ML20100Q179

Proposed Tech Specs Re Feedwater Isolation Times,Valve Stroke Times & Instrument Air Containment Isolation Valves

ML20100Q179
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/21/1992
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20100Q164	List: ML20100Q158 ML20100Q172 ML20100Q179
References
NUDOCS 9202060208
Download: ML20100Q179 (76)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. ATTACRMEllT A-1 i i Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 160/20 Revision 1 Revise the Technical Gpecification aa follows: Remove Pace Insert Pace 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-28 1-2 1-2 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-19u 3/4 6-19b ~ 3/4 6-19c 3/4 6-19d 3/4 6-19e 3/4 6-19f 3/4 6-199 3/4 6-19h 3/4 6-191 3/4 6-19j 3/4 6-19k 3/4 9-4 2/4 9-4 B 3/4 6-3 B 3/4 6-3 l l l l 9202060208 920121 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P PDR

TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINFrkID SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 1. Manual a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable Reactor Trip (SI) Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Containment Vent and Purge Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Teodwater Pumps Not Applicable Rx Plant River water System Not Applicable b. Containment Quench Spray Pumps Not Applicable contbinnent Quench Spray Valves Not Applicable containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable d. Control Roon Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable 2. Containment Pressure-Hiah a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 5 27.0* b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0 tg g Q.,0 ) agr c. F s-dEntalbrlOmtIdion-Phase"A" $ N'.0(3)/33.0(2) i d. e.- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable f. Rx Plant River Water System s 77.0(3)/110.0(2) BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 PROPOSED -m- ,, ~ - - - m .- ----- - - + - -.

.__-____.-__...-_._.-_.-_____.m._._.__.__._ TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTIQt{ RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 3 At5pc,;irei- -2. C;...__nt:nt Pressure-Low ll a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 5 27.0*/27.0# b. Reactor Trip (from SI) S 3.0 I*

• NIYrp ed." dfOs T N,'

i d g d. ContDNed'IsIIkion-Phase"A" I3$.0(3) Auxiliary reedvater Pumps Not Applicable e. f. Rx Plant River Water System 5 77.0(3)/110.0(2)

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 PROPOSED

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) t EliGIlfEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESEQRSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS // %. Steam Line Pressure-Low ll 1 a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 27.0#/37.0## b. Reactor Trip (from SI) s 3.0 " *[ Af'3k}, @as Yhdb $ i d. "ChnTalnm,e fso a" tion-Phase "A" (3)/33.0(2) Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable e. f. Rx Plar:t River Water System 5 77.0(3)/110.0(2) g. Steam Line Isolation s 8.0 5. Containment Pressure--Hich-Hiah Containment Quench Spray 5 85.0(2) a. b. Contcinssent Isolation-Phase (B) Not Applicable c. Control Roon Ventilation Isolation s 22.0(3)/77.0(2) 6. Staan Generator Water Level--Hich-Hiah Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip 2.5-a. (Above P-9)

• fk"9*

abh k blo f hfe"NtI,re#D ntermediate Hiah-Hiah 7. Centairman -I 3#'O a. Steam Line Isolation s 8.0 8. Steamilna Pressure Rate--Hioh Neaative a. Steamline Isolation s 8.0 9. Loss of Power 4.16kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage i 1.3 a. (Loss of Voltage) b. 4.16kV and 480v Emergency Bus s 95 Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 3EAVER VALLEY -- UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 PROPOSED

TABLE 3.3-5 (conQnugal TABLE NOTATIQB Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

Response

time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Lov Head Safety Injection pumps. Sequential transfer of chargiag pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is r.ot included. Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays agi included. Offsite power available. Response. time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. 1 Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tanx (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included. Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

Response

time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centri'ugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump sitetion from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included. (1) -Feedwater system evera-F1 response time chai1 include- -v e ri-f ioa t i on-e t-v aAve-e t re kte t (me 7F4a ppliceble-t o-the-f medwe t er- -regula41tey/ Vah e clesase &+,and--bypase-va lveev h o /w.* iso /o fee < a c/u h a :upw nspes sx anc (2) Disscl generator starting and esquence loading delays included. (3) Diesel generator starting and seguince loading delaye D21 included. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3"28 PROPOSED

DEFIN!TICNS_ REPORTABLE EVENT 1.7 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50. ,CONTAINFENT INTEGR!Tl 1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGR!TY shall exist when: 1.3.1 All punetrations required to to closed during accident conditions are either: a. Capable of being closed by an CPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positicos, except -as-t-ov44ed-t*44WC 0# !"est44o4t4% can het as permi,th/';.G hh Q,laives Li et etan bmEtt odeshit%Ms hy 1peelh*ce o% 3.C,J,1, l'.8.2 All equipment hatches are closed and rua.ed. 1.8.3 Each air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3., and 1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of vpecification 3.6.1.2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accu. racy to knean values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including 'be s<tnsor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHAtuiEL FUttCT10t!AL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be perfnrmed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps sucit that the entire channel is calibrated, CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall incluce, where pcssible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent ( instrument channels measuring the same parameter. I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 1-2 [ MoponD 1

_ ~ 3/4.6 CONTM NMENT SYSTEMS E{,,j.1 FjeftARY CCNTAINMENT CCNTAIIM,yt? T'4T_EGRITY LIMITING CCNDIT1CN TCR CPERATION mm __ s3.6.1.1 Primary CCNTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. , APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTICH Without primary CCNTAINMDC INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGl... within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the fc110 wing 36 hours. SURVEILI.ANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CCNTAINMDC INTEGEITY shall be demonstrated: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that: 1. All penetrations

• not capable of being closed by CPERABLE containment automatic isolatien valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by

valves, blind

flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in *. heir positions, except -ae-

-pr suMed-in-T4 b l e-3, 6 -o f-s pe e l f ic,a yten-h h+ri r $ct nlves 1isf a.1, oftn udtt admNdNabVt cedev/ ay pthwanv SpaNb'cahe, 2. G.7./. All equipment hatches are closed and ealed. b. By verifying that each containment air lock is CPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3. Except

valves, blind fl&nges, and deactivated automatic valves l

which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, l or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDCWN except that suct, verification ne2d not be performed more often thar. once per l 92 days. I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 MC90st*D l.

m.__._.._.__._____ f CQNTAINMENT SYSTEMS coNTAnnowr tvuAct LIMTING CORDITI0ll POR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 containment leakage rates shall be limited tot An overall integrated leakage rate of: a. 1. L 0.10 percent by weight of the containment air p,er 24 hours at P, (40.0 psig), or b. A combined leakage rate of 5 0.60 L for all pont tntic:. and valves subject to Type B a,nd C tests -ee-4dee4444cd i, T ble 2. 5-1r when pressurized to P ' a APPLICABILI'rY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTIQH1 With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceed'ng 0.15 L, or (b) with the measured a combined leakage 1.ua for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C t e.. *. 4 exceeding 0.60 L restore the leakage rate (s) to within the limit (s) priorto$n,creasingtheReactor coolant System temperature above 200'F. SURVEILIA_NCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 -The containment leakage rates shall be' demonstrated at the following test schedule and.shall be de tern.ined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50*f a. A Type-A test (overall Integrated Containment 14akage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 1 10-month intervals during shutdown at P, (40.0 psig). Exemption Lto Appendix J. of 10 CFR 50, Section III.D.1(a), granted on December 5, 1984. BF. AVER' VALLEY a UNIT'l 3/4 6-2 fkOf0S6-b

CONTAINFENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 Cfj,TAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES LIMITING _ C,0NDIT10N FOR OPEPATION /ack 3.6.3.1 'a cor tainment is01ation alve)( 4pecif4ed-4n-Table 46 shall be OPEPABL h-HoleHen--t4 met-et-seewn in Tehle 3.5-h APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve (s)-wn!Ned h Tobic 3 S 1 l inoperable, either: Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 a, hours, or b. Isolate the affected penetration wit'. n 4 hours by use of at least me deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours by use of c. at least one closed manual valve or blind flanget or d. Br in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHU)u0WN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i (ock contoiament i 4.6.3.1.1 4he-isolation valvel(-*pecified-teT;ble 3.5-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLET. a. At least once per 92 cays by: 1. Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least one l complete cycle of full travel. 4 LocKrJ or suld closed NIM m*y be of**d os an k) ten,%f l basis u d er el miw d a b a co" b'I' BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 PA0POS&b l l l l

i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVE !LL ANCE R[QUIREME NTS (Con t inuedj,_,__,_, 2. Cyclino each weight or spring loaded check valve testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle M full travel and verifying that each check valve rcrains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is

• 1.2 psid but less than 6.1 psid.

b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to servite after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the i valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above, and veri-fication of isolation time. Cadosde*1t 4 l 4.6.3.1.2 EachAj solation valve -spee444J" TMt 3.5 ' shall be demon-stra.ted OPERABLhfduring the COLD SHUTDOWt, or REfuEllNG MODE at least once per 18 months by: a Ph856: A Containment isolation test signal Verifying that on ~' each Phase A isolation val"e actuates to its isolation positir. k Verifying that on a Phase 3 containment isolation test signal, b. each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. Verifying that on a Containment purge and Exhaust isolation c. signal, each Purge and. Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation

position, Cycling each powtr operated or automatic valve through at d.

least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the / isolation time, I Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable e. during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differentia' oressure in the direction of flow is < l.2 psid and opens...d the di'ferential pressure-in the d'* ction of flow is 1 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. f. Cycling each manval valve nc'. locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete r i I cycle of full travel, (Mhtf pa (, [,; y/r g.,g

t. -

BEAVER VALLEY - UNii I 3/4 6-18 PRoPosSb h

'IABIE 3.6-1 CCNIADGENT EDEIRATICNS MMDEM WJ3?tM aM INSIIE FIFO!T CUISIIE CITOST NO.-AREA TIINITPIOTINOf VAIA'E TDE*(SEC) VAIAT TG2* f SEC) 1-D CIR to RE Hz 1A & NE Pump 1A Seal (boler (1)MN-100-112A2 N/A (1)1CCR-247 N/A e, N 2-D CXR frtat EE Itt IB & NE Plaip 1B Seal (boler (1)MN-1CD-117R1 N/A (1)1CCR-252 N/A f3 SP M 4-D CCR to RE Ibc 1A & MS Ptap 1A Seal (baler (1)MN-1CD-112A3 N/A (1)10CR-251 N/A 5-D OCR from NE HK 1B & NE Ptap 1B Seal (boler (1)MN-100-112B2 N/A (1)1CXR-248 N/A 6-B Spare ew 7-A High Head SI to Hot Isjs (3)(211SI-63 4/A (3) (2)MN-ISI-969A N/A l 55 oe 8-C CXR to RCP IB & IC 'Ihermal Barriers (B)W-1CD-107D1 <$0 -eO-(B)W-1CC-107C2 %(,C ll $l "8 9-B CIR frua Stroud Cbolers (B)W-1CD-111D1 <[O (B)W-1CD-111D2 <60 -2G-ll 10-B Spare 11-B Air virn. N1irg Water-OL2t (B)W-1CO-1100 <[0 (B)W-1CC-110F2 <(C (B)W-1T-110F1 <. 60 td [ 12-A Spare rn 13-D Deluge W to Ostr Hase Reels IFP-627 N/A (A)W-1FP-107 N/A l %q 14-D Air kirc. h11rg water-In (B)W-1CD-110E3 <60 iB)W-1T-110E2 <4C lI 15-A Coolant System Charging (3)(2)101-31 N/A (3) (2)MN-101-289 15 I 16-B C01 to Shraxi (bolers (B)W-1CD-111A2 <(, C (B)W-ICC-111A1 GO -N-

