reactor Protection system 0.9 Migh Pressure injection system 0.02 (mergency feedwater System 0.02 Low Pressure Injection System 0.003 Power Conversion System 0.0005 , Core flood System 95 5 Reactor Sullding Cooling System 3E 6 teactor Building Spray System 6E*7 ( ) . Figure 3.10 Front Line Systems Ranked by Sensitivity Importance
21 In this example, assuno you know the information you wish to obtain is a listing of systems ranked by risk sensitivity importance. When you enter PRISIM, you will be given the option of obtaining safety related information through the direct access path or through the inspection procedure path (Figure 3.11) . If you select the direct access path, as in this example, you will first see a screen that presents the categories of safety related information available from PRISIM (Figure 3.12). The information you desire is in the "Safety related systems" category. As shown in the figure, you choose this category and a menu
, presenting the information available on safety related systems will appear on the screen (Figure 3.13). For this example, you select "Risk sensitivity importance" and a listing of systems ranked by risk sensitivity importance will be presented (Figure 3.14).
e e 9 9 9 l i l I 1
l 22 ( ) > PAfMS Foe 08tAlWING SAFliT RELAftD INFORMAtl0N [ j
> 1. Direct access path l
- 2. Inspectico procedare path ,
l 1 i , 1 4 1 1 1 I l ( ) ! l Figure 3.11 Paths for obtaining Safety Related Information 1 i e [ \ 1 CATECORIES OF SAFtfY RELATED INFORMAf!ON i ) 1 Safety irplicattor.s of the current plant status ) 2. Desinant accident sequern;es
> 3. Safety related systems j 4 Safety related s h ystems 1
- 5. Safety related cceponents 4
4 6. Support system interfaces
- 7. Component failure data
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions )
. l 1 l l; ( ) I l
1 i Figure 3.12 Categories of Safety Related Information ] .
t 23 ( ) i j INFORMAfl04 AVAILABLE FOR SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS j i
- 1. Risk reduction toportance l
> 2. Risk sensitivity leportance ; ; 3. Risk significance leportance i
i k )
~,
Figure 3.13 Information Available for Safety-Related Systems i q i i
! [ \
] FRONT Llht $YSTEMS RANKED BY RISK SENSITIVlfY IMPORTANCE l 4 RISK SENSITIVITY SYSTEM IMPORTANet Pressuriser Safety Relief System 2 teactor Protection system 0.9 l Nigh Pressure Injection System 0.02 Emergency Feedwater System 0.02 i l Low Pressure injection System 0.003 1
, Power conversion system 0.0005
] l Core Flood system 9E.5
! Reactor Building Cooling System 3E 6 e
Reactor Building $ pray System 6E*? l .l N ) j F gute 3,14 Front Line Systems Ranked by Risk Sensitivity j Ittportance 4 3 i 4 1 A
24
- 4. CATEGORIES OF SAFFTY REIATED INFORMATION (AND SAMPI.E COMPUTER SESSIONS)
PRISIM provides two general categories of information: (1) updated PRA information ( in f o rmation that has been updated via the PRA update routine and that reflects ANO l's status when user specified equipment is out of service) and (2) preptocessed information (information that has been derived using the results of the ANO-1 PRA and that is meaningful regardless of the plant s status). The following sections , define the specific types of information provided by PEISIM and illustrate, through sample computer sessions, how you can obtain the information useful for making decisions that affect plant safety. Specifically, Section 4.1 describes the information provided via the PRA , update routine and provides instructions on how to obtain this in-formation, and Section 4.2 describes eight types of preprocessed information and provides instructions on how to access this information. 4.1 l!pdated PRA Information 4.1.1 Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status Monitoring a nuclear power plant's safety status involves being cognizant of the plant's configuration, which changes centinuously. As various components fall or are removed from service for testing or maintenance, the instantaneous core damage frequency estimate and the relative importances of components change.
- PRISIM's PRA update routine is designed to help you monitor the plant's safety status. While in the DBM routine module of the program, you can ,
specify any combination of out of service components and then select an "END OF INPUT" option to enter the PRA update routine and receive plant safety status information. Using the plant configuration you input to the program, the routine will calculate and display (in approximately 7 seconds) a significance factor which is the factor of increase in the instantaneous core damage frequency that results from the specified components being out of service. The significance factor is a useful index for quickly evaluating the safety implications of a plant's status. If this factor is large, a degradation in plant safety is indicated. In addition to thi s,
- l significance factor, PRISIM's PRA update routine will provide three other types of information updated to reflect the specified plant status:
- 1. A list of components ranked according to their relative contributions to the instantaneous core damage frequency.
- 2. A list of the most important failure scenarios (minimal cut sets) for core damage.
25
- 3. An "improvement from repair" option, which shows the factor of decrease in the instantaneous core damage frequency associated with returning each disabled component to service.
The first screen you will see in the PRA update routine provides the significance factor and options for obtaining the other types of information. It has the following format: SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT PLANT STATUS
. XX IS Tile SIGNIFICANCE FACTOR WITil Tile W1.IDVING EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE Out-of-service equipment MENU FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Ranking of safety related equipment Improvement from repair Ranking of core damage scenarios Return to Control Screen You obtain the additional information desired or return to the control screen by moving the cursor to highlight the desired information and pressing the return key.
Selecting the "Ranking of safety related equipment" option will result in the display of equipment not known to be out of service ranked according to relative contribut. ions to the instantaneous core damage frequency. This truncated list indicates the relative importances of components not known to be out of service. Selecting the "Ranking of core damage scenarios" option will result in the display of the plant's most likely failure mode given the specified plant condition. You can view additional failure modes, ranked according to their relative contribution to the instantaneous core damage frequency, by pressing the "4" key. Selecting the "Improvement from repair" option will result in the display of a ranking of the specified out-of-service events according to the benefit of restoring each to service. This information will help , you identify the out of service equipment that should be repaired first. PRISIM contains a reduced core damage frequency equation. Not all safety related components at ANO 1 have been accounted for in the j reduced equation; some components that you may want to specify as being j out of service cannot be specified as being out of service. Generally, failures of the components that have not been accounted for in the j equation will not significantly affect the core damage frequoney. I
l l 26 i l l However, if several components are simultaneously out of service and , cannot be specified as such because of the limiestions of the program, the PRISIM PRA update routine vill not provide a reliable indication of l the plant's safety status. Under these circumstances, the PRA update l routine should not be used. Sasole Session In this session, Valve CV6034 in the North Battery and Switchgear Rooms
- l Emergency Cooling System and Pump P7A in the Emergency Feedwater System are out of service. These components are the only components known to be out of service. You will use PRISIM's PRA update routine to assess the safety implications of these components being out of service. ,
When you first enter PRISIM, a screen offers you the option of obtaining safety-related information through the direct access path or the inspection procedure path (Figure 4.1). This screen is the Master Menu. If you choose the direct access path, you are then presented a list of information categories addressed in PRISIM (Figure 4.2). You select "Safety implications of the current plant status" and are presented two options for specifying out of service components (Figure 4.3). If you select the "Schematics" option, as in Figure 4.3, you will be presented a list of safety related systems for which schematics are available (Figure 4.4). Having selected the schematic for the North Battery and Switchgear Rooms Emergency Cooling Water System, you will next see the * ! l screen featured in Figure 4.5. You specify Valve CV6034 as being out of ! service by positioning the cursor on this component and then pressing the return key. (Note that the cursor position includes all Chilled Water Train A components.) You next move to the "SYSTEM MENU" option and press the return key a second time. This action returns you to the system menu where you select the Emergency Feedwater System in order to specify the pump in this system that is known to be out of service (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). r After you have specified the out of service components, you position the cursor on the "END OF INPUT" option on the schematic and press the return key, which takes you into PRISIM's PRA update routine. The next screen that appears (Figure 4.8) provides the significance factor when the specified components are out of service, and it offers options to return to the control screen or to receive the following updated safety - information: (1) a ranking of safety-related equipment, (2) a ranking of core damage scenarios, and (3) a ranking of improvement from repair. As indicated in the figure, the core damage frequency is increased by a , factor of 40 when the two pieces of equipment are out of service. If you want to see a ranking of safety-related toutpoent, nove the cursor to that option (as in Figure 4.8), press ??.e t eturn key. Sn/ a screen will appear that provides a ranking af safs: -related equipc ent not known to be out of service (Figure 4.9).
,=
27 [ l PAfMS FOR 06TAIN!WG SAFETY RELAftD INFORMAfl0N
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path 1
I a I i ( ) Figure 4.1 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information i i
- d 3
[ CAftGotit$ 07 $AFEff RELAftD thPORMAfl0N
)
I > 1. safety leptications of the current plant status 1
- 2. Dominent accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems
- 4. Safety related subsystees 7
- 5. Safety related corponents i
- 6. S p rt system interfaces
- 7. Corponent f ailure date
! e j 8. System testing / surveillance 9 Operator actions ; i ! i ( ) l 1 Figure 4.2 Categories of Safety Related Information l l i 4 1 1 0 4
l i 28 l I ) l OPfl0N$ AVAILABLE FOR !
$tLECTING OUT 07 $ttvlCE COMM*ENTS ,
- 1. Copponent Li:ts I l
l > 2. Schematics l l
- i i
( ) I l Figure 4.3 Options Available for Selecting Out of Service Coreponents [ SAFtif RELATED $YSffMS FOR VWICM $CMEMAf!C$ Att AVAILABLE i 9
> 1. North Bat *ery ard Switchgear Rooms Emergency Cooting System
- 2. South Battery ard $witc>aear Rooms Emergency Cooling $ystem
- 3. Core Flooding System 4 DC Power System
- 5. Emergency AC Power Systee
- 6. Energency feedwater Initiation and Contret system
- 7. Emergency Fee 6 tater System
- 8. Engineered Safeguards Actuation System
- 9. Nigh Pressure Injection systee
- 10. Low Pressure injection System *
(CON 1IWUED) I i ( ) i Figure 4.4 Safety Related Systems for Vhich Schematics Are Available l._-_. .- -- - .. . - - - - - . -.
I 29 i r NORTH 8Af fERY AND SWTCHCtAR ROOWS 6 (WERCENCY COOUNG $YSTEu SCHEW ATC - R00us 99, 95 AND 149 4 , ( NIEnt*w
-d*
- m >_ e[. . mou~1 om ..rt.
EsNcc _ recu s.s
*]
y y f I
- h t 't recon w t
- ren .w. .. .a. .x.
, wew mos % ecem
' NcnTH RAT!tRY #C0g me $= maa wm arc =cs bx. Dor. .&.
> sysTru utNu (No cr wut
( ) Figure 4.5 North Battery and Switchgear Rooms Emergency Cooling System Schematic - Rooms 99, 95. and 149 d l i . ( 3 SAFETY RELATED SY$fEMS FOR VM!CM $CHEMATICS Att AVAILABLE ; e
- 1. North Battery ars1 Switchgear Rocms Emergency Coollng $ystem
- 2. South Battery and Switchgear Rooms Emergency Cooling System
- 3. Core Flooding System 4 DC Power System I
- 5. Emergency AC Power System l 6. Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System
> 7. Emergency Feed ater System
- 8. Engineered Safeguards Actuation Systen l 9. Nigh Pressure injection system
. 10. LowPressureInjectionSystem i (CONTINVED) 4 ( J ;
i i Figure 4.6 Safety Related Systems For Which Schematics Are Available l l i ! l l I
, I t
30 . t ( (WCRGENCY f fECeATER $y$ttu SCHCW ATLC
)
_.:.,__4.>._.,. %u ,, ,, %u sa a 4 c.w c m.. .~ nei gp u_g,__ m 64 - cm Cv:tw l
""" u ,2uef>-.u Q, d7 n
;2> !
b v nu (* *
<=
,/ agg ,
o- g g ,y, Wrw=u : con . i
~
Wb. e cm.. sm ,90, .
-A C11 m p*e== v CO39 "'
i +9: em . , a R u <t>-w+
" c, ls':% c== ,,
.m, , c., ,
tv;MSn v Ca*8 gy,g MtP Y ' C12e* O
-**,3 com r3 =>-
~E' 7, __J # "
4 %.m c57
+
_ gc mu snitw wcNu > (No cc eur l ( ) .i Figure 4.7 Emergency Feedwater System Schematic i
)
1 l $ ( D l SAFETY IMPLICAfl0N$ OF ikt CURRENT PLANT STAfus 40 l$ th! $1CNIFICANCE FACTOR WifM THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE ] 4 Battery ard $wgr. Rocen Cooling System Chitted Water Train A Falls Emergency Feedwater Pg P7A Falls a 1, 1 l MENU FOR A00!TIONAL INFORMAfl0N i e
> Ranking of safety related equl Frent Irprovement frere repair Ranking of core dapege scenarios Return to Contret Screen j i
i Figure 4.8 Safety Implications of the Current Plant I Status 1 4 I
. ~_ . , .
i 31 l i [ D , RANCING OF EQUIPM(NT hof KNOWN 10 SE OUT OF SERVICE i I i I
- 1. Diesel Generator i Falls !
- 2. ICVS Isolation valve Cv3820 Falls to Close {
d
- 3. Auxillary Cooling Water systee Isotation valve CY3643 Falls to Close
- 4. StV Falls to teclose (EFW Avaltable) 1 3 5. Diesel Generator 1 NX service Water Valve CV3806 Falls to Open !
- 6. Battery and $wer. Roon Cooling Systam Chitted Water Train 8 Falls i i
- 7. Service Water Pg P48 Falls to Start !
i i l
- a I
i i l D ESC to return to the Selection Menu, j i j Figure 4.9 Ranking of Equipment Not Known To Be Out of ! Service i . e ! I I I 1 r i i 4 , i t l [ I I l I 6 I I
- i i !
t a r
32 1 Now that you have determined how Valve CV6034 (North Battery and Switchgear ECS) and Pump P7A (Emergency Feedwater System) affect plant safety, you decide to determine how also taking Intermediate Cooling Water System (ICVS) Isolation Valve CV3820 out of service for periodic j testing will affect plant safety. To do this, you must first press the j "Ese" key on your keyboard (as instructed by the screen in Figure 4.9) l and you will be returned to the additional information menu (Figure i 4.10). You then select the "Return to Control Screen" option on this i screen and you will be returned to the PRISIM control screen (Figure 4.11). To ensure the previously specified equipment remains out of . service, press the "R" key on your keyboard to resume the current I session. PRISIM will then display the last system schematic presented in the DBM routine (Figure 4.12). You then return to the system menu and choose the "Service Water System: Puap Loops" schematic (Figure ' 4.13). Using this schematic (Figure 4.14), you can specify Valve CV3820 as being out of service. As before, after selecting the "END OF INPUT" option, you will next see a screen with a new significance factor that represents the updated core damage frequency (Figure 4.15). 4.2 Preprocessed Information PRISIM provides rapid access to the following maj or types of I preprocessed information obtained from ANO 1 PRA results and other plant data:
- Descriptions of the dominant accident sequences identified by the PRA ,
(useful for evaluating emergency operating procedures).
- Importance rankings of safety related systems, subsystems, components, and operator actions (useful for a wide range of .
decisions regarding inspection activities), e Support system interfaces for safety system components (useful for verifying system and component operability).
- Single failures that will fail a safety system when a specified component in the system is out of service (useful for verifying system operability).
