ML20083E192
ML20083E192 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Beaver Valley |
Issue date: | 12/16/1983 |
From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
GL-83-33, NUDOCS 8312280506 | |
Download: ML20083E192 (175) | |
Text
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Telephone (412) 393-6000 Nuclear Division P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 December 16, 1983 irector of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
[ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.1 Division of Licensing Vashington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests Cased on Generic Letter 83-33 Gentlemen:
Based on our review of Generic Letter 83-33, "NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50", whicn provided spe-cific interpretations for certain re uirementss of the Fire Protection Rule, we have detemined that additional exemptions will be necessary to be consistent with the staff interpretations and to remain within conformance cf the Rule for these particular issues.
Numerous correspondence, telephone conversations, and meetings between the Staff reviewers and Duquesne Light Company had taken place and resulted in, what we believed to be, a mutual understanding and clarification of the requirements of Appendix R. Our final SER for Appendix R, documented on January 5,1983, concluded that the proposed Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I design meets the requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 items III.G.3 and III.L with respect to safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the areas identified in our submittal, provided our proposed modifications are implemented according to the committed schedule dates.
documented in our Appendix R Submittal Report 30, of JuneOur 1982 and previously identified exem
' supplemented by additional infomation provided by our letters of October 22, October 28, December 10, and December 21, 1982, were all granted and documented in your letter of liarch 14, 1983.
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C Betver Valley Power Station f Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests Based on Generic Letter 83-33 Page Two Duquesne Light Company hereby requests additional exemptions, from certain provisions of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, based on the interpretations of certain requirements provided in Generic Letter 83-33. In summary, the eleven (11) fire areas for which exemptions are being requested are broken down into five (5) separate categories:
- 1) Section III.G sets forth the requirement for fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of " fire areas",
defined in Generic Letter 83-33 as that portion of a building or plant that is separated frm other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors, and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier).
Certain configurations that do not meet the strict definition of fire areas have been been detemined and exemptions from the pro-visions of III.G.2 are requested for the following areas:
Control Room HVAC Equipment Room (CR-2), Elev. 713' (See Attachment II)
Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1 & 2), Elev. 713' (See Attachment III)
- Process Instrument Room (CR-4), Elev. 713' (See Attachment IV)
Communications Equipment & Relay Panel Room (CR-3), Elev. 713' (See Attachment V)
Nomal Switchgear Room (NS-1), Elev. 713' (See Attachment VI)
Cable Spreading Room (CS-1), Elev. 725'6" (See Attachment XI)
- 2) Section III.G.3 requires suppression and detection for the original area under consideration for which alternative or dedicated shutdown capability has been provided. Exemptions from the provisions of III.G.3 are requested for the following areas:
Primary Auxiliary Building (PA-1A), Elev. 768 (See Attachment I)
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests Based on Generic Letter 83-33 Page Three Control Room HVAC Equipment Room (CR-2), Elev. 713 -
(See Attacnment II) ,
- Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1 & 2), Elev. 713 (See Attachment III)
- Process Instrument Room (CR-4), Elev. 713 (SeeAttachmentIV)
Communications Equipment & Relay Panel Room (CR-3), Elev. 713 (See Attachment V)
Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1), Elev. 713 (See Attachment VI)
Carbon Dioxide Storage /PG Pump Room (C0-2)
(See Attachment VIII)
- 3) Section III.G. 2 (a) requires structural steel forming a part of or supporting fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. An exemption from the provisions of III.G.2 (a) is requested for the following area:
- Service Building, Elevation 713 area below the Cable Spreading Room (Structural Steel)
(See Attachment VII)
- 4) Section III.G.3 requires suppression and detection be installed "in the area, room or zone under consideration" in addition to pT6viding alternative or dedicated shutdown capability.
To satisfy this requirement, the Staff's interpretation is
, that suppression and detection needs to be installed "throughout" the fire area. An exemption from III.G.3 is requested for the following area:
e
- Pipe Tunnel (Sub-area QP-l), Elev. 735 (SeeAttachmentIX)
- 5) Section III.G.2 (d) requires 20 foot separation of cables of redundant trains inside containment area. An exemption from the provisions of III.G.2 (d) is requested for the following area:
- Reactor Containment (RC-1), Elev. 738, Source Range Cable Routing (See Attachment X)
Beaver Valley Power Station l Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 )
Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests '
Based on Generic Letter 83-33 Page Four The technical justification and fire hazards analysis for each fire area supporting our exemption requests are provided in Attachments I through XI of this letter dich provides reasonable assurance that at least one safe shutdown division is free of fire damage given a postulated fire in any one fire area. Each exemption is predicated upon an equiva-lent level of protection to that required by Appendix R based on the infomation and considerations provided for each fire area.
The bases for these additional exemption requests are:
- 1) that the existing plant configurations of these fire areas provide equivalent protection to the public health and safety to that which would be provided by the specific requirements of Appendix R as interpreted by the Staff; and
- 2) that, therefore, any plant modifications necessary to comply with the specific requirements of Appendix R, as interpreted by the Staff, would not enhance the overall facility fire protection safety, and
, 3) that the modifications previously made to the facility for conforming to B.T.P. 9.5-1 have already been implemented and the existing con-figuration (s) found acceptable by the NRC under that review effort.
DLC believes that the existing configurations given the fire loadings of the areas, the degree of protection already inherent in the present design, and the previously committed to modifications documented in our SER provide protection equivalent to that which would be achieved by conformance to the specific requirements and interpretations of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
In addition to the exemption requests, we are presently evaluating the status of our fire doors and open trenches. We have determined that some fire door cpenings do not have an approved UL label affixed to the door or frame sich would denote the proper fire rating.
For some of the unlabeled fire doors, documentation from the manufacturer is available due to the oversized dimensions of the doors. We are making arrangements to have a qualified individual from UL make a site visit to conduct an inspection and test program of all unlabeled doors and frames to determine their acceptability. Our objective is to have all fire doors properly labeled or have adequate documentation to verify satisfactory fire rating of the openings. This information will be made available at the time the NRC I & E Review Team conducts their Appendix R site inspection tour to aide in their review process.
. _ - _ . __ -_ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ~
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests Based on Generic Letter 83-33 Page Five In our final SER dated January 5,1983, page 8, Section C -
" Repairs" noted that the licensee would have repair procedures for utilizing support craddles under the main steam lines for the pro-posed water-solid operation outlined in our October 28, 1982 letter describing our cold shutdown methodology. We have re-evaluated the presently existing supports and determined that they are acceptable as is. No additional support cradles will be necessary. The calcu-latior.s and supporting documentation will be available to the NRC I&E Review Team during the Appendix R site inspection visit.
In regards to your letter of November 22, 1983, pertaining to the fee requirements of 10 CFR 170 relative to our previous alternate safe shutdown exemption per 10 CFR 50 and subsequent approval by your letter of January 5,1983, we have forwarded the payment due under separate cover. In accordance with the policy set forth in your letter, all addi-tional exemptions pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 are exempt from fees. Therefore, no payment is necessary for the additional exemptions requested within this letter.
Please contact my staff if additional information or clarification is necessary, Ver tru yours,
/
. J. Carey Vice President, Nuclear i
.. Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Appendix R - Additional Exemption Requests Based on Generic Letter 83-33
- Page Six Enclosures cc
- Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Mangement Branch Washington, DC 20555 Director, Safety Evaluation & Control Virginia Electric & Power Company P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richrrond, VA 23261 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: Dr. Thomas E. fiurley, Regional Director Region I
> 631 Park Avenue
- King of Prussia, PA 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Licensing Attn : D. G. Eisenhut, Director Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
, Attn: S. J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Peter Tam, Project Manager
, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Phillips Building Washington, DC 20555 Mail Stop 438 i
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d5 ATTACHMENT I ENEMPTION I. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING (PA-1A) EL.768'7" (See attached Figures 11.7-1 and 11.7-2)
A. Discussion Even though this fire area does not contain safe shutdown cables / equipment, the ventilation exhaust fans (VS-F-7A and -7B, and VS-F-4A and 4B) located in this fire area are for the Charging Pump Cubicles located three floor 3 below at elevation 722 in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). The use of portable ventilation fans as a means of providing an alternate method for essential air flow to the Charging Pump Cubicles to ensure continued operation of the pumps was approved in your SER for BVPS-1 dated 1/3/83 and an exemption was granted per your letter of 3/14/83. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case the PAB 768 floor level), we request an additional exemption from III.G.3 for the PAB elevation 768 floor level because this area does not have fixed suppression or detection.
This exemption is predicated on equivalent level of protection to that required based on the information and considerations provided within this section.
B. Boundaries The construction of this area constitutes a 3-hour rated fire-barrier between the fuel building (FB-1), the pipe tunnel (PT-1) and the lower floor elevations of the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB).
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-24M)
Reinforcod Concrete:
- a. North lft,61n. which is the outside wall
- b. South ift,6in. which parallels the fuel building (FB-1) and a portion makes up the outside wall
- c. East lft,6in, which is the outside wall
- d. West 2ft,0in. which parallels the pipe tunnel (PT-1) and a portion makes up the outside wall.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-24Q)
Structural Steel with 1 1/2 inches corrugated steel decking
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-24M) 2ft,0in. reinforced concrete
- 4. Room Volume 231,480 cu.ft.
All penetrations to adjacent fire areas have been sealed for a 3-hour rating which constitutes a 3-hour l fire rated boundary for this fire zone.
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C. Ventilation Figure 11.7-3 details the primary auxiliary building ventilation for this elevation. This zone of PA-1A is not designed with any dedicated supply or exhaust ventilation.
D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment in the 768'7" level of PA-1A As identified in our circuit analysis report (Figure 11.7-4),
there are no redundant safe s c.utdown cables / equipment in this fire area.
Additional equipment located on this floor level:
- 1. Charcoal Filter Banks (VS-FL-23, -24 and -25, and GW-FL-1A,
-1B; -4A, and -4B; Figure 11.7-1). The existence of the associated filter bank heat detectors that alarm in the control room, in conjunction with the spatial separation from other equipment in the area and the available fire suppression feature within the area provides adequate assurance of early detection, containment of the fire and extinguishment.
- 2. The Primary Grade Water Vacuum Pump (PG-C-1, Figure 11.7-1) is equipped with an 8 gal oil reservoir. The rupture and subsequent ignition of the oil in this reservoir is not a significant threat to any safe shutdown equipment due to location and quantity of oil.
- 3. The Main Exhaust Filter Banks (MF-1 and MF-2; Fig. 11.7-1) contain charcoal filters enclosed within metal containers for each bank, which is provided with a water deluge supression system, and therefore is not considered as an exposure hazard for this area.
E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Systems Heat detectors with control room alarm are provided in MF-1 and -2 only.
- 2. Fire Extinguishi.ng Systems Existing a) Interior standpipe hose rack stations are provided as the primary fire suppressions system with portable fire extinguishers in the area (Carbon Dioxide and Dry Chemical) as backup protection.
b) An automatic / manual water spray deluge suppression s, stem is provided for MF-1 and 2. (Ref. Figures 11.7-5 and 11.7-1.)
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- 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at BVPS-1 were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibics in this Area a) Cable insulation is negligible as all cable on this elevation is enclosed in conduit.
b) 8 gallons of lube oil for the primary grade water vacuum pump.
c) 4,000 lb. of charcoal housed in the charcoal filter banks.
d) Charcoal contained within the Main Filter Banks MF-1 &
2 is contained and adequately protected, there fore it is not considered an exposure hazard in this area.
- 2. Heat Release Potential Cable-negligible Charcoal - contained within the charcoal filter banks (VS-FL-23, 24 & 25, and Gk'-FL-1 A, 1B , 4A & 4B)
(4000 lbs.)
a) Head Load = 14,000 Btu b) Area = 10,000 ft c) Heat Release Potential = 560 Btu /ft Lube Oil - (8 gallons) a) Heat Load = 1.24 x 10' Btu b) Area = 10,000 ft 2 c) Heat Release Potential = 125 Btu /ft:
Total Heat Release Potential = 685 Btu /ft 2 l
Based on the total heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is negligible (less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
I G. Justification of Area Acceptability l l
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for the area.
- 2. Manual suppression equipment is immediately available in the area.
- 3. Strict plant control of hazardous quantities of transient combustibles.
- 4. The fire rated construction of the area would obviate the potential for a fire in this area spreading to adjacent fire areas. .
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- 5. The normal fans (VS-F-7A,-7B) and the emergency fans (VS-F-4A,-4B) associated with the charging pump cubicle ventilation system had previously been assumed lost for this area. To ensure continued charging purup operation, a portable gasoline driven emergency exhaust fan will be provided as part of the fire brigade inventory and will be utilized to provide cubicle ventilation to ensure continued long to .n operation. This method was approved and an exemption was granted per your letter of 3/14/83.
This alternate shutdown capability method would bring plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R, except for fixed suppression and detection for the original area under cotsideration (PAB, Elev. 768 floor level).
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations.
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FIRE AREA PA-1A REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL IN6 "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER NOTE 1 NONE NO NO NO CHAPTER 6 YES SECT 6.5 CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT NOTE 1 NONE NO NO NO CHAPTER 6 YES SECT 6.5 NOTE FOR FIRE AREA PA-1A: n w
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- 1. DECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY AND DISPERSED LAYOUT OF ALL THE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHARGING PUMP CUBBCLE VENTILATION SYSTEM (NORMAL FANS VS-F-7A, -7B; EMERGENCY FANS VS-F-4A, -48), ALL OF THE ASSOCIATED POWER AND CONTROL CABLES WERE NOT @
H TRACED. THIS SYSTEM FUNCTION HAS BEEN ASSUMED LOST FOR THE FOLLOWING AREAS: CS-1 MS-1, CR-4, CV-1, CV-2, AND PA-1A, - H IC, AND -1E. THE FUNCTION IS REPLACED BY THE MODIFICATION DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 6,SECTION 6.5.
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BETWEEN BUILDINGS ELEV.767*-10" BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT 1 Fl9E HAZARDS ANALYSIS REVISED 3/1/82 8 312 28 0 5 0 8 -OL l,
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.- '4* ATTACHMENT II EXEMPTION i
i II. Control Room. HVAC Equipment Room (CR-2) EL.713' (See attached Figures 11.8-1 and 11.8-2)
A. Discussion This area contains the HVAC equipment and controls for the control room areas (CR-1 through CR-4) and isolation valves for the control room " pressure envelope". The emergency outside air pressurization fans and charcoal filter bank units are also located in this area.
The potential for a fire in this area to render equipment located in this area inoperable was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report.
Our proposal was to:
, 1) remove the B Train on #2 Diesel Generator control circuit and wiring out of this area in order to meet the required separation criteria for redundant safety related circuits, and
- 2) provide a method to ventilate the areas lost by virtue of a fire in this area (CR-2), by use of portable ventilation units as part of the fire brigade equipment inventory.
! These were approved and documented in your SER for BVPS #1 dated January 5, 1983, and your letter dated March 14, 1983, respectively.
However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case the CR-2 area), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for CR-2 because this
, area does not have fixed suppression.
e Section III.G of Appendix R sets forth the requirement for fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas.
