ML20101S830

Proposed Tech Specs Revising Several Portions of Plants Shutdown & Refueling Operations

ML20101S830
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	07/17/1992
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20101S823	List: HL-2231, Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,proposing to Revise Several Portions of TS Involving Shutdown & Refueling Operations ML20101S830
References
NUDOCS 9207200082
Download: ML20101S830 (48)

Text

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ENCL 0SURE 3 l

PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 i NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING IICENSES OPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS REFUELING SPECIFICATIONS PACE ClutGE_INSlflET_LQ!il 1!0it 1 Removed Pace J_nJfrted Pagg

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1.0-1 1.0-1 1.0-2 1.0-2  :

1.0-5 1.0-5 3.10-3 3.10-3 l 3.10-3a 1 3.10-3b 3.10 8 3.10-8 Unit 2 IXa IXa XIlla Xilla 1-2 1-2 '

1-11 1-11 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 3/4 9-5 3/4 9-5 3/4 10-5 3/4 10-5 3/4 10-6 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 8 3/4 10-1 B 3/4 10-1 l

t 003478 HL-2231 E3-1

.9207200002 920717 PDR. ADDCK 05000321 i P PDR g

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t PP 1.0 Qtfinitions $

The following-terms are defitied so that a uniform interpretation of these specifications may be achieved.

A. (Deleted)

B. Cold Shutdown _ Conditian - Cold shutdown condition means reactor l operation with the Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, coolant -

temperature s 212*F, and with no core alterations permitted.*  ;

The Mode Switch.may be placea .n the REFUEL position while a single control rod and/or control roa drive is being removed from the core and/or reactor pressure vessel par Specification 3.10.E.3.

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.i A

'During the performance of inservice hydrostatic or leakage testing with'

- all control rods fully inserted and reactor coolant temperature > 212*F,

-and/or reactor vessel pressurized, the reactor may be considered to be in

- the Cold Shutdown Condition for the purpose of determining Limiting Condition for Operation applicability. - Note that the Cold Shutdown c.ondition may be referred to in different ways'throughout the Technical

.ec.fications. For example, " reactor suberitical and reactor coolant temperature < 212 F," " irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor is depressurized," " reactor. water temperature < 212*f and

- reactor coolant system vented," or " reactor is not pressurized (i.e.,

's 212'F)" should be interpreted as COLD SHUTDOWN. However, compliance with an ACTION requiring COLD SHUTDOWN thall require a reactor coolant temperaturo-s 212 F. In addition, compliance with the follosing

-Specifications is required when perforring the hydrostatic or leakage i testing under the identified conditions: 3.5.8.1.b, 3.5.C.1.c, '

l 3.6.F.2.d, 3.7.C.1.a(7), 3.9.c, and applicable notes in Table 3.2-1.

HATCH - UNIT 1 1.0-1 techsp\h\91-13AUl\l60 s

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C. .Cate. Alteration - Core alteration shall be the movement of any

. fuel,: sources, reactivity control components, or other components V affecting reactivit removed and fuel in,v thewithir, theMovement vessel. reactor vessel with the of source vessel range head monitors,

~

local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing in-core probes, or:special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement) is not considered a core alteration. Suspension of core alterations shall nec preclude completion of movement of a i component to a safe, conservative position.

D.- Des g - Power - Design power refers to the power level at which the reactor is producing 105 percent of reactor vessel rated ' steam flow.

Design powcr does not necessarily correspond to 105 percent of rated reactor power. The stated design power in megawatts thermal (MVt) is the result of a heat balance' for a particuler plant design. For Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 the design power is approximately 2537 MWt.

E. Enoineered Safety Features - Engineered safety features are those features pro'vided for mitigating the consequences of postulated ac:ldents, including for example containment, emer9eray core cooling, and standby gas treatment system.

'F. Ilot Shutdown Cmdition - Hot shutdan condition means reactor operation with the Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN positior, coolant temperature greater than 212'F, and no core alte ations are permitted.*

0, .110t Stan@y_Cetqdjtion - Hot standby condition means reactor _ operation with the Mode Switch in the START & HOT STANDBY position, coolant temperature greater than 212 F, reactor pressure less than 1045 psig, critical.

H. Immediate - Immediate means that the aquired action shall be initiated as soonLas practicable, considering the safe operation of the " nit and the-importacco of the required action.

I,--Instrumqrt Calibratiqa - An _ instrument calibration means the adjustment of an instrument ot.tput signal so that it corresponds, within acceptable range and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors.

J. Instrument _fA n nel - An instrument channel means an arrangement of a

i. sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a k trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument channel.

b

• 0uring the performance of inservice hydrostatic or leakage testing with-l all control rods fully inserted and reactor coolant temperature > 212"F, H 'andhr rea tor. vessel pressurized,. the reactor may be considered to be in L the Cold Shutdown Condition for the purpose of determining Limiting Condition for Operation applicability. However, compliance with an L - ACTION regtnring COLD SHUTDOWN shall require a reactor coolant temperature $ 2 W F.

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l HATCH -_ UNIT 1 1.0-2 techsp\h\91-13AUl\l60 I

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'Z. : Reactor-Pressure - Unless otherwise indicated, & reactor pressure listed in these Technical Specifications is that

- pressure measured at the reactor vessel steam dome.

AA. . Egiuel Mode - The reactor is in the Refuel flode when fuel is in the ,

reactor vessel with the head closure bolts ' ass than fully tensioned or with the head removed. The Mode Switch may be in 1 SHUTDOWN or. REFUEL.

^4*

BB, Refuelir,o Outace . Refueling . is the period of time '

between the shutdown of the Ut . ior to a refueling and the startup of the Unit after that refueling.

C C ., 'Run Mode The rea: tor is in the Run Mode when the Mode

-Switch is in the RUN position. In this mode the reactor pressure-is;at or above 825 psig and the reactor protection system is energized with APRM Scram (excluding the APRM 15% of the flux scram) and APRM rod blocks in servica.

- DD. Safety Limit - Th'a. Safety Limits tre limits below which the reasonable maintenance of the physical barriers which guard against the controlled release of radioactivity is as:ured.

Exceeding such a limit requires Unit shutdown and review by the. Atomic Energy Commission before resumption.of Unit Operation. Operation beyond such a limit may not in itself result.in serious consequences, but it indicates an operational ~ deficiency subject to regulatory review.

