ML20099L007

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Supplemental Significant Deficiency Rept 413-414/84-16 Re Unconsidered Effect of Superheated Steam for Main Steam Line Break in Doghouse.Initially Reported on 840608.Higher Temps Will Not Affect Reactor Capability
ML20099L007
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/15/1985
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20099L003 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0588, RTR-NUREG-588 413-414-84-16, NUDOCS 8503200444
Download: ML20099L007 (60)
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Text

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DUKE PowEn Godmtxy P.O. H O X CM318 0 CHAHLOTTE. N.C. 28242 IIAL D. TUCKER ww.m ,emmans** ren.E PIf 0M E m.m. ,-o March 15, 1985 (704) 07:F4531 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Dr. Grace:

Please find attached a supplemental report concerning Significant Deficiency No. 413-414/84-16.

Very truly yours,

&M4 91 Ital B. Tucker LTP: sib Attachment cc: Director Palmetto Alliance Office of Inspection & Enforcement 2135 Devine Street U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Washington, D. C. 20555 INPO Records Center Mr. Robert Guild, Esq. Suite 1500 P. O. Box 12097 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. Jesse L. Riley NRC Resident Inspector Carolina Environmental Study Group Catawba Nuclear Station 854 llenicy Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Mr. II. R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 8503200444 850315 PDR ADOCK 05000413 E PDR

DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 & 2 EVALUATION OF MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK IN D0GHOUSE SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY REPORT NO. 413-414/84-16 SUPPLEMENT 2 Prepared By: .

cl.s Date: 3 - t 2. - 8 C

. L. Ritchie,~ Senior Technical Specialist Reviewed By: 3. N b, W Date: 3 gs-C4. K. Ray, III,VSupervising Design Engineer Approved By: kN #& Date: 3 13 - f 5' R. R. Weidler, Supervising Design Engineer Inspected By: O[ M v+ gineer Date: 7- /J- #4-C. L. Sansbury, Sen

[I jfv Date:

Inspected Byg'J. E. Thomas, Senior Engineer 8 3/8J' MN30107H L

DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: 413-414/84-16, Supplement 2 Report Date: March 12, 1985 Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY: Unconsidered effects of superheated steam generated by steam generator for Main Steam Line Break analysis results in increased doghouse temperatures outside containment. This could possib.ly preclude safety related components from performing their intended safety function. The potential deficiency was initially identified May 11, 1984.

INITIAL REPORT: On June 8,1984, Mr. Kerry Landis, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia, was notified by telephone of the subject deficiency by L. M. Coggins and R. R. Weidler of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, N.C. 28242.

Subsequently, deficiency report (413-414/84-16) as submitted on July 9, 1984, and Supplement 1 to the report was submitted on September 4, 1984.

COMPONENT AND/0R SUPPLIER: Duke Power Company is responsible for the doghouse environmental analysis. The MSLB analysis is accomplished utilizing input information supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Water Reactor Division.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: A potential deficiency was identified after revised information was received from Westinghouse giving mass / energy release rates for a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) inside containment. The original Westinghouse information indicated a saturated steam condition from the steam generators; however, revised in"ormation identifies steam generator tube uncovery and the formation of superhaated steam.

Duke Power had prev MSLB in the Doghous.fously assumed the same saturated steam condition for an tainment.

es located outside containment as for an MSLB inside con-Consequsntly, environmental qualification parameters for the Dog-houses were based en original analysis results of 330 F peak temperature.

Utilizing the new data from Westinghouse, revised Duke Power environmental analysis with superheated steam conditions indicated a potential increase in Doghouse temperature from the 330 F parameter to approximately 457 F peak Doghouse temperatur,e. Hence, the potential existed that safety related com-ponents could be subjected to temperatures higher than the qualification basis of 330 F, and could possibly preclude components from performing their intended safety functions following a postulated MSLB in either Doghouse. Therefore, on June 8, 1984 Duke Power reported this as a potentially reportable item and began a detailed engineering evaluation. This evaluation, based on conserva-tive " worst case" conditions, was completed during August 1984. Results from this evaluation were transmitted to the NRC on September 4,1984 under report

number 413-414/84-16, Supplement 1.

This report concluded that the analysis performed by Duke Power and Westinghouse demonstrated that no required safety components are precluded from performing their safety function prior to the on-set of adverse temperature effects and, therefore, no safety implications exist to prevent safe shutdown of the plant.

1 l

l

On September 28, 1984 representatives from Duke Power Company and Westinghouse met with the NRC to discuss proposed license condition 14b (FOL NPF-24) which concerns the MSLB in the Doghouse. The meeting concluded with the NRC stating their position that Duke had not demonstrated sufficient margin between com-pletion of equipment safety functions and the time at which doghouse atmos-pheric temperature exceeds equipment qualification temperature.

On October 8, 1984 Duke Power Company submitted a summary of the Justification for Interim Operation for Catawba Unit 1. This summary included the results of a more realistic analysis of the time margins between completion of equipment actuation and the time at which the Doghouse atmospheric temperature exceeds the qualification temperature. In addition, the results of a Westinghouse scoping-type fracture mechanics study was included which showed that the worst case break would be limited to approximately 0.2 in.2 (.001 ft.2). The more realistic analysis demonstrated substantial additional time margins. The fracture mechanics evaluation concluded that tube bundle uncovery would not occur due to limited break size. Therefore, the original equipment qualifica-tion temperature envelopes would not be exceeded. Again it was concluded that plant safety would not be adversely affected in the event of a MSLB in the Doghouse, and that qualification of the required Doghouse equipment had been demonstrated.

