ML20092N844

Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant

ML20092N844
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	06/12/1984
From:	Reid D, Sawyer E, Sojka R YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20092N843	List: ML20092N842 ML20092N844
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-840612, NUDOCS 8407050119
Download: ML20092N844 (79)

Text

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DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM PLAN FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT s

License No. 50/271 DPR 28 ,

Expiration Date 2007 R

) 7 Approved bi( 1 6 6*/9-8Y R. E. Sojka date a

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b/ ((

D. A. Reid l

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'E. ' A. Sawyer '// ' ' ' ' ' '

b Yankee Atomic Electric Company ,

1671 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 R

8407050119 840619 PDR ADOCK 05000271 F PDR R

l DETAILED 00tfmOL ROOM DESIGN REVDmi PROGRAM PLAN POR THE VERMORT YAmtEE NUCLEhR P000ER PLANT June 12, 1984 General Physics Corporation Columbia, Maryland l

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace

1. INTRO DUC TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Ob j e c t i v e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Scope................................................... 5 1.3 S ch ed u le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. MANAGEMENT AND STAFFIN G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1 S truc tu re o f th e Rev ie w Tea m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 Qua li fica tions o f the Review Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 Integration of the Detailed Control Room Design Review with Othe r Human Fac tor s Activ ities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.1 Wyle Survey...................................... 12 2.3.2 BWROG Con trol Room Survey Prog ram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.3 Supplement i to NUREG-07 37 Activitie s. . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3. DOCLMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.1 Docu me n ta t io n Req u ire men ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2 I npu t D ocu men ta t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.3 Ou tp u t Doc u me n ta t io n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.4 Documen ta tion Con trol Pr oc edu res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.5 Ma nag e men t o f HED Record s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

4. REVIEW PROCEDURES............................................. 18 4.1 Ope ra t ing Expe r ience Rev iew. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 .1. 3 P u rp o s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.2 Me th od ol ogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.2.1 D ocum en t Rev ie w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.2.2 Ope ra to r In te rv ie ws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.2 Con tr ol Room S u r v ey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.1 P u r p o se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.2 198 2 BWROG Su rvey Me thodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22 4.2.3 BWROG Supple men ta l Su rvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2.4 BW ROG S u r vey Upd 4 te . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3 Con tr o l Room Inv e n to r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 i

A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

Page 4.4 System Function Description and Task Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.4.1 Purpose......................................... 25 4.4.2 Me th od o l ogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.4.2.1 Systeins Function Descrip tion. . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.4.2.2 Ta s k A na ly s i s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.5 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.5.1 P u rp o se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.5.2 Me th od o l og y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.5.2.1 I&C Availability....................... 31 4.5.2.2 I&C Suitability........................ 31 4.5.2.3 I&C Location........................... 32 4.6 VI.lida tion of Con tr ol Room Func tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.6.1 Purpose......................................... 33 4.6.2 Me th od ol og y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

5. HED ASSESSMENT AND RESOLUTION................................. 37 5.1 RED As s e s s me n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1.1 P u rp o s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1.2 Me th od olog y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.2 H ED Co r r ec t ion s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.2.1 Purpose......................................... 39 5.2.2 Me th od o log y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.3 I mp le me n ta t io n S ch ed u le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

6. DCRDR FINAL REPORT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS.................... 43 APPENDIX A - BWR OWNER'S GROUP CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM APPENDIX B - TYPICAL DATA COLLECTION FORMS APPENDIX C - RESIMES OF DCRDR TEAM MEMBERS ii

GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION Following the incident which resulted in fuel damage at the Three F8 le Island nuclear power plant, the NRC expressed concern that the man-=achtne interface in the control room may have been a contributing factor. Nume rou s recommendations and suggested ways to istprove this interface in the form of NUREG and REG GUIDES were issued for reviev and conrnent. In addition, numerous papers addressing the problem were issued by industry groups. The regulatory requirements were eventually defined in Generic Letter 82-33 and NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, which states:

" Conduct a control room design review to identify human engineering discrepancies. The review shall consist of (i) The establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team and a review program incorporating accepted human engineering principles.

(ii) The use of function and task analysis (that had been used as the basis for developing emergency procedures Technical Guidelines and plant specific emergency operating procedures) to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations. This analysis has multiple purposes and should also serve as the basis for developing training and staffing needs and verifying SPDS pa rame ter s.

(iii) A comparison of the display and control requirements with a control room . inventory to identify missing displays and controls.

(iv) A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles. This survey will include, among other things, an assessment of the control room layout, the usefulness of audible and visual alarm systems, the information recording and recall capabability, and the control room environ.wn t. "

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION In addition:

"c. Assess which human engineering discrepancies ar2 significant and should be corrected. Select design improvements that will correct those discrepancies. Improvements that can be accomplished with an enhancement program (paint-tape-label) should be done promptly."

Documentation of these efforts is required as follows:

"a. All licensees shall submit a program plan within two months of the start of the control room review that describes how items 1, 2, and 3 above will be accomplished,

b. All licensees shall submit a summary report of the completed review outlining proposed control room changes, including their proposed schedules for implementation. The report will also provide a summary justification for human engineering discrepancies with safety significance to be lef t uncorrected or partially corrected."

NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, also addressed several other items of concern which are directly or indirectly related to the control room review. This program plan describes the method by which the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC) proposes to conduct a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCPDR) at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant.

The Vermont Yankee plant is a 540 megawatt electric General Electric boiling water reactor located in Vernon, Vernont. It went into operation in 1972 and is licensed to 2dO7. The operation of the Vermont Yankee plant is directed by the plant manager and his staff at the plant site. The corporate office is located in Brattleboro, Vermont. Engineering support services are provided by the Yankee Nuclear Services Division located in Framingham, Massachusetts.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 1.1 Obiective The objective of this program is to review and improve, where necessary, the man-machine interface in the logical sequences of safe nuclear power plant operation in all operational nodes. %roughout its years of operation, VYNPC has continued to assess the plant control room with the objective of creating and maintaining a control room environment conducive to safe and efficient ope ration. This process is accomplished by a continuing review of means to provide unambiguous information to the operator thereby minimizing any dif ficulties in determining the plant status. Prior to 'IMI, this process was conducted in an informal manner. Subsequent to the TMI incident, and as a result of later requirements inposed by the NRC, the process is being formalized.

Vernent Yankee's program for maintaining and improving the man-machine interf ace in the plant control rcom is long atarding. Certain steps in the program have already been accomplished. Se following paragraphs describe the events already completed at the time of the submittal of this program plan, as well as those planned for future implementation.

1. A preliminary evaluation of the control room was conducted by an -

engineering contractor using MIL-STD-1472B as a reference. Ce rtain modifications were recommended but no significant safety hazards were discovered which required that imediate action should be taken.

2. A complete control room review was conducted by a team under the g direction of the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) . Wis consisted of a survey of all the control room panels, the control room environment, and operating reports as well as a series of operator interviews and a task analysis.." The review was conducted in accordance with a __

prescribed procedure , used standard forms and was documented in a summary report. This teah. consisted of several engineering and operational personnel of other utilities who operate boiling water reactors, human factors engineers and representatives of the reactor 3

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION venSor, General Electric. Subsequent to this review, a supplemental rev 4=w was suggested by the BWROG to address concerns of the NRO.

3. A review of all modifications to the control board and control room subsequent to the BWROG survey will be conducted. These modifications will be evaluated against the same checklists used in the original survey. This will result in a complete survey which is current and will include the Alternate Shutdown panels, recently installed in response to the requirements of Appendix R. These panels are located outside of the control room.

4. A supplenental survey of the control board will be done using checklists provided by the BWROG. This survey responds to a request by the NRC to the BWROG that the original survey method be augmented.

5. A Task Analysis using the newly developed Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) will be conducted.

6. Human Engineering Discrepancies (EEDs) resulting from all previous steps will be combined into a numbered list, classified and prioritized.

7. Conceptual modifications will be developed to address those HEDs from Step 6 and submitted for review by the management team.

8. Following management team approval of the recommended modifications, a summary report will be prepared which wills

a. Explain in detail the steps taken in the discovery and resolution of the HEDs. Procedures and findings will be included.

b. Provide the list of HEDs and a schedule f0t implementation of those HEDs deemed worthy of correction.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION The general layout of the control room and its interior corponents are shown on Figure 1.

This Program Plan describes a method of completing the DCRDR to meet obligations of Generic Letter 82-33. It incorporates reviews previously comple ted . All reviews, whether done prior to the creation of this program plant or subsegeuntly, were done in accordance with written procedure and thoroughly documented.

1.2 Sco7a The scope of the DCRDR consists of the following activities e A review of historical operational information.

e A representative series of operator interviews.

e A complete review of the control board. .

e An evaluation of the control room environment.

e Documentation and evaluation of any enhancements or mo3ifications suggested by the previous steps.

e A task analysis, using the EOPs, o Documentation, evaluation and prioritization of EEDs reveale t by these steps.

e Development of c neeptual design nodifications, where required.

e Evaluation of these modifications to determine if they resolve the HED and to assure that no new HEDs are created.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION e A sum:ury of the entire process, the findings, a description of any resulting modifications, and a schedule for implementation which will be provided to the NRC.

These items are described in greater detail in Sections 4 and 5.

1.3 Schedule A schedule depicting the sequencing and duration of major tasks in the Vernent Yankee DCRDR process is shown in Figure 2.

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2 Chapter 2 of the DCRDR Program Plan addresses the management and staffing ,[ '

aspects of the review. Section 2.1 describes the structure of the Review p, 5( . 7 Team. Section 2.2 describes the qualifications of the Review Team. A discuasion of how the DCRDR interf aces with and is integrated into the other - '['IC -

human factors activities is contained in Section 2.3. > V:

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1 Review Team has overall responsibility for the program, its implementation, . . . '*

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the resolution of its findings, and the authorization of its '.:. i.. S recomendations. To accomplish this, they direct the efforts of a Design ,m Review Team which will evaluate all previous findings, conduct supplemental .-(

and additional reviews as needed, conduct the Task Analysis, evaluate all <

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Design Review Team will be supplemented by additional personnel as needed.

