ML20101S139

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Amends 149 & 159 to Licenses DPR-79 & DPR-77,respectively, Revising TS to Incorporate Balance of RG 1.97 Instrumentation Involving PAM & Ci Valves Instrumentation
ML20101S139
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  
Issue date: 07/09/1992
From: Hebdon F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20101S142 List:
References
RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 NUDOCS 9207160387
Download: ML20101S139 (28)


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fT UNITED STATES t.

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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'e, Q I WASHINGTON D C 20665 x mi f TENNESSEL_yJJttEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-327 SE000YAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 159

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License No. OPR-77 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

-A.

The application. for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated April 12, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility wi'11 operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comrission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment-can be conducted without endangering the health and

' safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this smendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied,

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i 2.

Accordingly, the license _i_s amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C'.(2) of Facility Operating License No. OPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) ' Technical Specifications

's -

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.159, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical-Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fe.c4 p 2 l

Y_

e Frederick J. Hetidon, Director Project Directorate 11-4 Division of Reactor Projects --l/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical

-Specifications

-Dat'e of Issuarce: July-9, 1992 L

l l

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.154 f_A.CJJ,J.TY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-77 00CKET NO. 50-312 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and insertiag the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by _the captioned amendment number and contain marqinal lines indicating the area of change, tlEMOVE INSfal NS 3/4 3-56 3/4 3-56 3/4 3-56a 3/4 3-56a 3/4 3-56b 3/4 3-56b 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-57a 3/4 3-57a 3/4 3-57b 3/4 3-57b

'o/4 6-19 3/4 6-19 B3/A 3-3 B3/4 3-3 B3/4'3-3a_

B3/4 3-3a B3/4 6-3 83/4 6-3 6-17 6-17

+

n e-l TABLE 3.3-10 m.

m ACCIDENT HONITORING' INSTRUMENTATION

[

I.

. MINIMUM

'TOIAL NO.

CHANNEL 5 INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS REQUIRE 0 ACil0N

1. Reactor Coolant THot (Wide Range) 4(1/RCS toop) 4(1/RCS Loop) 1 (Instrument Loops68-001,-024,-043,-065) y
2. Reactor Coolant TCold (Wide Range) 4(1/RCS toop) 4(1/RCS Loop) 1 (Instrument Loops68-018,-041,-060,-083)
3. Containment' Pressure (Wide Range) 2 2

1 (Instrument Loops30-310,-311)

4. Containment Pressure (Narrow Range) 2 2

1 (Instrument Leops30-044,-045)

5. Refueling Water Storage Iank Level 2

2 1

m1 (Instrument Loops 63-0!;,-051) y

6. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range) 3 3

2 g

(Instrument Loops68-062,-066,-069)

7. Pressurizer Level (Wide Range) 3 3

2 (Instrument toops68-320,-335,-339)

8. Steam Line Pressure 2/ steam line 2/ steam line 1

(Instrument Loops 1-002A,-002B,-009A,-0098, p

-020A,-0208,-027A,-0278)

[

9. Steam Generator Level - (Wide Range) 4(1/ steam generator) 4(1/ steam generator) 1 l

g (Instrument Loops 3-043,+056,-098,-111) fo

10. Steam Generator Level - (Narrow Range) 2/ steam _ generator 2/ steam generator 1

g (Instrument Loops 3-039,-042,-052,-055,

-094,-097,-107,-110)

11. Auxiliary feedwater s
a. Flow Rate 1/ steam generator

.1/ steam generator 5

5 (Instrument loops 3-163,-155,-147,-170) g

b. Valve Position Indication 3/ steam generator 3/ steam generator 5

(Instrument Loops 3-164,-164A,-172,-156, y'

-156A -173.-148,-148A..-174.-171,-171A,-175)

i TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued) m m

ACCIDENT MONITORING. INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS i

g INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS REQUIRED ACTION Z

12. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin 2

2 1

g Monitor-(Inst?ument loops94-101,-102)

13. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 2

1 (Instrument Loops63-178,-179)

14. Incore Thermocouples 65 a.

Core Quadrant (1) 2(1/ Train)

I b.

