ML20084P396

Advises That Wall 21 Will Be Eliminated to Facilitate Installation of Remote Shutdown Panel Per IE Bulletin 80-11 & App R Fire Protection Requirements.Revised Pages of Rept 02-0370-1132 Applicable to Reevaluation of Wall 21 Encl

ML20084P396
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/11/1984
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8405180195
Download: ML20084P396 (9)

Text

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GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear

= r 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Di'ect Dia: Number:

hay 11, 1984 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Divison of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Additional Request to Defer Modifications to One Masonry Wall (IE Bulletin 80-11)

Subsequent to receipt of your letter dated March 27, 1984, which forwarded an evaluation report granting deferment of modifications to certain masonry walls, we have identified one (1) additional masonry wall which we believe a deferment until the next refueling outage (Cycle

11) is acceptable. The wall in question is wall No. 21, which is the outside boundary wall for the 480 Volt Switengear Room. Recent work to address Appendix R Fire Protection requirements has identified tha need to eliminate this wall in order to facilitate the installation of ie Remote Shutdown Panel. This work is scheduled for the next refueling outage.

Two of the three walls in the 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Wall Nos. 22 and 23), previously identified as requiring modifications during the current outage, have been modified. Our consultant has reanalyzed the consequences of the failure of wall No. 21 during a seismic event hnd has concluded that its failure would not impact the safe shutdown of the plant. We concur with this conclusion. The attachment to this letter provides the revised pages of Report No._ 02-0370-1132 applicable to the reevaluation of wall No. 21.

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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Pubhc Utihties Corporation

I-If you should have any questions regarding the information herein, please contact Mr. Paul Czara at (609) 971-4893.

Very truly yours, 0

~

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:PFC: dam Attachment cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Colanission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731

Report No. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY WALL FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the requirements of NRC I.E.Bulletin 80-11, all masonry walls at Oyster Creek that are in proximity to or have attachments from safety related piping or equipment such that wall failure could affect a safety related system l

have been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

These walls are being upgraded to meet the required seismic standards. Of the masonry walls identified, twenty-five still require modifications.

In order to obtain a delay in the required wall repairs, GPUNC contracted Impell Corporation to perform a wall failure consequence analysis.

This report documents the methodology t

and results of this analysis.

/IL Subsequent to the completion of this report, Walls 22 and 23 were modified, whereas Wall 21 was not modified. Since Walls 21, 22 and 23 are all in the area of the 480V switchgear room, GPUN requested Impell to evaluate the consequence of Wall 21 failing and Walls 22 and 23 remaining.in tact.

It should be noted that the initial analysis conservatively considered all of Wall 21 failing, whereas the structural evaluation for Wall f

21 indicates that only the 23 foot continuous span required modification and the 4 foot floor to ceiling section of the wall situated East of the 7 foot doorway did not require mod'i fication.

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Report Nr. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY WALL FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

4.0 CONCLUSION

The equipment which could affect plant safety or is utilized to achieve the plant protective functions required for plant l

shutdown is affected by the following wall failures:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,16, 21, 22, 23, and 42 These twelve walls will be structurally modified prior to mstart from the curmnt 1983-1984 refueling outage with the exception of wall 42. Wall 42 was removed above the cable tray s.

Wall 42 was previously designated as a wall requiring addition of boundary supports.

The removal of the top of the wall eliminated the mquirement for boundary supports.

Walls whose failure does not directly affect plant shutdown are as follows:

8,15,17,18,19, 20, and 25 These walls will be modified prior to restart:from the following refueling outage. Walls 24, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 will be reanalyzed to detennine if the ESW and containment spray piping can maintain structural integrity after wall f ailu re.

If the analysis determines that the wall failures have a negative effect of the containment spray piping, wall 24, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 will be modified prior to restart.

l d Subsequent to the completion of Revision 0 of this report, Walls 22 and 23 were modified whereas Wall 21 was not I

modified.