EE. 1!tcondary Contai A ment Intearity - Secondary containment integrity means that the. reactor building is intact and all the following conditions are met: ,

1. At.least one door in each access opening is closed.

2. -_The . standby gas treatment system is operable.

3. ' All- automatic ventilation system isolation valves are operable or are secured in-the isolated position.

1 FF. Shutdown Mo(q f The reactor is in the Shutdown Mcde when the Mode Switch is in the SHUTDOWN position and no core alterations are permitted. When the Mode Switch is placed in the SHUTDOWN position a scram-is initiated, power to the .

control rod drives is removed, and the reactor protection system trip systems are de-energized for two seconds and cannot be reset before ten seconds have elapsed.

HATCH - UNIT'1 1.0-5 techsp\h\91-13AUl\24

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LIMITDQ${ LENS FOR 0PERAT!ON $#VElttfl(1 REUVIRf}i[ES 3.10.E.1. h2Wr.imatLiorJfithdrawal - 4.10.E.1. knuirements for Wilhttitel cf I ar 2 (palh (Continued) gf I or 2 Control Rods (Cor.tinued)

a. performod. All other nfueling interlocks shall be cperavle.

b. Prior in perfoming control rod b. Prior to performing control drive maintenance without re- rod drive maintenance without moving fuel assablies: renoving fuel assemblies it shall be tiemonstrated that (1) A shutdown aanjin test shall be the core is subcritical by made as described in Specifica- a margin of at least 0.38%

tion 4.10.E.1.b. 4K with the highest worth control rod capable of with-(2) All the control mi drives in t/c drawal fully withdrawn.

5 x 5 tud arry centenxi on the control nxi or drie trderping naintmanca shall hasa their directional control valves electrically disarmed.

2. Reauir ments for Withdran l

.qf More Than 2 Centrol Rods Any number of control rods may be withdr.wn or removed from the reactor core provided the Mode Switch is locked in the REFUfL position. After the Fuel assemblies in the two by two cell containing the control -

rod to be withdrawr are re-moved, the refueling interloci which prevents withdrawal of that control rcd may be by-passed. All other interlocks shall be operable.

3. h gqitem n1L igy Withdrawal of a 3. Requirements for Withdraill_PLil '

Contrg.) AddD.jhe Cold Shut.QQyn qstrol Rod in the Cold _Shutd wn Conillt.cn [ondttton The Mode Switch may be placed in For the condition of the Mode Switch the REFUEL position while in the being placed in the REFUEL position Cold Shutdown Condition to allt.w while in the Cold Shutdown Condition, withdrawal of a s. ingle control rod verify the foll(wing:

or withdrawal and subse = ent removal of the associated control a. The applicable surveillances are rod drive provicted at least the performed, at the required following requirements are mot: frequencies, for the LCOs specified in 3.10.E.3.a.1, if credit is beira

a. One of the following conditions taken for Specification exist: 3.10.E.3.a.l.

(1) -The Refuel position one- b. The applicable surveillances are

-rod-out interlock is perfonned, at the required operable per Specification frequencies, for the LCOs specified 3.10.A.1 (control rod full- in 3.10.E.3.c.1, if credit is being in position indication must taken for Specification also be operable), 3.10.E.3.c.l.

03 -

(2) . A control rod withdrawal i block is inserted. '

b. All other control rods are fully l inserted. l

-ilATCH - UNIT 1 3.10-3 techsp\h\91-13BUl\0

llMITING COND1110NS FOR OPEOIl0N SURVEILLANCE REOUlR(,MQ(]S

c. One of the following conditions - c, Prior to entering this condition, exists: and every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter, 4

assure that:

(1) The requirenents are met for .

Specifications Table 3.1-1, (1) All other control rods in a Scram Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 8 five-by-five array centered (inoperative and 15% Flux on the control rod being +

only); E the Electric Power withdrawn are disarmed..

Monitoring for the Reactor if credit is being taker.

Protection System is operabia for Specification per Specification 3,9.D; M 3.10.E.3.c.2, and all control rods are operable per Specification 3.3. (2) All other control roos are

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fully inserted, and QB f

(3) A control rod withdrawal (2) All other control rods in a block is inserted, if credit five-by-five array centered on is being taken for the control rod being withdrawn Specification 3.10.E.3.a.2.

are disarmed M the requirements of Specification 3.3.A Core Reactivity Margin, are met except the single control rod to be withdrawn may be assumed to be the highest-worth control red.

J+s NOTE: If the control rod being withdrawn is not insertable, then requirement c.2 must be 4

chosen.

With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control. rod insertable, fully insert all insert 3ble control rods #3) place the Mode Switch in the SHU11XNN position within one hour.

With one or more of the above -

requirements not met with the effected control rod not insertable, immodlately suspend withdrawal of the control rod and removal of tho associated CPU #iQ either fully insert all con'.rol rods as soon as practical or satisfy the applicable LCO requirements.

4 HATCH - UNIT 1 3.10-3a techsp\h\91-138Ul\0 i

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BASE! FOR tIMITING C001iIONS F0fLDPERATION 3.10.E.1. Recuirements for Withdrawal of L,lt LControl Ro@

Th6 maintenance'is perfomed with the Mode Switch in the REFUEL positia to provide the refueling interlocks nonnally available during refueling operations.

In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control red from being withdrawn at the same time.

The requiremenc that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated and that all surrounding control rods have their directional control valves electrically ditarmed ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this main-tenance. The adequacy of the shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that.

the core is shut down by a margin of 0.38 percent Wk with the strongest avail-able control rod fully withdrawn. The safety design basis (fSAR - Section 3.6.5.2) states that the reactor must remain subcritical urder all conditions with the single highest worth cor. trol rod fully withdrawn.

1. Recuirements for Withdrawal of More Than 2 Control Rogt Specification 3.10.E.2. allows unloading of a significant portion of the reactor core. This operatioa is perfomed with the Mode Switch in the REFUEL position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations. .

In order to withdraw more than one contrcl rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on each withdrawn c atrol rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn et a time. The ecquirement that the fuel assemblies in the cell controlled by the control rod be removed frore the reactor core before the interlock can be bypassed ensures that withdrawal of another control rod does not result in inadvertent criticality. Each control rod provides primary reactivity contyvl for the fuel assemblies in the cell associated with that control rod. Thus, removal of an entire cell (fuel assemblies plus control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the Core.

3. Reauirements for Withdrawal of a Centrol Rod in the Cold Shutdown Condition Specification 3.10.E.3 allows the Mode Switch to be placed in the REfitD position while in the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated control rod drive. The criteria listed emulate equipment operability conditions which nomally exist in the Refuel Mode and are designed to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The survell)ance requirements listed provide assurance that these criteria are met before and during the operation.