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The Design Review team will have a core group of specialists in the Tl'l ". ' ; ,

fields of human f actors engineering, plant operations (e.g., licensed . .... .. . ' , , . ,

operators), and instrumentation and controls engineering; the core group will ..{ . .. l -

also include personnel who are cognizant of the related issues of NUREG- V C,'

0737. 1his core group may be supplemented by personnel from other disciplines {j such as nuclear, mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering if required. [.[. e 2.2 Qualifications of the Review Team 'k ' ,,. j ,v .

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The qualifications of key review team members will be as follows: .'I}

• o Human Factors Specialists A degree, at the graduate level, in human ' ,[.

factors engineering is recomended. Vermont Yankee will obtain the .'

services of a human f actors specialist and will use some of the h.,',

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l following criteria during the selection process. Experience in the ...g . ' .-

application of human f actors principles to design and/or evaluation .

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L. Marso!ain R. Branch J. O'Connor ,, R. Liddle n

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Figure 3. Review Team Structure-10

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION of systems and equipent in the power industry is preferred.

Workspace layout, panel and instrumentation design (controls and displays) environmental conditions (e.g., lighting and acoustics) ,

and procedures and training are areas of specific eghasis.

Experience in systems analysis and task analysis mast be within the capabilities of the human factors professionals on the team.

e Reactor operator: A currently licensed senior reactor operator with a minimum of two years' experience in the Vermont Yankee conttol room being reviewed will be included on the Control Room Design Review team.

e Instrumentation and Control Engineer A bachelors degree in electcical engineering and at least five (5) years experience in design of instrumentation and control systems with experience in the display of information will be included on the Control Room Design Review team.

e Program Manager: The Design Review Team will be directed by a Program Manager who shall have knowledge and experience in reactor plant operations, be knowledgeable in the engineering and regulatory requirements and have demonstrated administration and management skills.

e other Disciplines: A bachelor's degree in the specific discipline will be provided as a minimum. A minimum of three years of applied design or operating technical experience is reconnended.

Professional licenses or certification and appropriate society memberships provide additional evidence of the experience level desired. Experience at nuclear plants or oth?r process control applications is preferred. Alternatively, experience with other coglex commercial, industrial, or military facilities ard systems will be considered acceptable.

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GP-R-212105 . ,

NkRMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 2.3 Integration of the Control Rocm Design Review With Other Human Factors Activities ,

The DCRDR Project will interface' with and/or reference previous and ongoing human factors efforts at the Ver;nont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. A description of some of the work is provided below.

2.3.1 Wyle Survey A preliminary survey of the Vermont Yankee control room was performed by Wyle Laboratories in August 1980. FiMings frcrn the survey will be reviewed and included, as found applicable, in the final results.

2.3.2 BWROG Control Room Survey Program In January 1982, the BWROG conducted a control room survey at Vermont Yankee. A team conprised of operations and engineering personnel from several utilities performed the checklist survey with the assistance of consultants from General Electric Company and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. he survey consisted of four phases: (1) an analysis of plant LER's and scram reports to identify possible design-related operator errors, (2) interviews with approximately one-third of the plant operators, (3) panel evaluations using checklists developed from previous surveys and accepted human factors standards, and (4) task analyses and walkthroughs of selected emergency procedures. The result of the survey was a summary report and a conpleted checklist.

Se intent of the BWROG Control Rocm Survey report for Vermont Yankee was to identify areas. of control room design for which modifications should be considered.' These were stated as general suggestions with the understanding that any corrective action should be considered on a control room wide basis.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCZ. EAR POWER CORPORATION Vernent Yankee is currently responding to the requirements set forth in Suppl'e ment 1 to NUREG-0737. his DCRDR Program Plan is the first step in responding to the DCRDR requirements (Section 5 of Generic Letter 82-33).

2.3.3 Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 Activities Given the integrative nature of Generic Letter No. 82-33, the DCRDR process will be coordinated with other post-TMI activities that are addressed in the letter. The results of the DCRDR project can be utilized in specific applications as discussed below:

e EOPs - A portion of the DCRDR (the Systems Function Description and Task Analysis) will use the Vermont Yankee-specific EOPs as its basis. It is assumed that the EOPs wiIl be fully verified and approved before use in the DCRDR portion of the Task Analysis. Thus, examination of the EOPs will inherently integrate their upgrading with the DCRDR.

i e SPDS - Vermont Yankee has no device specifically identified as an SPDS. Safety parameters are prominently displayed both on the control board and on the plant process conputer. He findings of the DCRDR project may result in additional methods of display of these parameters on either the control board or the plant process computer.

o Reg Guide 1.97 - he Verification of the Task Performance Capabilities portion of the DCRDR systematically verifles the presence or absence of information required by the operator during emergency operations. He results of this process will give insight

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into the monitoring instrumentation that is available to the aparator and, conversely, if any type of indication is required but missing.

This information will be available for use in responding to the needs of Reg. Guide 1.97. ,

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l SECTION 3. DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL A large nunber of documents will be referenced and produced .during the DCRDR. Therefore, an efficient and systematic method for controlling these documents is necessary.

3.1 Documentation Requirements The documentation methodology described in this section will be utilized to meet the following requirements:

o Provide a record of all documents used by the review team as references during the various phases of the DCRDR.

e Provide a record of all documents produced by the review team as project output.

e Provide a systematic method to document all identified HEDs and. their resolution.

e Develop project files in a manner that allows future access to help determine the effects of control room changes proposed in the future.

Documentation collected during the DCRDR project will be maintained in the Vermont Yankee files at the Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Nuclear Services Divis ion.

l 3.2 Input Documentation The following documents have been identified as primary reference material which may be used during the review process. As the review progresses it is anticipated that additional material will be identified and re fe renced. Therefore the following list of documents, if available, is prelimina ry.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION e Licensee Event Reports e Scram Reports e Plant Information Reports e Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) e Systems descriptions e Piping and instrumentation drawings e Control room floor plan e Panel layout drawings e Panel photographs e BWROG Generic Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) e Vermont Yankee Plant-Specific E0Ps e Applicable Design Change Descriptions 3.3 Datput Documentation Throughout the review process standard forms will be used to record data, and to document analyses and record findings wherever possible. All of the documentation produced during the course of the review will be controlled in accordance with the procedures described in Section 3.4. The following list represents a preliminary estimate of the types of dccuments that will result from the DCRDR project:

ce Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan e Project Schedule e Operator Questionnaire e Operating Experience Review Report e Panel Checklists e Task Analysis Worksheets e List of HEDs asse's sed according to their safety inplications I

e Photographs of Control Board e Sunmary DCRDR Report 15

GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION 3.4 Documentation Control Procedures All documents used as primary input during the review or generated during the review will be maintained in a centual file at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company Nuclear Services Divison offices. A complete listing of the documents contained therein will be continuously maintained and controlled by the Program Manager or his designee. This file will be available for inspection or audit upon reasonable notice.

3.5 Managemen t of HED Records When an RED has been identified, the engineer records his/her observations on an HED form (Figure 4 shows a typical form). This information allows the Review Team the opportunity to compare all of the discrepancies which apply to a given component. This section of the file will track the entire cycle of an HED from observation, through evaluation, to eventual recommendation and implementation. One possible resolution may read "This KED is being resolved by Engineering Design Change No. xx-xx".

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j GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATZON e IULAN EElEERIE DISCREPANCY REC (RD # PLANT:

REVIEWER: ST DATE: 02/17/82 NO. : 800 PANEL NUMBER I COMPONENT 3 DENT 3FIER 3C 651 RFPT FLOW CONTROL DISPLAYS DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY THESE DISPLAYS ARE NEITHER LOCATED DIRECTLY ABDVE A540CIATED CLN7ROLS NDR ARE THE D15 PLAY CONTRDL PA3R5 ARRANCED IN RDWS COMMENTS sua vEv RECOMMENDATION PRDVIDE GLOB AL LABELING AND/OR DEMARCAT]DN TO ENHANCE CONTROL / DISPLAY RELATIONSHIP.

IMPLEENTATION THIS HED HAS BEEN RESOLVED DEMARCAT3th MA5 BEEN 3MPLEENTED.

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Figure 4. Typical HED Form 17 m

I G?-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATIOil l

SECTION 4. REVIEW PROCEDURES The Vermont Yankee DCRDR review procedures are primarily based on the Human Factors Engineering Control Room Survey, Revision 1, and the supplement produced by the BWR Owner's Group Control Room Improvements Comittee. Wat BWRDG survey program addresses the planning and review phases only of the DCRDR process . Se assessment, inplementation and reporting phases are described in this program plan specifically for the Vermont Yankee DCRDR.

The DCRDR addrecres the following specific objectives:

e To determine Wether the control room provides the system status information, control capabilities, feedback, and performance aids necessary for control room operators to accomplish their functions and tasks effectively.

e To identify characteristics of the existing control room instrumentation, controls, and other equipment, and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance.

e To develop recomendations for measures te correct those deficiencies revealed by the two previous. items, provide priorities for their implementation, and, if needed, provide conceptual design nodifications Wich themselves have been evaluated for human factors conside ra tions.

e To produce a sumary report to the NRC describing the entire DCRDR process, its findings, and the resolution of those findings.

The first objective is concerned with the coupleteness of the control room given control room operator functions and task responsibilities. The second objective is concerned with the suitability of the design in light of human and equipment performance capabilities, individual task 18 h

l l VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION GP-R-212105

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responsibilities, and operational dynamics. The other objectives address those phases not included earlier in the BWROG program.

Six major processes are used to establish and apply benchmarks for identifying human engineering discrepancies of both cogleteness and human engineering suitability e Operating Experience Review e Control Room Survey e Control Room Inventory e System Function Description ard Task Analysis e Verification of Task Performance Capabilities e Validation of Control Room Functions The procedures involved in each of the six processes are discussed in the following sections.