On the basis of the information discussed above, the NRC staff concluded (SER Supplement 4, Section 3.11) that acceptable justification for interim operation in accordance with Paragraph (i) of 10CFR 50.49 had been submitted. However, license condition (7) of FOL NPF-31 required that prior to March 31, 1985, Duke Power Company shall environmentally qualify all electrical equipment as required by 10CFR 50.49. This same license condition was carried over to FOL NPF-35 which superseded NPF-31.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS: A study has been conducted by Duke Power with assistance from Westinghouse to determine if subjecting safety related components to temperatures higher than the qualification basis of 330*F could possibly preclude components from performing their intended safety functions following a postulated MSLB in either doghouse. The results of these studies are presented under " Corrective Action," below.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: In order to resolvo license condition (7), Duke Power has further evaluated the time margins between the completion of Doghouse equipment actuation and the onset of temperatures higher than the qualification para-meters of the equipment at which time the analysis conservatively assumes equipment failure. In this analysis, conservative " worst case" conditions of significant deficiency report number 413-414/84-16, Supplement 1 are used.

Attachment 1 outlines the results of the above analysis. The attachment also indicates which equipment is required to remain functional during and/or following an MSLB in the Doghouse. In addition, heat transfer analysis has been performed on the solenoid valves used to operate the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) and Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) to take into account the temperature / time lag for this equipment. Attachment 3 contairs pages from the NUREG-0588 response that are applicable to the MSLB in the Doghouses.

2 l

Although it is concluded from the temperature / time margin study that required equipment has sufficient margin between required actuation time and the time when equipment qualification temperature is exceeded, this report also includes a Westinghouse core response analysis (see Attachment 2) for the postulated consequential failure of the MSIV's, Steam Generator PORV's, and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves due to an MSLB and that are located in the faulted Doghouse.

The Westinghouse analysis involves a 1.0 ft2 MSLB upstream of the MSIV in one of the two doghouses. The 1.0 ft2 maximum size break area is considered to be appropriate for this analysis because of the following reasons:

1. The conservative computer code SUPERPIPE was used by Duke Power in performing the Main Steam piping stress analysis. Resultant pipe break stress ratios (actual stress / allowable stress) are all less than 0.7.
2. Double-ended mechanistic pipe breaks are not required on the Main Steam 1.ine in the doghouse due to application of the containment penetration area break exclusion criteria of Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1.

Inservice inspection will be performed as required for application of the criteria. The 1.0 ft2 minimum break size required by Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 for environmental effects is met by the Westinghouse analysis.

3. Any break would most likely be postulated to occur at a branch line connection to the Main Steam piping. These connections in the doghouse involve piping with a maximum cross-sectional area of 0.2 ft.2 which yields a safety factor of 5.
4. For any postulated break size greater than 10 ft2, under the conservative

" worst case" conditions of significant deficiency report number 413-414/

84-16, Supplement 1, all safety actuations occur prior to tube uncovery, and therefore prior to the generation of the superheated steam and re-sulting harsh environment.

5. A 1.0 ft.2 rupture size bounds smaller breaks because it results in a more severe cooldown of the reactor coolant system, and thus a greater peak heat flux.

The following is a summary of the results of our evaluations:

  • All electrical equipment in the faulted Doghouse that is required to auto-matica11y actuate on a safety signal will perform its intended function for at least 30 minutes prior to reaching its qualification temperature, with at least a margin of 433% between the time actuation occurs and the equip-ment internals exceed their qualification temperature.

The Westinghouse core response analysis demonstrates that it is acceptable for the MSIV's, Steam Generator PORV's and the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves located in the faulted Doghouse to fail during a MSLB in the Doghouse and still allow safe shutdown of the plant.

In conclusion, Duke Power Company's further evaluations have shown that the higher temperatures generated in the event of an MSLB in the Doghouse will not affect the capability to shutdown the reactor and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and that qualification of all equipment in the Doghouse has been demonstrated.

3

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 1 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valva - Main Steam SM 1, 3, 5 & 7 Open Closed Isolate Steam Isolation. (1)

  • Valves are air operated, Generator to fail closed, with redun-Control Cooling dant normally energized solenoids that deenergize to close on a main steam isolation signal.
  • During the " worst case" conditions (70%) power w/0.5 Ft2 Break in com-partment 3) the main steam isolation valves will actuate 338 sec.

after the MSLB and 12 sec. before the atmos-phere temperature reaches 340 F (Qualification Temperature). However, heat transfer analysis performed on the sole-noid valves used to operate the main steam isolation valves show that the coil assembly

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 2 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During FGLB Yes No Discussion temperature lags the atmosphere temperature and does not reach 340 F for at least 30 minutes after the MSLB, which is a margin of at least 433%.

  • See Attachment 3, page 32, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valva-Steam SV1, 7,13 & 19 Closed Closed Isolate Steam (1)

  • Valves are air operated, Generator Power Generator to fail closed, with redun-Opercted Relief Control Cooling dant normally energized Valva (PORV's) solenoids that deenergize to close. If open, valve; close automatically on a main steam isolation signal.
  • During the " worst case" conditions (70%) power w/0.5 Ft.2 break in compartment 3) the steam generator PORV's will actuate 338 sec.

after the MSLB and 21

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 3 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Su= mary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equip =ent Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion sec. before the atmos-phere temperature reaches 346 F (qualifi-cation temperature).

However, heat transfer analysis performed on the solenoid valves used to operate the PORV's show that the coil assembly temperature lags the atmosphere temperature and does not reach 346 F for at least 30 minutes after the MSLB, which is a margin of at least 433%

  • See Attachment 3, page 39 for NUREG-0588 response.

Valve-Main Steam SM9, 10, 11, & 12 Closed Closed Isolate Steam /

  • Valves are air operated, Isolntion By-Pass Generator to fail closed, with redun-Control Cooling dant normally energized solenoids that deener-gize to close. If open, valves automatically close on a main steam isolation signal.

11' Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 4 of 18

Catawba 1 & 2 l Summary of Electrical Equipment l Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating Darirg Ft.oction Performed MSL8 Equipment Number Position During MSLB M5LB Yes No Discussion
  • Due to valve size (2"),

flow rate will be minimal and cooldown rate will not be exceeded if these valves are lost as a consequence of the MSLB.

  • See Attachment 3, page 40 for MUREG-0588 response.

Valv2-Main Feed- CF33, 42, 51 & 60 Open _ Closed Valves serve as a /

  • Electro-Hydraulic water Isolation backup to prevent operated valves.

steam generator

~

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 5 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position FGLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion signal. In addition, steam generator overfill can be prevented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the turbine building. Feedwater control valves close on both a feedwater isola-tion signal and high steam generator level signal.

  • Loss of feedwater is prevented through the main feedwater lines by two (2) check valves in series and by closure of the feedwater control valve (located in turbine building) in each flow path. The feedwater control valves close on a feed-water isolation signal.

-w Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 6 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion

  • See Attachment 3, page 33, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valva-Reverse CF87, 88, 89 & 90 Closed Closed Valves prevent

  • Valves are air operated, Purge Isolation J loss of feedwater t fail closed, with redun-(Feedwater Purge from the steam dant deenergize-to-close Isol: tion) generator. solenoids.
  • Valves are used only at low power and are normally closed.
  • Non-safety grade motor operated valves located in the turbine building can also be used to isolate flow.
  • See Attachment 3, page 40a, for NUREG-0588 response.

4

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2

  • Attachment 1 Sheet 7 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position During MSLB MSLB Yes No Discussion Valv s-Feedwater CA149, 150, 151 & Closed Closed Valves serve as a J
  • Valves are air operated, Supply to upper 152 backup to prevent fail closed gate valves Nozzle. steam generator
  • Steam generator overfill overfill and to through the upper nozzle prevent loss of lines is prevented by feedwater from the tripping the main feed-steam generator, water pump and closing the pump discha,rge isolation valves located in the turbine building.

The main feedwater pump and isolation valves are tripped closed auto-matically on a high steam generator level signal.

In addition, steam gen-erator overfill can be prevented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the turbine building.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 8 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Feedwater control valves close on both a feedwater isolation signal and high steam generator level signal.

  • See Attachment 3, page 40b, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valv;s-Tempering CA185, 186, 187 & Open Closed Valves serve as a

  • Valves are air operated, Isolation /

188 backup to prevent fail closed gate valves.

steam generator

  • Steam Generator overfill overfill and to through the tempering prevent loss of lines is prevented by feedwater from tripping the main feed-steam generator. water pump and closing the pump discharge iso-lation valves located in the turbine building.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 9 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion The main feedwater pump and isolation valves close automatically on a high steam generator level signal. In addi-tion, steam generator overfill can be pre-vented by closing the feedwater control valves also located in the Turbine Building. Feed-water control valves close on both a feed-water isolation signal and high steam generator level signal.

  • Loss of feedwater through the tempering lines is prevented by two (2) check valves in series in each flow path.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 10 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion

  • See Attachment 3, page 40':,

for NUREG-0588 response.

Valv:'-Auxiliary CA42, 46, 50, 54 Open Open Valves supply /

  • Electric motor operated Feedwater Iso- 58 & 62 Auxiliary Feed- gate valves with manual lcticn water flow and initiatinn.

CA 38 & 66 Closed Closed isolate the

  • Flow to the faulted steam faulted steam generator can be isolated generator. by closing the control valves located in the feedwater pump room, by closing manual isolation valves or by tripping the pumps that are not required.
  • See Attachment 3, page 36, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valves-Steam SV25, 26, 27 & Open Closed Valve serve as a

  • Electric motor operated Generator PORV /

28 backup to isolate gate valves with manual Isal tion steam generator initiation.

to control cooling l

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Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 11 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position M5LB During MSLB Yes No Discussion

  • The PORV's are the primary source for isolating the steam generator pressure boundaries (see valves number SV1, 7, 13 & 19 above).
  • See Attachment 3, page 34, for NUREG-0588 response.

Valv:s-Main SM 74, 75, 76 Open Closed Valves serve as a ,/

  • Electric motor operated Stcan Low Point & 77 backta to isolate gate valves with manual Drain Isolation the steam gene- initiation.

rator pressure

  • Drains are orificed to bouncary to prevent excess steam control cooling flow. Limited flow through orifice will not effect cooldown during MSLB.
  • See Attachment 3, page 36a, for NUREG-0588 response.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 12 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Preformed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion V21ve-Steam BB10, 21, 57 & Open Closed Valves serve as a Generator Blow- 61 J

  • Electric motor operated backup to prevent gate valve.

down isolation loss of feedwater

  • Loss of feedwater is from the steam prevented by the Electric generator. Motor Operated gate valve located in the containment.
  • Blowdown can also be isolated by closing the non-safety blowdown control valve located in the turbine building.
  • All blowdown isolation valves close on auto-matic auxiliary feed-water pump start on a low-low steam generator level signal.
  • See Attachment 3, page 36b, for NUREG-0588 response.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 13 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valv2-Steam BB147, 148, 149 Closed Closed Valves serve as a Generator Blow- & 150 J

down Isolation loss of feedwater By-Pass

  • Loss of Feedwater is from the steam prevented by the Electric generator. Motor Operated gate valve located in the containment.
  • Blowdown can also be isolated by closing the non-safety blowdown control valve located in the Turbine Building.
  • See Attachment 3, page 36l:,

for NUREG-0588 response.

r Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 14 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Valv:s-Auxiliary SA 2 & 5 Closed Either Not Applicable J

  • The turbine driven aux-Eccdwater Pump See Discussion Turbine Steam iliary Feedwater Pumps are not required for Suppy Isolation any steam line break.

