ML20096G896
| ML20096G896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1984 |
| From: | Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8409110203 | |
| Download: ML20096G896 (42) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:'1N Septenber '/, 1984 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION l' Before the Atomic Safei!y and Licensing Board
~
In the Matter of )
) -
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC 1 ILLUMINATING ) Docket Nos. 50-4400C$fN COMPANY, Et Al. ) 50-441 U -
. )
(Perry Nuclear Pow'er Plant, ) (Operating Liceng )Sfffg NI Units 1 and 2) '
) - J26
) _ . _ . . . - . ..
E OCRE BRIEF ON 'IHE HIS'IOIN AND INI'ENI' OF THE A'lh5 RULE I. Introduction On June 26, 1984, the Nuclear Ibgulatory Conmission ptblished in the Federal Pegister (49 FR 26036) its final rule (10.CFR 50.62) on anticipated transients ,without scram ("A'1hS") . This acdon directly impacted Issue #6 in this proceeding. Issue #6 states: Applicant should install an autonated standby liquid control system to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated transient withcut scram.
.New 10 CFR 50.62(c) (4) requires BWRs grant 5d a construction permit after July 26, 1984 that havealready been designed and built to include this feature to have'an automatic SICS. Based on this new regulation, Intervenor Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("OCRE") moved for sunmary disposition of Issue #6 on July 6,1984 on' the basis that Applicants' SICS has autceatic .
capability. On July 30, 1984 Applicants responded, taking a very narrcw interpretation of this provision, claiming that the rule should not apply to PNPP as the SICS was being designed and built for manual initiation. On August 3, ,1984 OCRE filed a response to Applicants' assertions, subniitting c'ocurrents shcwing that the SICS design was i$ deed automatic, and if the SICS was not being built as such, this reflects Applicants' deliberate actions to thwart cortplian with the rule. 'Ihe Licensing Board then instructed the parties rasafa'a?qh . SO3 G
c to file briefs on the legislative history of the A3E rule to assist it in deciding the tratter. While Applicants have stated that the Perry SICS has automatic capability and that this capability can be implemented at low cost, they nonetheless claim that it is not being implemented and thus nemr should be, based on an extremely literal interpretation of the new rule. The issue here can be distilled to: how does one interpret 10 CFR 50.62 (c) (4) in the case of a BWR CP holder with the SICS having automatic capability under construction and as yet inconplete, but where the CP holder chooses to build the SICS with manual initiation for the probable purpose of avoiding empliance with the rule? As is shown belcw, the only interpretation ofthedTWS rule consistent with its stated intent, legislative history, and the Connission's mandate to protect the public health and safety, is that, in the instant case, the Applicants be ordered to automate the SICS. II. History of the ATES Rule Because the new ATWS rule is a culmination of over a decade of NRC work on the issue, a brief examination of the histcry of the ATWS issue is necessary to place the rule in the proper context. OCRE vould refer the i Board to Attachments 1 and 2, taken from a Science Applications, Inc. Technical Report submitted Decenber 31, 1981 in support of the Utility Group petition for rulemaking on ATWS, for ease of cfironological reference. 7he discussion of AIWS began in 1969 when an ACRS consultant raised the question of the effect of camon node failures on the reactor protection system. Further study by the (then AEC) Staff led the Staff to request analyses of ATWS consequer.ces from reactor designers. After receiving these analyses, the Staff concluded that BNRs needed prcnpt action to secure reactor shutdown in the event of ATWS (see WASH-1270, p. 4) . i L
r n In Septenber 1973 the Staff issued ESH-1270, 'Ibchnical Report on Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Water-Cooled Power Ibactors. Berein the Staff concluded that. (then unspecified) design improvements should be made to plants then under ccnstruction or in operation to make the con-sequences of A' INS acceptable. 2is class of reactors sas further defined as those with CP applications docketed after 1968 but before October 1,1976.
%e Staff's licensing position was that these plants shculd " incorporate any design changes to assure A%S consequences are acceptable" (p. 86) . Se Staff also expressed a gcal that the prcbability of A%'S should te less than 1 x 10-7/ year. It should be noted that Perry was specifically identified in WASH-1270 as cne of those plants for which the Staff would require design changes.
In response to NASH-1270, General Electric, the Perry NSSS vendor, issued in October 1974 NEDO-20626, Studies of BWR Designs for Mitigation of Anticipated Transients Without Scram. G stated that: several avenues of establishing satisfactory ccmpliance with the requirements of WASH-1270 were considered. The principle new one here, addition cf autcmatic liquid control initiation, has rrore quickly approached the stage of a conplete evaluation which can be presented at this time. (NED}-20626, p. 3) mus, the concept of automatic SICS initiation was first advanced by G as a way of meeting the then rather vague Staff requirenents for A%S mitigation. On Decenter 9,1975, the URC Staff issued its Status Peport on Anti-cioated Transients Without Scram for General Electric Beactors in respcnse to NEDO-20626. %e Staff, while expressing scrie disagreement Es to the evaluation methods and assu:rptions of G, did not dispute the adequacy of the concept of autmatic SICS initiation as an A%'S mitigation system. h e Staff did qu3stion g See also Attachtrents 3 and 4, internal NRC Staff ntnoranda, in thich it is plainly stated that GE developed the automatic SLCS design to mitigate A' IFS consequences, but that the utilities rejected this safety enhancment. Attachnents (next page) u
m n 4 _4_ whether the GE-submitted design for automtic SICS initiation was sufficiently diverse from reactor protection system sensors to avoid connon node failure. In' April 1978.the NFC Staff issued Volunes 1 and 2 of NUREG-0460, Anti-cipated Transients Without Scram for Light Water Beactors, in response to
- "subst.antial criticisms frm applicants, reactor vendors, and industry groups, principally to the effect that the Staff requirements are unnecessary, or at 2
best overly conservative" (NUREG-0460,'Vol.1, p.W5)-). e industry also cmplained of the costs involved in inplementing A'IWS mitigation designs. NURBd-0460) sunmarized the Staff's-review and evaluation of "all the information currently available on the subject of A%5" with special enphasis ontthe criticisms from industry (p. 6) . NUREG-0460 is the first time value-impact analyses of A'IWS designs were performed by the Staff.
-6 While changing its goal for the probability of A%S to 1 x 10 / reactor year, the Staff proposed to use deterministi: rather than probabilistic criteria for A' INS ' licensing requirements. W e Staff envisioned that rulemaking would be initiated to codify A%S accpetance criteria. 'Ihe proposed criterion for mitigating systems design required A%S mitigation systems to be automatically
' initiated unless it could be demonstrated that an operator would reasonably be expected to take correct and timely action (p. 66) . m e Staff further stated
-that " safety systems are generally required to be autdmatic since limited reliance can be placed upon the ability of an operator to respond gaickly and correctly to the multitude of signals and alarms resulting frm an abnormal event" (p. 67) . Also, the Staff stated that for SVRs "an automatic,and therefore
_lf Continued.that this 5 and 6 (docments only recently obtained frcm Applicants) demonstrate' is the case for PNPP as well. In 1981 Applicants accepted GE's A%E proposal, which included an automatic SIfS. However, they later rejected this_ feature in favor of manual SICS initiation.
; _2/ Wese industry critics made frequent reference to WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study, and the methodology employed-therein in attenpts to show that A'IWS is not a significant risk'in light water reactors. However, WASH-1400 did indicate that A%S is a dominant contributor to risk in BVRs.
L
, -5_
nore rapidly actuated)[ SICS] of larger capacity would be necessary to reduce heat generation to within the capacity of the standby core cooling system before the core beccmes uncovered" (p. 48) . 'Ihe Staff's value-inpact analysis indicated that the value of all A'IWS nodifications greatly outweighed the inpacts, especially for the BNR/6. 'Ihese analyses were based on industry-supplied cost estimates, which the Staff suspected were overestimated. (p. 86-87) . In Decenber 1978 the Staff issued Volume 3 of NUREG-0460. Based on new information, the review of the NRC Regulatory Requirements Review Cmmittee, anithe findings of the Iawis Ccnmittee (NUREG/CR-0400), the Staff revised its position:" "we now believe that a numerical safety objective is not satisfactory for use in regulatory decision neking in the manner suggested in the first two volunes of NUREG-0460" (p. 3) . '1he Staff then proposed specific plant nodifications to be inplemented according to the stage of plant construction or operation so. as to obtain an appropriate balance of safety'and cost. Four alternatives j were proposed for all plants. 'IWo of these alternatives (Alternatives 3 and 4) required automation of the SIIS in BWRs. All nuclear' power plants were divided
-into 4_ groups::early operating plants, operating plants, plants under construction, and new plants. Plants under construction were defined as those plants with a CP (received prior to January 1,1978) but not an operating license; for these plants, Alternative 3 was deemed appropriate. (p. 45) .