A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that
, is separated from other areas by boundary fire barrier (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier). For boundary fire barriers, using walls, floors, ceilings, dampers, doors, etc. existing prior to Appendix R, the rating required of a boundary fire barrier is based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, i.e., the rating of the barrier or boundary must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not necessarily be a 3-hour rated boundary unless the fire loading warrants such a boundary. Pursuant to the Staff's interpretation of fire areas, the fire rating of such boundaries must be three hours or an exemption must be requested. Therefore, an exemption from III.G.2 is required for this area (CR-2) because of an existing fire door which has a fire rating of 1 1/2 hours.
(See Figure 11.8-2).
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s B. Boundaries The construction of this area constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the process instrument room, relay room, and the primary auxiliary building, with the. exception of the single fire door described below.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A,-8B)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North ift.0in, which parallels the relay room (CR-3)
- b. South 2ft.0fn which parallels the Primary Auxiliary Building (PA-1)
- c. East 2ft.0in which is next to an unexcavated area
- d. West Ift.0in, which parallels the Process Instrument Room (CR-4) 1 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawings 11700-RC-8C,8F) 2 ft.0 in, reinforced concrete
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8H)
Minimum 3 ft. reinforced concrete
- 4. Room Volume 32,780 cu.ft.
- 5. Fire Doors The double door entrance to this area from CR-4 is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated door. The single side door near the Relay Room (CR-
- 3) is a 1 1/2 hour fire-rated door. (See Figure 11.8-2). The single door is a solid (no glass), hollow metal, 4 ft. x 8 ft.
sized door, which was originally installed to achieve the required fire barrier rating based on the fire loading in the room.
All penetrations to the adjacent fire areas have been sealed for a 3-hour rating.
C. Ventilation This area is serviced by the same ventilation air conditioning system as the Control Room areas CR-1, CR-3 and CR-4. The system is detailed on Figure 11.8-3. Duct penetrations are provided with 3 4
hour fire rated dampers between fire areas as detailed on Figure 11.8-5.
D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in CR-2 Both sets of DC power cabling associated with the field flashing of the emergency diesel generators are routed through this area (CR-2).
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.- r E. Fire Protection Existing or Committed
- 1. Fire Detection Systems Early Warning Detection System consists of area ionization coverage with control room and local alarm. Heat detection with control room alarm is provided for the charcoal filter bank unit.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems Portable extinguishers are available within the room and directly outside the area, as indicated on Figure 11.8-2. A standpipe hose rack station is located in stairwell (S-4) and could be used for water suppression. A 150-lb wheeled dry chemical extinguisher also exists in stairwell (S-4) on this floor level (Elev. 713). No automatic suppression system is installed in this area (CR-2).
- 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station-Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame scurce which was the acceptable industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in the CR-2 area
- a. Cable Insulation --- 5,025 lbs
- b. Lube Oil --- 10 gal.
- c. Charcoal --- 100 lbs
- 2. Heat Release Potential
- a. Cable Heat Load = 5.527 x 107 Btu Area = 1,490 Sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential = 37,060 Btu /sq.ft.
- b. Lube Oil Heat Load = 1.55 x 10' Btu Area = 1,490 Sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential = 1,040 Btu /sq.ft.
- c. Charcoal Heat Load = 1.40 x 108 Btu Area = 1,490 Sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential = 940 Btu /sq.ft.
The total heat release potential =39,040 Btu /sq.ft. Based on the heat release potential ~, the required fire rating for this area is less than one hour.
4
. - g' G. Justification of Area Acceptability
'1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for this area.
- 2. Three (3) hour fire rated dampers are installed in all ducts penetrating the fire barriers of this area.
- 3. The CR-2 area is provided with floor and equipment drains that will prevent equipment damage from standing water due to fire hose use. The drain header is provided with a deep seal running trap, eliminating the potential of fire propagation through the drain system.
4
- 4. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route.
. b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures.
c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials.
d) The accessibility to this area is restricted due to the security system card-key access into the switchgear area.
- 5. The installed early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area and the separation of redundant trains will maintain integrity of the cables and equipment. The fire brigade personnel, responding from the Control Room area two floors above the CR-2 area, will respond to extinguish tha fire via the southeast stairwell.
The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
- 6. The circuit analysis presented in (Figure 11.8-4) has identified the potential loss of function of the field flashing circuits of both emergency diesel generators. These circuits are routed through the area in conduit, running at least 10 ft above the floor elevation.
These circuits will be modified as described in Section 6.10 of our original Appendix R submittal report, which would reroute the B train or #2 DG Control Circuit and wiring out of this area, thereby meeting the required separation criteria for redundant trains. This will obviate the potential loss of function and bring the plant design for this area into compliance with Appendix R, except for fixed suppression in the original area under consideration (CR-2).
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- 7. In the event of a fire in this area, loss of ventilation to the Control Room, Process Instrument Rack Room, and Relay Room will be covered by providing ventilation via portable gasoline-driven exhaust fans, when necessary, and included as part of the fire brigade-inventory. This method of providing portable
, ventilation to these areas was previously approved in your letter of March 14, 1983.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of I
protection to that required based on the above considerations and modifications.
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- BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT I FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS l REVISED 3/1/82 i
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EMERGENCY GENERATOR YES YES YES - NO EE-EG-2 (TR-PP) EE-EG-1 (TR-PP)
EMERGENCY GENERATOR N/A YES YES NO EE-EG-2 (V-REG) EE-EG-1 (V-REG)
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CllARGING FLOW CONTROL VALVE MOV-RW113A YES YES YES - NO MOV-RW113G DIESEL GENERATOR llEAT EXCalANGER 18 n H
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. ATTACHMENT III EXEMPTION III. Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1 & -2) EL.713' (See attached Figure 11.9-1)
A. Discussion The West Emergency Switchgear Room (ES-1) contains the safety-related 4KV switchgear and 480V substations and associated cabling for the AE (Orange) Train. The East Emergency Switchgear Room (ES-2) contains the safety-related 4KV Switchgear and 480V substations and associated cabling for the DF (purple) Trair The rooms and redundant trains are adequately separated by a 3 hour-rated fire barrier to prevent a design basis fire from spreading between rooms.
The potential for a fire in either of these areas (ES-1 or 2) to render the loss of vital instrumentation redundant power supplies (120 volt AC Vital Bus 1,2,3 and 4) was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report. Our proposal to provide an alternate capability via a Buckup Indication Panel (BIP) was approved and documented in your SER for BVPS #1 dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case ES-1&2), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for these areas becauqe they do not have fixed suppression.
Section III.G of Appendix R sets forth the requirement for fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier). For boundary fire barriers, using walls, floors, ceilings, dampers, doors, etc. existing prior to Appendix R, the rating required of a boundary fire barrier is based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, i.e., the rating of the barrier or boundary must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not necessarily be a 3-hour rated boundary unless the fire loading warrants such a boundary. Pursuant to the Staff's interpretation of fire areas, the fire rating of such boundaries must be three hours or an exemption must be requested. Therefore, an exemption from III.G.2 is required for these areas (ES-1&2) because the ceiling slab which is the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (CS-
- 1) constitutes a minimum 1 1/2 hour fire rated barrier (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACHMENT XI), and the Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1&2) are provided with 1 1/2 hour fire rated dampers at the CS-1 perimeter penetration.
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. B. Boundari.es The construction of these areas constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the East and West Emergency Switchgear Rooms.
For adjacent areas, the boundary fire barriers are 3-hour rated fire barriers with the exception of the ceiling slab and fire dampers described below.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing, 11700-RC-8A,8B)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North 2ft.0in. 2ft.0in. parallels the Normal Swgr. Room, in addition ES-1 parallels the MS pipe chase.
- b. South 2ft.0in. 2ft.0in. parallels the unexcavated area.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8C,8F)
Reinforced concrete (5 1/2" max., 4" min.) on 1 1/2 inches corrugated metal decking constitutes a minimum 1 1/2-hour fire rated barrier. per the fire resistance / concrete thickness curve. (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACRMENT XI).
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8G)
Minimum 3ft.61n. reinforced concrete
All penetrations to the adjacent fire areas have been sealed for ,
a 3-hour rating which constitutes a 3-hour boundary for this fire zone.
C. Ventilation r
- The emergency switchgear rooms and battery rooms ventilation system includes two 100 percent redundant exhaust fans powered from the emergency buses. The fans exhaust the rooms through a common exhaust duct discharging to outdoor atmosphere. Each Emergency Switchgear Room exhaust register is provided with a 1 1/2 fire rated damper at the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) periceter penetration.
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D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in ES-1 & ES-2.
Redundant safety-related 4KV switchgear and 480V substations are located in each of these separate areas and supply power to Class 1E circuits required for safe shutdown. The circuit analysis has indicated the potential loss of safe shutdown instrumentation redundant power supplies via the 120 VAC Vital Bus 1,2,3 and 4 if either ES-1 or -2 areas are lost due to a fire per the criteria of Appendix R.
E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Existing Early warning detection. system consists of area ionization coverage with local and control room alarm.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems No fixed fire suppression is available in either ES-1 or -2.
Portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are located in each area with additional dry chemical extinguishers available in nearby adjacent areas. A 150-lb wheeled dry
- chemical extinguisher is located in the adjacent Normal Switchgear (NS-1) room.
- 3. Standpipe Hose Rack Station Standpipe hose rack stations are available at both stairwell entrances on this level of the building.
- 4. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazard Analysis
ES-1 ES-2 Cable Insulation 5,920 lbs 5,665 lbs.
- 2. Heat Release Potential ES-1 ES-2 6.51x107 Btu Heat Load 6.23x10' Btu 2,435 sq.ft. Area 2,350 sq.ft.
31,660 Btu /sq.ft. Heat Release Potential 26,380 Btu /sq.ft.
Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for
.each of these areas is less than 1/2 hour.
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G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for these areas.
- 2. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route.
b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures.
c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials.
d) The accessibility to the switchgear areas is restricted due to the security system card-key 8CCess.
- 3. The installed early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area and the separation of redundant trains will maintain integrity of the cables and equipment. The fire brigade personnel, responding from the control room area two floors above the switchgear area, will respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
- 4. The circuit analysis presented in (Figures 11.9-2,-3) has indicated the potential loss of safe shutdown instrumentation redundant power supplies (120 VAC Vital l Busses) if either ES-1 or ES-2 is lost in its entirety in accordance with the layout separation criteria of Appendix R. This potential loss of function was addressed in a previously approved exemption and describes a plant modification to provide a backup indication panel replacing this lost function. This was approved in your letter of January 5, 1983. This alternate shutdown capability modification would bring plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R, except for fixed suppression in the original area under consideration (ES-1 and -2).
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations.
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l CONTROL ROOM,SWITCHGEAR AND CABLE SPREADING AREA g~ ;
BEAVEh VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT I FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS I
REVISED 3/1/82 8 312 2 8 0 5 0 6 -C)(o YJ
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Asuar //.9- 2 EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR - ORANGE flRE AREA R QUMDANT FUNCIJ.ON CABLES AVAILABL E APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAjlU!!E CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYfi LQUIPMENT 10ST LQU I PMENI POW @ LMSTRUMENT.__ COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER Cll-P-1A CH-P-1B YES YES YES -
NO CilARGING PUMP CH-P-1C Cll-P-1B YES YES YES -
NO- .
CHARGING PUMP ,
DC-SWBD-1 DC-SWBD-2, 4 YES N/A YES - NO DC SWITCllBOARD DC-SWBD-3 DC-SWBD-2, 4 YES N/A YES -
NO DC SWITCHBOARD EE-EG-1 (FEED) EE-EG-2 (FEED) YES YES YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-1 ( FI ELD) EE-EG-2 (FIELD)
YES YES YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR
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EE-EG-1 (GND-SW) EE-EG-2 (GND-SW) YES YES YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR FW-P-3A FW-P-3B YES YES YES -
NO AUX FEED WATER PUMP MCC-1-El MCC-1-E2 YES N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-1-E3 MCC-1-E4 YES N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-1-E5 MCC-1-E6 YES N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-1-E7 HCC-1-E8 YES N/A YES - NO O MOTOR CONTROL CENTER :p 9
n MOTFS FOR FIRE AREA ES-1: $
' 1. CABLE IN AREA FOR CONTROL Of NORMAL AUX LUBE OIL PUMP, ASSOCIATED CABLE WITH SUITABLE CIRCUIT PROTECTION IS PROVIDED. $
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- 2. TilESE PANELS SERVE AS INSTRUMENTATION POWER SUPPLIES. -
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MCC-1-E9 NCC-1-E10 YES YES YES - NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER g MCC-1-E11 MCC-1-E12 YES N/A YES - NO N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER m PNL-VB-1 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 g NOTE 2 PNL-VB-3 NONE N/A . N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A ,
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NOTE 2 .
PNL-VB-is NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A I VITAL BUS PANEL SECT 6.11 NOTE 2 -
PZR-itTR-A PZR-IITR-B YES YES YES - NO PRESSURIZER HEATER PZR-IITR-D PZR-HTR-E '
YES YES YES - NO PRESSURIZER llEATER RH-P-1A RH-P-1B YCS YES YES -
NO -
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP VS-F-1A VS-F-1B YES YES YES -
NO
. CONTAINMENT RECIRC. FAN VS-F-1C VS-F-1B YES YES YES -
NO CONTAINMENT RECIRC. FAN
< VS-F-16A VS-F-16B YES YES YES -
NO EMERGENCY SWITCHCEAR EXHAUST FAN VS-F-55A VS-F-550 YES YES YES -
NO EMERCENCY SWITCllGEAR SUPPLY FAN 2 of is l \ l
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EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-2 (." ROT) YES YES YES - NO EE-EG-1 ( PROT)
EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-2 (TR-PP) YES YES YES - NO EE-EG-1 (TR-PP)
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REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILA511__ APPEN0lX REMARKS O CABLE FAILURE CONIROL AND R OR SPURIOUS 30 TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE -OPERATION CONTROL AND '4 INSTRUMENT p, (CONT'D) Z MOV-FW151D MOV-FW151C YES YES YES -
N0 f STM CEN AUX g FEED PUMP in iSOL VALVE U MOV-FW151F YES YES YES M MOV-FW151E -
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- VALVE MOV-RW102C2 MOV-RW102B1, B2 YES YES YES -
NO WR-P-IC DISCHARGE ISOLATION A HEADER TV-CH200 A, B, C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7&8 YES LETDOWN ORiflCE ISOLATION VALVES TV-MS105A TV-MS105B YES YES YES -
NO AUX FEED PUMP STEAM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE VS-F-22A VS-F-228 YES YES YES -
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LYPJ EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER CH-P-1B CH-P-1A YES YES YES -
NO CHARGING PUMP
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DC-SWBD-1 NOTE 1 YES N/A YES -
NO DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-2 DC-SWBD-1,3 YES N/A YES -
NO DC SWITCHPOARD DC-SWBD-3 NOTE 1 YES N/A YES -
NO DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-4 DC-SWBD-1,3 NO N/A YES -
NO DC SWITCHBOARD EE-EG-2 (FEED) EE-EG-1 (FEED) YES N/A YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-2 ( FIELD) EE-EG-1 (FIELD) YES N/A YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-2 (GND-SW) EE-EG-1 (CND-SW) YES N/A YES -
NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR FW-P-3B FW-P-3A YES YES YES -
NO AUX FEED WATER PUMP MCC-1-E2 MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 YES N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9,11 Q
W MCC-1-E10 MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 YES N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9,11 Q H
- -I NOTES FOR FIRE AREA ES-2:
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- 1. THIS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOT LOST DUE TO A FIRE IN THIS AREA, ONLY SUDFEEDS INCLUDED TO PROVE'C00RDINAT10N.