- Schematics that show the equipment re alignment required for a component being taken out of service for testing or maintenance ,
(useful for evaluating proper equipment tag outs and safety system lineups).
- Summaries of ANO 1 licensee event reports (LERs) and comparison of
- plant specific failure data with industry averaged failure data for i plant equipment (useful for evaluating equipment failures).
l r
5 [ t I 33 j i 6 i SAFEff IMPLICATIONS OF 1pt CUtttNT PLAuf $1ATUS { 4 i i 40 !$ THE $1CNIFICANCE FACf04 WITN TMt FOLLCWING 10V!F' MENT CUT OF Sgtvict [ t' lattery ard $wgr. Roers Cooling Systee Chilled Water Train A Falls f Emergency Feed =ater Ptrp PTA Falls l I i i i h 6 l 4 e l g i
?
MEW FOR AD0lfl0NAL INFORMAfl0N ; I Ranking of safety related equipment trprovement frorn repair tanking of core damage scenarios > Return to Control Screen j i i . i Figure 4.10 Safety Implications of the Current Plant 1 i 1 Status i 1- i ! r , ! a i I ] e Byte Birder RUN TIME DATA BA$t CONft0LLit ) i Copyright, Eastern Technical Engineering Corp.,1985 87
- Rev P0.41 terial s 006012 LlerAarWUC1 i j Couit0L 5CREEN l i !
j 8 estn new session L cad sessiert 5 ave session l I l t es a thii $ession P lay Back Current Session + - Playback Speed 1 Sec. j l ($C to emit N
- i 1 !
4 Brede succorted Green Override j e 513, Pg 357,P 9010 t l l Q ) , i i; Figure 4.11 PRISIM Control Screen , 1 1 : l i i . I
34 1 1 ( 3 . i twFRc(Ncv rt[CmAftR SY$ftw SCHCwthC _ .n, _a,_. q _.' N.
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1 A- e= = ,. 3 4 i -- ...ig _}-- 4 ,,,,, cu M ei ! e Qe;.,s , p snftw wtw t two cc evt Q ) r Figure 4.12 Faergency Feedwater System Schematic , l 1 . 1 [
$4Fiff RELAf t0 SYSitMS FOR WICM $CMEMATICS Att AVAILABLE i
- 1. Worth Battery ard luf tchgear Rooms Emergency Cooling System
- 2. South Bettery and Sultchgear Roome Emergency Cooling System j
- 3. Core Flooding Srstee ;
l 4 DC Power Systee I 4 l
- 5. Emergency AC Power Systen l a
- 6. Emergency Feedwater initiation ard Control System 4
1 7. Emergency Feedwater $ysice .i . l 8. Engineered Safeguards Actuation $/stee I 4 9. Migh Pressure Injection Systee
- 10. Low Pressure lejection Systee .
m couftwtu) k )
! Figure 4.13 Safety Related Systems For Vhich Schematics i Are Available l
l I i
35 j l i [ \ SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS FOR WHICH SCHEMATICS ARE AVAILABLE (CONTINUED) l
- 11. Low Pressure Injection System: Decay Heat Exchanger E35A Service Water Supply
- 12. Low Pressure Injection System: Decay Heat Exchanger E358 Service Water Supply
- 13. Reactor Protection System o > 14. Service Water System: Ptep Loops
- 15. Service Water System: Diesel Generator i Cooling
- 16. Service Water System: Diesel Generator 2 Cooling
( ) Figure 4.13 (cont.) ( . SERVCE WATER SYGTEM PUMP TRAINS SCHEMATIC
)
ATER SY1'IM y s,s la evan n toce a : M h P.c macs eva.i ,,, = cv= = n coat a = env sno
& w **e y
evna , evaa a u=a n ,,, toen i A he asswco cyan s'tucer t MM?rt?,ntt, SYSTEM WENU > END OF INPUT ( ) Figure 4.14 Service Water System Pump Trains Schematic
36 ( ) SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT PLANT STATUS 520 IS THE $1GNIFICANCE FACTOR WITH THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE Battery and Swgr. Room Cooling System Chilled Water Train A Falls Emergency Feedwater P g P7A Falls ICWS Isolation Valve CY3820 Falls to close
= l MENU FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Ranking of safety related equipnent irrprovement from repair Ranking of core damage scenariot Return to Control Screen j l
Figure 4.15 Safety Implications of the Current Plant Status I l
. l
37
- Summaries of periodic testing / surveillance requirements for safety-related systems (useful for verifying technical specification compliance).
The following are descriptions of this information and how the information can be accessed via the DBM routine in the PRISIM computer program. 4.2.1 Dominant Accident Sequences o PRISIM provides descriptions of the most important accident sequences identified in the plant's documented PRA. That is, PRISIM presents the accident sequences that represent the most likely ways for core damage
- accidents to occur at the plant. These descriptions provide valuable insights on the relationships among plant safety systems and highlight the important contributors to plant risk identified by the PRA. This information is useful for training inspection personnel, acquiring a general knowledge of plant behavior, and ranking emergency operating procedures.
Upon accessing the dominant accident sequence information category, you will see a screen that lists important accident sequences ranked according to percentage contributions to core damage frequency; each sequence is identified by its initiating event and the ensuing safety system failures. Two sets of percentage contribution values are prasented. One set does not account for operator recovery actions; the second set does. You may select any of the listed sequences to obtain more detailed information--information about the failures involved in the sequences. Af ter you make a selection, a detailed description of , the sequence will appear on the next screen. This screen will also provide options for accessing (1) information on specific failure scenarios (minimal cut sets) for the accident sequence and (2) possible operator recovery actions for the sequence. Electing to access information on a specific failure scenario will result in a description , of the scenario and options for obtaining more detailed information on l all the scenarios associated with a particular accident sequence (i.e., operator recovery actions for each specific scenario and a summary of all associated scenarios). Sample Session In this sample PRISIM session in which you want to obtain information on ; dominant ANO-1 accident sequences, you are first presented with the l opt.on of obtaining safety-related information through the direct access . path or the inspection procedure path (Figure 4.16) . If you select the j direct access path, as in this example, you will be presented a list of ! the information categories addressed in PRISIM (Figure 4.17). You select the "Dominant accident sequence" category, as indicated by Figure 4.17, and are then presented a ranking of the accident sequences by their percentage contributions to the core damage frequency (Figure 4.18).
38 f h PATHS FOR OBTAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path a
( j Figure 4.16 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information [ CATEGORIES OF SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
- 1. Safety laplications of the current plant status
> 2. Dominant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems
- 4. fafety related subsystems
- 5. Safety related conponents
- 6. Support system interfaces
- 7. Conponent failure data
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions
( ) Figure 4.17 Categories of Safety-Related Information
39 ( ) DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCE SELECTION LIST
% OF CORE MELT % OF CORE MELT INITIATING SAFETY RELATED FREQUENCY FREQUENCY RANK EVENT SYSTEM FAltl&ES (W/0 RECOVERY) (W/ RECOVERY) 1 Loss of Power SRVR HPRS 21.0 7.4 Conversion System , >2 Smett Smelt LOCA HPIS 16.0 17.0 (Eq. die s 1.2")
3 Loss of offsite HPIS 14.0 27.3 power longer than
, 8 hours 4 Loss of offsite SRVR NPRS 12.0 3.8 power (CONTINUED)
N Y Figure 4.18 Dominant Accident Sequence Selection List O i l 1 l i
40 If you are particularly interested in obtaining information on small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) events, you move the cursor to the second sequence on the list, llaving selected the sequence, which is initiated by a small-small LOCA and which includes failure of the liigh Pressure Injection System (HPIS), you will press the return key and next see the screen appearing in Figure 4.19. This screen provides a detailed description of the initiating event and of the ensuing system ; failures. It also provides options for obtaining detailed scenario l information for the sequence and for obtaining recovery information for the sequence. - 1 If you request the "DETAILED SCENARIO INFORMATION FOR THIS SEQUENCE" . l option, as Figure 4.19 indicates, a detailed description of the first scenario will appear on the next screen (Figure 4.20). The screen will also include options for accessing recovery information for the selected ' scenario, for accessing a detailed description of the next scenario, and for accessing a summary of all scenarios for the selected accident sequence. In this example, you choose to see recovery information for the selected scenario. This information will be displayed on a screen i like that illustrated by Figure 4.21. l l At any time during the selection of these options, you can backtrack to the previous screen, backtrack to the last branch point (the last screen that displayed multiple menu options), or return to the Master Menu by using the keyboard controls for these options described in Section 2. 4.2.2 Safety-Related Systems l PRISIM's data base provides importance measures for safety-related systems--measures that may be used to make decisions about where to e apply resources to maintain or improve plant safety. 1 PRISIM provides three types of importance measures
- for safety-related systems:
- Risk reduction e Risk sensitivity e Risk significance Tabic 4.1 defines these three importance measures.
*Since inspectors are most concerned with preventing core damage, the melsures of importance in PRISIM are based on core damage frequency.
41 ( ) DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE #2 INITIATING EVENT This sequence is initiated by a rupture of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pump seat or a reture in the RCS piping in the range of equiv-atent diameters .38" s dia 5 1.2". Neither type of rupture directly causes any safety related equipment failures. SYSTEM FAILURES The RCS rupture is followed by a failure of all High Pressure Injec-tion System (HPIS) pmp trains to provide flow to the RCS. With no recovery actions considered, this accident sequence contributes 16% to core melt frequency.
> DETAILED SCENARIO ]NFORMATION FOR THIS SEQUENCE RECOVERY INFORMATION FOR THIS SEQUENCE
( ) Figure 4.19 Description of Accident Sequence #2 e [ D DOMINANT SCENARIOS FOR ACCIDENT SEQUENCE #2 e I Scenario 21 described t:elow contributes 11% to the sequence f requency. The initiator is a "Small Small LOCA .38 in. < Eq. dia 5 1.2 in." HPIS FAILURE Failure of the Chilled Water Unit for cooling Switchgear Roorn 100 resulting in loss of ac power to Ptrps P36A and P368 AND failure of the Chilled Water Unit for
, cooling Switchgear Room 99 resulting in loss of ac power to Ptrp P36C e > RECOVERY INFORMATION FOR THIS SCENARIO
SUMMARY
OF SCENARIOS l NEXT SCENARIO i N } Tigure 4.20 Dominant Scenarios for Accident Sequence #2 I i l
42 l ) RECOVERY INFORMAfl0N FOR SCENARIO 2 1, ACCIDENT $EQUENCE #2 Recovery from this scenario is achieved by restoring the room cooling capability of either Chllled Water Unit VCH48 or VCH4A, or both, to pre-vent a toss of Rooms 100 and 99 cooling, respectively. Room cooling capability is regained by either restoring the chilled water unit or by manually starting portable f ans. In either case, this is a tocal recov-ery action. The time available for restoring cooling capability without-Irreversible damage is about 70 minutes. Recovery decreases the esti-mated frequency of this scenario by a factor of 100. , o i ( ) l Figure 4.21 Recovery Information for Scenario 21, Accident Sequence #2 o. l l i 1 I l t
43- i Table 4.1 Measures of Importance and Their.Interpretatior. Importance Measure- Interpretation
- Risk Reduction This measure is the likelihood. the equipment-would be failed and would contribute to a core damage event if a core damage event were to occur r Risk This measure is the rate of change (or sensitiv-Sensitivity ity).of the frequency of core damage' events with changes in the probability of the equipment failure Risk This measure is a combination of the risk Significance reduction and risk sensitivity measures. Like the risk reduction measure, it emphasizes the equip-ment's contribution to risk. But it also gives additional weight to, equipment with high risk sensitivity importance e
B l s l i i i
,,-,w- n. - - ., , , , - - - , , -. _ . - , . - -
i 44 1 If you command PRISIM to present either the risk reduction or the risk i sensitivity importance measure, you will be given a list of systems i ranked according to a numerical value that appears with each system on i the screen. If, on the other hand, you select the risk significance l importance measure, a list of systems grouped according to three risk ; significance groups (high, moderate, and low) will appear. No numerical ) values appear with the systems on the screen, and there is no implied i ranking within any of the three groups. i The following is a description of how you could access some of the - information on safety-related systems available in PRISIM. Samole Session Assume you want a list of ANO-1 safety-related systems ranked according to the risk reduction importanca measure. You enter PRISIM via the i direct access path (Figure 4.22) and then select the "Safety-related l systems" category of safety-related information (Figure 4.23). The subsequent screen that appears (Figure 4.24) offers you the option of seeing systems listed according to the risk reduction, risk l sensitivity, or risk significance importance measures. You select the l "Risk reduction importance" option and a ranking of systems according to , risk reduction importance measures will appear on the next screen l (Figure 4.25). 4.2.3 Safety-Related Subsystems , The PRISIM data base provides the same three types of information on safety-related subsystems as it provides on safety related systems; that is, it provides rankings according to the risk reduction and risk - sensitivity importance measures and provides groupings according to the risk significance importance measure. The following sample session illustretes how you could access some of the information on safety-related subsystems available in PRISIM. Sample Session Suppose you want a list of ANO 1 safety-related subsystems grouped according to their risk significance importance measures. You enter PRISIM via the direct access path (Figure 4.26) and select the "Safety-related subsystems" c a te go ry of safety-related information (Figure , 4.27). The subsequent screen that appears (Figure 4.28) offers you the option of seeing subsystems listed according to the risk reduction, risk sensitivity, or risk significance importance measure. You select the "Risk significance importance" option and then a screen will appear that = l presents the grouping of subsystems according to their risk significance I importance measures (Figure 4.29). 1
45 ( h PATHS FOR O8TAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path
( ) Figure 4.22 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information 4 [ tATEGORIES OF SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION e
- 1. Safeta laplications of the current plant status
- 2. Dominant accident sequences
> 3. Safety related systems
- 4. Safety related subsystems
- 5. Safety related conponents
- 6. Support system interfaces
- 7. Conponent f alture data
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions
( ) Figure 4.23 Categories of Safety-Related Information
( 46 [ h INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS
> 1. Risk reduction Irportance -
- 2. Risk sensitivity leportance
- 3. Risk significance irportance
( ) Figure 4.24 Information Available for Safety-Related Sys terns s F ) FRONT LlhE SYSTEMS RANKED BY RISK REDUCTION IMPORTANCE e RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM IMPORTANCE High Pressure Injection System 0.8 Pressurfter Safety Relief System 0.5 Emergency Feedwater System 0.09 Power Conversion System 0.08 Low Pressure Injection System 0.04 Reactor Protection System 0.008 , Core Flood Systern 0.0001 Reactor BuildlN Cooling System a Reactor Building Spray System a ( ) Figure 4.25 Front Line Systerns Ranked by Risk Reduction Importance
+
47 ( D PATHS FOR OSTAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path e
6 ( ) Figure 4.26 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Inforination e [ CATEGORIES OF SAFETY *RELATED !WFORMATION e
- 1. Safety inplications of the current plant status
- 2. Dominant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems
> 4. Safety related subsystems '
- 5. Safety related corponents
- 6. Support system interfsces
- 7. Cceponent failure data
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions l
i I i N _ } Figure 4.27 Categories of Safety-P11ated Information
48 ( ) INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR SAFETY RELATED SUBSYSTEMS
- 1. Risk reduction leportance
- 2. Risk sensitivity frportance
> 3. Risk significance leportance I
k ) Figure 4.28 Information Available for Safety-Related Subsystems l r 3 SUBSYSTEMS GROUPED BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE l HIGH RISK SIGNIFICANCE Emergency feedwater System Turbine Driven Pwp Train Green AC Power Green DC Power High Pressure Injection Standby Pw p (P36C) Low Pressure Injection Train A low Pressure Injection Train B North Battery and Swltchgear Room Cooling System Chilled Water Unit (Train A) North Switchgear Roorn (Room 99) Cooling
> (CONTINUED) '% ]
Figure 4.29 Subsystems Grouped by Risk Significance Importance S
49 ( , h SUBSYSTEMS GROUPED BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONTINUED) HIGH RISK SIGNIFICANCE (continued) Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves -f all to open Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves fall to rectose Reactor Protectlon System Channel A
- Reactor Protection System Channel B Reactor Protection System Channel C Reactor Protection System Channel D Red AC Power Service Water System Loop 1 Service Water System Loop 2
> (CONTlWUED)
( ) Figure 4.29 (cont.) , b e SUBSYSTEMS GRCUPED BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONTINUED) e H!GH RISK $1GNIFICANCE (continued) South Battery and Switchgear Room Cooling System Chilled Water Unit (Train B) South Swltehgear Room (Room 100) Cooling MODERATE RISK SIGNIFICANCE Emergency feedwater System Motor Driven Purp Train Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Digital Channel 1 s Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Digital 1 (corron equipwnt for Digital channels 1, 3, 5, 7, j and 9) e l
> (CONTINUED) I
( ) Figure 4.29 (cont.)