In March 1980 the Staff issued Volume 4 of NUREG-0460. Here the Staff's requirements became nore severe than previous proposals. -'Ihe three action alternatives (Alternative 1 was a "do nothing" option) became expanded and were labelled Alternatives 2A,'3A, and 4A. Both Alternatives 3A and 4A for BWRs required autcmation off the SICS. 'Ihe Staff intended that all plants other than the early operating plants inplement Alternative 4A, the rest stringent of the-cptions. Specifically, this alternative called for BWRs to " provide actuation
, a '
L- . _ . circuitry for the SICS that is automatic and diverse from the reactor trip c system.'A two-minute delay may be~ included to decrease the frequency of ex-pensive false actuations" (p. 21) . On Septenber 4,1980, SECY-80-409, " Proposed Rulenaking to Amend 10 CFR Part 50 Concerning Anticipated , Transient Without Scram (A'IWS) Events," was submitted to the Comnission' by the Staff. In' this paper the Staff reccmnended that a proposed A%S rule be issued for public cmment. 'Ihe draft proposed rule contained in SECY-80-409 had as its stated .gocitl: to require inprovements in the design of light water cooled nuclear power plants to reduce the likelihood of failure of the autcznatic protection system to rapidly shut down the reactor (scram) in the event of operational occurrences expected to occur one or nore times during the operating life of a nuclear power unit (anticipated transients) and to mitigate _ the consequences of 'such anticipated transients without scram (A'IWS) events.
%e draft proposed rule further stated:
We principal benchmark for deciding whether and to what extent nuclear power plants should be nodified because of A%5-related safety concerns is set.forth in Section 161i(3) of the Atomic Energy Act. That. section grants to the Ccanission the authority to " prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary . . . in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property." 'Ihroughout ' the history of regulatirg nuclear reactors, the dual concept of preventing accidents and mitigating their consequences should they occur, i.e.,
. defense in depth, has been used to achieve this objective. 'Ihus, con-servative design, construction, and operation of plants are required so that accidents will not happen (i.e., have a low probability of occurrence).
men, to provide defense in depth,:the capability to mitigate their consequences is required for accidents that are postulated to occur even though the design is required to include measures to prevent them. It is within this framework that the NBC has concluded that the probability of A' INS events occurring over the lifetine of light-water-nuclear power plants and the potential magnitude of consequences arising frcm such events, should they occur, are sufficiently great.to warrant the ingsition- -
'of requirements designed to reduce the probability and consequences of h ' A'IWS events.
Be text of the actual proposed anundments to 10 CPR 50 required only that licensees submit A'IWS evaluation models conforming to specified analytical criteria. - %e SICS was not specifically mentioned. However, this approach was j
_7_ supposed to inplenent what the Staff then called Alternative 2d, which was equivalent to Alternative 4A of Volume 4 of NUREG-0460, according to Appendix D of the SECY. paper. Wus it cut be inferred that the Staff . intended to require automation of the SICS through their acceptance / rejection of ~ licensee evaluation models. On Novenber 24, 1981 the NFC published in the Federal _ Register (46 FR 57521). for comnent.thrm proposed rules on A%S. %e stated purpose and basis of the. rules was virtually identical to those portions of SECY-80-409 quoted above. %e three proposed rules were:. (1) the Staff rule, an outgrowth of NUREG-0460'; (2) the Hendrie rule,. a proposal from former NBC mairman Joseph Hendrie; and (3) a utility-sponsored petition for rulemaking,' PRM-50-29, submitted in September 1980. me Staff rule required evaluation models very similar to those proposed i in SECY-80-409. However, additional Mitigating System Criteria were included which required A'IWS mitigating systems to be automatically initiated "unless it can be demonstrated that an operator would have adequate 'information and would reasonable be expected within the time available to .take the proper corrective action" .(proposed-10 CFR 50.60(b) (3), 46 FR 57525) . 2e Hendrie rule proposed a reliability assurance program to detect reliability deficiencies in safety systems inportant for A%3 prevention or mitigation. It also would have required autanation of the SICS in BWRs. (Proposed 10 CFR 50.60(c) (1)(ii), 46 FR 57531) . W e rationale of the Hendrie rule can best be conveyed by quoting the passage below from former Chairman Hendrie's June 9,- 1981 memorandum to his fellow Ccmnissioners on A'IWS: My aim in starting afresh was to try an approach with several elements: (a) Fix the obvious A'IWS problems in BWR's that make A'IWS one of the daninant BWR' risk sequences. (b) .Make people look carefully at their plants for A' INS-related vulnerabilities and then fix the outliers - and do it on a systems analysis or reliability engineering basis, rather than conducting a probability exercise to show'nothing is wrong. (c) Acccmplish the above without creatire a brave new staff industry.of A%S analysis review and endless argument over design details.
. p ._.. .- _ - . ,... _ .... ,
L te Utility Proposal, PRM-50-29, did not call for SICS automation. The nodifications proposed in PFM-50-29 were similar to those of Alternative 2 of NUIE-0460. Several of these (e.g., recirculation puup trip and scram discharge volum nodifications for NRs) had already been inposed on licensees by order. The next substantive (and visible) action ori the A7WS rule appears to ; be the ACRS' July 15, 1983 letter-report on the proposed final A'IES rule ( (Attachnent 7) . Berein the ACRS Q1 airman states that the proposed final rule requires for BWRs that the " SICS must be capable of autmatic initiation for new plants and for other BNR plants that already have the capability to autmate this systy." (Diphasis added.) On July 19, 1983 the Staff submitted SECY-83-293 to the Conmission. This paper recomrended that the Carmission approve for publication in the Federal Register the proposed final amendtrent to 10 CPR 50 regarding A7WS, which is virtually identical to the final rule published on June 26, 1984. SECY-83-293 also contains supplemental material in-the form of explanatory caments in the body of the paper, a 'Ibgulatory Analysis, and a Task Force Report. Each of these will be examined to illuminate the Comission's intent with regard to SICS initiation. The SECY paper itself contains the following statement on SICS design for BWRs: The final rule requires an increased capacity for the SICS on all BWRs. The petitioner [ Utilities, PRM-50-29] has proposed the increased capacity for SIIS only for NRs that are yet to be constructed. The final rule also requires that SICS initiation be automatic (in lieu of manual initiation by the operator) for new plants and for other plants that have already been designed to include this feature. Autmatic initiation of SICS was not proposed by the petitioner. The staff believes that the SICS is sufficiently inportant to reactor safety to require the increased capacity for both present and future reactors and that it would be cost effective to require automatic initiation of SICS for future reactors. (SECY-83-293, p. 3, emphasis added.) L
l 1 _9_ l The ATWS Task Force performed generic value-impact analyses for T plants (and those of other vendors) [to determine the appropriate course of action for A7WS. The Task Forw used cost estimates for ATES modifications provided by the Utility Group petitioner.. For automating the SICS, this cost
- estimate was $23.6 million. She Task Force also performed probabilistic analyses to determine the degree of risk reduction frcm the proposed design modifications. The base case probability of A7WS for GE plants (generically) was asstmed to be 5.3 x 10-5/ year. This probability is reduced to 1.2 x 10-5/ year by installing the Alternate Fod Insertion system and increasing the SICS flow to 86 gallons / minute. Autmating the SICS further reduces the probability of A7WS to 2.6 x 10-6/ year. The Task Force states that " automatic SICS actuation-would enable the plant to successfully mitigate an A7WS with no operator
. intervention other.than to establish long term, shutdown cooling."(SECY-83-293, Enclosure D,' p. 23) The Task Force concludes that:
If SICS were autcmatediand the capacity increased above 86 gpu, the P(A7%S) could be reduced to 2.6 x.10-6 with a sizeable value ($4.6 million) . However, the Utility Group's cost estimates to do this are over twenty million
' dollars and are dcminated by downtime for installation ~in existing plants and-by downtime for a spurious actuation. The value/inpact ratio 'for this generic option is unfavorable. For. new plants, however, the value/ impact would be close to 1 if a reliable system could be designed that would have a high reliability when challenged and a high reliability against spurious actuations. (Enclosure D, pp. 32-33, emphasis added.)
The Task Force has also sutmarized its findings as follows: For General Electric plants the Task Force rewmends Option 1, equivalent
;to the Utility Proposal for New Plants, which includes a manually initiated 86 gym standby liquid control system (SICS) plus an alternate rod injection system to be inplenented at operating plants and those under construction.
1he value inpact results of this study are favorable for Option 1. For several plants under construction that have installed an autonatically actuated
- SICS and for plants that have not yet received a construction permit, the Task
_3f Table ~1' of_ the Task Force Report (Enclosure D to SECY-83-293) gives a breakdown of the Utility Groups's estimated ~oost of SICS initiation:
$3.35 million for design, engineering, and installation; $10.0 million for downtime for installation; $5.0 million for spurious trip; $4.2 million for AFDUC, operation, and maintenance.
y P , . ~ , , , p.1. [ , , Force recomends Generic Option 2.; which includes autmatic initiation of the SICS. . Be value/ impact results of Option 2 for new plants is close to 1; however, the Task Force has concluded that for a BWR AEG the consequences are significant enough to warrant this Option. (Enclosure D, pp.1-3, emphasis added).