Core Quadrant (2) 2(1/ Train)

I w

c.

Core Quadrant (3) 2(1/ Train) 1 D

d.

Core Quadrant (4) 2(1/ Train) 1

15. Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation G

l C2 a.

Dynamic Range 2

1 8

(Instrument Loops68-367, 370) b.

Upper Range 2

1 (Instrument Loops68-368, 371)

Y c.

Lower Range 2

1

{

(Instrument Loops68-369, 372) a j

16. Containment Area Radiation Monitors E
a. Upper Compartment 2

I 4

?

(Instrument loops90-271,-272)

b. Lower Compartment 2

1 4

{

(Instrument Loops90-273,-274) e o,

t

.m j

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION e

I MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS i

g INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS REQUIRED ACTION Z

l

17. Neutron Flex
a. Source-Range 2

2 1

(Instrument Loops 92-5001,-5002)

b. Intermediate Range 2

2 1

(Instrument Loops 92-5003,-5004)

18. ERCW to AFW Valve osition a) Motor Driven Pumps 1/ Train / Pump 1/ Train / Pump 1

y (Instrument Loops 3-116A, (2 Valves / Train)

(2 Valves / Train) g

-1168, -126A, -1268) er b) Turbine Driven Pumps 2 Trains 2 1/ains 1

(Instrument Loops 3-136A, (2 Valves / Train)

(2 Valves / Train)

-1368, -179A, -1798)

19. Containment Isolation 1/ Valve 1/ Valve ##

3 Valve Position F

' Panels TR-A XX-55-6K

& TR-B XX-55-6L)

R a

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E T

U."

  1. Source Range outputs may be disabled above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint g

l

    1. Not required for isolation valves that are closed and deactivated.

G e

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TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from 13bles 3.3-1 and 3.3-3, and LCO 3.3.3.5 since they may l

contain more restrictive actions, With the number of channels one less tSN. the minimum a.

Manr.els required, restore the inoperable charnel to brERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least i

HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

With the number of channels two less than the minimum channels required, restpe at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status with. 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, i

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

c.

ACTION 2 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirer..ents f rom Tables 3.3-1 since it may contain more restrictive actions.

a.

With the number of channels one less than the minimum channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 houro b.

With the number of channels two less than the minimum channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within thc next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, c.

With the number of channels three less than the minimum channels required, restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the i

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

l d.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION 3 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from LCO 3.6.3 since it may contain more restrictive actions.

a.

With the accident monitoring indication for one of the pene-tration inboard or outboard valve (s) inoperable, restore the inoperable valve (s) accident indication to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or isolate each affected penetration within 30 days by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position, or isolate each SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-57 Amendment No. 46, 149 159

_ TABLE 3.3 10 (Continued)

ACTIONSTATEMEN]

(Continued) affected penetration within 30 days by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next S hours and HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the accident monitoring indication for both an inboard and outboard valve (s) on the same penetration inoperable, restore at least the inboard or outboard inoperable valve (s) indication to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or isolate each affected penetrat an within 7 days by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position, or isolate each affected penetration within 7 days by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

      1. On a penetration where accident indication is declared INOPERABLE on a valve but on the opposite side of the penetration an accident indication valve does not ex.t (such as with h clostf system or a check valve), only ACTION 3(a) must i.a entered.

However, valves FCV-63-158 & -172 are both inboard penetration valves, but if both valves have inoperable accident indication ACTION 3(b) must be entered until at least one of the valve's accident indication is restored to OPERABLE status.

Valves FCV-30-46 &

VLV-30-571, FCV-30 47 & VLV-30-572, and FCV-30-48 & VLV 30-573 are all outboard penetration valves, but if both valves have inoperable accident indication ACfl0N 3(b) must be entered until at least one of the valve's accident indication is restored to OPERABLE status.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-57a Amendment No.159

TABLE 3.3 10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 4 -

a.

