ML20086U323
| ML20086U323 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1984 |
| From: | Cordaro M, Nicholas Hobbs, Renz W, Schiffmacher W, Weismantle J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086U072 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8403070222 | |
| Download: ML20086U323 (32) | |
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LILCO, March 2, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of ) 4
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, NORMAN A. HOBBS, JR.,
WILLIAM F. RENZ, WILLIAM G. SCHIFFMACHER, AND JOHN A. WEISMANTLE OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 93, 94 AND 95 Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 707 East Main Street Richmond, Virginia 23212 (804) 788-8200 4
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LILCO, March 2, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)
Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, NORMAN A. HOBBS, JR.,
WILLIAM F. RENZ, WILLIAM G. SCHIFFMACHER, AND JOHN A. WEISMANTLE OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 93, 94 AND 95 PURPOSE This testimony discusses intervenor's Contentions 93 through 95, which deal with the potential loss of offsite power in con-junction with an emergency at Shoreham. The principal purposes of this testimony are, first, to demonstrate that an emergency at Shoreham is highly unlikely to cause, or occur in conjunction with, a widespread loss of offsite power; and second, to show that any loss of offsite power precipitated by other causes, occurring independently of and simultaneously with an emergency at Shoreham, will not significantly impede the required emergency response.
With respect to the specific instances cited in these. contentions, backup power supplies either are unnecessary or are provided.
I LILCO, March 2, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)
Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, NORMAN A. HOBBS, JR.,
WILLIAM F. RENZ, WILLIAM G. SCHIFFMACHER, AND JOHN A. WEISMANTLE OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 93, 94 AND 95 TESTIMONY
- 1. Q. Please state your name and business address.
A. [Cordaro] My name is Matthew C. Cordaro. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.
[Hobbs] My name is Norman A. Hobbs, Jr. My business ad-dress is HMM Associates, 336 Baker Avenue, Concord, Mas-sachusetts, 01742.
( [Renz] My name is William F. Renz. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 East Old Country j Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.
[Schiffmacher] My name is William G. Schiffmacher. My l
business address is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.
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[Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle. My business i
- address is Long Island Lighting Company, 100 East Old
- Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.
- 2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications and your role in emergency planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
k l A. [Cordaro] I am Vice President, Engineering, for LILCO. ,
My professional qualifications are being offered into evi-dence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qual-i ifications of LILCO Witnesses." I am sitting on this panel to provide the LILCO management perspective on emer-gency planning and to answer any questions pertinent to i management. My role in emergency planning for Shoreham is to ensure that the needs and requirements of emergency planning are being met, and that the technical direction and content of emergency planning are being conveyed.to corporate management.
[Hobbs) I am an Emergency Planning Consultant with HMM Associates. My professional qualifications are'being of-fered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Pro-
- fessional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses." My famil-iarity with the issues raised by these Contentions stems from my experience in emergency. planning (including other offsite emergency plans for nuclear plants), communica-tions system design, and public information.
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[Renz) I am employed by the Long Island Lighting Company j 1
as Offsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator in the Nu- l l
clear Operations Support Department and Manager of the Technical Support Division of the Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization (LERIO). My professional quali-fications are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses." My familiarity with the issues raised by these Contentions stems from my work in developing and im-plementing the LILCO Transition Plan, particularly my work in developing the communications system.
[Schiffmacher] I am employed by LILCO as the Manager of the Electrical Engineering Department of LILCO. My pro-fessional qualifications are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifica-tions of LILCO Witnesses." My familiarity with the issues raised by these Contentions stems from my experience in Electric System Planning and Electric System Operations, as well as my responsibilities associated with the instal-l l
lation of the Prompt Notification System. j (Weismantle] I am Manager of the Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization for LILCO. My professional qualifications are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses." My familiarity with the issues raised
by these Contentions stems from my work in developing and implementing the LILCO Transition Plan.
- 3. Q. What are the basic premises underlying Contentions 93 through 95 and are those premises valid?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] The Preamble to Contentions 93 through 95, as well as to Contention 96, states:
Preamble to Contentions 93-96. The LILCO Plan must provide an adequate response for even "the worst possible accident, regard-less of its extremely low likelihood."
NUREG 0654,Section I.D. at 7. This in-cludes a loss of offsite power, which would not be unlikely in conjunction with a severe accident at Shoreham. The LILCO Plan, however, contains no measures for dealing with such a circumstance, and thus does not provide fcr the protection of the public health and safety, for the reasons set forth in contentions 93-96 below.