50 f D SUBSYSTEMS CROUPE0 BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONTINUED) MODERATE RISK SIGNIFICANCE (continued) High Pressure Injection Normally Operating and Aligned - Standby Ptsps (P368 and P36A) Red DC Power LOW RISK SIGNIFICANCE e Core Flood System Train A core Flood Systern Train B l Emergency Feedwater Initletion and Control System Control / Vector e Trains A and D (Motor Driven Ptrp Train) Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control System Control / Vector Trains B and C (Turbine Driven Ptsp Train) D a= (CONTIWUED) ( ) 1 1 Figure 4.29 (cont.) j i l l ( 3 SUBSYSTEMS CRCR#ED BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONilWUED) I LOW RISK $!GNIFICANCE (continued) Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System Trip Train A (starts both EFS prps) Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System Trip Train 8 (starts EFS Turbine Driven Ptap) Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Digital Channel 2 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Digital Channel 3 l Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Digital Channel 4 Engirwered Safeguards Actuation System Digital 2 (comon equipment for Digital channels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) e l Q } l Figure 4.29 (cont.) l l l l l
51 4.2.4 Safety-Related Components PRISIM also provides importance information on components (i.e., the three importance measures defined for safety-related systems and subsystems). And it provides five other types of information that are relevant when a particular component is out of service:
- 1. Single active component failures (e.g., the failure of a motor-operaced valve to close, or the failure of a pump to operate) that
= will disable the system when the specified component is out of service.
- 2. Information on support system interfaces (for listed single, active componera failures).
- 3. Schematics that show the equipment realignment required for a companent being taken out of service for testing.
- 4. Schematics that show the equipment realignment required for a
; component being taken out of service for maintenance.
- 5. Plant-specific LERs that describe previous failures of components similar to the component that has been specified as being out of service.
. The following sample session illustrates how you can access some of this safety-related component information using PRISIM.
Sample Session S Assume you want to see FRA related information that is relevant when a particular component,- Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A, is out of service. As in previous PRISIM sessions, you are first presented the option of obtaining information either through the direct access path or the inspection procedure path (Figure 4.30)- . You elect to take the "Direct access path" and are presented a list of information categories addressed in PRISIM (Figure 4.31). You then choose "Safety-related components" (as indicated in Figure 4.31), and a menu of information categories for components appears on the next screen (Figure 4.32). Since you are interested in seeing information that is relevant when
. Pump P7A is out of service, you select the "Information relevant when a particular component is out of service" option. The next screen that appears (Figure 4.33) will be a menu screen with two options for specifying the out of-service component. You select the schematics 8
option, as indicated in the figure, and a new screen will appear that lists the safety-related systems for which schematics are available (Figure 4.34). On this screen, you indicate you want to see a schematic of the Emergency Feedwater System. The next screen that appears will be a schematic of that system (Figure 4.35). '9
52 [ D PATHS FOR 06TAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path l
l I 1 l N Y l Figure 4.30 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information
- l l
[ h l CATECORIES OF SAFETY RELATE 0 INFORMATION
- 1. Safety implications of the current plant status I
- 2. Deninant accident sequences 1
- 3. Safety related systems
- 4. Safety related subsystems
> 5. Safety related corponents l
- 6. Support systern interfaces
- 7. Corponent f ailure data
- 8. 3ystem testing /survelltance *
- 9. Operator actions a
( ) Figure 4.31 Categories of Safety Related Information
53 ( ) INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR SAFETY RELATED COMNNENTS
- 1. Risk reduction Iq wrtance
- 2. Risk sensitivity leportance
- 3. Risk significance inportance
>4 Information relevant when a particular conponent is out of service e
f ( ) Figure 4.32 Information Available for Safety-Related Components e OPi!ONS AVAILABLE FOR SELECTING OUT OF SERVICE COMPONENTS
- 1. Corponent Lists
> 2. Schematics e
e 1 ( ) Figure 4.33 Options Available for Selecting Out-of-Service Components
54 ( ) SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS FOR WHICH COMPONENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE D 1. Emergency Feedwater Systein
- 2. High Pressure Injection System
- 3. Low Pressure Injection System
- 4. Reactor Building Cooling System
- 5. Reactor Building Spray Systee l
k ) Figure 4.34 Safety Related Systems for Which Component Information Is Available EVERC.ENCY FEEDW ATER SYSTEu SCHEW ADC 1 S
~emO,WTw um. a.
9
.to.. uar . _ ag n g _ w, a m Cv MW cvwai H~ Cm44 cv7tJO ng pq
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Oln f4 4$b~ j> E 184 ,e 9>_ v c. .. . to
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49 w3> c v7s27 lla cn*' ~
=
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.-A CST I e la en= .-
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cues
~g v we
, ,W 49udr can mee cm, n
-~, n, ,
T'4 _.J 4 psw.m 4 es;eo W? ___A"1 = l k ) Figure 4.M Emergency Feedwater System Schematic e- -y r.4-,,em - y -
55 You can now specify the out-of service component by moving the cursor to Pump P7A's position on the schematic and then pressing the return key. The next screen that appears (Figure 4.36) lists the information available that is based on Pump P7A being out of service. If you elect to first receive information on the most likely single failures for the Emergency Feedwater System when Pump P7A is out of service, you can command PRISIM to provide this information by positioning the cursor on this entry and pressing the return key. PRISIM will then provide the screen illustrated in Figure 4.37. This new screen will let you see the a most likely single failures, and it will give you the option of seeing additional single failures involving support system equipment that will fail the system. Moving the cursor to the desired component on the screen (e.g., "Pump P7B fails to operate") and pressing the return key will command PRISIM to present this additional failure information. (Figure 4.38 shows the support system equipment for Pump P7B. ) This screen format is discussed in Section 4.2.5. 4.2.5 Support System Interfaces A fifth type of preprocessed information in PRISIM's data base relates to the support services (power, service water, etc.) required by safety system components. Information on support system interfaces can help you verify the operability of equipment. For example, if you know one train of a safety system is to be isolated for maintenance on a component, you would want to first verify the operability of the , redundant train. PRISIM will provide you the support system interface information (i.e., all the support components or functions that must be available for the components in the redundant train to be operable, including some that may not be obvious) necessary to make this . verification. PRISIM only considers support functions that can alone fail either (1) a component of a front-line safety system or (2) another support function that will, in turn, fail a front line safety system component. In the format used to display this information, each level of indentation corresponds to a separate tier of support service. For example, consider this hypothetical sequence: 1 Pump 100 Service Water Loop X , 480 V AC MCC B51 Room 100 Cooling 125 V DC Panel Dil I 4160 V AC Bus C5 e Here, Pump 100 is served directly by Service Water Loop X and Bus C5. Service Water Loop X is served by MCC B51 and Panel Dil. MCC B51, in turn, requires Room 100 Cooling for continued operation. Failure of any , one of these support functions will fail Pump 100. l l
56 ( ) AVAILABLE INFORMAfl0N BASED ON PUMP P7A BEING OUT OF SERVICE
> 1. Most likely single f ailures for the Emergency feedwater System
- 2. Equipnent realignment for corrective maintenance on Ptrp P7A
- 3. Equipment reatlgrrnent for testing Purp P7A
- 4. Historical causes of f ailure for Purp P7A and similar ptrps at ANO 1 l
k ) Figure 4.36 Available Information Based on Pump P7A Being Out of Service l [ MOST LIKELY SINGLE FAILURE EVENTS FOR THE ! EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SY1 TEM VHEN PUMP P7A 15 OUT OF SERVICE e
> 1. Ptrp P7B falls to operate I
- 2. Condensate Supply Valve CV2800 (Ptrp PTB) falls closed i
1 Select a cecponent to see additional single fattures involving support system equipwnt. ( ) Figure 4.37 Most Likely Single Failure Events for the Emergency Feedwater System When Pump P/A Is Out of Service
57 f SUPPORT SYSTEM INTERFACES FOR EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP P78 Purp P7B 4160 V AC Bus A3 Room 100 Cooling 480 V AC MCC 851 Room 100 Cooling (Repeat) 480 V AC MCC 852 Room 100 Cooling (Repeat) e Service Water Loop 1 4160 V AC Bus A3 (Repeat) 125 V DC Panel 011 Room 109 Cooling ESAS Channel 1 4 120 V AC Panet RS1 480 V AC MCC B56 480 V AC MCC B51 EFICS Channel A Initiation 120 V AC Panet RS1 125 V DC Bus D01 ( ) Figure 4.38 Support System Interfaces for Emergency Feedwater Pump P73 h r 8 .I i i l l
1 58 l The appearance of "(Repeat)" following an entry indicates that the support for that component or function has been developed "higher up" in the sequence and is therefore not shown again. The development starts where the same component or function is first listed. If no support development is shown for a component or function that is not followed by ;
"(Repeat)," no single support system failures exist for that item.
PRISIM also provides support system interface information in a "reverse I logic sequence." You can identify a support component or function and PRISIM will supply a table that identifies the front-line safety . equipment (and support equipment) dependent on the support component or function. The following example illustrates how you can use PRISIM to obtain support system interface information in the "reverse logic sequence."
- i Samole Session In this session, assume you want to determine which components are dependent on a specific Emergency AC Power System component (e.g.,
480 V AC Bus B5). You enter PRISIM through the direct access path (Figure 4.39) and select the "Support system interfaces" information category indicated on Figure 4.40 On the subsequent screen you choose the option that will provide lists of components served by a particular j support system component or function (Figure 4.41). The next screen 1 presents the support systems for which information is available (Figure 4.42). You choose the "Emergency AC Power System" and are presented , with a system component / function list (Figure 4.43). You select the component of interest ("480 V AC Bus B5"), and a table that lists the components dependent on 480 V AC Bus B5 appears on the screen (Figure 4.44). , 4.2.6 Component Failure Data Two types of information on couponent failures are provided by PRISIM. First, there are summaries of ANO 1 licensee event reports (LERs), listed by component type. Second, there are comparisons of plant-specific failure data and industry averaged failure data for plant equipment. The following sample session illustrates how to access component failure data (in this case L.ERs) and provides information typical of the results , you would obtain if you were interested in component failure data. Samole Session Assume you want to obtain LER information on turbine-driven pumps. You j decide to obtain this information via the direct access path (Figure 4.45). You then select the "Component failure data" category of safety-related information (Figure 4.46). You will be presented a text menu 4
59 ( ) PATHS FOR OSTAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path
( ) Figure 4.39 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information [ \ CATECORIES OF SAFETY RELATED INFORMAfl0N
- 1. Safety laplications of the current plant status
- 2. Dominant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems
- 4. Safety related subsystems
- 5. Safety related corponents
> 6. S m rt systee interfaces T. Copponent f ailure data e
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions a
1 1 ( ) Figure 4.40 Categories of Safety Related Information
60 f 3 TYPES OF SUPPORT SYSTEM INTERFACE INFORMATION AVAILABLE
- 1. Support system interf aces for front line safety system comonents and selected support system comonents
> 2. Lists of com nnents served by a particular support system co m onent or function l
1 ( ) Figure 4.41 Types of Support System Interface Information Available
)
SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR WHICH INFORMATION l$ AVAILABLE e
- 1. Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System
- 2. DC Power System Sm- 3. Emergency AC Power System
- 4. Emergency feedwater Initiation and Control System
- 5. Engineered Safeguards Actuation System 1 6. Service Water System l
l i N } i 1 . Figure 4.42 Support Sys terns for Which Information Is Available i 4 l f l ___~
61 ( ) EMERCENCY AC POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT / FUNCTION LIST
- 1. 4160 V AC Bus A3 7. 4160 V AC Bus A4
> 2. 140 V AC Bus 85 8. 480 V AC Bus 86
- 3. 480 Y AC MCC 851 9. 480 V AC MCC B61 4 480 V AC MCC B52 10. 480 V AC MCC B62
- 5. 480 V AC MCC B53 it. 480 V AC MCC B56
- 6. 120 V AC Panet R$1 12. 120 V AC Panet RS2
( ) Figure 4.43 Emergency AC Power System Component / Function List [ \ COMPC*ENTS CEPENDENT ON 480 V AC BUS B5 e
- 1. Reactor Building Cooling Fan VSF1A
- 2. Reactor Building Cooling Fan VSF18
- 3. 480 V AC MCC B51 4 480 V AC MCC B52 i
( ) 2 Figure 4.44 Components Dependent on 480 V AC Bus B5 r
62 [ PATHS FOR OBTAINING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path 1
( Figure 4.45 Paths for Obtaining Safety-Related Information r [ \ I CATECORlLS OF SAFETY RELATED INFORKAfl0N e
- 1. Safety implications of tM current plant status
- 2. Dcninant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems i 4. Safety related subsystems
- 5. Safety related corponents
- 6. Support systers interfaces ;
i
- P 7. Component failure data '
- 8. System testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions e
e
%- J Figt.re 4.46 Categories of Safety Related Information 9
.-,,_a. , - , .- , - , - - ,,
63 that allows selecting either LER information or comparisons of plant data with industry averaged data (Figure 4.47). Since you are interested in obtaining LER information, you select this category and then the component of interest (turbine driven pumps) from the next menu that appears (Figure 4.48). Summaries of LERs involving the plant's turbine-driven pumps will then appear on another screen (Figure 4.49). (Note that only the first of a sequence of screens is shown.) 4.2.7 System Testing / Surveillance PRISIM provides information associated with periodic testing / surveillance requirements for safety-related systems. This information is. a summary of the integral and component te s ting / surveillance requirements as outlined in the ANO-1 Technical Specifications. The following sample session illustrates how to access system testing / surveillance data. This session also provides information typical of the results you would obtain if you were intsrested in system testing / surveillance information. Sample Session Assume you want to obtain testing / surveillance requirements for the High Pressure Injection System (HPIS). You enter the program via the direct access path (Figure 4.50) and then select the desired category of , safety-related information (Figure 4.51). On the next screen you are presented the systems for which testing / surveillance information is available (Figure 4.52). You choose the HPIS and are first presented with a screen which presents the integral system testing / surveillance e requirements (Figure 4.53) and then a screen which presents the component testing / surveillance requirements (Figure 4.53 [ continued)). 4.2.8 Operator Actions PRISIM provides importance measures of operator actions, measures that may be used to make decisions about where to apply resources to limit or reduce risk. Importance measures are provided for two types of operator actions: planned operator actions and operator recovery actions. In general, planned operator actions are those actions that are established in ANO-1 Emergency Operating Procedure 1202.01 and that are to be i , carried out by the operator following the occurrence of an initiating I event that causes or requires a reactor shutdown. Operator recovery I actions presented in PRISIM are those actions taken by an operator that mitigate the effects of an accident following an initiating event and , e the ensuing safety-related system or component failures. The recevery l actions are not explicitly established in Emergency Operating Procedure 1202.01. (Three operator actions that are called for by Emergency Operating Procedure 1202.01 are treated as recovery actions: (1) recovery of some Service Water System faults following a degraded power condition, [2] verification and corrsction of failures of the Emergency i l l l 1
4 64 1 ( D COMPONENT FAILURE DATA AVAILABLE e
> 1. A listing ef plant LERs
- 2. A caparisce, c1 plant data with Irdntry averaged data
( ) Figure 4.47 Component Failure Data Available [ COMPONENT CATEGORIES FOR WNICH PLANT SPECIFIC LERs ARE AVAILABLE 6
- 1. Batteries
, 2. Buses
- 3. Check Valves
- 4. Circuit Breakers
- 5. Olesel Generators
- 6. Fans 7 Motor Driven Ptrps t
- 8. Motor Operated valves
- 9. Pnetnatic/ Hydraulic Valves
- 10. Relief valves ,
1
> (CONilWUED) l ;
( ) 4
! Figure 4.48 Component Categories for Which Plant-SpeciS<
I II.Rs Are Available j
65 ( ) COMPONENT CATEGORIES FOR WNICM PLANT
- SPECIFIC LERs ARE AVAILABLE (CONTINUED)
> 11. Turbine Driven Ptrps e
e N } Figure 4.48 (cont.) [ h LERa INVOLVING TURBINE DRIVEN PUMPS e LER 8 DATE SYSTEM / COMPONENT DESCRIPTION , 85 008 08/19/85 Main Feedwater/ P1B tripped on over* Turbine Driven PLrp speed due to the fall
- PIB ure of a drive shaft coupling to the speed control governor shaft 85 007 08/11/85 Main feedwater/ PIB tripped dae to a turbine Driven Pttp high thrust bearing wear PIB Indication 85 001 01/07/85 Energency feedwater/ P7A failed to develop
, Turbine Driven Ptry the required flow end P7A discharge during test
- ing. The determined cause was low steam flow to the turbine driver, o which was the result of l inadequate modification .