With the number of channels less than the minimum channels required, initiate an alternate method of monitoring containment area radiation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and either restore the inoperable channe',(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or prepare and submit a special report to a

the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.1 within the next 14 days that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.

b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION 5 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from LCO 3.3.3.5 since it may contain more restrictive l

actions, a.

With th number of channels on one or more steam generators less than the minimum channels required for either flow rate or valve position, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.

With the number of channils on one or m, e steam generators less than the minimum channeis required for flow rate and valve position, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

i l

l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-57b Amendment No. 112, 149 159 I

-~

TABLE 3.6-2 v,

S$

{j CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Y

x VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Set

%,f E

q A.

PHASE "A" ISOLATION w

1.

FCV-1-7 SG Blow Dn 10*

2.

FCV-1-14 SG Blow Dn 10*

3.

FCV-1-25 SG Blow On 10*

4.

FCV-1-32 SG Blow Dn 10*

I 5.

Deleted 6.

Deleted 7.

Deleted I

8.

Deleted 9.

FCV-26-240 Fire Protection isol.

20 l

Re 10.

FCV-26-243 Fire Protection isol.

2e 11.

FSV-30-134 Catat Bldg Press Trans 4*

S' Sense Line tg 12.

FSV-30-135 Cntat Bldg Press Trans 4*

Sense Line 13.

FCV-31C-222 CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*

14.

FCV-31C-223 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

15.

FCV-31C-224 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

16.

FCV-31C-225 CW-Inst R 'm Cirs 10*

17.

FCV-31C-229 CW-Inst ' vm Cirs 10*

18.

FCV-31C-230 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

g;h!

st 19.

FCV-31C-231 CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*

SE 20.

FCV-31C-232 CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*

@l 21.

FSV-43-2 Sample Przr Steam Space 10*

22.

FSV-43-3 Sample Przr Steam Space 10*

c) 23.

FSV-43-11 Sample Przr Liquid 10*

_c 24.

FSV-43-12 Sample Przr Liquid 10*

a 25.

FSV-43-22 Sample RC Outlet Hdrs 10*

26.

FSV-43-23 Sample RC Outlet Hdrs 10*

c) 27.

FSV-43-34 Accum Sample 5*

28.

FSV-43-35 Accum Sample 5*

((

29.

FSV-43-55 SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10*

INSTRUMENTATION BASES design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100.

All specified measurement ranges represent the minimum ranges of the instruments.

This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 " Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3 3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is Matlable for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accident 61 release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTOOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and wintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility and the potential capaDility for subsequent cold shut-down from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50, 3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS This specification deleted.

3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INS,TRUMT.NTATION The OPERACILITY of the accider.t monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.

The postaccident monitoring instrumentation limiting condition for opera-tion provides the requirement of Type A and Category 1 monitors that provide information required by the control room operators to:

Permit the operator to take preplanned manual actions to accomplish safe a

plant shutdown.

Determine whether systens important to safety are performing their intended functions.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 62, 81, 149 l

159

=

INSTRUMENTATIO$

BASES I

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release and to determine if a gross breach of a barrier has occurred.

for Sequoyah, the redundant channel capability for Auxillary Feedwater (AFW) i flow consists of a single AFW flow channel for each Steam Generator with the second channel consisting of three AFW valve position indicators (two level control valves for the motor driven AFW flowpath and one level control valve for the turbine driven AfW flowpath) for each steam generator.

Two containment hydrogen monitoring channels are designated as accident monitoring instrumenta-tion (Type A. Category 1) in.accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.

Operability and Surveillance Requirements for the purpose of accident monitoring is governed by Specification 3/4 6.4.1 for containment hydrogen monitors.

l I

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3a Amendment No.159

A CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT J STEM (EGTS)

The OPERABILITY of the ECTS cleanup subsystem ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leakage into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions.

Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.

ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line and one exhaust line) of purge system lines at a time to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelinc., of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceedec' in the event of a loss of coolant accident during purging operations.

The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAlWENT SPR'AY SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the containment spray subsystems ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.2 40N1Alh4EN1 COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of the lower containment vent coolers ensures that ace-quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following a non-LOCA event.