Although the thrust of the Preamble is unclear, there appear to be two basic premises underlying Con-tentions 93 through 95, both of which are in error.
The first premise is that NUREG-0654,Section I.D. at 7, requires an adequate response for the worst conceiv-able circumstances both onsite and offsite at the time of an emergency. The language of the guideline quoted in the Preamble, however, stipulates an adequate re- (
sponse for "the worst possible accident" at Shoreham.
It does not require a response for the worst possible conditions that can be. imagined to exist offsite, including a loss of. power offsite.
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The second flawed premise is the assertion in the Preamble that a loss of offsite power "would not be un-likely in conjunction with a severe accident at Shoreham." The Preamble thereby presupposes, incor-rectly, that a loss of power from the Shoreham facility would cause a widespread loss of offsite power.
- 4. Q. Why would a loss of power from the Shoreham facility not cause a loss of offsite power?
A. [Cordaro, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] A loss of power from Shoreham will not cause a loss of offsite power because all of LILCO's generating capacity is interconnected. The Shoreham plant represents less than twenty percent of the total LILCO generating ca-pacity. Furthermore, LILCO's four high voltage interconnections to the New York Power Pool and the rest of the interconnected grid will provide instanta-neous replacement of power for any loss of Shoreham generation. These four interconnections and the interconnections between the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and the LILCO transmission system, are shown schematically on oppoeite sides of Attachment-1. 1
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- 5. Q. How can the generating capacity from other utilities, which is available to LILCO, be activated?
A. [Cordaro, Schiffmacher, Weismantle)- It does not need to be activated. Power would be replaced instanta-neously since a reserve capacity already exists "on
l line." This reserve is large enough to provide for the loss of the two largest generating units in the state.
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- 6. Q. What is the significance of these arrangements with re-spect to the specific issues raised in Contentions 93-95?
A. [Cordaro, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] As a result of i these interconnections, it is exceedingly unlikely that an emergency at Shoreham would cause or occur simulta-neously with any widespread loss of offsite power.
Thus, independent backup power sources for specific fa-cilities and the sirens should not be necessary.
- 7. Q. In the unlikely event of a widespread loss of offsite power simultaneously with an emergency at Shoreham, are there provisions for restoring power or providing back-up power where required?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] .Yes. We have addressed these provisions individually in re-sponding to the specific contentions discussed.below.
Contentivn 93
- 8. Q. What issues does Contention 93 address?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] In Contention 93, intervenors allege that the LILCO Tran-
.sition Plan does not provide for backup power to the EOC, staging areas,. bus transfer points, receiving hos-pitals, or relocation centers and that in the event of.
a power outage these facilities would become inopera-ble. Contention 93. states:
Contention 93. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires the emergency re-sponse organization to establish." adequate facilities" to maintain the emergency re-sponse. See also NUREG 0654,Section II.H. The LILCO Plan fails to satisfy this requirement by failing to allow for the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:
A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply nor does it provide for the management of the emergency response from another lo-cation. In the event of a loss of offsite power the EOC would become in-operable and LERO would become unable to implement an emergency response.
B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that backup power supplies have been estab-lished for staging areas, bus transfer points, receiving hospitals, or reloca-tion centers. In the event of a loss of offsite power, these facilities would become inoperable.
The legal standards cited in Contention 93 are the follow-ing:
10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b)(8)
(8) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency re-sponse are provided and maintained.
NUREG-0654, II.H.3 i
Each organization shall establish an emergency operations center for use in di-recting and controlling response func-tions.
NUREG-0654, II.H.4 Each organization shall provide for timely activation and staffing of the'fa-cilities and centers described in the plan.
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- 9. Q. What facilities are addressed in the Contention?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) The Contention addresses five types of facilities:
The Emergency Operations Canter (Con-tention 93.A)
Staging areas (Contention 93.B)
Bus transfer points (Contention 93.B)
Receiving hospitals (Contention 93.B)
Relocation centers (Contention 93.B)
- 10. Q. Is a backup power supply required for any of these fa-cilities?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] No.
The Contention cites no such requirement, and none ex-ists.