TABIE 3.6-1 02fIADfENT H2EMATICtG MAXIM.M MAXIliM H2R IP6IIE SIR 2E CUTSIIE FIHNI ND.-AREA TmtrIFICATIGUIwmW VALFE TIE *(sir} VAlyE nEspsq 17-A G R to RCP IB (B)W-1CD-103B1 460 (B)W-1CC. 038 <50 -2e-g o 5 18-A cot to W IC (B)W-1CC-103C1 <60 (B)W-1CC-103C <60 n I 19-A RCP's Seal lentes-Return (A)MN-101-378 <60 (A) MW-10f-381 < GC' { 10f-369 N/A w 20-C SI W=- Makasup ISI-42 N/A (1) ISI-41 N/A [ ~)1-B Spare 22-B Spare m. l 5S 23-B Spare y t oe EO 24-SgD RE to H6r 1Rf-14 N/A 1R1-15 N/A 8 1Rf-16 N/A 25-B CCR than ICP IB & IC Jetors (B)W-1CD-105D1 <60 (B)W-1CC-105D2562 I I 26-C CCR from BCP 1A @senant merl* (B)W-1CC-107El <60 (B)W-ICC-107E2 <LC -le-I 27-C CCR from ICP 1A Motz (B)W-1CD-10SEl <fC (B)W-1CD-105E2 <(t? -i+- 28-A RCS Imtzkndn (A)W-10f-200A <6C' -725-(A)W-10f-204 < (D -+-5-- (A)W-10f-2000 <[O -715-(A)W-101-200C < 60 -7,6-t:::7 (1)MN-10f-142 N/A RV-10f-203 N/A mk 29-A Prbmary Drain Trarsfer Rap #1 Discharge (A)W-1DG-108A (60 (A)W-IIX;-1088 (60 + lI 30-B Spare 31-D Deluge Systan to Cable Perrrtraticsi Area IFP-804 N/A (A)W-1EP-105 N/A l

TABIE 3.6-1 QJfCAIMENT IDEIRATIONS I i M MAXDI.M PENT INSIIE FIKEE 01ISIIE SDOZ NO.-AREm Trswr rFIOtTICMn m_mmui VAIRE TDE* f.iBC) VAIRE TDE* fRi 32-C Deluge System tn R5t Area IFP-800 N/7 (A)W-1FP-106 N/A l U <j 33-C 8114$1 Head SI to Hot Legs (3) (2)1SI-84 N/a (3) (2)KN-ISI-869B N/A N t 34-A Spare 4 I E y 35-A Seal Injar+Irm Natur EP 1A (10) (2)10f-181 N/A (3) (2)f07-101-308A N/A 4 y 36-A Seal Injectimi Mater RCP IB (10) (2)10t-182 N/A (3) (2)MN-10f-308B N/A [ y 37-A Seal Injectica Water RCP IC (IP)(2)l01-183 N/A (3) (2}KN-101-308C N/A y j i 38-A Cantainment Susp Ptap Distarge (A)W-10A-100A <00 (A)W-1DA-100B < M -le- [ i 39-C St-Generator lA Blruntwn Cle3ed Systen N/a (3) (2) (A) W-11D-100AT<' N o* 40-A Steosa Generator IB Blrmatumi Clr=aswi Systen N/A (3) (2) (A)W-LID-100BWM o e. m I g-41-B Semne Generator 1C Blomakam Ciceed Systrum N/A (3) (2) (A)W-LID-100C%O. -j 42-C G-- -- _.I Air to Ptaal Handllrg (s) ISA-15 N/A [1)lSA-14 N/A - I f w ani. i 43-B Air Activity Natitoe-Cut (A)W-lCV-102-1 <60 (A)W-1CV-lO2 < 6 0 'r-1 t 44-B Air Activity lenitor-In t (A)W-1CV-101A < (-0 l e (A)W-lCV-101B <4c7 L m { 45-B Primary grade Water to IHF 1R0-72 N/A (A)W-lT-519 <60-i2- { 1 46-A Q1arging Fill %br (10)(2)l01-170 N/A (3) (2) (1) PCV-101-160 N/A l f 47-B Instnament Air (l' IIA-91 N/A (f)11A-90 N/A II f 4 E i

TABLE 3.6-1 cornAnserr PoemATlac i 4 m ,e i Elfr IREIIE HINEE (AmiIIE SHME no.-am m n - n nmrr. arf - - m mr vuur 1wrw 1 vuur w e-> j U-48-B Priar. y Stunt Mandar (A)W-1DG-109A2 </-C (A)W-1G;-109Al < (o-s-4 4 49-C Niby. Sqply to IRP 130-68 M/A (A)W-IRD-101 4 k i ?. 50-c spare s G 51-C Spare E q 52-c Spare 53-C Nih m. Sigply to SI W==1ators (A)W-ISI-101-2 5 (A)W-ISI-101-1 5 54-B Spare s 55-1-A SI W ='intor Sample (A)W-ISS-109Al <60 -i9-(A)W-ISS-109A2 < (70 [ . 3Y y* 55-2-A Oett Yamararp ptJnitCCing Open Tape l aT (A)W-11M-100A1 4 Co i 2 EG (A)W-11F-100A2 4 (c. 55-3-A Spare I 55-4-A 1RP Gas Sample (A)W-ISS-111A1 <60 (A)W-ISS-111A2 < 60 t 56-1-A Pr===ri. tar rimid Sample (A) m 1SS-100A1 <fo-GG-(A)W-ISS-100A2 < 60 i 56-2-A R(3 thld Lag Sample (A)W-ISS-102A1 <60 -GG-(A)W-ISS-102A2 < (c -Re-Cy 56-3-A RCS Cold Iag Sample (A)W-ISS-105A1 < po-29-- (A)W-ISS-105A2 < (0-Ee-r mq 56-4-A SDE GN 1A BlW S;eple Closed System N/A (3) (2} (0W-ISS-117A$6C ' 57-1-A OGg Tamararr Manitoring Open Taps i (A)W-11M-100A1 < 6e '_r-t (A;W-11M-100A2 ( Ge ! ( ~

). N F 3,6-1 ~ 02fDLDRE3fr ITICIEILTIGG lWLXDut MMCDut I M fI IEIIE S1MEE OJISIIE Sggg no.-A m n _.1ucanew--murar VAIRE TM fG 1 VAIRE -W fwi 57-2-A Ostr Isakage Mcznitmitig Cpart ' raps l g (A)W-11M-100A1 < 6 C l (A)W-11M-100A2 < 6c I 57-3-A Sparu af j O 57-4-A Spare E 58-B CIR to D 1A i i e (B)W-102-103Al <(c -GO-(B)W-1CC-103A < G<' -se-l} E 59-C Spare 60-6 D Ixw Head SI to Hot Tary: (3) (2)1SI-13 N/A (3) (2)MN-ISI-890A N/A 9 l ,w 5N (3)(2)1S1-451 N/A 3, 61-SgD Irw Head SI to Cbld legs (3) (2)1SI-10 N/A (3) (2)MN-IS1-690C N/A l M,' (3) (2)1SI-11 N/A Og (3)(2)1SI-12 WA 62-Sep Irw Hood SI to Hot Iags (3) (2)1SI-14 N/A (3) (2}MN-ISI-8908 h/A t f (3) (2)1SI-452 N/A [ L 63-Scp GsP Di % 360* W 105-4 WA (B)MN-1Gi-101B 75(4) i 64-Sep gip Discharge 350* Header 105-3 F/A (B)MN-1Qs-101A 75(4) 65 Ftaal Transfer 'Dic t Ef (7) Flange WA (2) (6)FH-1 F/A l I 7 66-Scp Outside RSP 2A 9*i'=1 frtan 00Er (B) (2)MN-1RS-155A 75(4) rn 9 67-fkp Outside MiP 2B 9dirM frtan 00tr i m (B) (2)MN-1RS-1558 75(4) 68-SgD Irw Head SI % IA Suctiori frtan 00fr Sump (3) (9) (2)MN-ISI-660A N/A l r 69-SgD Irw Head SI % 1B Suctiert fItas Offr Sg (3) (9) (2)MN-ISI-860B N/A ! I r

TABLE 3.rrl CONTAIM(EFT ENTICtG PWGNM 79VCDHf PfFT INSIIE SIMPZ (UISIIE SIH22 PO.-AREA IMNTIFICATINI-mCN VALVE ' RIPE

• f SErl VAINE TDE* fSEQ g

70-SgD Cutside RSP 2B Discharge IRS-101 N/A (B) (2)MN-1RS-1568 75(4) 71-SgD Outside RSP 2A Disdiarge IR9-100 N/A (B) (2}MN-1RS-156A 75(4) { 72-SgD Spam 73-SgD Main Steam IIxp 1A typrass Closed Systen N/A (1) (2)MN-1)G-101A N/A c Mstin Steam RR Valve Closed Systan N/A (1) (2) (6)HCV-1M3-104 N/A E Main Steaua IIxp 1A Clrward S)1 sten N/A (2)W-1PG-101A 5 Main Steena Line Drain Closed Systema N/A (2)W-1PG-113A 8 l ~ Main Stensa to Amiliary Feed Rap Closed Systaa N/A (2)M N-1)G-105 N/A Main Steams Ai 56ic Dmp Closed System N/A (2) (6) PCV-1)G-101A N/A Main Stessa Safety Valves Closed System N/A (2)(6) Safety Valves N/A ew $? 3 o-74-SgD Main Stama Irxp IB Bypass Closed System N/A (1) (2)MN-1)G-101B N/A l $1 Main Stama HIR Valve Cloced Systan N/A (1) (2) (6)HCV-1)G-104 N/A Main Steam IIxp 1B Closed Sys*a N/A (2)W-IPG-101B 5 Main Steasa Line Drain Closed System N/A (2)W-176-111B 8 l Main Steams to Amillag Feed Rap Closed System N/A (2)MN-IPG-105 N/A Hain Steam At=,sT eric Dap Closed Systen N/A (2) (5) PCV-IPG-101B N/A h Main Steams Safety Valves Closed System N/A (2)(6) Safety Valves N/A 75-SgD M' tin Steam Icop 1C Bypass Closed Systan N/A (1) (2)MN-1PG-101C N/A Main Stassa HE Valve Closed Systaa N/A (1) (2) (6)HCV-1PG-104 N/A y Main Steaan Icop 1C Closed Systen N/A (2)W-1PG-101C 5 NA (2)W-IPG-111C 8 I m Main Steaan Line Drain Closed S)stema / Main Steam to A wilia q Fbed Rap Closed Systaa N/A (2)MN-17G-105 N/A D Psain Steaua Atunaegheric Dump Closed Systen N/A (2) (6)RN-1MS-101C N/A N Main Steam Safety Valves Closed Systen N/A (2)(6) Safety Valves N/E 4 76-SgD FW IIxp 1A Closed System N/A (2)MN-1FW-156A N/A AEW Icop 1A Clcred Sys*m N/A (2)1FW-42 N// 77-SgD FW Icop 1B Closed Systas N/A (2)MN-IIW-156B N/A AFW Icop 1B Closa3 System N/A (2)11W-43

• 'A

i D BLE 3.6-1 03fDWWENT IDEiFATIOtS I mx1=

m. uem x

HIE Ilgi1IE SIICEE UJISIIE SIIGE HD.-ARM i F-- , m a m nar d m

• i v n W VM2E rw fni VALME "rDGE*f y or 78-fiig)

