Text

Audit for Mark I Containment Long-Term Program - Structural Analysis for Operating Reactors,Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2, Technical Evaluation Rept
	ML20080K634
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/27/1983
From:	Le A, Subramonian N, Triolo S; FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Shaw H; NRC
Shared Package
ML20080D240	List: ML20080K634; ML20080N463;
References
	CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, RTR-NUREG-0661, RTR-NUREG-661 GL-83-08, GL-83-8, TAC-07939, TAC-07940, TAC-57156, TAC-57157, TAC-7939, TAC-7940, TER-C5506-329, NUDOCS 8309290297
	Download: ML20080K634 (44)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ _ _

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT l

l AUDIT FOR MARK I CONTAINMENT LONG-TERM PROGRAM - STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS FOR OPERATING REACTORS GEORGIA POWER COMPANY l

E. I. HATCH NUCLEAP PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 4-NRC DOCKET NO. 50-321, 50-366 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07939, 07940 FRC ASSIGNMENT 12 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASK 329 I

Preparedby Franklin Research Center Author:

N. Subramonian, S. Triolo, 20th and Race Streets A. K. Le Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:

N. Subramonian Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:

H. Shaw September 27, 1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

Prepared by:

Reviewed by:

Approved by:

N O %5 ~~ 0,'r m j{}y I

m Principal Author Project Manager Denartrpedt Director (Acting)

Date: S*27 d3 f gl'-3)

Date: 9

'2.-). 83 Date:

XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDit,4 g

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.00. Franklin Research Center N

20th and Race Streets. Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000

4 4

TER-C5506-329 i

4 CONTENTS i

Section Title Page i

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 AUDIT FINDINGS.

2 3

CONCLUSIONS.

7 4

REFERENCES.

8 APPENDIX A - AUDIT DETAILS APPENDIX B - ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 1

4 tj i

l i

l iii nklin Research Center

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TER-C5506-329 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NBC.

l l

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Nh Franklin Research Center A DMuon ef N Fem W

TER-C5506-329 1.

INTRODUCTION The capability of the boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I containment suppression chamber to withstand hydrodynamic loads was not considered in the original design of the structures. The resolution cf this issue was divided into a short-term program and a long-term program.

Based on the results of the short-term program, which verified that each Mark I containment would maintain its integrity and functional capability when subjected to the loads induced by a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the NRC staff granted an exemption relating to the structural factor of safety requirements of 10CFR50, 55 (a).

The objective of the long-term program was to restore the margins of safety in the Mark I containment structures to the originally intended margins. The results of the long-term program are contained in NUREG-0661

[1], which describes the generic hydrodynamic load definition and structural acceptance criteria consistent with the requirements of the applicable codes and standards.

The objective of this report is to present the results of an audit of Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 plant-unique analysis (PUA) report with regard to structural analysis. The audit was performed using a moderately detailed audit procedure developed earlier [2] and attached to this report as Appendix A.

The key items of the audit procedure are obtained from

" Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide" [3), which meets the criteria of Reference 1.

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TER-C5506-329 2.

AUDIT FINDINGS A detailed presentation of the audit for Hatch Units 1 and 2 is provided in Appendix A, which contains information with regard to several key items outlined in the audit procedure [2].

Based on this detailed audit, it was concluded earlier that certain items in the Hatch Units 1 and 2 PUA reports

[4, 5) indicated noncompliance with the requirements of the criteria [3] and that several aspects of the analysis required further information. Based on this conclusion, the Licensee was requested to provide information with regard to the items contained in Appendix B of this report.

The Licensee's responses were obtained during a meeting held on August 31, 1983. A brief review of the Licensee's responses is provided below.

Request Item 1 In response to this item, the Licensee stated that the vacuum breaker support pipes in Hatch Units 1 and 2 were analyzed using the accelerations at the vacuum breaker centroid obtained from the computer model. Other loads such as dead-weight, pressure, and impact loads on the vacuum breaker were also evaluated and included in the analysis.

The calculated stresses were below the allowables. The Licensee's approach is technically adequate. The criteria for vacuum breaker modifications were not addressed in Reference 3; hence, the vacuum breaker evaluation is outside the scope of this Technical l

Evaluation Report (TER). However, this issue will still be examined as part 1

of the Mark I Long-Term Program and will be addressed in a separate TER.

A Request Item 2 i

In response to this item, the Licensee indicated that, with regard to Hatch Unit 1, the operability and functionality evaluations for the ten valves that were not included in the PUA report will be completed by December 1983.

The Licensee further indicated that no difficulty is anticipated in qualifying these valves for operability and functionality. The Licensee's response has resolved the concern.

I nklin Research Cerder A Onasson of The Franken heenute a

TER-C5506-329 Request Item 3 In response to this item, the Licensee indicated that the fatigue usage factors for typical safety relief valve (SRV) discharge piping and torus-attached piping at Hatch Units 1 and 2 are less than 0.5, and hence the conclusions of the genecic study [6] are applicable. Accordingly, the Licensee can be exempted from performing plant-specific fatigue evaluations for SRV discharge piping and torus-attached piping.