- me Begulatory ' Analysis basically suntnarizes the Task Force findings.
'Its conclusions on' automation of the SICS are:
Autmatic SILS would appear to be reasonable for new plants frm a value/inpact' standpoint,. particularly if one considers the apparent vulnerability of NRS to A39S sequences potentially havinn. severe consequences.
= %e . staff believes that this system could be designed to greatly minimize the
~ likelihood of spurious actuation, .which is by far the biggest contributor to the cost' estimations -for new plants. (Enclosure C, p.14)
. %e following conclusions can be drawn from' the legislative history of the A'IWS rule: ,
- l. he NBC has.found that the risk to the public health and safety is sufficiently great, especially 'in NRs, to require design improvements to prevent and
,to mitigate the consequences of AUG.
- 2. Applicants have been on notice since 1973 that such modifications would be required for Perry, and since 1978 that autmatic SICS would likely be one such nodification.
-3. 2 proposed automatic initiation of the SICS as a way to meet the Staff's requirements in WASH-1270.
.4. @e Staff has continually viewed automatic SICS initiation as causing a significant. reduction in A39S risk for NRs.
- 5. SILS autmation for all 2 plants was rejected as a generic option due to the cost estimate ($23.6 million) for autmation given by the Utility Group; however,-this option is desirable in those cases where installation
. costs are minimal.
- 6. he final A'IWS rule as approved by the ACRS called for automation o'f the SILS in BfR plants having the capability to automate the system.
R
III. Discussion ! We legislative history of the A' INS rule provides the guidance necessary k l to interpret the phrase " designed and built" of 10 CFR 50.62(c) (4) . Were r is sufficient arrbiguity in the use of such words to indicate that a literal interpretation is improper. We text of SECY-83-293 uses the word " designed" only. %c Task Force uses the word " installed." The ACRS used ths phrase "having the capability to automate" the SICS. The controversy can be resolved by examining the cost-effectiveness of automating the SIES at Perry. We _NRC rejected the generic option of requiring automatic SICS actuation for all BWRs because the generic costs of autmation exceeded $20 million, according to Utility Group estimates. Nearly half of'that sum is for- downtime for installation. For new plants (and for those in which the SICS is already installed before conmercial operation) this cost is non-existant. Undoubtedly this is the basis for requiring SILS autmation in such plants: the cost is so greatly reduced as to make this important safety inprovement (which would reduce the prcbability of'A'IWS to near the NUREG-0460 goal) cost effective. By Applicants' own admission, autmation of the Perry SICS would cost Ccopare this to the $3.35 million for design, engineering, and installation of the autcmatic SICS as estimated by the Utility Group. he Perry installation costs are thus far less than those of the nea plant considered by the Staff. Clearly, what is meant by " designed and built" is that the plant have the _4f It is of dubious legality to consider this figure at all, as it obviously stems frm Applicants' decision to reject the original GE design for the auto-matic SICS in favor of manual dporation. Applicants took the risk, when they decichd not to inplement Perry's automatic SICS capability, that this decision might be reversed by rulemaking or adjudication. Indeed, to paraphrase the Suprene Court, Applicants have been on notice that they proceed with SICS construction at their own risk, and that all funds so spent may go for naught. With eyes open, Applicants willingly accepted that risk, hcwever great. P%er Ibactor DevelopTent Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, 367 US 396, 415 (1961) (standing for the principle that consideration by the Comtission of a CP holder's investments in the issuance of an OL is prohibited.as the applicant made such investments at its own riskJ . f 3
= -. - - - - .
capability to be autanted at 1m mst (i.e., before camercial operation) . Yet another argument carpels the rejection of a literal interpretation of " designed and built". If that phrase is literally interpreted, a CP holder could easily evade carpliance with the rule by simply not building the facility with an autanted SLCS. As a practical matter, the Conmission surely did not intend to create a clever loophole through which BNR CP holders could escape its requirenents. Had the Cmmission wanted to limit SIfS automation to new plants only, it sinply would have said so. Certainly the Cm mission expects scme WR CP holders to automate the SIfS. 'Ihe continual opposition of the utilities to AUG nodifications is a matter of public record. 'Ihe Cmmission has had enough deal'ngs with devious licensees to realize that a strict adherence to a literal wording such as this would create an est . . hatch for the disgruntled utility petitioners. A literal interpretation serves only to mock the Cmmission's intention of decreasing the public risk fran A'IWS. IV. Conclusion Applicants have ccnceded that the Perry SILS is capable of being autmated at lw cost. 'Ihe only interpretation of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) consistent with this fact, the Camission's stated intentions in promulgating the AEG rule, the history of the ABG rule and issue, the pleadings in this case, and camon sense is that a BhR with autantic SIfS capability be required to use it. For all of the foregoing reasons, OCE urges the Limnsing Board to order Applicants to autante the Perry SIfS. Ibspectfully submitted, lp WWNW Susan L. Hiatt OCE Ibpresentative 8275 Munson Rd. Pentor, Gr dimo
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. Affecting Resolution of the ATdS Issue 2-2
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HISTORICAL EVENTS l SURROUNDING ATWS ,
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.Regulatoes ' . Industry y Event
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- SWks and NRs included in cesign the reactor Pre. ,
3rotection system (275) and a diverse 1969 . -3 reactivity control system to prgstee safe shutdown. 4 The current elscussions of ATs3 were IX95 'AC25 inittsted h/ an AC25 statement tnat tne grateitt'4 1 for, c:rren.*cds f ailure of tne s '
' teram system IPould be studied.
Cl tuMitted to the A(C a topical fetort.
. July. GE N(M.lC189 "An Acalysts of Functional Cermn.
1970 Mode Tativres in CE tut Protection and Con. trol testrsentation". =nica addressed the potentf a] for coeren.aode f ailure. J The AEC sta "'s preliminary results on AT%5 Sent.. ACC staff 1970 AC25 were dfscussed =tta the ACAS. anc tme Alt etsu1 story rtoutsted that the d\verst reac*
')
tfvit/ Cantrol system (5LC) De acequate for transl4%t initlation. . t }'
' Westingnouse ,VCAP-?555 *Acalysts of Anticicated Reactor fee.. Transients without Trio" eas Deblished.
1971 This deaft with the consecuences of an ATV3 evert, and ledtcates that in all cases E continued core heat rWyal can be eJintained.
- f. ' ' la certain cases hign reactor coolant f ,,
pressures entst briefly' kowever. no catas. l
, , . tropMf t.f atture of t*e 8eactar Csolant i System is likely to occur.
7-4 N[CO.10349
- Analysts of Antictpated Transtant:.
l March, GI witeout Scram
- was su ystted by ct to A(C.
1971 k1 fnts reoort demonstrates that recirculation pump trip (RPT) and manual SLC .ere adeouate to keep has within faulted 11atts and ultimate capanility,
, x aw
' Wes$nghouse CP 7486 *An (741ustion Of Ant 1C1 Dated Maf
!!?! Oeerational Transtents in WesttW4 ale Petssucited Vater neactsP' se s . petil t shed.
U i" This etport dealt with the reliability Of the I reacter protection system with respect to s # rendem comoneat fatture and systematfC or [ * . ccreen.acde failures. It was concluded that entsting design nesares taken in Westing. t - y house NA 01 ants ette adecuate assureece that saticipated transients seesent es undJe
/ rfit to pullte healtM sed safety, thus, no v special provisions were pecposed for f ac3r.
,.x I paration in the desite to cope with tne s
consecuences of tPt hroothetical case of transients ulthout trip. k., 9 ., TN ACA5 and the requistory staf f concluded Auf.. AECEfJff ~ , _ that a design chaege to the proposed fe%old-
*3 M . 1911 ACl1 i ll * - -
- ' Istand.wa unas .as soor oriate to isait tn.
L Deat1bfa' consawancas of ATV5. g
' -TFa ACC staf? t'ransaltted to the ACAS a pre.
'1orff. AIC staff -t posed set of pesttions and actions to be d .
If7 b - A*AS J taken to fooleewet the conclusions of sne staf f'and the ACA5 studf es on aful.
'. ) -
[. *
*}?
A.1 - , 8 ,-'
., s , I
~
?
j
-' 26
" go
.e .
'g\, .
. . ..m,p.
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~
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. Se ct. ,
B&W W lCC16 Walysis of AnttCipated Traestents
, i: 1972 Wit *out fr10* wa s .wel t sred. This report W studf ed tne Consequence and the probability I' of occurrence of 4Tsi. It was Concluded (nat h the n is eo signiflCant 20tential fCr system f damage due to suci events.
f.*
- t Jan.. AEC staff The ACC staff trar,smttted to the AC25 an n 1973 ACA$ am nded Dr030 sed position on tne neti of
- design CDanges for protection against Aft $.