(CONTINUED) ' N ) Figure 4.49 LERs Involving Turbine Driven Pumps 4 i a 1
66 [ t PATHS FOR 081AINING $AfETY RELATED INFORMAf!ON
> 1. Ofrect access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path I
1 ( ) Figure 4.50 Paths for Obtaining Safety Related Information 1 [ \ CATEGORIES OF SAFETT RELATED INFORMAfl0N I l
- 1. Safety leptications of the current plant status j
- 2. Dorninant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems 4 Safety related subsystems
[
- 5. Safety related conponente
- 6. Support system Interf aces l 1
- 7. Corponent f at ture data j
> 8. Systeen testing / surveillance
- 9. Operator actions l
i Q ) l Figure 4.51 Categories of Safety Related Information 1 i I
67 ( h SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS FOR VNICM INFORMATION ASSOCIATE 0 WITH PERIODIC TESTING /SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS IS AVAILABLE EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEMS
> 1. High Pressure Injection System
- 2. Low Pressure injection System
, 3. Core Flooding Systee
! 4 Emergency Feedwater Systee REACTOR BUILDlWG COOLING SYSTEMS
- 1. Reactor Building Cooling System
- 2. Reactor Building Spray System (CONTINUED)
N ) Figure 4.52 Safety Related Systems. for Which ?.nforma tion , Associated with Periodic Testing / Surveillance Requirements Is Available [ PEtim !C TESTING / SURVEILLANCE
\
- REQUIREMENTS MIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM INTEGRAL TESTING / SURVEILLANCE once every 18 months the HPIS shall t,a tested to demonstrate it is operable. A test signal will be applied to demonstrate the '
actuation of the system for emergency core cooling operation. The test will be considered satisfactory if control board Irdication i verf fles that att appropriate pwp breakers have opened or closed 1 ard att valves have completed their travel. l l o
> (CONTINUED)
( ) I Figure 4.53 Periodic Testing / Surveillance Requirements-- I High Pressure Injection System l l 1
68 i
)
PERIODIC TESTlWG/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MIGH PRESSURE INJECTION STSTEM (CONT!WUED) COMPONENT TESTlWG/ SURVEILLANCE PUMPS The HPIS psps sheLL be tested quarterly to verify proper start-
@ and operation. Acceptable performance wlLL be indicated if the pap starts and operates for 15 minutes and the discharge a
pressure and flow are within t 10% of acceptable timits.
]
VALVES All ESF valves in the NPIS and all associated ESF valves in the , SVS designed to function in the event of a LUCA shalt be tested , quarterly. Acceptable performance will be indicated if oppropriate motion is indicated won actuation. (REfURN TO MENU) N } Figure 4.53 (cont.) l l
=
e 4 1
69 Safeguards Actuation System to actuate safety-related systems and components, and [3] manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System.) PRISIM ranks planned operator actions according to their risk sensitivity and risk reduction irrportance measures and groups them according to risk significance. Operator rceovery actions are also ranked and grouped according to these importance meaeures. The following sample session illustrates how to accass operator action information (in this case, information on operator racovery actions) and shows some of the results that are obtained using chis option. Sample Session In this session, assume that you want PRA related information associated with operator recovery actions that could be taken following a failure of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFS) motor driven pump. As in previous sessions, you enter the program through the direct access path (Figure 4.54) and then select the desired category of safety related information ("Operator actions") illustrated in Figure 4.55. On the next screen you select "Operator recovery actions grouped by risk significance importance" (Figure 4.56) to obtain a list of operator recovery actions grouped according to high, moderate, and low risk significance (Figure 4.57). You can now obtain information on the operator recovery action of interest by moving the cursor to the "Restore EFS motor driven pump" entry and pressing the return key. The new screen that appears (Figures 4.58 and 4.58 [ continued)) provides the detailed recovery information. This completes the description and presentation of sample sessions of l each category of safety-related information provided by the PRISIM l program. The appendixes that follow provide additional information on ! the use of the PRISIM computer program. Appendix A explains how to l obtain copies of the graphics screens provided by PRISIM. Appendix B details the information provided via each of the two PRISIM access I paths. l l l l
l 70 ( ) PATMS FOR OBTAINING SAFEff RELATED INFORMATION
> 1. Direct access path
- 2. Inspection procedure path I
l t
+
l l ( ) Figure 4.54 Paths for obtaining Safety-Related Information l 1 ( D CATEGORIES OF SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION e
- 1. Safety laplications of the current plant status
- 2. Deninant accident sequences
- 3. Safety related systems i 4 Safety related subsystems
- 5. safety related corponents
- 6. Support system interfaces
- 7. Corponent f alture data j l . i
- 8. System testing /surveittance J j > 9. Operstor actions j l
l
- i
( ) I Figure 4.55 Categories of Safety-Related Information l l l 1
71 ( ) INFORMAfl0N AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR ACTION $ j
; 1. Plamed operator responses ranked by risk reduction leportance
- 2. Planned cperator responses ranked by risk sensitivity leportance j
- 3. Plamed operator responses grouped by risk significance trportance
- 4. Operator recovery actions ranked by risk reduction leportance
- 5. Operator recovery actions ranked by risk sensitivity frportance
> 6. Operator recovery actions grotped by risk significance importance
( ) Figure 4.56 Information Available for Operator Actions e f \ OFEKATOR RECOVERY ACTIONS CROUPE0 BY RISK SIGNIFICAWCE IMP 09fANCF 4 MIGH RISK $1GNIFICANCE Restore Chilled Water Unit VCH4A l Restore Chllled Water Unit VCH48 j Restore Diesel Generator 1 following loss of offsite power that persists for tonger than 8 hours 1 Restore Diesel Generator 2 following loss of offsite power that persists for longer than 8 hours Restore offsite power e Restore room cooling to Makeup Ptrps l l Restore SVS Loop 1 on loss of flow due to a flow diversion to the I Auxillary Cooling Water System (ACVS) )
- l l
> (CONTINUED) i l ( )
l
) Figure 4.57 Operator Recovery Actions Grouped by Risk Significance Importance l
i l
72 ( OPERATOR REC 0YERT ACTIONS GRCUPED BY RISK SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE (CONTINUED) HIGN RISK $!CN!FICANCE (continued) Restore SVS Loop 1 on loss of flow due to a flow diversion to the - Intermediate Cooling Water System (ICVS) MODERATE RISK SIGNIFICANCE Manually control EF$ turbine driven Ptry Train 8 on toss of green de s power l Open Rs step Isolation valve CV1405 Open RB $ g Isolation Yalve Cv1406 , Restore cooling to Room 99 Restore cooling to Roca 100
> Restore EFS motor driven prp l
(CONTINUED) ( ) i F15 ure 4.57 (cont.) l l l I f D l f RECOVEtf INFORMATICN FOR RESTORING EFS MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP l This recovery action consists of restoring the EFS ector driven prp to I establish flow in EF$ Train A. The location of the recovery action de- i pends upon the specific cause of the prp failures j
$PECIFic CAUSE OF EFS MOTOR DRIVEN LOCATION OF REC 0VERY PUMP P78 FAILURE ACTION P78 f alls to start er rm unrecoverable PTB unavaltable due to corre tive Unrecoverable i maintenance PTB Olschargo Check Valve plugs Unrecoverable Power Cable falls open circuit Unrecoverable Circuit Breaker (CB) falls to trans- Local I
fer e
> (CONTINUED)
( ) Figure 4.50 Recovery Infornation for Restoring EFS Motor- l Driven Pump J t i l
73 ( RECOVERY INFORMAfl0N FOR RESTORING EFS MOTOR DRIVIN PUMP (CONTINUED) ) I l SPECIFIC CAUSE OF EFS MOTOR CRIVEN LOCATION OF RECOVERY PUMP P78 FAILURE ACT10N , r CS Control Circuit falls control Room i The time avalloble for restortre the EFS motor
- driven pg without irreversible damage is about 20 minutes. Recovery, where it takes place, decreases the estimated frequency of the scenarios by a factor of 1.8. This recovery action is taken in scenarios 15 2 and 15 3.
( ) figure 4.58 (cont.) F 9 4 i e t e . 1 b A
. .- . __ ~_ - - - . .. .
i A-1 [ t f APPENDIX A i j OBTAINING HARD COPIES OF CRAPHICS SCREENS l l PROVIDED BY PRISIM , To obtain a hard copy of a graphics screen provided by PRISIM, you must 4 make a photocopy of the appropriate plot of the screen image (schematic) provided in this appendix. You can quickly find the plot of the desired , screen by bringing the screen up on your monitor and pressing the "Esc" key. The control screen will appear, and, at the bottom of the screen, the picture number of the desired screen will be displayed. Use this picture number to find the location of the appropriate schematic in this , appendix. Schematics are arranged according to ascending picture number, beginning with 9002 and ending with 9146, with intentional gaps to allow for the inclusion of other schematics at a later date. l t i > I 1 j i i l i 1 ! l i j i a
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_ .m _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . . _ _ . ____ _ .. - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ~ . _ _ _ _ .. _ _ . _ _ _ . - LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC REACTOR DH10 - VESSEL 8#^S3 BWST , DH10 JL BYPASS FROM DH8A > F4 m FROM CFT
%WX FROM CFT B SS FROM DH88
^
T2B
, T2A TO TO
_ E35A Jk HP TO RB SPRAYdk
),( )( P34A
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S CV1401 CV1428 y, **"^^'y, L 1 CV1410 ' CV1414 SUMP / : I }k h FROW RCS m 82 Sm Sm yY H CV1050 CV1404 TO h TO HTX HTX BWST HP 3 BYPASS E358 BYPASS TO R8 SPRAY j d AL Ak P348 u h CV1400 CV1429 CV1406 TO BWST 4 >< y, TO HP ' CV1415 h i HTX BYPASS
. . . . - e
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HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC h JL TO RCS JL A ...._....__. h BWST T3 lB 18 lB g n - - p h
^
R
~
CV1407 h CVI408 h
~ ~
TO LP TO tP
)( )( )( JC )( AND R8 W AND R8 M :>
SPRAY PUMPS SPRAY PUMPS w u, m 228 N 227 CV1234 P36A l Q . T g am m FROM LP COOLER E35A DISCHARGE 1 r J d P368 CV1235 k 'M k C 1 J L Q 1 r g J L TANK T4 TO RCS PUMP _ 3 P36C 3 SEAL HEADERS ' ; g JL Mm m FROM LP COOLER
' ' E358 DISCHARGE SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT
LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC A DH10 - REACTOR VESSEL
^
DH10 JL BYPASS V k_ Y
,. -\- FROM DH8A =
JL
?4 FROM # W FROM HTX 1 CFT CFT BYPASS J J 1 T2B
~
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g CV1401 CV1428 m Q, g R8'
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A L FROM RCS . 52 Sn CV1410 5, ] h ' CV1414 SUMP / HOTLEG U 1r ' Cb050 Cb404 TO TO BWST gp HTX HTX 7 3 BYPASS E358 BYPASS TO R8 SPRAY j d JL JL P348
?4 l CV1400 CV1429 CW6 TO SWST 4 -,
Q TO HP ' CV1415 JL HTX BYPASS i MTEM MENU END OF #4PUT e g e e
- i
LOW PRESSURE HEAT EXCHANGER E35A SECONDARY COOUNG SCHEMARC E35A g __ FROM ROOM COOLER WCI A, ROOM COOLER WC18. L O COOLER E50A AND L 0 COOLER E47A FROM , OTHER o SWS >* 0 LOADS m
"O CV3822 JL CV"3823 ' TO EMBOCY POND TO OTHER SWS < CV3824 O LOADS FROM SWS LOOP 1 V TO DISCHARCE FLUME SYSTEM MENU END OF LNPUT
4 LOW PRESSURE HEAT EXCHANGER E358 SECONDARY COOLING SCHEMATIC ; i k E358 g m FROM ROOM COOLER WCI A. ROOM COOLER WC18. '. L O COOLER E50A AND L O COOLER E47A i I FROM I e Omm m o SWS > 0 LOADS $ 1 CV3821 mQ
,, = TO EMERGENCY I d
CV3823 PONO 1 TO OTHER Sws c CV3824h LOADS g FROM SWS LOOP 2 V l TO Dr$ CHARGE FWME 8 SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT i 1' i ] . . . . .- e _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _____,.___,___....____.m. . _ _ . _ _ _ . . . - - - - . - , - . _ . . - . . , . - - . _ _ . _ _ _ . . . . . . . . _ . . . _ _ . . . . . . . . .