The Licensee's approach is technically adequate.

Request Item 4 In response to this item, the Licensee provided a review of the analyses for Hatch Unit 1 with regard to the miter joint and areas near the miter joint where overstressing was suspected. A 50% increase in the allowables is permitted by the criteria for local membrane stresses. For the area in close proximity to the miter joint, the stress can be classified as local membrane stress and hence the calculated stresses are still within the allowables.

With regard to the suspected overstressing of certain elements near the miter joint, the Licensee reanalyzed the region using a realistic model of the cone plate stiffeners and demonstrated that the stresses are within the criteria allowables.

The Licensee's response has resolved the concerns with regard to possible overstressing of regions close to the miter joint.

Request Item 5 In response to this item, the Licensee indicated that, for Hatch Units 1 and 2, a 180* shell model of the torus was used to evaluate the effects of the asymmetric SRV discharge and chugging loads, and the only components that were significantly affected by these asymmetric loads were the earthquake tie supports.

The Licensee's response is technically adequate.

Request Item 6 In this response, the Licensee provided justification for not considering a 180* beam model of the vent system for Hatch Units 1 and 2 in order to l00d FranWin Research Center J

A Dmenon of The Franhan inssouse m

TER-C550 6-329 determine the effects of seismic and other nonsymmetric loads. During the Mark I Short-Term Program, an evaluation using a 180* model showed that responses to nonsymmetric loads were not significant. However, the nonsymmetric loads were considered in the plant-unique analysis using asymmetric boundary conditions in the finite element model of the vent system. The Licensee's response is technically adequate.

Request Item 7 In this response, the Licensee demonstrated that the apparent overstresses in the columns and clevis pin of Hatch Unit 1 were caused by certain analytical metnods tnat were highly conservative. The load comnination tnat procuced these hign stresses is comprised of SRV cisenarge loads, chugging loads, and seismic loads, and their response can be combined using the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) method. The Licensee has indicated that the buckling stress in the columns and the bearing stress in the clevis pin.are less than their respective allowables when the SRSS method is used to combine the responses. Licensee's response is technically adequate and has resolved the concern.

Request Item 8 In response to this item, the Licensee provided a review of the analyses for Hatch Unit 2 with regard to the area near the miter joint where over-stressing was suspected. A 50% increase in the allowables is permitted by the criteria for local membrane stresses. For the area in close proximity to the miter Joint, the stress can be classified as local membrane stress and hence, the calculated stresses are still within the allowables. With regard to the suspected overstressing of certain elements near the miter joint, a detailed analysis by the Licensee which more accurately determined the range of the stress intensity for this case indicated that the stresses are within the criteria allowables. With regard to certain localized regions near the miter joint where the calculated buckling stresses exceeded the allowables, the 1

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- UOO nklin Research Center A Drneson of The Frankhn Insensee

TER-C5506-329 Licensee indicated that the allowables used for comparison are based on uniform stress fields, which is not realistic for the case considered.

Furthermore, the existence of high stresses near a boundary probably cannot cause a buckling mode of failure. The Licensee's response to this item is technically adequate and has resolved the concerns with regard to possible overstressing.

Request Item 9 In response to this item, the Licensee indicated that the overstress condition in the ring girder of Hatch Unit 2 was predicted by an analytical model which did not explicitly represent the T-quencher support boxes which are located in the area of overstress. When the effect of these boxes on the ring girder was considered (using plate element models for the boxes), the calculated stresses were found to be within the criteria allowbles. The Licensee's response has resolved the concern on possible overstressing.

Request Item 10 In response to this item, the Licensee indicated the reasons for the apparent overstress condition at the weld near a saddle stiffener in Hatch Unit 2.

The post-processor computer program used in the analysis had picked the maximum stresses in the region for a given losding combination rather than the actual stress at the weld location. When the weld was reevaluated (using the actual stress at the node corresponding to the weld), the calculated stress was found to be within the criteria allowable.

The Licensee's response has resolved the concern.

Request Item 11 In this response, the Licensee indicated that the operability and functionality evaluations for the remaining 14 valves and two pumps in Hatch Unit 2 have been completed, and the results were submitted to the NRC in June 1983 as an amendment to the PUA report. These results meet the criteria requirements. The Licensee's response is technically adequate.

nklin Research Center A Omsson of The Franken ansasuse

TER-C5506-329 Request Item 12 In response to this item, the Licensee confirmed that all of the loads required by the criteria have been considered for the applicable structures.

The Licensee's response is satisfactory.

Request Item 13 In response to this item, the Licensee provided the basis for determining the bounding load combinations. The Licensee's response is technically adequate.

nklin Research Center A Dmeson of The Fm kneewee

TER-C5506-329 3.