Agril, AkC staff The ACR$ agreed with the afnended positten
,137) ACL5 pro;cled by the ACC staff.
Se n t . , A(C staf f WA5W1270 wa s punitsPed. This report Con-1973 siderti frecuent ttanstant initiators, eur. ger.Cy stress limits and 100r11*0 release limits. Its ecsitten On Atw$ .as (1) Plants with Constructica pe itt apol1 Cat 10n (cCleted fr0r6 early 1968 to CCtaber 1976 are requirts to provide the Cs:43Ilttles to revent tre occurrence of ATd5. and to mitigata tP.e Con-sequences Of AIw5 should it 3CCur. (2) Plant s with CCRstrutt106 per' nit appliCa* tions docketed af ter QCtSter 1976 are re-Quired to ennente tne preventf04 Capat1Ilty.
' by adding a reactivity sn tdown u system.
IndeDenotat frCm tPe reactor trip system. 1973 Af ter uA$b1273 was liswed, reaCtte manu. 1974 facturers fn COnjJnCt10A with the staff. began 13 devtl03 aCCe3 table retnods of cer*
- forming analyses of Afd5 events. A draf t Anst standard, h661. wa s written, which Out-Iteed general guidelines for tee analysts of Afk1 Cuents in PVes.
Aug., Westinghouse WCAP=I330 *destinghoule Anticipated Translents 1974 Witrout Trip Analysts" =as publisPed. Based on previces studies, Westingnouse believed that AIwS' should AOL be alsured 10 occur at all for design purposes. Nevertheless, anti-Cf pated transients were analyled for betting
- A0use PVCS 13 satisfy (Pe A(C regulatory staff licensing pasttf on On ATW1. T>e results snowed tRat In all Cases tPe C45 ratto is greater tnan 1.0 and tne seat teatter Coolant Systes pressur e is below the all0= sele pres.
sure. Aed tre radiological Conteogentes Calculated fo* these postulated eveats are . weil witRin the guidelire values set forta in ICCFE100. OCt., fit NID0-2*674
- studies of 8wa Designs for mitt.
1974 gatten of ATd5* was publismed. This report # - demonstrated that an altermait path to suc. , Ctssfdl shutdown for ant 1C194ted transients, _ 3 as required by WA$%1270, Could be aCateved ' D by the f rCarpcration of retf rculation purp trip (APT) and autcriatic Doron inject 106 3 The stansby itquid Control (5tC) system . s would Pave been unchanged, e: Cast for the 3 aut:natic 10gf C. .- s A$$$ venders The 4555 venders submitted resorts desCrf atng Oct., the analysts of ATW5 events for tastr reaCter 1974 as signs. 4 & ld LAW = LOC 99 'l & W anticipated Transf eats Oe t . . . Without Scram Malysis* .as subitsred. Tee 1974 Conteauer.Ces of postdlated AT'm1 events was studied for nuclear power plants designated
- lawASM-1270 (Acoerdia Al as Class B. This study also sucalen nts orevt29 sly sutaitted ,
, aralysis in 8Aw.10016 On olents designated I as Class C. It is Co*Cludes t.ha t the Con. *
' sewences of ATb5 events are vitain tne .
aCtantaale safety 11alts esta610sned for tAtt study and moresent ne undue risk to the . Pv411C neelth and safety. 2-7 _
.,e e. e we . .
*+.m. ,. ..a es. ee e emania e-. v l
. J Table 2.1 (Cont.) ,
C.g CC aPO.181 *Ah5: I,occeed shutdo a System ma r. 1371 for Abb Class A Plants
- as twellshed.
, ?nig report descritwd an Mor'sved NactSe a nu t.e c=m systea, etta voch tee AT'wi saf ety .
OSjective W sta be n t seg all Peqvlerme*its i of WA58-1273 would be satisfied. .{. Av4.. 3&W sad 13101 'AT'5 Pest an: Co-rea mose failure .K' I 1975 Analf sts of Control Aod Crive Pecnau se" .as f published. This report concluded Inst a st* y Taaltaneous tedaniCal Conren**cde flilure of [ . the trio fuectl3n la all control c14 drive A; ' ecoanisms (C2CM ts incrediale; fortPer-cre.
.f toere is no credtble r'echanical careca ecde "
- fallare of bots trip and powered insertion capability in all (A"/'s. ,
Cet., Mac staff wa58-1400 w s ownlished. It tadicated taat: 1975 (1) Ah5 us act a mirant contributor to risk in a VestlSq'4Cuse h4 (2) Ath5 may te a dominant c:ntrinet:r to - - risk in a lh4 hoy, ARC staff , , the MAC staff preposed in 5(CY.15 888 ePd tRe
*1975 Corriission agreed to treat both tategortes +
ef plaits toentically as defined in dA5> 12?O l That is, they et's all reogtred to P.svt the l capaallity of prtetetton and mitigation. Dec. MAC staff The NRC staff's review of etsponses to WA5d-1775 - 1270 resvites in the issuaace of owestions sac the identification of vartsolved issues. TRtse Islues could pecDably have been salveret and the Ah5 fisve, as then def tned, csvid have teen resolved Rad the Criteria re-diced vecna.iged. Instead. CPe ARC f ssued tee 1975 staff status reports on ATa5 ses set forth an additsacal recwirement that the unavailabtitt) of the mitigatton syster'. Couoled with the freoseecy of tne transf ert initiation and sc'am failure derraad fate, eust meet a 13 7/ pear freoveacy of serious conseawence. 5.ese. euent discussion revealed that serious conse. quences were interpreted by the NRC as neeeding the desirLifetts. C.t C(M80-158
- Analysts of Anticisated Transients var.
1976 utthout Butter Scram in Cemeestion In91 Peer. frg M515s* Rev. I and its luo. I were pub-ItsPed. Ihts stLdy APalyted (Pe transteat t?em.al.nycraulle conditions and radiological release constwences whic'i wevid occur in power plants e-oloring a Corewstion (niineer. Irg (C.() Msclear Steam Susply Systre (M555) during an A h5 event. Further respcases to
#AC oWestions was provided in SWp. I. And it was concluded that all Class I C*( M555 can Met all safety Criteria. I Mida Aoplf Cants we's reCuested to perforal ar41yses for trete slaats using the evtmods seveloced 1974 ny tre NS$1 veaders and redtfied in tre 4RC staf f status reports issued in Decerber,1315.-
8711 M7 lll ' Ahli A leeperatsal, Part !. An(us Auf., fration ned Analysts of d45H.1273* was out. 1914 , 11sned. Teis was to upgrade tre numerical Information prest'ited in WA$d 1273 by correct-ing def f citacles in that docet and bodattaq the input data.
- wo addittent were paeserted in the accroaCA: the use of a dreand failure podel f nstead of a (few*depeede9t redel for tha AP58 and the tacorporation of leyesten In'errece into the pro 644tlistic treatpent of tme data.
#7 265 *A h 5: A Asaporaisal, Paat !!, Evalwa.
g gpgg tien af Soctetal A1sts ewe to fasctor Protect < 1976 $1on 5f ste1 failvr'e* (Vol, l*3) were Out>= If8Aed. Ihis mas aA evalwation for both IWRs aP=$ NAs based on more curepett data and methodology than used in isA5h l270. AIs4 wDa
- eated 8arestan estimatas af A75 unseellsaill.
ties were gt nn. 2-8 - . . .
4 f l
>r '
-l j
Table 2.1 (Cont.) ' l A e t'(%' I f GI The analf ses Ds lu2 scrLa gystem reliability Oe C . were performs and documented. f
' IIII lf MP.25$ "Ard$: A tes:arafial. Part (f. [valua.