F. Reactor Buildino Cranel The reactor building crane and monorail hoist are required to be operable for handling the spent fuel cask, new fuel, or spent fuel pool gates. Administratively limiting the height that the spent fuel cask is raised over the refueling floor minimizes the damage that could result from an accident. The design of the reactor building and crane is such that tasks of current design cannot be lifted more than two feet above the rtfueling floor. An analysis has been made which shows that the floor over which the spent fuel cask is handled can satisfactorily sustain a dropped cask from a hei Modifications to the main reactor butiding crane are being ght of in studied 2 feet.

order to increase its ability to withstand a single failure. A spent fuel cask will not be lif ted until these modifications have been ar.cepted by the NRC and the NRC has approved the lifting-

, of a cask by the crane, and the appropriate Technical Specifications.

G. Sg nt Fuel Cask Liftina 1runnigns and Yoke Before lifting a spent fuel task, the trunnions and yoke shall be in good working condition and properly connected.

HATCH - UNIT l- 3.10 8 techsp\h\91-13BUl\0

INDEX LIM 111NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERA 1IONAL AND SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS (Continued) 3/4.10.5 SINGLE CONTROL R00 WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN 3/4 10-5 3/4.11 RAQ10 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration 3/4 11-1 Dose 3/4 11-4 Liquid Waste Treatment 3/4 11-7 Liquid Holdup Tanks 3/4 11-3 3/4.11.2 GASE0US EFFLUENTS Dose Rate 3/4 11-9 Dose, Nobie Gases 3/4 11-13 Dose, Radioiodines, Radioactive Material 3/4 11-4 in Particulate Form, and Radionuclide Other than Noble Gases

Gaseous Radwaste Treatment 3/4 11-15

-Total Dose 3/4 11-16 Explosive Gas Hixture 3/4 11 Main Condenser 3/4 11-19 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE 3/4 11-20 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL-ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 3/4 12-1 HATCH - UNIT 2 IXa techsp\h\91-13IU2\48

INDEX SASES SECTIQN PAGE 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY B 3/410-1 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER B 3/410-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS B 3/410-1 --

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS B 3/410-1 3/4.10.5 SINGLE CONTROL R0D WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN B 3/410-1 3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration B 3/411-1 Dose B 3/411-1 Liquid Waste Treatment B 3/411-2 Liquid Holdup Tanks B 3/411-2 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate B 3/411-2 Dose, Noble Gases B 3/411-3 Dose, Radiciodines, Radioactive Material in Particulate Form, and Radionuclide Other than Noble Gases B 3/411-4 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment B 3/411 S Total Dose B 3/411-5 Explosive Gas Mixture B 3/411-5 Main Condenser B 3/411-5 3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIDACTIVE WASTE B 3/411-6 l

HATCH - UNIT 2 XIlla techsp\h\91-131U2\48 l

s " 1. 0 DEFINITIONS (Continued)

F CHANNEL FUNCTIONALIESI

.A: CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

e o a. Analog channels-~- the injection of a simulated signal into the' channel as close to the primary sensor as Dracticable to verify OPED. ABILIFY including alarm and/or

- trip functions and channel failure trips, b.- Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel' sensor to verify OPERABILITY including R alarm and/or trip functions.

L LORE'~ALTGATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, reactivity control com)onents, or other components affecting reactivity within_the reactor vessel wit) the vessel head: removed-and fuel in the vessel. Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing in-core probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel l replacement) is. not considered a CORE ALTERATION. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS thall'not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

.G RE' MAXIMUM FRACTION Of LIMITING POWER DENSIII The' CORE MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY (CHFLPD)-

1shall be the largest FLPC which exists'in the core for a.given Lop {ratingcondition.-

- CORE OPERATINJU,ltilTS REPORT 2The CORE OPERATING-LIMITS REPORT shall be the unit-specific

document that provides core operating limits for the-current

, ' operating: reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits- shall be determined for ead6 reload cycle in accordance with15pecifIcation.6.9.1.11. Plant operation within these.

operating limits is addressed _in indi_vidual-specifications. -

.[Rj TICAL POWER RATIO-The CRITICAL POWER RATIO-(CPR) shall be the ratio of that power in the assembly which is calculated by application of an NRC-approved critical power correlation to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

1-AyfftAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

- EL shallL be the average, weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time' of sampling,-~of the sum of the average beta and gamma.

energies per disintegration, in MeV, for isotopes with half lives _ greater than 15 minutes, making up- at least 95% of the

-total'non-iodine activity in the coolant.

l HATCH:- UNIT 2 1-2 techsp\h\91-13CU2\l06

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TABLE 1.2

• OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS g

r e MODE SWITCH AVERAGE-REACTOR CONDITION")- POSITION COOLANT TEMPERATURE l-il. POWER OPERATION- Run Any Temperature

-2. STARTUP Startup/ Hot Standby Any Temperature g 3. _ HOT SHUTDOWN- Shutdown > 212 F")

4.- COLD SHUTDOWN Shutdown") s 212*F")

5.-1 REFUELING Shutdown or Refuel"' s 212*F ,

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I

a.

-In Conditions I through' 4, fuel is in the reactor vessel with the reactor l vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. In Condition 5, fuel 31s in--the.

reactor vessel with the head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

bi. See Special Test Exception 3.10.3. I

c. During the performance'of-inservice hydrostatic or leak _ testing with all I

o . control rods fully inserted and reactor coclant temperature above 212 F,.

-theLreactor may;be considered to be in the COLD-SHUTDOWN condition for the

, purpose of determining Limiting Condition for Operation applicability.

However. .complian.ce with, an ACTION requiring COLD SHUTDOWN shall . require a .

reactor! coolant: temperature f 212 F. In addition, compliance with.the- -

following Specifications is required when performing the hydrostatic and-

, ileak--testing under the identified conditions: 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.2, 3.6.6.1, and 3.7.1.1.

2d.. iThe reactor mode. switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a sing'le control rod and/or control rod drive is being removed from the core and/or . reactor pressure vessel per Specification 3.10.5.

IIATCH-1 UNIT 2 1-11 techsp\h\91-13CU2\91 0 , ~ .