Postaccident use of these coolers ensures containment tem-peratures remein within environmental qualification limits for all safety-related equipment required to remain functional.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINNENT ISOL_ATION VALVES The valves identified in Table 3.6-2 are containment isolation valves as defined per 10 CFR 50.

The operability of these containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the contain-ment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive mate-rial to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a loss of coolant accident.

Additional valves have been identified as barrier valves, which in addition to the containment isolation valves discussed above, are a part of the accident monitoring instrumentation in Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.7 and are designated as Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, "Instrurtentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and following an Accident," December 1980.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 67, 114, 150 159

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS d.

DELETED e.

Postaccident Sampling A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditi ns.

The program shall include the following:

o (i) Treining of personnei, (ii) Procedures for sampling and analysis, (iii) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

f.

Radioa:tive Efficent Controls Program A program shsil be prov;ded conforming with 10 CFR 50.36a for the control of radioactive effluents and for maintaining the doses to MEMBER 5 0F THE PUBLIC from radioactive effluents as low as reasonfoly chievable.

The program (1) shali be contained in the ODCM, (2) shall be iroplemented by operating procedures, and (3) shall include remedial actions to be taken whenever the program limits are exceeded.

The program shall include the following elements:

1)

Limitations on the operability of radioactive liquid and gaseous monitoring instrumentation including surveillance tests and set-point determination in accordance sith the methodology in the

ODCM, 2)

Limitations on the concentrations of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS conforming to 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 11, Column 2, 3)

Monitoring, sampling, and analysis of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents in accordance with 10 CFR 20.106 and with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM, 4)

Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses or dose commitment to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released from each unit to UNRESTRICTED AREAS conforming to Appendix 1 to 10 CFR Part 50, 5)

Determination of cumulative and projected dose contributions from radioactive effluents for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least every 31 days, SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 6-17 Amendment Nos. 12, 32, 58, 74, 148 159

i.

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- l' UNITED STATES

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- )I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e,

[

t WASHINGTON. o C 20666 3

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORifY DOCKET'NO. 50-328 SE000YAH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE t

Amendment No.149-License No. OPR-79

+

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A;. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority- (d the licensee); dated April-12,;1991, complies with the standards an requirements.of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended -(the: Act),

i

= and the Commission's rules and regulations -set :forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;.

B.-

The facility will operate:in conformity with the application, the

. provisions of1the Act, and the rules and regulations of.the Commission;-

C.-.There is reas'onable assurance (i) that th'e activities authorized by-this amendment can be. conducted without endangering.the health and

-safety of the public, =and (ii) that such1 activities will be conducted inLeompliance with-the Commission'sLregulations; D.

The4 issuance: of. this amendment will not' be inimical to the common

' defense' and: security-or to 'the healtniand-safety of the public; and-

?

E. 1The issuance.of this amendment is'in accordance with-10 CFR Part 51-

~ of-the Commission's regulations:and all applicable' requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment 1

and paragraph 2.C.(2) of facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) lechnical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 149, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION dj..,!. I

!0kr Frederick.J.Hebdoly,-Director Project Directorate 11-4 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 9,1992 i

l-l

alTA(HMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.149 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-79 DOCKET NO. 50-328 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-57a 3/4 3-57a 3/4 3-57b 3/4 3-57b 3/4 3-58 3/4 3-58 3/4 3-58a 3/4 3-58a 3/4 3-58b 3/4 3-58b 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-19 B3/4 3-3 B3/4 3-3 B3/4 3-3a B3/4 3-3a B3/4 6-3 B3/4 6-3 6-16 6-16

~~

t.-

' TABLE'3.3-10 s v.

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION'

~<

}

E-MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS j

INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS REQUIRED ACTION j

1. Reactor' Coolant T g (Wide' Range)-

4(1/RCS Loop).