Jan.. (PRI ifon cf Societal ainas due to atactea Protec. 1977 tion System f ailure" (Vol. a) was publisned. Ints dccureat dealt with the Droo40flity of eaceeding 10Cf4100 guttelines from ATVS everts
=
in light water resetors. It srewed. togetner with results in etmer volures of Part II. tPat the fracti: Pal contribution to the total pottn' tial reattor ritt due to AIN$ Is very LedlI (less (Pan $11. and LPe $rttability that an ATV$ relults 19 a radiation release est ding 20071100 crittria 11 on the orte* of 10* / year. Therefore. LPe Criteria set 40 in VA$M* 1270 Rad sets tutstantially ret and to tact. fitting or otatr reatter modifications heeded to be considered. 84V.10C$) Rev. 1 was pus 11 sped. The earlier Pay. 3&W coecluston oa consequences :f AfW$ eas reaf. 1911 fireed to represent no undue rtst to tne pubitt etalth and safety. Aoril, ARC staff NUR[5 0460 (Vol. 1. !} Were fullisred. This as NR: staf f's rescosse to (Pel studf es on 1918 ATv5 aad otree related analyses dsee ey tne industry. TPe MAC staff reviewed the infor. mation on Ath$ that Rad been developed in the past ard evaluates the suscettititty of current nuclear plaats to ATV$ eveats usief
'- favit tree / evert tree aralysis tecentoves as used in WASM-la03. Based on trat evaluation.
tre staff concluded tPat some corrective ressures were recuired to reduce tre rf st of, severe ceasecuecces arisf rg from possible ATV$ events, this conclusion was bases on tee ( ' operating esperieace to date for reactor scram systers. Ceerating racerf ence was not sufficient to eseclusively otter =tne of a . statistical tasis =%e'Ser reactoe scran e systres are reltable ew to site tre , pecelen of unaccettable consecue%es frtu ATd5 events sufficiently tasII. NP.8*1 'Afd$: A teapprsisal. Part 111. Frt-July. 174)
. oveacy of Anticteated Traattests' was 9u6 1974 lished. This occurent contairs the resalts of a data collettien and sealysis task con.
oveted to detarmine tre freovency of those articipated treattents rnich might recutre a successful IcrLa. IPe miC staff suggested in MUAt .0460 (Vol.3)
' Cec.. AAC staff trat plaets with tanstewction straits arter to 1978 1/1/78 socald implement sa autsmatie $tC trstem vita API and an- ATW$ red injection sCPe*W.
the MAC issued a stateneat of policy wnich 3 Jan.. BAC staff accepted tre eteW19eedativi trat (Pe use Sf FF) 1971 , >e,aroided for LPe deternf aatton of assolute rist pr9bstilities far Ruhly8tems unlass an 8$eouste Sata base esists and it is possfelt tc evantify the uncertaintfes.
..--a . .
4 2-9
Table 2.1 (Cont.) feo., MAC staff the RAC staff reovested (Nat generic evolve. tions be performed of the tadustry to can. 1979 firm that tne moeifications specified in muttG.Ga63 (vol. 3) are soplicaole and would acnieve tee desired cDJectives. 1979 G( As regalated by t*e NGC staff in 4ba[G.Ca60 (Vol. 31.' OE issued esely verification af Alternative 3 9,etent'al c3pasilf ty for the prevention & mitigation of an ATh$ event. Mcv., C*C The res.ilts of ar.'5 analyses for C.[ designec 1971 855$s , CthP0-263.**, ert puni t sred. It was se,own that C.( destgaed plants meet the post-ATh$ crtteria f or reactor coolant sys. ten integrity, redtological releases, fuel integ ity, contatereet artssure and fu nc* tionastitty if statpaent ness 46 for long term cooling, ma ecM, NeC staff Fue(G 0a60 (Vol. a) .as puolf sret ty tre stC 1910 sta f f. All plants were recutred to trolement Alternative a, escept a f ew c1C plants to be treated on an tidtvidual basis. This was to reeJire of all pla9ts toe Cacao 11ftF to altt. =
- gate the levere consetvences of an ATh5 snould it occur.
July, B&W !aw.1510 was submitted to tPe NAC la response IS80 to tPete specific rt1utsts on AT45 analyses. This reoort described a reenalysts of the ArV5 events vstat the most recent MAC gwide. lines, it was agata cancivdes tnat in tre valisely testance of an ATd5 event the 8 & W designed plant can mitigste the coese. 49ences of suCn an event with acceptalle results.
$ tot. 4, ARC staff 5tCT.43 401 was released by the N*C staff.
This docurent was to address t*e subject of 1940 procated rulemastag to saend ICCfR50 ten. cerning anticipated transients witPowt scraa (AIVS) events. in the Staff recorrendations: (1) Alternative (22), f.e. Alter.ative AA is for plants receiving tPeir coerattog Itcease on or after January 1,198a; (2) Alternative (26),or3A.and(!c)are for otrer plarts Itcensed before Jaavary 1, 1954. (3) Alter *ative (24), i.e. AlterPattet IA. 11 a clart leecific resolution fOr 4 lialted eurcer of very early plants. Sect.. Electric A grovo of 20 utt11 ties reovested the M8C to 1963 Utility resolve tee ATd5 issue according to plant Group andtff cations dets11sd in a petitfon sve* aftted De Septersta 16, 1120. The major tenett of LAe setttten are For esistfng $lants! (1) Ekas: provide the follo=(ng: (4) nectreviation 7wro Trip given an Ard5 signai. (b) Indeof adent, redundart and ive se dntitet.etaectricai react.e ,eans ice.. to
,iven a si,Mii caeracteris.
tic af an Arw1. (ci ur discurge ni- i
.odi ficais on.
2'10
~
Table 2.1 (Cont.) k,, y ... b). L (. O ll
- (2) Pra s: 8Povide the fo110 ming:
' (a) Ccnowstion legtneering one sab-catt aad WilCOs p]4nts $Dall Pave an alternate evens to sautdown tre rtactor (Ast is n
a1 verse and redu dant to tne electrical cortion of tot re-atter protection system up to tut not including tPe trip treaters, in addition, aut:ena. tic taltistion of avalltary feedwater rust ottur indeDena de4tlf o f tPe Rf $. (b)t!tstlegneuseclartlsPallgr1
, Vif t autoedtlC 1Altletion Sf turttee trte 4Rd adallf ary f eegester 18 dependent Of the 871.
For new plants: Acciuse of tre need to ensur e tr.at plant ecolflCattent for A7d1 see inte* grated lato LM plart in a consistent manaer with the ootential Changes, any ATd5 endificatf cas for m plants should be deteratued as cart of the de* 1raded Core rulsettag process. la a erro frun Aouscow to minogue dated 12/1$/30 Cec., sut; staff the following conclustees were stated:
. 1960 -
*. It a00 ears tPat tRe NEC soortsch to ate 1 probacllities is too Conservalfve walle tM [fAl apprcath is unduly optisistis.
Mandating tepesved prevention and sitife-
- tion may rtduce the retuired staff re*
view; Powever.
*. $ tate it is een.cechanist1C,so*4 design or installatton flaws may artse. In addition. IPs staff d0es not Pave a (Ond -
reerd in tre selection of sesign Bases LP.at art interded to enveicot Broad
' Classes of unar&lyted actisent sCeearfos.
* *n a meae frces Minogue. 01-ector of MAP. to CAstr.
man Joen Ameerne, he stated trat 'IPRI Pas a-valid point in suggesting that tee staff is us. cetessarily conservative in tre treat.+ent of t8e*
, opportunities to fia or learn from precwesers.
RfC staff in a e*ee frSe 01rths to tPe Cereisstorert. t>t Jan.. following altercatives to tre rule presented in list SECT 63 aC1 are presented ta rtspend to tossents fras c W ssterer Antarre: The requirarents for post 1984 plants wn ich had been incivded in 1CCf.40 40f
- could be deleted face the rule.
ese Tpe agggoterte trite *ia en p* 4ary
- lystes stresses could os relases ta level 3 testead of level C.
e- Additional retutwts are tited for
- plants it 'htgi population
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< 7(1) i The consequences of ATW5 could'be major.
4 e, o. .! y , - ,1
. $. . a '
3a, , 3a u- , 4 D. ).~ .-1,ack cfhgrecunt 61stiwith respect to the probabilitin usociated ' ' [j c . .
b, .
p E with'ATNS, , , > 2
, 1
, q.. 2 g,
-{; * - -
1 4 t
, 43) . Lack ofMreamnt exist: as to whether.or rot additicnal requireinen,tsl ' *g b:'
. , , , s .
Ii4s ,,,.',. e need to be bposed upon thu 6tondby liquid centrol systems, ap y
, .4
[ '* I, ,i u[ t n
^
7
;(4). Concern.over the in. pact of the loss' of offsite rower. -
e 3,"h.. , m
. 4 4
gr gr
- g. % !,
4 , 9
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j ;g g
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g@Qx.%M.y n K' Y 1 - - 2
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- m. N.p & $+$$ a
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F Q &a:kD ! -% ~ 7; :e, c&?m '.
.,;.m*l:.'
. e y y nY hd[v&:%.?o.gh&q$w$y N
wm eS + :mW a ~$ & hE ., h'
'f;WO Ww(5)DConcernithatuufficient a ., , :
dIversilty;v p M m m. n s Ao ;w m . M . e.: m a ex15ts 2 ans u n n.
- =. .e with, respect,to, a w:the; initiation n mg.