Assuming a single failure of one motor driven pump, adequate time is avail-able for the operator to realign the other motor driven pump to supply flo w to intact steam generators.

Both the motor and turbine driven auxiliary feedwate "

pumps are located in the feedwater pump room so they are not affected by the steam line break.

  • See Attachment 3, page 40d ,

for NUREG-0588 response.

Instrumentation- CAFE 5090 - - -

J

  • This equipment may fail Auxiliary Feed- CAFE 5100 under the higher MSLB w ttr Flow CAFE 5110 temperatures. However, TRANSMITTERS CAFE 5120

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 15 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Post-Accident monitoring of the auxiliary feed-water function can be accomplished by the steam generator level transmitters which will not be affected by a steamline break in the Doghouse since the level transmitters are located in the containment.

  • See Attachment 3, page 6, for NUREG-0588 response.

Instrumentation- CFLS6000 - - -

/

  • The function of these Doghouse Water CFLS6030 transmitters is to deter-Level Trans- CFLS6060 mine water level for pipe citters CFLS6090 breaks not associated with the MSLB.
  • See Attachment 3, page 14, for NUREG-0588 response.

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 1 Sheet 16 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion Control and Power - - - -

  • No safety-related cables Circuits /

are routed through the Doghouses which terminate at equipment located out-side of the Doghouse.

  • A review was performed to determine if component failures in the harsh environment could cause any valves to reposition from the preferred posi-tion. No failures were identified that could cause undesirable repositioning.
  • All safety-related control circuits in the Doghouses were reviewed to determine if any component failures could affect other safety-related circuits. All safety related control

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84 Supplement 2 Attachment 1-Sheet 17 of 18

. Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identi fication Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position MSLB During MSLB Yes No Discussion components in the Dog-houses are protected by separate fuses that are coordinated

- with upstream feeder breakers to avoid affecting any other related circuits.

Cable-S/G PORV EPR, FR-EPR - - -

and MSIV Control and XLPE J

  • The S/G PORV & MSIV insulated cable control cables provide power to the redundant normally energized S/G PORV & MSIV air control solenoids. As stated above, these solenoids deenergize to close automatically on a main steam isolation signal. In the unlikely event of a cable failure, open or short, power to the soTenoids would be

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16

' Supplement-2 Attachment 1 Sheet-18 of 18 Catawba 1 & 2 Summary of Electrical . Equipment Exposed to Higher MSLB Temperatures Required Preferred To Mitigate Normal Position Effects of Identification Operating During Function Performed MSLB Equipment Number Position During MSLB MSLB Yes No Discussion lost and the solenoids would go to their deenergized safety position. Additionally, the S/G PORV's & MSIV's preferred position during a MSLB is closed.

Therefore, the solenoid cables are not essential to mitigate the con-sequences of a MSLB.

  • See response to NUREG-0588, Attachment 3, pages 44, 47, 51 & 52a.
  • See Note 2.

NOTES:

(1) Although it is desirable that valve (s) properly position, the Westinghouse analysis for the core response (Attachment 2) due to the consequential failure of the main steam isolation valves, PORV's, and the main feedwater isolation valves located in the faulted Doghouse has demonstrated that the reactor can be safely shutdown and maintained in a safe shutdown condition, even if these valves fail in the faulted doghouse.

(2) Valves that actuate on a safety signal (Main Steam Isolation, Feedwater Isolation, High Steam Generator Level, etc.) will not resposition after actuation because of electrical circuit design features such as isolation, interlocks and protective devices.

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 1 of 5 CATAWBA STEAM LINE BREAK CORE REPSONSE ANALYSIS WITH CONSEQUENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO SUPERHEATED STEAM Background-The Catawba submittal on the effects of superheated steam mass and energy releases outside containment provided justification of safety related

-operation prior to equipment qualification (EQ) envelopes being exceeded. In addition, Duke Power provided arguments that the equ'ipment would remain in their actuated positions even if the EQ envelopes were subsequently exceeded.

As a result of NRC review on the environmental effects of superheated steam on equipment in the Catawba plant doghouses, Duke Power has requested an additional analysis of the effect of a consequential failure of affected equipment.

Identification of Causes and Accident Description The steam release arising from a rupture of a main steam line would result in an initial increase in steam flow which decreases during.the accident as the steam pressure falls. The energy removal from the RCS causes a reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, the cooldown results in an insertion of positive reactivity. If the most reactive rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) is assumed stuck in its fully withdrawn position after reactor trip, there is an increased-possibility that the core will become critical and return to power.

A return to power following a steam line rupture is a potential problem mainly because of the high power peaking factors which exist assuming the most reactive RCCA to be stuck in its fully withdrawn position. The core is ultimately shut down by the boric acid injection delivered by the Safety Injection System.

The analysis of a main steam line rupture is presented in the Catawba FSAR to demonstrate that the following criteria are satisfied:

Assuming a stuck RCCA with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safety features, the core remains in place and intact. Radiation doses do not excced the guidelines of 10CFR100.

Although DNB and possible clad perforation following a steam pipe rupture are not necessarily unacceptable, the FSAR analysis, in fact, shows that no DNB occurs for any rupture assuming the most reactive assembly stuck in its fully withdrawn position.

The major rupture of a steam line is the most limiting cooldown transient and is analyzed at zero power with no decay heat. Decay heat would retard the cooldown thereby reducing the return to power. A detailed analysis of this transient with the most limiting break size, a double-ended rupture, is presented in the Catawba FSAR, Section 15.1.5.

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 2 of 5 The following functions provide the protection for a steam line rupture:

1.

Safety Injection System actuation from any of the following:

a.