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~ . . - - . _ - - . - - - _ . . - - . . ~ - - . _ _ . - - _ - .. - _ - ~ . _ _ _ . . . - - _ - ~ . _ . . - .___ . .~ -..- -... . --
l ' l EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC rRou u u rROu , SERVICE SERVICE t
?4 TO WATER WATER CV2676 CV2668 ATM LOOP 1 9 9 LOOP 2 CV3850 CV3851
?< 3g CV2646 p7g MM CEN M j
' TO CONDENSATE E24A /
Q / TRANSFER PUMPS V CV2645 [ CV2667 j pCV2803 : CV2627 'L- - ________ O
>< TO
_.y T g; CST CV2619 CV2618 ATM. A CV2806 W ~ CV2620 STEAM P7A s & W CEN % ; TO/FROM CV2617 E248 WT 2 CST I CV2663 g V CY2648 SV2663 s CS281
;; CV2626 g_3 4
-cTc CS280 OCSr Sv26:3;m; 4 PSV-6602 QCV2613 SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT
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,, m DICTAL SUBSYSTEM CHANNEL 4
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CHANNEL 10 RC m 1 PRESSURE ANALOG SUBSYSTEM RS _ NO.3 PRESSURE SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT
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PIPE SEGMENT SCHEMATIC FOR SERVICE WATER COOUNG OF DIESEL GENERATOR DG1 l COOLER E20A e O _ o sws l 7 DC 1 toAos CV3823 L 9 TO 3 7 ;g)4
- EMERCDeCY CV3806 j y TO OTHER O
SWS hCV3824 LOADS n y TROM TO SWS LOOP 1 DISCHARGE FLUME SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT ,
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REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
! RADIADON '
a DAMPER ^'^a= A~o BPDA cv747o INTERLOCK FROM
'\, MA VSFIA 0 ,Nr RB ATMOSPHERE W 3 V
CV3812 RADIADON FROM DETEC10g SW = t92 p y'9 F7 b 814R LOOP 1 CV3814 DAMPER 7gou BPDs cv7471 gg m
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ATMOSPHERE s y SUPPLY TO O > AIR = u DAMPER % UM BPDC 2 FROM W1C i R8 - 8 f ATMOSPHERE CV3813 CV3815 FROM t9; i RADIADON SW = P' ( pq DETECTOR LOOP 2 815R DAMPER BPDD cv7473 FROM
' VSFID 0 RB - \8 8 ATMOSPHERE D RADIADON ALARM ANO INTERLOCK
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM PUMP TRAINS SCHEMATIC TO INTERMEDIATE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 1r TO SWS 00P 2 < % 'A P4C ASSUMED LOADS CV3641 CV3642 RUNNING O CV3640 e AUXIUARY O COOUNG 4 % 'A P48 ASSUMED 3" M WATER SYSTEM CV3643 CV3644 RUNNING CV3645 CV3646 LOCP 1 1 % 'A ASSUMED IN LOADS CV382C STANDBY TO INTERMEDIATE V CoOUNG WATER SYSTEM
-,,--,,-----,w, , . - - - - , , - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ZOA 10A H30MY@ A8311YG ( ON(I ON (I ( H30Wm AH311Y8 t00 998 C00 998 S G H3ANI StZA G ZZA H3ANI') 'd l C LA E LA l C98 CSG I c, c, (, c, vs 7 Z98 C f 19 8 y p p y 198 f ES8 C C C C C
& Y & 5 Y Y a 98 4 4 se e d
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> , e - - .
198 MO W 198 MOU LS8 NOW 198 WOW sz0 st0 l l I I l l zYu tYu I g g (I tra 110 rss tsu Csv tsu ON 3Y A 0tt DY A Ott gj OY A OZ1 3Y A Ott ON 1YDNYM l v_ 4 EZA. 43ZA b Ct[b It[b N o C ( (( (, v C C (, C C Z00 LOO { [ ( (, q on C 00 A GZ1 00 A SIL l00 A set 00 A 931 __ al al t00 400 000
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. . . a : a ,
1 EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1219 TO RCS COLD LEGS
;L i JL MU1232h !!hkhh "
THESE VALVES ARE "k MU1212 CLOSED TO REMOVE TO INJECTION 3 g VALVE CV1219 FROM UNE A MU1224 SERV!CE AND ARE
-. . . . . OPENED TO RETURN TO INJECTION n ;jg:l.,,, IT TO SERVICE UNE B j{iMUt2. 2 4
g: 480 v AC uCc ast Mu1213 5 5,uu1211 8 X Ca 5152 ) ) C8 5151 - X >*
- r2 CV1220 CV1219
[C FROM BWST
-... h-iii.@.3%j;i:i MU19A
< OR MAKEUP 1 , TANK "38*
3
!!NN!!!
MU25 U (CONTINUED)
EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV* :19 (CONTINUED) TO RCS COLD 1.EGS MU1232 MU1231 j TO INJEcllON
-{MU1212 UNE A uu1224 TO INJEC110td n g UNE B uu1223 480 V AC MCC B51 MU1213 , ,\ MU1211 t i X !N!!!$h!! !!!' !!M.!!!!N!!N!N!! )C Y sn N CV1220 y 'CV1219 FROM BWST i
RACKED OUT TO REMOVE % WU20A
'A uu19A I -.
= OR M AKEUP VALVE CV1219 FROu TANK SERVICE AND LEFT MU26
^
OPEN IN STANDBY TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE MU25 y l TO TRAIN 8 I I l l e ,
- g a
- l
j t
- EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1220 TO RCS COLD LEGS h h 4
MU1232h MU1231 h TO INJECTION
\ MU1212 UNE A ijivyJppi:
TO INJECTION . ,. g UNE B MU1223 480 V AC WCC B51 MU1213 ,\MU1211 8 e N CB 5152 ,) ) CB 5151 X Y w i CV1220 h (CV1219
' FROM BWST C OR W AKEUP THESE VALVES ARE ,
CLOSED TO REMOVE . !!$..30 Alii MUISA l"-d TANK VALVE CV1220 FROM jijyyjij P36A SERVICE AND ARE OPENED TO RE1 URN IT TO SERVICE MU25 i i U i I """ (CONTINUED) 1 1 1 _ - . - - _ _ - . - , . - - - . . ,---_m- . - - ~ - _ ~e a
EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1220 (CONTINUED) r-TO RCS CGW LEGS - n U I MU1232 )j MU1231 )Ij RAOKED OUT TO REMOVE TO INJECTION , g _._
\.
~
MU1212 VALVE CV1220 FROM SERVICE AND LEFT UNE A MU1224 OPEN IN S*.'ANDBY TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE TO INJECTION ,
,s g UNEB MU1223 480 V AC MCC B51 WU1211 MU1213 d A i4T#);insii- iMMitst;sii x a.
CV1220 h (C/1219 FROM BWST M 'A MU20A MU19A c OR MAKEUP TAMK
^
MUO6 1 U TO TRA:N B I
* *
- e e e
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1227 To RCS COLD LECS A A MU1234 MU1233 g n To INJECnoN
, UNQ uu1224 TO LHJECDON
. pyg , , UNE
- Mui221:;
C V AC MCC B61 MU1214 uu1215 I }{ X C8 0152 ) ) CB 6151 THESE VALVES ARE e CLOSED TO REuoVE S CV1228 {C } CV1227 VALVE cv1227 FROM co SERMCE AND ARE L oeENEo To RETuRei e TO WMN 8 IT TO SERMCC A MU24 h
; I MU23 1
- FROM 8v!ST T
..JM::: -:-:::W l W OR M AKEUP i:!Mu200::i MU19C 'd P36C TANK (CONTINUED)
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTEN ANCE ON VALVE CV1227 (CONTINUED)
TO RCS COLD LEGS A
f M01234 y MU1233
[
l , g
CV1228 {C
- I . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _
l $ k WU24
! i RACKED OUT TO REMOVE MU23 i VALVE Cv1227 FROu ' FROM BWST SERVICE AND LEFT M ay I T 1 OR MAKEUP OPEN IN STAND 8Y uu20C uu19C d TArg TO RETURN !! TO SER ACE P36C w . < . e -
EQU1PMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CCRRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1228 TO RCS COLD LEGS I S' MU1234 p uu1233 __ Yyij n TO INJECTION LINE D
$MUi2dii ,
TO INJECTION M01215 480 V AC uCC 861
\MU1214
)$ C8 6152 l) ) CB 6151 X THESE VALVES ARE l
y CLOSED TO REuoVE CV1228 IC S CV1227 VALVE CV1228 FROM i l SERVICE AND ARE OPENED TO RETURN m TO TRAlH 8 IT TO SERV!CE > 0 w W MU24 f i i l MU23f FROM BWST
' l
!! C d
P36C in" ** " (CONTINUED)
?g N
O I T C E J N g I O T e C ,
" 6 3
P N O C TI C E JD N u I E O IN C TL
)
D B u E N U NI 3 3 2 4 1 7 2 A R T AIh f T t 2 2 4 3 N u 1 U 1 O 2 2 u V T u U O 9 C u M C ( . ( 8 n {Sl 2 h, 5 2 !. 1 k i ~ V C S 1 6 N[i. E C E B I9 V L C C L D 4 L 2 u A V O C g2u A C t I.-li' S u RN C V $ i R OO O 0 5 h
! E F T 4 k. E C -
E h V L V _ TC G R k uu E NN b E R GT S E A h RF Y O MN i O T FELDB T NE 8 T 2DAI NT
- GT I
L N {CI 8 U 2NT C V AS N 1 R AA 4 5 2 D C ENI U T EM E E C 3 1 2 E _ R 2 2 1 V K V V. N R _ t t C CLRE
- _
E u u AAEPO M u RVSOT T N VIT E C _ ME _ Pl R UR QO EC _
*o5 _
- . I Yw M
OO T ORT T F D S WP BM D 0E E. E U S 0N 1 4EI C P V MS O O VOR RR L CC S S E FO
. S EI O I VL OT EAN VVAT L I AEE R VVC N .
S OIVU
. I WRT HEEE TRSR kgB b h--
- H
- D 1
5A
- [ 1 4 pLIP N A
3 , A OR TT S U T B 8 C ) 4 A 3 T 5 P S V 0 w . 0 4 B 6 A 8 1 2 O 4 D H T C D . 8 : 3 _ H . D 0 0 b DH 1 0 4 8 - 1 5 V 3 E - C _ E 9 8 8 V 2 I;DH - L A 6 B 1 kVC 4 1 V C - C 0 _ RN M
) ' 0 4
OO C A 1 V F C E V 1 TC 6 . _ 0 1 NN 8 6 - EA 8 3 4 B - MN 1 H C
. NE D GT I
L N R , X - O L AAI T E O C SS 8 EM 1 T H ) R AC D D
. Ev R
E !l : ( E T NI V , U _ N E T C T I _ M E N _ PR I O UR C QO ( EC oO
- t , ;' ,1: I )j;: ' ! !
- , :j
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1400 (CONTINUED) TO REACTOR VESSEL RACKED OUT TO REMOVE jt jg VALVE CV1400 FROM SERMCE AND LEFT OPEN !N STAND 8Y e - TO RETURN IT TO
,\DH18 DH133 SERVICE.
480 V AC MCC B61 4160 V AC BUS A4 g : ! 5 : ! tsiCEES in iiEeM6;isiic)ii 5' O
! t X R b I
__ _ M & h OH3B DH28 i 3 g BW88 FROM BWST I CV1400 Cv1429 40 E359
) 'DH1B M -
E DH10
- TO BwST y '
DH88 l TO LPIS TRAIN A l 1 l r I
* . e . _, .
e - e e s e EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1401 TO REACTOR VESSEL Jk JL THIS VALVE IS CLOSED TO REMOVE VALVE CV1401 FROM SERMCE AND IS OPENED TO I O SME
,\DH17\DH13A 480 V AC MCC 851 4160 V AC BUS A3 g &
co >
-> CB 51114 ) CB A305 ') L w
, )( )( I JA Cb401
& Mi DH3A DH2A s 33gi;- FROM BWST
, CV1428 jffldil8kf[ j DH1A FC FC TO BwST y DH8A DH10 TO &IS TRAIN B (CONTINUED) 4 o . , , . . _ . , - - - . - . - -
l ' , la T S W B M O R _ F A A - g8W DHB 1 SB I yLIP N 7) 3 , A A - OR TT S _ U 3 B 3 A C A
$! 4 3 T
) V $
i P S W D 0 $ B E 6 $ A O U 1 4 2 T NI T E V O N H D _ N O C ( M EM ROT RF OFE T 1 Y O LBO NT T hH A 3 D T0DAI 0 U 4 NT _ 1 1 0 OV AS N 1 R #' DH 4 D CENI TU E . 1 EE C EC A V KVMNRMR 5 3 . C CLRE E AAEPOE RVSOTS E 8 A V 2 8
#' H L
A V 1 5 B k4 1 V C D C C RN M i: d t OO C d A i F A v E ! jf C _ TC V { NN 0 8 1, 5 EA A 4 i; B MN 3 IC. NE 1 H GT O . _ UNI R , X _ AA O T EL _ EM R O C SS T 7 1 H AE D . E E R V T V ' 1 NI , E T C . ME P R I UR QO _ EC _ w il! i; 1 )
>Lw M
OO T ORT S TF D W B D 8E E 2NE M S 4EP M 1 O R O LC VO R E F C S S S EI
. I V O L DT EAN VVAT L I AEE .:
OM : VVCN :. S MR h.: :2 A
. I HEEE N:
TRSR 8:?1 : H n@:D B I :: S8 3
- 7j j
yWINA A- OR TT S U 3 B A
- C ) 4 3
A P T 5 S _ V 0 i W 0 3 B 6 A A - 1 2 O 4 8 H T C D , A : 3 - H D - 0 8 2 33OH 1 4 g 1 3
. V g C
E A V 8 2 lD iH 8 L A V 1 5 8 kV 4 C 1 C ,. C 1 . RN M
) 0 OO C M 4
V 1 , F A C E V 4 , TC 1 e 1 . NN 0 8 1 5 EA A 4 8 MN 3 1 C .
. NE H ,
GT D , LI N I m R , X AA O T EL 7 EM ) _ R oC T SS 1 H D EvE A
. C E .
E U TV NI R
, X N -
E TC I T ME N P R I O _ . UR C _ ( . QO EC . ~ o ooe _ m i i- j ' I ; 4 l ,, : , ;t i 4 _
^
u s
"R "O
A 8 A1 H bWB D S8 I yLIP N 7j 3 3 j A A OR s TT U ' _ B ki A - c k 4 3 A T k P S
) v '
W D E U 0 6 1 4 b 42D A B O T E H N I V T O . A : N MM , _- ( O C E ROT RF Y O OFE T L D8 T MH 3 D O 8 NT 0 8 2 T2DAI U4NT OV1 AS N R 33 H 1 D 4 D C ENU E T A 1 V EECI KVMNRM EC 5 O CLRE 3 C R E - AAEPOE ,- RVSOTS E A V 8 2 31HD S < kT L t s 4 A e V e C c RN 1 u ! 0 OO c Y 4 1 F A Y C E v k. T C b
- i. ,
NN 0 8 k EA A 4 MN 3 1 !@ NE H i. & GT D . I L N X I R ~ AA O T LE 7 EM R O T C SS 1 H I - AE D . E E R V . T V NI T ~ X E C - M P E I R UR , QO EC -- eo
;. i! ' ,
~ . _ . . . .-. __ .. - . . - .. _ . _ . -
* * . + .- .