4.1 Operating Experience Review 4 .1.1 Purpose The purpose of the Operating Experience Review is to identify specific factors or conditions that could cause aid /or have previously caused human performance problems and could be alleviated by improved human engineering. This review will provide information on potential problem areas by studying documented occurences of human engineering related problems that have occurred at Vernont Yankee.

Documents which report incidents at other plants, as well as informational reports from vendors and suppliers, or information notices from regulatory agencies, are reviewed under an in-plant program iglemented in response to NUREG-0737, item I.C.5. That information is not reviewed 'again in this program.

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t GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 4.1.2 Me thodology l

I There are two major steps in the Operating Experience Review: a document Review and Operator Interviews. Both tasks were completed as part of the 1982 BWROG Control Room Survey Plan. The document review will be updated since approximately two years have elapsed since the completion of the BWROG work. The nethodologies for both tasks are described below.

4.1.2.1 Document Review Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the Vermont Yankee plant were reviewed to identify plant specific design deficiencies known to have previously contributed to operator errors and to document the need for further evaluation during the other Control Room Review phases.

The 1982 BWROG survey program documented Vernont Yankee plant specific LERs and Scram reports fra the preceding two years (1980-1981). To provide an updated review, LERs and Plant Incident Reports (PIRs) for the Vernant Yankee plant from 1982 to the present will be examined. Any occurrence for which operator error will be identified as a contributing f actor was listed indicating the LER or PIR number and a description of the operator error.

'Ihe survey team will then analyze each event to identify possible deficiencies in the human engineering design of the control room by comparing corresponding items from the Control Room Review checklists. These items will be included in the detailed evaluation during the DCRDR sssessment phase.

The results of the this update will be potential BEDS documenting operating experience problems related to the Vermont Yankee control room design.

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GP-R-212105 VERMot!T YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 4.1.2.2 Operator Interviews The purpose of the Operator Interviews was to obtain direct operator input to aid in identifying potential or actual deficiencies in the control room layout or design or in operating procedures that result in confusion (mental activities) , difficulty (marmal activities) or distraction (the environment) .

For the interview, a representative grote of one-thir<' x more of the operators was selected covering a range of experience, education, ability, and physical size. A total of ten operators were interviewed as part of the 1982 BWROG control room survey program.

Using the questionnaire in Appendix C, operators were asked to respond in writing based on their operational experience and i knowledge of control rooms. Copies of the written responses were provided to the survey team for a preliminary review prior to actual in terviews. Interviewees retained their copies and reviewed them with a survey team menber during a later oral interview.

The interviews were conducted by utility personnel and survey-team menbers with background or experience in operations and engineering or design under conditions conducive to a free flow of information. 'Ihe oral interview took one to two hours for each operator with the entire interview process taking about one day.

Following the interviews, the survey team consolidated the information'obtained and analyzed it to help identify specific areas of concern for detailed analysis during the DCRDR assessment phase.

. l Additional intetviews of operators assigned to the-control room cince 1982 will be conducted. In this way, it is felt that a i l

different perspective will be obtained from those operators who may l have gotten accustomed to the existing control room instrumentation and configuration.

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CP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 4.2 Control Room Survey 4.2.1 Purpose l

The purpose of the Control mom .3crvey is to identify characteristics of instruments and controls, equipment, control room layout, and environmental conditions that do not conform to precepts <>f good human engineering practice, regardless of the particular system or specific task requirements. his is accoglished by conducting a systematic comparison of existing control room design features with human engineering guidelines. The ultimate objective is to identify potential modifications of the operator-control room interf ace which will reduce the potential for human error. 2 13 process was completed as a part of the 1982 survey and the more recent nurvey supplement.

4.2.2 1982 BWROG Survey Methodology The methodology followed in conducting the control room survey is described in Appendix A of NEDC 30285 (BWROG Owner's Group Control Room Design Review Program Sunrnary Report) . The appendix is entitled "BWR Owner's Group Control Room Design Review Program" and is attached.

Each Control Room Sprvey was conducted by the survey team using the BWROG checklists which are titled, in order, (A) Panel Layout and Design, (B) Instrumentation and Hardware, (C) Annunciators, (D) Conputers, (E)

Procedures, (F) Control Room Environment, (G) Maintenance and Surveillance, and (H) Training and Manning. Checklist (A) , (B) , and (C) were completed for each-pane 1 in the control room, including back paneis, auxiliary panels and periphera). equipment that contain controls and displays normally ope' rated by the control room operator. Se remaining checklists were congleted only once since they were applicable to the entire control room.

In completing the checklists, particular attention was given to items identified as potential problem areas in the Operator Interview and in 22

l GP-R-212103 VERMONT YANKEE NUOLEAR POWER CORPORATION i l

the LER Analysis to ensure couplete coverage. These items were compared i to the decklist items where applicable.

Supplemental information was provided in the BWROG workshop to give additional guidance to review team meters in cogleting the decklists.

Each decklist item was presented in the form of a question for consideration by a survey team meser. Following that question was a series of numbers in which the specific item being reviewed was evalu ated . 1he first set of numbers (4 3 210) indicated the degree of cogliance wherein 4 indicated m complicance, 3 irulicated somewhat conpliance, 2 indicated nostly compliance,1 indicated full compliance, and 0 indicated the specific question being considered was not applicable or could not be considered at this time. As each specific question was evaluated, the team menber(s) actually doing the evaluation of that question indicated the relative degree of compliance by circling the applicable nunber.

Following the nunber indicating the degree of cogliance for each item being evaluated was a predeterminec number ranging from one to three which indicated the relative importance of that item with respect to the potential for causing or contributing to operator error. A 3 indicated high potential for operator error, 2 indicate moderate potential, and 1 indicated low potential. In the final evaluation of each item considered, it was the product of the degree of conpliance multiplied by

the potential for operator error that determined if the consideration of corrective action is justified.

Following each checklist item was space for the person performing the evaluation to enter conenents. For ead specific checklist item, these consnents identified items or components of nonsompliance,' the scope of review, or any qualifying statement judged to be appropriate to the evaluation. If, for exangle, a large nunber of conponents are reviewed and only a few were non-conpliance, these were specifically noted in the consnent space and the general rating was "mostly ceipliance." To Provide

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION additional documentation, still photographs were taken of major items or components of non-compliance such as mimic layouts, control / display groupings, labeling systems or equipment locations. Rese photographs were cross referenced to the specific checklist item by a notation in the coment space. Due to the inportance of coments in the evaluation, additional Coment Forms were attached for more detail when necessary.

Each of these control room survey areas and general firdings is described in the BWROG Human Factors Design Review of the Vermont Yankee Control Room Summary Report.

4.2.3 BWROG Supplemental Survey Methodology The 1982 BWROG control room survey areas of the Vermont Yankee control room described above will be again reviewed using the BWROG Supplement checklist. Ris survey will be performed by the review team, supplemented by plant control room operators.

This Supplement is intended to augment Revision 1 of the BWROG Control Room Survey (CRS) Program dated 1/1/81 to further document proposed control room enhancements. The additional items listed in the supplement have been drawn from human engineering gu'lelines recomended in NUREG-0700 and verified through considerable experience of BWROG Survey teams.

Major sections of the supplement checklists are identified by letters corresponding to section designations used in the original checklists.

In order to differentiate between the two nunbering systems, an "S" prefix has been assigned to eadi supplement item. The supplement

~

checklist sections are:

SA. Panel Layout and Design SB. Instrumentation and Hardware SC. Annunciator s SD. Compute rs 24 l

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l GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION SE. Procedures l SF. Control Room Env.i.ronment l SG. Maintenance and Surveillance l

This checklist supplement will be performed during the planned DCRDR activ ities. The results of BWROG 1982 checklist survey and the I Supplement Survey will be conpiled on HED forms described in Section 3, Documen tation. These forms will be the input documentation for the DCRDR Assessment aM Implementation phase.

4.2.4 BWROG Survey Update To update the 1982 BWROG Survey, a review of all changes to the control room ard control board will be conducted by the survey team by

, reviewing all design changes and plant alterations for changes on the control board. The modification to the control board discovered by this search will then be evaluated against the checklists of the original BWROG survey and any findings documented for further evaluation.

4.3 Control Room Inventory The function of a control room inventory in the DCRDR is to determine whether the instrumentation and controls (I&C) needed to support operation under emergency conditions are present in the control room. This function will be acconplished as part of the task analysis effort and the related verification and validation efforts. The determination of IEC availability is described in Section 4.5, Verification of IEC requirements.

4.4 System Function Description and Task Analysis 4.4.1 Purpose The purpose of the Systems Function Description and Task Analysis portion of the DC10R is to identify control room operator tasks and l corresponding instrumentation and control requirements during emergency

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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION ope rations. This will be acconplished by performing an analysis of events encompassed in the Vermont Yankee-specific EOPs.

4.4.2 Methodology This portion of the DCRDR entails two major, sequentially-oriented tasks. Each of the two tasks is discussed separately below.

4.4.2.1 Systems Function Description Plant systems and subsystems in the control room are described in the Vernont Yankee FSAR. 'Ihis information will serve as a reference base for the subsequent Task Analysis und Assessment phases. In addition, the EOPs will be reviewed to select operating scenarios for each walk-through during the Task Analysis. Procedures will be used to exercise and evaluate all major areas of the control board.

4.4.2.2 Task Analysis It is assumed that the procedures used for the DCRDR Task Analysis have already been evaluated and approved for use. Using these as a basis, the review team will identify and document the discrete tasks that the operators must perform during emergency ope ra tions. Correspondingly, the specific instrumentation, controls -

and equipment that are required to successfully perform the emergency operations will be identified and documented. In this task, the skills and knowledge of the human factors consultant, supplemented by operations personnel, will be utilized.