Two-out-of-three low steam line pressure signals in any one loop.

b. Two-out-of-four low pressurizer pressure signals.
c. Two-out-of-three high containment pressure cignals.
2. The overpower reactor trips (neutron flux and delta-T) and the reactor trip occuring in conjunction with receipt of the safety injection signal.

3.

Redundant isolation of the main feedwater lines.

Sustained high feedwater flow would cause additional cooldown.

Therefore, in addition to the normal control action which will close the main feedwater valves a safety injection signal will rapidly close all feedwater control valves and feedwater isolation valves, trip the main feedwater pumps, and close the feedwater pump discharge valves.

4.

Trip of the fast acting steam line stop valvesi (designed to close in less than 5 seconds) on:

a.

Two-out-of-three low steam line pressure signals in any one loop.

b. Two-out-of-four high-high containment pressure signals.
c. Two-out of-three high negative steam line pressure rate si0 nals in any one loop (used only during cooldown and heatup operations).

Fast-acting isolation valves 1 are provided in each steam line; these valves will fully close within 10 seconds of a large break in the steam line. For breaks downstream of the isolation valves, closure of all valves would completely terminate the blowdown. For any break, in any location, no more than one steam generator would experience an uncontrolled blowdown even if one of the isolation valves fails to close, unless a consequential failure results in reopening of both MSIVs in the doghouse. This would cause an additional cooldwon of the primary system, with a possible increase in the peak return to power. The following section of this report documents the analysis of these effects and consequences.

Besides the MSIVs, the affected equipment in the doghouse are the steam generator power-operated relief valves and the main feedwater isolation valves. The PORVs are assumed to open as a result of a consequential failure due to superheated steam. The consequential reopening of the main feedwater isolation valves would not affect the transient since the safety injection signal also trips the main feedwater pumps, and closes the feedwater control and feedwater pump discharge valves.

1 Main Steam Isolation Valves

ATTACHMENT 2

-SHEET 3 of 5 Analysis of Effects and Consequences

Method _of Analysis-

-The analysis of the steam line rupture has been performed to determine:

tl. The core heat flux and RCS temperature and pressure transients resulting from the cooldown following the steam line break described below. The LOFTRAN code modified for the ~ calculation of superheated steam enthalpy

has been used.

2.~ The: thermal'and hydraulic behavior of the core following the steam line break. ' An evaluation of the transient statepoints from this analysis verifies that_the Catawba FSAR analysis-is bounding, and that DNB therefore does not occur.

'The analysis ass'umptions are the same as those of the steam line break

. analysis:in the Catawba FSAR, Section 15.1.5, with exceptions noted herein.

The most restrictive single failure in the safety injection system is

! assumed. .The major difference of this analysis.is the assumption of a consequential failure of affected equipment in the doghouse due to superheated steam. Specifically, the following scenario of events is analyzed:

1. A 1.0 ft2 rupture occurs in one of the steam lines upstream of the.MSIV in one of_the two doghouses. -This case bounds smaller breaks because it results in a more~ severe cooldown of the reactor coolant system, and thus a greater peak. heat flux.
2. All four steam generators blow down through the break until steam line

-isolation occurs by closure of the MSIVs.

3. Following steam line isolation, initially only the_ faulted loop steam generator (loop 1) blows down. Saturated steam is released to the
doghouse ~until tube bundle uncovery occurs, after which the steam oxiting the break becomes superheated.
4. The MSIVs in the affected doghouse are assumed to reopen _when the superheated steam enthalpy reaches 1210 Btu /lb. This is conservative-since the enthalphy is lower than the that which resulted in the EQ envelope to be exceeded:in the compartment analyses performed for the

. Duke Power plants. The result is an uncontrolled blowdown of both affected steam generators (loops 1 and 2).

- To ensure conservatism in the analysis, cases were analyzed for both a " lata" and'a " predicted" time of uncovery of the steam generator tube bundle. In addition, cases were analyzed with reactivity feedback calculations based on

-the core properties associated with an assumed stuck RCCA positioned in either

the loop 1 or loop 2 core sectors.

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 4 of 5 Results A time sequence of events for the four cases analyzed is shown in Table 1. As shown by Table 1, the consequential MSIV failures do not affect the peak return to power for cases in which reactivity feedback calculations are based on loop 1, since the peak occurs before the MSIVs open. For the cases in which reactivity feedback is calculated based on loop 2, the additional cooldown induced by the MSIV failures causes an increased return to power.

A comparison of transient statepoints for all cases analyzed to the FSAR transient conditions verifies that the FSAR case bounds the new analyses.

Therefore, the DNBR remains above the limit value of 1.30, and the conclusions of the Catawba FSAR remain valid.

't

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 5 of 5 TABLE 1 TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Case 1 - Late Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 1.

Event Time (sec)

Steam line ruptures 0 Steam line isolation occurs 9

. Criticality attained 27 Steam generator tube bundle uncovery occurs 189 Peak heat flux reached 192

- Consequential failure of MSIVs in affected doghouse 193 Case 2 - Late Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 2.

Event Time (sec)

Steam line ruptures 0 Steam line isolation occurs 9 Criticality attained 43 Steam generator tube bundle uncovery occurs 217 Consequential failure of MSIVs in affected doghouse 226 Peak heat flux reached 267 Case 3 - Predicted Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on Loop 1.

Eve,t Time (sec)

Steam line ruptures 0 Steam line isolation occurs 9 Criticality attained 27 Steam generator tube bundle uncovery occurs 123 Peak heat flux reached 139 Consequential failure of MSIVs in affected doghouse 145 Case 4 - Predicted Tube Uncovery, Reactivity Calculations Based on loop 2.

Fvent Time (sec)

Steam line ruptures 0 Steam line isolation occurs 9 Criticality attained 43 Steam generator tube bundle uncovery occurs 136 Consequential failure of MSIVs in affected doghouse 177 Peak heat flux reached 233

' Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 ATTACHMENT 3

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMEN LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE. RUPTURE ENVIRONM Page Rev. Pm Rev. M Rev.