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV1429 TO REACTOR VESSEL JL JL THIS VALVE IS CLOSED TO j REMOVE VALVE CV1429 FROM . .; SERMCE AND IS OPD!ED TO DH18 DH138 4160 V AC BUS A4 480 V AC MCC 861 e 8 > co C8 6161 ) C8 A405 ,) , e
)( X M h i 3 FROM BWST Cb50 CV1429 DH38 DH25 *[5kg[. .,
j hDH1B 3C 33 TO BWST y DH88 DH10 TO LPIS TRAIN A d j (CONENUED)
>h T
S W B M O R F 8 B g8W B D 1 H SA I j P N 4 vj 7 3 LI A A OR S T1 U 3 B 8 C N-; 4 A 3 T
" S
) V n W
D 0 B E 6 k 8 2 O U E 1 4 H T N V D I T O 8 O N MM E 3 O ROT RF Y O H D C OFE 8 T ( T 9 L DNT . T2DAI 0 1 9 U4NT 1
;DH 2 OV A S N R D CENU E .
4 I T 8 1 EE C E C 3 V KVMNRMR CLRE 3 . C AAEPOE r. RVSOTS E 9 8 8 V 2
;DH L
A V 1 6 0 k4 1 V C C C 0 RN M b m 0 OO C A S bC 4 F E V TC )h
- k. ,
NN 0 8 k EA 8 4 - MN 3 1 k-NE H . GT D UN I R L ~ X AA O E 8 _ EM R O T T C SS 1 H AE D m E E R V _ T V - X _ NI E T C ME _ P R I UR QO EC _ oO
- _
' , ! 1 4 i> ,
ah_- ___ . # .A 4.., 4.. a h EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR ' CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2400 a t TO BWST d DH9 hDH10 480 V AC MCC B61 4160 V AC BUS A4 C8 6171 ) ak BS3 2 404 ) g 8 ? W6 C550 !![d!ii!h W e4 a@ '= "' m Su E hBS2B y THIS VALVE IS CLOSED TO REMOVE VALNE CV2400 FROM SERMCE TO LPIS AND IS OPENED TO RETURN IT TRAIN A TO SERMCE. i (CONTINUED)
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2400 (CONTINUED) RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2400 FROM SERMCC AND LEFT OPEN IN S'ANDBY TO BW dk
. TO RETURN IT TO SERMCE
] jDH9 jEH10 i
j 480 V AC MCC B61 4160 V AC BUS A4 l !!Nl!bkk.ld5; jBS3 ![NkifM)!!id j N y M , i T ,j g FROM BWST W m 3III BS4h CE24M S1 BW6'8 8W50 ' OR SUMP P358 jBS28 u TO tPtS TRAIN A 1 4 I 9 O & 4 O 4
s - . . . . EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2401 l TO BWST d
) jDH10 jOH9 480 V AC MCC B51 4160 V AC BUS A3 CB 5171 ) ] jBS3 CB A304 ')
e w w p A YkI!5- l T ej g m FROM BWS1 l IIII BS4A CV1401 ,ilBSTA!!!P BW6'A BW5A ' OR SUMP P35A jBS2A y 1HIS VALVE IS CLOSED TO REMOVE VALNE CV2401 FROM SERMCE TO LPIS AND IS OPENED TO RETURN IT 1 RAIN B TO SERMCE. (CONTINUED)
.- . - - . . . - ~ . . _ . . .. , -- - - _ .- . - . . .
4
- EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2401 (CONTINUED) i l
1 RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2401 FROM SERMCC , TO B M T AND LEFT OPEN IN STAND 8Y , j TO RETURN IT TO SERMCE N I DH10 hDHS 480 V AC MCC 851 4160 V AC BUS A3 i!!k[kt[f,I[id h853 MI[i[$$!!:Q. O w 4 y ld g , i T ej g _ FROM BWST. l' IIII BS4A M k1 BS1A BW6'A BW5A ' ' OR SUMP P35A
] hES2A i
V TO t.PIS 1R AIN 8 1 i I j e . . . * * ]
. . _ - .. .. . - _ _ _ - - . . = _ - . . - - - - . - - - - . _ . . .- _ - - . .._...._- . - . _- - . _ _ - = _ . . . ~ .
I . I P EQUIPMENT P7 ALIGNMENT FOR 1 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2613 1 ._ l P7A . FROM CST OR M B L C 666 3 1 (LC.) : I
,, 125 V DC MCC Di5 480 V AC WCC B52 A
W FROM SG "A" C8 72-1512 ) C8 5241 1) THESE VALVES ARE
. CLOSED AND THOR . .y
#
- 4S$ :. ^ BREAKERS RACKED OUT
- m Q . r-M.- TO REMOVE VALVE $
' CU633 .
. .I: CV2613 FROM SERMCE.
i THE VALVES ARE OPENED Ati THOR CV2613 BREAKERS L. EFT OPEN IN STANDBY TO Y l RETURN IT TO ' 480 V AC WCC B62 SERMCE. CB 72-2512 ) CB 6241 ) 125 V DC MCC D25 - A
- .j:g;,::.
. i v..J . FROM SC *B" icv 284ti S-:r - :r.
t e
- . - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ .. .- = - . - _ - - _ - - - -. . - - . .- . -- .
4 i EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR l CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2613 (CONTINUED) M^ rRou csr oR P C 666 l a.C.) l 125 v oc ucC 015 4ao v Ac uCc e52
--14 ~ rRou sc *A*
C8 72-1512 3 CB 5241 ) i e 8 ?y4 JA * :n-I ' Cv2sl3 E e t y 4ao y Ac uce a62 '
!ik!NNbk!?)
Ce s241 ) RACKED OUT TO REu0VE VALVE Cv2613 rROM SERMCE 125 V DC MCC D25 AND LEFT OPEN N STANDBY --{A ;y; e FROM SG *B" TO RETURN IT TO SERMCE CV2617 e . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.______________z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
YC T DT O HT tI N , A U TM SN RR NY N DO E SDFRAE O EJ REKT
# OE LK 0 AER R CC 2 SBOT v 2
A E R RV A 62 E VR R AS CLO V HY ii A B S RE T N D U B S E V E DA C D q EKL L AA HT N T A REV .A SC V BEEDI NR E. I V
. V E VCE E 5 SIROIVNNS EEMREE 2
1 HHEEPPO T1RSOOT [L T S - Y C O
- 5 T 1
D C C o W 2 s C 2 D v 6 4 C 2 V 1
^
0 5 2 5 1 6 2 V C
;:M.i4 :
2 1 n
- i.
2 7 : V:i - 6 8 n:$* 2 V C 3
- 1 C 6 A B R ,
E C 5 - C 0 V kM 3 L A V MC A V 5 s s jQ C D V ( 6 0 RN 0 8 6 5 2 1 A OO ' 4 s C _' 1 R F B , E - T C TC a oS NN - TC EA . Oc ,. TS - MN - NE GT UI N AA ) - EM R D -
. E E -
TV U - - NI N E TC I - T - ME P R N O C I _ UR ( QO EC
, 1 i a 1 Jj ;1 ! ' J
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR l CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2620 (CONTINUED) RAmED WT TO OM VALVE CV2620 FROM SERMCE 125 V DC WCC D15 1
- j. AND LIFT OPEN IN STAND 8Y TO '
REW IT TO HMM gg;g;;I7pygg;; TO m
,j _ FROM CY26C SC *B" '
FW1.Il CY2620 AND PUMP P7A 480 V AC MCC B63 i FW57 [- CB 6335 ( CV2626 II
. TO CST N
@ TO CST FW59 co FW568 125 V DC BUS RA1 -
C8 RA1-06 ( C CV2648 n FROM TRAW A 1 y , # 3
EQUIPMENT REAllGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2626 125 V DC MCC D15 CB 72-1514 TO _
.j m FROW CY2647 SG '8* '
pygg ;- ' AND PUMP ?7A
, 6Mfjj 480 V AC MOC B63 CB 6335 (
o (CV2626 TO CST .,,
. T _
FW59 e 125 V DC BUS RA1 THESE VALVES ARE CLOSED AND THEIR BREAKERS RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2626 FROW CB RAl-06 C SERVICE. THE VALVES ARE OPENED AND THEIR BREAKERS LEFT
]' ;gg>!Njii!.
1! OPEN IN STANDBY TO RETURN IT 0NK ;' - " ". TO SEMICE.
- n FROW TRAIN A (CONTINUED)
j [ . : . . s y&o ~ A 7 7 4 P 6 . 2 Y CN M OO R FM T
, S
) Y C D 5 O E 1 T U D N C I C 0 T M 2 6
N C V 2 O D 4 C 6 s C V 1 5 2 6 8 8 4 6 . ( . 5 2 1 2 V 5 2 v C 3 c 6 2 6 2 1 2 7 B C _h . fi_ O V C 3 6 B s A a _ . E C s C u V 38 M !!- s L A _ c f.f AC y A V O T V k g g.m o v te N E CY I 0 8 M i 5 2 CO V 8 E R D _' 4 h; 1 F E V ESA O N T CE
- T TC B .
OS M M SVI - TC NN E O NR R RI E OG EA O F NS TS MN T 6E O NE T 2P T GT U6O 2 VTIT UN I O CF D EN AA EELR EM R KV CLDT U AANE . E RVAR T NI V E T C ME PI R UR QO EC o$
. * , - s e i
, EQUIPMENT REALIGNMEN f FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2627 480 V AC MCC B61 CB 6141 TO -
.j m FROM CV2646 SG *A" gw3fA ijGV26?kjj: AND PUMP P78 125 V OC WCC D15 C8 72-1522(
CV2627 U o > TO CST W 0, FW58 - 125 V DC BUS RA2 - TMESE VALVES ARE CLOSED AND THOR BREAKERS RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2627 FROM SERE THE VALVES ARE C8 RA2-06 (l :#Gi:..;,..<. .. OPENED AND 1 HOR BREAKERS t. EFT pg(.@jk OPEN IN STAN08Y TO RElVRN IT TO SERVICE. ' iL FROM TRAIN 8 (CONTINUED)
- , . - _ - ,., . , . . - .. ~ ,, _-,,# .. _.,, c-. ..,, . , , . , , - ~ . . . , , , _ _ . - -, ,, m . . , , , . .
i ! ' ,l , , a ' 8 6 7 4 P 6 . 2 P VM CU P . M O D R FAN . T S
) C
~
D 1 0 O T E 6 B 6 U W C F N I C 0 T W 7 6 N C A 2 V O = C 7 5 . _ C ( V 2 6 8 5 4 6 8 0 2 5 2 . - 8 V W V N 7 4 C F C I A 2 R 6 {- [ T . 2 M O V 5 2 A R . . C F 1 D R m C S E _ C U V AW B L A j3
.W 1
F C D 512 a C D (, 6 . V O T V 2 j5Fw V 0 E .4 1 , - 5 5 2 RN CY MB 2 f. 2 A OO ER
; 1 8 1 R F V ED 7:!
E N S TA E 8 TC O MMSC
,A N ; OS TC T C -
E M NN R O NR OG - EA O F NS RI E TS MN T 7E NE T 2P O GT U 26O TT . - . I L N I O CF VTI - D EN AA EELR EM R KV CLDT U _ AANE . E RVAR = .. TV NI . E T _ C _ ME _ P R I , _ UR QO - . EC -
-S -.
lj !) i!l .!1 , ' . , : a ' 1 j :i ; , , i 1 4
. . . _ - ~ . - _ . _. . - . . . - - - - - .- ..- .__ -_ . -_
. 4 e e e e EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2645 125 V DC MCC D15 FROM STEAM 125 V DC MCC D25 SYSTEM THESE VALES ARE CB 72-1512 U
') CD 72-251z CLOSED AND THOR I BREAKERS RACKED OUT O TO REMOVE VALVE CV2645 CV2663 CV2613 " 3 ARE OPENED AND THDR 125 V DC BUS RA2 480 V AC MCC B61 BREAKERS LEFT OPEN IN N
STAND 8Y TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE. C8 RA2-06 ') TO CST - ' C8 6175 620 c ' '
. .. '). id .......... O e AND SO ~8- FW55A!:Cv2647: FW10A CS
~ 3!CVZ802!:i
^\ P7A r r " ~ " " "' >
N57 C8 RA2-06 ) CB 6181 ) 125 V DC BUS RA2 - 480 V AC MCC B61 TO CST NM /- 125 V DC MCC D15 - 480 V AC MCC B61 TO CST M FW58 .,,CB 72-1522 ) CB 6185 i gwnw, -t m V n TO TRAIN A FROM SW (CONTINUED) 6
-- - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - , - --+-,1 v,w-,- - - - - - - - ,, .- -, -
e - e, - , - - er -ee, -,,
l , Y v. .
~
n N mP EN R MOU T eO T E R FR E mF5 T 4DLO" T , 6 NY _ W2 V A6N C 0C 4 1 1 EAN3 , 6 6 B B mEMT LR S C C C C uVSNI AE
. MM 9 i
] C C W 5 <
A A 5 8 M 1 6 7 1 V V 1 6 n 5 2 5 B 6 8
- b. 0 0 8 8 4 4 B
C 0 %y C . j i C C 2 C %, M 0 C ) 8 M C 2 A V
) C g
/
C - W 2 D S D h 'DL E V 3 8 0 )
- ' J i;M PO U 5 1 4 1 OO 2 6 6 , RL N
I 1 2 V 0 8 8 3 F . T C 2 V V C N C O M C A - ( 5 EM TT SI MY S
'd 2 5 A 1 R
S D C y 4 OS U C . 6 R [ S M F 2 [ C C V 3 A D D 2 2 S C 5 6 6 0 1 V V 5 1 E 1 D 2 V C T A'FW . 5 5 2 2 2 V C S 3 1 1 7 L C 2 C B A A M [i
) A O d C N
V C ? R T S u D p S - m 5 RN V U B 7 4 5 8 7 O OO 5 2 2 C 6 4 2 6 2 6 T F D 6 V 2 2 v E 1 { 0 C vC C V TC NN Q j 5 2 A 5 A c EA 2 R 5 T MN 1 D C A'FW S C NE C O g GT
- T I
LIN 7 5 D AA c "~B W EM R 0G 2S F 6 8 E D , T NI V N A ~ E C T ~ - M E - P R I UR _ QO . EC . e ow n ( <
) , '
]" II
- l l! l t t ; 1 1 1 5 5 -
E 8 8 VE C C L RN " . RA AEP OV *T C C MM S SO E WC ) EEV E V 3 C C OV LTTA L
= 9 1
A A 4 9 D N M E AE V L V 1 5 V V 1 5 - AR 5 0 0 D O E SE B 8 C 8 8 4 4 s C E TEERM C )
. S C 4 OT .KAN M O -
LUE ER ) a - C O C RV C l g E DRMBl E A s v R EEER V 7 .M W S 1 AC S C SNO T 0 5 a 1
)
] '
] oMO P
E AM O V RO 8 4 C s 0 O RL 5 L A R N YE S FA BC 0 S 8 s VREsD NDM R 3 2 v v C EK4EAE SAsN T S A C EE2E RVP O S S mBCOINT U B 1 3 C A
)
i AV87" A s R B t S C V s U C A l B M ) 0 a
)
- s C C 1 C s 5 D A 5 4 o 0 s -
- V V s s
T A'm 1 A R 5 0 2 8 a S 1 4 C
- C D D
- ) C A N 6
4 R S O T
- c I A
t RT - 6 U c] S s 2 B 4j B O V C
) <2j sj 2 s T
. C D s o :v y N 2 v
C V - C A,.@ ~ 4 E 5 1 A V 2 R As5 T L
- m 1
S A B C T S C V 'C O T - 1 s O RN D , T - . OO C ' F C .g~ - TC E M C
) 6 2"
NN A 1 4 i v" EA V i s
..C" MN 0 e NE 8 C GT 4 L N I
I AA = ) EM R . D
~^ E -
E U
. T NI V O N E TC I
T . M E N - PR I O C UR ( QO EC - ey -
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2646 (CONTINUED) RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VAL %E CV2646 FROM SERMW AND LEFT OPEN IN STANDBY TO RETURN IT TO SERMCC 480 V AC MCC B61 125 V DC BUS RA1 4160 V AC BUS A3 480 V AC MCC 851 C8 6141 ijCS[.M[fgjj[ TO CST ij$j[yy}j[i C8 5173' H TO A CV2670
.j k FW56A CV2646 j
FW108 i .3 CV2SOO _ FROM o CV2648h CV2803)h Y
- 1 i .