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- 2. Tile ONLY CABLE IN Tills AREA IS AN ASSOCI ATED CABLE TO Tile MOTOR HEATER WillCil IS PROTECTED BY A COORDINATED CIRCUIT BREAKER FROM A NON-1E POWER SOURCE. y
- 3. TilESE PANELS SERVE AS INSTRUMENTATION POWER SUPPLIES. $
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EMERGENCY SW1TCHGEAR- LE q .,
-F1RE ARE Eg-2.gc .,
.;n:r 9y RFDUNDANT FUNCIl0N CABLES AVAILARL{_ APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONIROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST _ EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION g POWER N (CONT'D) C MCC-1-E12 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 9,11 YES N/A YES -
NO y MCC-1-E4 MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 YES N/A YES MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9,11 NO g g
MCC-1-E6 MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 YES N/A YES -
NO N *
. MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9,11 M m
MCC-1-E8 MCC-1-E1,3,5,7 YES - N/A YES -
NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9,11 %
pg
+4 FNL-VB-1 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 ;
PNL-VB-2 NONE N/A N/A NO CilAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 PNL-VB-3 NONE N/A 'N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 PNL-VB-4 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 PZR-HTR-B PZR-HTR-A YES YES YES -
NO PRESSURIZER HEATER PZR-HTR-E PZR-HTR-D YES YES YES -
NO PRESSURIZER HEATER RH-P-1B RH-P-1B YES YES YES -
NO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP VS-r-1B VS-F-1A YES YES YES -
- No CONTAINMENT RECIRC. FAN VS-F-1C VS-F-1A YES YES YES -
NO CONTAINMENT RECIRC. FAN 2 of 4
_ _ _ _ _ _ l. I A
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FIRE AREAigg-2:2.I-T Ew. ,
l REDUNDANT FUNQTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS CABLE FAILURE OPERATION EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE TYPE POWER (CONT'D) YES YES YES - NO VS-F-55B VS-F-55A
' EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR SUPPLY FAN WR-P-1A YES No YES- CHAPTER 7 YES WR-P-1B RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-1A YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES WR-P-1C '
RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-9A YES YES YES - NO WR-P-9B AUX. RIVER WATER PUMP 1
CONTROL AND
, INSTRUMENT No CH-P-28 CH-P-2A YES YES YES -
BORIG ACID TRANSFER PUMP EE-EG-1 (ENG) YES YES YES -
NO
, EE-EG-2 (ENG)
]
EMERGENCY GENERATOR
'EE-EG-1 ( PROT) YES YES YES - NO i EE-EG-2 (PROT)
EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-1 (TR-PP) YES YES YES - NO J EE-EG-2 (TR-PP) 1 EMERGENCY GENERATOR EE-EG-1 (V-REG) YES YES YES -
NO EE-EG-2 (V-REG)
EMERGENCY GENERATOR NO 0ps LT-rW487 LT-rW477,497 YES YES YES -
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MOV-RW102B2 MOV-RW102A2 YES YES YES -
NO RIVER WATER PUMP 1B D6SCHARGE VALVE MOV-RW102C1 MOV-RW102A2 YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER PUMP 1C DISCHARGE VALVE TV-MS105B TV-MS105A YES YES YES - NO TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEED PUMP STEAM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE VS-F-168 VS-F-16A YES YES YES -
NO EMERGENCY SWlTCllGEAR EXHAUST FAN VS-r-22B VS-F-22A YES YES YES -
NO DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING EXHAUST FAN WR-P-1A NOTE 2 YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER PUMP 4 of 4
- _s , _ _ _
9 f>'f ATTACHMENT IV EXEMPTION IV. ' Process-Instrument Room (CR-4) EL. 713' (See Attached Figures 11.10-1 and 11.10-2)
A. Discussion This area is located in the basement of the Service Building (E1.713), one floor below the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) and two floors below the Control Room (CR-1). The room houses the Emergency Shutdown Panel, installed during original construction of the plant for hot shutdown capability if the control room had to be evacuated in the event of habitability problems. The loss of this shutdown panel does not affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The reactor protection and Engineered Safeguards Features System logic cabinets and Solid State Protection System racks are also located in this area.
The components located in this area required for safe shutdown are the Class IE control and instrument cabling associated with:
- Emergency Diesel Generators control and protection relay circuits
- Auxiliary Feedwater control and associated instrumentation circuits
- Steam Generator Pressure process instrumentation circuits
- Pressurizer Pressure and level process instrumentation circuits
- Reactor Coolant hot and cold leg temperature process instrumentation circuits
- Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger River Water Isolation Valves SIS signal circuit (opens the associated cooling water valve on D.G. auto-start)
The potential for a fire in this area to render all the above cabling and equipment inoperable was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report. Our proposal to make modifications and provide alternate / dedicated shutdown capability external to this area, thereby eliminating the possibility of a fire in CR-4 from jeopardizing the plant's ability to achieve safe shutdown, was approved and documented in your SER for BVPS Unit 1 dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case CR-4), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for the Process Instrument Room (CR-4) because this area does not have fixed suppression.
L.
. f Section III.G of Appendix R sets forth the requirement for fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier). For boundary fire barriers, using walls, floors, ceilings, dampers, doors, etc. existing prior to Appendix R, the rating required of a boundary fire barrier is based on the guidance in Appendix A to "TP ASB 9.5-1, i.e., the rating of the barrier or boundary must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not necessarily be a 3-hour rated boundary unless the fire loading warrants such a boundary. Pursuant to the Staff's interpretation of fire areas, the fire rating of such boundaries must be three hours or an exemption must be requested. Therefore, an exemption from ITI.G.2 is required for this area because of the three (3) existing fire doors which have a fire rating of 1 1/2 hours (See Figure 11.10-2), and the ceiling slab, which is the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) constitutes a minimum 1 1/2 hour fire rated barrier (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACHMENT XI).
B. Boundaries The construction of this area constitutes a 3-heur rated fire barrier with the exception of the ceiling slab and the 1 1/2 hour fire rated doors leading to the Relay Room (CR-3) and A/C Equipment Room (CR-2) described below.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A,-8B)
- a. North The north wall faces the Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1) and the Turbine Building (TB-1) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete at that section which parallels NS-1.
- 2) Ift.61n. reinforced concrete at that section which parallels TB-1.
- b. South The south wall faces the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB).
2ft.0in. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels the PAB.
4
. p
- c. East The east wall faces the Control Room A/C Equipment Room (CR-2) and Relay Room (CR-3).
lft.0in. reinforced concrete parallels the Relay Room (CR-3) and the A/C Equipment Room (CR-2).
- d. West The west wall faces the Motor Generator Room (MG-1) and the Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) Ift.0in. reinforced concrete at the MG-1 section.
- 2) 2ft.0in reinforced concrete at the NS-1.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-7G)
Reinforced concrete (5 1/2" max., 4" min.) on 1 1/2 inches corrugated metal decking constitutes a minimum 1 1/2-hour fire- rated barrier per the fire resistance / concrete thickness curve. (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACHMENT XI).
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8G)
Minimum 3ft.61n. reinforced concrete.
- 4. Room Volume 65,880 cu.ft.
- 5. Fire Doors 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated doors are provided to adjacent areas NS-1 (Normal Switchgear Room), MG-1 (Motor Generator Room) and the double door entrance to CR-2 (Control Room A/C Equipment Room). 1 1/2 hour fire-rated doors are provided to CR-3 (Relay Room) and the northwest entrance door to CR-2 room.
See Figure 11.10-2.
All penetrations to adjacent fire areas have been sealed for a 3-hour rating.
C. Ventilation This area is serviced by the same air conditioning system as the Control Room areas CR-1, CR-2 and CR-3. The system is detailed on Figure 11.10-3. Duct penetrations are provided with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated dampers between fire areas as detailed on Figure 11.10-5.
D g ~/
D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in CR-4 Both Class 1E and non-Class IE equipment and cable exist within 1
this area. The major equipment located in this area consists of the primary and secondary process racks, reactor protection racks, and emergency auxiliary shutdown panel. A battery rack exists within area CR-4. Separate ventilation and enclosure was not provided as it was determined that a maximum of only 0. 25*.
hydrogen concentration would result with minimum outdoor air supplied cad 10 times the maximum calculated hydrogen being generated during battery charging.
E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fir'e Detection Systems -
Detection consists of area coverage by ionization type detectors provided with an alarmed display in the control room fire detection panel. This fire detection panel is powered from the normal system with automatic transfer to station emergency power on loss of primary power source.
Activation of any ionization detector will cause all fire alarms throughout the plant to sound. Detectors are also located in the subfloor area for the actuation of the Halon
-1301 system.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems A fixed suppression system is available in the subfloor cable trench area in the false floor which is an automatic total flooding Halon 1301 system. No suppression system j exists within the CR-4 room area.
Portable extinguishers are available within the room and
.directly outside the area, as indicated on Figure 11.10-2.
l A standpipe hose rack station is located in stairwell (S-4) and could be used for water suppression. A 150-lb wheeled dry chemical extinguisher also exists in the stairwell (S-4) on this floor level (Elev.713).
- 3. Propagation Retardants l
l All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1
- were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is
! comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in CR-4 area.
Cable Insulation - 24,060 lbs.
I
8
., /'
- 2. Heat Release Potential Heat Load =2.65 x 10' Btu.
Area =5,490 sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential =50,200 Btu /sq.ft.
Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is less than one hour.
G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for this area.
- 2. The control room air conditioning ductwork penetrations between this area and CR-2, CR-3 and CS-1 are provided with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated dampers in the associated wall or floor penetrations. ,
- 3. The circuit analysis presented in Figure 11.10-4 has identified the following redundant functions which could potentially be lost, assuming the layout separation of Appendix R:
- Emergency Diesel Generators control and protection relay circuits
- Auxiliary Feed 4ater control and associated instrumentation circuits
- Steam Generator Pressure process instrumentation circuits
- Pressurizer Pressure and level process instrumentation
- Reactor Coolant hot and cold leg temperature process instrumentation circuits
- Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger River Water Isolation Valves SIS signal circuit (opens the associated cooling water valve on D. G. auto-start)
These circuits will be modified as described in Section 6.10 of our original Appendix R submittal report.
River Water Supply Valve MOV-RW113D will be provided with isolation in its control circuit for a safety injection interlock. Additionally the plant modification to provide a backup indication panel (BIP) replacing the lost parameters associated with the reactor coolant system will be installed per Section 6.11 of the Report. To resolve the concern with the loss of Auxiliary Feedwater capability, a new pump and associated instrumentation will be installed as described in Section 6.2 of our original Appendix R Report.
T 4
. t-These modifications will obviata the potential loss of functions in this area and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R, except for fixed suppression in the original area under consideration (CR-4).
- 4. Loss of ventilation to the Control Room (CR-1), Process Instrument Room (CR-4), and Relay Room (CR-3) will be covered by providing ventilation via portable gasoline-driven exhaust fans, when necessary,- and included as part of the fire brigade inventory. This method of providing portable ventilation to these areas was previously approved in your letter of March 14, 1983.
- 5. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route.
b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures.
c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials.
d) The accessibility to the switchgear area is restricted due to the security system card-key access.
- 6. The installed early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area until the fire brigade personnel, responding from the control room area two floors above the CR-4 area, respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations and modifications.
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FW-P-3B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A AUX FEED WATER PUMP SECT 6.2 LCV-CH460A&B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7k8 YES PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL VALVES LT-FW474,84,94 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEMI GENERATOR 1 A, SECT 6.11 1B, nND IC NR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-FW475,85,95 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM GENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 IB, AND IC NR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-FW476,86,96 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 IB, AND 1C NR .
LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-FW477 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR A WR SECT 6.11 LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-FW487 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR B WR SECT 6.11 m LEVEL TRANSMITTER y LT-FW497 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A O STEAM CENERATOR C WR SECT 6.11 lj LEVEL TRANSHITTER LT-RC459 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A >
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LT-RC460 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A sn PRESSURIZER LEVEL SECT 6.11 TRANSMITTER N/A 89 MOV-CH115B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 4 REFUELING WATER STORACE TANK CHARGING PUMP ISOL
, ; VALVE MOV-CH115D NCNE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REFUELING WATER STORACE TANK CHARGING PUMP ISOL VALVE MOV-CH289 NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CHARGING LINE ISOLATION VALVE MOV-CH310 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A l
REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CHARGING LINE DISCHARGE ISOL VALVE ,
MOV-CH378 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WATER RETURN VALVE MOV-CH381 NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WATER RETURN VALVE MOV-FW151A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO l STM CEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 i
ISOL VALVE MOV-FU151B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO STM CEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 -
ISOL VALVE 4 of 10
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. REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE COAiROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS JJPf, EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D)
MOV-FW151C NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO STM GEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 6 iSOL VALVE MOV-FW151D NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO STM CEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 ISOL VALVE MOV-FW151E NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO STM GEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 ISOL VALVE MOV-FW151F NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 NO STM GEN AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 ISOL VALVE MOV-RW103A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RECIRCULATION SPRAY ,
llEAT EXCHANGER SUPPLY ISOL VALVE MOV-RW1039 NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REClRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER SUPPLY ISOL VALVE MOV-RW106A NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER SERIES ISOL VALVE MOV-RW106B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT n COOLING WATER HEAT y EXCHANGER SERIES ISOL VALVE n C
MOV-RW113.A N/A N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A y DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.10 EXCHANGER 1B INLET ISOL $
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VALVE H 1 MOV-RW113C N/A N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A l SECT 6.10 DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER 18 INLET ISOL VALVE N/A N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A MOV-RW113D SECT 6.10 DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER 1A INLET ISOL VALVE NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-RW114A PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER SERIES
. ISOL VALVE NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A F - MOV-RW114B k' PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING P.