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-1 PLANT SYSTEMS

_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION'(Continued)

~

' ACTION (Continue.dl-

b. In CONDITION 5, if an RHRSW subsystem is inoperable,'its' _ supported RHR subsystem being used for decay heat- removal shall be considered inoperable. Only one operable RHRSW pump per subsystem is required.

Take the ACTION . required by Specification 3.9.12.

c. In' condition *, with up to three RHRSW pumps inoperable or with one RHRSW subsystem inoperable, restore both subsystems with at least one pump in each system to OPERABLE status within 7 days

, or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVETLLANCE pE0VIREMENTS L4.7.1.I' Each residual heat-removal' service water system subsystem shall-be demonstrated OPERABLE:

.a.- lAt' least Lonce per 31; days by verifying th;t each valve in the -;

flow path that .is not locked, sealed or otherwise ' secured in-

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position, is inlits' correct position, and

b. _ At'least once per 92 days by verifying that each pump develops a discharge. pressure of a 300 psig.at a flow of 2: 4000 gpm.

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TREFUEl1NG OPERATIONS 3/4;9;3 CONTROL ROD POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-

'3.9.3 All control rods shall be fully inserted *-

APPLICABillIX: CONDITION 5, when moving fuel assemblies or startup. sources in.the core, EILQH:

With all control rods not fully inserted, suspendLfuel and startup source

. movement. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

i SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENT.S j 4;9.3 : All control rods 1shall be verified to txt fully inserted within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the start of and at-'least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during fuel or.

startup source movement, i

• Except. control rods removed per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.

• • See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 9-5 techsp\h\91-13EU2\0 t

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1 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.5 SINGLE CONTROL RQQ_HITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDO)jl LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3 10.5 The Reactor Mode Switch may be placed in the REFUEL position while in the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated control rod drive provided at 7 east the following requirements are met:

a. One of the following conditions exist:

1. The Refuel position one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.1, E control rod position indication is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.3.7; DE

2. A control rod withdrawal block is inserted,

b. All other control rods are fully inserted.

c. One of the following conditions exists:

1. The requirements are met for Specifications Table 3.3.1-1, functions 1.a. 1.b, 2.a. 2.d, 11 and 12; AND the electric power monitoring for the reactor protection system is operable per Specification 3.8.2.7; M all control rods are operable per Specification 3.1.3.1.

DB

2. All.other control rods in a five-by-five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn are disarmed tRQ the requirements of Specification 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin, are mot except the single control rod to be withdrawn may be assumed to be the highest-worth control rod.

NOTE: If the control rod being withdrawn is not insertable, then requirement c.2 must be chosen.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITION 4 with the Reactor Mode Switch in the Refuel position.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 10-5 techsp\h\91-13FU2\0

4 4 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

' 3/4.10.5 SINGLE CONTROL R0D WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUI (E d LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION V

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control rod insertable, fully insert all insertable control rods ANJ place the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one lour.

b. With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control rod not insertable, immediately suspend withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD 6@ either fully insert all control. rods as soon as practical or satisfy the applicable LCO requirements.

SURVEILLANCE-RE0VIREMENTS 4.10.5 for the condition of the Reactor Mode Switch being placed in the REFUEL position while in MODE 4, verify the following as applicable:

a. The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required frequency, for the LCOs specified in 3.10.5.a.1, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.5.a.1.

b. -The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required frequency, for the LCOs specified in 3.10.5.c.1, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.5.c.l.

c. Prior to entering this condition, and every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter, assure that:

1. All other control rods in a five-by-five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn are disarmed, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.5.c.2, and

2. All other control rods are fully inserted, and

3. A control' rod withdrawal block is inserted, if credit is_ being taken-for Specification 3.10.5.a.2.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 10-6 techsp\h\91-13FU2\0

1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES

~

-314.9.l REACTORJ0DE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor _ mode switch in the refuel position ensures-that the restrictions on rod withdrawal and refueling pletform movemant during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce-the. refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage- the_ reactor internals.or fuel assemblies, and exposure of-personnel-to' excessive radioactivity.

3/4.9;2 INSTRUMENTATION Tho OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capaSility is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. During the unloading, it is not necessary to maintain 3 cps because core alterations will involve only reactivity removal and will _not result in criticality. The loading of up to four bundles around the SRMs before attaining the 3 cps is permissible because these bundles 1 form a suberitical configuration.

3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0jilTJ08 The requirement that all control rods be inserted during fuel or startup source movement' ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod and prevents. two positive reactivity changes from occurring simultaneously.

3 /4. 9. 4 DECAY-TIME The minimum requirement -for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel

. movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of:the .short ll"ed- fission products. This decay time is' consistent with the assumption- ased in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.5- SEC0hDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. When the reactor-is shutdown or during-refueling, the:drywell may be open and the reactor building then becomes the primary containment. The refueling floor is-maintained under the secondary-containment integrity of Hatch Unit 1.

Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the building with the standby gas treatment system on .e' per E18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches and-dampers, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. Only one closed i

damper in each penetration line is required to maintain the-integrity of the secondary containment.

l HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 techsp\h\91-13CU2\89 u

c .

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removtd during

.the period when open vessel tests are being performed during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER in order to perform the tests required in the Technical Specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the Specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being pt.rformed.

214.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not: occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4- RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at. low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 ~ SINGLE CONTROL ROILWITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTQQWJ This specification allows the Mode Switch to be placed in the Refuel position while in the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated control rod drive. The criteria listed emulate equipment operability conditions which normally exist in the Refuel Mode and are designed to preclude the possibility

.of an inadvertent criticality. The surveillance requirements listed provide assurance that these criteria are met before and during the operation.

HATCH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 10-1 techsp\h\91-13HU2\l21

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6 f)J/gT 4%Q. -6ere.JLiteration - Core alteration shall be the additiopg i fyggaffnc d relocation W m T.ec f ft;el, sources, incAr.s4nsTfuments, or 1

@ # y y J c ' reactivity controls within -

ssure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel essel. Suspens on o shall jnotr_uAtrK completion of the movement ofcomponent a% alterations 13'a se44 r.ensevative position.

D. Desion Powe_r_ - Design power refers to the power level at which the rer.; tor is producing 105 percent of reactor vessel rated steam flow.

besign power does not necesssrily correspond to 105 percent of rated reactor power. The stated design power in megawatts thennal (MWt) is the result of a heat balance for a particular plant design. For Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 the design power is approximately 2537 MW1.

)

E. Quineered Safety Features - Engineered safety features are tMse features provided for mitigating the consequences of postulated accidents, including for example containment, emergency core cooling, and standby gas treatmont system.