CONCLUSIONS Based on the audit of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 Plant Unique Analysis Reports, it was concluded earlier that certain aspects required additional information. Licensee's responses to the request for additional information were obtained during a meeting with the Licensee held on August 31, 1983.

Based on the information provided by the Licensee, it is concluded that the Licensee's structural analyses with regard to major plant modifications and the torus-attached piping conform to the criteria requirements. The Licensee's approach to the evaluation of piping fatigue conforms to the approach recommended by the Mark I Owner's Group, which has been accepted by the NRC.

The evaluation criteria of the containment vacuum breaker modifications are not addressed in Reference 3 and are therefore outside the scope of this TER; however, this issue will still be examined as part of the Mark I Long-Term Program.

nklin Research Center A Dmeson of The Frankan innende

s TER-C5506-329 4.

REFERENCES 1.

NUREG-0661

" Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I Containment Long-Term Program Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-7" Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation USNBC July 1980 2.

Technical Evaluation Report Audit Procedure for Mark. I Containment Long-Term Program - Structural Analysis Franklin Research Center, Philadelphia, PA June 1982, TER-C5506-308 3.

NEDO-24583-1

" Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide" General Electric Co., San Jose, CA October 1979 4.

E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Plant Unique Analysis Report - Mark I Containment Long-Term Program, Revision 0 Georgia Power Company Southern Company Services, Inc.

January 1983 5.

E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Plant Unique Analysis Report - Mark I Containment Long-Term Program, Revision 0 Georgia Power Company Southern Company Services, Inc.

February 1983 6.

Mark I Containment Program Augmented Class 2/3 Fatigue Evaluation Method and Results for Typical Torus Attached and SRV Piping Systems MPR Associates, Washington, D.C.

November 1982, MPR-751 NO Franklin Research Center A Chaman of The Poemahn insatute

e APPENDIX A AUDIT DETAILS I

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el Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Benjaman Frankhn Parkway. Phila Pa 19103 (21S)448 1000 l

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TER-C5506-329 e

1.

INTRODUCTION The key items used to evaluate the Licensee's general compliance with the requirements.of NUREG-0661 (1) and specific compliance with the requirements I

of " Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide" [2} are contained in Table 2-1.

This audit procedure is applicable to all Mark I containments, exgept the Brunswick containments, which have a concrete torus.

For each requirement listed in Table 2-1, several options are possible.

Ideally, the requirement is met by the Licensee, but if the requirement is not met, an alternative approach could have been used. This alternative approach will be reviewed and compared with the audit requirement. An explanation of why the approach was found conservative or unconservative will be provided. A column indicating " Additional Information Required" will be used when the information provided by the Licensee is inadequate to make an assessment.

A few remarks concerning Tables 2-1 and 2-2 will facilitate their future use c,

A summary of the audit as detailed in Table 2-1 is provided in Table 2-2, highlighting major concerns. When deviations are identified, reference to appropriate notes are listed in Table 2-1.

o Notes will be used extensively in both tables under the various columns when the actual audits are conducted, to provide a reference that explains the reasons behind the decision. Where the criterion is satisfied, a check mark will be used to indicate compliance.

o When a particular requirement is not met, the specific reasons for noncompliance will be given.

o Where the Licensee's response to the request for additional information provided satisfactory evidence for compliance with the criteria, an appropriate remark is made and the original audit findings are provided only for the sake of completeness.

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Plant Name H AT C H UNDT$ I02-Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Uconsee Uset S:;ction Keyitems Considered Cdteda Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Audit Not o.

NA Remarks Conser-Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yative vative 1.2 All structural elements of the vent system and suppres-sion chamber must be considered in the review.

The following pressure retaining elements (and their supports) must be considered in the review:

o Ibrus shell with associ-V ated penetrations, reinforcing rings, and support attachments o Tbrus shell supports to V

the containment structure o Vents between the drywell V'

and the vent ring header (including penetrationa therein) o Region of drywell local V'

to vent penetrations o Bellows between vents and V

torus shell (internal or external to torus) o Vent ring heade: and the V

downcomers attached to it o Vent ring header supports

/

to the torus o Vacuum breaker valves y

W'**

'4" attached to vent penetra-tions within the torus (4 deds

facc 'J (where applicable) welK. rit$gani.

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vesc m b,<s k.e e D ' b D

HC ' " #

o Vacuum breaker piping

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see systems, including vacuum Note www bn:cdce r breaker valves attached I

m.o q u d.sc.s to torum shell penetra-c re t eria, a A ca.d4 clJ.

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O NRC Contr ct N. NRC-03-81 130 d$ Frtnkhn Rrserrch Center FRC Pr; ject N. C5506 p;gg

A Division of Thi Frznkhn Institura FRC A:signm:nt N:. I2 20th and Race Streets. Phda. Pa 19103(215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. 329

3 Plant Name HATCH L/M TS 4$2 Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark i Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses S ction Keyitems Consloored Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No.[2]

in the Audit Not o.

NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 1.2 (Cont.)

tions and to vent penetrations external to the torus (where applicable) o Piping systems, including

/

SW pumps and valves. internal

N N^*

to the torus, atitached to

< * "'N the torus shell and/or vent penetrations o All main steam system V

safety relief valve (SRV) piping o Applicable portions of V

the following piping systems:

- Active containment system piping systems (e.g., emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and other piping required to maintain core cooling af ter loss-of-coolant accident (IDCA) )

- Piping systems which provide a drywell-to-wetwell pressure dif-ferential (to alleviate pool swell effects)

- Other piping systems, including vent drains o Supports of piping systems V

mentioned in previous item o Vent header deflectors V

including associated hardware

NRC Contract No. NRC-03-81 100 dud Franklin Research Center FRC Project Ns. C5506 Paga A Dms.on of Ths FrsnkLn insneues FRC AssignmInt No. l2 20th and Race Streets. Phda. Ps 19103(215) 448 1000 FRC Task No.

32Q 4

Plant Name HArc H LJaJars I W 2 Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Audit Not Info.

NA Remarks Conser-Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 1.2 (Cont.)

o Internal structural elements (e.g., monorails, catwalks, their supports) whose failure might impair the containment function 1.3

a. 'Ihe s tructural acceptance critiiria for enisting Mark I containment systems are contained in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code,Section III, Division 1 (1977 Edition), with addenda through the Sumner 1977 Addenda (3] to be referred herein as the Code.

'Ihe alternatives to this criteria provided in Reference 2 are also acceptable.

b. When complete appli-V cation of the criteria (item 1.3a) results in hardships or unusual difficulties without a compensa-ting increase in level of quality and safety, other structural acceptance criteria may be used af ter approval by the Nuclear aegulatory Commission.

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A Desen of The Frsnkhn insatut, FRC Assignm:nt Ns. 12 20th and Race Streets. Phda.. Pa 19103(215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. -329 5

Plant Name NATC.H UNers 16 2 Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark lContainment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Siction Keyitems Considered Cdteda Addtl.

Alternate Approach Ns.[2]

in the Audit Not Consor. Unconser-NA Remarks Met Met Reqd.

yative vative 2.1 a.

Identify the code V

or other classification of the structural element b.

Prepare specific V

dimensional boundary definition for the specific Mark I contain-ment systems (Note:

Welds connectiiig piping to a nozzle are piping welds, not Class MC welds) 2.2 Guidelines for classification of structural ele:nents and boundary definition are as follows:

(Refer to Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 for non-piping and piping structural elements, respectively, and to item 5 in this table for row designations used for defining limits of boundaries)

V a.

Torus shell (Ibw 1)

The torus membrane in combination with reinforcing rings, penetration elements within the NE-3334 [3]

limit of reinforce-ment normal to the torus shell, and attachment welds to the inner or outer surface of the above members but not to nozzles, is a Class MC [3] vessel.

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A N RC ContrEct ND. N RC-03-81-130

!.b Franklin Ressarch Centar FRC Project No. C5506 Paga l

6 Dwision of The Frtnkhn insutut, FRC Aisignm:nt No. I 2.

20th and Race Streets. Phda.. Pa 19103 (215) 448 1000 FRCTask No. 3 29 6

Plant Name HATCH uN8TS l h 2, Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses SIction Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Audit Not Info.

NA Remarks Conser-Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

b.

Torus shell supports (Row 1) - Subsection NF

[3] support structures between the torus shell and the building s trueture, exclusive of the attachme,nt welds to the torus shell; welded or mechanical attachments to the building structures (excluding embedments);

and seismic constraints between the torus shell and the building structure are Class MC

[3] supports.

c.

External vents and V

vent-to-torus bellows

, (aow 1) - 21e external vents (between the attachment weld to the drywell and the attachment weld to the bellows) including:

vent penetrations within the NE-3334 [3]

limit of reinforcement normal to the vent, internal or external attachment welds to the external vent but not to nozzles, and the vent-to-torus bellows (including attachment welds to the torus snell and to the external vents) are Class MC [3] vessels.

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FRC Assignm:nt ND. I 2.

FRCTask No. 32'l 7

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Plant Name 64 ATc H LaN #T S IdJ 2 Ta.ble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licansee Uses S ction Keyitems Considered Criteria Addt!.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

g, NA Remarks Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

d.

Drywell-vent connection V

region (Bow 1) - Vent welded connections to the drywell (the drywell and the drywell region of interest for this program is up to the NE-3334 [3] liidit of reinforcement on the drywell shell) are Class MC [3] vessels.

e.

Internal vents (aows 2 V

and 3) - Are the continuation of the vents internal to the torus shell from the vent-bellows welds and include:

the cylindrical shell, the closure head, t

penetrations in the cylindrical shell or closure head within the NE-3334 [3] limit of reinforcement normal to the vent, and attachment welds to inner or outer surface of the vent but not to nozzles.

f.