- WATER HEAT EXCHANGER SERIES i iSOL VALVE YES YES YES - NO MOV-RW117 MOV-RW116 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION AIR COOLER SUPPLY ISOL VALVES MOV-S1867A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A BIT TANK INLET ISOL VALVE HOV-Sl8678 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 1 N/A 1
BIT TANK INLET ISOL VALVE
. MOV-S1867C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A BIT TANK OUTLET ISOL VALVE MONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-S1867D BIT TANK OUTLET ISOL VALVE 6 or 10 m _
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CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) YES NO PCV-MS101A SV-MS101A N/A N/A -
STM CEN 1A ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PCV-MS101B&C SV-MS1018&C N/A N/A YES - NO
- l STM CEN 1B&lC ATMOSPitERIC 1 STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PCV-RC455C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 & 8 YES j PRESSURIZER POWER J RELIEF VALVE 1
< PCV-RC455D k 456 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 & 8 YES i PRESSURIZER POWER j RELIEF VALVES PT-MS474,84,94 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A
! STEAM GENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 18, AND 1C PRESSURE TRANSMITTER
. PT-MS475,85,95 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 1B, AND 1C PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-MS476,86,96 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A O I STEAM GENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 to I B, AND IC Q H
PRESSURE TRANSMITTER H PT-RC402 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SECT 6.11 PT-RC403 NONE N/A N/A NO CllAPTER 6 N/A M SECT 6.11 M PRESSURE TRANSMITTER g PT-RC4484 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A
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PT-RC456 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A g PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 TRANSMITTER PT-RC457 and LT-461 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 AND LEVEL TRANSMITTER PZR-HTR-A PRESSURIZER HEATER NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PZR-HTR-B PRESSURIZER HEATER NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PZR-HTR-D PRESSURIZER HEATER NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A ,
PZR-HTR-E PRESSURIZER HEATER NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RH-P-1A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP RH-P-1B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RES! DUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP TRB & TI-RC410 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A ,
REACTOR COOLANT COLD SECT 6.11 LEG NO. 1 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATOR _ , _ , , , ,
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INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) NO CHAPTER 6 N/A TRB & TI-RCis2O NONE N/A N/A REACTOR COOLANT COLD SECT 6.11 LEG NO. 2 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATOR TRO & TI-RC423 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A 4 REACTOR COOLANT HOT SECT 6.11 ,
LEC NO. 2 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATOR TRB & TI-RC430 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A
, REAClOR COOLANT COLD SECT 6.11 i LEC NO. 3 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATOR TRB & TI-RC433 NONE N/A N/A MO CHAPTER 6 N/A REACTOR COOLANT HOT SECT 6.11
. LEG NO. 3 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATOR IV-CC110D&E3 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION AIR COOLER ISOL VALVE j TV-CC110E2&F2 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A j CONTAINMENT REClRCULATION i AIR COOLER ISOL VALVE 1
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TV-MS105A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A un AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 ,
STEAM SUPPLY g iSOL VALVE TV-MS1058 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTt'R 6 N/A AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2
. STEAM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE VS-F-1A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAINMENT RECIRC FANS VS-I-1B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAINMENT RECIRC FANS VS-F-1C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAINMENT RECIRC FANS VS-F-16B VS-F-16A YES YES VES - NO i EMERCENCY SWITCilGEAR EXilAUST FAN WR-P-1A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RIVER WATER PUMP
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%, 6 ATTACHMENT V EXEMPTION V. Communication Equipment & Relay Panel Room (CR-3) EL.713' (See attached Figure 11.11-1)
A. Discussion
' This area is located in the basement of the Service Building (Elev. 713), one floor below the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) and two floors below the Control Room (CR-1). Equipment located in this area is mainly relay and communication panels. The primary components located in this area required for sate shutdown are the diesel generator protection panels. The circuit analysis presented in our original Appendix R submittal report had identified several circuits associated with the control and protection of both emergency diesel generators which could result in the coincident loss of function of both diesel generators if the loss of this area were postulated.
The potential for a fire in this area to render both emergency diesel generators inoperable was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report. Our proposal to make modifications and provide alternate / dedicated shutdown capability external to this area, to eliminate the possibility of a fire in CR-3 from jeopardizing the plant's ability to achieve safe shutdown, was approved and documented in your SER for BVPS Unit 1 dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case CR-3), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for the Communications Equipment and Relay Panel Room (CR-3) because this area does not have fixed suppression.
Section III.G of Appendix R sets forth the requirement for fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier). For boundary fire barriers, using walls, floors, ceilings, dampers, doors, etc. existing prior to Appendix R, the rating required of a boundary fire barrier is based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, i.e., the rating of the barrier or boundary must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not necessarily be a 3-hour rated boundary unless the fire loading warrants such a boundary. Pursuant to tne Staff's interpretation of fire areas, the fire rating of such boundaries must be three hours or an exemption must be requested.
4 4
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Therefore, an exempticn from III.G.2 is required for this area (CR-3) because of the two (2) existing fire doors which have a fire rating of 1 1/2 hours (See Figure 11.11-1), and the ceiling slab which is the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) constitutes a minimum 1 1/2 hour fire rated barrier (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACHMENT XI).
B. Boundaries The construction of this area constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier with the exception of the ceiling slab and the 1 1/2 hour fire rated doors leading to the Process Instrument Rack Room (CR-
- 4) described below.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A,-8B)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North ift.61n. parallels the Turbine Building (TB-1)
- b. South ift.0in. parallels the A/C Equipment Room (CR-2) ,
- c. East 2ft.0in. below grade
- d. West lft.0in. parallels the Process Instrument Rack Room (CR-4)
- 2. Ceiling. (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-7G)
Reinforced concrete (5 1/2" max., 4" min.) on 1 1/2 inches corrugated metal decking constitutes a minimum 1 1/2-hour fire rated barrier per the fire resistance / concrete thickness curve. (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, ATTACHMENT XI).
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8H)
Minimum 3ft. reinforced concrete.
- 4. Room Volume 10,980 cu.ft.
- 5. Fire Doors Both doors located between the Process Instrument Room (CR-
- 4) & Communications Equipment and Relay Panel Room (CR-3) are 1 1/2 hour fire-rated doors. (See Figure 11.11-1).
They are solid (no glass), hollow metal, 4 ft 8 ft sized doors, which were originally installed to achieve the required fire barrier rating based on the fire loading in the room.
All penetrations to adjacent fire areas have been sealed for a 3-hour rating.
l l
C. Ventilation This area is serviced by the same air conditioning system as the Control Room Areas CR-1, CR-2 and CR-4. The system is detailed on Figure 11.11-2. Duct penetrations are provided with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated dampers between fire areas as detailed on Figure 11.11-4.
D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in CR-3 Control and instrumentation cable associated with the emergency diesel generators.
E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Systems Early warning detection system consists of area coverage by ionization type detectors provided with an alarmed display in the control room fire detection panel. The fire detection panel is powered from the normal system with automatic transfer to station emergency power on loss of primary power source. Activation of any ionization detector will cause all fire alarms throughout the plant to sound.
The air conditioning system for this area has branch supply and return ducts that individually service CR-3. Redundant smoke detectors exists in the returns to present the possibility.of any smoke spreading to the other zones.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems Portable extinguishers are available within the room and directly outside the area, as indicated on Figure 11.11-1.
A standpipe hose rack station is located in stairwell (S-4) and could be used for water suppression. A 150-lb wheeled dry chemical extinguisher also exists in the stairwell (S-4) on this floor level (Elev. 713).
- 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
r
- 6 F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in the CR-3 area Cable Insulation - 4,750 lbs.
- 2. Heat Release Potential Cable Heat Load = 5.22 x 107 Btu Area = 915 sq. ft.
Heat Release Potential = 58,550 Btu /sq.ft.
Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1) The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for this area.
- 2) The control room air conditioning ductwork penetrations '
between this area and CR-2, CR-4 and CS-1 are provided with 3-hour fire rated dampers in the associated wall or floor penetrations.
- 3) The circuit analysis presented in Figure 11.11-3 has indicated the potential loss of function of both diesel generators as various control and protection circuits for both emergency diesels are routed through this area.
The plant modifications described in Section 6.10 of our original Appendix R submittal report, which would reroute the B train or #2 DG control circuit and wiring thereby meeting the required separation criteria for redundant trains. This will obviate the potential loss of redundant functions and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R except for fixed suppression in the original area under consideration (CR-3).
- 4. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route.
- b. Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures.
c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials.
d) The accessibility to this area is restricted due to the security system card-key access into the switchgear area.
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- 5. The installed early . warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area until the fire brigade personnel, responding from the control room area two floors above the CR-3 area, respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell.. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations and modifications.
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FIRE AREA g pt.,; REDUNDANT FUNQTION CABLES AVAIL _ABLE . APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILUBE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION lyPL POWER NO DC-SWBD-3 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-84 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO DC SWITCHBOARD MCC-1-E2 MCC-1-El YES N/A YES - NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PNL-VB-1 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO VITAL BUS PANEL PNL-VB-2 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO VITAL BUS PANEL NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO PNL-VB-3 VITAL BUS PANEL WR-P-1A WR-P-18 YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-1C WR-P-1B YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-9A WR-P-18 YES YES YES - NO AUX RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-1B YES YES YES - NO WR-P-98 AUX RIVER WATER PUMP CONTROL AND n H INSTRUMENT W EE-EC-1 (ENG) N/A N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY CENERATOR SECT 6.10 O l1 E . NOTES FOR FIRE AREA CR-3: $ 4 1 "
- 1. THIS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOT LOST DUE TO A FIRE IN THIS AREA, ONLY SUB-FEEDS INCLUDED ta TO PROVE COORDINATION.
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- R[DUNDANT FUNCTION N CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS O CABLE FAILURE EQUIPMENT POWER 1HSTRUMENT_ COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION y TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST g
CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT $ MC (CONT'D) N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EE-EG-1 (PROT) N/A N/A SECT 6.10 $, u EMERGENCY GENERATOR YES YES - NO y, EE-EG-2 (V-REG) N/A EE-EG-1 (V-REG) EMERGENCY GENERATOR g N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A y
. EE-EG-2 (ENG) N/A N/A SECT 6.10 EMERGENCY GENERATOR N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EE-EG-2 ( PROT ) N/A N/A SECT 6.10 EMERGENCY GENERATOR YES YES - NO MOV-RW113A MOV-RW113C,D YES DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER 1A INLET VALVE YES YES - NO MOV-RW113B MOV-RW113C,D YES DifSEL CENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER 1A INLET VALVE YES - NO PNL-VB-4 NOTE i N/A N/A VITAL BUS PANEL YES - NO PT-RC402 PT-RC444, 445, 446 N/A YES PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER YES - NO PT-RC403 PT-RC444, 445, 446 N/A YES PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRANSMITTER YES CHAPTER 748 YES TV-CH200A,B,C NONE N/A N/A -
RECENATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE VALVES 2 0F 2
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KITACHMENT VZ EXEMPTION VI. Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1) EL. 713' (See attached Figure 11.10-1) A. Discussion This area is located in the basement of the Service Building (Elev.713). The area contains non-safety related 4160 Volt Switchgear and 480 Volt substations, and associated cabling for the equipment. The fire area is adequately separated by a 3 hour-rated barrier to prevent a design basis fire from spreading to adjacent areas. The circuit analysis presented in our original Appendix R submittal report had identified several circuits associated with the control and protection of both emergency diesel generators which could potentially result in the coincidental loss of function of both diesel generators given a loss of this area due to a postulated fire. This was previously identified and our proposal to make modifications to reroute the #2 DG control circuitry from this area (Section 6.10 of our Appendix R submittal report), to eliminate the possibility of a fire in NS-1 area from jeopardizing the plant's ability to achieve safe shutdown, was approved and documented in your SER for BVPS Unit 1 dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case NS-1), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for the Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1) because this area does not have fixed suppression. Section III.G of Appendix R sets forth the requirement for the fire protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the barrier). For boundary fire barriers, using walls, floors, ceilings, dampers, doors, etc. existing prior to Appendix R, the rating required of a boundary fire barrier is based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, i.e., the rating of the barrier or boundary must exceed with margin the fire loading in the area and need not necessarily be a 3-hour rated boundary unless the fire loading warrants such a boundary. Pursuant to the Staff's interpretation of fire areas, the fire rating of such boundaries must be three hours or an exemption must be requested. Therefore, an exemption from III.G.2 is required for this area because of the existing 1 1/2 hour fire rated dampers at the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) perimeter penetration.
y s B. Boundaries The construction of this area constitutes a 3-hour rated barrier between the Normal Switchgear Room and the Emergency Switchgear Rooms, the Process Instrument Room and the Rod Drive MG Room.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A,-8B)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North ift.61n. which parallels the Turbine Building
- b. South 2ft.0in. which parallels the Emergency SwitchgearRooms (ES-1 & -2), Rod Drive MG Room (MG-1),
Process Instrument Room (CR-4) and Cable Spreading Room (CS-1).
- c. East 2ft.0in. which parallels the Process Instrument Room (CR-4) and Cable Spreading Room (CS-1).
- d. West i The west wall faces the Main Steam and feedwater pipe chase and part of the West Emergency Switchgear Room (ES-1) and Cable Spreading Room (CS-1 and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) Ift.0in. reinforced concrete at the pipe chase
- 2) 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete at ES-1.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8C,8D) 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8F)
Minimum 4ft.0in. reinforced concrete
'4. Room Volume
- 130,570 cu.ft.
All penetrations to adjacent fire areas have been sealed for l a 3-hour rating which constitutes a 3-hour fire rated boundary for this fire zone. I
i '.' C. Ventilation The ventilation supply and exhaust system for this area has branch ducts servicing ES-1, ES-2, MG-1 and CS-1. All areas are exhausted to an outdoor discharge. All branch ducts are provided with at least a 1 1/2 hour fire damper at the CS-1 perimeter penetration. Venting of any of the areas could be accomplished by resetting the respective fire dampers, all of which are accessible from CS-1. The power and controls for this ventilation system are outside the CS-1 area. D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in NS-1. Various control and protection circuits for both emergency diesels are routed through this area. E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Systems The Early warning detection system consists of area ionization coverage with local and control room alarm.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems Portable Carbon Dioxide fire extinguishers are located throughout the NS-1 area, with additional portable extinguishers available in adjacent areas. A 150-lb wheeled dry chemical extinguisher is located in this area. Water coverage could be achieved for this area by the standpipe hose rack stations in the stairwells using available hose lengths.
- 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is '
comparable to IEEE-383 tests. F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in the NS-1 area.
Cable Insulation = 31,385 lbs.
- 2. Heat Release Potential Cable Heat Load =3.45 x 10' Btu Area =5,935 sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential =58,680 Btu /sq.ft. Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is less than one hour.
9 D G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading.
- 2. The circuit analysis of Figure 11.12-2 has indicated the potential' loss of function of both emergency diesel generators as various control and protection circuits for both emergency diesels are routed through this area. The plant modification described in Section 6.10 of our original
. Appendix R submittal vaport, which would reroute the B train or #2 DG control circuit and wiring from this area, thereby meeting the required separation for redundant trains. This will obviate this potential loss of function and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R criteria, except for fixed suppression in the original area under consideration (NS-1).
- 3. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any majo. plant traffic route. b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures. c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials. d) The accessibility to the switchgear area is restricted due to the security system card-key access.
- 4. The installed early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area and the separation of redundant trains will maintain integrity of the cables and equipment until the fire brigade personnel, responding from the control room area two floors above, respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations and modifications.