F. Hot Shutdown Condition - Hot shutdown condition muns reactor operation with the Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, coolant temperature greater than 212*F, and no core alterations are pemitted.* l G. 1103 0 Standby Condition - Hot standby condition means reactor operation with the Mode Switch in the START & HOT STANDBY position, coolant temperature grecter than 212'F, reactor pressure less than 1045 psig, c ritical . )

H. 1 mediate - Immediate means that the required action shall be initiated as soon as practicable, considering the safe operation of the Unit a id the importance of the required action.

I. Instrument' Calibration - An instrument calibration m ans the adjustment  ;

of an instrument output signal so that it correspon' , within acceptable range and accuracy, to a known yhlue(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors.

J. Instrument Channel - An instrument channel means an arrangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter j monitored by that instru.nent channel.

J

• During the performance of inservice hydrostatic or leakage testing with all control rods fully inserted and reactor coolant temperature > 212*F, and/or reactor vessel pressuriz.ed, the reactor may be considered to be in the Cold Shutdown Condition for the purpose of determining Limiting g Condition for Operation applicability. However, compliance with an >

ACTION requiring COLD SHUTDOWN shall require a reactor coolant temperature < 212*F. _

1 HAiCH - UNIT 1 1.0-2 Amendment No, yg, 102, 7#,160

. _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - _ - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

las62r su Actnows M66 l

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Core- Alteration - Core alteration shall be the movement of any fuel, C.

sources, reactivity control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Movement of seurce range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing in-core probes, or_.special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement) is not considered a cere alteration. Suspension of core alterations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

c , .

M _ DEFINITIONS (Continued) g b

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

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a. Analog channels - the injectio1 of a simulated signal .

into the channel as close to the primary sensor as

,I practicable tn verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions and channel failure trips.

l',

b. B1 stable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the c$anhel sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

N ALTERATION N

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CORE ALTERATION sEitt4 movement of fuel, sources, n he addition, removal, relo g /A 3 f Z' T ' 416 ' d strumen pgpfd 7 g,)

controls within the reactor pre AuseM,1Af th or-rtictivity the vessel -head removed and fuel in Suspension ( RATIONS 8 20 # 7 /Il6 4 I ./ N 'd .

shall y e completion of the movement of a compone a-s1rfe conservative position.

N v CORE MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY The CORE MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY (CMFLPD) sr.all be the largest FLPD which exists in the core for a given operating condition.

[

CORE OPERf, TING LIMITS REPORT e

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These' cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance 1 with Specification 6.9.1.11. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

CRITICAL POWER RATIO

-The CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR) shall be the ratio of that power in the assembly which is calculated by application of an NRC-approved critical power correlation to cause some point in the

-)

assembly to. experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY E shall be the average, weighted in preportion to the )

concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling, of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration, in MeV, for isotopes with half lives greater than 15 mim tes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

J

' HATCH - UNIT 2 I-2 Amendment No. 14, 41if, 106

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_ [QRE ALTERATIQ!{

CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, reactivity control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel,

' hovement of source range monitors, local power __ range monitors,

. intermediate range monitors, traversing in-core probes, or specirl is r ot considered.

movable detectors a CORE ALTERATION. (including Suspension undervessel of CORE ALTERATIONS replacement) sha ll not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position-t 4

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A. (Deleted)- -l, Si B. . Cold Shutdown condition. J Cold ' shutdown condition means reactor l

.T - operation.with the Mode Switch in the SHUTOOWN position, coolant:

? '_ temperature.$ 212*F,-'and with no core alterations permitted ' '_ I  ;

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% , fuoring the performanca of inservice hydrostatic _o_r leakage testing with k* & all' control' rods 6 fully: inserted and reactor' coolant temperature > 212*F, and/or reactor; vessel pressurized,-the reactor may _be considered to'be 10 j N. ' - athe Cold Sh'utdown Condition for the purposelof determining Limiting _-

N Condition- for: Operation! applicability.1 - Note that the Cold Shutdown.

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, Condition:maylbe referred,to in different' ways throughout the Technical f specifications. For example, " reactor:suberiticaliand reactor coolant

!Q' temperature -< 212'F,"~ " irradiated fuel _ in the' reactor vessel and the - -

reactor isidepressurized," " reactor water temperature < 212*F and M reactor coolant system vented," or " reactor is not prbssurized;(i'.e.,

55'212*F)"=should be interpreted as. COLD SHUT 00WN. However, compliance with an ACTION requiring' COLD SHOT 00WN shall require a reactor ccclant- ,

S~ temperature 5 212'F. LInl addition', compliance with the following: '

F+

d Specifications js required when perf orming the hydrostatic' or' leakage

~  : testing under the identified conditions:- 3.5.B.1.b,'3.5.C.1.c.

3.6.F.2.d, 3.7.C.1.a(?), 3.9.c, and applicable notes in Table 3.2-1.

<; p- HATCH ~~ UNIT.11

^

1.0 Amendment- No. 78,160 ' .

2. Reactor Pressure - Unless otherwise indicated, a reactor pressure listed in these Technical Specifications is that pressure measured at the reactor vesssi stea's dome.

pA_ -

7. Ef:;;' %de - The reactor is in the Refuel Mode when +% ".:n Swltch is in the nevR -"W^t _D en tne Mode Switch is in [p/W6MAh/

f/@e rg,,g thh pioidon, the refueling interlocks are m m@

g,y gg, BB. Refuelino Outeot - Refueling outage is the period of time between the shutdowm of the Unit prior to a refueling and the startup of the Unit af ter that refueling.

0C. Run Mode - The reactor is in the Run Mode when the Mode Switch is in the RUN positiot. In this mode the reactor pressure is at or above 825 psig and the reactor protection i system is energized with APRM Scram (excluding the APRM 15% of the flux scram) ar.d APRM rod blocks in service.

DD. Saf ety Limit - The Safety Lin!its are limits below which the reasonaole maintenance of the phyrical barriers which guard against the controlled release of radioactivity is assured.

Exceeding such a limit requires Unit shutdown and review by the Atomic Energy Connission before resumption of Unit Operation. Operation beyond such a limit may not in itself result in serious consequences, but it indicates an

_y operational deficiency sub. ject to regulatory review.