1 3 35 4 52 5

'2 0 36 5 52a 0 4 4 36b 0 53 6 5 4 36c 0 53a 0 6 6 36d 0 54 5 7' 4 37 4 54a 0 8 4 38 4 55 0 9 4 39 6 56 4 10 4 40 6 57 2 11 4 40a 1 58 2 12 D 40b 0 59 2 13 4 40c 0 60 2 14 4 40d 0 61 0 15 D 40e 0 62 D 16 D 41 D 63 2 17 4 42 5 64 1 18 4 42a 0 65 1 19 4 43 6 66 1 20 3 43a 0 67 1 21 3 44 6 68 1 22 4 44a 0 69 1 23 4 45 6 70 1 24 4 45a 0 71 1 25 4 46 6 72 1 26 1 46a 0 73 1 27 4 47 6 74 1 28 D' 47a 0 75 1 29 4 48 6 76 1 30 4 48a 0 77 D 31 D 49 6 78 0 32 6 49a 0 ~79 1 33- 6 50 5 PRN-1 6 34 6 51 6 PRN-2 6 34a 0 CD - Deleted: It has been determined that this equipment is not in the scope of 10CFR50.49 due to plant / system design changes, relocation to a mild environment area, or review of function and failure mode with respect to the event causing the harsh environment.

b

Significant Deficiency Report '

No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 '

- Attachment 3 Sheet 2 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 1

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 3

. LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Transmitter - MANUFACTURER: Veritrak MODEL #: 76DP Main Feedwater Flow (NSSS)

(Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

The (Doghouse) Main Feedwater Flow signals are not required for pipe ruptures that cause a change in the normal Auxiliary Building operating environment.

Further, failure of this equipment as a result of exposure to a harsh environment will not preclude the safety function of other equipment claimed in the accident post accident analysis. Additionally, th3 information provided by this equipment is not employed as a post accident monitoring parameter for operator action.

QUALIFICATION REPORT: N/A I

i HETH00: N/A l

t REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A ECSE

\  ; , _ _- - - - - -

Signific nt Deficiency Report .

No. 413-414/84-16 Supplement 2 ,

Attachment 3

-> Sheet 3 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 6

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6

. . LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Transmitter- MANUFACTURER: Barton MODEL #: 764 Aux. FW Flow (Doghouse) (Lot 7)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 420*F Continuous Continuous 16.4% 15.6%

Press: 8.85 psig Press: 75 psig RH: 100% RH: 10CL (Note 5) 1 QUALIFICATION REPORT: Barton R3-764-3(CNM-1210.04-261) l METHOD: Test l

l REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 10 Years MPIC

3., Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/83 ,

Supplerent 2 Attachment 3 Sheet 4 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 14

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 4 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Level Switches-Doghouse Level MANUFACTURER: Magnetrol MODEL #: A-103F-3X-Y-MPG '

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 285*F Approximately 15 secs.

Press: 8.85 psig Continuous i 1/4 inch i 1/4 inch Press: 30 psig prior to accomplishment RH: 100% RH: 100% of trip function, i.e.,

(Note 5) trip main fdw pumps QUALIFICATION REPORT: Duke Power Company Reports TR-053 and TR-060 METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 15 Years MPIC

Significant Deficiency R; port No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 5 of 33 -

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 32

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Main Steam Isolation MANUFACTURER: Atwood and Morrill MODEL #: MSI Valve Actuator Valve (Doghouse) Assembly PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 325*F* Temp: 340*F 5.63 min. 30 min. N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 110 psig (Note 4)

RH: 100% RH: 100%

  • D:ghouse environment at time safety function completed - Ref. CNC-1381.05-00-0067.

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Procedure 201-39500, Test Report STR-060578-1 (CNM-1205.12-0009) w METHOD: Test l REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: SLND & Elastomers - 5 years MEQP l

.Signific:nt Deficiency Report ,-

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 6 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 33 SUMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6

- LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Feedwater Isolation MANUFACTURER: Borg-Warner (NVD) MODEL #: Pneumatic-Hydraulic Valve (Doghouse) Operator P/N 38991 '

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMGMSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F* Temp: 340*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 110 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 1736 (CNM-1205.12-0014)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A MEQP

F Signific nt Defici:ncy Report -

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 7 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 34

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6

. LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators MANUFACTURER: Limitorque MODEL #: SM8 RH Insulation S/G PORV Isolation (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY- ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Prass: 8.85 psig Press: 105 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 600-376-A, September 1972; 600-456. December 1975 (CNM-1205.19-0001)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A MEQP

Significant Deficiency Report ,

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 8 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 36 SUPMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators MANUFACTURER: Rotork Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation MODEL #: NA-1 (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILI1Y OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED- DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: N 11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (CNM-1205.19)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A MEQP

Significant Deficicncy Report ,

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 9 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2-- Page 36a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 1 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motcr Operators- MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Prdss: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: N 11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (CNM-1205.19)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A _MEQP

Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 10 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 36b'

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. O LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators- -MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 S/G Blowdown Isolation (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340*F Continuous

'v r* Continuous N/A N/A P re ?.s: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: N 11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (CNM-1205.19)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A MEQP

Significant Defici:ncy ' Report :

N). 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2

' Attachment 3 Page 11 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 36c

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUf.LIFICA'70N.0F CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 0 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Motor Operators- MANUFACTURER: Rotork MODEL #: NA-1 S/G Blowdown Isolation By-Pass (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 340*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Prcss: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: N 11/4, December 1970; TR116, October 1973; TR222, June 1975 (CNM-1205.19)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A MEQP

Significant Deficirncy Report ~ '

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 -

Attachment 3 Page 12 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 39

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor MODEL #: V70900-39-3-1 S/G PORV's (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 300*F* Temp: 346*F 5.63 min. 30 min. N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig (Note 4)

RH: 100% RH: 100%

i

  • D:ghouse environment at time safety function completed - Ref. CNC-1381.05-00-0067. ,

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Valcor Reports MR-70900-301-1 and MR-70900-39-1-1(CNM-1210.04-0309).