.4(1/RCS Loop) 1 l

(Instrument Loops.682001,-024,-043,-065)

.m 2._ Reactor Coolant:TCold (WideLRange) 4(1/RCS Loop) 4(1/RCS Loop)'

1 l

~(Instrument: Loops68-018,-041,-060,-083)-

T

.3. Containment Pressure (Wide Range) 2-2 1

[

(Instrument' Loops30-310,-311)

[

4. Containment Pressure _(Narrow Range)-

2 2'

1 i

(Instrument: Loops30-044,-045)

5. Refueling-Water 45torage Tank Level 2

2 1

F (Instrument Loops63-050,-051) y

6. Reactor' Coolant' Pressure (Wide Range) 3 3

2 g

(Instrument Loops68-062,-066,-069)

7. Pressurizer Level (Wide Range) ~

3 3-2 (Instrument. Loops68-320,-335,-339)

8. Steam Line Pressure ~

2/ steam line 2/ steam line 1

(Instrument Loops 1-002A,-0028,-009A,-0098,

[

-020A,-0208,-027A,-0278) i-E

9. Steam Generator: Level

.'(Wide Range) 4(1/ steam generator) 4(1/ steam generator) 1 2

(Instrument Loops 3-043,-056,-098,-111)

10. Steam Generator Level -'(Narrow Range)

~2/ steam generator 2/ steam generator 1

E

(Instrument Loops 3-039,-042,-052,-055, T

-094,-097,-107,-110)

11. Auxiliary Feedwater -

a.-Flow Rate 1/ steam generator 1/ steam generator 5

i w

2

'(Instrument Loops 3-163,-155,-147,-170) j g

b. Valve Position Indication 3/ steam generator 3/ steam generator 5

?

(Instrument Loops 3-164,-164A,-172,-156,

-156A,-173,-148,-148A,-174,-171,-171A -175)

W t

I TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

I m

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

  1. >z MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS i

g INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS REQUIRED ACTION Z

12. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin 2

2 1

l m

Mc,nitor (Instrument Loops94-101,-102) l l

13. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 2

1 l

(Instrument Loops63-178,-179)

14. Incore Thermocouples 65 a.

Core Quadrant (1) 2(I/ Train)

I b.

Core Quadrant (2) 2(I/ Train)

I l

c.

Core Quadrant (3) 2(1/ Train) 1

(

y d.

Core Quadrant (4) 2(I/ Train)

I h

15. Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation 6

m a.

Dynamic Range 2

.i (Instrument Loops68-367, 370) b.

Upper Range 2

I (Icstrument Loops68-368, 371) e 2

1 c.

Lower Range j[

(Instrument Loops68-369, 372)

16. Containment Area Radiation Monitors I
a. Upper Compartment 2

1 4

I (Instrument Loops90-271,-272) w8

b. Lower Compartment 2

1 4

(Instrument Loops90-273,-274)

U

v, TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

!s ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION x

MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS SE INSTRUMENT.

OF CHANNELS REQUIRED ACTION

-4

17. Neutron Flux na
a. Source Range 2

2 1

(Instrument Locps 92-5001,-5002)

b. Intermediate Range 2

2 1

(Instrument Loops 92-5003,-5004) 18.

7 to AFW Valve Position R

a) Motor Driven Pumps 1/ Train / Pump 1/ Train / Pump 1

(Instrument Loops 3-116A.

(2 Valves / Train)

(2 Valves / Train) 4'

-1168, -126A, -1268) 2T Cr b) Turbine Driven Pump 2 Trains 2 Trains I

(Instrument Loops 3-136A, (2 Valves / Train)

(2 Valves / Train)

-1368, -179A, -1798)

19. Containment Isolation 1/ Valve 1/ Valve ##

3 Valve Position

_o 3, (Panels TR-A XX-55-6K Og

& !R-B XX-55-6L)

=

E E

E."

{

  1. Source Range outputs may be disabled above the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint.
    1. Not required for isolation valves that are closed and deactivated.

TABLE 3.-3-10 (Continued)

-ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3 3, and LCO 3.3.3.5 since they may l

contain more restrictive actions.

'With the number of channels one less than the minimum a.

channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least

- i HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

' b.

With the number of channels two less than the minimum channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel j

to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in NOT STANDBY within the next 6' hours and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The provisicns of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

-c.