EE. Sf_condary containment Inteority - Secondary containment integrity means that the reactor building is intact and all the following conditions are met:

1. At least one door in each access opening is closed.

2. The standby gas treatment system is operable.

3. All automatic ventilation system isolation salves are operable or are secured in the isolated position.

FF. Shutdown Mode - The reactor is in the Shutdown Mole when the Made Switch is in the SHUTOOWN position arid na core

( alterations ar; permitted. When the Mode Switch is placed in the SH!ITDOWN position a scram is initiated, power to the control rod drives is retnoved, and the reactor protection system trip systems are de-energized for two seconds and cannot

be reset before ten seconds heve elapsed.

l.

s HATCH - UNIT 1 1.0-5 Amendment No. 2a

r x 3 -.

//JS227 04126teous ,A'466 .

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t AA. Refuel Mode - The reactor is in the Refuel Mode when fuel is in the reactor vessel with the head closu e bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed. The Mode Switch may be in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL.

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MODE-SWITCH

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~ AVERAGE REACTOR CONDITION [4- ,_ POSITION i COOLANT TEMPERATURE

-N s y 1.(,POWERLOPERATION'- Run' Any Temperature

2. :STARTUP-Startup/ Hot Standby Any Temperature '

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[6 3.: 2HOTSHUTDOWNl Shutdown

> 212*P - (c)'

4. COLf) SHUTD0'4N- Shutdown [d) -

s 212*P - [d

5. REFUELINGY A

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@fl}.s (c) ~.controli: Duringrods tthefullyoinserted performance:of f r. service hydrostatih 'or leak testing with.all -

and reactor! coolant temperature .above 212 F, V:

-m Q f the" reactor may be-considered to be-in;the COLD SHUTDOM' condition for' the

' (p'uppo3,- of determining Limiting Condition. for Operation applicability.

- However, comp 1tance with an ACTION requiring COLD.. SHUTDOWN shall require a-creactorfcoolant;temperatureis 212*F. - In addition,. compliance with the following Specifications is required when performing the hydrostatic and

- leak.tes',inglunder the identified conditions: 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.2, 3.6.6.1, iIN$} 6 6 q,

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HATCid " UNIT,2: :1 Amendment No. JS, 91

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(a)- In Conditions 1 through 4, fuel is in the reactor. vessel with the reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned, in Condition 5, fuel is in the reactor _ vessel with the head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

(d) The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position whtie a single control rod and/or control rod drive is being removed from the core and/or reactor pressure vessel per Specification 3.10.

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0 0 PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

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M .10NDITION 5, with up to thre' RHRSW pumps inoperable id e pjgg Ngu/

one llNR5W inoperable, sub+ptim,Dh restore ws.te:: bot Ahys is with ne pump in 4Wa b M.n adays

- t least or declare the R Lin 04EftABCE status within 7 ystv&Tnoperatde-44r.Jg. ccay heat N4/f M06 - removal -

r coolant circulation and take thT AetlCl4 -)

y Spect" cation 3.9.12.

c. In condition *, with up to three RHR$W pumps inoperable or with one l RHRSW subsystem inoperable, restore both subsystems with at least one pump in each system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 Each residual heat removal servica water system subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

..)

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otnerw.se secured in position, is in its correct position, and

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that each pump develops a discharge pressure of 2 300 psig at a flow of 2 4000 gpm.

.)

HATCH - UNIT 2- 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 91

l (3.7.1.1,Actionb)

b. In CONDITION S, if an RHRSW subsystem is inoperable, its supported RHR subsystem being used for decay heat removal shall be considered inoperkble. Only one operable RHRSW pump per subsystem is required.

Take the ACTION required by Specification 3.9.12.

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'3.9.3 All. control rods shall be fully inserted.*

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' LWith all control rods not fully inserted, surpend 00^ ALTI MTION;. The provtstons of LSpecification 3.0.3 are not applicable. '

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SURVEILLANCE R_E.g,0.jREMENTS -

4 8.9.3 lAll' control rods shall.be verified to be fully inserted within 2.-hours prior: to- the start of ar.d at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during-e9RE-f

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• Except control rods rcmoved per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.

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• • See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

JHATCH . UNIT;2. 3/4 9-5

3/4.9 RFFUELING OPEkATIONS C..

en -

(

}/4.9.1 _ _REACTOR_ MODE SWITCH .

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• that the restrictions on rod withdrawal and refueling platfo during the refueling operations are properly activated.

, These conditions

• criticality, damty the reactor interr.als or fuel assemblie t('

of personnel to e w ssive radioactivity.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION redundant monitoring capability is available to detect chan reactivity condition of the core. (

to maintain 3 cps because core alterations will involve removal and will not result in criticality. y only reactivitDurin The loading of up to four bundles these bundles around form athe SRHsconfigure.

suberitical before attaining tion. the 3 cps is permissible because l

3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION

/ w t <4'T M & d I sc m sto'Lmis!r The requirement that all control rods be inserted during tem w GilDMr control ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a rod and prevents two positive reactivity changes from occurring simultaneously.

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subtriticality prior to fuel movement decay of the ensures short livedthat sufficient fission products. time has elapsed to allow the radioactive with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.This decay time is consistent 3/4.9.5 SECONDARY CONTAINHENT

( of radioactive material which may resultThefrom an accident. Seco reactor drywell is sealed and in service.butiding provides secondary containment d refueling When the reactor is shutdown or during the drywell primary co,ntainment. may be open and the reactor building then becomes the containment integrity of Hatch-Unit 1.The refueling floor is maintained under the second gas traatment system once per 18 months, along with the doors, hatches and dampers, is adequate to ensure that there are no

, violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. Only one closed damper secondary in each penetration line is required to maintain the integrity containment. e of th HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 8 , M , 89

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^fi L141Tlot COND111Dhi FOR DPERAlink iutv[1LLAkt[ R[0Ulk[ MENT 5 3.10. E .1. ReavirementsforWithdrawal 4 .10. E .1. beautrements for withdrawal L' 6.

oil or 2 control Rads (Continued) of 1 or 2 control hads (Continued)

4. I,arformed. A11 other refueling '

interlocks shall be operable. ,

b. . Prior to performing control red b. Prior to performing control l c(.,. ~ drive maintenance without re- rod drive'asintenance without

- L' moving feel assembliest removing fuel assoa611es it (1) A sh;tdown margin test shall be shall be demonstrated that the core is subtritical by made as described ir. becifica- a margin of at least 0.3M tien 4.10.E.1.b. M with the highest worth control rod capable.of with-(. (2) All the control rod drives in the drawal fully withdrawn.