- 11. Q. Would you please address the potential censequences of a widespread loss of offsite power for each of these facilities?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantla] Yes.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Contention suggests that the EOC needs a backup power supply. Although it is neither required nor sug-gested in NRC regulations or NUREG-0654, the EOC does have a backup supply. This is a 75 kw gas-fired emer-gency generator which is sufficient to provide the EOC with the required power to support LERO activities.
Staging Areas The staging areas are existing LILCO operation centers at Riverhead, Port Jefferson, and Patchogue. These i LILCO facilities serve as assembly areas and satellite coordination points for LERO field emergency personnel.
LERO workers will report to these areas to receive in-structions and pick up dosimeters. There is no need for electric power to enable the personnel to assemble, receive instructions, and pick up equipment.
I In any event, the Riverhead and Port Jefferson staging areas have backup generators that can supply power for LERO activities. The radio at the Patchogue Staging Area will be backed up by a battery. Beyond these provisions, emergency light to read or.to pick up dosimeters could be provided by the flashlights _that are included in each of the 60-65 traffic guide kits at each staging area. Flashlights from spare traffic guide kits could be used by personnel who remain at the staging areas.
Bus Transfer Points The Bus Transfer points-are merely outdoor assembly areas in predetermined locations. Here, people get off buses that have picked them up in the EPZ and board different buses bound for a relocation center located outside the EPZ. Loss of power would have no impact on the ability of people to change' buses. Buses have l.
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lights. Transfer point coordinators at these locations are equipped with mobile radios which operate off of vnhicle batteries.
Receiving Hosoitals The LILCO Transition Plan indicates that should protec-tive actions be warranted out to 10 miles, sheltering is the preferred protective action for the three hospi-tals within the EPZ boundary. Each of the three hospi-tals in the EPZ are located near the ten mile boundary.
Should the hospital administrator at any of these three hospitals within the EPZ decide on partial or complete evacuation, receiving hospitals would be specified on an ad hoc basis. Each of the receiving hospitals pre-vioucly considered, however, is equipped with its own backup power supply.
Relocation Centers Relocation centers are facilities located outside of the EPZ where the American Red Cross will provide food and shelter for the general public. The Red Cross, which operates the centers, makes provisions for_op-erating under adverse conditions. The loss of power at these relocation facilities would not prevent their op-eration. In addition, the LILCO Transition Plan pro-vides for secondary relocation centers. In the event of a power outage, persons being sheltered in the
primary relocation centers could be moved to the sec-ondary relocation centers or to Red Cross relocation ,
I centers in Nassau County.
- 12. Q. What is your conclusion?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] A widespread t
} loss of offsite power would not prevent an emergency i l response at any of the facilities listed in Contention
- 93. In addition, the EOC and the Riverhead and Port Jefferson staging areas each have a backup power l source.
j Contention 94
! 13. Q. What issues are raised by Contention 94?
I A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantlel Con-tention 94 alleges that there is no backup power supply
- for the LILCO Customer Service office or the EOC and i
- that in the event that power to these facilities were lost, LILCO would not be able to provide.for prompt no-tification of emergency personnel. Contention 94.
states:
Contention 94. .10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)'
and NUREG 0654,Section II.E.2 require that emergency plans provide for the j . prompt notification of reponse personnel.
See also 10 CFR Part.50= Appendix E,~ Sec -
tions 4C and D. Notification channels must remain open'on a 24-hour basis.
NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.1.a. The LILCO Plan. violates this requirement by not al-lowing for the possibility of a: loss of-offsite. power. Specifically:
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) 1 A. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the LILCO Customer Service Office has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the'LILCO Customer Service Office will become inoperable.
Thus, the SNPS Control Room will be unable to notify LERO and initiate the emergency response process. See LILCO Plan at Sec-tion 3.3.
B. The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the EOC will become inoperable, and LERO will be unable to notify emergency personnel in the field.
- 14. Q. What are the regulations and guidelines cited in Con-tention 94?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle),
The regulations and guidelines cited in Contention 94 are 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(5); 10.C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C., IV.D.; NUREG-0654, 5 II.E.2.; and NUREG-0654, t
5 II.F.1.a.
- 15. Q. What is your conclusion with respect to Contention 94.A?
"A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] There.
is no requirement in the NRC regulations or guidance (NUREG-0654) for a backup power supply at the Customer Service Office in Hicksville. In any event, backup power for the LILCO Customer Service Office is' supplied by a 156 kw emergency diesel generator. This backup generator is sufficient to provide power-for.the func-tioning of.the Customer Service' Office with regard to
.LERO activities.
