ML20106A533

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Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Sections 2.0 & 3.0 to Include Operability & Surveillance Requirements for Toxic Gas Monitoring Sys & Correcting Duplication of Table Numbering. Significant Hazards Considerations Encl
ML20106A533
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 02/07/1985
From:
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20106A506 List:
References
NUDOCS 8502110269
Download: ML20106A533 (9)


Text

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. TECHNICAL S"ECIFICATIONS I

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DEFINITIONS.

1 1.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM.

1-1 1.1 Safety Limits - Reactor Core 1-1 1.2

-Safety Limit, Reactor Coolant System Pressure.

1-4 1.3 Limiting Safety System Settings, Reactor Protective System 1-6 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2-0 2.0.1 General Requirements.

2-0 2.1 Reactor Coolant System 2-1 2.1.1 Operable Components 2-1 2.1.2 Heatup and Cooldown Rate.

2-3 2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Radioactivity 2-8 2.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Limits 2-11 2.1.5 Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Halogens Concentrations.

2-13 2.1.6 Pressurizer and Steam System Safety Valves.

2-15 2.I.7 Pressurizer Operability 2-16a 2.1.8 Reactor Coolant System Vents.

2-16b 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2-17 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System..

2................

2.4-

' Containment Cooling.

2-24 2.5 Steam and Feedwater Systems.

2-28

'2.6 Containment System 2-30 2.7 Electrical Systems 2-32 2.8 Refueling Operations 2-37 2.9 Radioactive Materials Release.

2.................

2.10 Reactor Core 2-48 2.10.1 Minimum Conditions for Criticality.

2-48

.2.10.2 Reactivity Control System and Core Physics Parameter Limits.

2-50 2.10.3 In-Core Instrumentation 2-54 2.10.4 Power Distribution Limits 2-56 2.11 Containment Building and Fuel Storage Building Crane 2-58 2.12.

Control Room Systems 2-59 2.13.

Nuclear Detector Cooling System.

2-60 2.14 ' Engineered Safety Features System Initiation Instru-mentation Settings 2-61 2.15.

Instrumentation and Control Systems.

2-65 2.16 River Level.

2-71

2.17 Miscellaneous. Radioactive Material Sources 2-72 2.18 Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 2-73 2.19 Fire Protection System 2-89 12.20. Steam Generator Coolant Radioactivity.

2-96 2.21

-Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 2-97

.2.22 Toxic Gas Monitors 2-99 l t

iAmendment.No. 32. 33. 52, 34, 57, 67, 80, 81 ATTACHMENT A 9502110269 850207 PDR ADOCK 05000285 L_

P_

PDR

~~

2.0 LIlilTING CONDITIONS FOR'0PERATION 2.21 Post-Accident lionitoring Instrumentation Applicability Applies to post-accident monitoring instrumentation not included as part of the Reactor Protective System or Engineered Safety Features.

This specification is applicable while in modes 1, 2 and 3.

Objective To assure that instrumentation necessary to moniter plant parameters during post-accident conditions is operable or that backup methods of analysis are available.

Specifications Post-accident instrumentation shall be operable as provided in Table 2-10.

If the required instrumentation is not operable, then the action specified in Table 2-10 shall be taken.

Basis a'

Post-accident monitoring instrumentation provides information, during and following an accident, which is considered helpful to the operator in determining the plant condition.

It is desirable that this instru-

- mentation be operable at all times during operation of the plant.

6 However, none of the post-accident monitors are required for safe shutdown of the plant nor are any control or safety actions initiated j

by the monitors.

In general, the post-accident monitors provide wide range capabilities for parameters which are beyond the range of normal protective and control instrumentation. They also provide remote sampling and analysis capabiltiy to reduce personnel exposure under post-accident conditions. Because the information necessary to assess the effect of an' accident (i.e., core damage) can be obtained from other sources and U

by manual methods, it is not necessary that the post-accident monitors be operable at all times,

~

q 4

l 2-97 Amendment No. 81 u

n TABLE 2-10 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Minimum Operable

' Instrument Channels Action

-1.

Containment Wide Range Radiaticn Monitors (RM-091A & B) 2 (a)

2. ! Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a) 3.