FW Inap 1C Closed System N/A (1 W -1FW-156C N/A i { AIW Izxp IC Cirumad System N/A (2, JW-44 N/A a o 79-SW) W to IA IISP ltK Closed Systen N/A (2)MN-1W-104A N/A [ o { 80-SW) W to 1C It!iP ltK L Clruand Systen N/A (2)dN-13W-104C N/A l t p 81-fil@) Iti to IB RSP HK Clnaad Systen N/A (2)MN-IN-104B N/A 82-S@) W to ID RSPltK t Closed Systen N/A (2)MN-1}W-104D N/A f 6 83-S5) Itf fram 1A RSP HK C1naad Systen N/A (2)MN-1W-105A N/A (?)IKd-615 Apr si 3M 84-SgD m from IC RSP HK Clemaad System N/A (2)MN-IN-105C N/A t (7)IRd-fa7 A'i4 U 85-SgD its fttus IB RSPltK Cinaad Systen N/A (2)MN-1W-105B N/'A ti =. 3j (3) lad-fazi A%4 U [ 86-SgD sai from 3D RSP tir Cinmad System .VA p)MN-IN-105D N/A 87-SgD H2 Dim $arge to 00tr U)tdW-h3 M4 \\\\ i N/A 1HY-111 Pf/A [ 1HY-197 N/A j l 88-SgD H2 Discharge to Q%r N/A IHY-110 N/A f IHY-196 N/A [ 89-SgD Main Condenser Ejartru-Vent 1AS-278 N/A (B)W-ISV-100A < fC ll o D 90-SgD 00tr Rage Exhaust WS-D-5-3B (11)(5)8 VS-{H5-3A (11)(5)8 91-SgD 00tr Ratge Sqply VS-{MH5B (11) (5) 11 VS-D-5-5A (11) (5)8 N ( 5 ) N/A i f a

'DRf F 3. 6-1 CCNDLDGEMT HMcIRATIGt3 t IELXDuf MAXDGE HIK DEIIE SIM EE OUISIIE SIMEE no.-Anen n-mcrrrrun-m-ncmf vAwE _ TIE *f W VAINE NE* fm 92-A Oetr Venaan Ray IB & H2 parmh. 9"im (A)W-1CV-150C < GC -hs-l 3 3 (A)W-1CV-150D < 6c -AS-IHY-102 N/A 8 1HY-104 N/A 0 93-B QStr Varsman Rap 1A & N W. 9 r+1rm 2 (A)W-1CJ-150A <(C,h5-- (A)W-1CV-1508 < 60 -AS-e E IHY-101 N/A n 1HY-103 N/A 94-C 00tr Ve=== Ejector 9w+iert (11)1CV-1CV-151 N/A (11)HCV-1CV-151-1 N/A 95-C RVLIS mu (2) (12) N/A (2) (12) N/A ED g' 95-64 H Analyzer - 00tr h (1)SOV-1HY-102B1 N/A (1)SOV-1HY-102B2 N/A 2 h 95-69 H Analyzer - PRZR Cubicle (1)SOV-1HY-103B1 N/A (1)SOV-1HY-103B2 N/A 2 95-72 H Analyzer - Diecharge (1)SOV-1HY-104B1 N/A (1)SOV-1HY-104B2 N/A 2 96-B Hief Hand SI to Gold Legs (3) (2)1SI-95 N/A (3) (2))OV-1SI-836 N/A 97-1-A NR Inlet Sample (A)W-ISS-104A1 <fe (A)W-ISS-104A2 ((c 20-97-2-A NR Outlet Sample (A)W-1SS-103Al <(o (A)W-ISS-103A2 < (<' h 97-3-A 00tr Leakage Itmitoring Open Taps (A)W-11M-100A1 <(o th (A)W-11M-100A2 < (C 97-4-A Steaua Generator 1C Blruaim Sample Closed Systen N/A (3) (2) (A)W-1SS-117C(fC 98-1-C Spire

i nstrF 3,6-1 OJGRIlGE3tT ITREIBIEIGE i HIEE M M DEIIE S1BDIE CUISIIE SamE m.-Ann n _., n..-awnwearnivnw varme -rw rwi varve % r* >- 96-2-C Spare 96-3-C spare g 98-4-C Spare 4 99-c Spara k 100-B Spare n 101-B Spare 102-B spare ,w 4

= s y

103-A-Refuelirq Cavity Purification Inlet 110-38 N/A IIC-37 N/A EE oy 104-A HaDmiirg Cavity PurifIr=tica Outlet 110-9 N/A 110-10 N/A 105-1-B Simema Generator IB MlW Saugde Ciceed System M/A (3)(2)(A)TV-ISS-Il7B -PO-l Mc 105-2-B RtER Vapor Sangde (A)TV-ISS-112A1 < & -PG-(A)TV-ISS-112A2 <(c 105-3-B Spara 105-4-B Spare 106-Sp SI W='intor Test Lirs (A) MEN-ISI-842 <fo (A)TV-ISI-689 <(c -h5-it U 107-c spare . o M 10s-B spare s O,

1 NEE 3.6-1 NM m ~ Marnaar mxnaar nesIIE snuna cursIIE snumE m .. __.,, r_..w,. -. m u-varm + __, w, varw vne.trggi w 109-c RVuS (2)(12) N/A (2)(u) WA N

ll 109-44 Inlet riew angas - oser ocus (1)s0V-Im-lo2A1 WA' (1)Sov-1HY-102A2 N/A r

.g. 109-49 Inlet Flow Sangala - PRER micia - (1)SOV-1HY-103Al N/A (1)SOV-1HY-103A2 N/A p 4 109-52 riaw sampam W % (1)SOV-1HY-104A1 N/A (1)SOV-1HY-104A2 N/A 4 e ?. H O-1-C HEIR Dud hW miihmtar PPSD-455A Closed!Wsten N/A - (1)1RC-277 N/A (1)1 h 278 N/A no-2-c spare mv g2 no-3-c spare 3 = /. no-4-c t oe ni-c - W (7) Flange tyA n2-c spare l (7) riange N/A n3-1-A BIT to onld Iags (3) (2)1SI-94 WA (3) (2)POV-ISI-867C /[--19(4) j i (3)(2)f0V-ISI-867D ff -M(4) j Pri-ir t' - : 1-2 Airl * = r 1 Mryanli e lswa M 1ve (1)1VS-169 N/A D mynalI w irwt M1ve (1)1VS-170 WA D Byaali*ir=1 vlalve (1)1VS-167 N/A-Spaall'

• ir= Vlalve 4

(1)1VS-168 N/A j.

"IhBE 3.6-1 02fIADHMr H2EIRATIGE MAIDEM MAXDEM B2fr Il6IIE SI5EEE CA.N M ND. -N TNMPIFIchTrNMESCRIPTIN VAU/E T3e fm VA WE TDEEs fM Emerauncy ctmtairunert Airlcri Bi-P-2 3y M m1i**iswa M vs (1) (7)lVS-184 M/A neum11 6 M ye (1) (7)1VS-183 4/A I k (A) Cbrtainmarit I=1*im Ihase A (B) Cartaisumert Tmistion Ihase B (1) May be opened on an 12tamittent basis urder arininistrativs cx:rtrol. ~ (2) Not subject to Type C leakage tests. mu E3 3, (3) Valves tested per ar=r-ifimtion 4.0.5. NO (4) leavi== cyanirq time. l (5) Mmlimhility: DLxrirq 03E AL*NRATIGE ce movement of irradiated ' uel within cxntairument. I (6) Not subject to the ringliramments of =5=r-ifimeimg/4.6.3. Listed in N 3.6-1 for informaticn cnly. ll (7) Tested under Type (B) testirg. (8) Not smari. 1 (9) Auto open on Safety Injartim recirculatica migrial. q-! (10) Not mutyject to the surveillarice reglirumments of 5: par-iffmtion 3/4.6.3. Valves tested per ITi g -r-ifim tion 4.o.s. D (11) Valve will be l<v4rari shut in

• 1, 2, 3 and 4.

(12) Isolaticn is prtvided by bellows cperated trjdra alic isolators.

AEFUELING OPERATIONS CONTA!NMENT BUILOlNG PENETDM10NS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.a The containnent building penetrations shall be in the following status: aY?b 4. The ecuipment c1Csed and held in place by a minimum of I four bolts, b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and c-Each penetration providing direct access from the containment Msphere to the outside atmosphere shall bt tither: Closed by an isolatien valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2. Exhausting at less than or equal to 7500 cfm through OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves -w+th i scht4eH4*et-es-seee4 4e+-4n4stle 0,0 1-to l OPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal adserters of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS). APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS er movement of irradiated fuel witnin tne containment. ACTION: k'ith the recuirements of the above specification not satisfied. irrnedi-ately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS 4.9.4.1 Each of the above recuired containment penetrations shall be detemined to be in its above required condition within 150 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. 4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OFERABLE by: a. Verifying the flow rate through the SLCRS at least once per 14 hours when the system is in operation. b. Testing the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves per the applicable portions of Specificatien 4.6.3.1.2, and c. Testing the SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 g-4 MO#0Mb

~- I CNrrAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM the chemical addition system ensures that The OPERABILITY of added to the containment spray in the event of a sufficient NaOH is LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that _1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion components within containment are minimized. These are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed effects on assumptions in the accident analyses. 3/A.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISCLATION VALVES of the containment isolation valves ensures that the The OPERABILITY will be isolated f rom the outside environment atmosphere containmentevent of a release of radioactive material to the conteinment in the of the containment. Containment pressurization atmosphere or time limits specified ensures that the release isolation within the the environment will be consistent with radioactive material to ofthe assumptions used in the analysis for a LOCA. The opening of locked or scaled closed containment isolation valveu on an intormittent basis under administrativo control includes the following considerationst (2) stationing an operator, who is in at the valvo controls, constant communication w ;h the control room, instructing this opor tor to close these valvos in an accident e (2) situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will provent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. 3/4.6.4 COKBUSTIBLE GAS CONTRCL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Yither recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) of water 3) corrosion of metals within decomposition radiolytic These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the containment. recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA." 3/4.6,5 SUBATMOSPMERIC PRESSURt CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.6.5.1 STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR The closure of the manual isolation valves in the suction of the steam jet air ejector ensures that 1) the containment internal pressure may be maintained within its operation limits by the mechanical vacuum pumps and 2) the containment atmosphere is isolated the outside environmsnt in the event of a LOCA. These valves i from are requir,ed to be closed for containment isolation. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Mopos ED I

ATTACHMENT A-2 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 ,2 2 v,Jit P;oposed Technical Specification change No. 160/20 Revision 1 4: ' n _,gg a ([ Revise the Technical Specification as follows: t O: _';_ Ni~_e Paae ingert Pace h51 N.A' 1-2 12 YI'[.d I 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 ' ~. 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-16 'i / 4 6-17 e 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-23 T, 3/4 6-24 3/4 ?," 3/4 6.a 3/ 6-27 3/4 6-28 3/4 6-29 3/4 6-30 3/4 9-4 3/4 s-4 6 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 e l

. - _ = DEFINITIONS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (Continued) b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated auto-mati? valves s9 cured in their clos'd positions, except 46-oed in Tacle 3.c-1 of v ee w etion 3.c.3.1. R n /n : l NN}ie to.<fn/ at t. w,i, y,fy,j, tt Y M andu d ~,n oyhd & ' pac, fic f

1. 8. 2 All equipment batches are closed and sealed.