A Task Analy is Worksheet is shom in Figure 5. Operator tasks will be analyzed using the EOPs and documented in the following manner:

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GP-R-212105 VretMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION l

1. The identification of discrete steps in the Vernont Yankee EOPs in order of performance. 'Ihese steps will be recorded in the " Procedural No." column of the Task Analysis form and branching points noted depending on the plant transient being analyzed in the " Scenario Response" column. Note that there may be more tasks subsequently identified in Step 2 below than there are procedural steps or vice versa. In this case, a dash will be entered in the colunn when no explicit precedure step is present in the EOPs.

2. A brief des::ription of the operators' tasks per procedural step will be recorded in the " Task / Subtask" column of the Task Analysis Worksheet. Note that there may be many nere tasks described than are explicitly called out in the procedural step. All tasks, both explicit and implicit, will be documented by SRO subject matter experts and human factors specialists using EOPs, FSAR and System Descriptions.

3. The operator decisions and/or actions that are linked to task performance are then noted in the " Decision and/or Contingent Action Requirements" column. System functional response is described when appropriate in this column. This set of data also includes branching points in the EOPs that determine the outcome of the operating sequence.

4. Input and Output requirements for successful task performance are roted in the "Information and Control Requirements" colunn. These would typically be parameters, conponents or procedural information that is necessary for l operators to adequately nssess plant conditions or system l

l status (e.g., reactor vessel water level,' recire, punp flow, reactor pressure , etc.) . Specific values for parameter 28 f

GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION i l

readings or control selection will be noted based on EOPs and Technical Specifications.

5. Once the Tasks, Decision Requirements, and Information ard Control requirements have been specified, the specific instrumentation and controls (IEC) that the operator requires per procedural step will be documented. All IEC needed to either (1) initiate, maintain or remove a system from service, (2) co'nfirm that an appropriate system response has or has not occurred, i.e., feedback, or (3) make a decision regarding plant or system status will be listed. The "Means" column refers to how the information and control requirements should be presented on the control boa rds (e.g. , switch, me ter, etc.) . He "IEC Identification" column provides the specific panel number and identification number of the actual control or instrument which meets the need expressed in the

" Requirement" and "Means" columns. In this manner, a list of required IEC is developed ard compared to the control board inventory.

The remaining columns of the Task Analysis Form will be utilized during the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities, which is

described in Section 4.4. Rese columns are described below

6. Verification column (used during V&V phase) l " Availability" of the necessary I&C for successful operator l task performance is noted by a check in this column; "Suitabi-lity" of the IEC to meet the information and control requireinents of operator task is noted by a check in this

! Column.

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GP-R-213105 VERMOMT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION t

7. Coments/Cardidate EDs Coments or candidate EDs can be noted in this column during any step of the Task Analysis or V4V phases. Data for EDs will be entered on an ED form and into the databa se.

The Task Analysis Worksheet thus serves as the complete record of operator tasks, decisions, information and control requirements; and I&C availability and suitability during the selected emergency operating sequences. This record is developed through the series of steps described above. All task data will be entered it.'.J the DCRDR database.

A preliminary on-site analysis of tasks will be performed prior to the walk-through to allow early identification of operational requirements ard to refine the task analysis worksheets. Cardidate human engineering discrepancies in control room design will be identified in this process.

Using the appropriate Task Analysis Worksheets, human factors engineers of the review team will perform a walk-through of each scenario with Vermont Yankee control room operators. During this walk-through the tasks required will be analyzed in terms of the presence of necessary instruments and controls or other equipment or job aids (the Verification of Tas!. Performance Capabilities specified in NUREG-0700) and the suitability of equipment, job aids and control room design for reliable execution of the required tasks (the Validation of Control Room Functions specified in NUREG-0700) .

Real-time walk-throughs will then be conducted to fully document the tasks involved for all crew positions and the candidate human engineering discrepancies which may arise. A conplete description of the walk-through method is described in the. validation process in Section 4.6. The task data is subsequently examined in both the verification and validation process described in the sections that follow.

' An important element for the successful and accurate completion of the task analysis is the involvement of all disciplines (engineering, operations and human factors) in each of the steps above.

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l 4.5 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities 4.5.1 Purpose The purpose of the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities is to systematically verify that the Instrumentation and Controls that were identified in the Task Analysis as being required by the operator are s e Present in the Control Room o Effectively designed to support correct procedure performance 4.5.2 Me thodology The Verification of Task Performance Capabilities will utilize a two -

phase approach to achieve the purpose stated above. In the first phase,-

the presence or absence of the Instrumentation and Controls that were noted in the Task Analysis worksheets will be confirmed. This will be done by comparing the requirements in the "I&C Requirements" column?of the Task Analysis Form to the actual control room, IEC 31sted in the "I&C Identification" and "Means" columns.

4.5.2.1 I&C Availability The result of the verification of IEC availability will be a control room inventory in the task analysis worksheet column labeled "I&C Identification." A separate review of the I&C identified above will be done to ensure direct versus indirect indications of pa rame te rs.

The presence or absence of required Instrumentation and Controls will be noted by "yes" or "no", in the " Availability" column of the Task Analysis form. If it is discovered that required Instrumentation and Controls are not available to the operator, any such occurrence will be identified as an RED and documented 31

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLP.AR POWER CORpORATIOil

> accordingly on an RED form. If the response is "Yes" it will signify that the available I&C satisfies the requirements.

4.5.2.2 I&C Suitability The second phase will determine the human engineering suitability of the required Instrumentation and Controls. For example, if a meter utilized in a particular procedure step exists in the control room, that particular meter will be examined to determine whether or not it has the appropriate range and scaling to support the operator in the corresponding procedural step. If the range and scaling are appropriate, it will be noted by checking the "yes" area in the "IEC Suitability" column of the Task Analysis Worksheet. Conversely, if the meter range or scaling is not appropriate for the parameter of interest to the operator, the "no" area in the "IEC Suitability" colunri of the Task Analysis Form will be checked. 'Ihis type of occurrence will be defined as an HED and documented accordingly on an HED form.

4.5.2.3 IEC Location Special attention will be given to the location of indicators in relation to controls to determine if the parameter being controlled is indicated in a location readily viewed by the operator who is controlling or otherwise affecting that parameter. Annuncia tor alarms which require changing operators locations to determine or correct the problem will be evaluated.

l The suitabili.ty review of I&C will be performed by the human factors specialist, an operations expert, and an I&C engineer.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION j i

4.6 Validation of Control Room Functions

-4.6.1 Purpose The purpose of the Validation of Control Room Functions step in the DCRDR process is to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew can be accomplished effectively within (1) the structure of the Vermont Yankee-specific EOPs and (2) the design of the control room as it exists.

Additionally, this' step provides an opportunity to identify EDs that may not have become evident in the static processes of the DCRDR, for example, in the control room survey.

4.6.2 Methcdology Utilizing the completed Tesk Analysis Worksheets, walk-throughs based

'on the Vermont Yankee EOPs will be performed in the control room. A normal complement of the control room operating crew will be performing the walk-throughs.

The purpose of the walk-through is to evaluate the operational aspects of control room design in terms of control / display relationships, display grouping, control feedback, visual and communication links, manning levels and traf fic patterns.

The operating crew will be provided with copies of the EOPs to follow as they are walking through the events. DCRDR team members will use the Task Analysis Worksheets to record observations and potential EDs.

One event at a time will be walked-through. Operators will be

! requested to perform the walk-through in slower than real time to provide  ;

a relatively slow-paced rehearsal of the event.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION During the walk-throughs, the operators will be instructed to speak one at a time and describe their actions. Since this will force serial action, the operations will not be performed simultaneously.

-.Specifically, the operators will verbalize e he cogonent or parameter being controlled or monitored e he purpose of the action e he expected result of the action in terms of system response As the operators walk-through the event, they will point to each control or display that they utilize, and indicate which annunciators are involved.

As the walk-throughs proceed, the operators will note any errors, such as igroper step sequencing or branching, that may occur on the Task Analysis Worksheet. %ese errors will be traced back to the EOPs for investigation to ascertain whether the error coeurred because of a procedural problem.

If a procedural problem is discovered, it will be documented. This documentation will be useful in responding to Item 7 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, which involves the Upgrade of Emergency Operating Procedures. Procedure validation problems will be addressed as part of the task analysis and walk-throughs of the EOPs. 21s documentation will also be useful in any type of long-term training program which involves procedures upgrades.

The operators who performed the event will review the cowleted Task Analysis Worksheets allong with human factors specialists. The operators will be asked to notie any errors or problems that were encountered in.the walk-throughs and to expoum won the source of the errors or problems.

These errors or problems will be documented for investigation as possible NEDs.

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! GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION 1

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For each procedural step, the following types of information will be recorded:

e An indication that the scenario response was accomplished will be noted in the "Scen. Resp." column.

e The identification of which menber (RO, SRO or SS) of the operating crew is performing the usk. 21s will be noted in the

" Crew Member" colum on the Task Analysis Worksheet.

e The location of the crew member when performing the task in the i " Loc." Column.

o A verification of the specific decision and contingent actions that are associated with each operator task. mis will include comunications between and among crew members.

e A verification of the Instrumentation and Controls requiring in the associated procedural step, for exanple, an indicating light on a controller energizing to red, or a pointer on a meter deflecting upward. his will be added to the "IEC Ident." column on the Task Analysis Worksheet.

e Coments related to verification or validation and potential HEDs.

Once the events have been analyzed to extract the infermation noted above, Link Analyses, which trace the movement patterns of the operating crew in 'the control room, may be prepared . to assess whether the control room layout hinders operator movement while performing ' the events.

If the review team decides that the walk-through requires additional objectivity, the analysis will be reviewed by an operator who did not participate in the task.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION Any dynamic performance problems that were uncovered durits this l

- Phase of the DCRDR process will be documented for review in the HED

'Assesament phase of the DCRDR.