* ^'*
FW60[ ,
" - 125 V DC BUS RA1 - 480 V AC WCC B51 TO CST N[ 480 V AC MCC B63 -
480 V AC WCC 851 TO CST C6335g Ce51,4g CV2626 [C CV3850] v a TO TRAIN 8 FROM SW LOOP 1 i F g & as T O
, , , , , - - - - - , - , .c , , ,
[ * - P 1 1 6 6 B B M C C OT C C R MM F l C C 2 1 5
- A A V V
)]
5 8 1 2 1 0 0 6 6 5 - B 8 5 B - 2 4 4 C 2 7 C .j'- 0 C 5 2
.g- - e . C B M )
C C
) C -
C M _ V A 5 f 7 1 Mh: Sw2 D V 3 84 0 6 8 h 3 3 OM O P
. 5 1 C 1 OO 2 6 2
5 RL F 1 V 8 C 3 M p V C - A EM 2 5 TE Td p ST ] A 1 MY S
% , R S
D S OS U U R B B F ) 4 l C C l 3 3 A D D 2 2 5 1 6 6 2 A0 tW 1 V V 5 5 5 1 D V F 2 21 2 C T 1 7 C S C 2 C 8 A M ) A - C - O ;
~, N 1
hTp R g
- R T I C 2
- A -
7 D 1 5 S \- T U 7. , 4 V 1 B 4: B 8 7
) O A5 5 2
- 6 -
6 2 2 C W 6 T 2 1 7 D 6 2.: V. C; N 'F 2 v , V 0 w-
. B V - : C C C 5
2 A 5 A E 2 1 R M5W T S V 8 C F T S C e L C O A 5
.[ '
T V 1 7 0 D - 5 RN C
- W F
OO C ?. 5*
- E E
V M ) 2*' V E L F d' L A ETH A E C 2 V' V TC D 4 D V H
?.!d- E NN V 1
S TD E E V NNH T 5 O < EA OE.AI 1 5 - L MN 2 2 CS M C DEN N EER EME P R 1 - 7 NE -
. GT s RK AA OSPT RRNOEE UT C E UNI -
a SR E T OFR AA - EBT V M OELO E . . EM R $ LR A U D RR FA S TE C D
) . E VO HD7S EBRYM R E TV ETE4EKDE U EDC2K6 LEA VANS N NI S E T - w C HNAVARTO TI M E TARCVBST N .
P R I O UR C QO ( - EC a c n - v a l !
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2647 (CONTINUED) 125V DC MCC D15 FROM STEAM 125V DC MCC 025 RACXED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2647 TROM SERV!CE
" 2' W5 bYNN R t. T TO \ ! - -
CV2663 C :# n CV2613 125 V DC MCC 015 125 V DC BUS RA2 480V AC MCC D61 CB 72-1514 ) [iN[i N k j. TO CST CD 8175 ) h SG 'O* 4 -M M < CV2620 FW55A CV2647 FW10A CV2502
^
o CV2806)[C Y ~ CV2645h - C8 RA2-06 l) :jyilijjjL"ij, q
- 125 V DC BUS RA2 -
480V AC MCC B61 TO CST N2 k- - 125 V DC BUS D15 - 480V AC MCC B61 TO CST M FW55 Cd 72-1522 CB 6185 me2, s CV3 5, :n v m TO TRA!N A FROM SW LOOP 2
. . . . e e
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2648
~
! mESE VALVES ARC CLOSED AND NOR BREAKERS RACKED OUT TO REMOW VALVE Cv2648 FROM SERMCE. THE VALVES ARE OPENED AND NDR BREAKERS
- 1. EFT OPEN IN STANDBY TO RETURN IT TO SERwCE.
125 v DC BUS RAI 4160 V AC BUS A3 480 V AC MCC B51 CB RA1-06 ) TO CST CB A311 ) CB 5173 )
~
M .l M 670 wo Sc A- Fw56Alsv2e4s rwioB W" .. ifcv2sO6.g t CSr g Cv2s4s'Xc Cv2 sos[c] :> CB RA1-06 ) C8 5193 ) E F - 125 y oC Bus RA1 4so y AC WCC 851 TO CST Fws68[ " 4ao y AC WCC B63 - 480 V AC MCC B51 TO CST M Fw39 C8 8335 CB 5194 wm v Cv>e5e n TO TRA;N B FROM SW LOOP 1 (CONTINUED)
EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2648 (CONTINUED) RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2648 FROM SERMCE AND LEFT OPEN IN STAND 8Y TO RE1 URN IT TO SERMCC 125 V DC SUS RA1 4160 V AC SUS A3 480 V AC MCC B51 CB RA1-06,) TO CST igEid! C8 5173 6 670 t Z b Z ' c e AND SG "A* FW56A CV2646 FW100 CV2800 h CV2648 O CV2803)h rwsoZ ME ""8 F - 125 V DC BUS RA1 - 480 V AC MCC B51 TO CST FW568[ 480 V AC MCC B63 - 480 V AC MCC 851 TO CST M FW59 CB 6335 CB 5194 CV3850 CV2626h v n TO TRAIN 8 MOM SW LOOP 1 . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ - ---.__- - - - _ __ - _--___- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' - ~ - * ^
a -
. . . o EQUIPMENT REAllGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2663 P7A FROM CST OR AN 8 *f pp
,' (LC.)
l 125 V DC MCC CIS 480 V AC MCC B52
'A I FROM SC "A" e
C CB 72-1512 ) C8 5241 ) :> mESE vAtytS ARE j!: '<ii - CLOSED AND THOR
- - BREAKERS RACKED
>g q ~ifh'g,
.i
"- - 66f'ii:
- ~ " '
CUT TO REMOVE CV2663 VALVE CV2663 FRou _ _ . _ SERV.CE. THE VALVES ARE OPENED Cg6J3 AND THDR BREAKERS "t'f LEFT OPEN IN STANDBY 480 V AC uCC B62 TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE. C8 72-2512 ) CD 6241 ) 125 V DC MCC D25 .. o. (CONTINUED) --tA E>g<5
- rROu SC a-ii:cv2mm:
> g
~ -
~A a .
C c - S s . M O u o _ R R _ F r _
= e 2 e 2
5 6 B 0 _ C C 6 C 7 C 7 6 ). M 6 46C ) 6 M ) 1 ga26V 5' yV2 (L C 2 C _ A 1 V A 1 C 4 C 4 C V 2 5 V 2 6 _ 0 0 _
) 8 8 8 B 4 C 4 C D _
E _ U _ N I T _ N _ O C
/
- x- -
( . 3 5 5 6 1 D 2 _ 6 0 _ 2 C C V C i _3 3_ C - C M Q 6 1
) u
- E RE O TA R
C D % h2 6 V C 6 2 v 2 c o TW V 1 C_ 1 V S )1 5 2 v L CEC Y 5 - - 5 _ A MVP I L 2 1 2 2 2 _ V ORP 3 7 1 REU B 8 FSS iC C _ RN OO E F CY E V 8 I TC EER N DC E _ NN _ EA A 7 TQ : s
' O N
SAMTR MN P MM SES _ EO N NE R RI O _ GT 1I O F N T I L N T 3ET I T 6PI AA U 6O 2 N EM OVTR _ _ R S D D CFUET E FN EK NELE s TV EI R A CLD _ _ Nl T OR AANO _ E C TT RVAT . M E _ P R _ I UR _ QO _ EC e"~~ _
... _--. - . .- -. - ._~_-=. -_..._. _. -_._-~ .= -- -_ -.-_-.
. - . _ . _ _ _ _ = . , - . . . - . - . . .
*
- e e a ,
EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2670 1 .i ) 480 V AC MCC B61 125 V DC BUS RA1 C8 6141(' C8 RA1-06 ( To .,. : A FW13A CV2670 Mh::. Fw56A:tiV'R65 FRN PUMP P78 I 125 V DC MCC 015
= C8 72-1522 (I CV2627 U y N TO CST &
w TO CST Fw58 125 V DC BUS RA2 \ Fw358 THESC VALVES ARE CLofED AND
' THOR BREAKERS RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2670 FROW l SERVCE. THE VALVES /JtE -
OPENED AND THOR BREAKERS IIFT CB RA2-06 (l g<g-(;CY264% 9 p. . .... ;; OPEN IN STAND 8Y TO RETURN IT
.. ..' TO SERMCE.
JL FROM TRAIN B (CONTINUED) i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ . _ . , . __ .__ _ ,. . - . . - - . , . -
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2670 (CONTINUED) UI[ icv 2s70 raoYstav.cE 4e v Ac ucc set 125 v oc 005 RAI AND LEFT OPEN IN STANOSY TO RETURN IT TO SERV.CE -.g- ,- TO SG .A. .e 'A - FW13 A CV2670
-y fc FW56A CV2646 FROM PUMP P78 125 V DC MCC D15 CD 72-1522 ('
$ D CV2627 F y
C TO CST
- To "
CS + u,33 7 FW558 125 V DC BUS RA2 k. CB RA2-06 C k-- O cv2s45 FRou TRA:N 8
L EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2803 i ivisE VALVES ARE cLosEn ANo Tuon BREAKERS RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2803 FROM SERMCE. THE VALVES ARE OPENED AND THDR BREAKERS
- LEFT OPEN IN STANOBY TO RETURN IT TO
] SERVICE. l 125 Y DC BUS RA1 4160 V AC SUS A3 480 V AC MCC B51 CB RA1-06 ) TO CST CB A311 ) CB 5173 ) 670 h -
. :. */ '
.. .. O AND SG *A" W56AlCV2846) FW108
[M800}
$ MOk!!{d3 Cv2803)y g . 0. . :sf.
l . y CB 5193[)
, C8 RA1-06 ) w L
125 V DC BUS RA1 480 V AC WCC B51 TO O T N[ 480 V AC MCC 863 - 480 V AC MCC B51 TO CST M M59 Ce s335 ) Ce s194 Cv3850]p Cv2626) <
- y u TO TRAIN B FROM SW LOOP 1 (CONTINUED)
1 J EQUIPMENT REAllGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2803 (CONTINUED) RACKED OUT TO REMOVE VALVE CV2803 FROM SERMCC AND LEFT OPEN IN STANDBY TO RETURN IT TO SERMCE 125 V DC SUS RAI 4160 V AC BUS A3 480 V AC MCC B51 CB RA1-06 ) TO CST gj3s}.f CB 5173 TO
' T CV2670 Z Z c e AND SG *A~ FW56A CV2641. FW108 CY2SOO U
CV2648Y OO CY2803 h Y e CB M-06 ij@{ppJ %; NO[ V - 125 v oC bus rat - 480 V AC WCC B51 TO GT NB[ 480 V AC MCC B63 - 480 V AC MCC B51 TO CST M g .,;. ,y :. FW59 CB 6335 :CI5!@Mi: .i: CV2626h CV3850) h U JL TO TRAIN B FROM SW LOOP 1 l
.-m-_, .m.s- ,.m,,_ ,. , -.. -. - -4.__ .m. , , - , , . -..ww,, ,m,_ ,,,.m. . - ~ . , . - ~ , , , r ,7 . . . ..m-., , - , , . ,
- - - - ~ . - ~ . . = _ . . . - . . . - . _ _ - . _ . . _ = . - . _ _ _ . .
. . - ~ .. - . _ . _.
e
- e *
- e l
EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON VALVE CV2806 125 V DC WCC D15 FROM STEAu 125 V DC WCC D25 SYSTEu THESC VALYES ARE CB 72-1512 U ) C8 72-2512 CLOSED AND THEIR BREAKERS RACKED OUT F: :1 TO REuoVE YALVE CV2806 k
-i:i Myfi:: - .3h. .. j[.ii- .
FRou SERVICE. THE VALW.S ARE OPENED AND THOR 125 V DC BUS RA2 460 V AC WCC B61 BREAKERS LEFT OPEN IN N STAND 8Y TO RE1 URN IT TO SERytCE. C8 RA2-06 ,) TO CST , J CB 6175 CV2620 e ' A
. . . . ..$ 0 AND SC *B* -
Fw10A Mfs502'j "7^
- FW55Acv2H5l .
cv264[Q$i Cv2ao6 7p l 3
'tB RA2-06 C8 6181 )
- Y 125 V DC BUS RA2 480 V AC WCC B61 TO G NB[ 125 V DC WCC D15 480 V AC WCC B61 TO CST M Fw35 C8 72-1522 CB 6185 )
Cv2627h Cvsa51p] v u TO TRAIN A FROW SW LOOP 2 (CONTINUED)
h
! ,l' 7' I' <'
m S -. 6E - 0 V N T 8 L 2 A RI T U V VON
. I .
OC HEN E ETPR . _ R RDEH DEVT D OUl . A TCA HKL .N TE S E AV CE DLO ATR E, . V LN DR EME TEC AASVRNS ROEERYIV V DEMSPEB R 1 1
+
_ 6 6 EEKE OKDE 3 B SSARW ANS EOE OEEA C C ._ HLRORRRTO TCBTFABST C C . MW ) , _ ) l C C 1 8 A A 5 2 8 5 2 1 1 6
- 1 6 V V 1 6
_ 5 B B 0 0 2 C 8 8 8 - . 2 C 4 4 C D 7 C
.i
.l2 -
C D W 0 C C 5 W C 2
) A 5 r ._ C 7 .D^ . W D V 1 S 2 6 ( C P j
V y0 8 8 L J WO 5 j 4 C 1 OO - 2 h 5 R F L 1 3 h 5 1 8 3 V C u : k - A . . 6 Eu TE S ST }Y MY %
]
, 'd 2 5 A 1 R
S D C 0 OS U C 8 R ! B M 2 F l
) .
_ C C V .
.~
.E hh i
A 6 D D 2 2 _ C 0
- V V 5 E
5 1 D h A'0WF 1 2 A 5 5 1 V N T R 2 21 2 7 1 C S L C 2 C B S A -. A M ) A O
. C
^
C N V C R T I A
~
D 21 S
.M 0 "" [
. R RN T -
V 5 U 1 1 B 4 8 7 OO 5 2 C
) 6 2 A8 5 W
2 6 O T F 2 V 2 _ TC E 1 7 D D V 0 6
.I C N 'F VC C 2 A c NN 5 A 5 - ._ EA 2 R T C -
MN 1 B C A'D T S S C . NE C O GT
- T -
O UN I
- 7 5
T - AA < ~B W ) EM R 0G 2S F D . . E _ 6 - E D U T V N _ NI E T A N I T M C N - _. E , P R O C I . UR ( _ QO - EC .