1.8.3 Ea:h air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3., and 1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2. 1.8.5 The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALI3 RATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated. CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behuior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indi-cations and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A ttMi ?UNCTIONAL TEST Shall be the injection of a simulated sign 1 into close to tu primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY the chann, e including alarm and/or trip functions. CORE ALTERATION 1.12 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipula+, ion of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of move-ment of a component to a safe conservative position. i l SHUT 00WN MARGIN l l 1.13 $dVTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which i the reactor is or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full length roi cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdraan. l l BEAVER VALLEY - U5 2 1-2 WCf0-%)

4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 6.1.1 Orimary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. \\ ACTION: Witbout primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the follewing 36 hours. SURVElLLANCF REOUIsEMENis 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that: 1. All penetrations

• not capable of being closed by OPERABLE contain-i ment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during

~ accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves, secured in their positions, except e--,4,4,. 4-. s e s, u m m,4a.a 4. v.m s c _, VA 0 hQ 2. All equipment hatches are c sedandseafe[ spe;4 M4, .1. t. 2./. d e i) ) b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3. "Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the c1p ed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed d' ring each u b-COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days, BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 fkOPOSEb i =

~. - - - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS -CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITINi CONDITION FDP OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

L 0.10 percent by weight An overall integrated leakage rate of 5,P,a,(44,7 p,4 ), a. of the-containment air per 24 hours at 9 b. A combir.ed leakage rate of < 0.60 L, for all penetrations ano valves subject to Type B and C testse ident4fied in Table 3.01, l when pressurized to P, (44.7 psig). APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and, valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L,, restore the leakage rate (s) to within the limit (s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200'F. Y h :IILLANCI REOUIREMENTS r.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following e test schedule and shall be deteminea in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972: a. A lype-A test (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage-Rate) shall be conducted at 40

• 10-month intervals during shutdown at P*

(44.7 psig). b. If any Periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L,, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L,, -a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests-meet 0.75 L, at.which time the above test schedule may be resumed. = BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-2 fkOAQSED ~~T~ =

I 4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION fach 3.6. 3.1,g he-containment isolation valvey spet+f4ed-4n-Teble 3.5-1 shall be T OPERABLE'lwi;h iselat4en-Mmet-ts-shown-indable-3+h APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve (s)-specified in Table 3.5.1 inoperable, l maintain at let.st one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and: a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or-b. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least oni deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c. Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 6thconfbdeied 4.6.3.1.J -The isolation valve)( cpecified in Table 3.5-1-shall be demonstrated l OPERABLER a. At leas't once per 92 days by: l l 1. Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel. 2. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and l verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differ-ential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is > 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after m intenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuater, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cyc1%c test, above, and verificatior af isolation time. Nt Of4Y o** Y Cle5h V0]VeS My 5 NsWe % loc $5cf et C p 1 h e t N st k to* o&aks's& }lA CYN l. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 MCPCSfb { ]

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ? SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) con hibeat 4.6.3.1.2 Each4 isolation valve spee4fied it: f:ble 3.5-1-shall be demonstrated l -OPERABLEYduring the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:- Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal each a. Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase b isolation valve actuates to its isolation position-** l Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation signal, c. each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.- d. Cycling each power operated or automatic valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. Cycling each wei plant operation,ght or spring loaded chtck valve not testable during e. through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is > 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid + l ~ f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete cycle of full travel. - "Th. ;,ecified la ;er.th ;;rveillerae ir,tervel durir.;; the fir.t f=1 cy:1;' =y te extr.t t; ceirait.;ith -:- ;l; tier, ;f th; fir;t r:f=11 ; rf:;:.

8EAVER VA!. LEY- - UNIT 2' 3/4 6-16 Ged pope h gA/ (3-7h

$0f65Eb

i TABLE'3.6-1 9 2 g CONTAIMENT PENETRATIONS I h MAXIR M MAXIMM PENT. INSIDE-STROKE OUTSIDE. STROKE NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION. VALVE 14tE (SEC) VALVE. TIME (SEC) e g' 1 Comp Cool from Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV157 < tia (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV157-1 < 60 g Heat Exch 2CCP-Rv105 N/A 2 Coup Cool 'to Res (1)(B)'2CCo-MOV150-2.< 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV150-1 < 60 Heat'Erch 2CCP-RV102 N/A 4 Camp Cool to Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV151-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV151-1 < 60 Heat Exch 2CCP-RV103 N/A h5 nap Cool from Res (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV156-2 < 60 (1)(B) 2CCP-MOV156-1 < 60 og Heat Exch 2CCP-RV104 N/A "g" [w 6 529c 7 High Head (3)(2) 2515-83 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV869A N/A Safety Injection (13) 9 SPARE 11 Instrument-Air (A) 2IAC-MOV133 < 6f, (A) 21AC-MOV134 < 60 13 SPARE 14 Chill & Service Wtr (B) 25WS-M0Y153-2 < 60 (B) 25WS-MOV153-1 < 60 y rw to Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV153 N/A N Cooling coils !h 15 CHARGING -~ (3)(2) 2CHS-31 N/A (3)(2) 2CHS-MOV289 < 10 (13) 16 SPARE }

TA6LE 3.6-1-(Cont) ~ ((. CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS x $E MAXIMUM MAXIMUM 12 PENT. INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE' [2 ' MO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE-TIME (SEC) VALVE. TIME (SEC) e-17 High Head (3)(2) 2515-84 N/A. (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV8698 N/A (( Safety. Injection (13) 19 Seal Water from (A). 2CHS-MOV378 < 60 (A) 2CHS-MOV381 < 60 Reactor Coolant Pump 2CHS-473 N/A s 20 ' Safety Injection 2515-42 N/A (1) 2515-41 N/A Accumulator Makeup 2 SIS-RV130 N/A 21 Chill'& Service Wtr (B) 25WS-MOV155-2 < 60 (B) 25WS-MOV155-1 < 60 from Cont. Air 25WS-RV155 N/A g; Recirc Cooling Coils a 3m 22 SPARE-q w" tf 23 SPARE 24 ResioJa1 Heat Removal-2RHS-107 N/A 2RHS-15 N/A to Refueling Water Tank 2RHS-RV100 N/A 25 Chill & Service Wtr (B)- 25WS-MOV154 -2 < 60 (B) 25WS-MOV154-1 < 60 from Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV154 N/A Cooling Coils h 27 Chill & Service Wtr (B) 25WS-MOV152-2 < 60 (B) 25WS-MOV15?-1 < 60 c' to Cont. Air Recirc 25WS-RV152 N/A GT Cooling Coils 9 28 ' Reactor Coolant Letdown (A) 2CHS-A0V200A < 60 (A) 2CHS-A0V704 < 60 (A) 2CHS-A0V2006 < 60 (A) 2CHS-A0V200C < 60 l (1) 2CHS-HCV142 N/A l 2CHS-RV203 N/A

TACLE 3.6-1 (Cont) a,g

f,

.CONTAlletENT PENETRATIONS-m h MAXIMM MAXIMUM g PEMT. INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE-M.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC) VALVE TIME (SEC) y 29 Pri Dr. Trans Pump Disch (A) 2DGS-A0V108A < 60 (A) 2 CGS-A0V1088 < 60 Q 2DGS-RV115 N/A 30 SPARE 31 SPARE 32 SPARE 7:>, 33 SPARE D g. 34 High Head Injection Line (3)(2) 2515-94 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV836 N/A m4 (13) (3)(2) 2 SIS-NOV840 N/A mw 35 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor (3)(2) 2CHS-474 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-MOV308A N/A Coolant Pump (13) 35 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor (3)(2) 2CHS-476 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-MOV3088 N/A Coolant Pump (13) 37 Inj Seal Wtr to Reactor (3)(2) 2CHS-475 N/A (2)(3) 2CHS-MOV308C N/A Coolant Pump (13) 38 Sump Pump Discharge' (A) 2DAS-ADV100A < 60 (A) 2DAS-A0V1006 < 60 ty 20AS-RV110 N/A th Q 39 St Gen Blowdown Closed System N/A (2) 280G-A0V100A-1 < EO 40 St Ge.i Blowdown Closed System N/A (2) 2BDG-A0V1006-1 < 60 41 St Gen 810wdown Closed System N/A (2) 2BDG-A0V100C-1 < 60

-TABLE'3.6-1 (Cont) ,g E CONTAIMIENT PENETRATIONS. <>F PENT.- MAXINK4 NAXINLM INSIDE SikOKE OUTSIDE STROKE Q NO.-AREA . IDENTIFICATION /DESCRIPTIM VALVE TIE (SEC) VALVE TIME (SEC) 42 Service Air (f)25AS-15 N/A [j)2SAS-14 N/A . ll 43 Air Monitor Sample 2CVS-93 . N/A.: (A) 2CVS-50V102 < 60 44 Air Moniter Sample (1)(A) 2CVS-50V153B < 60 (1)(A) 2CVS-50V153A < 60 45 Primary Grede. Water 2RCS-72 N/A (A) 2RCS-A0VS19 < 60 2RCS-RV100 N/A 46 Loop Fill (3)(2) 2CHS-472 N/A (3)(2)(1) 2CHS-FCV 160 N/A ) (13) f { 47 SPARE Cf

• 48 Primary Vent Header (A) 2VRS-A0V109A-2 < 60 (A) 2VRS-A0V109A-1 < 60 49 Nitrogen Supply Manifold 2RCS-6R.

N/A (A) 2RCS-A0V101 < 60 50 . SPARE 51 TPARE g 52 SPARE 53 Nitrogen Manifold (A) 2GNS-A0V101-2 < 10 (A) 2GNS-A0V101-1 < 60 m M. I .w

1 TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) = T. F CONTAllMENT PENETRATIONS. p g- .5 MAXIMUM MAXIMUM-LE PENT. INSIDE STR0nE OUTSIDE-STROKE-0 NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME.(SEC) VALVE 11ME (SEC) h 55 ' Leakage Detection (2) 2LMS-50V953 < 60(4). = Press Relief Tank .(1)(A) 2SSR-50V130A-1 <.60 (1)(A) 2SSR-50V130A-2 4 60 Accumulator Water Sample (A) '2SSR-A0V109A-l'< 60 (A) 2SSR-A0V109A-2 < 60 2SSR-RV117 N/A Hydrogen Analyzer-(1) 2HCS-50V136A' N/A (1) 2HCS-50V1368 N/A .j 56 Cold Leg Sample -(A) 2SSR-A0V102A-1 < 60-(A) 2SSR-A0Y102A-2 < 60 255R-RV118 N/A g ' D g, Hot leg Sample (1)(A) 2SSR-50V128A-1 < 60 (1)(A) 255R-50V128A-2 < 60 l 255R-RV120 N/A } u a W "_. D Pressurizer Liquid (A) 2SSR-A0V100A-1 < 60 (A) 2SSR-A0V100A-2 < 60 Space Sample 2SSR-RV119 N/A i Blowdown Sample Closed Systen N/A (2) 2SSR-A0V117A < 60 l l 57 Leak Detection (2) 2LMS-50V950 < 60(4) Blowdown Sample Closed System M/A (2) 2SSR-A0V117B < 60 j tt Pressurizer Vapor (A) 2SSR-A0V112A-1 < 60 (A) 2SSR-A0V112A-2 < 60 l g Space Sample 2SSR-RV121 N/A { Hydrogen Analyzer (1) 2HCS-50V135A N/A (1) 2HCS-50V135B N/A .i 59 Instrument Air Containment 2IAC-22 N/A (A) 21AC-H0V130 < 60 l f i t ~' = = - - -