Vent ring header (Bows v

4 and 5) and downconers (Row 6) - Vent ring header including the downcomers and internal or external attachment welds to the ring header and the attachtaent welds to the downcomers are Class MC

[3] vessels.

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FRC Aisignm:nt No. I 2.

FRCTask No. 329 6

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TEble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Accep:ance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Key items Considere<1 Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

In the Audit Not ' ' IrW3' Conser. Unconser-Met Met

'.le@.

vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

- The portion of the cowncomer within the NE-3334 [3] limit of reinforcement nora;al to I

the vent ring header and portion of the vent ring header within NE-3334 limit of reinforcement arc considered under aow 5.

g.

Vent ring header V

supports (Ibw 7) -

i Subsection NF [3]

supports, exclusive of the attachment welds to I

the vent ring header and to the torus shell, are Class MC [3]

supports.

h.

Essential (aows E bb' "

E 10 and 11) and c,.u.,v.-J:vc.J ncn-e,sential (aows cl

(

_Q 12 and 13) piping systems - A piping E to ru s; s~i+rM system or a portion ipig y r h of it is essential j.g if the system is necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a shutdown condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of

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20th and Race Streets. Phda.. Pa 19103 (215) 448-1000 FRC Task No. 329 9

Plant Name HATCH UNITS l Ed,2, Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Audit Not Info.

NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

accidents which could result in potential off site exposures comparable to j

the guideline exposure I

of 10CFR100 [4). Piping should be cocsidered essential if it' performs a safety-related role at a later time during the event combination being considered or during any subsequent event combination.

i. Active and inactive V

component (Rows 10-13) - Active component is a pump or valve in an essential piping system wnich is required to perform a mechanical motion during the course of accomplianing a system safety function.

j. Containment vacuum V

breakers (Bow 2)

Vacuum breakers valves mounted on the vent internal to the torus or on piping associated with the torus are Class 2 13] components.

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Enh and Race Streets Phda. Pa 19103(215) 448-1000 FRC Task N2. 32.9 lO Plant Name HATC H UNITS J 6J Z 4

Ttble 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program i

Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered O' "*'i".

Addtl.

Alternate Approach No' [2l in the Audit N05 NA Remarks Conser, Unconser-Met Met At4d.

vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

k.

External piping and supports (Rows 10-13):

- No Class 1 piping

- Piping external to V

and penetrating the torua. or the external vents, includidg the attachment weld to the torus or vent nozzle is Class 2 [3] piping.. ' lite other terminal end of such external piping should be determined based on its function and isolation capability.

- Subsection NF [3]

V support for such external piping including welded or mechanical attachment to structure; excluding any attachment welds to the piping or other pressure retaining component are Class 2 [3] aupports.

1.

Internal piping and V

supports (aows l

10-13) - Are Class 2 or l

Class 3 piping and Class 2 or Class 3 component supports.

l m.

Internal strti.:tures V

(Row 8) - Non-safety-related elements which are not pressure retaining, exclusive of Attachmenc welds to any pressure retaining 9

4 NRC Contract ND. NRC-03-81 130 LOLU Fr:nkhn R:serreh Centxt FRC Project N3. C5506 PIga A D mion of Ths Fren%n Instituts FRC Assignm:nt N2. I2 20th and Race Streets. Phda. Pa 19103 (215) 448-1000 FRC Task No. 329 II Plant Name HATCH LJNITG l 8_s 2 Tcble 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Cr terta Addtl.

Alternate Approach No' [2]

in the Audit Not NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

member (e. g.,

monorails. ladders, catwalks, and their supports).

n.

Vent deflectors (aow 9)

- Vent header flow deflectors and" associated hardware (no t including attachment welds to Class MC vessels) are internal s tructure s.

3.2 Ioad terminology used V

should be based on Final Safety Analysis Paport (PSAR) for the unit or the Ioad Definition Report (LDR) [5].

In case of conflict, the LDR loads shall be used.

3.3 Consideration of all load V

S" I 8 J" A " \\'*'*

combinations defined in

"* k5

*g#y gy Section 3 of the LDR [5]

IE, 0""'"*

shall be provided.

l3 4.3 a.

No reevaluation for limits set for design pressure and design temperature values is needed for present structural elements.

{

b.

Design limit requirements used for initial construction following normal practice with respect to load definition and allowable stress shall be used for systems or

NRC Crntract N3. N RC-03-81 130 r:nklin Rssearch Csnt:r FRC Project 143. C5506 Pag')

A Division of The Frtnkhn insti uts FRC Assignm:nt N3. I2 20th and Race Stresia. Phda. Pa 19103(215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. 329 I 2.

Plant Name H A rc H ur9#rG 162 Tcble 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program

==

Licensee uses Section Keyitems Considered Crit #1 Addtl.

Alternate Approach ND.[2]

in tile Audit Not Info.

NA Remarks Conser-Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yatlye vative 4.3 (Cont.)

portions of systems that are replaced and for ne',s systems.