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i l GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION l

t SECTION 5. HED ASSESSMENT AND RESOLUTION  !

5.1 RED Assessment All EDs that are identified as a result of the DCRDR process will be assessed and categorized. Additionally, recoassendations for the correction or resolution of HEDs will be generated, anS a recomunended schedule for their implementation will be developed.

4 5.1.1 Purpose The purpose of the HED Assessment phase of the DCRDR project is to examine the HEDs that have been identified and place them into categories in terms of their potential to increase operator error during ope rations. This is accomplished by analyzing and evaluating the problems that could arise from the identified HEDs.

5.1.2 Me tho$ ology The DCRDR review team will citegorize HEDs for their potential to increase operator error during operations. As each HED is assessed, they will be assigned in one of the following categories:

1. Category I - HEDs Associated with Documented Errors HEDs which have been previously documented (as determined in j the Operating Experience Review) as having contributed to a significant operating crew error will be assigned to category

- I. .-

2. Category II - HEDs Associated with Potential or Interactive Errors 1

, l NEDs placed in Category II come from two sources )

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a. If it is judged that the ED degrades performance ard if the effects of the ED are judged to be seriouc enough to cause or contribute to increasing the potential for a nignificant operator error, the ED will be assigned to Category II.

b. If it is judged that the ED has any cunulative or interactive effects with other EDs, it will be assigned to Category II. Cumulative EDs would be those that are placed in this category by their nunber of occurrences, such as improper lahaling characteristics throughout the entire control room. Interactive E M would be those EDs that augment each other such as improper scaling on a meter conbined with the absence of a parameter designation.

3. Category III - EDs Associated with Low Probability Errors of Serious Consequences All HEDs that are judged by the DCRDR review team to have a low potential for error but could result in serious consequences if the error did occur would be placed in Category III.

4. Category IV - Non-Significant HEDs All REDS that are judged by the DCRDR review team to neither increase the potential for causing or contributing to a significant, operating crew error, nor to have adverse safety consequences, nor to have any cunulative or interactive effects will be assigned to Category IV.

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I GP-R-212105 VEFMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATZON 5.2 HED Corrections 5.2.1 Purpose Recomendations for HED resolution or correction will be made by the Review Team for each identified HED. his will be done in an atterqpt to alleviate the human engineering problems that are associated with the HEDs.

5.2.2 Me thodology The following techniques are anong the methods that may be utilized for the corrections of discrepancies.

Those HEDs resulting from the previously described activities will be addressed by the review team in the following manner: Starting with HEDs bearing the highest priority, the list will be evaluated. For those HEDs which appear to have a logical ard straightforward resolution, a recomendation to the management team will be prepared. Before forwarding the recomendation, two additional steps will be performed:

(1) verification that the recomended solution adequately addresses the HED, is feasible, cost effective, and adheres to accepted human factors principles and , (2) validation that this solution does not create another HED.

Those HEDs not readily responsive to a straightforward solution will be assigned either to a menber of the review team, or to the supporting staff, to develop a conceptual solution. Rose solutions will be evaluated by the review team and, if acceptable ard meeting the needs of items 1 and 2 above,"will be recomended to the management team for approval.

In the process of evaluation the review team may find it necessary to produce some form of mockup of the proposed resolution. For this purpose, either a partial mockup of the control board or a complete 39

GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKE NUCLEAR POER CORPORATION 1

I morkup may be necessary. The need for such equipment will be decided by the review team.

Recomendations which receive the management team's approval will be forwarded to the engineering staff foe detailed design and iglementation in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program requirements.

Recomendations which do not receive management team approval will be returned to the review team for further action. It is assumed that the recomendations will be of two kinds:

1. - There will be those whose solution is not approved. These will be evaluated by the review team and a new solution proposed and returned as a recomendation.

t

2. The management team may reject a recomendation on the basis that they do not agree with the severity or rating of the ED.

This rejection will contain a detailed explanation for the' disag reement.

These will be again evaluated by the review team taking into consideration the management teams' explanation. The review team may choose to reclassify the ED or return the rcomendation with a clearer explanation of the ED. If this -second recomendation is rejected, it shall .e reclassified in accordance witn the unagement team's instructions. If the human f actors engineer dissents, this will be documen ted .

If the second recommendation is accepted, it shall be forwarded by the management team 'to the appropriate engineering support services.

l A description of the entire process will be included in the Sumary l

Report. It will include a logging, tracking, and final resolution of l

l these items from observation, to ED, to ultimate assignment to the-

i. preper group for iglementation.

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• GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCIJRR POWER CORPORATION e Correction by enhancement: Enhancement techniques include changing control ard/or display labels and annunciator title legends, or adding demarcation lines or mimic lines to existing arrays of controls and displays. Rese techniques will be mcked g via d rawings. He review team will then judge their effectiveness in resolving the HED. If the, enhancement correction is judged to be effective, it will be considered to be the appropriate resolution, and be so recommended to the management team, i

e Correction by design change: HEDs that cannot be effectively corrected by enhancement may require a design effort, either in terms of cogonent reconfiguration or rearrangement. These design changes will be verified by having operations personnel assess their effectivaness. This may be achieved by having operators walk through the portion of an EOP that involves the utilizativa of the cogonent(s) that were reconfigured or rearranged to see if the design correction in fact did provide an enhancement; or other appropriate operational review methods. These recomended solutions will be forwarded to the k nagement team for their approval, e Correction by training, peacedural modifications or operator task reass ignment. Some HEDs can be resolved through methods that do not require physical mo]ifications to instrumentation and controls. The lack of a required indication could be resolved by supplying this indication on the plant coquter. Training programs could be initiated or supplemented to alert operators to particular control arrangements that not optimal but cannot be reconfigured due to space constraints or separation criteria, ard Procedures could be modified to cogensate for: irreconcilable instrument and control layout or location. Rose " solutions will be forwarded to the mang2 ment team for their approval.

e Category IV. HEDs will ba documented but it is likely that no corrective action will' be taken.

41

GP-R-212109 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATION 5.3 Inplementation Schedule A schedule for implementation of REDS will be developed based on the category assigned, additional engineering study requirements, inglementation complexity, and plant scheduling constraints.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLFAR POWER CORPORATIOil 4

SECTION 6. DCRDR FINAL REPCRT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS At the completion of the DCRDR project, a final report will be gene rated. This report will document, in sununary form, the procedures utilized in the DCRDR. Any departures from the methodologies described in this Program Plan will be noted and justified.

The final report will sunenarize the results of the DCRDR review process. Se HEDs that were identified during the Operating Experience Review, the Control Room Survey ard the Task Analysis will be included along with the proposed modifications for correction and/or resolution for each HED. A tentative schedule for implementation of modifications to correct HEDs will be included. An actual inglementation schedule will not be provided pending completion of design, bid specification, and award of contract for installation of modifications.

The final report will also address the integration of the DCRDR results with other areas of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities, where they occur.

Se results of the DCRDR will be incorporated into Vernont Yankee training programs as applicable. his will ensure that any inplemented changes will be brought to operators' attention with regard to physical modifications or procedural alterations.

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GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUC2 EAR POWER CORPORATION APPENDIX A BWR OWNER'S GROUP CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM O

O

NEDC-30285 APPENDIX A BWR OWNERS GROUP CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY 8/1/83 0

9

NEDC-30285 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 1.0 1

2.0 DEVELOPMIurr OF DESIGN REVIEW METHODOLOGY 2.1 Task Force Membership 1 2.2 Program Development _

5 9

3.0 TRAINING OF REVIEW TEAMS 4.C VALIDATION SURVEY 9 9

50 PRRPORMANCE OF DESIGN REVIEWS 5.1 Program Elements 9 5.1.1 Operator Interviews 11 5.1.2 Licensee Event Report Analysis 12 5.1.3 Control Room Survey 12 5.1.4 Procedure Walkthroughs and Task Analyses 14 5.2 Evaluation Methods 17 5.3 Survey Teams 18 21 6.0 RESULTS REPORTING AND PRIORITIZATION 22 7.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATIONS I

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NEDC-30285 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Title Page 1 Control Room Design Review Timeline 4 2 Control Room Design Review Program Development 6 3 Control Room Design Review Methodology , 10 4 Task Analysis Format 15 S Task Analysis Instructions 16 6 Evaluation Product Classification 19 LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page I

Utilities Participating in the BWR Ovners Group Design 2 Review Program II General Electric Task Force Membership 3 III Design References 7 IV Checklist Subject Areas 13 V Team Member Responsibilities 20 11 k e-

NEDC-30285 1 \

l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Increased awareness of the importance of the human element in reactor safety has recently spawned new regulatory requirements questioning -

the role of human f actors in the nuclear power industry. NUREG-0660, Task 1.D.1 mandates design reviews of all nuclear power plant control rooms to identify human factors enhancements which may reduce the potential for operator error. The BVR Owners Group has responded to this requirement by formulating, as a cooperative effort between the Control Room Dnprovements Committee and General Electric Company, a generic control room review program for perf ormance of these reviews. Utility participation is listed in Table I.

As illustrated it figure 1, the BWR Owners Group Control Root Re view program has been designed and instituted in six stages: (a) d e ve lopment of design review methodology; (b) training of review team s ; (c) performance of a validation survey; (d) performance of control room design reviews; (e) results reporting; (f) implementation of control room modifications. Extensive manpower and exper ise has been applied to each stage of the review process, with final results the culmination of many man-years of dedicated effort.

2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN REVIEW METHODOLOGY The BWR Owners Group Control Room Design Review Program was developed through a cooperative effort between the Control Room Improvements Committee and General Electric Company. After progressing through a series of design iterations and being subjected to several reviews by outside agencies, the program was given final approval by the Control Room improvements Committee in January,1981.

2.1 Task Force Membership Initial work on the hontrol Room Design Review Program was perf ormed by a multi-disciplinary task force within General Electric, working under the direction of the Control Room Improvements Com=1: tee. The composition of this group, detailed in Table II, waa specifically l

selected to bring into play a wide cross section of General l

Elec tric 's experience in reactor design. Included were members with 1 .