• _-.._,m.______

TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS I E PENT. MAXIMLM INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE MAXIMLM Q 110.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC) VALVE e TIME (SEC) g 60 Low Head Safety Injection (3)(2) 2515-132 N/A q Discharge (13) (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV88888 N/A 61 Low Head Safety Injection (3)(2) 2515-130 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV8889 N/A Discharge (13) 62 tow Head Safety Injection (3)(2) 2515-133 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV8888A N/A Discharge (13) g, 63 Quench Pump Discharge 2QSS-4 M/A (B) 2QSS-MOV101A < 60 (4) l g g D 2QSS-RViOlA N/A g[ (, 64 Quench Pump Discharge 2QSS-3 N/A (B) 2QSS-MOV1018 < 60 (4) u 2QSS-RV1018 N/A 65 fuel Transfer Tube (7) Flange M/A [2)(6) ,LD C -/o.1 N/8 l 66 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (B)(2) 2RSS-MOV155A < 60 (4) 67 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (B)(2) 2RSS-MOV155C < 60 (4) 68 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (B)(2) 2RSS-MOV1550 < 60 (4) 69 Recirc Spray Pump Suction (B)(2) 2RSS-MOV1558 < 60 eai 70 lecirculation Pamp (2)(13) 2RSS-29 M/A (B)(2) 2RSS-MOV156A < 60 (4) i g Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV156A N/A 71 Recirculation Pump (2)(13) 2RSS-31 N/A (10)(B)(2) 2RSS-MOVIS6C < 60 (4) Discharge \\ (6) 2RSS-RV156C N/A l l l

TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) h-CONTAIMENT PENETRATIONS g. g MAXIMUM max 1 MUM p PENT. INSIDE . STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE q NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC) VALVE 11ME-(SEC) h 73 Nain Steam System "A"- Closed System M/A (2) 2M55-10]A S l 5 C?osed System M/A (2) 2 MSS-AOV102A N/A Closed System N/A -(2) 2 MSS-50V105A N/A Ciosed System 'N/A (.1)(6) 2 MSS-SV101A N/A Closed System N/A (M(6) M55-SV102A N/A hs Closed Systee M/A (/)(6)2M55-SV103A N/A 1s u g* Closed Systee N/A p)(6) 2 MSS-SV104A N/A n a @h Closed Systee N/A U)(6) 2 MSS-SV105A N/A Steae Orains System Closed System N/A (2) 2595-A0V111A-1 < 60 Closed System M/A (2) 2SDS-A0V129B < 60 Steam Vent System Closed Systee N/A (g)(6) 2SVS-PCY101A N/A Dm Closed Systen N/A (,1)(6) 2SVS-HCV104 ~ N/A n R J t

TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) a. h CONTA* W NT PENETRATIONS E ~ s MAX 1f1M MAXINUN P PENT. INSIDE S120KE OUTSIDE STROKE. O NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION /DESCRIPTJ0h VALVE TIME (SEC) VM*E IIME (SEC) 74 Main Steam Systen "B" Closed System N/A (2)2 MSS-M101B 5 l x ] Closed System M/A (2) 2 MSS-A0V1028 N/n Closed System M/A (2) 2 MSS-50V1058 N/A Closed System M/A (2)(6) 2 MSS-SV1018 N/A Closed System M/A [.2)(6) 2 MSS-SV1028 N/A g Closed System N/A (2)(6)2 MSS-SV1038 N/A Closed System M/A f2)(6)2 MSS-SV1048 N/A h Closea Systen N/A- [.2)(6) 2M55-SV1058 N/A Stzam Drains System Closed Syste.s N/A (2) 2505-A0V1118-1 < 60 Closed System M/A (2) 2S05-A0V1298 < 60 Steam Vent Systee Closed System M/A (2)(6) 2SVS-PCV1018 N/A Closed Systen N/A [2) (6) 2SVS-HCV104 ~ N/A rp n D M

TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) CONTAll0IENT PENETRATIONS C MAXIlWM MAXIMUM F PENT. INSIDE STRDKE DUTSIDE STROKE O 'NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC) VALVE TIME (SEC) e 75 Main Steam System "C" Closed System M/A (2)2 MSS-b101C 5 l Closed System M/A (2) 2 MSS-A0V102C N/A m Closed System M/A (2) 2 MSS-50V105C N/A C7) sed System N/A [J)(6) 2 MSS-SV101C M/A Closed System N/3 [?)(6)2 MSS-iV102C N/A Closed 0ystem M/A [2)(6)2 MSS-SV103C N/A Closed Systee M/A (?)(6) 2 MSS-SV104C N/A i m i b Closed Syster N/A [2)(6)2 MSS-SV105C N/A Steam Drains Systes Closed System M/A (2) 2505-A0V111C-1 < 60 Closed System r/A (2) 2SDS-A0V1298 < 60 Stean Vent System Closed System M/A (2)(6) 2SVS-PCV101C N/A Closed System M/A [A)(6)25VS-HCV104' N/A i O 76 Feedwater "A" Closed Systen N/A (2) 2FWS-HYV157A -G-7 4 (2) 2F W 2S --M/A-l l @ 77 Feedwater "B" Closed System M/A (2) 2FWS-HYV1578 7 i N. I r, ..~m m, - 78 Feedwater "C" Closed System N/A (2) 2FWS-HYV157C 7 (2) 2PE.,- % N/A l t

TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) 'I 9 ~ CONTAllMENT PENETRATIONS 3 9 5 i .tAXIMUM MAxlMUM P PENT.. INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE SIRO %E O No.-ARE/. IDENTIFICATIFsDESCRIPTION VALVE TIT (SEC) VALVE IIME (SEC) .c 79 Aux Femi "A" (2) 2ft' '3" M/^ (2) 2FWE-HCV100E N/A l 5 (2) 2tWE-HCV100f N/A (2) 2f% '2^. - ' ' = l- -{2) 2f"E'2" '/* 80 kux Feed "8" (2) 2 M -1*J "/.^. (2) 2FWE-HCV100C N/A I (2) 2FWE-HCV100D N/A (2) 2f E "3" N/A-(2) 2 M '2" "/* g 83 Aux Feed "C" (2) 2 M -101 "/^ (2) 2FWE-HCV100A N/A l i o R (2) 2FWE-HCV1006 N/A N * -(2) 2fE-'"^ N/" ? (2) 2f E "" N / ", [ d5 i 87 Hydrogen Recombiner N/A (1) 2HCS-MOV117 N/A I Discharge-(1) 2HC5-111 N/A .j . *i 88 .7,.: :;:. Recombiner N/A (1) 2HCS-MOV116 N/A I, Discharge (1) 2HCS-110 N/A I 89 SPARE 90 Purge Duct Exhaust (5) 2HVR-fe0238 10 (4)(5) 2HVR-M0023A 10 D rp 91 Purge Duct Sgply (5) 2HYR-M00258 10 [N)(5) 2HVR-M0025A 10 N ~ [p/)(5) 2HVE-0MP206 N/A 92 Hydrogen Recombiner (1) 2HCS-50V114B N/A ~ D isolation (1) 2HC5-50V11EB N/A r i Ree:. tor Cont. Vacuum (A) 2CVS-50V151B < 60 l Par 4 Suctiec (A) 2CVS-50V1528 < 60

+ i . TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) -- LONTAIDOENT PENETRATIONS ~ I 5- 'n n AIMim ' MAXIMUM

E PENT.

INSIDE Siw0KE. OUTSIDE STROKL Q No.-AREA -IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION TVAL4E TIME (SEC) VALVE TIMt (SEC) t e. e 93 Hydrogen Recombiner } lsolation (1) 2HCS-50V114A N/A (1) 2HC'. '2V115A N/A t Reactor Cont. Vacena .(A) 2CVS-59V151A < 60 Isolation (A) 2CVS-50V152A < 60 94

Ejector Suction '

(N) 2CVS-151 N/A (N) 2CVS-151-1 N/A [ 96 SPARE g, 97 Leakage Detection (2) 2LMS-50V952 < 60 (4) o s g," Blowdem Sample Closed System N/A (2) 2SSR-A0V117C < 60 I hb Liquid Sample - Cont. -(1)(A) 2SSR-50V129A-1 < 60 (1)(A) 2SSR-50V129A-2 < 60 Sump A RHS 2SSR-RV122 N/A Hydrogen Analyzer (1) 2HCS-50Y1338 N/A (1) 2HC;-50V1348 M/A f 98 SPARE 99 Hose Rack S g 1y '2FPW-761 N/A (A) 2FPW-A0V206 < 60 100 SPARE .t1 i m 101 Reactor Cont. Deluge - 2FPW-753 N/A (A) 2fPW-A0V205 < 60 N Cable Pent. Area & RMS' rb Pump ~ c) 103 Reactor Cavity Perif. Inlet. ~2FNC-121 N/A' 2FNC-38 N/A i l. 104 Reactor Cavity Purif 2FNC-122 N/A 2fMC-9 N/A j. ' Outlet j L I

i n TABLE 3.6-1 (Cont) 7 g CONTAl m GIT PEMETRATIONS-

=

MAXIMtM MAXIMUM E PEMT. INSIDE ' STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE Q NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION /DE5CRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC)' VALVE TIME (SEC) l 105 Leak Detection (2) 2LMS-50V951 < 60 (4) Leak Detection 2LMS-51 N/A i 2LMS-52 N/A ~ Hydrogen Analyzer (1) 2HCS-50V133A N/A (1) 2HCS-50V134A N/A -Post Accident Sampling (A)(1) 2 PAS W 105A-1 < 60 (A)(1) 2 PAS-50V105A ' : 60 106 4@ s Safety'Inj. Test line (A) 2 SIS-MOV842 < 60 (A) 2 SIS-A0V889 < 60 2515-RV175 N/A i }i v 108 SPARE eg g D i 110 SPARE i 113 Safety Injection (3)(2) 2 SIS-95 N/A (3)(2) 2 SIS-MOV867C < 10 (4) (13) (3)(2) 2515-MOV867D < 10 (4) l 114 Recirculation Pump (2)(13) 2RSS-32 N/A (10)(B)(2) 2RSS-MOV156D < 60 (4) tt Discharge (6) 2RSS-RV156D N/A m Q 115 Recirculation' Pump (2)(13) 2RSS-30 N/A (B)(2) 2RSS-MGV1568 < 60 (4) y Di charge (6) 2RSS-RV1568 N/A 116 Fire Protection HVR' 2FPW-388 N/A (A) 2FPW-A0V221 < 60 Filter B 117 Fire Protection HVR 2FPW-382 N/A (A) 2FPW-A0V204 < 60 Filter-A i

TABLE 3.Fd (Cont)- h CONTAlleENT PENETRATIONS 9 5 MAXIMUM max 1 MUM E PENT. IMsIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE O NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME (SEC) VALVE IIME (SEC) g 118 Quench Spray Systen 2QSS-267 N/A (11)(B)(1) 2Q55-50V100A N/A a (11)(B)(1) 2Q55-50v1006 N/A " 119 RVLIS 17) M/A (12) N/A ffinaryContaineerstPersonnelAirLock2PH5-PAL-1 Equalizing Valve (f)(7) 2PHS-112 N/A Equalizing Valve (t)(7) 2PHS-113 N/A i Equalizing Valve (t) (7) 2PHS-101 N/A Equalizing Valve (i)(7) 2PHS-110 N/A b= Equalizing Valve ( f) (7) 2PHS-111 N/A Op Equalizino Valve (f) (7) 2PHS-100 N/A q h Emergency Containment Air Lock 2PHS-EAL 1 Equalizing Valve (1)(7) 2PHS-202 h/A Equal' ting Valve (t) (7) 2PHS-201 N/A Drn n h M "b

D' HI LE 3.6-1 (Cont) h NOTES-E (A) Containment Isolation Phase A. E Containment Isolation Phase 8. 5 ((2)

1) May be opened en as latermittent basis undar adelnistrative control.