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CONTROL ROOM,SWITCHGEAR g AND CABLE SPREADING AREA BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT I FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REVISED 3/1/82 8312280506-/2 i 1l
~ _ C' O O = 6 Fasans !I.I2- 2. NORMAL SWilCHCEAR ROOM FIRE AREK M id WJ REDUNDANT FUNCHON CABLES A1/AILABL.E APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUlPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER EE-EG-1 (FEED) EE-EG-2 (FEED) YES N/A YES - NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR MCC-1-El MCC-1-E2 YES N/A YES - NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MCC-1-ET MCC-1-E8 YES N/A YES - NO MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PNL-VB-2 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 PNL-VB-3 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS SECT 6.11 NOTE 3 WR-P-1A WR-P-1B YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-9A WR-P-1B YES YES YES - NO AUX RIVER WATER PUMP WR-P-9B WR-P-1B YES YES YES - NO AUX RIVER WATER PUMP CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT Cil-P-1B Cll-P-1A YES YES YES - NO CHARGING PUMP g M CH-P-28 Cll-P-2A YES YES YES - NO M DORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP O 4 NOTis FOR FIRE ARFA NS_-1: g
- 1. THIS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOT LOST DUE TO A FIRE IN THIS AREA, ONLY SUBFEEDS INCLUDED TO PROVE %
COORDINATION OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES. - tn
- 2. FW-P-2 IS THE TURBlNE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP. U
- 3. THESE PANELS SERVE AS INSTRUMENTATION POWER SUPPLIES. y tvl 1 of 4 y
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FIRE AREA'BE:.r~ 7 ) Bmwd REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDlX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS n TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION g CONTROL AND O INSTRUMENT y (CONT'D) DC-SWBD-3 NOTE 1 YES YES YES - NO g DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-4 NOTE 2 YES YES YES - NO M DC SWITCHBOARD s in EE-EG-1 (ENG) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A m EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 g EE-EG-1 (PROT) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A N EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 EE-EG-1 (V-REG) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 EE-EG-2 (ENG) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 EE-EG-2 ( PROT) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 EE-EG-2 (V-REG) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.10 TW-P-3A FW-P-2 NO YES YES - NO
/'tX FEED WATER PUMP NOTE 2 '4 P-3B FW-P-2 NO YES YES -
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?.oA FEED WATER PUMP NOTE 2 Mov-CH1150 MOV-RW-115D YES YES YES -
NO REFUELlHG WATER STORAGE TANK CHARGING PUMP ISOLATION VALVE MOV-Cit 289 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 7 N/A CHARGING LINE CONTAINTHENT ISOLAT10N VALVE 2 of 14 () .. .I
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O fisant H. I2 - 2 NORMAL FIRE SWITCHGEAR.ROOH AREA Q 1? f W REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQUlPMENT F0WER INSTRUMENT _ COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION [QUIPMENT LOST CONTROL AND I NST RUMEff T (CONT'D) MOV-FW151A MOV-FW151B YES YES YES - NO STM GEN AUX FEED PUMP lSOLAT10N VALVE MOV-FW151C MOV-FW151D YES YES YES - NO STM GEN AUX FEED PUMP lSOLAT10N VALVE MOV-FW151E MOV-FW151F YES YES YES - NO STM CEN AUX FEED PUMP ISOLATION VALVE MOV-RW103A MOV-RW103B YES YES YES - NO RIVER WATER SUPPLY ISOL TO RECIRC SPRAY HEAT EXCilANGER MOV-CH289 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CilARGING CONTAINTMENT ISOLATION VALVE MOV-RW1114A MOV-RW111B 4 YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCilANGER INLET VALVE MOV-RW11f0 4 MOV-RW111A 4 YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCilANGER Q INLET VALVE :xs n PNL-VB-1 PNL-73-2,14 YES YES YES - NO $ VITAL BUS PANEL H PZR-IITR-A PZR-HTR-E YES YES YES - NO $ PRESSURIZER llEATFR K PZR-HTR-B PZR-HIR-E YES YES YES - - NO N PRESSURIZER H[i1ER y E N 3 of is H
Aeud //./2 - 2 6 NORMAL SWITCHCEAR-ROON p ". FIRE ARE h
- REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAllABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND " R OR SPUR 10US' n TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWE3 INSTRUMENT. COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION s DC O
CONTROL AND g H INSfRUMENT H -(CONT'D) NO p PZR-HTR-D PZR-HTR-E YES YES YES - PRESSURIZER HEATER Z M RH-P-1A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 7 N/A M RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP m" . RH-P-1B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 7 N/A-RESIDUAL HEAT h" REMOVAL PUMP Q VS-F-1C VS-F-1A,1B YES YES YES - NO CONTAINMENT RECIRC. FAN VS-F-16A VS-F-16B YES YES YES - NO EMERGENCY SWi1CHGEAR EXHAUST FAN VS-F-55A VS-F-55B YES YES YES - NO EMERCENCY SWITCHGEAR SUPPLY FAN I NO l WR-P-1B WR-P-1A YES YES YES - RIVER WATER PUMP I i 4 Of 4 l 1 i
l D ' ".o ATTACHMENT VII EXEMPTION VII. (Structural Steel) Service Bldg. EL. 713' area below the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) Fire Areas: ES-1 West Emergency Switchgear Room ES-2 East Emergency Switchgear Room MG-1 Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Room CR-3 Communications Equipment and Relay Panel Room CR-4 Process Instrument and Rod Position Room (See Attached Figures 11.13-1 and 2) A. Discussion The structural steel located in the above fire areas, which helps to support the above floor area cable spreading room (CS-1), is denoted in Figure 11.13-1. Located in these areas are various safe shutdown cabling as discussed in Section D below. An exemption is requested from III.G.2a which requires that structural steel forming a part of or supporting fire barriers separating redundant trains to have a fire rating equivalent to the fire resistance of the barrier. A fire hazards analysis has been performed and documented within this request for exemption which justifies the acceptability of the present plant design based on- equivalent level of protection, and shows the maximum temperature the steel will reach during a fire in these areas and it's ability to carry the required loads. B. Boundaries The construction of all of the above listed areas constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier between each of the adjacent fire areas with the exception of the ceiling slab described below.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A, -8B)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North The north wall faces the 4KV Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1), the pipe chase, and the turbine building and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
(1) 2ft.0in reinforced concrete at the pipe chase and NS-1. (2) ift.61n. reinforced concrete at the turbine building. l ;
9 f b. South' The south wall faces an unexcavated area, Primary Auxiliary building (PAb) and the A/C Equipment Room (CR-2) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses. (1) 2ft0in. reinforced concrete at that section which parallels the unexcavated area and the PAB. (2)
~
Ift.0in. reinforced concrete at that section which parallels CK-2.
- c. East The east wall faces the Cable Tunnel (CV-3) and the'A/C Equipment Room (CR-2) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
(1) 2ft.0in, reinforced concrete at that section which parallels CV-3. (2) Ift.0in. reinforced concrete at that section which parallels CR-2.
- d. West i
2ft.0in. parallels an unexcavated area and the normal switchgear room (NS-1). I e. Intermediate walls running north-south between areas I ES-1 and ES-2, ES-2 and MG-1, MG-1 and CR-4, and CR-4 and CR-3 are all Ift.0in. reinforced concrete with qualified 3-hour fire rated penetration seals, as required, which constitutes a 3-hour fire barrier between these rooms.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-7G)
Reinforced concrete (5 1/2" max., 4" min.) on 1 1/2 inches corrugated metal decking constitutes a minimum 1 1/2-hour fire rated barrier per the fire resistance / concrete thickness curve (Figure 11.13-3)*. See Figure 11.13-6 for _s details of ceiling slab. (See Exemption Request for CS-1 area, A'1TACHMENT XI)
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8G,-8H)
Minimum 3 ft. reinforced concrete
- 4. Room Volumes ES-1 29,220 cu.ft.
ES-2 28,220 cu.ft. MG-1 17,160 cu.ft. CR-4 65,880 cu.ft. CR-3 10,980 cu.ft.
- Reference. NFPA Fire Protection Handbook; 15th edition, 1983.
Figure 5-8R.
g C. Ventilation
- 1. The ventilation supply and exSaust system for ES-1, ES-2 &
MG-1 are the same. All areas are exhausted to an outdoor discharge. Venting of any of the areas could be accomplished by resetting the respective fire dampers, all of which are accessible from the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1). The power and controls for this ventilation system are outside the CS-1 area.
- 2. The air conditioning system is the same for CR-3 and CR-4 as that for CR-1 and CR-2. The system is detailed on Figure 11.13-4.
D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Equipment ES-1 and ES-2 house redundant safety-related 4KV switchgear and 480V substations and supply power to Class 1E circuits required for safe shutdown. MG-1 houses both class 1E and non-class 1E equipment and cable. The two rod drive motor generator sets and switchgear supply power to the CRDM's and.are located in this area. These power supplies are not required for safe shutdown. CR-4 consists of the primary and secondary process racks, reactor protection racks and the emergency auxiliary shutdown panel located in CR-4 area. CR-3 contains the safe shutdown diesel generator protection panels and the relay and communication panels. E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Systems Early warning detection system consists of area coverage within each applicable fire area by ionization type detectors provided with local alarm and control room alarm display in the fire detection panel. CR-4 additionally has ionization detectors located in the sub-flooring which alarm locally and in the control room and activates the Halon Suppression System in the event of a cable fire in the subfloor area. (Figure 11.13-5)
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems
- a. Portable Carbon Dioxide extinguishers presently exist within all areas, with additional portable Carbon Dioxide extinguishers available in adjacent and nearby areas. Additionally, portable 150-lb. wheeled dry chemical extinguisher units are available in the adjacent area (NS-1) and at the S-4 stairwell entrance.
Standpipe hose racks stations are available at both stairwell entrances on this elevation.
- b. Halon 1301 Suppression System installed in the subfloor cable area of CR-4. (Figure 11.13-5)
< 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of combustibles in these areas are all for cable insulation as noted.
Fire Area Cable Insulation ES-1 5,920 lbs. ES-2 5,665 lbs. MG-1 5,575 lbs. CR-4 24,060 lbs. CR-3 4,750 lbs.
- 2. Heat Release Potential from Cable Insulation Fire (Btu) (Sq.ft) (Btu /sq.ft.)
Area Heat Load Area Heat Release Potential ES-1 6.51 x 10 7 2,435 31,660 ES-2 6.23 x 10 7 2,350 26,380 MG-1 6.13 x 10 7 1,430 48,420 CR-4 2.65 x 10' 5,490 50,200 CR 5.22 x 10 7 915 58,550 Based on the heat release potentials, the required fire ratings for each of the areas is less than one hour. G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The fire loading for each of the areas that contain structural steel was determined to be as noted below. In all cases, the existing walls, floors, ceilings and doors exceed this rating.
Fire Area Fire Loading Barrier Required ES-1 24 min. Determined from ES-2 20 min. the STANDARD TIME-MG-1 36 min. TEMPERATURE CURVE CR-4 38 min. CR-3 44 min.
,. All the areas no.ed contain structural steel members supporting the floor above (CS-1). Because of hangers and cable tray supports attached to various beams, the stresses vary. Except at the perimeter walls, all supporting beams are Compact I sections. A reserve capacity exists and va, ries from 24% to 78*. (Min. To Max.) under ' working. stress conditions.
Fire Area Minimum Reserve Capacity ES-1 52% ES-2 51% MG-1 24% CR-4 49% CR-3 40*. It is. recognized that a rise fa temperature reduces the yield stress.in steel and that at 1100 F the yield stress may drop to 60% of the value at room temperature. The most highly stressed beam still has not reached the yield point per our calculations. ( See Attachment 1) Because steel has a high thermal conductivity, it can transfer heat away from a localized heat source rather quickly. Heat will be transferred to cooler regions through the grid of steel beams supporting the entire CS-1 floor area. A cushion of time can be anticipated in such large areas of heat dissipation.
- 2. A margin o f. safety is provided by the vertical concrete columns that support the horizontal steel beams and the floor-to-ceiling solid 12 inches reinforced concrete walls separating areas ES-1, ES-2, MG-1, CR-4 and CR-3. In the event the horizontal ceiling beams start to weaken, the floor load would be distributed onto the partition concrete walls and the vertical concrete columns in the area.
- 3. Three hour fire rated doors are installed between each of these areas except CR-3/CR-4 which are 1 1/2 hour fire rated doors, and all penetrations are sealed with a qualified 3-hour fire rated material.
- 4. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route, b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures. c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials, d) The accessibility to the switchgear area is restricted due to the security system card-key access.
- 5. The installed. early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area and ,
the separation of redundant trains will maintain integrity of the cables and equipment until the fire brigade personnel, responding from the control room area two floors above this switchgear area, respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room. This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the-above considerations and modifications.
~
e r Duquesne Light Company Sheet 1 of 1 LOCATION SERVICE BUILDING COMPILED SUBJECT STEEL FRAMING AT E1.725'-6" BY: S. Bose Date 8/9/83 REFERENCES / DESIGN BASIS Stone & Webster Engr. Corp. (SWEC) calculations #11700-S-5 and #13387.13-S-59 are used to determine the stress levels for the most highly stressed beams shown in the Stress Summary. The latter calculations are based on a i- g value of 1.176 for SSE loading. The applicable stress F equals oxx for vertical stress, including dead and live load only. To neglect seismic. stress, the g-factor is divided into the final SWEC result, as applicalbe. Yield stress of A36 steel is F =36Ksi. Allowable stress per AISC Sec. 1.5.1.4.3 is F =.75F = 75x36 =27 Ksi Reserve capacity = 1-F /F Postulated yield stress at 1100'F=.6F =.6x36 =21.6 Ksi STRESS
SUMMARY
FIRE MOST HIGHLY STRESSED MAX. BENDING STRESS RESERVE J
- AREA . BEAM PER SWEC CALCS. oxx (KSI) CAPACITY ES-1 -B-16.#13387.13-S-59 15.36/1.176 =13.06 1-13.06/27=52%
ES-2 B-15.#13387.13-S-59 15.48/1.176 =13.16 1-13.16/27=51% ! MG-1 F-10.#11700-S-5 -(no g-value used-20.43 1-20.43/27=24% CR-4 B-12.#13387.13-5-59 16.04/1.176 =13.64 1-13.64/27=49% i CR-3 B-3. #13387.13-S-59 19.00/1.176 =16.16 1-16.16/27=40% CONCLUSIONS
- 1. All beams have a reserve capacity.
- 2. The maximum beam stress (oxx - highest value 20.43) is lower than 21.6 Ksi, the postulated yield stress at 1100'F.