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NEDC-30285 Table I UTILITIES PARTICIPATING IN THE BVR OWERS GROUP CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM

• Boston Edison Company Cleveland Electric Illuminating Conpany Commonwealth Edison Company.

• Detroit Edison Company

• Georgia Power Company

• Oulf States Utilities Illinois Power Compa y.

• Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

• Nebraska Public Power District Niagara Mohawk Power Company Northern States Power Company Pennsylvania Power and Light Company.

Philadelphia Electric Company

• Power Authority of the State of New York Taiwan Power Company.

• Tennessee Valley Authority Washington Public Power Supply System I Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Company l

• Participated on inter-utility survey teams t

2

NEDC-30285 Table II GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW TASK PORCE COMPOSITION Punction Qualifications Program Management (1) BS - Nuclear, UCLA PE - Alabama 16 years experience in startup testing and planning, reactor operations (2) BS - Mechanical Engineering, Union College PE - New York 27 years experience in systems design, training, operatiuns, management C&I Engineering BS - Psychology, USF SRO License 21 years experience in reactor operations, training, control systems and design, hu=an factors engineering, biotechnology Itaini ng SRO Certification 7 years experience in reactor operations, t rai ning Systems Engineering 27 years experience in C&I engineering.

panel layout and design, seismic evaluations, human engineering Startup Test Operations SRO License 31 years experience in startup engineering, training, project engineering, performance improvement Hechanical and Nuclear Testing BS - Chemical, U of I PE - Nuclear (Calif) 29 years experience in reactor operations, j startup l

l Nuclear Services Engineering BS - Electrical, Colorse's

19 years experience in .eactor operations, service engineering, maintenance and testing l

Industrial Design ,(1) BPA, Los Angeles l 15 years experience in industrial design, human factors (2) BS - Industrial Design, SJS 15 years experience industrial design, human factors 3

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NEDC-30285 knowledge of reactor operations, human factars engineering, control systems and design, service engineering startup, testing and operations, training, industrial design, and control and instrumen.ation engineering. Additional human factors support was provided by a team of specialists associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, including Dr. T. B. Sheridan, Dr. D. D. Lanning, Dr. J. M. Christensen and Dr. P. J. Nicholson. Total manpower was approximately thirty people.

2.2 Program Development The scope of the Control Room Design Review Program was carefully defined to insure a complete human factors review of Bk'R control rooms addressing all aspects of the requirements of NUREG-0660, Task 1.D.I. However, it was recognized that other requirements related to human factors and control room design are currently being considered in parallel, and that there already exist many specific control room design requirements. To avoid duplication of effort and repetition of reviews already performed, subjects included in the Centrol Room Design Review were selected to eliminate overlap. For example, because a detailed review of training programs is required by NUREG-0660, Task 1. A.2, training program content was not addressed in the Control Room Design Review Program.

ngure 2 illustrates the series of reviews performed in the development of design review checklists, all steps being under the direction: and subjec,t

To Ihi' approval 'ol th'e'Clntrol Room Improvements Committee. Using the sources listed in Table III and the experience of General Electric engineers as a data base, a preliminary set of checklists was developed. Items included in these checklists were selected based upon the criteria that each (a) was within the defined scope of the task requirements specified by NUREG-0660, Task 1.D.1, (b) was applicable to Bk'R control rooms, and (c) could potentially cause or contribute to operator error. Then followed an exhaustive series of #design iterations incorporating comments from coc'prehensive internal and external reviews. This process was intended to verify that all task requirements were satisfied, that the approach used was valid, and that all necessary aspects of control room design were l

addressed.

5 l

NEDC-30285 I

Data Base l l

s, 1

NUREG -

0660 ' Within Scope of Task Appliccbie to BWR Potential for Error v

Preliminary. Checklist v d Internal Reviews: External Reviews:

GE BWROG MIT (assoc. )

INP0 t

f v

Workshop v

Validation Survey v

Owner's Group Review v

Final Checklist Figure 2 Control Room Design Review Program Development 6

1 s

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NEDC-30285 Table III DESIGN REFERENCES l

1. Baker, C. A. and Grether, W. F., " Visual Presentation of Information,"

WADC TR 54-160, 1954, Wright Air Develope 2nt Center, WPAFB, Ohio.

2. Dreyfuss, H., The Measure of Man, Whitney Publications Inc., NY, 1967.

3. Kemeny, J. G. (Chairman), " Report of the Presidents Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," October, 1979.

4. Malone, T. 8., et al., " Human Factors Evaluation of Control Room Design and Operator Performance at Three Mile Island-2, NUREG/CR-1270, Essex Corporation, January, 1980.

5. Malone, T. B. et al, " Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation,"

NUREG/CR-1580, Essex Corporation, July, 1980.

6. McCormick, E. J., Human Factors In Engineering and Design, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill Inc., NY, 1976.

7. Rogovin, M. , and G. T. Frampton, Jr. , "Three Mile Island, a Report to the Commissioners and to the Public".

8. Sahley, L., Dimensions of the Human Figure.

1

9. Seminara, J. L., et al, " Human Factors Review of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Design," EPRI NP-309.

10. Seminara, J. L. et al, " Human Factors Methods for Nuclear Control Room l Design," EPRI NP-1118. I

11. VanCott, H. P. and R. G. Kinkade (Eds), Human Engineering Guide to Equip-i ment Design, Rev ed., Dept. of Defense, GP0, 1972.

l 7

NEDC-30285 Table III (Continued) l l

12. Woodson, W. E. and D. W. Conover, Human Engineering Guide for Equipment Desioners, Ind. ed. , University of California Press, Berkeley, CA,1964.

13. IEEE Std 566-1977, " Recommended Practice for the Design of Display and Control Facilities for Central Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

14. IEEE Std 567-1979, " Criteria for the Design of the Control Room Complex for a Nuclear Power Generating Station."

15. MIL-STD 803A-1 (USAF), " Human Engineering Design Criteria"

16. MIL-STD 1472-C, " Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities."

17. NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons learned Task Force Status Report and Short-term Recommendations."

18. NUREG-0585, "THI-2, Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report".

19. NUREG-0660, " Action Plans for Implementing Recommendations of the President's Commission and Other Studies of the TMI-2 Accident."

20. NUREG-0659, " Staff Supplement to the Draft Report on Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation."

8 l

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NEDC-30285 An independent six week review of the BWR Owners Group program was performed by a consultant team consisting of seven contributors from two departments of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This team tested the program for completeness, adequacy and validity. Comments were also received from a review performed by the Institute of Nuclear Pcwer Operations.

The revised program resulting from this series of reviews was utilized in a six day workshop for utility personnel, and validated through a trial survey. Feedback from these sessions was incorporated into the final version of the BWR Owners Group Control Room Review Program, approved by the Control Room Improvements Committee in January, 1981. This final version was used in performing all subsequent design reviews.

3.0 TRAINING OF REVIEW TEAMS In October of 380, a six day workshop was held at the General Electric BWh Training Center in Morris, Illinois to present the design review program to utility personnel and provide instruction in human factors evaluations.

This training program encompassed all phases of the review p.acess and included practic- time on General Electric's BWR-3 simulator.

4.0 VALIDATION SURVEY Validation of the design review process was performed at the Duane Arnold Energy Center in November of 1980 with representatives from General Electric, MIT and other universities, and three utilities present. Feedback from this first review, and inputs received dering the workshop, were incorporated into the final version of the BWR Owners Group Control Room Design Review Program.

5.0 PERFORMANCE OF DESIGN REVIEWS l

5.1 Program Elements .t As illustrated in Figure 3, the BWR Owners Group Control Room Design Review Program consists of four phases: (a) :btaining direct operator input through operator interviews; (b) an evaluation of l

9 t

NEDC-30285 i

l Pha se Function Method I Operator Interview Direct Operator Input ' Representative Selection Prepared Questionnaire Cross-reference to Checklists 11 LER Analysis Historical Review LER's Previous 2 years Identify Known Problems Review for Operator Errors '

Cross-reference to ecklists III Control Room Survey Ccmpare Engineering Aspects Checklists and Surveys with Established HFE All Inclusive Review Criteria IV Emergency Procedure Evaluate Operational Selected Emergency Procedurt Task Analysis and Aspects of Control Task Analysis Walkthrough Room Design Traffic Patterns Videota pe l

l

! Figure 3 Control Room Design Review Methodology 10 l

i NEDC-30285 I .

l l l

plant operating experience through analysis of Licensee Event Reports f (LER's) and scram reports; (c) an evaluation of control panel design utilizing a series of prepared checklists compiled from recognized human fcctors standards; and (d) task analyses and walkthroughs of i

selected procedure s. These techniques were selected from knorn human f actors evaluation methods and closely conform to those used in previous successf ul review ef fort s. Data collected in each of the four review phases are collated into plant summary reports.

5.1.1 Operator Interviews The operator interviews are designed to obtain directly the benefit of day-to-day plant operating experience. Since many aspects of panel design may not be readily apparent without actual involvement in plant activities, interviews represent an integral part of the survey process.

Approximately one-third of the licensed operators at each plant were selected to participate in interviewa. This sample size was judged suf ficient to encompass a wide variety of operator opinion, determine areas of common concern, and provide for accumulating data on operators' physical characteristics. An attempt was made to include a complete spectrum of operator experience, education, ability, and physical size.

l Because experience has demonstrated that more complete responses are t

obtained when operators are allowed time to deliberate the questions.

a prepared questionaire was devised f or the Control Room Survey.

