ML20082P000
| ML20082P000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/31/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079Q962 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-94-137 NUREG-0800, NUREG-0800-09.5.1-R3, NUREG-800, NUREG-800-9.5.1-R3, SRP-09.05.01, SRP-9.05.01, NUDOCS 9504260038 | |
| Download: ML20082P000 (52) | |
Text
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NUREG-0800 (Formerly NUREG-75/0871 C.
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
y Q4/ i STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Chemical Engineering Branch (CMEB) secondary - None I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The purpose of the fire protection program (FPP) is to provide assurance, through a defense-in-depth design, that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions and will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the environment in accordance with General Design Criteria 3 and 5.
The fire protection program consists of fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment, administrative controls and procedures, and trained personnel.
The CMEB review of the fire protection program includes a review of the evaluation of potential fire hazards described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR),andareviewofthedescriptionofthefireprotectionsystemdesign fire prevention" showing the system characteristics and layout which define the and " fire protection" portions of the program.
The CMEB reviews the total fire protection program described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR) with respect to the criteria of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 attached to this SRP section, specifically with respect to the following:
1.
Overall fire protection program requirements, including the degree of involvement and assigned responsibility of management; fire protection administrative controls and quality assurance program; fire brigade training activities and coordination with offsite fire fighting organizations, including their capability in assisting in the extinguishment of plei.
fires.
2.
Evaluation of potential fire hazards for safety-related areas throughout the plant and the effect of postulated fires relative to maintaining the ability 9504260038 941107 Rev. 3 - July 1981 ETE 4 137 PDR USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
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O design analyses, procedures, and criteria used for seismic Category I supporting structures for the FPP, and for externally imposed system loads resulting from less severe natural phenomena.
The Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEB) will, upon request, review that portion of the hose standpipe system which should remain functional following a postulated SSE, and confirm that systems compo-nents, piping, and structures are designed in accordance with applicable seismic design criteria.
The Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) verifies, on request, the adequacy of the fire protection instrumentation and controls.
For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch.
1 II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The applicant's fire protection program is acceptable if it is in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
10 CFR Part 50 550.48, and General Design Criterion 3, as related to fire l
prevention, the design and operation of fire detection and protection systems, and administrative controls provided to protect safety-related structures, systems, and components of the reactor facility.
l 2.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to fire protection for shared safety-related structures, systems, and components to assure the ability i
to perform their intended safety function.
l The following specific criteria provide information, recommendations, and guidance and in general describe a basis acceptable to the staff that may be
)
used to meet the requirements of 550.48, GDC 3 and 5:
Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 as it relates to the i
a.
design provisions given to implement the fire protection program.
b.
Regulatory Guide 1.78 as it relates to habitable areas such as the control room and to the use of specific fire extinguishing agents.
Regulatory Guide 1.101, as it relates to fire protection emergency c.
planning.
)
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The secondary and coordinated review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I of this SRP section.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material from this SRP section as may be appropriate for a particular case.
1.
CHEB reviews the SAR to determire that the appropriate levels of management and trained, experienced personnel are responsible for the design and implementation of the fire protection program in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
9.5.1-3 Rev. 3 - Jui.v 1981
4' T'
V.
IMPLEMENTATION The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this SRP section.
Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations.
Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides.
VI REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 3, " Fire Protection."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General. Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants."
5.
Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
6.
10 CFR Part 50, S 50.48, " Fire Protection."
7.
Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, " Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
9.5.1-5 Rev. 3 - July 1981
i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
A.
INTRODUCTION...............................................
9.5.1-9 B.
DISCUSSION.................................................
9.5.1-9 1.
Defense-in-Depth.......................................
9.5.1-10 2.
Use of Water on Electrical Cable Fires.................
9.5.1-11 Establish.-,t and Use of Fire Areas....................
9.5.1-11 3.
e 4.
Definitions............................................
9.5.1-12 C.
P0SITION....................................................
9.5.1-14 1.
Fire Protection Program Requirements................
9.5.1-14 a.
Fire Protection Program............................
9.5.1-14 b.
Fire Hazards Analysis..............................
9.5.1-18 c.
Fire Suppression System Design Basis...............
9.5.1-19 d.
Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown..................
9.5.1-20 Implementation of Fire Protection Programs.........
9.5.1-20 e.
2.
Administrative Controls................................
9.5.1-20 3.
Fire Brigade...........................................
9.5.1-23 4.
Quality Assurance Program..............................
9.5.1-27 a.
Design and Procurement Document Control............
9.5.1-27 b.
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.............
9.5.1-27 c.
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services.........................................
9.5.1-27 d.
Inspection.........................................
9.5.1-27 e.
Test and Test Contro1..............................
9.5.1-28 f.
Inspection, Test, and Operating Status.............
9.5.1-28 g.
Nonconforming Items...............................
9.5.1-28 h.
Corrective Action..................................
9.5.1-28 i.
Records............................................
9.5.1-28 j.
Audits.............................................
9.5.1-28 5.
General Plant Guidelines...............................
9.5.1-28 a.
Building Design....................................
9.5.1-28 b.
Safe Shutdown Capability...........................
9.5.1-31 c.
Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability.......
9.5.1-32 d.
Control of Combustibles............................
9.5.1-33 e.
Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays, and Cable Penetrations..............................
