ML20094F446

Proposed Tech Spec Table 3.6.3-1 Re Primary Containment Isolation Valves,Changing Isolation Actuation Setpoint for Six Valves

ML20094F446
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/06/1984
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20094F440	List: ML20094F436 ML20094F446
References
TAC-55555, NUDOCS 8408100049
Download: ML20094F446 (3)

Text

.

veg -

Eg TABLE 3.6.3-l' (Contimed)

>~

PRIMARY C0tfrARNENT ISOLATION VALVES

• l ISOLATION TIbE Q VALVE FLNCTION AND NLMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)

C-3 7

$$h A. Autcznatic Isolation Valves (Continued) 884

'Dggu 6. Contairunent Spray Isolation Valses E

2 Ell-F016 A(b) and B(b)

• 10 2 Ell-F028 A(b) and B(b) *. 24

7. RHR Heat Excharger Drain Isolation Valtes 2 Ell-F011 A and B

• 20 2 Ell-F026 A and B

• 20 ,

8. Drywell-to 'Ibms Differential Presaire System Isolation Valves N*

2f48-F209 12 5 i 2T48-F210 12 5 5 2f48-F211 12 5 2T48-F212 12 5

9. HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valves 2E41-E002 3 50 2E41-F003 3 50 taj See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valve group (b)May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control

• Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a Iow Low Iow (Ievel 1) signal from 2B21-N691A,B,C,D. Refer to item 2.b of Table 3.3.3-1.

y ea o

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Contirued)

, PRIMME CONIAIIDENP ISOLATION VALVES ISOLATION TDE

, VALVE FLNCTION AIO NLMEER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds) g A. ALitanatic Isolation Valves (Contin.ned)

21. Core Spray Systen Flow Test.Line Isolation Valses 2E21-F015 A

• 50 2E21-F015 B '

• 50

~

22. Stappression Pool Vent and R1rge System Isolation Valves l

l 2T48-F338 10 5 2T48-F339' 10 5

~

2r48-F318 10 5 2T48-F326 10 5

$ 23. RHR Shutdown Cooling alction Isolation Valses 22 Ell-F008 11 24

24. RW Head Spray Isolation Valve 2 Ell-F023 11 20 La>See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valse group

• Closes upon actuation of Core Spray via a Iow Iow Iow (Lesel 1) signal from 2B21-N691A,B,C,D. Refer to iten 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1.

l l

p ,. g .

I f

GeorgiaIbwerd ATmmmT 3 NRC DOCKET NLNBER 50-366

~

OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5

, EIMIN I. HATCH NUCIEAR PIANT LNIT 2 i' mv>tST TO GANGE ISOIATION ACIUATION SETPOINT

-IN THE TE3NICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SIX VALVES I

Containnent isolation valves listed in Table 1 (Attachnent 1 to this letter) are associated with the RHR and Core Spray systems. %ese valves are normally closed, .and are designed to go closed on receipt of an isolation : signal. %e proposed anenament would revise the Technical j Specification. isolation setpoint for each of the valves of Table 1 to make

the setpoint consistent with the original design of the plant.

h. .

%e present isolation value derived fra the Technical Specifications is

. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level 3. RPV level 3 is one of two isolation i signals which is associated with Group 2 isolation. %e existing Technical Specification for the subject valves erroneously states that the valves go fl closed on a Group 2 isolation. %e original design drawings for the plant,

• l' however, state that the valves in question should go' closed on a RPV level 1 I signal, i . %e prW change would replace " ' Group' 2" with an asterisk and a I

footnote which reads " Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a j Iow Iow low (level 1) signal fra 2B21-N691A, B, C, D. Refer to iten 2.b of  ;

j Table 3.3.3-1" for.the RHR systen valves, and " Closes upon actuation of Core 3 Spray via a Iow Low Iow (Level 1) signal fra 2B21-N691 A, B, C,D. Refer to  :

iten 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1" for the Core Spray systen valves. .

BASIS:

i 4

his change is to make the Technical. Specifications consistent with the l original design basis, as identified by vendor drawings and instrument data i sheets, and with the licensing basis provi6ed in the ESAR. %e design i actuction point of each of the subject valves is consistent with the design j actuation point of its systen. Se accident analyses, as reported in the FSAR, assumes that the Core Spray and RHR systens would be actuated at a RPV Therefore, the actuation of the subject valves at RPV

! level 1 trip point.

' level 1 is consistent with the original design of the plant as reported in the FSAR. %e probability of occurrence or the consequences -of an accident 4

or malfunction of equipnent important to safety is not increased above those evaluated in the FSAR due to this change, because the original accident analysis, as presented in the ESAR, assunes that the subject valves would receive their actuation signals at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. %e possibility for an accident or malfuncticn of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR does not result fra this change, because

. the design is consistent with the design considered in the original accident i analysis. %e margin of safety, as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not reduced due to this change in that the safety analysis i was based on the original design, which assumed - that the subject valves

' closed at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. We conclude, therefore, that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a l

! significant hazards consideration.

4 i

I f

mm.

~. _ _ _._._ _ __ _ _ _ _ _._._. _. _