Operators were asked to complete these questionaires prior to the arrival of the survey team, based upon their own knowl.3dge and l

experience and without consulting other opera *cre. Their responses then served as topics for more detailed disct esions during a later, in-depth oral interview with a survey team member.

l l Topics incleded in the interview questionaire were carefully selected l

to allow for operator input on a wide variety of subjects and to address the conee'.no for which operating experience must serve as the primary source of information. To assure maximum credibility, 11

NEDC-30285 I persons with experience in operations were chosen to conduct the int erviews. Generally, the interviewer would not be an employee of the host utility to provide for a f ree flow of information.

l 5.1.2 Licenaee Event Report (LER) Analysis Aspects of control room design which ,have been contributing f actors in past operator errors may sometimes be identified through analysis 4 i

of plant operating experience. In *.he Control Room Design Review program, this information is obtained through operator interviews and through review of plant LER's and scram reports for the twc year period preceding the survey. These documents were searched f or examples of operator error possibly caused, or compounded by, design related considerations. Any events so identified were designated for further review during the survey process (checklist evaluations, task analyses, and procedure walkthroughr).

1 5.1.3 Control Room Survey The Control hoom Design Review Program uses, as a central evaluative technique, a series of checklists compiled f rom accepted human f actors standards and adapted specifically for BWR's. As such they comprise a generic program directly applicable to the product line j being surveyed. Extensive consideration has been given to assuring that, while all desired aspects of control room design are addressed, superficous, redundant, and non-applicable itens were eliminated.

Where possible, the emphasis has been placed on verifying that the functional requirements of panel components are satisfied, rather than recommending specific types or designs of hardware.

The checklists of the Control Room Design Review were atructured to l cover the subject areas listed in Table IV within the intended scope of the survey , requirements. Checklist sections addressing (a) panel i

layout and de'aign, (b) instrumentation and hardware, and (c) annunciators are used in performing evaluations of individual

pa nels. Sections addressing (d) computers, (e) procedures, (f) e nviro nment , (3) maintenance activities, and (h) training and manning apply to the control room as a whole.

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i l NEDC-30285 1

Table IV i

CHECKLIST SUBJECT AREAS l

A. PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN D. COMPUTERS Anthropometrics and control Console I room layout '

Capability Demarcation lines and mimica CRTs Control / Display grouping Typers Color codes Labels Temporary modifications E. PROCEDURES itaffic patterns and panel a rrang ement Availability Access and recognition B. INSTRUMENTATION AND HARDWARE Format Cont ent Cont roller s References Indicators Re vi sion Reco rder s Logkeepi ng Indicating light s Switches F. CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONKENT Emergency switches

Key-lock switches Communications Auditory displays C. ANNUNCIATORS Lighting Heating and venti 11ation Grouping Fire control Window design Emergency situations Visual alarm General Audible alarm Acknowledgement C. MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE Visual alarm Procedure s Operator functions Maintenance Jumpers and lifted leads Nuisance alarms Pe rmanent modifications Tags Spare parts Procedures H. TRAINING AND MANNING Training i

,- Control room manning Shif t change l

l l

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NEDC-30285 l

5.1.4 Procedure Walkthroughs and Task Analyse s Task analyses and walkthroughs of selected emergency procedures are performed in order to evaluate operational aspects of control room design. Included in this evaluation are control / display relation-ships, availability of information, visual and communication links, traf fic patterns, and manning levels.

~

Using written plant procedures as a guide, task analyses are prepared using the format shown in Figure 4. Each sequential acep identified within the procedure is then evaluated according to instructions provided with the form (Figure 5). This analysis consists of the following steps:

(1) Operating events are defined (2) Operator tasks are identified for each event under consideration (3) Control and instrumentation requirements are specified for each operator task (4) The completeness of the control room inventory is ver~ified through comparison with instrumentation identified in the task analysis (5) The task sequences are validated with walkthroughs of scenarios encompassing the events being considered. Traffic patterns, communication requirements and manning levels are also considered.

As a minimum, valkthoughs arv performed of existing plant procedures for a scram and a loss of coolant accident.

l Because the event-oriented procedures currently in use will soon be replaced with symptom-based procedures, task analyses performed during the design review are centered primarily around the Emergency Procedure Guidelines developed by the BWR Owners Group. While plant 14 m

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( 1) TASK

?he task sequence is developed fma the procedure being evaluated and the predetemined scenario. Each required operator action is listed as a separate task with diagnosis considered the fint task for i

energency pmcedures. S.ibtasks are listed in the same colan ,

identified by indentatitm.

(2) DEVI3 A0 CATION For each task or subtask considered in Column (1), the grimary control or display utilized by the operator in acceplishing this task is identified and located.

( 3) ASSOCIATED DEVICE 3AOCATICN Listed is this coltann are any devices associated with the primary control or display listed in Colmn (2). This may include backup instrtmentaticri, indicating lights , alarms , et c.

(4) ASSISTAN G/CDMMUNICATIONS Notaticri is made in this oolten if assistance is required tiy the operator to ecucplete the task or if a connunication must be made .

( 5) NOTES Any item fotrid discrepant in the walkthrough will be listed in.this 4

colunn. For each task, coltans (1) thmuti (4) are analyzed in tems of the following consideraticris:

- Is the sequence valid and ocaplete?

- Is sufficient infomaticri immediately available to the operator to l oasplete the task?

- Does each eitioni contml and display identified in coltane (2) and (3) confom to checklist evaluation criteria?

- Do control / display relationships meet checklist criteria?

- Are shift manning levels adequate to perfom the task?

- Are traffic patterns triobetructive?

- Is direct feedback used to verify control fianctions?

/

l l Figure 5 l

Task Analysis Instructions l

l 16 1 . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . _ _ _ . - . , . . . _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ - . . , _ _ , . . _ . ._. . _ . . -

NEDC-30285 specific procedures based upon these guidelines are not yet available, the analyses perf ormed provide much usef ul inf ormation on the adequacy of present control room instrumentation and the ability l of the operator to respond in accordance with the Guidelines within the f ramework of existing control room design. .is such, they serve as a valuable method of integrating procedure and control room upgrade ef fort s. More detailed analyses are expected to be performed at the time actual plant specific procedures are prepared.

52 Evaluation Methods An in-depth analysis of control room dasign requires review of every panel containing controls and displays normally used by operators, including auxiliary and back panels. Evaluations are therefore performed on a panel-by-panel basis, checklist Sections A, B, and C being completed separately for every panel.

Each checklist item is evaluated by means of two numerical ratings:

(1) a " compliance f actor" indicating the degree to which the panel under consideration co= plies with that criterion, and (2) a

" potential for error f actor" representing the relative likelihood that non-compliance with that checklist item could caust er contribute to operator error.

A graded system of compliance evaluations is amployed because a simple yes/no judgement of design compliance with a given human j

factors standard nay provide only limited information when a wide spectrum of actual design ef f ectiveness is possible. Therefore, each panel is rated on a scale of one to four for each checklist item.

"One" indicates full compliance with a given criterion on the panel being reviewed, "two" indicates that the criterion has been "mostly" complied with, "three", indicates "somewhat" compliance, and "four" l indicates total non-compliance. A " sero" signifies that the criterion is not applicable to that panel.

The " potential for error factor" has been preassigned for each checklist ites, based on the work of a task force consisting of approximately thirty General Electric and utility engineers f rom 17 l

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9

i '

l NEDC-30285 a wide variety of disciplines. Each item was independently evaluated by each task f orce member, based upon his own knowledge and experience. From this data base, a final value was assigned based upon the statistical frequency distribution of the ratings.

Each rating f actor was reviewed and , approved by the Control Roo=

Improvements Committee of the BWR Owners Group. The resulting factors ranged f rom one to three "three" indicating "high" poteatial f or operator error, "two" a " moderate" potential, and "one" a " low" potential for causing er contributing to operator. error.

These two rating f actors, the degree of compliance assigned by the survey team, and the predetermined potential for error, are multiplied together to obtain a final Evaluation Product. These Evaluation Product s are then utilized in forming preliminary prioritization recommendations for control roo~m enhancements (see Figure 6). Final corrective action will be determined in an itee-by-item review of these suggested areas, addressing safety significance of the components and systems involved, f requency of use and the consequences of required operator retraining.

5.3 Survey Teams i

The BWR Owners Group Control Room Design Review is intended to be '

J performed by inter-utility review teams composed of members with expertise in a variety of disciplines.

Four such teams have currently been formed, each typically consisting of representatives from three or four utilities with backgrounds in operations, control and instrumentation or engineering, a human f actors consultant and a General Electric engineer. The host utility provides additional support as required in the areas of computers, operation $, engineering, maintenance, and training. The result.ing team structure thus includes expertise in all necessa y fields. Or.e l utility employee is designated as the " team leader," rer;ponsible f r scheduling the review and coordinating review team aggivictes, Individual team member responsibilities are liste.d in Table V.

18 f

. . . .~ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ __________-____________0

III C0hiROL ROOM REVIEW CD79Eh7 FORM This fom is to be used during the perfomance of the Control Rocc: Review to 5 identify, for each specific checklist item as necessary, the scope of review, items or osmponents of non-compliance, or any qualifying statements ,

oppmpriate to the evaluation of that checklist item. When this fom is used, the checklist item ntaber is to be entered here, and a note is to be made in the space following the checklist item to identify the use of this concent -

fom, assuring proper cross-referencing. This fom is to be placed in the survey package directly following the page on which the checklist item appears.

Item Cement i

O e

M iii T

ll _- _.

III CONTROL ROOM REVIEU Panel A PANEL LAYOUT and DEIGN A1 For centrol panels:

A1.1 does the design generally c:eet measurement 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

standards per the attached anthropemetric diagrams (complete and attach)

A1.2 are they of the sa=e layout and design on 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

multi-mit plants (not mirror image)

A1 3 when panel cc:cponents are pemanently 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

removed, are spaces covered to prevent debris or dust frec entering panel internals and repainted to avoid visual distinctiveness A1.4 have sharp corners and edges been 4 3 2 1 0 x 1 =

eli=inated?