~
jj ll j4 il+ . l ,j, , fI ' : lr
e # 9
- O O EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON PUMP P7A THESE VALSES ARE CLOSED 125 V DC MCC 015 FROM STEAM 125 V DC MCC 025 AND THDR BREAKERS ARE RACKED SYSTEM OUT TO REMOVE PUMP P7A FROM SERMCE. THE VALVES ARE OPENED CD 72-1512 ) U AND THDR BREAKERS LEFT OPEN ' C8 72-2512 IN STANOBY TO RCTURN IT } g I '
TO SERV 1 C CV2663 CY2613 125 V DC DUS RA2 480 V AC MCC B61 TO CST CDRA2-06) CD 6175
. ..\... h 620 m AND SC a-
!A ?k.
Fws5ASCV254% . M FW10A
' T i
[q[y780fj c " U" CST Ck 6 : CV2506 C Fw37 'C8 RA2-06 ) CB 6181 )
- I L 125 V DC DUS RA2 480V V AC MCC B61 To CST N\ _
125 V DC uCC 015 **3 \- 4s0 v AC uCC B61 To CST -=-(A-Fw5a CD 72-1522 ) Ca ela5 ) Cv2627) Cv5a51 ][C v o TO TRAlft A FROM SW LOOP 2 (CONTINUED)
EQU!PMENT REAllGNMENT FOR CORRECT!VE M AINTEN ANCE ON PUMP P7A (CONTINUED) 125 V DC MCC D15 FROu STEAM 125 V DC uCC D25 SYSTEM
- [C0 !72-15% )j j;p Q.caQ2y;$}.2.)
THESE DREAKERS ARE C RACKED OUT TO REu0VE CV2663 i i CV2613 Puu? P7A FRou SERV.CE AND LEFT OPEN tN STANDBY 125 V DC BUS RA2 450 V AC MCC B61 TO RETJRN IT TO SERV.CC.
) TO CST )
CV2620 -4 Z M e AND SG ~B- FW55A CV2647 F%10A l CV2802
"^ >
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EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON PUMP P78 (CONTINUED) l 4 RACALD OUT TO REMOVE PUMP P78 FROM SUTV.E AND LffT OPEN IN STAND 8Y TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE 125 V OC BUS RA1 4160 V AC SUS A3 450 V AC MCC 851 CB RA1-06 ,) TO CST [dnjgg. ,y CS 5173 h l b A ' ' " W"8 t 670 e CST AND SG *A" FW56A CVN46 Fm00 CVa00 Cv2 sos "p 3 Cv2s4a)(a , e - C.RA1-o.b m 519 0 a w FW60[ V - 125 y oc sus RA1 - 480 V AC MCC 851 To esT N[ 4so y Ac uce ess
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i EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ON PUMP P35A i 1 5 3 TO BWST A I 4 hDH10 hOH9 450 V AC MCC B51 4160 V AC BUS A3 1 CB 5171 ) hBS3 CB A304 ) r 3 w 4 M > > N p W. . . . . . . . . ' ' IIII BS4A CY2401 ;)$y8::, i T , _ FROM BWST L h!f' m BW6A ., . OR SUMP P35A I *)hBS2A THESE VALVES ARE CLOSED TO p REMOVE PUMP P35A FROM SERMCE i ' AND ARC OPENED TO RETURN IT ; TO LPIS TO SERMCE. ; TRAIN B ' l (CONENUED) 4 y l l 1 4 4 3
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1 l l EQUIPMENT REAUGNMENT FOR CORRCCTIVE MAINTENANCE ON PUMP P358 l l l l TO BWST l 4 fiDH10 f-{ DH9
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EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR TESTING PUMP P7A 125 V DC MCC D15 FROM STEAM 125 V DC MCC D25 SYSTEM U ) CB 72-2512 C8 72-1512 ) THESE vat.VES ARE CLOSED l 1' TO 1EST PUMP P7A AND ARE I P g OPENED TO RETURN IT TO SERVICE. CV2663 CV2613 125 V DC BUS RA2 480 V AC MCC 261 h
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EQUIPMENT REALIGNMENT FOR TESTING PUMP P78 THESE VALVES ARE CLOSED TO TEST PUMP P78 AND ARE OPENED TO RETURN IT TO SERvlCE. 125 V DC BUS RA1 4160 V AC BUS A3 480 V AC MCC B51 i ' C8 RA1-06 ') TO CST C8 A311 ) CB 5173
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' POND CV3824h (NORMALLY OFF) v DISCHARCE FLUME SYSTEM MENU END OF INPUT
- - _ _ . . - - - > - , ,- w - , . . ,
B-1 APPENDIX B DIACRAM OF THE PRISIM INFORMATION IIIERARCIIY This appendix contains a diagram of the PRISIM program information 4 hierarchy. The diagram was developed as a visual aid to help you obtain PRA-related information from PRISIM. The diagram is a user-oriented flow chart that details the information provided by PRISIM and shows the series of steps you must take to obtain this information. Diagram interfaces are denoted by identifying triangles. 3 9 l l l
B-2 X\
- PRlSIM ,
CONTROL < SCREEN MASTER MENU DIRECT ACCESS PATH INSPECTION PROCEDURE PATH v + CATEGORIES INSPECT 10N OF SAFETY- PROCEDURE RELATED INFO ' MENU MENU A B 4 Figure B.1 Diagram of the PRISIM Information Hierarchy
B3 A PRA-RELATED NFORMADUN (DIRECT ACCESS PATH) 1r 0 1r SAFETY 4 I ~ WPUCATIONS OF ACODENT R11ATED Q THE N T EMM MDS PLANT STATUS 4 1r ir l' RANKHC OF AC00ENT BY X MD C OF CORE DAMAE NPORTAN E FREQUENCY WENU l ir DUARE RANKNG OF DESC'OPTO4 OF SYSTEMS 8Y EA04 AC0004T M5K REDUC 110N SEWK ndFWtTANT RAMQNG CF g SWTEMS SY p DETA2/.D SENARIO RSN SENsTMTY y wouAn0N FOR NPORTAN E __ SELECTED AC00ENT GROUPWC OF SYSfDeS BY p esx s m CANQ REC 0 WRY MO IMPGtTANM 4 reR StuCTm S&NAMO NEXT N SMNARIO
- 9) WARY 4 Or raNAmoS RECOWRY N0 e a r0R sEm CTED AC00ENT SEQUENE 6
l l i Figure B.1 (continued) i 1
l l B.4 l 1 l l i Q 1 ir 1r r_ _ SAPEN SAPETY- SUPPORT llELATED llELATED SYSTEM NTEN'AMS P
- SJOSYSTEMS C0hP04 NTS mr I qp qr hePORTAM E SPORTANM ELECDON &
WENU WDeu l SELECDON SUPPCRmG
-] ET CC"uMCTxwPC"ENT/
r , RANKhG GF RANWG W tag l1 W 94ggg y SMNS 5'.' COMPONDITS W 4 SUPPORT 1NC N TS NE REDUCDON .SSC fEDUCTION COMPONENTS gpg hPORTA & _ __ SPORT ANM AND FUNCT10NS_ ,, RANNh4 & ; RANm3 & SJOSYSTEWS SY COMPONENTS SY RSK !ENJTNT* i M RSC ENSTNTY . adPORTAN M I __ S&PCptTAM2 l A cm0urmo CF QRourno CF , y SJOSYSTEMS SY y CCEPC8dDdTS BY hSC 9941F1CANQ ESC 99dFICAMG JR _ MTANN 6 wCRuAn0N RELEVANT FOR M QUT-7-fMtVH1 C0hPCIENTS 2 ir _ SE11CDON OF COMPONENT _ ir h e WOST UKM Sh2Z FAA1JRES FM AFFECTED SYSTEM i e EQUP T47 MA&XMfENT FOR WAINTENAMM 0F MLEFTED ConPCNENT d e taAPWENT RlW.19dMENT FOR TESTWC SELECTED CCWPONENT e HSTOIECAL CAUES OF 9t489E FOR ELECTED COMPCNENT 4 AND SMUA COMPONEN*- ~ ~ '95 .W Ffgure B.1 (con ,t-4 I
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B5 Aa _. . - g COWP@ENT SYSTEM OPUtATOR rAnus it$mc/ ACDONs DATA SUR\0LLAN M
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PLANT LDta A r M i RANKED BY M y REDUCDON W %CH _adPGtTMM 4 ___ mo st1ECDON 7
## NW CATE 2 Y " AdPCptTMM
{ eFC RECANietCh Wte CONE meNG -4NTEGRAL TESTS POR MC'ID -COMPONENT TESTS GRO N 3Y i COMPCPdFWT CR SIGMFICAMGb d JMY RdPGtiANG C M AR$CDI GtA3 g & PLANT DATA W1H pdDUSTRY-p g RWeGD BY R SC REDUCTS A h 2 DATA WTANM GtA saRu TNm ** 8Y
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A rous.nY we Twa , AMGC 1 pon.Plenad Operetor Responsee 4 2 ORA-Ow.ter R.ee-r Ace no $"E MCONetY ACTMS 0 e o i Figure B.1 (continued) i i l
-B-6 Paa act4Tro ?
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_ i ht WAmm ir 1r 1r 1r A A A A , I DCaptM T CLPWIG W CERf' AfE5tB6" 7 ACOCENT M MMfS DT 4 W M.AMT DATA g w gg W1H sent1MY-42IdP3.GEPICAfeG f 4M- A@ tad k Data ( l l . l (FNLPh4 & BriDesA1KBt CGPOEMTS SY ss12. ANT FCBI l seeiCAMca " out-Cr-un a cam i tranv4mm '
-ri l
i A A ' l l l _, usw.s a wt um. 4 I l l 1, d L. Figure B.1 (continued) r
B-7 R t 1r 027b3 l 71707 1r 02700 WONTHLY OPERAMONAL WAFlENAMM WAINTEMAN2 SWETV WR1F1CADON 8 OBSERVATION i SurrY USTWG OF USTING OF SAPUCAfl0NS [, PLANT LENS PLANT LERe F THE CURRDIT R T,STATVSJ , A A A COWPARISCN COWPAN5ON GRO W G OF y 0F PLANT DATA 4 l0FPLANTDATA y SUS $YSTEMS SY WTH INDUSTRY- WTH MOUSTRY- 45 SGNIFICANQ d A N Qt DATA AWRAG E DATA AdPOR" AN2 A A A 1 GROUPING OF Ut0VPtNG OF RANKMG & g COWPONENTS SY q CCadPONENTS OY y SYSTEMS SY ESK SGMF)CANG ESK SONFICANQ R$ ENSTTATY adPOR"AN M hePCBl"ANT RdPCBtTANCE A A A 4 NFGtWAT10N M ORMAflON WORT g REM VANT FOR g RELEVANT FOR gygygg OUT-OF-5ERWCE OUT-OF-ERWCE MTEWAMS g CCart PTS condPCledit 5 A A , 4 Figure B.1 (continued) P
B8 : i t i S ir 1r 1r ! 71710 90712 l 93702 EFS SYSTDd' N-OFFICE RNEW ONSTE FOLLOWUP d SALXDOWN OF NM OF EWNTS 04NT REPORTS - e
? I t
i. d GROUPWC OF SAFETY SAF.:TY ~ g SYSTEMS BY g AdPUCATIONS BdPUCA110NS tlS( SCNFICANG W M CURRENT 4 OF M CURRENT t._ BFGtME , PLANT 5?ATUS PLANT STATUS i
- P 1P 9P I C C l
t
!. SJPPORT USTNG l USTING 4 SYSTEM --9 0F PLANT --t 0F PLANT NTUEFAE4 LERe tzRe I
4 i r ir ir l
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l i i 1 l 1 1 i i J , 4 i 1 ! l l l 1 I l 4' Figure B.1 (continued) I d 1 1 4 , il
~. . . _ . , - . _ .
B-9 9 I J ! I l 4 - U f SAFETY IMPUCAfl0NS . OF THE OJRRENT 4 ! PLANT STATUS ! i 1P SELICTION OF FAILIO COWPOND4T(S) ; iP SONIFICANM FACTOR , FOR PEOMED EQUIPMENT BONC OUT OF SERME , 4 1r i 4 + & _. 4 i RANDONC OF l RA%YdC 0F lWPROWWENT RETURN TO SAPITY-RELATED CORE DAWAQE FROW CONTROL 4
) EQUPMtAT SENARICS REPAIR . SMEN ,
ir _ 1r 1r PRIORITY USMC COMPONENTS RANKED OF COWPONENTS NOT NT mm ACCORDING TO THE X d, KNOW4 TO BE USMG @ M I KNEAT F : OUT OF SERM 2 FALURE WODES Rt STORAftON k i e 1 ( 1 1 i
- l I j
l I 4 Figure B,1 (continued) i
.s, - . . --
NOTICE When you no longer need this report, please return it to G. F. Flanagan, 3 Engineering Physics and Mathematics Division, Bldg. 6025, MS 09W, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box X, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831. t Thank you. l 1 J
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..CF01 136 13 Ses 77e',"/2' BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG/CR-5021, Vol. 1 ORNL/TM-10604/V1 m
, r ,a .so w.r.,a 2 a.vi e .u User's Guide Fo PRISIM Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1, Volume 1, Prog im for Inspectors , o , , , , ,,, , p, a , , , t December oos -
7 1987
. . . .c . s , f D. J. Campbell, V. H. uthrie, J. R. Kirchner, , c . ,jia.,o.r ..w.o J. Q. Kirkman, M. M. Pa la, B. C. Ellison, .osi- ( g ii .
F. M. Dycus , J. A. Farqu.1rson , and G. F. Flanagan January / 1988 y ,....:.u.w o.:..sa. .os .. .so..,6,*a.0o. , s ., e. c , . eaos.ci t as. Aam. svvevi JBF Associates. Inc. ,,,,,
/
Knoxville, TN 37932 B0825 q
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Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O. Box X UNCLASS.
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Oai Ridge, TN 37831
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T..i t . .c r ax ., This user's guide is a two-volume document d gned to teach NRC inspectors and NRC
' regulators how to access probabilistic risk sestment information from the two Plant Risk Status Infomation Management System ( IM) programs developed for Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit One (ANO-1). Volume 1 .sc bcs how the PRA information available , in Version 1.0 of PRISIM is useful for pl< ning nspections. Using PRISIM, inspectors can quickly access PRA information and u. that formation to update risk analysis results, reflecting a plant's status at ny parti ilar time. Volume 2 describes how the PRA information available in Version 2 of PRISI s useful as an evaluation tool for regulatory activities. Using PRISIM, egulators ca both access PRA information and modify the information to assess he impact the. changes may have on plant safety.
Both volumes are stand-alone docume s; each volume esents s m ral sample computer sessions designed to lead the user through a variety f PRISIM applications used to obtain PRA-related information f monitoring and con olling plant risk. 4 l
i. c:a v, o u s.s s - . . i .*:, os :i s;. . -s 4,.,.,, 1.
Risk Analysis
- . si c m. ., . c t . si.. .c . r .os e t.. m..eas yesi ni:' tow UnC.
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Unc.
*r wvee.u...ats 96
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