] (2) Not subject to Type C leakage P.ests. -e {3) na --. L - - ? -- a-.a th k s }les} Cf ie s l m a _- g ak e, Maximum opening} ties.peci&da.sk; ag a f 3 ig g y a s~ l (4) (5) gp11cebility: During CORE ALTERATIONS or novament of irradiated fuel within containment. 4he-- p;shir: f O x Hi sti;; 3.2.0 ;r: = t ;;15:21:. TM natei.unt ?;rg Exh;;t :24 Saly-vale !!! M ?::'-d-Ett tri:; :;: :t!= b rt: 1, 2, 3. : 2 4. wE (6) Not subject to the requirements of Specificaties 3/4.6.3. L!sted in Ta'sle 3.6-1 for infonmation ont; H y T It s (7) Tested under Type "S" testing. -yg.f..I a 1/ l Uo

$$f!1y.rndrd;;

tret!r;!ci-(8)

I (9) Auto open on Safety Injection recirculation signal. (10) Auto close on Safety Injection recirculation signal. 1 (11) Auto open on QSS switchover signal. U (12) Isolation is provided by bellows operated hydracile isolators. 4" 9 (13) Not subject to the surveillance requirements of specification 3/4.6.3. Valves tested per specification 4.0.5. 5 (14) value wittbe lockal sLt i., r:Jes 1,2,3 a-,l y. g

l REFUEllNG CPERATIONS CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS LIMITIFF CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the i lowing status: hefeh The equipment-ttee closed and held in place by A Mnimum of four bolts, l a. b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and Each penetration providing direct access from the containment c. atmosphere to the outside atmocphere shall be either: 1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2. Exhausting at less tnan or equal to 7500 cfm through OPERABLE Containment Purge anc Exhaust Isolation Valves with i;olation-ti c: n pcci44cd in T2'e-4r4 to CPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS). APPLICAB:L2: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. ACTION: With the requirements of the aoove specification not SStisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the cont ainment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not ap'plicable. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be ir, its above required condition wiv.hin 150 hours prior to the start of and at leart once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. -4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: Verifying the flow rate to the SLCRS at least once per 24 hours a. when the system is in operation. b. Testing the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation ":lves per the applicable portions cf Specification 4.6.3.1.2, and Testing the SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1 with the exception of c. item 4.7.8.1.c.2. I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 fR0f03E b

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RASES 3/4.6.1.4 AND 3/4.6 1.5 INTERNAL PRESSURE AND AIR TEMPERATURE (Continued) of 45 psig and 2) ensure the containment internal pressure returns subatmospheric within 60 minutes following a LOCA. Additional operating margin i3 provided if the containment average air temperature is maintained above 100'E as shown on Figure 3.6-1. The limits on the parameters cf Figure 3.6-1 are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. 3/4.6.1.6 CONTATNMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the originai design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will wit:istand tne maximum pressure of 44.7 psig in the event of a LOCA. The visual and Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this l capability. l 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT QUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS The OPERASILITY-of the containment spray systems eisures that containment depressurization and subsequent return to subatmospheric pressure will occur in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant termination of contai1 ment leakage are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident

analyses, 3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient i

NaOH is added to the contninment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the indine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the incr<ase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses. 3/4.6.3_ CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 3 The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the con-tainment atmosphere will be isolatec' from the outside environasnt in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressuri-zation of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits spect-fled ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analycas for both a LOCA and major secondary system breaks. The opeting of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves cn an internittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an o constant communication with the control room,perator, who is in at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to closa these valvea in an accident cituation, and (3) assuring that environmencal conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-2 PbPoseb

4 M3'1LC[HENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 160/20 Revision 1 REVISION TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 9 A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would mtlity our previous sub.nittal dated April 23, 1990 to incorporate the following changes: 1. modify the BV-1 Table 3.3-5 feedwater isolation response

tire, 2.

correct BV-1 table 3.3-5 editorial errors, 3. delete BV-1 and BV-2 Table 3.6-1 including modification of the following: a. Definition 1.8 containment integrity b. Specification 3.6.1.1 containment ints.grity c. Specification 3.6.1.2 containment leskage d. Specification 3.6.3.1 containment isolation valves e. Specification 3.9.4 containment building penetrations f. Bases 3/4.6.3 containment isolation valves 4. Specification 3.9.4.a, for both units has been revised by replacing " door" with " hatch". B. BACKGROUND 1. The BV-1 main steamline break analysis has been updated to include a total isolation time of 10 seconds for the feedwater regulating valve and 30 seconds for the feedwater bypass valve. Therefore, Table 3.3-5 has been revised to include total feedwater isolation times consisting of the signal response time and the valve closure time. 2. Two editorial errors incorporated into BV-1 table 3.3-5 in our previous submittal have been corrected. The change to page 3/4 3-26 includes correcting the listed initiating signal from "2. Containment Pressur7-Low" to "3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low." The change to page 3/4 3-27 involves correcting the item number listed for the " Steam Line Pressure-Low" initiating signal from "2" to "4". 3. The NRC has issued Generic Letter 91-08 to provide guidance to plant licensees to remove component lists from the technical specifications. The generic letter includes recommended changes to applicable requirements to remove reference to the tables that list these components. This change modifies our original submittal by deleting Table 3.6-1 which lists the containment isolation valves and modifies related requirements by removing reference to the table or addresses those valves open under administrative control.

Attachment B, continued Revision to Containment Isolation Valves Page 2 C. JUSTIFICATION 1. The main steamline break event has been re-analyzed to resolve inconsistencies and incorporate plant changes made since the analysis was last performed. Feedwater isolation is achieved by closure of the feedwater regulating valves and bypacs valves. New limits for feedwater isolation response time are required to ensure the containment design criteria are satisfied, therefore, isolation o: the applicable valves within the specified time satisfies this criteria. 2. The changes to BV-1 Table 3.3-5 are editorial corrections and are consistent with the current requirements. 3. Generic Letter 91-08 provides an acceptable method for removal of component lists from the technical specifications. The removal of component lists is acceptable because it does not alter existing technical specification requirements-or those components to which they apply. In accordance with the generic

letter, the incorporation of lists into plant procedures is subject the. change. control provisions tor plant procedures in the Administrative Controls Section of the technical specifications.

Therefore, the change control provisions of the technical specifications provide an adequr,te means to control. changes to the component lists, when th3y have been incorporated into plant procedures, without including them in the technical specifications. Related specifications that reference Table 3.6-1 have been modified by removing reference to the table -and by including a note from the table which allows th opening of valves under administrative control. 4. An administrative change to Specification 3.9.4.a includes replacing " door" with " hatch" for consistency with plant terminology. D. SAFETY ANALYSIS 1. The BV-1 main steamline break analysis uses the main feedwater isolation time to determine the mass balance in the faulted steam generator. The steam generator dryout time is based on the steam break flow and the main and auxiliary feedwater flow rates. This establishes the mass and energy release profiles used to determine' the temperature and pressure in containment. The main steamline s ,m, .m

Attachment B, continued Revision to Containment Isolation Valves Page 3 break cuent has been re-analyzed to resolve inconsistencies identified during preparation of a design basis document and to address plant changes made since the analysis was last performed. The plant changes were q"alitatively justified at the time of installation based on available margin and sensitivities. To ensure the containment pressure and temperature design criteria are satisfied the main feedwater regulating valves were assumed to be closed within 10 seconds and the foodwater regulating bypass valves were assumed to be closed within 30 seconds. These isolation times are total actuation times consisting of signal response time and valve stroke time. Table 3.3-5 has been revised to specify these limiting feedwater isolation times with note (1j defining these times as total actuatior tir c. The feedwater isolation times are based on the limiting accident analysis requirements since the main steamline break event assumes the minimum time for foodwater isolation. Therefore, these changes are considered safe and will not reduce the safety of the plant. 2. Editorial changes to BV-1 Table 3.3-5 have been incorporated to correct errors incorporated by our previous submittal. These changes do not add anything new and, therefore, are considered to be safe and will not affect the safety of the plant. 3. Table 3.6-1 has been removed from the technical specifications in accordance with the recommendations provided in Generic Letter 91-08. The generic letter provides a modification to the requirements of specification 3.6.3.1 to address operable containment isolation valves in lieu of reference to Table 3.6-1. This modification is addressed in the limiting condition for operation,-action l statement, and surveillance requirements. In addition, an

• note has been added to the word operable to-address note (1) in Table 3.6-1 " Locked or scaled closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control."

The i i concept of this note has also been incorporated into Definition 1.8, Containment Integrity, and Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a to provide the operators with the capability to open those valves required for necessary plant operations and is consistent with the current use of note (1) in Table 3.6-1. Specifications 3.6.1.2.b and 3.9.4.c.2 have been modified by removing reference to Table 3.6-1. Bases section 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, has been revised by including the considerations that consticute an acceptabic administrative control for opening locked or j scaled closed containment isolation valves. l

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Attachmant B, continued Revision to Containment Isolation Valves Page 4 The other notes listed in Table 3.6-1 may be deleted also since these notes are only included for information and do not alter any technical specification requirement or affect the technical specification applicability requiremente The inservice testing (IST) requirements referenced by Specification 4.0.5 include verification of valve stroke

times, therefore, removal of valve closure times included in Table 3.6-1 will not alter the technical specification requirements to verify that valve stroke times ate within their limits.

Removal of Table 3.o-1 and related changes do not change the technical specification applicability or requirements, only the formal location of the valve list is charged from the technical specification to a plant operating procedure that is controlled in accordance with the requirements of Administrative Control 6.9, Procedure Therefore, these changes have been determined to be safe and will not reduce the safety of the plant. 4. The change to Specification 3.9.4.a is an administrative change and does not affect the safety of the plant. E. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ESALUdTION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below: The Commission may make a final determination, pGrsuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing tacility involves no significant hazords consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Tha following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards. 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequenc a of an accident previously evaluated?