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- 16. Q. What about Contention 94.B?
A. (Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] There is no requirement in NRC regulations or guidance (NUREG-0654) for a backup power supply at the EOC. In any event, backup power for the EOC is supplied by a 75 kw gas-fired emergency generator. This generator is sufficient to provide power for the functioning of the EOC.
Contention 95-
- 17. Q. Please summarize the issues raised by Contentions 95.A., D. and E.
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] Con-tentions 95.A., 95.D. and 95.E., question LILCO's abil-ity to provide an appropriate alert signal and a follow up instructional message to the general public on the
- grounds that there is no backup power supply for the sirens, that the tone alert radios do not operate on batteries, and that the Emergency News Center does not l have a backup power supply and a backup news facility has not been established. Contentions 95.A., 95.D.,
and 95.E., state:
Contention 95. 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires every emergency plan to provide for early notification and clear instruction to those within the plume EPZ. These requirements.are dis-tinct: the public murn be given an early alert signal and a follow-up instructional message. See NUREG 0654, Appendix 3, Sec-tion B(2)(a). The LILCO Plan violates these requirements by failing to take
P l account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power. Specifically:
Contention 95.A. LILCO relies on a system of sirens for providing an immedi-ate alert to the public. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the sirens have a backup power supply. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the sirens will not function.
Contention 95.D. LILCO relies on tone alert radios to provide the extra evacua-tion time required by large facilities such as factories and schools. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4,5. The tone alert radios will evidently operate on AC power rather than on batteries. Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the tone alert radios would not function.
Contention 95.E. Emergency plans must provide formal means for dissemination of information to the public through the news media. See NUREG 0654,Section II.G.3 and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7). LILCO relies on the establishment of an Emergency News Center to satisfy this requirement. See OPIP 3.8.1. However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the Emergency News Cen-ter has a backup power supply or that a backup news facility has been established.
Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Emergency News Cent er will become inoperable and LILCO's pub.ic l
notification duties will not be satisfied.
1 Contention 95.A.
- 18. Q. Is there a requirement for backup power to the sirens?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) There is no requirement in NRC regulations or guidance (NUREG-0654) for a backup power supply to the sirens.
This is evidenced by the fact that other emergency plans for nuclear power plants in New York have been
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accepted and have no independent backup power supplies for electro-mechanical sirens.
- 19. Q. Is there a source of backup power to the sirens?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] There are several means by which a loss of power to the sirens can be restored, but there is no independent source of backup power which has been designed and installed spe-cifically for the sirens. I
- 20. Q. Is it likely that power to the sirens would be lost in the first place?
A. (Renz, Schiffmacher] No. Because of the design of the LILCO grid rnd the interconnections between LILCO and other generation sources, a loss of power to a substan-tial part of the electric system is remote. Since the blackout of 1965, which affected the entire northeast, LILCO has experienced only one subsequent incident unat would have disabled all of the sirens. Even in that instance, power was restored to the area in just over 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Furthermore, measures have been introduced since 1965 that have significantly decreased the average power restoration time.
- 21. Q. Would you explain the means for restoring power to the sirens?
A. [Schiffmacher] LILCO is committed to restore power to the sirens on a priority basis. LILCO's System Op-erations Department is developing procedures to ensure
i prompt restoration of power to the sirens and to the Shoreham plant. This commitment is designed to produce restoration of power to the siren systems following a widespread loss of power generation, by use of black start gas turbines.
- 22. Q. Would you consider this gas turbine system to be a source of " backup power" to the sirens?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] It all depends on how you define " backup power." The methods just described would restore power to the circuits ,
driving the sirens. In~thi~s sense, the system can be l described as a backup power system.
- 23. Q. How would LILCO identify those siren circuits that were not receiving power?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) Whenever a feeder circuit is not receiving power, it is noted by 1
an alarm in the LILCO System Control Center. Sirens are map coded as priority locations for: restoration; particular sirens are related to specific circuits.
The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator at the EOC will contact the Supervising Service Operator in Hicksville to ascertain the status of the siren cir-cuits.
- 24. Q. Would the loss of power to the siren system preclude a timely warning to the public?
A. [Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] No. The procedures described above will provide quick restora-tion of power to the siren system. In addition, LERO will provide supplemental notification through the use of Route Alert Drivers. LILCO also has a letter of agreement with Island Helicopter which states that Is-land will provide alerting services in the event that the sirens fail. (Attachment 2).