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O o ATTACHMENT VIII EXEMPTION VIII. CARBON DIOXIDE STORAGE /PG PUMP ROOM (CO-2) (Figures 11.14-1,-2,-3) A. Discussion This area is a two level structure located adjacent to the emergency diesel generator buildings. The lower level of this structure (below grade) contains various support equipment (transfer pumps, tank heaters, and valve stations) associated with the boron recovery yard tankage. The only components in this area required for safe shutdown are the four (4) motor-operated, river water supply valves (MOV-RW-113A, -B, -C, -D) for emergency diesel generators (EE-EG-1;-2). The upper level (grade elevation) contains the 10 ton refrigerated carbon dioxide storage tank unit. The potential for a fire in this area to render all four river water supply valves inoperable was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report. Our proposal to physically remove and relocate one of the valves to another fire zone (diesel generator #2 Room (DG-2)), thereby eliminated the possibility of coincidental loss of cooling water to both diesels in the event of a fire in this area (CO-2), was approved and documented in your SER for BVPS Unit I dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires fixed suppression and detection for the original area under consideration (in this case the CO-2 area), we request an exemption from III.G.3 for the Carbon Dioxide Storage /PG Pump Room because this area does not have fixed suppression or detection. This exemption is predicated on equivalent level of protection to that required based on the information and considerations provided within this section. B. Boundaries The -construction of this area constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier between the Diesel Generator Building (DG) and the outside.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-40A;-B,)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. Lower Level (El.721'6")
(1) North ift.0in. parallels unexcavated area (2) South ift.0in. parallels unexcavated area and concrete stairway (3) East Ift.0in. parallels unexcavated area (4) West 2ft.0in, parallels unexcavated area l
~
- b. Uppsr Level (E1.735'6")
o (1) North 2ft.0in. parallels outside area (2) South 2ft.0in. parallels outside area (3) East 2ft.0in. parallels outside area (4) West 2ft.0in. parallels DG-2
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-40C)
Since the intermediate floor slab is penetrated by openings, resulting in both levels being considered as one fire area, there will be no evaluation of the lower level ceiling. The upper ceiling is 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete.
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-40C)
For reasons stated in previous paragraph, only the lower level floor will be evaluated. This floor is a minimum 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete.
- 4. Room Volume upper level 3,048 cu.ft.
lower level 2,996 cu.ft. TOTAL 6,044 cu.ft. All penetrations to the adjacent fire area have been sealed for a 3-hour rating which constitutes a 3-hour boundary for this fire zone. C. Ventilation A 1,780 cfm wall-mounted propeller exhaust fan [1VS-F-44] shown in Figure 11.14-4 may be run manually, or automatically when the room temperature rises above the setting of a room thermostat. When the fan starts, the intake and exhaust dampers (1VS-D-44-2] and [1VS-D-44-1] will open. In winter, space temperature is maintained by electrical unit heaters installed in each space. D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment in the CO-2 area The structure is considered a vital area because it contains the river water supply valves '(MOV-RW-113A,B,C and D) for the emergency diesel generators. E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection System There are no automatic or manual fire detection systems within the CO-2 area.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems There are no automatic suppression systems within the CO-2 area.
\
- 3. Propagation Retardants
~
All cables installed at BVPS-1 were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests. F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in This Area a) Cable insulation is negligible as all cable is enclosed in conduit, b) One gallon of lube oil associated with the primary grade water transfer pump motors.
- 2. Heat Release Potential Cabie-Negligible Lube Oil - (1 gallon) a) Heat-Load = 1.55 x 105 Btu b) Area = 214 sq. ft.
c) Heat Release Potential = 724 Btu /sq.ft. (negligible) Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is negligible (less than 1 hour). G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading.
- 2. The circuit analysis (Figures 11.14-5) has indicated the potential exists for an area fire to render all four motor operated valves (MOV-RW113A,-B,-C,-D) inoperable. These valves supply river water to the two diesel generator cooling system heat exchangers. The plant modification described in Section 6.9 of our original Appendix R submittal report will relocate motor operated valve MOV-RW113D into the diesel generator building (DG-2) as shown on Figure 11.14-6. This will eliminate the possibility of coincident loss of cooling water to both emergency diesel generators and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R criteria.
- 3. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route. b) Storage of transient combustibles in the area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures. c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials.
d) The accessibility to this area is restricted due to the security system card-key access. This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent-level of 3- protection to that required based on the above considerations and
, modifications.
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' ' ' FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
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CO2 STORAGE AND PG PUMP ROOM F1RE AREA fa-2 RI'DUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILA!1[_ APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAlluRE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQU I PME_HT L OST [QUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER MOV-RW113A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.9 EXCHANGER 1A INLET VALVE MOV-RW113B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.9 EXCHANGER 1A INLET VALVE MOV-RW113C NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.9 EXCHANGER 1B INLET VALVE MOV-RW113D NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.9 EXCl! ANGER 1B INLET VALVE l O h R h . A 5 m 5 ik ;;i l
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'a ., 5 / ?, MOV-RW113A I.!. MOV-RW113C / a. r.e..: - t l-M OV- R W113 8 EXISTING MOV-RW113D SCHEMATIC OF RELOCATED MOV-RW113D FI GU RE II.I A - co B EAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 1 APPENDIX R REVIEW . REV1 SED 3/18/82
I e .
. ATTACHMENT IX L EXEMPTION IX. PIPE TUNNEL (SUBAREA QP-1), EL 735 ft.
(See Attached Figures 11.15-1,-2,-3 and Figure 11.15-5) A. Discussion This area which houses the Motor-driven and the Steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps [FW-P-3A, 3B and FW-P-2) and the Quench Spray Pumps [QS-P-1A;-1B] is a subarca of the Pipe Tunnel (PT-1), otherwise known as Subarea QP-1. The potential for a fire in this area to render all auxiliary feedwater capability inoperabic due to the existing plant geometry was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review Submittal report. Our proposal to install an additional auxiliary feedwater pump (dedicated shutdown system) which would be located in a separate fire area in the Turbine Building and be independent of existing onsite and offsite power sources (Reference Section 6.2 of our Appendiv 2 Report), was approved and documented in you SER for BVPS Unit #1 dated January 5, 1983. In addition, the Pipe Tunnel (PT-1) elevation 722 area was previously evaluated and an exemption was granted based on equivalent level of protection to that required by Appendix R, Section III.G and documented in your letter of March 14, 1983. However, after receiving further clarification from the staff on the position of suppressic and detection in a fire area vs. fire zone and the need for .everage "throughout" the fire area, we request an exemption from III.G.3 for this subarea QP-1 because it does not have suppression and detection coverage "throughout" the fire area, nor is this subarea separated by boundary fire barriers. This exemption is predicated on equivalent level of protection to that required based on a fire hazards analysis and the information provided in this section. B. Boundaries
- 1. Walls (Ref. Dwg. 11700-RC-21A)
Reinforced Concrete:
- a. North 2-ft 0-in reinforced concrete which parallels the Service Building.
- b. South 4-ft 6-in reinforced concrete which is the Reactor Containment wall,
- c. East 2-ft Oin reinforced concrete which parallels the West Cable Vault (CV-1)
- d. West 2-ft 0-in reinforced concrete which parallels the outside of the building, west yard.
- 2. Colling 2-ft 0-in reinforced concrete
- 3. Floor 2-ft 0-in. reinforced concrete
- 4. Room Volume i l500 ft' All penetrations leading to adjacent fire areas are sealed for a 3-hour fire rating.
C. Ventilation Air is recirculated throughout the pipe tunnel (PT-1) area by VS-AC-9 which has a capacity of 10,200 CFM. This area is maintained at a negative pressure by means of the supplemental leak collection system. D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables /Equirment The circuit analysis has indicated the potential loss of all three of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps given a fire in this area. Other major equipment located in the area are the Quench Spray Pumps [QS-P-1A,-1B), which are not required for safe shutdown. E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Systems Early warning ionization smoke detectors and preaction thermal heat detectors, which alarm locally and in the control room in the event of a fire, are located in the room housing the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
The actuation of any one smoke or heat detector in the auxiliary feedwater pump area provides a fire alarm on the fire protection control panel in the control room. Waterflow, detector, and master deluge valve supervision is provided witn a circuit trouble alarm in'the control room. Detectors are also installed in the return main of the ventilation system servicing this area with annunciation in the control room.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing System The auxiliary feedwater pump area is provided with an automatic preaction sprinkler spray system using closed heads. Smoke and heat detector systems are installed in the same area as the sprinklers. Actuation of any heat detector, as from a fire, opens a deluge valve which permits fire main water to flow into the sprinkler piping system and to be discharged from only the affected sprinklers.
I A 4-in curb is installed around each auxiliary feed pump to contain an oil spill or water from the sprinkler spray system. Each curbed area is provided with a drain. The three drain lines form a single header below the floor of the auxiliary feed pump area and pass through a deep loop seal. The arrangement and elevation of this piping prevents an oil leak or fire from spreading from one feed pump to another through the drain system. The combined drain header enters an oil interceptor to remove oil from the water and prevent the transfer of oil-contaminated water to the tunnel sump. The water leaving the oil interceptor will enter the auxiliary feedwater area drain tank. The contents of this tank are continuously monitored for high radiation. A high radiation condition provides indication and alarm in the control room and automatically diverts the auxiliary feedwater area drain tank discharge from the yard oil separator to the tunnel sump. This prevents transferring potentially radioactive water from the auxiliary feedwater area drainage system.
- 3. Hose Station / Extinguishers Portable fire extinguisher units are located throughout the area. The nearest standpipe fire hose station is located less than 50 feet away in the cable vault stairwell (S-2) located on Elevation 735.
- 4. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazards Analysis
- 1. Type / Quality of Combustibles Cable Insulation = 3360 lbs.
Lube Oil = 90 Gallons
- 2. Heat Release Potential Heat Load = 5.1 x 107 Btu Area = 1430 ft 2 Heat Release Potential = 3.57 x 10" Btu /ft 8 Based on the heat release potential in the area, the required fire rating for this area is less than 1/2 hour.
--- --__- - - - - - - . . - . . _- - . _ _ ~ - . . . - - _. - - , ,, . - .--_. -
G. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The circuit analysis (Figure 11.15-4) of our original Appendix R Report submittal previously identified the potential loss of this area and the loss of safe shutdown equipment (auxiliary feedwater capability) due to the <
existing config tration not in compliance with the separation criteria of Section III.G. As a result, our proposal to install a new Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, separate from this fire area and independent of existing onsite and offsite power sources, was approved and documented in your SER dated January 5, 1983. This dedicated shutdown equipment modification would bring plant design for this area under consideration into conformance with Section III.G of Appendix R.
- 2. The existing fire suppression and detection systems provided in the area of coverage for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps would promptly detect and extinguish the fire in its incipient stage, thereby eliminating the potential for propagation or spread or' the fire.
- 3. The curbing and drain system provided around each Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, previously discussed in Section E.2 of this exemption request, would prevent the possibility of an oil fire in the area from spreading.
- 4. A fire in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area would be prevented from spreading to the Cable Vault (CV-1) room by virtue of a 3 hour fire-rated boundary between these fire areas. The door between the rooms is a 3-hour fire-rated door and all penetrations have been sealed with a 3-hour rating.
- 5. The motor-driven Quench Spray Pumps, located in the area adjacent to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, are not required for safe shutdown. The only fire condition that might develop in this area is an electric motor insulation-type fire which would simply smolder, be short lived, and not likely to propagate or spread to other areas.
- 6. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be l expected in this area for the following reasons:
l l a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route. b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures. c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area , during plant operations do not involve the use of large ! quantities of combustible material. d) The accessibility to the area is restricted by existing security capability. l l l l
) . 7. Tha Papa Tunnal (PT-1) crea is serviced by a ventilation system with detectors located in the return main which would provide remote alarm indication in the control room in the event of a fire in this area and aide response time of the fire brigade.
- 8. A possibility of a fire in this subarea (QP-1) spreading are described below:
a) To the west of this area exists a non-fire rated door , which leads to the lower elevation (Elev. 722) of the Pipe Tunnel (PT-1) area. This area was previously evaluated in our original Appendix R Report submittal' and subsequently an exemption was granted and documented in your letter of March 14, 1983. b) To the west is the Safeguards Area Ventilation Equipment Room (size =10' x 15') which houses ventilation unit VS-AC-7. This unit recirculates filtered and conditioned air for the safeguards pipe tunnel area. An exit door leading directly to the outside of the building is to the west of the room. At the northwest corner of the room, a ladder going to an open hatchway exists which leads to the floor directly above, Elev. 751 of the Pipe Tunnel (PT-1). In the unlikely event the fire were to spread up the hatchway to the floor Elev. 751 above, the only equipment located in this room is a ventilation fan unit (VS-AC-6) and a self-contained charcoal filter unit [HY-FL-1,-2] for the Hydrogen Recombiner Units located in the adjacent room. No equipment or cables required for safe shutdown are located in these areas. Based on the above, the possibility of a fire spreading to adjacent areas via the non-rated door to Elevation 722 below QP-1 and via the open hatchway to the floor above to Elev. 751 is negligible based on the low fire loading in these areas, existing plant layout and construction of the areas, the administrative control of combustibles in the area, and the equivalent level of protection to that required by Section III.G.
- 9. The provision for detection and suppression "throughout" this fire area would not significantly increase the level of fire safety presently afforded by the existing partial coverage in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area. Additional supression and detection systems throughout this area would not enhance the level of protection for this fire area under consideration with respect to Appendix R safe shutdown capability criteria.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ - - - - - - _ - - -
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- o ATTACHMENT :.X EXEMPTION X. REACTOR CONTAINMENT (RC-1), EL. 738' (Source Range Cable Routing)
(See Attached Figures 11.16-1,-2) A. Discussion i The Nuclear Instrumentation System at Beaver Valley uses information from three separate types of instrumentation channels to provide I protection levels. Each range of instrumentation (source, intermediate and power) provides some form of overpower reactor trip protection deemed necessary during operation. One type of neutron detector, with solid-state electronic circuitry, is used to monitor the leakage neutron flux from the reactor during core loading, shutdown, and startup, as well as during subsequent refueling. The system provides control room indication and recording of signals via rwo independent source range channels from the reactor containment through separate penetrations and into separate preamplifiers, one located in the East Cable Vault (CV-2) and one located in the West Cable Vault (CV-1). A source range instrument drawer for process monitoring capability outside the control room will be provided with capability to tie into the pre-amplifier located in the East Cable Vault (CV-2) within one hour following its required use. This will provide alternate safe shutdown capability outside the control room for source range indication as noted in your letter of January 5,1983. The cabling for the redundant source range detector signals are in separate conduits. However, because of its existing plant geometry inside containment, the routing does not meet the 20 foot separation criteria of Appendix R, item III G.2(d). The cable penetration area inside containment,- where the redundant trains are within =2 feet ; (min.) of each other,- is protected by a fixed suppression and ' detection system due to the heavy cable loading in this area. Given the protection of the conduit and the limited quantity of installed or transient combustibles in the area of the routing, this layout is considered equivalent protection to that required by Appendix R. The Reactor Containment (RC-1) was previously evaluated and an exemption was granted based on equivalent level of protection to that required by Appendix R and documented in your letter of March 14, 1983. However, it did not specifically address the source range cable routing inside containment. This exemption is predicated on equivalent level of protection to that required based on a fire hazards analysis and the information provided in this section.