( , 5 x $ red array centered on the control red or drive undergoing maintenance shall have their directional control valves electrically disarmed.

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2. ~Reauirements for_ Withdrawal- '

{ of here lhan 2 tontrol kods Any number of control' rods may be withdrawn er removed from C

the reactor core provided tho' Mode switc.) is locked in the REFUEL position. After the  :

Feel assemblies in the two by two cell containing the control

. rod to be withdrawn are re- '

moved.'the refueling interlock d ich prevents withorewal of that control red may be by--

passed. All other. interlocks-

'shall be operable.

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3. Reouirements for Withdr1wal of a Control Rod in the Cold Shutdqua Condition The Mode Switch may be placed in the REfVEl. position while in the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated control rod drive provided at least the following requirements are met:

a.l. The Refuel position one-rod-out' interlock is operable per Specification 3.10.A.1 (control rod full-in position indication must also be operable),

QB

2. A control rod iithdrawal block is inserted..

-b. All other control rods' are fully inserted, c.l. The requirements are met for Specifications Table 3.1-1 Scram Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 8 (Innperative and 15% flux only); AND the Electric Power Monitoring for the Reactor Protection System is operable per Specification 3.9.D; AND all control rods are operable per Specification 3.3.

DB

.2. All other control rods in a five-by five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn are disarmed 6HD the requirenents of Specification 3.3.A Core Reactivity Margin, are met except the single control rod to be withdrawn may be assumed to be the highest-worth control rod.

NOTE: If the control rod being withdrawn is not insertaole, then requirement c.2 must be chosen.

With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control rod insertable, fully insert-all insertable control rods AMQ place the Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one hour.

With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control rod not insertable,'immediately suspend withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD AND either fully insert all control rods as soon as practical or satisfy the applicable LCO requirements.

d

• _- s__ ___~ _ _ _ . . .r .. - ~_ _- - . . ~ -,-.,e - , ,,m3 4 . ,. c._

l 1

l 1

l l

1 l

l 1

(4.10.E.3) i u

3. For the condition of the Mode Switch being placed in the REFUEL position l while in the Cold Shutdown Condition, verify the fo11 ewing:

a. The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required frequencies, for the LCOs specified in 3.10.E.3.a.1, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.E.3.a.1.

b. The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required .

frequencies, for the LCOs specified in 3.10.E.3.c.1, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.E.3.c.l.

c. Prior to entering this condition, and every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter, assure that:

1. All other control rods in a five-by-five-array centered on the i control rod being withdrawn are disarmed, if credit is being take.i for Specification 3.10.E.3.c.2, and r

2. All other control rods are fully inserted, 'ar,d 3.- A control rod withdrawal block is inserted, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10.E.3.a.2.

r f

f

,> e BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.iD.E.1. Reavirements for Withdrawal of 1 or 2 Control Rodt, The maintenance is perforined with the Mode $ witch in the R(FU(L position to )

provide the ref ueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations.

In order to withdraw a second control rod af ter withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents teore than one control rod f rom being withdrawn At the same time. -

The requirement that an adequate shutdowr margin be demonstrated and that all surrounding control rods have their directions) control valves electrically disarmed ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this main-tenance. The adequacy of the shutdown ma* gin is verified by demonskating that the core is shut dr'wn by a margin of 0.38 percent ak with the strongest avall-able cordrol rod fully withdrawn. The safety design basis (FSAR - St.ction 3.6.5.2) states that the reactor must remain suberitical under all conditions i with the single highest worth control rod fully witndrawn. I

2. kautr*ments for Withdrawal of More Then 2 Control Rods Specification 3.10.E.2. allows unloading of a significant portion of the reacter core. ihis operation is perf ormed with the Mode Switch in the REFUEL position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations.

In~ order to witndraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to bypass the ref ueling 'nterlock on each withdravn control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawa at a time. The requirement that the fuel assemblies in the cell controlled by the control rod be reme >d from the reactor

/ [ g ' '* l7 ' core before the interlock can be bypassed ensures that withurawal of another

, pgj control rod does not result i't inadvertent criticality. Each control rod provides prinkary reactivity contro! for the f uel assemblies in the cell e 7 associated with that control rod. Thus, removs1 of an entire cell (tuel 3 /S C -) a:$emblies pius control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the core. )

F/cv1 - F. +

Reactor Buildino Cranes

/h. Y l- . The reactor building crane and monorail hoist are required to be operable for h 6[_ handling the spent fuel cask, new fuel, or spent fuel pool gates. Administrative 1y limiting the height that the spent fuel task is raised over the refueling floor miniraires the damage that could result f ron, an accident. The design of the reactor building and crane is such that tasks of current design cannot be lifted more than two feet above the refueling floor. An analysis has been made which shows that the floor over which the spent fuel cask is handled can satisfactorily sustain a dropped task f rore a height of 2 feet. Modifications to the main reactor building crane are being studied in order to increase its ability tr withstand a single failure. A spent f uel cask will not be lif ted until these modifications have been accepted by the NRC and the NRC has approved the lif ting of a cask by the crane, and the appropriate Technical Specifications.

Fr . Soent Fuel Cask Liftina Trunnions and Yoke Before lifting a spent fuel cask, the trunnions and yoke shall be in good working condition and properly connected. ,

J HATCH - UNIT 1 3.10-8

)

(3.10.E.3)

3. Reautrements for Withdrawal of a Control Rod in the Cold Ehuldgyn fondi.tJsn Specification 3.10.E.3 allows the Mode Switch to be placed in the REFUEL position while 1.1 the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated control rod drive. The criteria listed _

emulate eculpment operability conditions which normally exist in the Refuel Hoce and are designed to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The surveillanco requirements listed provide assurance that these criteria are met before and during the operation.

4 a

A I

INDEX

]

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONAL AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,,

SECTION PAGE )

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS (Continued) wc tc cc,J ra c i:ci' << im wna n. - a v 0 3/ht! /VtJ.t!