It also should be noted that tone alert radios, which have battery backup, provide a functional supple-ment to the siren system. These tone. alert radios, which are activated by the Emergency Broadcast System signal and operate independently of the siren system, will provide notification to schools, hospitals, spe-J cial facilities, large employers, and other institu-tions at which a large number of people might be locat-ed.
- 25. Q. You mentioned Route Alert Drivers. How will Route Alert Drivers provide a backup to the sirens?
A. (Cordaro, Hobbs,.Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) The Route Alert Drivers will be dispatched to broadcast a message over a mobile loudspeaker to areas where.the sirens have failed. On his drive through the route alert area, the Route Alert Driver will broadcast a prerecorded message over the loudspeaker system
l attached to his vehicle. The message will notify resi-dents of the area that there has been an accident at the Shoreham Power Station and that residents should tune in to their local emergency broadcasting station for further information.
- 26. Q. How will LERO know which sirens have failed to function and, therefore, where to send the route alert drivers?
A. [Cordaro, Rens, Weismantle, Schiffmacher] As previous-ly stated, LILCO's Supervising Service Operator will be able to identify electric circuits that may have failed entirely and that are to provide power to sirens. This information is available to LERO.
- 27. Q. Are there any other means to identify any sirens that have failed to sound?
A. (Cordaro, Weismantle] Yes. LILCO has a contract with !
Marketing Evaluations, Inc. that provides for a survey to be conducted of the area covered by each of the 89 sirens. (LILCO Transition Plan at App-B-53). Individ-uals from Marketing Evaluations, Inc. will be assigned LERO pagers. When the sirens are activated, the Coordinator of Public Information will contact Market-ing Evaluations either by coded pager or commercial phone and inform them to initiate a survey of the EPZ.
The purpose of the survey will be to determine whether selected persons living near each of the 89 sirens have heard the sirens. When nonfunctioning sirens, if any, are identified, Marketing Evaluationo will contact the
Coordinator of Public Information or his Staff at the EOC. Route Alert Drivers will then be dispatched to the areas where the sirens have not sounded.
- 28. Q. Are you familiar with the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(5) and the recommendations of NUREG-0654, Appendix B, Section B(2)?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] Yes.
Those regulations require that the capability exist to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
- 29. Q. Does LILCO's prompt notification system comply with these regulatory requirements and guidelines?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) Yes.
The Prompt Notification System, which includes the siren system, tone alert radios, and Emergency Broad-cast System, has the capability to provide notification and an instructional message to the public in the plume.
exposure pathway EPZ within 15 minutes.
- 30. Q. Do the regulations require a direct backup power supply for sirens or any prompt notification system?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle) No.
j The regulations only require the capability to provide l
prompt notification. LILCO provides that with its siren system, tone alert radios,-and Emergency Broad-cast System.
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- 31. Q. Do you have any reason to believe that there is a lack l of reasonable assurance that a timely warning will be forthcoming in the event of a loss of power to the siren system?
A. [Cordaro, Hobbs, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] No.
The combination of LILCO's ability to restore power to sirens promptly through switching and, if necessary, the use of gas turbines; to identify promptly electric circuits that are out of service; and to dispatch the Route Alert Drivers provides reasonable assurance that there will be a timely warning even in the event that there is a loss of power to the siren system.
- 32. Q. Mr. Hobbs, you have been a consultant to a number of utilities and states concerning emergency planning is-sues and communications systems. 'Are you aware of any nuclear power plant where a direct backup power supply is provided to a siren system such as_the one used by LILCO?
A. [Hobbs] No. LILCO, like the majority of other utilities, uses electro-mechanical sirens. I am aware of no utility or government responsible for notifica-tion of the public in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant that uses a system.of electro-mechanical sirens.
which also has a direct backup power supply for the siren system. A few utilities have backup power sup-j plies ~for a few of their individual sirens; this, how-ever, has not been required. .
- 33. Q. Mr. Schiffmacher, why_did LILCO elect to employ electro-mechanical sirens fo'r/its prompt notification-system?
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A. [Schiffmacher]At the time we' designed the system,
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probably have a corrosive effect on the sirens. We Y .;J2-
{.* , ; .% 3 b therefore determined to use electro-mechanical sirens.