GPUN requested that Impell evaluate the consequence 1

of Wall 21 failing and Walls 22 and 23 remaining intact. The conclusion derived from this evaluation is that no plant protective functions required for plant shutdown will be adversely affected by leaving Wall 21 unmodified. This conclusion is based on the following: Wall 21 is essentially two (2) separate sections, a 23 fcot long section running East 1

from a concrete wall to a doorway, and a four foot floor to ceiling section running East from the doorway to a concrete wall. The structural evaluation for Wall 21 indicates that the 23 foot section of wall requires modification whereas the 4 foot section is seismically adequate as presently installed and does not require modification. Accordingly, Wall 21 was evaluated in two phases:

23 Foot Section: Maintaining the 23 foot section of Wall 21 unmodified does not affect any plant shutdown systems since all safety related components in proximity to the wall are above the elevation of the Wall or redundant Components are available since Walls 22 and 23 nave been modified.

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i Report No. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY WALL FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 4 Foot Section: This section of Wall 21 was conservatively considered to fail in Revision 0 of this report and impact on Cable Trays V-30,15A and 16C. Since subsequent infonnation received by Impell indicates that this section of Wall 21 is seismically adequate as presently installed, the aforementioned Cable Trays will not be impacted.

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k Report No. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 WALL NO. 21 LOCATION: OFFICE BUILDING SWITCH GEAR ROOM l

COMPONENT FUNCTION Swgr USS 1B2 o

Containment Spray PP 1 -4 Power Cabinets o

SD Cooling PP NUO2C o

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o SD PP NUO2B i

o Core Spray Booster PPs NZ038, C o

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MCC-1824 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY WALL FAILURE WALKDOWN, EQUIPMENT AFFECTED PAGE I

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0370-043-01 9

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Report No. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 WALL NO. 21 LOCATION: OFFICE BUILDING SWITCH GEAR ROOM COMP 0NENT FUNCTION Motor Control Ctrs o 1821 Panels 16-8 o

Power for Swgr Room Area and Access Door 50-2 49-2 d NOTE:

The following items have been eliminated from the above list due to supplemental infomation provided to Impe11 by GPUN or additional analysis done by Impell:

Cable Trays V-30, ISA and 16C - Supplemental information received by Impe11 from GPUN indicates that the portion of Wall l

21 in proximity to these components is seismically adequate as installed.

Accordingly, the function of these cable trays will be maintained.

Ventilation Ducts, Cable Tray 190 - These components are above the elevation of the 27 foot continuous span of Wall 21 and are not an integral part of the wall. Accordingly, maintaining the 27 foot continuous span of Wall 21 as presently installed will have no affect on the function of these components.

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY

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,.' '. 5 Report No. 02-0370-1132 Revision 1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MASONRY WALL FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS TABLE C-2 (continued)

AFFECT OF WALL FAILURE ON PLANT SYSTEMS FAILED SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CAUSE OF FAILURE COMMENTS Emergency Diesel Battery Room'17,18; DC Power for Generators Control Room Walls breakers control 6, 7 and indication at panel s 9XF, 8F.

and 9F Reactor Protection Cable spreading room Both channels lost System wall 25; control room should fail safe walls 2,16;lls 21, switch gear room wa 22, 23.

Electomatic Relief Switch gear room walls Manual operation Valves 21, 22, 23; battery not possible room walls 17,18; control room walls 2, 3 Emergency Condenser Reactor Building Walls Auto control of System 31, 32; Control Room valves disabled.

Walls 2, 3; Battery Room walls 17,18 Containment Spray Reactor Building Walls Pipe ruptured, System 29, 30, 31, 33; Switch torus drained, Gear Room Walls 21, 22, containment 23; Control Room Walls isolation not 2, 3; Battery Room Walls possible.

Both 17, 18 trains lost.

d Subsequent to the completion of Revision 0 of this report, Walls 22 and 23 have been modified and the maintaining of Wall 21 as presently installed has been detennined not to have a detrimental affect on protective functions required for plant shutdown.