B. Bounderies The boundaries of the Reactor Containment (RC-1), El. 738'10" is depicted on Figure 11.16-1. The containment structura perimeter consists of a 10-ft concrete mat, with 4-ft 6-in thick reinforced concrete walls to the dome transition that is a minimum thickness of 2-ft 6-in of reinforced concrete. A continuous steel liner is provided on the entire interior for assuring leak tightness of the structure. This structural design constitutes a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The interior of the containment is considered as one fire area. The interior structural details will afford a degree of passive fire protection due to their size and placement. The total volume of the reactor containment is 1.8 x 108 ft8 C. Ventilation The containment ventilation system, depicted on Figure 11.16-3, normally operates in a recirculation mode with the containment recirculation coils serviced with chilled water acting as the heat sink. The plant river water system acts as an emergency backup heat sink available under a loss of power condition. D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in RC-1 The cabling and physical equipment that is potentially lost in the event of an exposure fire in RC-1 was previously documented in our Appendix R Submittal Report, Section 11.2. An exemption for RC-1 area was granted and documented in your letter of March 14, 1983 to DLC. The cabling involved for the source range monitoring indication is not required for safe shutdown, but this capability outside the control room was required and documented in your letter of January 5, 1983 to DLC. E. Fire Protection Existing in Source Range Conduit Path
- 1. Fire Detection Systems
- a. The Cable Penetration Area (E1.735') is designed with four photoelectric and fcur ionization smoke detectors, with Control Room annunciation.
- 2. Fire Extinguishing Systems Existing
- a. Cable Penetration Area-Open head deluge system l- b. Standpipe system at all elevations 1
l Additional design information is available in our Appendix l R Submittal, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1. l l
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- 3. Home Stations /Extinguishnrs Portable dry chemical fire extinguisher units are located throughout the area. Standpipe fire hose stations are located near columns 8,11 & 14 for coverage of the source range cabling route. (Reference Figure 11.16-1).
- 4. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
F. Fire Hazards Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of Combustibles in the RC-1 Source Range Cable Routing Area a) Cable Penetration Area Cable Insulation /455 lbs.
b) Source Range Cable Route (from penetration area back to detector wells of reactor vessel). Cable Insulation / negligible (in Conduit)
- 2. Heat Release Potential a) Cable Penetration Area Heat Load: 5.005 x 10' Btu Area: -
170 ft 2 Heat Release Potential: 30,820 Btu /ft 2 b) Source Range Cable Route Negligible (In Conduit) Based on the heat release potential in the area, the required fire loading for this area is less than one hour. G. Justification of Area Acceptability This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of l protection to that required by Appendix R when the following points are considered: l
- 1. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in the Reactor Containment (RC-1) area for the following reasons:
f a) The coa:ainment structure is considered an exclusion area while at power, and strictly controlled. During an outage the plant's security force controls personnel access and material control for the containment area. b) Storage of transient combustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures.
.. u . _ __ . _ _ _ __ .
c) Solv:nts typically used at thn plcnt do not hcva a ficah point balow thsir boiling point (inhibitsd solvents). This substantially mitigates the fire hazard potential of transient combustibles throughout the plant.
- 2. The principal fire hazard in RC-1, the reactor coolant pump lubricating oil, has been eliminated by the ' installation of an oil collection system.
- 3. The cable penetration area inside containment is protected by installed water suppression and detection systems, which would promptly detect and extinguish the fire in its incipient stage, thereby eliminating the potential for propagation or spread of the fire.
A Photograph of the Cable Penetration area in containment has been included to better illustrate the typical layout condition. (Figure 11.16-4)
- 4. All containment trays are of a covered design which will afford a significant level of fire propagation protection from an electrically induced cable fire.
- 5. All cables installed at Beaver Valley Pcwer Station Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
6 Redundant cable penetrations enter the containment from the East and West Cable Vaults (CV-1 and CV-2) which are separated by a 3 hour fire-rated barrier (see Figure 11.16-1). This fire barrier, considered in conjunction with the flame-resistant, fire-retardant properties of the cable insulation and the suppression and detection systems within the areas, provides the required assurance that a cable fire associated with one train will not affect the redundant train on the opposite side of the barrier, thereby assuring separation between cable vaults.
- 7. All Source Range cabling inside containment has been run inside conduit which will afford a significant level of fire propagation protection from an electrically induced cable fire.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations.
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,e ' 4 e, A'ITACHMENT XI EXEMPTION XI. Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) EL. 725'6" (See Attached Figures 11.17-1 and 11.17-2) A. Discussion This area is located on the 725'6" elevation of the Service Building, one floor below the Control Room (CR-1) and one floor above the Communication Room (CR-3), the Process Instrument Room (CR-4), Motor Generator Room (MG-1), and the Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1 and ES-2). The Cable Spreading area contains safety related redundant instrument, control, ..nd power cables that are required for attaining safe shutdown. The area also contains nonsafety related instrument, control, and power cable. The following redu-dant functions which could potentially be lost given a fire in chis area and predicated upon the layout separation requirements of Appendix R:
- a. Containment Ventilation
- b. Emergency Diesel Generator Control and Protection Circuits,
- c. Emergency Diesel Generator Field Flashing
- d. Emergency Switchgear Ventilation The circuits associated with a, b, and c above will be modified as described in Section 6.10 of our original Appendix R submittal report. A brief summary of each is noted below:
- 1. One containment recirculation fan power cable will be rerouted out of this area via a previously installed 3-hour fire rated electrical ductline. (See Section G of this attachment)
- 2. The control circuit will be modified to maintain the auto-start function by using interposing relays from a separately protected power supply.
- 3. One train of the field flashirg leads will ba rerouted out of this area (CS-1).
- 4. The Emergency Switchgear ventilation will be supplemented by auxiliary portable ventilation being provided under the modification described in Section 6.6 of our original Appendix R submittal report and approved via your letter dated March 14, 1983.
. .t s e, These modifications will obviate the potential loss of functions in this area and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R, except for the 3 hour rated fire , barrier boundary requirement of a fire area as interpreted by Generic Letter 83-33. The intent of the requirement to provide reasonable assurance that at least one safe shutdown division is free of fire damage after a postulated fire in this area (CS-1) is met by virtue of the modifications previously committed to and identified in our SER, and the rerouting of one train of redundant _ power and control cables required for safe shutdown in a separate 3 hour barrier envelope described in Section G of this exemption request.
The potential for a fire in this area to render all of the above , cabling and equipment inoperable was previously identified in our Appendix R Fire Protection Review submittal report. Our proposal to make modifications to the #2 Diesel Generator control circuits and wiring and provide portable ventilation capability for key areas, thereby eliminating the possibility of a fire in CS-1 from jeopardizing the p,lant 's ability to achieve safe shutdown, was approved and documentated in your SER for BVPS Unit 1 dated January 5, 1983. However, since Appendix R requires the separation of redundant trains under consideration within the
" fire zone boundaries" and the separation between fire zones to comply with 3-hour fire barrier', we request an exemption from III.G.2 for the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) because this area does not have a 3-hour barrier envelope.
This exemption is predicated on equivalent level of protection to that required based on the information and considerations provided within this section. B. Bou'ndaries The boundaries and wall construction of the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) are depicted on Figures 11.17-1 and 11.17-2. The fire loading for the area was determined to be less than 1 1/2 hours. The existing walls, floor slab, ceiling, doors, etc. exceed with margin the fire loading of the area. The floor slab is 5 1/2" of reinforced concrete on 1 1/2" of corrugated metal decking (Ref. Figure 11.17-3), which constitutes a barrier of slightly greater than 1 1/2-hours, in accordance with the NFPA handbook.
- 1. Walls (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8A,-8B) Reinforced Concrete
- a. North The north wall faces the Normal bwitchgear Room (NS-1),
the Turbine Building (TB-1) and the Main Steam Pipe Chase and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete at the sections which parallel NS-1 and the Pipe Chase.
- 2) Ift.61n. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels T3-1.
- b. South The south wall faces the HVAC Equipment Room (CR-2),
the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB), Cable Vaults (CV-1 and CV-2) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) 2ft.0in reinforced concrete at the sections which parallel PAB, CV-1, CV-2.
- 2) ift.0in. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels CR-2.
- c. East The east wall faces the HVAC Equipment Room (CR-2) and the Cable Tunnel (CV-3) and is divided into two sections of different thicknesses.
- 1) 2ft.31n. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels CV-3.
- 2) Ift.0in. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels CR-2.
- d. West The west wall faces the Pipe Tunnel (PT-1).
l 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete at the section which parallels PT-1.
- 2. Ceiling (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-8C,8F) 2ft.0in. reinforced concrete ,
- 3. Floor (Ref. Drawing 11700-RC-7G) 5 1/2" reinforced concrete on 1 1/2" corrugated metal decking. (See Figure 11.17-3)
- 4. Room Volume 121,250 cu. ft.
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- 5. Fire Doors The Cable Spreading area has four entrances. (Ref. Figure 11.17-1). The doors entering the East and West Cable Vaults (CV-l&2) are both 3 hour fire-rated doors. The West entrance door from the Normal Switchgear Room (NS-1) is a 3 hour fire-rated door. The East stairwell door is a 1 1/2 hour fire-rated door, which is consistent with all stairwell doors in the plant. This stairwell door in conjunction with the adjacent 1 1/2 hour fire rated stairwell doors gn the upper and lower floors in the Service Building would prevent a fire from spreading to other fire areas by virtue of the 3 hour boundary fire barrier.
All penetrations to adjacent fire areas have been sealed with cellular concrete or silicone foam to achieve a fire rating equivalent to the barrier. C. Ventilation The ventilation supply and exhaust system for this area has branch ducts servicing ES-1, ES-2, MG-1 and NS-1. All areas are exhausted to an outdoor discharge. All branch ducts are provided with at least a 1 1/2-hour fire damper at the CS-1 perimeter penetration. Venting of any of the remaining areas could be accomplished by resetting the respective fire dampers, all of which are accessible from this area. The power and controls for this ventilation system are outside of the cable spreading area. (Ref. Figure 11.17-4 and 11.17-5). D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Cables / Equipment Located in CS-1 Both Class 1E and non-Class 1E cable 2xist within this area. The only major equipment located in this area are the emergency powered redundant supply and exhaust fans for the Emergency Switchgear and Battery Rooms. Loss of ventilation to the Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1 and -2) was previously evaluated and covered by providing portable ventilation fans which was approved in your letter of March 14, 1983. E. Fire Protection Existing
- 1. Fire Detection Sys.tems Detection consists of area coverage by ionization type detectors provided with an alarmed display in the Control Room fire detection panel. This fire detection panel is powered from the normal system with autonatic transfer to station emergency power on loss of primary power source.
Activation of any ionization detector will cause all fire alarms throughout the plant to sound. A heat detection system is also located in the area for the auto actuation of the total flooding CO 2 system.
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- 2. Fire Extinguishing System The primary fire suppression system in CS-1 is an automatic
-> or manual, double shot, total flooding, CO2 system. This is in accordance with the fire insurance carrier recommendations originally established for the area.
The design of the total flooding CO system conforms to the
' requirements of.NFPA No. 12. The initial shot is actuated by a temperature detection system or can be actuated manually. The second shot is manual. Lockout switches as well as CO 2 p.'ddscharge alarm are provided for personnel protection. An al,rt. VIRE display is provided in the control room. An .iarmed TROUBLE light is provided in the control room for the area in case of loss of the electrical integrity in detector and release circuits or upon lockout of the system. An alarmed display for CO 2 DISCHARGE also exists in the control room for low level in the storage tank, high or low pressure in the storage tank, and compressor electric motor trip. These alarms enable the control room to be aware of the CO 2 system status and availability at all times, and provide required protection for inadvertant operation or rupture of the system.
Mechanical pressure release devices activated by CO 2 pressure are provided to close dampers and doors to prevent escape ' of CO2 from the fire area. The respective fans associated with this area are also automatically shut doen on discharge of COz. Fire hose racks installed at both stairwell entrances provide water coverage in the event of a deep-seated, localized, cable fire in the area. Portable CO 2 and dry chemical extinguishers are also available from nearby areas. (Ref. Figure 11.17-1 and 11.17-2).
- 3. Propagation Retardants All cables installed at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I were fabricated to pass the vertical cable tray flame test with an oil and burlap flame source which was the accepted industry standard during the construction of BV-1 and is comparable to IEEE-383 tests.
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F. Fire Hazard Analysis
- 1. Type / Quantity of combustibles in CS-1 area.
Cable Insulation - 115,300 lbs.
- 2. Heat Release Potential Heat Load =1.27x10' Btu Area =12,125 sq.ft.
Heat Release Potential =104,600 Btu /sq.ft. Based on the heat release potential, the required fire rating for this area is less than 1 1/2 hours. G. Cables Rerouted in 3-Hour Barrier Envelope (Ref. Figure 11.17-7) i Because of cable tray congestion in CS-1 area, a modification was made as part of the Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 review effort to ensure thct the Station could be shutdown if a fire results in the total loss of the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1). The modification provided protection of one train of equipment required for safe shutdown by encasing certain redundant (purple) control and power cables through a 3-hour fire rated barrier (Ductline 997) located in CS-1. The rerouting of 18 control and 7 power cables to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel was accomlished in 1981 during our second refueling outage. For details of the modification and the listing of cables rerouted through the ductline, see Figures 11.17-7 & 8. H. Justification of Area Acceptability
- 1. The existing construction provides fire barriers in excess of the required ratings determined by the fire loading for this area.
- 2. The Control Room air conditioning ductwork penetrations for CS-1 area are provided with 3-hour fire rated dampers in the associated wall or floor penetrations (Ref. Figure 11.17-4 and 11.7-5), thereby providing a 3-hour boundary fire barrier between the CS-1 area and the vital Control Room
, ventilation system fire areas CR-1, CR-2, CR-3 and CR-4.
- 3. The circuit analysis presented in Figure 11.17-6 has identified the following redundant functions which could potentially be lost predicated upon the layout separation requirements of Appendix R:
- a. Containmant Ventilation'
- b. Eme.gency Diesel Generator Control and Protection Circuits
- c. Emergency Diesel Generator Field Flashing
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- d. Emergency Switchgeat- Ventilation The circuits associated with a,b and c abcve will be modified as described in Section 6.10 of our original Appendix. R submittal report. A' brief summary of each is noted below:
- 1. One containment recirculation fan power cable will be rerouted out of this area via a previously
. installed 3-hour fire rated electrical ductline.
- 2. The control circuit will be modified to maintain the auto-start function by using interposing relays from a separately protected power supply.
I 3. One train of the field. flashing leads will be rerouted out of this area (CS-1).
- 4. The Emergency -Switchgear ventilation will be l supplemented by auxiliary portable ventilation L being provided under the modification described in l
Section 6.6 of our original Appendix R submittal report and approved via your. letter dated March 14, 1983. These modifications will obviate the potential loss of functions in this area and bring the plant design for this area into conformance with Appendix R, except for the 1 1/2 hour-fire barrier floor and the 1 1/2 hour fire rated
' dampers in the area under consideration (CS-1).
- 4. Loss of ventilation to the Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ES-1
& ES-2) as a result of a fire in CS-1 will be covered by providing ventilation via portable gasoline-driven exhaust fans, when necessary, and included as part of the fire brigade inventory. This method of providing portable ventilation to these affected' areas was previously approved in your letter of March 14, 1983.
- 5. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles would not be expected in this area for the following reasons:
. a) The area is not adjacent to or near any major plant traffic route.
b) Storage of transient ecmbustibles in this area is prohibited by plant administrative procedures. c) Maintenance and operations activities in this area do not involve the use of large quantities of combustible materials. d) The accessibility to the Cable Spreading Room (CS-1) area is restricted due to the security system card-key access.