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- 34. Q. Contention 95.D. asserts that the tone alert radios
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) 35. Q. Contention 95.E. asserts that there is no source of backup power at the Emergency News Center, that such backup power is necessary for the ENC to function, and that there are no provi: ions for relocating the ENC if it becomes inoperable. Do you agree with these asser-tions? A. (Cordaro, Renz, Schiffmacher, Weismantle] No. First, the standards cited in the Contention (10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b)(7); NUREG-0654, II.G.3.) make no reference to any requirement for backup power for the ENC; no such requirement exists. Second, LILCO's ENC is to be at the Quality Inn, Old Mill, Ronkonkoma. The loss of offsite power to the ENC would not render it inopera-ble. Telephone and minimal portable light.dng would be servicable. Third, if, for whatever reason, it became necessary to relocate the ENC, contingency plans pro-vide that it would be relocated to LILCO's Mineola of-fice, where the company's Corporate Communications Center is located. This is explicitly stated in Revi-sion 3 of the LILCO Transition Plan at 3.8-4.
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.f. e ATTACHMENTS V. : t ,..
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. ATTACHMENT 1 Schematics Showing (i) LILCO Inter- .Y -I ~ '" .%-
connections to State and Regional Power [ .
.'v.., ,U' Grid, and (ii) Interconnections Between c@,iw M. - .
Shoreham Power Station and LILCO 'i- ',.-- i Transmission System n f- : _ 'W;. r.-
.. . s 'l ATTACHMENT 2 December 19, 1983 Letter Agreement with '?-f ll +# '
Island Helicopter Corporation ;-
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ATTACHMENT 1
e0esy - M A H E PR R PO O B H .DR S NA T A L H R GK O _ NL P EA H _ W T _ R _. WR O EO N NN 32 S N
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ATTACHMENT 2 mm e at Department E Long Island Lighting Company 550 Stewart Avenue NR Garden City, NY 11530 LETTER AGREEMENT - Isla(nd Helicopter Corporation agrees to provide aircraft - p for use in an emergency upon request from the Long Island Lighting company in the event of an accident at Shoreham, and for support during drills and exercises. I. AIRCRAFT Should an emergency at Shoreham require it, Island Helicopter and its major division New York Heli-copter will provide LILCO with those fleet aircraft airworthy and available at the time the aircraft are requested by LILCO. Airworthiness shall pertain to the maintenance status of any particular aircraft. l Availability shall be determined in respect to an aircraft's current location if on assignment. Island Helicopter represents that on an average, at least three of its aircraft are available and airworthy at any given time. II. CURRENT AIRCRAFT INVENTORY PASSENGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT MODEL CAPACITY (EACH) 3 Bell Jet Ranger 4 6 Bell Long Ranger 6 2 A-Star 5 1 Twin Star 5 7 Dauphin 9 2 S-58T 14 1 365N 7 TOTAL PASSENGER CAPACITY 161 III. AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION All airworthy and available aircraft will be put at LILCO's disposal, to be utilized at LILCO's direction for emergency transportation, evacuation route spotting and other traffic control functions, alerting populations should the public warning system fail, evacuation of ill or injured, and any
Yir . 8 J. Sacca .-- >er 13, 1983 . - ggg D M NE other pruposes that may arise during an emergency. All flight and weather decisions will be the re-sponsibility of the respective aircraft captains. Jt is understood that Island's aircraft will op- ~ brate into and out of any and all approved safe .- landing areas within close proximity of the Shoreham *
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facility. All flights will be conducted within th.e scope of existing regulations, including the operating pol- - icies of Island Helicopter Corporation. - It will be the responsibility of LILCO to insure _ L that all aircraft utilization is safe in regards to radioactive, thermal or associated exposure which in any way could present harm or damage to the physical well being of Island crew members, maintenance crews, subcontractors and the specif-ic aircraft utilized. In this regard, LILCO will train Island personnel regarding possible radiation exposure and on the use of dosimeters. IV. EMERGENCY SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION _ _ s ,
- . A ' .. y When the need for such service arises, it shall be -
r;d.5 coordinated through Island operations in Garden ie? .... City, New York. L ,J . gJ ,a'-l. us.3 %. . > p The primary contact will be Kathy Murphy, Manager of Operations, at 516 294-0355.