4.4 Service Limits and See definition Design Procedures shall for Service be based on the Limits in B&PV Code,Section III, Section 4 of Division 1 including Reference 2.

addenda up to Summer 1977 Addenda [3], specifically:

a.

Class MC containment vessels:

Article NE-3000 [3]

b.

Linear-type component (Class 2 and 3) support -

with three modifications to the Codes

- For bolted connections, the requirements of Service Limits A and B shall be applied to Service Limits C and D without increase in the allowables above those applicable tu Service I4vels A and B;

- NF-3 231.1 (a)

[3] is for primary plus secondary stress range;

2:. ::. :. % 81 130

!;b " nklin Rtserrch Csnter

/AC p ros.:. lis. C5506 p;g; A Dim.on of N 6enki.n Insriruu FRC Assignm:nt NO. I2 20ih and Rxe Str +ts. Phda.. Pa 19103 (215) 448-1000 FRC Task No. 324 13 Plant Name H ATc H UN4TS I h 2 Tcble 21. Audit Procedure for Struttural Ac:optance Criteria of Mark lContainment Lon0-Term Program Licensee uses Sectt:n Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach ND.[2]

Not Info.

NA Remarks Consor. Unconser-Met Met Road.

vative vative

- All increases in allowable stress permitted by Subsection NF [3] are limited by Appendix XVII-2110(b)

[3] when buckling is a consideration.

c.

Class 2 and 3 piping, pumps, valves,"and internal structures (also Class MC) 5.3 The components, component loadings, and service level dSsignments for Class MC

[3] components and internal structures shall be as defined in Table 5-1 of Reference 2.

5.4 The components, component loadings, and service level assignments for Class 2 and Class 3 piping systems shall be defined in Table 5-2 of Reference 2.

5.5 The definition of operability is the ability to perform required mechanical motion and functionality is the ability to pass rated flow.

L e ( e. M M p or w t.

a.

Active components

/

see New W M M sb shall be proven operable. Active 2ad N den cern II components shall be considered operable if Service Limits A or B or more conservative limits (if the original design criteria required.'.t) are met.

As NRC C:ntract N2. NRC-03-81-130 b0 rinklin R:setrch Cant:r FRC Pr: Ject No. C5506 p;g3

'A Divison of The Frinklin institut, FRC Assignm:nt No.12 20th and Race Streets. Phda. Pa 19103(215) 448 1000 FRCTask No. 324 l4 Plant Name HArcH UNITS l 6 2 TEble 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program i

Licensee uses Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

In the Audit Not info.

NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reed.

vative vative i

5.5 (Cont.)

b.

Piping components shall V

g,g 8.ic.enualr*p* 4 y,(,3 g,,,3,y,( g g be proven functional in 24 4u%

a manner consistent a

with the original design criteria.

V 6.1 Analysis guidelines provided hereifi shall apply to all structural elements identified in item 1.2 of this table.

i 9) 22 a.

All loadings defined in V

b0 See Section 3.3 subsection 3.2 of

"* d of this table.

Reference 2 shall be 0,

considered.

42 b.

A summary technical V

report on the analysis shall be submitted to the NRC.

6.2 The following general guidelines shall be applied to all structural elements analyzedi

/

gg see V

a.

Perform analysis Notd k "* D 'i*'#'L according to guideline I

3g c:... c r n.

defined herein for all i

loads defined in LDR I3

[5].

(Pbr loada considered in original design, but not redefined by LDR, previous analyses or new analyses may be used.)

b.

Only limiting load

/

combination events need be considered.

I l

l

, A NRC Contract No. NRC-03-81 130 0

ranklin R:serreh Centa FRC Pr ject N3. C5506 p;g3

A Dmsx>n of Ths Fr:nkhn instituts FRC Assignm:nt Ns. tZ FRC Task No. 329 15 20th and Race 5: eets. Phila.. Pa. 19103(215) 448 1000 Plant Name HATCH UMB; I&2 Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containmont Long-Term Program Licensee Uses SIction Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach N2.[2}

in tne Audit Not info.

NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

u vadve 6.2 (Cont.)

gg,e Licen d r%fa y cIWd M c.

Fatigue effects of all V

Nott kcu, rea operational cycles 3

c ru r n shall be considered.

V d.

No further evaluation of structural elements for wnich combined effect of loads defined in LDR [5] produces stresses less than 10%

of allowable is required. Calculations demons trating conformance with the 10% rule shall be provided.

e.

Damping values used in

/

dynamic analyses shall be in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide

1. 61 [6 ].

6.3 Structural responses for loads resulting from the combination of two dynamic phenomena shall be obtained in the following manners a.

Absolute sum of stress V'

components, or b.

Cumulative distribution

/

function method if absolute aus of stress components does not satisfy the acceptance criteria.

6.4

'1brus analysis shall -

consist of:

[

i l

v'_*-..