ACTION 2 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from Tables 3.: I since it may contain more restrictive actions.

4 a.

=With the number of charnels one less than the minimum channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6. hours and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the'next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, i

b.-

With the number of channels two less than the minimum

. channels required, restore at least one. inoperable channel to OPERABLE. status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTOOWN within l

the'next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. '

1 c.

With the number of channels three less than the minimum =

channels required, restore one channel to OPERABLE-status

~within'48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY =within'the-

'next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 6-hourf..

d.

The provisions of Specification-3.0.4 are not applicaole.

ACTION'3 - NOTE:~

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from a

LCO 3.6.3 since it may contain more restrictive actions.

      1. ' a.-

With the accident monitoring indication-for one of.the pene--

tration inboard or outboard valve (s) inoperable, restore

the' inoperable valve (s) accident indication to OPERABLE i.

status within 30 days, or isolate each affected penetration within-30' days by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position, or isolate each L

l' SEQUOYAH

. UNIT 2:

3/4 3-58 Amendment No.-_38,.135

^

149

,-,. a _ _ --._ _ - _. _ _ - _ -. -. -.-

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) affected penetration within 30 days by use of at least cne closed manual valve or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With the accident monitoring indication for both an inboard and outboard valve (s) on the same penetration inoperable, restore at least the inboard or outboard inoperable valve (s) indication to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or isolate each affected penetration within 7 days by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position, or isolate each affected penetration within 7 days by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

      1. On a penetration where accident indication is declared INOPERABLE on a valve but on the opposite side of the penetration an accident indication valve does not exist (such as with a closed system or a check valve), only ACTION 3(a) must be entered.

However, valves FCV-63-158 & -172 are both inboard _ penetration valves, but if both valves have inoperable accident indication, ACTION 3(b) must be entered until at least one of kne va've's accident indication is restored to OPERABLE status.

Valves FCV-30-46 &

VLV-30-571, FCV-30-47 & VLV-30-572, and FCV-30-48 & VLV-30-573 are all outboard penetration valves, but if both valves have inoperable accident indication, ACTION 3(b) must be entered until at lesst one of the valve's accident indication is restored to OPERABLE status.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5Ba Amendment No. 149

s 4

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 4 -

8.

With the number of channels less than the minimum channels required, initiate an alternate method of monitoring containment area radiation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or prepare and submit a special report to I

a the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.1 within the next 14 davs that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status, b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION 5 - NOTE:

Also refer to the applicable action requirements from LCO 3.3.3.5 since it may contain more restrictive l

actions, a.

With the number of channels on one or more steam generators less than the minimum channels required for either flow rate or valve position, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 oonrs and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next b nours.

b.

With the number of channels on one or more steam generators less than the minimum channels required for flow rate and valve position, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, c.

The provisions of Specification S.0.4 are not applicable.-

E SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-58b Amendment No. 102, 135 149

TABLE 3.6-2 y,..

4..

' in -

5.

CONTAIPMENT ISOLATION VALVES

{TVALVENUMBER-FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)

. E ' ~ A.

PHASE "A" ISOLATION 1

. m --

1.

FCV-1-7 SG Blow Dn~

10*

2; FCV-1-14 SG Blow Dn 10*

4'

3. ~FCV-1-25 SG Blow Dn 10*

4;.FCV-1-33

.SG Blow Dn 10*

5.

DELETED 6.

DELETED

- - 7.

DELETED 8.

DELETED-9.

-FCV-26-240 Fire Protection Isol.