Attachment B, continued Revision to Containment Isolation Valves Page C The proposed change revises our previt,s submittal to incorporate the following changes:

1) modify the BV-1 Table

's. 3 - 5 feedwater isolation response

time,

2) correct BV-1

'thble 3.3-5 editorial errors, 3) delete BV-1 and BV-2 Table 3.6-1 including modification of the following: a. Definition 1.8 containment integrity b. Specification 3.6.1.1 containment integrity c. Specification 3.6.1.2 containment leakage d. Specification 3.6.3.1 containment isolation valves e. Specification 3.9.4 containment building penetrations f. Bases 3/4.6.3 containment isolation valves 1) The main steamline break event has been re-analyzed to resolve inconsistencies and to address plant changes made since the analysis was last performed. The plant changes were qualitatively justified at the time of installation based on available margin and sensitivities. To ensure the containment pressure and temperature design criteria are satisfied the main feedwater regulating valves were assumed to be closed within 10 seconds and the feedwater reguJating bypass valves were assumed to be closed within 30 seconds. These isolation times are total actuation times consisting of signal response time and valve stroke time. Table 3.3-5 has been revised to specify these limiting feedwater isolation times with note (1) defining these times as total actuation times. The feedwater isolation times are based on the limiting accident analysis requirements since the main steamline break event assumes the minimum time for feedwater isolation. Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or 'onsequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2) Editorial changes to BV-1 table 3.3-5 have been incorporated to correct errors incorporated by our previous submittal. These changes are consistent with the current requirements and do not add anything now. Thereforo, these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 3) Table 3.6-1 has been removed from the technical specifications in accordance with the recommendations provided in Generic Letter 91-08. The generic letter provides a modification to the requirements of specification 3.6.3.1 to address operable containment isolation valves in lieu cf reference to Table 3.6-1. This modification is addressed in the limiting condition for operation, action statement, and surveillance requirements. In addition, an

• note has been added to the word operable to address note (1) in t

- - - - - - - - ~ _. _. -. -. - _. .httachment B, continued Revision to Containment Isolation Valves Page 6 Table 3.6-1 " Locked or sealed closed valves may be - opened on an intnrmittent basis under administrative control." The concept of this note has also boon incoruorated into Definition 1.8, Containment Integrity, and surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a to provide the operators with the capability to open those valves required for necessary plant operations and is consistent with the current use of note (1) in Table 3.6-1. Specifications 3.6.1.2.b and 3.9.4.c.2 have boon modified by removing reference to Table 3.6-1. Bases section 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, has been revised by including the considerations that constitute an acceptable administrative control for opening locked or scaled closed containment isolation valves. The other notes listed in Tables 3.6-1 may be deleted also since these notes are only included for information and do not alter any technical specification requirement or affect the technical specification applicability requirements. The inservice testing (ISY) requirements referenced by Specification 4.0.5 include verification of valve stroke times, therefore, removal of valve closure times included in Table 3.6-1 will not alter the technical specification requirements to verify that valve stroke times are within their limits. Removal of Table 3.6-1 and related changes do not change the technical specification applicability or requirements, only the l formal location of the valve list is changed from the technical specifications to a plant operating procedure that is controlled in accordance with the requirements of Administrative Control 6.6, Procedures. Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident - previously evaluated. 4) The change to Specification 3.9.4.a corrects the plant terminology used by replacing " door" with " hatch". This-is an administrative change and therefore will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident _previously evaluated? The requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1 will continue to govern the operability of the containment isolation valves. The proposed change does not introduce any new mode of plant operation or require any physical modification to the plant. Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of a_new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. +- - 4+.. e c-

Attachment B, continued Revision-to Centainment Isolation Valves Page.7 3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin -of safety? The proposed changes will not reduce the operability of the containment isolation valves or change the functional test requirements. The proposed changes will not affect any of the plant setpoints or margins to the accident analysis limits or technical specification limits and, tburefore, will not involve a significant reduction in the hargin of safety of the plant. F. NO SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)

and, accordingly, a

no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. ' b i I r S ~,.~,m .-,-,,e- -,3 4 e,--... 7 3, p n- - - *mo

.. - ---.-. ~. - l +* ATTACHMENT C-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 100/20 Revision 1 a Typed Pages: 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-29 1-2 j 3/4 6-1 ) 3/4 6-2 1 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 9-4 B 3/4 6-3 1 i i i i 1 J L I 1 I -,----r-v v rw-

TABI.12al-E ENELNEERED_SAEXTY__ FEATJJRES REEE9EEE_ TlliES INITIATING SIGNAL,AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN HECQHDS 1. lianual a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable Reactor Trip (SI) Not Applicable Containment Icolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Containment Vent and Purs1 Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Nct Applicable Rx Plant River Water System Not Applicable .i b. Containment Quench Spray Pumps Not Applicable Containment Quench Spray Valves Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable d. Control Room Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable 2. Conthinnp_Dt Pressure-HLgb a. Safety Injection (ECCS) s 27.0* h. Peactor Trip (from SI) $ 3.0 c. Feadwatcr Isolation 1) Feedwater Regulating Valves 5 10.0(1) 2) Feedwater Bypass Valves s 30.0(1) d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" 5 22.0(3)/33.0(2) e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable f. Rx Plant River Water System 5 '/ 7. 0 ( 3 ) /110. 0 ( 2 ) BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 Proposed

.... - ~. - -, - - - _ -.... - -. _ - ~... -..... TABLE 3.3-5 fContinued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESEQMLT.DiEE I N I T I A T I N Q _.G I G M L _ A N D F U N C T I O N RESPONSE TIME IN SECQ RS

3.

Pressurizer PresEure-Low ll 'a. Safety Injection (ECCS) $ 27.0*/27.0# b. Reactor Trip (from SI) $ 3.0 c. Feedwater Isolation 1) Feedwater Regulating Valves 5 10.0 (1) 2) Feedwater Bypass Valves s 30.0 (1) d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" s 22.0(3) e. -Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable f._ Rx Plant River Water System 5 77.0(3)/110.0(2) s (= l; ~ BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 3 3/4 3-26 Proposed

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continuedl EHQ1HEERED SAFETY FEATilBER_, RESPONSE TIMES , INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME It{_SECQHDH 0

4. Steam Line Pressure-low a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) $ 27.0//37.0// b. Reactor Trip (from SI) s 3.0 c. Feedwater Isolation 1) Feedwater Regulating Valves s 10.0 (1) 2) Feedwater Bypass Valves s 30.0 (1) d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" $ 22.0(3)/33.0(2) e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable f. Rx Plant River Water System $ 77.0(3)/110.0(2) g. Steam Line Isolation s 8.0 -5. Co n t a i nment;__Er_e s s u r e --H i c h -H i a h

a..

Containment Quench Spray 5 85.0(2) b. . Containment-Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable'- c. Control' Room Ventilation Isolation s 22.0(3)/77.0(2)

6. Sip _ag Generatox Water Level--Hich-Hiah a.

Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip $ 2.5 (Above P-9). b. Feedwater-Isolation

1) 'Feedwater Regulating Valves 5 10.0.(1) 2 )-

Feedwater Bypass Valves s 30.0 (1) .7. Containment Pressure--Intergpdiate Hich-Hich 1 a. Steam Line Isolation s 8.0

8. Steamline Pressurs Rate--Hiah Neoativa a.

Steamline Isolation s 8.0 9.-Loss of Power a. -4.16kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage s 1.3 (Loss of Voltage)- b. 4.16kv.and 480v Emergency Bus s 95 Undervoltage (Degraded voltage) l BEAVER-VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 p Proposed 1' l

~.. -. -. =. - -. - -. - -. _., - IABLE 3.3-5 (Continuedl TABLE NOTATION Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Low Head Safety Injection pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves

open, then VCT valves close) is not included.

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction trom the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves

open, then VCT valves close) is included.

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attair. ment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included. (1) Feedwater isolation includes signal response and valve closure time. (2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. (3) Diesel generator starting and-sequence loading delays nnt included. BEAVER. VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-28 Proposed

\\ DEFINITIONS - REPRRIAliLE EVENT -1.7' A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of these conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, -CSNTA1NMENT IIITIGRITl 1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRlTY shall exist when: 1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: a. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automat.ic isolation-valve system, or b. Closed by manual

valves, blind

flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except tor valves that are open under adminirtrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

1.8.2 All equipment hatches are closed and sealed. 1.8.3 Each air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3, and 1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2. CHANNEL CALI3EATIQH 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responas with the necessary-range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel . monitors. . The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. -The CHANNEL CALIBRATION-may be. performed. by any series of scquential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated. -CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by. observation. This determination shall

include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication.and/or vtatus with other indications and/or status derived from-independent instrument-channels measuring the same parameter.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 1-2 Proposed

4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ~ CONTAINMENT INTFGRITY_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in,at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated: a. At least once por 31 days by verifying that: 1. All penetrations

• not capable of being closed by_

OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed-by _ valves, blind

flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control.

as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1. 2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed. b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per -Specification 3.6.1.3. Except ' lves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which ate located inside the. containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the' closed position. -These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days. BEAVEl VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 Proposed 4

1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to: a. An overall integrated leakago rate of: 1. L, 0.10 percent by weight of the containment air per 34 hours at P, (40.0 psig), or a b. A combined leakage rate of 5 0.60 L for all penetrations a and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to Pa* APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: i With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L or (b) with the measured combined leakage a I rate for all-penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L, restore the leakage rate (s) to within the a limit (s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant. System temperature above 200'F. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedu and chall be determined in accordance with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50}e: a. A-Type-A test (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall-be conducted-at 40 1 10-month intervals during shutdown at P (40.0 psig). a I' Exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, Section III.D.l(a), granted on December 5, 1984. l ( BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Proposed

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i I 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION V4 LYES LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION _-=r 3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.- l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, either: a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE

• status within-4 hours, or b.

Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic ' valve secured in the isolation position, or c. Isolate the'.affected penetration within 6 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or-d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hot'rs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN'IS .=- m OPERABLE}: isolationvalveshallbedemonstratedl 4.6.3.1. Each containment a. At least once por 92 days-by: 1.- Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least -one complete cycle of full travel. Locked or. sealed closed valves may be opened on an-intermittent-basis under administrative control. BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 Proposed

CONTAINMMI., fiXSIDiG l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i 2. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 paid and opens,when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is > 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid. b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above, and varification of isolation time. 4.6.3.1.g Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by: a Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test

signal, each Phase A

isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test

signal, each Phase B

isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation

signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

d. Cycling each power operated or automatic valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time, e. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and coens when the differential pressure in the direction of tiow is > 1.2 paid but less than 6.0 psid. f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, scaled or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete cycle of full travel. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-18 (next page is 3/4 6-20) l Proposed i l

BEPUELlHG_pPERATIONS CQNTAINM.ENT BUIL.Q1H.0 PENETRATIONS i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following. status: I a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum l of four bolts, b. A minimum of one door in each altlock is closed, and c. Each pcnetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either: l 1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2. Exhausting at less than or equal to 7500 cfm through (' OPERABLE Ccntainment Purge and Fxhaust Isolation Valves to OPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers l of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS). APPLICAEILITY: _During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. AC3T.IQH: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions-of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4.1 -Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required condition within 150 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. 4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall-be demonstrated OPERADLE by: a. Verifying the flow rate through the SLCRS at least once per 24 hours when~the system is in operation. b. Testing the Cor.tainment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2, and c. Testing the.SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-4 Proposed -,e--. ym.e v. w ,ye- ..-.-e- -y e -m -.-. e w - e. e - -y e n-r v --

CONTAINMERT.SYSTDiE BASES r____. 3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDI11gLS_YSTDi The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient-NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal officiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment _are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses. 3/4.6.3 CORTAINMENT ISOLAT10E VALVEli The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis for a LOCA. The opening of locked or scaled closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditionn will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will I prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. l '3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this eg'aipment L will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected Mydrogen generation associated with

1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic. decomposition of water 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA." 3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE COJIIRQL SYSTEM 3/4.6.5.1 STEAM _ JET _ AIR EJEC1QB The closure of the manual isolation valves in the suction of the steam jet air ejector ensures that 1)- the containment internal pressure may be maintained within its operation limits by the mechanical vacuum' pumps and 2) the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside environment in the event of a LOCA. These valves are required to be closed for containment isolation. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Proposed

, _., _ ~ ~ _. _.. _. ATTACliMr.NT C-2 Beaver Valloy Power Station, 'J n i t-tio. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change 13n. 160/20 Revision 1 v Typed Page: 1-1 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-2 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 9-4 4 B 3/4 6-2 1 I l l. i r. 1 I l l I l l I

,*: DEFINITIONS CQHTAINMEET-INTEGRITY (Continuedl b. Closed by manual

valveu, blind

flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6,3.1.