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC

Significant Deficiency Report ,

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment-3 Page 13 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 40

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor MODEL #: V70900-39-3-1 Main Steam Isolation by pass (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: QR-70900-21-1 Rev. A; QR-52600-515 Rev. B, MR-70905-21-3-1 (CNM-1210.04-253 254 & MCM-1210.04-119)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC

Significant Deficiency Report- #

No. 413-414/83-16' Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 14 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 40a SL29tARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 1 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor Reverse Purge Isolation MODEL #: V70900-21-3 (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE

(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)-

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: QR-70900-21-1 Rev. A; QR-52600-515 Rev. B, MR-70905-21-3-1 (CNM-1210.04-253 254 & MCM-1210.04-119)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC

a .-]

Significant~ Deficiency Report'

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 -

Attachment 3 Page 15 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 40b SUMARY OF. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. O LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor Feedwater Supply to Upper MODEL #: V70900-39-3-1 Nozzle (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE . ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO MIICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED' PIPE RUPTURE -(% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Valcor Reports MR-70900-301-1 and MR-70900-39-1-1(CNM-1210.04-0309).

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC e

Significant Deficiency Report .

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3-Page 16 of.33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 40c

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E' EQUIPMENT Rev. O LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor H0 DEL #: V70900-21-3 Tempering Isolation (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE . (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: QR-70900-21-1 Rev. A; QR-52600-515 Rev. B, MR-70905-21-3-1 (CNM-1210.04-253 & MCM-1210.04-119)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC

m Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/83-16 ' -

Supplement 2 Attachment 3 ~

Page 17 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 40d

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 0 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Valve Solenoid Operators- MANUFACTURER: Valcor MODEL #: V70900-21-3 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 87 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT:' QR-70900-21-1 Rev. A; QR-52600-515 Rev. B, MR-70905-21-3-1 (CNM-1210.04-253 254 & MCM-1210.04-119)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: 5 Years MPIC

Significant Deficiency Report No.~413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 18 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 42

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 5 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Anaconda MODEL #: FR-EPR Hookup Wire (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement

-Spec: CNS-1354.04-00-0006)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 385 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 66 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 80205-1 (CNM-1354.00-0019)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency Report .

No. 413-414/83-16 kUESck$enk3

  • Page -19 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 43

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Anaconda MODEL #: EPR Medium Voltage Power (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Specs: CNS-1354.01-00-0001

& 0003)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 80205-1 (CNM-1354.00-0019)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency Report .

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 20 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 44

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable -MSIV & S/G PORV MANUFACTURER: Anaconda MODEL #: FR-EPR Control (Doghouse)

Insulation (Procurement Specs: CNS-1354.02-00-0001

& 0002)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 385 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 80205-1 (CNM-1354.00-0019)

METHOD: Test / Analysis l REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

.-. .. .. - - _ . .. =.

Significant Deficicncy Report

  • N3. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 '

Page 21 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 45

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Anaconda MODEL #: FR-EPR Instrumentation and Control Insulation (Procurement (Doghouse) Specs: CNS-1354.03-00-0001' 0002 & 0003)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN- DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 385 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 66 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: F-C4836-2 (CNM-1354.00-0020)

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency R; port .

No. 413-414/83 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 22 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND'2 Page 46

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IE EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Anaconda MODEL #: FR-EPR Low Voltage Power (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Specs: CNS-1354. 01-00-0001

& 0003)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT 10PERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH '1EQUIRED i

IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 385*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 80205-1 (CNM-1354.00-0019)

METHOD: Test i

REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS i

m Significant Deficiency Rip;rt- -

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 Attachment 3 Page 23 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION'- UNITS 1 AND 2 .

Page 47

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6-LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSEDJIO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT _

EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MSIV & S/G PORV MANUFACTURER: Brand-Rex- MODEL #: XLPE Control (Doghouse) ' Insulation (Procurement:

Specs: CNS-1354.02-00-0001-

& 0002)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 385*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: FC-5120-1 and FC-5120-3 (CNM-1354.00-0023) and CNM-1354.00-0024 1

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A 'PSS E

Significant Deficiency Report -

No. 413-414/83-16 .

Supplement 2-Attachment 3 Page 24 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 48

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Brand-Rex MODEL #: XLPE Coaxial (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Spec: CNS-1354.04-00-0004)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Tt.mp: 240*F* Temp: 385 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: FC-5120-2 and FC-5120-3 (CNM-1354.00-0021 and CNM-1354.00-0024)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency Report .

NA 413-414/83-16

. Supplement 2 ',

Attachment 3 Page 25 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 49 SUMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IE EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Eaton MODEL #: FR-EPDM Instrumentation and Control Insulation (Procure:nent Specs:

(Doghouse)

CNS-1354.03-00-0001, 0002 & 0003]

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% 0F SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F Temp: 430 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 15 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Qualification test of electrical cables by Isomedix (CNM-1354.00-0035).

METHOD: Test / Analysis REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

- $75ignificantLDeficiency Reportf ef.f Noe.413-414/83-16 .: .'.

" Supplement 2 * '"

Attachment 3 Page 26 of 33

' CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 50

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 5 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Okonite MODEL #: EPR Medium Voltage (Doghouse) ' Insulation (Procurement Specs: CNS-1354. 01-00-000:

& 0003)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2) -

Temp: 440 F Temp: 455'F Continuous Continuous N/A Press: 8.85 psig N/A Press: 32 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

b QUALIFICATION REPORT: Okonite Report #355 (CNM-1354.00-0022)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency R: port' -

No. 413-414/83-16 .