- 6. The installed early warning smoke detection system would promptly detect incipient fire conditions in this area until the fire brigade personnel, responding from the Control Room area one floor above the CS-1 area, respond to extinguish the fire via the southeast stairwell. The brigade should be capable of reaching this area within minutes after an alarm is received in the Control Room.
This exemption request is predicated upon an equivalent level of protection to that required based on the above considerations and modifications. O
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6 / s o AGuer //17- G CABLE SPREADING AREA FIRE AREA GE-1 REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION POWER CH-P-1A CH-P-1B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES CHARGING PUMP CH-P-1C CH-P-1B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES CHARGING PUMP ' ~ DC-SWBD-1 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-2 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO DC SWITCHBOARD DC-SWBD-3 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO DC SWlTCHBOARD DC-SWBD-4 NOTE 1 N/A N/A YES - NO DC SWITCHBOARD EE-EG-1 (FEED) EE-EG-2 ( FEED) YES NO YES - NO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 5 EE-EG-1 (FIELD) NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY CENERATOR SECT 6.7 l EE-EG-2 ( FIELD) NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A EMERGENCY GENERATOR SECT 6.7 FW-P-3A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A AUXILIARY FEED PUNP SECT 6.2 g 4 FW-P-3B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A AUXILIARY FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 } NOTES FOR FIRE AREA CS-1:
- 1. THIS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOT LOST DUE TO A FIRE IN THIS AREA, ONLY SUB-FEEDS INCLUDED TO PROVE COORDINATION. d M
- 2. THIS FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN, ONLY TO ENSURE CIRCulT BREAKER COORDINATION. "
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- 3. THERE ARE POWER CABLES FOR WR-P-1A IN THE CS-1 AREA. THIS DEVIATES FROM THE INFORMATION g IN THE FIRE STUDY REPORTS, BUT WAS SHOWN TO BE CORRECT BY PLANT INSPECTION.
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PNL-VB-1 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A I SECT 6.11 ; VITAL BUS PANEL . 1 PNL-VB-2 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A f. VITAL BUS PANEL SECT 6.11 PNL-VB-3 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS PANEL SECT 6.11 PNL-VB-4 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A VITAL BUS PANEL SECT 6.11 , 1 PZR-HTR-B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PZR-HTR-A PRESSURIZER HEATER PZR-HTR-D PZR-HTR-B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PRESSURIZER HEATER PZR-HTR-E PZR-HTR-B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PRESSURIZER HEATER RH-P-1A RH-P-1B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 2 of 14 v
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06t4RE l117-6 . : CABLE SPREADING AREA ., FIRE AREA M ,
!il REDUNDANT FUNC110N APPEN0lX REMARKS Q
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NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A LT-FW487 SECT 6.11 SIEAM GENERATORS 1.EVEL TRANSMITTERS NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A LT- FW497 SECT 6.11 STEAM GENERATOR IC WR LEVEL TRANSMITTERS NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A LT-RC459 SECT 6.11 PRESSURIZER LEVEL l TRANSHITTER NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A LT-RC460 SECT 6.11 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER . NOTE 2 N/A N/A YES - N/A MCC-1-E2 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER NOTE 2 N/A N/A YES - N/A MCC-1-E6 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER N/A N/A YES - N/A O MCC-1-E10 NOTE 2 W MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 9 MCC-1-E12 NOTE 2 N/A N/A YES - N/A y MOTOR CONTROL CENTER N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-CH115B REFUELING WATER STORAGE NONE $ M TANK CHARGING PUMP ISOL " VALVE m un 5 4 5 of 14
FMildC//.17-G -
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REDUNDANT FUNCTION n CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS $ CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS g EOUlPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT _ COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION g lyf( EQUIPMENT LOST H CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A g MOV-CH115D NONE N/A en REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK CHARGING y PUMP 1 SOL VALVE in MOV-CH289 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A % sq REGENATIVE HEAT ' i EXCHANGER CHARGING ( LINE ISOL VALVE MOV-CH310 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A l RECENATIVE HEAT I EXCHANGER CHARGING LINE ISOL VALVE MOV-CH378 NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL WATER RETURN VALVE MOV-CH381 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
- SEAL WATER RETURN VALVE MOV-FW151A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STM CEN AUX SECT 6.2 FEED PUMP ISOL VALVE MOV-FW151B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STM CEN A9X SECT 6.2 FEED PUMP 1 SOL VALVE MOV-FW151C NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STM GEN AUX SECT 6.2 FEED PUMP lSOL VALVE 6 or 184 'v
o / r Ftsar u.17-6 CABLE SPREADING AREA FIRE AREA G3-l REDUNDANT FUNCIlON CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS CABLE FAILURE COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT lYfi CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A MOV-FW151D NONE N/A SECT 6.2 i STM GEN AUX i FEED :' UMP ISOL VALVE MOV-FW151E NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A ) STM GEN AUX SECT 6.2 l FEED PUMP 1 SOL VALVE NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A 1 MOV-FW151F SECT 6.2 STM CEN AUX FEED PUMP 1 SOL VALVE NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 NO MOV-RC535 j PRESSURIZER RELIEF i BLOCK VALVE 1 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 NO MOV-RC536 PRESSURIZER RELIEF BLOCK VALVE 1 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 NO I MOV-RC537 PRESSURIZER RELIEF BLOCK VALVE n H CHAPTER 7 N/A 28 NONE N/A N/A YES MOV-RW102A1 h RIVER WATER PUMP 1A D1SCHARGE VALVE y MOV-RW102A2 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A > E RIVER WATER PUMP 1A DISCHARGE VALVE $< 88 MOV-RW102B1 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A w ten RIVER WATER PUMP 18 D1SCHARGE VALVE , h 2 7 of 14
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CA Di REA ~' FIRE AREA CS-1 REDUNDANT FUNCTION n H CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS # CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS CABLE FAILURE COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTR'IMENT _ lyff H CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) NONE h/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-RW102B2 RIVER WATER PUMP IB d j DISCHARGE VALVE g ) NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A m MOV-RW102C1 RIVER WATER PUMP IC g DISCHARGE VALVE m H NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A NOV-RW102C2 RIVER WATER PUMP IC DISCHARGE VALVE NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-RW103A RIVER WATER SUPPLY ISOL VALVE CONT RECIRC MOV-RW103B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RIVER WATER SUPPLY ISOL VALVE CONT RECIRC NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-RW106A PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT l EXCHANGER INLET VALVE NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-RW106B PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVE MOV-RW113A NONE N/A N/A NO CFAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.10 , EXCHANGER 18 INLET ISOL VALVE MOV-RW113B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL CENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.10 EXCHANGER 1A INLET ISOL VALVE l I 8 of 14 l l l l V
f utSR C ll.I ? - f CABLE SPREADING AREA j FIRE AREA G.E-1 ! REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVALLABLE APPENDIX REMARKS l CABLE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT. COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) NO CHAPTER 6 N/A MOV-RW113C NONE N/A N/A DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.10 EXCHANGER 18 INLET ISOL VALVE MOV-RW113D NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT SECT 6.10 EXCHANGER 1A INLET ISOL VALVE MOV-RW114A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SERIES 1 SOL VALVE MOV-RW114B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SERIES ISOL VALVL MOV-RW116 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7
- N/A RIVER WATER SUPPLY VALVE CONT AIR COOLERS MOV-RW117 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A RIVER WATER SUPPLY VALVE CONT AIR COOLERS MOV-Sl867A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7' N/A O BlT TANK INLET g ISOLATION VALVE e MOV-S18670 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A BIT TANK INLET 2:
1SOLAT1ON VALVE MOV-S1867C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A b< M BIT TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE U m 21 9 of 14 g
flGylE //*ll-fe CABLE SPREAplNC AREA FIRE AREA CS-1 , O 28 REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS @ M CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS CABLE FAILURI OPERATION H EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST CONTROL AND F. INSTRUMENT HI (CONT'D) NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A MOV-S1867D ts: BIT TANK OUTLET , ISOLATION VALVE SV-MS101A N/A N/A- YES - N/A h PCV-MS101A STM CEN 1A ATMOSPHERIC Q .l STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE SV-MS101B N/A N/A YES - N/A PCV-MS101B&C STM CEN 1B&1C SV-MS101C ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PCV-RC455C PRESSURIZER POWER REllEF VALVES NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A PCV-RC455D k 456 PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVES PT-MS474,84,94 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 18, AND IC PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-MS475,85,95 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A STEAM CENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 18, AND 1C PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-MS476,86,96 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A SIEAM CENERATOR 1A, SECT 6.11 18, AND IC PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-RC402 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SECT 6.11 10 of 14
FI6aAC ll.17-G CABLE SPREADING AREA FIRE AREA G3-1 4 REDUNDANT FUNCTION CABLES AYA_lMBLE APPEN0ix REMARKS CABLE FAILUBE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS lyf[ EQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE J Jgg 9fEBA CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PT-RC403 NOME N/A N/A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SECT 6.11 PT-RC444 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 TRANSMITTER PT-RC455 ? MONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 i , TRANSMITTER PT-RC456 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 TRANSHITTER PT-RC457 & LT-461 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SECT 6.11 AND LEVEL TRANSMITTER PZR-HTR-B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES PZR-HTR-B PRESSURIZER HEATER RH-P-1B YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES RH-P-1B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP g TRB & TI-RC410 NOME N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A SECT 6.11 O REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG NO I TEMP RES3STANT y BULB AND INDICAT10.4 TRB as TI-RC413 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 SECT 6.11 N/A g REACTOR COOLANT HOT LEG g NO 1 TEMP RESISTANT ta BULB AND INDICATION v. TRB & TI-RC420 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A up REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG SECT 6.11 g pq
. NO 2 TEMP RESISTANT H BULB AND INDICATION 11 of 14
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n POWER litSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION TYPE LQUIPMENT LOST EQUIPMENT CONTitOL AND / INS 11tUMEN T - E j (CONT'D)
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TRB k TI-RC423 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A g REACTOR CCOLANT HOT LEG SECT 6.11 g en NO 2 TEMP RCSISTANT tiULB AND 1NDf CATION
.'r m TRB k TI-RC430 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG SECT 6.11 %re l- NO 3 TEMP RESISTANT >i BULB AND INDICATION TRB k TI-RC433 NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A REACTOR COOLANT HOT LEC SECT 6.11 NO. 3 TEMP RESISTANT BULB AND INDICATION TV-CC110A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAINMENT >
RECIRCULATION AIR i ; - l COOLER ISOLATION 4 i VALVE TV-CC110B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A j CONTAINMENT , RECIRCULATION AIR . COOLER ISOLATION VALVE TV-CC110C NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A 1 CONTAINMENT l RECIRCULATION AIR COOLER ISOLATlON VALVE TV-CC110D k E3 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A l CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION AIR COOLER ISOLATION VALVE l l 12 or 14 l l l l l
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EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION M EQUIPMENT LOST l CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT (CONT'D) N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A TV-CC110E2&F2 NONE N/A CONTAINMENT REClRCULATION AIR COOLER ISOLATION VALVE TV-CC110F1 NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A CONTAIMMENI l RECIRCULATION AIR COOLER ISOLATION l VALVE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 768 YES TV-CH2OOA,B,C NONE REGENATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVES TV-CH204 NOME N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A - LETDOWN LINE ISOLATION VALVE TV-MS105A NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 STEAM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE TV-MS105B NONE N/A N/A NO CHAPTER 6 N/A n AUX FEED PUMP SECT 6.2 g STEAM SUPPLY n c:: ISOL VALVE w d VS-F-22A NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A DIESEL CENERATOR g BUILDING EXHAUST FAN P VS-F-22B NONE N/A N/A YES CHAPTER 7 N/A g s
- DIESEL CENER.ATOR u BUILDING EXHAUST FAN en k
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CABLES AVAILABLE APPENDIX REMARKS # CA8LE FAILURE CONTROL AND "R" OR SPURIOUS C n EQUIPMENT POWER INSTRUMENT COMPLIANCE REFERENCE OPERATION g TYPE EQUIPMENT LOST H CONTROL AND INSTRUMENT E M (CONT'D) YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES WR-P-1B WR-P-1A RIVER WATER PUMP d WR-P-18 YES NO YES CHAPTER 7 YES WR-P-1C e RIVER WATER PUMP
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, REROUTED CABLES i
CONTROL CABLES DESCRIPTION FROM TO FUNCTION 1CCPBPC303 4"VS-1DF PNL-Shutdown Component Cooling Pump - IB ICHBBPC006 PNL-Relay 34 PNL-Shutdown Charging Pump - 2B ICHSPBC301 4KVS-1DF PNL-Shutdown Charging Pump - IB 1ECPBNC458 4KVS-1DF PNL-Shutdown Read Voltage for 4KVS-1DF 1FWEAPC009 PNL-Relay 32 MCC-1-E6 Motor Operated Valve-FW151A 1FWEAPC014 PNL-Relay 32 PNL-Shutdown Motor Operated Valve-FW151A 1FWEBPC302 4KVS-1DF PNL-Shutdown Feedwater Pump - 3B 1FWEBPC615 PNL-Relay 32 PNL-Shutdown Shutdown Transfer Switch MOV-FW151A, C, E 1FWEBPC616 DC-SWBD-2 PNL-Relay 32 DC-Switchboard - 2 IFWEBPK616 DC-SWBD-2 DC2-BKR-Box DC-Switchboard - 2 1FWECPC009 PNL-Relay 32 MCC-1-E6 Motor Operated Valve-FW-151C 1FWECPC014 PNL-Relay 32 PNL-Shutdown Motor Operated Valve-FW-151C , 1FWEEPC009 PNL-Relay 32 MCC-1-E6 Motor Operated Valve-FW-151E 1FUEEPC014 PNL-Relay 32 PNL-Shutdown Motor Operated Valve-FW-151E 1FWSBNX035 PNL-Shutdown TB-718 Level Transmitter-FW487 1RCPBPC205 PNL-Relay 34 PNL-Shutdown Pressurizer Heater-B Bank 1RHSBPC302 4KVS-1DF PNL-Shutdown Residual Heat Removal Pump - 1B ISWSBPC301 4KVS-1DF PNL-Shutdown River Water Pump - IB POWER CABLES DESCRIPTION FROM TO FUNCTION 1CCPBPH301 4KVS-1DF SPL2 Component Cooling Pump - IB 1CHSBPH301 4KVS-1DF SPL3 Charging Pump - IB 1EHSBPL211 480VUS-1-9 MCC-1-E6 Motor Control Center - E6 1EHSBPL226 480VUS-1-9 MCC-1-E12 Motor Control Center - E12 1FUEBPH301 4KVS-lDP FW-P-3B Feedwater Pump - 3B 1RCPBPL205 480VUS-1-9 PNL-PR-HTR Pressurizer Heater - B Bank 1RHSBPH302 4KVS-1DF SPL1 Residual Heat Removal Pump - IB Figure 11.17-8 _ - _}}