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#g;6,;i,Y . 4 At that time, the level of emergency will be des- $8k . s ..
cribed by LILCO, and the approximate number of "'(f[; . x, .s[d aircraft deemed necessary to respond will be re- _
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quested. If the entire fleet is required, LILCO Dxguma;n- , will so state upon notification of Island. Air-craft on the ground will be dispatched immediately. Aircraft in service will be dispatched as soon as lE ggggg possible (ASAP). .c
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V. FLIGHT CO-ORDINATION c :R ~ ~ : @,4 :
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= In the event of a major emergency requiring exten- %gi.y} G sive use of Island aircraft, I::21and will set up a ..jMf.dM command and control center (.to be named .). This >M?.1 I
$2fH.$y-V center will coordinate with the Local Emergency
.9 9 't Response Organization (LERO) to facilitate effective communications between LERO and the operating air-craft. .
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J. Sacca er 13, 1983 3-
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VI. AIRPLANE OPERATIONS _ Should the need arise for long-range transpor , tation, Island will provide jet services thru - its division, Business Jet Airlines. The fol-owing equipment would be available: . NUMBER OF PASSENGER AIRCRAFT MODEL CAPACITY (EACH) 1 Gates Lear Jet 24 6 Passenger 2 Gates Lear Jet 25 8 Passenger 1 Lockheed Jet Star II 9 Passenger f cu. The Lear Jets are configured for aerial ambulance .: 2. %
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flights. u .5,4, m VII. COST hj$f:h The cost for the abovementioned services will be on a cost-incurred basis plus monthly retainer, !!!'f g\ v: *,
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; mee The retainer will be , billable monthly, beginning the month in which the plant goes on- ifff.h*[1?"i
+ .. ) , 9 line and begins commercial operation. The cost of ~ 'S ~{2[JI-aircraft utilized will be derived based upon the then current agreed pricing found within the pur- h!EEE chase order agreement between LILCO and Island Helicopter Corporation, to be revised by the part-ies periodically as set out in the purchase order ~
agreement. Any additional charges for actual utilization will reflect actual costs incurred by #N Syhfhj* i4"}% i Island to mobilize this emergency effort, as follows: 1
- 1. . Overtime costs attributed to existing crews as well as off-duty crews necessary to fulfill LILCO's request for assistance.
l
- 2. On-site maintenance personnel for the purpose of continued aircraft availability once in emer-gency service.
- 3. Any costs inherent to mobilization /de-mobili-zation of a command and control center set up pursuant to paragraph V of this agreement.
VIII. SERVICE COVERAGE The implementation plan would provide coverage on a y - - . . - - . - . * * * . + = . - - - -
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=i J. Sacca ler 13, 1983 MMM M W M.
e 365 day, 24 hour basis. Response times will be . immediate during normal business hours of 0630-through 1900 hours, subject to availability of-pirworthy aircraft.- Before or after business hours, response. times will be extended consistdnt . with the effort necessary to obtain full operat-ing strength, expected within 1 to 4 hours. Island shall maintain an emergency response pro-gram whereby crews are tele-electronically alerted, assembled at convenient locations, and subsequently flown to Garden City (when necessary) in order to
- insure rapid aircraft response.
Island Helicopter Corporation will consult with " LILCO in respect to landing site selection and .. any other pre planning stages, including partic-ipation in drills and exercises, to insure a comprehensive emergency response progra'. m IX. FORCE MAJEURE Except as otherwise specifically provided in this agreement, neither party shall be liable for any delay or failure in the performance of any services or other obligations under this agreement due to the
.following causes beyond their control: Acts of God, -
(including without limitation weather conditions), fire, floods, strikes, riots, insurrection, war or acts of public enemies. Each party shall give to 3 the other. prompt notice of any events of force - majeure, and shall use its reasonable best efforts _ to minimize the extent and effect of any such event. - X. TERM OF AGREEMENT - ' This Agreement shall commence on the date of ex- -. . ecution by both parties, and shall continue from year-to-year thereafter, until terminated by either party upon not less than one (1) year's prior writ- = ten notice to the other. E E 3 E 5 G E 2 E J d 3.-.,.. . I
J1 J. Sacca ser 13, 1983 >5 - MMM M W2 XI. INSURANCE-Seeattachedexhibitsforinsuranc$ Coverage.
.. I, EPTED AND AGREED G LAND LIGHTING CO PANY ISLA ' EL OPT RATION
/ % . BY s/Ki ($ h )
LE: Vice President TI LE: l/ E: /c2. / 9 DATE: /).!/4!&5
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