Supplement 2 er Attachment 3 Page 27 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 51-

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 6 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND. EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MSIV & S/G PORV MANUFACTURER: Okonite MODEL #: FR-EPR Control (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Specs: CNS-1354.02-00-0001

& 0002)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 455*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 32 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: Okonite Report #355 (CNM-1354.00-0022)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

.' Significant'D5ficiency R: port

- fyNo.-413-414/83-16 ,

'$ Supplement 2 *

">~

' Attachment 3 Page 28 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 52

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 5 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MANUFACTURER: Okonite MODEL #: Tefzel Hookup Wire (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Spec: CNS-1354.04-00-0006' PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERAEILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF. SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Terp: 440*F Temp: 455 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A -

Press: 8.85 psig Press: 32, psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

i QUALIFICATION REPORT: Okonite Retort #344 (CNM-1354.00-0026)

METHOD: Test l

REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficicncy R: port '

No. 413-414/83-16 Supplement 2 -

Attachment 3 Page 29 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 52a

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 5 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable - MSIV & S/G PORV MANUFACTURER: Rockbestos MODEL #: XLPE Control (Doghouse) Insulation (Procurement Specs: (CNS-1354.02-00-000

& 0002), CNS-1354.03-00-000

& 0002, 0003, CNS-1354.04-00-0006)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Te p: 240 F* Temp: 346 F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 113 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: FC-5120-1 and FC-5120-3 (CNM-1354.00-0023) and CNM-1354.00-0024 METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

Significant Deficiency R2 port - ,

No. 413-414/83 Supplement 2- ',

Attachment 3 Page 30 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 53

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT . Rev. 6' LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Cable Termination MANUFACTURER: Ray Chem Splice Material MODEL #: WCSF-N (Doghouse)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240 F* Temp: 360*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 70 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: 71100 & F-C4033-3 (CNM-1367.01-0001 & 2)

METHOD: Test REPLACEMENT INTERVAL: N/A EPSS

n Significant Deficiency Report .

No. 413-414/83-16 .

Supplement 2 ~

Attachment 3 Page 31 of 33 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 Page 54

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT Rev. 5 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT ID: Seal Material for Cable MANUFACTURER: 3M MODEL #: Scotch Cast 9 Epoxy Entrance Fittings (Doghouse) (XR-5240)

PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED (1) QUALIFIED PIPE RUPTURE (% OF SPAN) (% OF SPAN)

ENVIRONMENT (2)

Temp: 240*F Temp: 350*F Continuous Continuous N/A N/A Press: 8.85 psig Press: 18 psig RH: 100% RH: 100%

(Note 5)

QUALIFICATION REPORT: CNC-1381.05-00-0039 and Wy'le Report #44390-1, Rev. A (CNM-1364.00-0001)

METHOD: Test / Analysis EPSS

. PRN-1 o R:v. 5 Significant Deficiency U

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 N 4 3-414/83-16 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E ELECTRIggpplement 2 tac e EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EXPOSED TO PIPE RUPTURE ENVIRONMENT Note 1 The methods employed to evaluate pipebreaks and to determine thr resulting environmental parameters are discussed in Section 3.6 of the Ca'swba FSAR.

Note-2 The pipe rupture environment is assumed to exist for 2 1/2 hours (except for one area of the Auxiliary Building, Elevation 543' which exists for 2 5/6 hours) based on 30 minutes at the peak temperature after which action by the operator isolated the break and allows the Auxiliary Building temperature to decrease to normal in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Use of the term " Continuous" indicates operability required /

demonstrated throughout the pipe rupture period.

The pipe rupture environmental analysis for the Doghouse was conducted seperately taking into consideration different sizes of main steam line breaks. All equip-ment located in the Doghouse is identified under " Equipment ID".

Pressure: Not a significant qualification parameter for pipe rupture outside the containment since all locations outside containment are open areas not susceptable to pressure build up. It should be noted that the pressure in the doghouse is a spike (8.85 psig) of less than 1 sec. duration.

- P. elative Humidity: For outside containment 'uptures of piping systems operating at temperatur e; less than 200 F, area relative humidity is not a sign.ficant qualification parameter.

This pipe rupture temperature precludes flashing of the liquid which could significantly increase area relative humidity. Additionally, evaporation of the liquid does not significantly increase area relative humidity due to the large open areas in which the pipe rupture occurs and the relative short duration of the pipe rupture.

Radiation: There is no significant increase in radiation levels outside the containment as a result of a pipe rupture outside the containment.

Chemical " Spray: Not a qualification parameter for pipe rupture outside the contalment since there is no chemical spray outside the containment.

6 Significant Deficiency Report PRN-2 No. 413-414/83-16 Rev. 6 r Supplement 2 P. age 33 of 33 Attachment 3-Submergence: Based on analysis performed by Duke Power Company, it has been determined that there is no safety-related electrical equipment,

-required to mitigate the event causing the flood (e.g., pipe rupture) or required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition given a flood event, located below the postulated flood levels.

. Note 3 The equipment listed is a NEMA 4 enclosure containing general application devices 1

(e.g., relays, switches, terminal blocks, etc.). The qualified environment is dictated by the single limiting device contained in the enclosure. The enclosure and device qualification is documented in calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0054.

Note 4 The 30 minute " Operability Demonstrated" parameter is based on Duke Power Company's Response to Significant Deficiency Report No. 413-414/84-16, Supp. 2.

Note 5 This equipment is not required to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in the doghouse. Therefore, the " Pipe Rupture Environment" parameters are for the HELB for which the equipment is required.

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