1.8.2 All equipment hatches are closed and scaled. 1.8.3 Each air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3, and 1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2. 1.8.5 The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE. EllANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with tha necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel menitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRAT1vN shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION ma( be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel rteps such that the entire channel is calibrated. CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall

include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANHEL_F_VERTIONAL'TEEI 1.11_ A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal .into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions. -CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any 1.12 CORE ALTERATION component within-the reactor pressure vessel with the ver.sel head removed and fuel in-the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS '~ shall not preclude completion of movementiof a component to a safe -conservative position. EHUTDOWN MARGIH 1.13 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity l-by which the reactor is or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown i .and-control) are-fully inserted except for the single rod cluster L assembly of highest reactivity worth wnich is assumed to be fully l withdrawn. l. l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 1-2 Proposed l 1

m .l1[4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS 2]_b 6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMDIT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: MOLLS 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTIOM: Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 l hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours. SURVEILLAt40E REQUIREMENTS = ar.. 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated: I a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that: 1. All penetrations

• not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by

valves, blind' flanges, or deactivated i

automatic valycs secured in their positions, except l for valves that are open under administrative control l: as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1. 2. All equipment hatches are closed and acaled, i b.- By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per I Specification 3.6.1.3. L Except

valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which -are--located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not_be performed more often than once per 92 days. I BEAVER _ VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 Proposed

C_Q1[TJQLNMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT LEAEADI - LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to: a. An overall integrated leakage rate of 5 L 0.10 percent by weight of the containmor.t air per 2k, hours at P ' a (44.7 psig). b. A combined leakage rate of < 0.60 L for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C Sests when pressurized l to Pa (44*7 P819)* APPLICARJLITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. A.CTION: 1 -W th either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakRae i rate exceeding 0.75 L or (b) with the measured combined leakage a rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L, restore the leakage rate (s) to within the a limit (s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200'F. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-4.6.1.2-The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972: a. A -Type-A test (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 1 10-month intervals during shutdown at P (44*7 P81 )* 9 a .b. If any Periodic Type A test fails to meet.01.75 L, the a test. schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fall to meet 0.75 L, a Type A test shall be performed at leaet every 1$ months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L at which time the above test a schedule may be resumed. 4 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-2 Proposed

.. _ ___ ~. _ _ _. -. _. _ _. _. . _ _ ~ ~. _. _.... _. _ _ _ _ _.. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 2]4.6.3 CONTAIMMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION y 3.6.3.1 Each Containment Isolation Valve Shall Be OPERABLE *. l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at l least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open andt a._ Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or b. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c. Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or d. De in St least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and-in COLD SHU3DOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUJitEMENTS 4.6.3.1. Each conteinment isolation valve shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE}: a. At least once-per 94 days by: 1. Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least' one complete cycle of full travel. 2. Cycling. each weight or spring loaded check valve-testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel' and -verifying that.each check valve remains--closed when the: differential pressure in-the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when_tho-differential pressure in the_ direction of flow is 2 1.2 paid but-less-than 6.0 psid. b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or: its-associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above, and verification'of isolation time. Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 Proposed

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.1. Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE]during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by: a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test

signal, each Phase B

isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. I c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust-isolation

signal, each Purge and Exhaust valvo actuates to its isolation position.

d. Cycling ach power operated or automatic valve through at Icast one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. e. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full t. vel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 paid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is g 1.. psid but-less than 6.0 psid. I f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, secled or otherwise secured in the closed position through at Icast one complete cycle of full travel. l l l o l l l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-16 (next page is 3/4 6-31) Proposed

_. _. _ _ _. ~ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. REFUILING. OPERATIONS i CONTAll{ MENT BUILDING PENETRAT]O?iS l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION --,:-r_= 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall bo in the following status a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a l minimum of four bolts, b. A minimum of one door in each airiock is closed, and c. Each penetration providing direct access from .h e containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either: 1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2. Exhausting at less than or equal to 7S00 cfm through OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust l Isolation Valyca to OPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS). APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement-of irradiated fuel in the containment. The prcvisions of-Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required condition within 150 hours prior to the-start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. 4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: L a. Verifying the flow rate to the SLCRS at least once per 24 L hours when the system is in operation, b. Testing the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2, and c. Testing the SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1 with the exception of item 4.7.8.1.c.2. BEAVER VALLEY - 2 3/4 9-4 Proposed l

CONTAINMENT SYSTERE BASES .i, w um a,.,.. 3/4.6.1.4 AND 3/4 32 1.5 IRTERNAL PRESSURE AND AIR TEMPERATURE (Continued) of 45 psig and 2) ensure the containment internal pressure returns subatmospheric within 60 minutes following a LOCA. Additional operating margin is provided if the containment average air temperature is maintained above 100*F as shown on Figure 3.6-1. The limits on the parameters of Figure 3.6-1 are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINiiENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the-structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum i pressure of 44.7 psig in the event of a LOCA. The visual and Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZAILQF AND COOLING SYSTEMS afJ.6.2.1 AND 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT OUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SXSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the containment spray-systems ensures that containment depressurization and subsequent return to subatmospheric pressure will occur in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant termination of containment leakage are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. 3/4.6.2.3 C11ERICAL ADDITION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the contajntent spray in the event of-a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses. 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The. OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containmeht atmosphere-or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of- ' radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for both a LOCA and major secondary system breaks. The ipening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on- + intermittent basis ~under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing Ln' operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not l preclude access to

1ose the valves and that this action will l

prevent the release ut radioactivity outside the containment. i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 Proposed

e e Attashment_D Beaver Valley Power Ftation, Unit No. 1 and 2 Proposed technical Specification Change No. 160/20 Revision 1 DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION VA1NE CHANGES The changes to Table 3.6-1 arb identified by double side bars in Attachment A. Changes to the table are provided here for documentation purposes only since the tables are being deleted. The following provides a description of these changes and documents the applicable justification. A review of the BV-1 accident analysis calculations and NSSS correspondence was conducted to determine those containment isolation valves where specific containment isolation valve stroke times are required. The valves applicable to penetrations 73-SGD, 74-SGD, 75-SGD, 76-SGD, 77-SGD, and 78-SGD were identified, therefore, these valve stroke times have not been changed. Valves applicable to penetrations 15-A, 53-C, 90-SGD, 91-SGD and 113-1-A will also maintain the current strobe time since the corresponding BV-2 containment isolation valve is required to have a similar stroke time. For penetrations 63-SGD, 64-SCD, 66-SGD, 67-SGD, 70-SGD and 71-SGD the current valve stroke time will be maintained sinco these valvee stroke open on a CIB signal and Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 refers to valve closure time to satisfy containment isolation requirements. The remaining valve stroke times have been changed to < 60 seconds to be consistent with the BV-2 valve stroke requirements and the guidance provided in SRP 6.2.4 which states that "in general, (containment isolation) valve closure times should be less than one minute." The current listed stroke times for those valves are based on the vendor expected stroke time within which the valve is expected to operate. Four manual valves; RW-615, RW-621, RW-627 and RW-633; have been ~ added to BV-1 penetrations 83-SGD, 85-SGD, 84-SGD and 86-SGD respectively in accordance with the exemption from General Design Criterion 57 issued by the NRC

dated, June 26, 1991.

These valves isolate the river water radiatjen monitor sample lines and are located outside containment upstream of the river water containment isolation valves. Since Table 3.6-1 is being

deleted, these valves will be included in the plant procedure which lists all containment isolation valves.

Table 3.6-1 note (6) has been revised for both units to include reference to Specification 3/4.6.1, in addition to Specification 3/4.6.3 now referenced, since the valves with this note are only listed to document that they are not containment isolation valves. Note (6) currently exempts these valves from the requirements of Specification 3/4.6.3 which specifically addresses containment isolation valves. Specification 3/4.6.1 also addresses containment isolation valves, therefore, exemption to this specification is consistent with the exemption to Specification 3/4.6.3. I ______O

__.m.._._ Attachment D, continued Description of Isolation Valves page 2 Note . (1) {May be opened on an intermittent basin under administrative control) has been added to Table 3.6-1 isolation valves for BV-1 penetrations 42-C and 47-B and BV-2 penetration 42 to provide the plants with the option to open these valves under administrative control to supply air to systems inside containment. This will allow the operators to cross-connect the BV-1 station. air supply through penetration 42-C to the containnent service air header and through penetration 47 to the containment air system. This is consistent with UFSAR Section 9.8.1 which states that the station air system can supply air to components within containment for service air requirements and as a backup to the containment air system. Adding note-(1) to the BV-2 penetration valves will allow the operators to also cross-connect the BV-2 station service air supply through penetration 42 with the reactor containment servico air header. This will allow use of air powered tools inside containment during plant repair activities. 't i

. -......~.. -..-... 04 Attachment E Beaver Valley Power Ste.- vi, Unit No.1 and 2 Proposed Technical Specification Ci.ange No.160/20 Revision 1 UFSAR CHANGES UFSAR Section 5.3.3 Page S.3-4 1 I l l l l l l t l l l I 1

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i l0 6 1 BVPS-1-UPDATED TSAR Pev. 3 (1/35) failure. Class C penetrations, where they differ L sore respects from the arrangements deacribed in Section 5.3.2, are described in detail in Section 5.3.3. Class D Penetrations Class D penetration piping has a normally closed valve outside the containment, and is separated frem the reactor coolant system by a closed valve or a membrane barrier. These penetrations are therefore, closed during normal cperation. Class D penetrations are provided in accordance with the arrangements described in Section 5.3.1. 2 (a), (b) and (d) except as noted in Section 5.3.3. 5.3.2.1 Conformance "o the 1971 AEC General Design Criteria Those AEC general design criter.*a covering isolation of lines penetrating containment are discussed in Sections 1A.54 through 1A.57. The penetration classifications specified in Subsection 5.3.2 conform with the following 1971 Gereral Design Criteria: a. Lines in Class A and Class C, which are connected to the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, are in conformance with General Design Criteria 55 b.

Lines in Class A and Class C, which are connected to the containment atmosphere, are in conformance with General Design Criterion 56 c. Lines in Class B are in conformance with General Design Criteria 57 d. Lines in Class D are in conformance with General Design Criterion 56 e. All penetrations conform with General Design Critorion 54. In order to provide the greatest ( gree of overall unit safety, it is necessary la certain cases to

ovide containment isolation arrangements wh:, ;h differ in somt.

manner frcm the specific arrangements listed above. Such cases are described in detail in Section 5.3.3. 5.3.3 Description Table 5.3-1 lists each line penetrating the containment structure and indicates the isolation criterion to which it conforms. As indicated, most isolation arrangements conform exactly with the 1971 General Design Criteria. The man i. =. Otrchc time for -co n ta inac n t icciaticr /civec ic given i: the Technical up :ificationc. The details of containment isolation arrangements which differ in some manner from the specific arrangements allowed by the General Design Criteria are indicated below: 5.3-4 L - ..______________.________________________._____________________.____________________._________.__J}}