N AC Conr:ct N3. NRC-03-81-130

~

FRC Project No. C5506 Page

Researen Center A Divmon of The Franun instaut, FRC Assignment No.12 20th and Race Snests. Phda. Pa 19103 (215)448-1000 FRCTaskNo. 329 I6 Plant Name HA7cH uN#76 l 6.s 2 Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Siction Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Audit Not info.

M Remarks Conser. Unconsor.

Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 6.4 (Cont.)

/

gg J i c.t n &

a.

Finite element analysis V

q m pgn g h'*

for hydrodynamic loada 4'

gg h (time history analysis) and normal and other 7

s loads (staric analysis) 8, making up the load q,

combinations shall be y

performed for h e most

,g highly loaded segment of the torus, including the shell, ring, girders, and support.

1-8 Ce nN b.

Evaluation of overall V

y,g sp% h.cvs effects of seismic and other nons*?mmetric h

D loads shall be provided G nc;e rn using beam models (of at least 180* of the torus including columns and seismic. restraints) by use of either dynamic load factors or time history analysis.

V c.

Provide a non-linear time history analysis, using a spring mass model of torus and support if net tensile forces are produced in coluaans due to upward l

phase of loading.

d.

Bijlaard formulas shall Y

be used in analyzing each torus nozzle for effect of reactions produced by attached piping.

If Bijlaard formulas are not I

-=

A NRC C;ntrret N3. NRC-03-81 130 dJ r:nkhn Rsse rch Csnt:r FRC Pr: Ject ND. C5506 p;g)

A Dneon of The Frtnkhn institute FRC As;'gnm:nt N2.

I2 20th and Race Streets. Phda. Pa 19103(215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. 329 I7 Plant Name HATCH UNITS 16 2 Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Usee S:ction Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach ND.[2]

Not Info.

NA Remarks Consor. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yative vative j

6.4 (Cont.)

applicable for any nozzle, finite element analysis shall be performed.

6.5 In analysis of the vent system (including vent penetration in drywell, vent pipes, ring header, downcomers and their intersections, vent column supports, vent-torus bellows, vacuum breaker penetration, and the vent deflectors), the following guidelines shall be followed:

a.

Finite element model shall represent the most highly loaded portion of ring header shell in the "non-vent" bay with the downcomers attached.

b.

Finite element analysis V

shall be performed to evaluate local effects in the ring header shell and downc~mer intersections.

Use time history analysis for pool swell transient and equivalent static analysis for downcomer lateral loads.

l l

I

MA NRC C:ntract No. NRC-03-81 130

. bl.d Frankhn Research Center FRC Prrjoct ND. C5506 Pag 3

'A Dmmn of The Frankhn inuitut, FRC Asaignm:nt ND. I2 2thh and Race Streets. Phda Pa 19103 (215) 4481000 FFiC Task No. 324 IS Plant Name H ATc H U tw TS I d.J 2 Trble 21. Audit Procedure forStructural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long Term Program i

Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl.

Alternate Approach No~ [2]

in the Audit Not In o.

NA Remarks Consor. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

vative vative 6.5 (Cont.)

Sct.

LdexnwN & M c.

Evaluation of overall effects of seismic and "bd b

IN '. 6'Aceru other nonsymmetrical loads shall be provided using beam models (of at least 180' of the vent system including vent pipes, ring header and column supports) by the use of either dynamic load factors or time history analysis, d.

Use beam models in analysis of vent deflectors.

e.

Consider appropriate suoerposition of reactions from the vent deflectors and ring headers in evaluating the vent support columns for pool swell.

6.6 a.

Analysis of torus

/

internals shall include the catwalks with supports, monorails, and miscellaneous internal piping.

b.

It shall be based on V

t hand calculations or simple beam models and dynamic load factors and equivalent static analysis.

L

MA N RC C;ntract No. N RC 03-81-130 NOU Frankhn Research Center FRC Pr: Ject No. C5506 pega

' A Division of The Frenkhn instituts FRC Assignm:nt No. I 2.,

oth and Race Streets. Ph.!a. Pa 19103 (215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. -32Q lQ Plant Name HATCH UfJi TS l 6 2 Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addt!.

Alternate ADDroach No' {2) in the Audit Not info.

NA

' Remarks Conser-Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yative vative 6.6 (Cone.)

c.

It shall consider Service Level D or E when specified by the structural acceptance criteria using a simplified nonlinear analysis technique (e.g., Bigg 's Me thod).

6.7 Analysis of the torus attached piping shall be performed as follows:

U **u a.

Designate in the V

. Cemvdi<ih summary technical report submitted all CIw Q ab M EC6W5 5AAE1 piping systems as essential or hipeg e non-essential for each gQ;d load combination.

b.

Analytical model shall represent piping and supports from torus to first rigid anchor (or where effect of torus motion is insignificant).

c.

Use response spectrum or time history analysis for dynamic effect of torus motion at the attachment point, except for piping systems less than 6" in diameter, for which equivalent static analysis (using appropriate amplification factor) may be performed.