W
;/ s y+th'respe:cttto: mr;rnp m%y$m:ya p %n..xm u;Mg AofMontainoenttisolatton ATW5M 4ystamswf J ..;p?;a:m.. <
m $@g t.6&g$qd : MR:GW .l, u .L m , y h ) W ,de % R i f Q h x, $ m ;- .yJ+h4@ [g$ii) ean .eseta quately quantifycthe r(WsksW .@W M. MQ@%%y(6Pb Q%g W$M~ Doubt'asito)hetherfor,~hotW;.,. t m l;@ w & br o ' .' NZ j y$ NAM h 3EM.MUC@MNssociatedilth comon tnodeifa MMf4N N, -M ,n W.j $ylk Q ,,, 3. . 4 .t. ,7* 6 5 Z. . 4, Q M E.'.i P,N f,te$3 %%
. .c. . > a $, mig.h. r P ;,n%Mk fi y ur.e,Md
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f scus sed,ii n .h pendi - v N e wpW:
.aq.ttache
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. A.
yy .f r 94 M L .if
^ :, ;t
$ $ @%eh$,0MN $ Mfp 8'ojo'd,1,$t.usfe'd);,> g'jQ., ' y'N* ., 4 ' gg .. ;.. g+ ,gqg.g' pgyggg g, y %g;3 7
.N tl. .:. y.mo. ,# .. .s 4. ...L
- 3. m . _n _ 3.mp .b.
* - ~~
m ... . . m-. . 4,2 W9 d .r4..: 6 W;.a.. i,!wuhe A ropoiaM ATVS Fix$sfin ftW6
" $ f J M M.w A W Q g ly.g p . f .y
.x;p, y &.
.% ' ?. 4.:,4
,y y$y%$ 61 sh'ichtare
%v pw. c. w w.Mp=mvide~ . = - - - - ~ --
addf tiohal -= n . protection, m~
. g'h t c ess p.W'%s%. m. n
;g x
\ ; p%m. lc , yew; :?.%
t c W>t w w@@;p - r
&.;,f 5
. : . .Y $ 'N p:t Q Q's.d 3: .- .,~U;~ Wd 5. M f j.d&> <w. m a.g?4 ' *kided ithat;the standby l' iquidi centr w t 8 . .
13 M W;;, w wM Pro m.&; ,; frww e- , . s. eep .i ^m . 5v. A i ,i;i...<
. y.p,f. a; <Ja.*.,.-a p .. .- , . a, c . , wavy a j .
t
- - .. a ,, c m y
- p.u e. Cy,y ;9 g,WTsufficient Q wleme g - :m.. =; ;,w .. pegative, -
reactivitylith ; ww( m : resp'ect.tosth'AsMficientiek , t NAbF.' I: w w.r s w qcxistsito:concludenthst: current EWR-6 rcactors@a
~ . a . , .. . . < ~ v .n lths
- ..e m p?;W Mg :mm a y ? h a. Lj[7 .' (%:/ W:4hf QQ Mgand redundant 3 .,'
negative reactivtty :fosertio/[.Mj '9' /r " Q} &,5 y%Q3 L, ,. n .s g;n a .
-ap3, y :p g?-- . yn ~ . .<c ,
. .; v.-
1 a, m. yster M provide + 35 < - : 25ufficicpt wg u r.Ayg f g n.. QN
-un++q n, . x , .
3 e i , . n {, Uh k I Viky.in$t g GICQ C5p3bilf _,tyjaQAinstJTWS7;,locluding;. d ggh%,pI?#
~ s .
wm. # -h.A c'e%n .m[4CCOUnt ithe f 4Uts tiONTQ f[CCnhon$ 00dN.74]I Ure d i 1,['. > y$ m"d.w$wwjll
, f t". M int 0 'h.h kf, g h
g hhhhhN kN W b N k fE N ' v, ;a.4.q:T m uAtfuse:of, gJ . w1'*
.a ott:crlsolubinpaisons nw. yey, y -
oramixtureiof
.m s>y++ < $m solub!PpoisonstiisuldMW.%s
, ec xm- 't b . .; u. w A @.Rb p u.
m-- y n. 9.g Igq
% W
+1 .. .
. . . ~ - 4 y.+
p.Pp,. _ p. O- ed .p. 1 .. s.3 )T%ub4fC00$idtrad'
; - :. u,; -
It r
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- immCd1 v
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., Atulylif?
y , e .,- a - the".informatihn. ,15[Ev'
, y c ,,
, i
% gm ailable[,O y f 44.
N hygggiothe. kh 2 y4# [ ' ": L;P {=? v mk,pn
.e3 , , ,u. m ~ u esv9 ,. .
h.ddq}c;yg;ng
- program jf;[,{t,jg . . . .
t x,, ngt; m %q m jh wg
,;;q{solubl.t poisons
..-9 p nf,q y,a on: current har&are conf 1 gyrations 15;likely to' bei smallW s P, %;i.g@y..C..
- i. r ,... .
p ,r.nc;g . ;
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+[ '
'3
+
4 g a . v.-~ ~
' ), 3,UAsj +, 4 ft%U)I y the peet'ht*4 of: tho' following ATW5 fixem sone. of-shichWb,$M+ , r.
y %.n
*y> . n .
- n. 'Q y ,y , ,; eyp~
, ra e F,
'.,y,,., 4n:t3y already,;;be echieved, era proposed as beinghre thin adepate with,MM.
u e. L< MNM
' k 4 , , r rg ( * . l pv
(
.IrtSQQG( tQ W Vs*De' j <
#u f.y ,:l.q&; y, , s'p?!
t.
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( 11- Trip..of the reactor racirculation pump. upo'n initiatfopof. 'tk.J.;,,NN['.Mr ?+bd,
, 4 . -
'~ .'
s ,, b g, [..
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, t
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1 7 . , . .
. .- , % en-
, .y4l .
existing h1 n pre:Sure c001snt injection.tystur(liPC5f RCICS)yW 9
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zbi :. l 3 Y upOn Twymmcdastana:m . IE
- N $* m '
- E' ' bINfr y',
m, , { At </ . (3)~Automatedinitiatiore et the. liquid' control syste should AWS W y:w,n W
, p
' Q(;';Y .n; - '
' ~
occur. ' ,
. ! i?.n
.h '
., V:
,r. u... . .s l ~ '
' , r'U, F}O Q;< '(4) piping, added to supply som of the' liquid control' fiddihhougOk Wz ' '.. e$
l
, c '?:;:..; m . .h ; T-
;. Q
- !~ i@g..y .,W' the c
itPCS-lines into the vessel. , N. ,, .?v ,M.U... , ,6. %s f.e . x .a.t% . !, .: - ,
+., w ,U - in Q
J 1,,..
<. y . ,v 'di.p ,fy%p n:'(5): v Suf ficiently. Independant contairmnt .y ,
1se14 2 tion'.systet.s k~
- w. . . m.
_,, . , ' ~.. .u < _ .e v y . Mi M, vjc. <7 Spon ANS cccurrence. 4,Spj.W,J@4fA
> Vd .M. 'O,3 q Wwcf A w ,, . . _ j; , .. 3,. ?, 3 (
d p0mpj1t Q . d y1 Ijd%s 1.Cygg m{.0 % the' e. d,6)yThe'addltinn following features: ; E' of s a- tnird.stanfiy, liquid ^ c v 4.n.fWl* a g s :s sin
. p.p ;. yu m 4 4 ca , ,
. ;. e,,, .
.+
( + e. ;,w...,; .M a v o.' .- .? i
, ' v Y.%. . .. b"> q .4 3 '7e, n (a); 100% 'cancity. '
f j;.n :.%- . q -W Ls M. .f :., y ,, Me,m4 ,. . ,O i; u ..w L ,.
.t -
<'4,.6.4=% '
.,";q . .q,g ' K, , ; (b) . stem drhen1(pernps cennected fo?the reactor? core 1:alatichg' x h,;
' 4s ,
Wi i g ', .. .
% 1 ;, 9 .V ! .')
. cool lng, sys tem): y.,y:..y .. p g:.y
.m 1, )
;4; ,,. e.g. v.g . _ ,
, a[":A t., ; > y. < > -
a r
- f. s & } >o,; ,
s
. . . r ..4 * ,
... .r. V (', s. ;q. 1 h.
. 0 ^v.$;; , (c).;diff arf.nt suc tion' andlinjectio'n1 points than:the electriddik.Q' M J[ 3
- n. ', o
- 2: '
a . ,,
, ., ,. :;. r l
1 i m:
.Q
, ,, t . e; . , .-b,' a. ,: ' drisenc pur.;$) . >
. , 4, e$ ' y .we,-., ;jF i>.
~ _ . . . %-
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. p ;.e.q m ; s , ,.
, ., 4e, a. a- . . ... . , > . . s . +
t
, u ,. - 4 7. .j,b. It'em (d - raight' T permit' one 100% capacity . , . f electrically.,,
drivan
# ..O pumpfy, g,Qppy
.7%, - Ac . e' 'l.. rather, than twa 50t 'capecity ' pumps. - Note that the steam
~
prim : % 3 ' > ;y
. 1
.* - t'r
, ,$ 'Jr ; e , 5 f . . *
.r. , /
L /q ; , ~ ' mver< noutnot be a turbine fit ,could be. a positive.d!splaceec'ntf. . . l k,
. y - .
. .I , , . m >
4 ,, a : 4.- ,s. - . - ,
. E..'..- .
rotary pisten pwp which hould com up to dosion'spt.1.' rapidly,('p,g r ba a { "' >
, 4. > ' . T f~ (7) Inclusion.of additional soluble poison capetty or subititutioni j: ' h _,
t.