A2 Are lines of decarcation, mimics or other graphic displays:

A2.1 used to distinguish between co::nonly shared 4 3 2 1 0 x 2 =

syste=s or components in multiple mit control rooms A2.2 used to encicae related displays 4 3 2 1 0 x 3 =

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} GP-R-212105 VERMONT YANKEE NUCIEAR POhTh CORPORATION APPENDIX C RESM OF DCRDR TEAM MEMBERS 4

e s

m GENERAL l'HYSics COHl' ORA TION

~

O ROBERT J. LIDDLE dEJtJF Manager, Human Factors Power Services M

EDUCATION M.S , Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1 B.S., Psychology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State _

University b

EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1980 - Present Mr. Liddle is a human factors engineer responsible 'or .

managing power plant control room design review methodology, staffing, and training programs. He provides in-house staff instruction in technical and administrative .,

aspects of control room reviews. Mr. Liddle serves as project manager for several human factors projects and has had experience with utility / Nuclear Regulatory Commission _

negotiations involving human factors issues.

e Program Plan Development Developed program plans for various utilities which present detailed methodologies utilized in the performance of control room design reviews. The program plans encompass management, staffing and data collection i and interpretation issues. a e Control Room Design Review Managed detailed control room design review projects at the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Susquehanna Steam Electric Station and Washington Public Power ,

Supply System No. 2; acted as lead human factors engineer in control room design review for Georgia Power Company's Plant Vogle, Unit 1, and managed human factors review at Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

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e Selection Testing -

Adninisters General Physics Basic Mathematics and -

Scie,nce Test (BMST) for operator training and select ion; -

assists in human reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear plant applications and the accompanying task analytic procedures.

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GENERAL PilYSICS CORPOH.1 TION -.

e Development of Human Engineering Standards __;

Compiled and developed standards, in control coding, -

legend plate design, mimic and demarcation lines, and color coding practices.

o Human Factors Training Instructs utility and industrial personnel in topics of performance evaluation techniques, experimental methodology and control room reivew procedures.

1977 - 1978 virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University In his research project, Mr. Liddle investigated the use of videotapa recording apparatus in an assessment center process. He assisted in scheduling and debriefine participants, data collection and interpretation, and rapor t wr iting .

PROFESSIONAL Member, Human Factors Society AFFILIATIONS PUBLICATIONS Applied Human Factors in Power Plant Design and Operation, General Physics Corporatien, 1980, Coauthor with D. C.

Burgy, D. A. Doyle, H. F. Harsam.

Suscuehanna Steam Electric Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan, General Physics Corporation, 1982. /

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan, General Physics Corporation, 1983,  ;

Coauthor with D. C. Burgy.

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June 1984 RICHARD L. BRANCH Assistant Operations Supervisor - Ve rmont Yankee Experience Mr. Branch has amassed an impressive list of experience in power plants beginning in 1946 as a member of the US Navy. Eleven years in various marine engine rooms were followed by two years as Engineer on a diesel submarine.

This, in turn, was followed by a year of training in the US Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit at West Milton, NY, and the Westinghouse Bettis Laboratories.

Six years of on-board experience followed on the USS Robert E. Lee and the USS George Bancrof t where he served as Engineering Watch Section Supervisor.

Following his retirement from the LS Navy, with twentv years service, he was employed by General Dynamics. Electric Boat Division in Groton, Ccnnecticut, as a Technical Aide.

He joined the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corperation staff in 1965 as a Shift Supervisor. This was during the early pnases of plant construction.

During the ensuing two years he was loaned to the Millstone Point Company as a Shift Supervisor and assisted them during the construction and start-up periods.

At the completion of his Millstone assignment he returned to Vermont Yankee as a Shif t Supervisor during the late construction period and participated in completion and start up of this plant. He continued as Shift Supervisor until 1976. Since then he has servced as Assistant Operations Supervisor and Operations Supervisor.

Licenses Mr. Branch holds or has held the following licenses and ratings:

1. AEC Senior Operators License for Millstone 1

2. AEC Senior Operators License for Vermont Yankee (currently in force)

3. Senior Chief Engineer USN

4. Operating Engineer USN

5. Engineer USN E_ducation Mr. Branch completed a High School Equivalency program while in the US Navy. He has completed a total of 12 US Navy training school, among which were included:

Machinist Mate School Class A Engineman School (Diesel)

Class C Engineman School (Diesel)

Cround Control Approach Schcol (Engineman)

Basic Nuclear Power School Training Unit S3G Nuclear Power Plant School (Bettis)

In civilian life he has completed:

BWR Reactor Operator Training Program (Morris, Ill.)

Program of Reactor Experiments (Argonne National Lab.)

In three different years ('77, '78, '79) he has requalified on the Browns Ferry Simulator and the GE BWR Simulator.

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. c- e 66 *71*.. C BACKCROUND 1980 - present YANKr.L AIte!!C LLECTRll COMPA*0 Senio Engineer with Yankee Atemis Electrit Company. Responsible for Instrument & Control projects in the Plant Enginee r ing Depa r tmen t. These include Yankee Control Room De s i gn Review, Vermont Yankee Control Room Design Review, Seabrook Eq u ipt.e n t uualification procram and the preparatinn and review of EDCRs.

1977 - 1980 UNDERVRITERS LABORATORIES Project Engineer responsible for the coordinatlan, . ost estimates for pro W t and performance of a five member tea- invostinating n.imerical centrollets.

programmable controllers. AC and D( speed control:ers, energy management equipment motor control centers, s'arter, centactors, relays, switches, etc.

In addition wcrked on d e v e 1 < m r..r n t at s t anie r.t = ind test prNrais for indust- i contro: e r;u i pne n t .

1975 - 1977 G1has a li! L L , INL.

Associate Electrical Nuclear Engineet on a 2300 't' dual unit nuclear power plant utilizing pressuriz.d water 'vne re.i tors. !c-hnica' respons t h il l *. f e incluce development of controi pa.1. weny, preparativi. of electrical sketches, review and approval of electrical elementary and block diagrams, vendor drawines, preparation of electrical division specifications for solid state and conventiona; equipment, technical and commercial comparison of bids. In addition, 'interf aced with other project disciplines to coordinate electrical and control equipment requirements.

1973 - 1975 STOhE 6 WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.

Control Systems Engineer en 2000 MW dual unit nuclear power plant utilizing pressurized water type reactors. Technical responsibilities included instrument application, preparation of control loop diagrams, logic diagrams, logic system descriptions, electrical diagrams, review and approval of vendor drawinn .

preparation of control systems Jianrams and cpecifications, techt.? cal and cor-cercial comparison of bids and preparation of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report .

EDUCATION A.A.S. in Electrical Tecpnology - Queensboro Communi_tg College - 1970 B.E.E., Bachelor of Electrical Engineer!nc. Pratt Institute - 1973

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.. "ii t ei He . A r.w r it n.i s n'e 1 Mr. Marsolais' experience in power plant operation, control heards and control roons started in 194.? when he hogan operatirm. narine power plants in the l'nited State. Merchant 'fa r i a. fleet. -

11 1 ' six v e :i r s a-operator includes hot. licensed md i.n l : snied experien e in s t c a:- engines and turbines, hoilers, turbo-ele.tri. Jrive~ and diese1 e tut i n e s .

In 1948, he turned te shoreside. or .tationary. plant ~ and <p. u t two years operating industria! plant- before joining the electric power company.

In 1951, he joined the New ingland Electrir. Systen as a L'at ch en ginee r '

switchboard operater in t h. gen.ratine s'. it lat. at Newburv'n' '

"A In !"5 he becam a Watch engiace- at ti &ner t !w statien ir c. r e n s . .

I: lwW. wher. t hs Yan,et p i o,: s a ., nearine .'onp i e t t on . he joined m stJff a' a Control rom Orerato'- ,utsequentl'. hecomine .i Snlft Sup.rVl40!

in 1961, servine in t '- t - 9.witim until IMO

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.' n. wa- . ,- i g:;e d ' t . c . on - uper. iso; e 'n o r c.. ,lett Vermont Tankee plant. i 'l l ow in.: a training period at t hi .eneral Electrit _

Bb'R s imu l a t o r in Morris, 11. . ne wa- loaned to Nor theast ' t i l i t i e s. to assist in the completion of ths 'f i l l s t .:n. I nucle.it plant.

3 l i, i.i. he wa- t r o n e. : e r t . . a in,ee h iear  :... Divisian's Systems Engineering Group. During the ensuring period, he was responsible for the den.ign/ management of several major items such as the Vermont Yankee reactor building crane replacement, the fire hazards evaluation for all the -

Yankee plants, system safety classification for all plants; and responsible for coordinatinE the Vermont Yankee plant responses for the issues resulting from the Three Mile Island plant incident.

In 1980, he became the Vermont Yankee Project Manager, responsible for procurement and delivery of all engineering support services by the Yankee Nuclear Services Division on behalf of Vermont Yankee. As such, he was also directly responsible for the receipt and delivery of all licensing communication with the NRC.

• Ile is currently a Principal Engineer in the Plant Engineering Department of Yankee Nuclear Services Division. __

_ EDUCATION -

Mr. Starsolais has com'pleted programs at the followin. tnstitutions:

l'.S. Maritime Servicen ; raining school (Eng.)

Marine Engineers Beneficia. Assoc. Eng. Trainine school tiawley-Mullane School of Steam Engineering Merrimack College Lawrence Industrial Sch. 1

Resume of Leona-d D. Marsolais Page 2 Yankee Operator Training Prograr.

GE BWR Simulator Operator Training Center Northeastern University Worcester Polytechnic Institute (Project Management Seminars)

Battelle Institute (Management Seminars)

CREDENTIALS Mr. Marsolais holds, or has held, the following:

2nd Assistant Marine Steam Engineers License 3rd Assistant Marine Diesel Engineer

• Massachusetts First Class Power Plant Operating Engineer Massachusetts Nuclear Power Plant Senior Supervising Engineer Senior Control Room Operators License (Yankee)

Senior Control Room Operator Equivalent (BWR Simulator)

• Associate Degree in Heat Engineering (Northeastern)

• Currently in force i

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