20

10. FCV-26-243-Fire Protection Isol.

20

.R

11. FCV-30-134 Cntat B1dg Press Trans 4*

Sense Line

12. FCV-30-135 Cntat Bldg Press Trans 4'

4 ti; Sense Line l

13. FCV-31C-222 :

CW-Inst. Room Cirs 10*

14. FCV-31C-223

-CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*

i

15. FCV-31C-224'

'CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*

[

16. FCV-31C-225-CW-Inst-Room Cirs 10*
17. FCV-31C-229 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

I

18. FCV-31C-230 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

F "3

19. FCV-31C-231 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

g

20. FCV-31C-232 CW-Inst Room Cirs 10*

)

2

21. FSV-43-2.'

Sample Przr Steam Space 10*

g

22. FCV-43-3 Sample Przr Steam Space 10*
23. FSV-43-11

. Sample Przr Liquid 10*

2 l

P

24. FCV-43-12

. Sample Przr Liquid 10*

[

g

25. FSV-43-22 Sample RC Outlet Hdrs 10*

j

26. FCV-43 ' Sample RC Outlet Hdrs 10*

1

27. FSV-43-34 Accum Sample 5*

i

28. FCV-43-35 Accum Sample-5*

((-

29. FSV-43-55 SG Blow Dn Sample Line.

10'

-g

30. FSV-43-38 SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10*'

b i-l:'

~

~...

J

. INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100.

All specified measurement ranges represent the minimum ranges of the instruments.

The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12. " Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is availa;1e for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials-to the atmosphere.

This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that suf-ficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT

. STANDBY of the facilit) and the potential capability for subsequent cold shut-down from locations outside of the control room.

This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50, 3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS This specification deleted.

3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient.information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2. " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.

The postaccident monitoring instrumentation limiting condition for opera-tion provides the requirement of Type A and Category 1 monitors that provide information required by the control room operators to:

Permit the operator to take preplanned manual actions to accomplish safe plant shutdown.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment Nos. 35,46,54,72,135 149

. - -. = -

INSTRUPENTATION BASES ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions.

Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release and to determine if a gross breach of a barrier has occurred.

For Sequoyah, the redundant channel capability for Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flow consists of a single AFW flow channel for each Steam Generator with the second channel consisting of three AFW valve position indicators (two level control valves for the motor driven AFW flowpath and one level control valve for the turbine drive AFW flowpath) for each steam generator.

Two containment hydrogen monitoring channels are designated as accident monitoring instrumenta-tion (Type A, Category 1) in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.

Operabil-ity and Surveillance Requirements for the purpose of accident monitoring is governed by Specification 3/4.6.4.1 for containment hydrogen monitors.

l

~SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-3a Amendment Nos.149

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS)

The OPERABILITY of the EGTS cleanup subsystem onsures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel-leak 6ge into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within i

the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions.

Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.

ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line and one exhaust line) of purge system lines at a time to ersure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss of coolant-accident during purging operations.

The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the containment spray subsystems ensures that contain-ment depressurization and-cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are cotisistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of-the lower containment vent coolers ensures that ade-quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following a non-LOCA event.

Postaccident use of these coolers ensures containment tem-peratures-remain within environmental qualification limits for all safety-related equipment required to remain functional.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The valves identified in Table 3.6-2 are containment isolation valves as defined per 10 CFR 50.

The operability of these containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside-environment 'in' the event of a release of radioactive material to the contain-ment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive mate-rial to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a loss of coolant accident.

Additiona! valves have been identified as barrier valves, which in addition to the containment isniation valves discussed above, are a part of the l

accident monitoring' instrumentation in Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.7 and are designated as Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2. " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 59, 140 149

- _ - _ _ _ _ - ~. _

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS b.

In-Plant Radiation Monitoring A program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentrations in vital areas under accident conditions.

This progran shall include the following:

(i) Training of personnel, (ii) Procedures for monitoring, and (iii) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

c.

Secondary Water Chemistry A program for monitoring of secondary water chemistry to inhibit steam generator tube degradation.

This program shall include:

(i)

Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables, (ii) Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables, (iii)

Identification of process sampling points, (iv) Procedures for the recording and management of data, (v) Procedures defining corrective actions for off-control point chemistry conditions, (vi) Procedures identifying (a) the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data; and (b) the sequence and timing of administrative events required to initiate corrective action, and (vii) Monitoring of the condensate at the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in-leakage.

When condenser in-leakage is confirmed, the leak shall be repaired, plugged, or isolated.

d.

Deleted SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 6-16 Amendment No. 50, 66 149

_