3/4.10,S -HIE PRESStfRE-000tAttHNdECMON-$MTEM- 3/4 10-5 3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS )

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration 3/4 11-1 Dose 3/4 11-4 Liquid Waste Treatment 3/4 11-7 Liquid Holdup Tanks 3/4 11-8 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate 3/4 11-9 Dose, Noble Gases 3/4 11-13 Dose, Radioiodines, Radioactive Matertal 3/4 11-4 in Particulate Form, and Radionuclide Other than Noble Gases Gaseous Radwaste Treatment 3/4 11-15 Total Dose 3/4 11-16 Explosive Gas Mixture 3/4 11-18

-)

Main Condenser 3/4 11-19 3/4.11.3 SOLID PADI0 ACTIVE WASTF 3/4 11-20 3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 3/4 12-1 h

)

HATCH-UNIT 2 IXa Amendment No. 48 >

INDEX BASES h

SECTION PAGE

=I 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY B 3/4 10-1 alvnt <>w)//Orsc 3/4.10.2 ROD SEQUENCE-CONTROL-SYSTEM- B 3/4 10-1

)

3/4.10.3 SHVTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS B 3/4 10-1 3/4 s o . s" %nd mi .m it / :fraML!H ,cuu:' yhmh'd gf.,jgg,.,

3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS '

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Concentration 6 ';/4 11-1 Dose B 3/4 11-1 Liquid Waste Treatment B 3/4 11-2 )

Liquid Holdup Tanks B 3/4 11-2 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS Dose Rate B 3/4 11-2 Dose, Noble Gases B 3/4 11-3 Dose, Radiciodines, Radioactive Material in Particulate Form, and Radionuclide Othe* than Noble Gases B 3/4 11-4 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment B 3/4 11-5 )

Total Dose B 3/4 11-5 Explosive Gas Mixture B 3/4 11-5 Main Condenser B 3/4 11-5 .,

S/4.11 3 SOLID RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE B 3/4 11-6

)

HATCH-UNIT 2 XIIIa Amendment No. 48

f N y l0.

l k '$ b b [ / \ ! b l (/

/ ??0G] kb.){' 7' ,2 0$ 6 d 5, 1 Sr:0!AL TE&T-EEEAT404-3 /4A Or&-41GH-P R E S SUR E-000LANT-I NJECT IO44V STEMP-LIMN 4HG40N0lHONS -E04-OPERAHON L)

3710r5-Theaaquiremants of Specification 3.5.1 are modified to not ruuire -

- HPCI to be OPERA R E bYfore-entryJ alo another oper3tiona M u dTTf67~

(' in order to perform a one time _tf.51572Dii"tUtnetseAerAtyp to 10% RATED P03R_with-the11Eerator not aligned to the system god :'or-a ~

. ' -_ J me pert 6d not to exceed 7 days.

APPtf0ABitHY. CONDiHONS-IT-2 amt-3.

- _AETiON.

---With-the-above-spee+fied-limitt-exceeded;-actuate-en-immediate power-reductier, to-less thar,10% pcwsr.

( SURVEIRANC-E-REQUIREMENT 5 4-10:5-Varffy-once per-heur-that- pcwer level-+t-5-10Fof-cated-tewee-(' '

l Ttrtv spn iitratimi appiits-frem-dene-2-0,1980.

HATCH - UNIT 2 -

3/4 10-5 Ameadment No. 16

l SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS T

3/4.10.B' SINGLE CO.NJROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUIDOXU UhlllRG CONDITIONS FOR OPERal].QN s'

3.10.S'.The Reactne Mode Switch may be placed in the REFUEL position while in  !

the Cold-Shutdown Condition to allow withdrawal of a single control rod or

-withdrawal,and subsequent remov.21 of the associated control rod drive provided  :

at least the folleeing requirements are met:

n. . One of the fo1~ lowing conditions exist:

1. -The Refuel position one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.1, ANQ control rod position indication is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.3.7; QB

2. A control rod withdrawal block is inserted,

b. All other control rods are fully inserted.

c. One of the following conditions exists:

1. The requirements are met for Specifications Table 3.3.1-1, functions 1.a 1.b, 2.a. 2.d, 11 and 12; AND the electric power monitoring for the reactor protection cystem is operable per Specification 3.8.2.7; AND all control rods are operable per

-Specification 3.1.3.1.

QB -

2. All other control rods in a five-by-five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn are disarmed AND the requirements of Specification 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin, are met except the single control rod to be withdrawn may be assumed to be the highest-worth control rod.

NOTE: If the control rod being withdrawn is not insertable, then requirement c.2 must be cnosen. .

AEEll(ABILITY: CONDITION 4 with the Reactor Hode Switch in the Refuel position.

/

/

HATCHL- UNIl 2 techsp\h\91-13FU2\0 3/4 10 67_

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPI1ONS.

7 1/4.10J' SLNGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHVTDQ.WB LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION _ . _

bLHQB:

a. With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected

ontrol rod insertable, fully insert all insertable control rods MlQ

place the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one hour.

b. With one or more of the above requirements not met with the affected control rod not insertabic, immediately suspend withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD MiQ either fully insert ali control rods as soon as practical or satisfy the applicable LCO requirements. -

M RVEILLANCE X QUIREMENTS 4.10[r For the condition of the Reactor Mode Switch being pla al in the REFUEL position while in MODE 4, verify the f9isowing as applicabw:

a. The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required frequency, for the LCOs specified in 3.10,K a.1, if credit is being taken for Specification 3.10 f'a.1. '

r

b. The applicable surveillances are performed, at the required frequency, for the LCOs specified in 3.10,ff.c.1, if credit is being takenforSpecification3.10.glc.1.

c. Prior to entering this condition, and every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter, assure that:

1. All other control rods in a five-by-five array centered on the control rod being withdrawn are disarmed, if credit is being takerforSpecification3.10.f,'.c.2,and

2. All other control rods are fully inserted, and

3. A control rod withdrawal block is inserted, if credit is being takenforSpecification3.10q'.r2.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/410[6 techsp\h\91-13FU2\0

e -

.* o 1

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS l

BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMlZER ,  !

In order to perform the tetts required in the Technical Specifications, it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the Specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed.

3/4,10 32 $HUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRAT10Nji Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restricticas in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perforu certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

( s

/N56fr AASd5 3/'Y/Qjl M:n7DsxT % d HATCH --UNIT 2 9 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. 121 .

1 i

l N l l

3/410.f[ SINGLE CONTROL ROD WIT}]DRAWAL - SQLD SHVTDOMi

' 1 This specification allows the Mode Switch to be placed in the Refuel I position while in the Cold Shutdown Condition to allow .t thdrawal of a i single control rod or withdrawal and subsequent removal of the associated ,

control rod drive. The criteria listed emulate equipment operability conditions which normally exist in the Refuel Mode and are designed to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The surveillance requireinents listed provide assurance-that these criteria are met before and durirg the operation.

b P

a L

I' i

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