Main Steam Line Radiat. ion Monitor (RM-064) 1 (a)

'4.

Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81A & B) 2 (b)(c) 5..

Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d)

Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c) 6.' Containment Wide Range Pressure 2

(b)(c)

-(a) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum

~ -channels. operable requirements, initiate the pre-method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) planned alternate within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and 1.

either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within

~.

7 days of the event, or 2.

prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specificati.on 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining

~

the' action taken, the cause of.the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

j(b)-With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to' OPERABLE y

~

status.within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN.within the next-

12 hours.

(c) With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 or be-in ~at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

L(d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made

operable.

2-98 Amendment flo. BI, BR, 83

r::

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

2-22 Toxic Gas Monitors Applicability Applies to toxic gas monitors which monitor the fresh air to the control room. This specification is applicable in all modes.

Objective g

To assure that redundant toxic gas monitors which are used for continuous measurement of the fresh air to the control room are operational.

' Specifications Toxic. gas monitors shall be operable as provided in Table 2-11.

If the required instrumentation is not operable, then the appropriate action 3pecified in Table 2-11 shall be taken.

Basis The redundant toxic' gas monitors were designed to detect toxic gases and to isolate the control room ventilation ~ system' in the event of an onsite r

-j or offsite toxic gas accident.

I'f both of-the toxic gas detectors are found inoperable, there is no

'immediate threat to the control room operators and reactor operation may continue while repairs are being made. During this repair, the control room ventilation will be switched to internal recirculation mode of opera-tion.

d 2-99

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C..

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f-TABLE'2-11 T0XIC GAS MONITORS OPERATING LIMITS Minimum Operable Instrument Channels Action

-1.

Chlorine Detectors

  • 2 (a) (b)

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.2.

Hydrogen Fluoride,*

Hydrochloric Acid,

- and Sulfuric Acid Detectors

  • 2 (a) (b)

-3.

Hydrazine* Ammonia Detectors 2

(a) (b)

-(a)

-With o'ne toxic detector inoperable, restore the inoperable detector to

-OPERABLE status within 7 days, or within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, initiate and maintain operation of the control room ventilation system in the recircu-4:

lation mode of operation.

.s :

1 (b)' With both toxic dete'ctors inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate and main-

.tain operation of the control room ventilation system in the recircula-tion mode ofl operation.

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k,1

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q v,

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Sulfuric Acid and Hydrazine.

(

2-100

=

7 LTABLE3-3~(Continued)-

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING 0F MISCELLANEOUS' INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS-Surveillance Channel Description Furiction Fregt.incy SurveiTiance Method 25.

Containment Purge Isolation Check.

M

~ Verify valve position using control room indication.

Valves (PCV-742A, B, C, & D)'

Comparison of readings from redun-26.

Containment Hydrogen a'. Check M

a.

dant channels.

Monitors (VA-81A&B)

b. Test Q

b.

Calibrate span /zero using_ sample gas and check flow rates.

c. Calibrate R

c.

Calibrate using known signals applied to sensors.

Compare independent level readings.

27.

Containment Water Level

a. Check M

a.

g!

Narrow Range (LT-599 &

LT-600)

b. Calibrate R

b.

Known signals applied to sensors.

Wide Range (LT-387 &

a. Check

-M a.

Observe nonnal reading and simulate full scale reading, LT-388).

b. Calibrate R

b.

Known signals applied to sensors.

Compare independent pressure readings.

28.

Containment Wid? Pange

a. Check M

a.

' Pressure Indication

b. Calibrate R

b.

Apply known pressure to sensors.

' 32g

29. Toxic Gas Detectors:

Comparison of readings from redundant

a. Check S

a.

g YIT-6288A&B (Clp) channels.

YIT-6286A&B (HCT, HF, H SO )

2 4

-5

b. Calibrate M

b.

Calibrate span /zero using calibration card.

Calibrate span /zero adjustment with

c. Calibrate R

c.

g calibration card, and verify using O

gas standards.

r

.9 TABLE 3-3_(Continued):

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description

Function Frequency Surveillance Method YIT-6287A&B (N H,.NH ).

a.' Check S

a.

Comparison of readings from redundant 24 3

channels.

b. Calibrate
Q b.

Gas calibration.