.a. . .i...
.$ 'of a dt fferent so'lubic~ poison,. ,,
- e. ?' e .. [.
l .. I *' l T- .- /
; (l'pMd j g .
m fL .> i
~
c ' Comon ikido T3t liwe and Bonefit Discust_1on :c 9 '.y - n.
- , ,,.s m L r.
.c .. . ..
4 -1 M p A. lucid secery of "conron aedo failures" is presented bagtnning on page 3-
.,. , ; ' ^.;'; .'
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, , , of WA$H.1NO. Heer, there are "comon inode benefits" whien can be F'
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'I tst1hstrate tMt arbitrarily tysW requirements to prottet againste '
) {' ' ; .4
.C hn0n :=ch faOurcs tray result in syltera CCrpMities end MdtWd MW 4 8 h,. - .j 5
p
* }tst ny substantially v1(ctnate rmch of the pins origtr.sily.scugnt; and,. m )
.( < R1< in sem instanc85, eliminate sore UMntages whicn alru4 cA16t.
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P.U. BOX 97 a PERRY OHic 44061 m T EL EPHON E (216) 259-3737 s ADDRESS-10 CENT ER Ro AD Serving The Best Location n; the N:stro 1 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROJECT ORGANIZATION C EI NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT AN D KAISER ENGIN EERS, IN C. .
i July 2, 1981 ;
m ArrAcarnea1 5 General Electric Con:pany 1000 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio kh114 Attention: Frank Miotti RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2 Anticipated Transients Without Scram Quote #149-B Gentlemen:
In response to your letter dated June 10, 1981, the Owners elect to accept quote 149-B. Tne clarifications are acceptable. Please incorporate a centract revision to cover AWS. ,
Very truly yours,
<<t fy Jim E. Barron Purchasing Department JEB:dms cc: H.A. Putre L.O. Beck File 98 ( k e
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY '
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,;'*jra.D.J.Zupan acoM S120 rnos H. L. Hrenda oArc September 4,1981 PHONC 2N6 Room N2NQ sueJccT GE Quote No.149B ', e ,,
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! l Engineering recommends acceptance of GE Quote! N o.149B, Mws ^1 ternate 3A, Design and Equipnent. ,
6 GE should be requested to provide clarification of the division of responsibility for radiological analyses, per Section 6 and Appendix B of the subject quote.
?
HLH/vr cc: B. L. Barkley - W220 R. P. Jadgchew - W225 H.,,AAtrmG W240 NDS File - 419 SP-M/C41/3.1 MAITI P0/DC-R290 ,
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> SCOPE OF WORK FOR ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ALTERNATE 3A p
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. DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT 4
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. i SECTION 1
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INTRODUCTION ,
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This document describes General Electric's proposed scope of work for ATWS Design Work, Project Design Services and supply of ATW5 Equipment 6.: .
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- i e
1-1 >
172-P1 , l
. a. allow BWR performance to meet acceptance criteria described in :
1
. . Appendix B including consideration of an ATWS event without ARI; b .~ have 'a reliabil'ity objective of 0.9 per demand;
([ o 3or V (W** ** *J
- c. use control grade equipment; and
- d. provide manual operation override to allow an increase in feedwater flow, if needed and available.
) 2.6 Standby Liquid Control System The standby liquid control system (SLCS) action is to be initiated automatically on receipt of signals indicating an ATV5 event is in progress. Simultaneous operation'of both pumps at full capacity (86 gpm total) is required to maintain suppression pool temperatures within specified limits. ,
The SLCS design will:
- a. provide an.automatiq ATW5 injection function for both loops simultaneously;
.b. provide a manual ATWS injection function fo(foth looD simultaneously operated only from the Control Room;
- c. require replenishment capability of the SLC5 tank with mixed sodium pentaborate solution fror outside the containment;
- d. consider the hydrodynamic pulsation effects of two pump operation; 0
A-8 172-P27 ,
j l
- e. r'equire automatjic t SLCS injection through the HPCSaline's (BWR/S and BWR/6) or through the jet pump. instrument. lities\(BWR/4).
i sf,{ .k.Ihhb~
' f. - provide automatic Reac' tor Water Cleanup ~ System'- lition;
- g. provide for periodic functional tests of the system in both; the manual and the automatic ATWS injection modes;
- h. minimizeundesiredinjectionoftheboratedliquidintothe j/ vessel by design of the logic and sensors to have a low failure c- rate; GtYc
- i. accommodate the containitent pressure and temperature environment during the period of needed AWS operation, and for BWR/6 during any predicted operation of containment spray;
- j. meet requirements 1.1 through 1.9 of Append,ix A; p -
- k. seetthecriteriaofAppendixB,inconjunctionwithother g' AWS functions, excluding the ARI;
% R- N include actuation circuits which have a reliability objective
] bb 1.
er demand and which are separate from RPS and containment o .9 g{bg solation circuits; I \.L .(K NN +* i m.
5 ave a reliability objective for delivering boron at full f capacityofhperdemand; L CA ,
k -.
- n. assure that no single active logic component. failure can prevent its function; and .
sp A-9 m .
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- . i
- o. u'se equipment, qualified ~ either by analysis or test','Io assure meeting the predicted conditions associated with'the ATVS i
event.. 1- -
i 2.7 Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves ,
To prevent radiological releases to the environs if there are significant fuel failures, the containment ventilation isolation ,
valves are to be closed upon high containment radiation. _This isolation logic is to be separate from the RPS._
The containment isolation interface specifications witi:
l g a. require conformance with Appendix B for the ATVS sents given in Appendix C;
- b. - 'specify that an electrical failure in the RPS, that could
{'- -
prevent a scram, will not prevent the containment isolation function; and .
- c. specifythatuseo{circuitsandvalves,qualifiedbyeither' analysis or test, to assure meeting the predicted condi,tions asscciated with the ATVS event. ,
2.8 Scram Discharge Volume Modifications Control rod drive system scram discharge volume modifications will L, ,.
. be designed to minimize the potential for common mode failure of the scram function due to drain line failure ,and thus unavailability of this volume. The design modification will consist of the addition of instrument volume water level sensors to the control rod drive hydraulic system and instrument line piping modifications. The design change will: .
I A - 10 172-P29 4
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. NUCLEAR POWER SYSTF.MS DMSION 1.-_
- GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY e 175 CURTNER AVENOE
- SAN JOSE, CAuf 0RNIA 95125 MC 399, (408) 925-2755 s_ qq.w
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December'29,, 1983 ,
Responds to:- N/A PY-GEN /GAI-2002 = '
INFORMATION Mr. P. B. Gudikunst '
Gilbert' Associates, Inc.
RECEIVED
.P.O. Box 1498 Reading, PA 19603 JAN 5 1954
Dear Mr. Gudikunst:
SUBJECT:
ATVS MANUAL SLC INITIATION . Attached is an advanced . issued copy of ECN NJ50426 showing changes to Standby Liquid Control elementary 82.8E234CA. The ECN essentially returns the elementary to Rev'ision 2 except for the trip of the pumps on low tai:L _ level and the relocatfon of pump and valve control from the containment r- to a local MCC. Very truly yours, fe. utnD . R. C. Mitchell - Project Manager
'r Perry Nuclear Power Plant FROM: DOC. CONT.'lOL DATE:/ g g [
RCH rm/A12299' COPIES TOs l~-M /// L # ' y,jg u
~
p x 7ct+dr ' Attachment VirAdc d 0 % W'** ^' ' V C W F t-- _ cc: J. J. Larsen #34 NAM %L W. F. Miotti "#1#"M'# ; P. A. Nichols, w/att. ACI Z-Fil.e: C41
.o D
RECEIVED
- JAN -41984 cocu=l.Elio.n.=
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IlsGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE
' ^'
O ,~CORPOTTEO'"SSuE W-NJ50426 , O INCORPOR ATION SIGNOFF REQUIRED 4ggyp SHEETROF f ,5 NUCLE AD ENERGY B'1SINESS OPERATIONS CO PORA D g DA,T GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.. SAN JOSE CALIFORNIA , ,M E ASONS, Fm RCHANGE. RESP COMP 7C7 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION \ f 'R CORRECTION _
. n '.
p IR E MENT,CONTR ACT CHANG E 3 ' E. lVL ATORY E PROJE CT/CUSTOME R/AE DENGRG CUSTOMER R EQ U E I.T E D - Q E M OYA L CF C C ASME.lEEE DOTHER EXPLAIN IN NARRATIVE g ,
. , y C f. .
3 jfS,YM-lOPERFORMANCE C , ;
> . , O VE RIFICAT{0N STATE MENT ,
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- L'E RI FI C ATI ON C Ot#AIN E D lN i DRF NO. !'b'N .