J

ga NRC Cgntrtet No. N RC-03-81-130

. USd!] Frankhn Rssetrch Canter FRC Proj!ct No. C;506 p g3 A Division of Ths Frtnkhn Instieve.,

FRC Assignm:;nt ND. 12 FRC Task No.

S~29 2O 20th and Race Snects. Phila-. Pa 19103 (215) 448 2000 Plant Name HArcH UNars l 6 2.

Ttble 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Cruer a Addtl.

Alternate Approach No. [2]

in the Aedit

. Jot NA Remarks Conser. Unconser-Met Met Reqd.

yatlye vative 6.7 (Cont.)

d.

Ef fect of anchor displacement due to torus motion may be neglected from Equation 9 of NC or ND-3652.2 [3]

if considered in Equations 10 and 11 of NC or ND-3652.3 [3].

6.8 Safety relief valve discharge piping shall be analyzed ac follows:

a.

Analyze each discharge

/

line.

b.

Model shall represent piping and supports, from nozzle at main steam line to discharge in suppression pool, and include discharge device and its supports.

c.

For discharge thrust

/

(

loads, use time history analysis.

d.

Use spectrum analysis or dynamic load factors l

for other dynamic loads.

I

~

NRC Contract N3. NRC-03-81-130 PagD L 0 rrenuiin at:.1rch c nist FRC Project No. C5506 Assignm:nt No. 2 A Dwmon of The Franklin insutuas as UNfTs 1a,2 20th and Race Streets, Phda.. Pa. 19103 (215) 448 1000 HATCH Table 2-2. Audit Summary for Structural' Acceptance Criteria of Mark 1 Containment Long-Term Program Analysis Requirements Re i nts

-h Structural Element Remarks

$*2 ?" as in nb u sse e S

=

a.

'1brus shell with associated

/

V V

penetrations, reinforcing rings, and support i

attachments

/

b.

Torus shell supports to the building structure j

v v

/

\\

c.

Vents between the drywell V

and the vent ring header l

(including penetirations therein) d.

Region of drywell local to V

vent penetrations a.

Bellows between vents and v

torus shell (internal or external to torus)

V f.

Vent ring header and the

/

downcomers attached to it 9

Vent ring header supports

/

v V

V

/

to the torus shell Odd h.

Vacuum breaker valves k

4 attached to vent penetra-oc.cp c.

T tions within the torus TR (where applicable) 1.

Vacuum breaker piping NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA l

systems, including vacuum breaker valves attached to torus shell penetrations and to vent penetrations external to the torus (where applicable) j.

Piping systems, including V

v 7

V' k

pumps and valves internal to the torus, attached to the torus shell and/or vent penetrations n

,e

(

NRC Contract N3. NRC-03-81-130 J' Eranklin Resstrch Cant:r FRC Project N2. CM Pag 3

^

A Divanon of Ths Frtnun Institura Tas N 9

El 20th and Race Streets. Phda.. Pa. 19103 (215)448-1000 p,

g g ggg Table 2-2. Audit Summary for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program L

pMg"r$nts Analysis Requirements Structural Element

[

BI!

Remarks

i. 3 u..y pg a

is 1

bob Y $3h 8

k.

All main steam system safety V

V V

V relief valve (SRV) piping 1.

Applicable portions of the following piping systems:

(1)

Active containment V

k system piping systems (e.g., emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction piping and other piping required to maintain core cooling after loss-of-coolant accident (IDCA))

(2)

Piping systems which V

V provide a drywell-to-wetwell pressure dif-ferential (to alleviate pool swell effects)

V (3)

Other piping systems, including vent drains m.

Supports of piping systems y

v V

V mentioned in previous item y

v v

V V

n.

Vent header deflectors including associated hardware o.

Internal structural V

V V

V elements (e.g., monorails, catwalks, their supports) whose failure might impair the containment function

l TER-C5506-329 Table 2-3.

Non-Piping Structural Elements STRICTURAL ELEMENT ROW External Class MC Torus, Bellows, 1

External Vent Pipe, Drywell (at Vent),

Attachment Welds, Torus Supports, Seismic Restraints Internals Vent Pipe General and 2

Attachment Welds At Penetration 3

'(e.g., Header)

Vent Ring Header General and 4

Attachannt Welds At Penetrations 5

(e.g., Downcomer s)

Downcomers General and 6

Attachment Welds Internals Supports 7

Internals Structures General 8

Vent Deflector 9 A 0000 Franklin Research Ce.ui.

nter a c==.an or Tw. re.nnna in

TER-C5506-329 Table 2-4.

Piping Structural Elements STRUCTURAL ELEMENT ROW Essential Piping Systems With IBA/DBA 10 With SBA 11 Nonessential Piping Systems 12 With IBA/DBA With SBA 13 ranklin Research Center A Deweian of The Frankhr hutoute

TER-C5506-329 NOTES RELATED TO TABLES 2-1 AND 2-2 NOTT. 1: The Licensee has not provided information on the analysis of the vacuum breaker piping systems for E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.