- Q - Quarterly -

S - Each Shift D - Daily M - Monthly A - Annually R - 18 months u,

J.

P - Prior to each startup if not. performed within grevious week.

0 E?

PM - Prior to scheduled cold leg cooldown below 300 F; monthly whenever temperature remains below 300 F and reactor vessel head is installed.

p; ATTACllMENT B Discussion, Justification and l

Significant Hazards Considerations The proposed amendment will establish limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the Toxic Gas Monitors which were installed in

. response to.NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4.

Wording has been proposed for Section 2.0 of the Technical Specifications concerning Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) for the toxic gas moni-tors. These LCO's require certain actions in the event of inoperability of the subject monitors. These conditions appear in a new table.

The LCO's for the Toxic Gas monitors are consistent with the LCO's proposed for the Chlorine detectors in Enclosure 3 to NRC Generic Letter 83-37.

.The additional table has been numbered as Table 2-11.

Additionally, Table 2-9,

. appearing on page 2-98, has been renumbered as Table 2-10.

This is to elimi-nate the confusion raised by the fact that the current Specifications have two tables numbered 2-9.

Additions have also been proposed to Section 3.0, " Surveillance Requirements" of_the Technical Specifications. These proposed changes establish surveillance

[

-requirements for the Toxic Gas Monitors, i

l?

The changes concerning surveillance of the Toxic Cas Monitors are generally

. consistent with the example provided for Control Room Habitability Systems in Enclosure 3 of Generic Letter 83-37.

The District's proposed Specifica-tions do differ in the following areas.

The. District does not have two independent control room emergency air clean

/

oup systems which are required to be operable during all modes of operation.

-As the District stated in the control room habitability report (Reference 1),

the Fort Calhoun Control Room has only one emergency cican up system. This was reviewed and accepted by the USNRC in Reference 2.

.The existing Fort Calhoun Technical Specification 2.12 also states that "if the control room

, air treatment system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made.

If the system cannot be repaired

-within seven (7) days, the reactor is shutdown and brought.to cold shutdown U

within 24' hours." The District still believes this is adequate to ensurc 4

-safe operation of the plant and no changes have been proposed.

The existing Technical Specification surveillance requirements aircady ad-dress the control room ventilation system and its major components, HEPA and charcoal. filters. These requirements include checking damper operation for DBA mode, checking the control. room for positive pressure, and checking

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of the contro1 room thermometer.

0

+

Page 2 As a part of the District's proposed Technical Specifications to conform to requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, the District has been negotiating

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the specifications for surveillance requirements for testing of charcoal and HEPA filters. Included in this are charcoal and HEPA filters which are part of the control room emergency air clean up system.

Because these items are part of a separate licensing issue, they have not been included in this Appli-cation.

No Significant Hazards Considerations This proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the (1) probability of an accident previously evaluated. The Toxic Cas Monitoring

-System was designed and installed to mitigate the consequences of a postu-lated toxic gas release accident. The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications merely require actions which will ensure that the control room Toxic Gas Monitors are performing their intended functions. These pro-posed changes do not alter the design, operability requirements or surveil-lance requirements of any system presently addressed in the existing Technical Specifications.

(2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different 4

. kind of accident than any previously evaluated. The proposed changes are intended to provide assurance that the toxic gas monitors are capable of per-

- forming their intended functions. Therefore, the changes add to the safety of control room operation and are not expected to create the possibility of an unanalyzed accident. These changes do not alter the design, operability

. requirements or surveillance requirments of any other system presently covered by the exisitng Technical Specifications.

(3) The proposed changes do not involve a reduction in any margin of safety.

As stated above, the proposed changes ensure that newly installed systems perform their intended function. The proposed changes do not alter any oper-ability or surveillance requiremnts of any existing plant systems.

Establish-ment of operability and surveillance requirements for the system does not constitute a reduction in the margin of safety.

Based upon (1), (2), and (3), above, the District believes this application does not involve significant hazards considerations.

References 1.

OPPD letters from W. C. Jones to the NRC dated January 26, 1981 l'

and August 7, 1981.

'2.

NRC letter from Mr. R. A. Clark to W. C. Jones dated December 30, 1981, f

I L