- 08 REQUIRED? SPARE PARTS MR. El REVISION MFG REVIEW SAF ETY/RE LI ABILITY CLASS!FIC ATION OF
'ES O NO E AFFECTED? REQUIREO? REQUIRED 7 ANALYS'S REQUIRED? CHAR ACTERISTICS AFFECTED?
3t NO YES O NO E YES O NO E YES-O NO E YES O NO E YES O NO E NtT SIGN SIGN INIT INIT INIT M ATE RI AL/H AR DW ARE STATUS PROJE CTS ~ OTY STATUS DISPOStTION l El. MR. PO NO PERRY l 4 2 N/A AT SITE WoRA li4PLEM E NT E D BY E. I. FDDR K L I - 9(o4 , R E v. O ( q i . c3 9 8262 234C A FDDR KL2 - 72 4, R E /. 3 K 2-724 w OST E FF ECT E < $1000 TOT AL ALL PROJE CTS ENTER ESTIMATED TOTAL APPROVAL ENDORSEME NTS COM' DATE INC E ASE) O < $10,000 TOTAL ALL PROJECTS REjPCgS8pppp p '797 gj. y 9 y,3
. DEC2 E ASE O > 510.000 TOTAL ALL PROJECTS
- MFG COST RESP ESTIMATED BY COMP OATE SCHEDULE EFFECT OC lNED *-
T.'JSTE M E R - DAYS OO Jg, WEEKS O O
"" MTHS CO l SUPPLIED NO EF FECT E 3CTHER SIGN ATUR E N/A
~ ^
'o UNil tu S TATES s, Y.! / - ~
- g. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ((/1 3* r ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR sAFECUARDS
- W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 2
g*****/ July 15, 1983 ATTAC W FMT
.[
Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
-Washington, D. C. 20555 SUBJ ECT: ACRS REPORT ON THE PROPOSED FINAL RULE ON ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUTSCRAM(ATWS)
Dear Dr. Palladino:
During its 279th meeting, July 7-9, 1983, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the proposed Rule on ATWS. A Subcommittee meeting was held with members of the NRC Staff on May 27, 1983. Tne Committee also had the benefit of the documents listed. For BWR plants, the Rule requires installation of an alternate rod injection (ARI) system and a standby liquid control system (SLCS) of a specified control capacity. The Rule also requires that the SLCS must be .capa.b.le of automaticlni.tiation for new plants _and for other BWR plants that already "hWt'hEapability to automate this system. Automatic trip of the recircu-lation pumps is also specified, although we understand that this feature is already operational on all plants through Commission Order. PWR plants are required to have equipment diverse from the reactor protec-tion system installed to assure automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater and of turbine trip. In addition, reactors manufactured by the Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) and Combustion Engineering, Incorporsted (CE) are required to install a diverse scram actuation system. While not in the current version of the Rule, an amendment will be proposed to require Westinghouse reactors to install a diverse scram actuation system as well. The NRC Staff is tecommending that licensees establish a reliability assur-ance program for thWants' reactor trip systems. We support efforts to enhance reliability assurance for such critical plant systems; however, we believe a comprehensive program that encompasses all plant safety-related systems would be more ef fective.
7 7 o,. .. . . . ~ . _ 9 : Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino July 15, 1983 rf
. ,. 9 We 'reconnend -that ,instrumerjption needed to accomplish safe shutdown of the pl/nt following 'an ATWS even; be'gualified to perform acceptably following the high phessure.op other evironmental effects to which the instrumenta-tion mightie exposed during the event. We also recommend that the possible effects of high pebssure on the integrity of primary _ system _ pump seals and
- t% pressure bovMery of instruments or other*~ components not coveTeT by the
'ASME , Boil 6F and Pressure yessel Code be explored, and that the NRC Staff assure itsglf,that. pump seal or other primary system coolant leakage caused by'd1' ATWS d6es nqt'significantly , increase the likelihood of severe damage
~
T f to the core. -
- j. ,
, f- ,a -
To furth(r decrease the pro'[Aility of an ATWS, we recommend that efforts be 1 5nt operators to A9CteUe_the_ number _ of_trans.icnts that challenge j mide the react by p%forotection SystrE For example, operating experience has sh thM a large forcion of plant transients results from mahnctions_qf_the feedwat er sy. stem.
~ ~
f'erent, information also indicates that tFe number of r'e'act'nr scrams iier plant .is'significantly hi,gher_i_n_ thel.S. than in certain fereign countries '(Japan ~ for example). We recommend an investigation to determine if. practical means exist to reduce challenges to the reactor
^
trip system. ' 3 qt ' _
*/ ? ,
We 4M concerned about f.he-potential for confusion when part of the reactor r trip system is $4.fety__gtade and part is nct. Neither the dj.ytrie_Shuldown
}'ggicjsyftems reriuired by.the Rule nor the heat traci_ny for boron solution j s .orage systems are safety. grade. , The same is true for the alarm systems that @dicate whether the heat tracers are operative. These matters may warraht further consideration.
. f. ,
The NkQ Staff has 'suggestid that an ATWS contribution to core melt frequency
._0 Ll /dy_e a ct o rge a r_gr_le Ryo u ltbeia c c e p.t a bl e . Since the rin to the public f rom sucn an accident may,_ vary _ mark _edly be.t. ween PSRs._ud_BWRs ,
it., is n6% clea'e that a 'sjngle core" melt probabifity criterion shoul'd be appWJNniformly .to all LWRs. If a major release of radioactive material finn tKe containmuni, is likely, the criterion of 10'5/ reactor year is, at u b'st,lmurginal,didde-considered.for anyStaf single cause.ccuch as ATWS, and f.yf_
~
likel.lbood_sho J ie NeC s f's estimates of ATW5~likeli-
. hoodf ary best estimates, 'witn cont.1derable uncertainty, and thus may not
'rtflhet a reasonable degree of,assyrar.ce that the actual risk is as low as it douldIbe. T7ttocend t? tar considerations of such risk be included,
. p.ad i.C 4 dy __f,o r._,f e a c t o r i_'ia vj ngj_hj g h s u r ro u nd i n g_ p op u l a t i o n_deas11,c,s .
Wei racommend that pe*,dners of new plants give consideration to designs '
. .that will reduct react'er trip systen challenges as well as enhance reli-
-ability. We note %at while thr. T ule requires new BWRs to enhance the
' cepability of the SLCS, it is silent concerning the need for additional For example, there is no requirerent for mitigating featurus, for PWRs. >
r de , f-
<+ , f
-s
7.** 7 I } Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino July 15; 1983 additional pressure relieving capability for B&W and CE plants. We disagree , with this position and reconnend that the NRC require licensees to explore means for enhancing the ATWS mitigative capabilities for new PWR plants. We support the provision that the schedule for impleme:ntatlombe_one_negoti-ated between the licensee and the NRC, but caution that care be exercised to i
' assure the timeliness of the changes required. ,
We believe that the proposed Rule is an appropriate approach to dealing , with the ATWS issue, but recommend that consideration be given to the ' above comments before a Rule is issued in final form. The Committee plans a later review of the proposed amendment dealing with the Westinghouse trip systein. Sincerely, Ws J. J. Ray Y Chairman Re ferences:
- 1. Memorandum from M. L. Ernst, NRC, to R. F. Fraley, ACRS, " Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 Related to Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS),"
dated June 27, 1963.
- 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant," USNRC Report, NUREU-1000 Volume 1, dated April 1983.
- 3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Confnission, " Generic Actions for Licensees and Staff in Response to the ATWS Events at Salem Unit 1," USNRC Report, SECY-83-248, dsted June 22, 1983.
- 4. Letter from E. P. Rahe, Jr., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, to H. R. Denton, NRC,
Subject:
Westinghouse Comments on Proposed Amend-ment to ATWS Rule, dated June 22, 1983.
i o
, I 3 .. -d ' .g
! II 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ' y This is tol certi'fy that copies of the foregoing were served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this
7M day of CMd4 , 1984- to those on the service list b.elow. I i.
s . .
. r.'9 i Susan L. Hiatt t
5 SERVICE. LIST , p4 Peter B. Bloche, Chairman Terry Lodge, Esq. ! Atomic Safety & Licensing Board ' 618 N. Michigan St. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Suite 105 . ; Washington,JD.C. 20555 Toledo, OH 43624 Dr. Jerry R. Kline i Atomic Safety,& Licensing Board. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l- ,.i
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20555 Washington,'D.C. , Mr..Glenn O. Bright 3
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- Atomic Safety &. Licensing Board ', , U.S. Nuclear Regul'atory Commission
. Washington,C D.C. 20555
.- Colleen P . Woodhead, Esq. ~ ,
. Office df'the' Executive Leg 51 Director U.S~. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
Washington,.D.C. 20555 . r Jay <Silberg, Esq'. Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW' g
.Washingt6n, D.C. 20036 (
Docketing'&, Service Branch
. Office of'the Secretary U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory.. Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomict Safety. & , Licensing Appeal. Board Panel U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission '
Washington, D.C. 20555 a}}