9.5.1-34 f.
Ventilation........................................
9.5.1-36 g.
Lighting and Communication.......................
9.5.1-36 6.
Fire Detection and Suppression......................
9.5.1-37 a.
Fire Detection..............................
9.5.1-37 b.
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems..............
9.5.1-38 c.
Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems..
9.5.1-40 d.
Halon Suppression Systems.....
9.5.1-41 e.
Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems..............
9.5.1-42 f.
Portable Extinguishers.....................
9.5.1-42 9.5.1-7 Rev. 2 - July 1981
A.
INTRODUCTION General Design Criterion 3 " Fire Protection," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
Noncombustible and heat-resistant materials are required to be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room.
Criterion 3 also requires that fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effect of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety and that firefighting systems be designed to ensure that their failure, rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components.
This Branch Technical Position (BTP) presents guidelines acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing this criterion in the development of a fire protection program for nuclear power plants.
These revised guidelines include the accept-ance criteria listed in a number of documents, including Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 50, S 50.48.
The purpose of the fire protection program is to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire.
It implements the philosophy of defense-in-Mth protec-tion against the hazards of fire and its associated effects on safety-related equipment.
If designs or methods different from the guidelines recommended herein are used, they must provide equivalent fire protection.
Suitable bases and justification should be provided for alternative approaches to establish acceptable implementation of General Design Criterion 3.
This BTP addresses fire protection programs for safety-related systems and equipment and for other plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely affect safety-related systems.
It does not give guidance for protecting the life or safety of the site personnel or for protection against economic or This document supplements Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical property loss.
Independence of Electrical Systems," in determining the fire protection for redundant cable systems.
B.
DISCUSSION There have been numerous fires in operating U.S. nuclear power plants through December 1975 of which 32 were important enough to report.
Of these, the fire 22, 1975 at Browns Ferry nuclear plant was the most severe.
With on March approximately 250 operating reactor years of experience, one may infer a frequency on the order of one fire per 10 reactor years.
Thus, on the average, a nuclear power plant may experience one or more fires of varying severity during its operating life.
Although WASH-1400, " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 1975, concluded that the Browns Ferry fire did not affect the validity of the overall risk assessment, the staff concluded that cost-effective fire protection measures should be instituted to significantly decrease the frequency and severity of fires and consequently initiated the development of this BTP.
In this develop-ment, the staff made use of mnv n1tional standards and other publications related to fire protection.
The docun,cnts discussed below were particules'ly useful.
9.5.1-9 Rev. 2 - July 1981 i
The primary objective of the fire protection program is to minimize both the i
probability and consequences of postulated fires.
In spite of steps taken to reduce the probability of fire, fires are expected to occur.
Therefore, means are needed to detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on providing passive and active fire protection of appropriate capability and adequate capacity for the systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown with or without offsite power.
For other safety-related systems, the fire protection should ensure that a fire will not cause the loss of function of such systems, even though loss of redundancy within a system may occur as a result of the fire. Generally, in plant areas where the potential fire damage may jeopardize safe plant shutdown, the primary means of fire protection should consist of fire barriers and fixed automatic fire detection and suppression systems.
- Also, a backup manual firefighting capability should be provided throughout the plant to limit the extent of fire damage.
Portable equipment consisting of hoses, nozzles, portable extinguishers, complete personnel protective equipment, and air breathing equipment should be provided for use by properly trained firefight-t ing personnel.
Access for effective manual application of fire extinguishing agents to combustibles should be provided.
The adequacy of fire protection vl for any particular plant safety system or area should be determined by analysis of the effects of the postulated fire relative to maintaining the ability to safely shut down the plant and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire.
i Fire protection starts with design and must be carried through all phases of construction and operation.
A quality assurance (QA) program is needed to identify and rectify errors in design, construction, and operation and is an j
essential part of defense-in-depth.
t 2.
Use of Water on Electrical Cable Fires Experience with major electrical cable fires shows that water will promptly extinguish such fires.
Since prompt extinguishing of the fire is vital to reactor safety, fire and water damage to safety systems is reduced by the more efficient application of water from fixed systems spraying directly on the fire rather than by manual application with fire noses.
Appropriate firefighting procedures and fire training should provide the te'chniques, equipment, and skills for the use of water in fighting electrical cable fires in nuclear plants, J
particularly in areas containing a high concentration of electric cables with plastic insulation.
This is not to say that fixed water systems should be installed everywhere.
Equipment that may be damaged by water should be shielded or relocated away from the fire hazard and the water.
Drains should be provided to remove any I
water used for fire suppression and extinguishment to ensure that water accumu-lation does not incapacitate safety related equipment.
3.
Establishment and Use of Fire Areas (eparate fire areas for each division of safety-related systems will reduce the possibility of fire-related damage to redundant safety related equipment.
Fire areas should be established to separate redundant safety divisions and isolate safety-related systems from fire hazards in nonsafety-related areas.
Particular design attention to the use of separctc isolated fire areas for redundant cables will help to avoid loss of redundant safety related cables.
Separate fire areas should also be employed to limit the spread or fires between Where redundant components that are major fire hazards within a safety division.
9.5.1-11 Rev. 2 - July 1981
Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, and their supports), including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fire dampers that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of fire.
Fire Stop - a feature of construction that prevents fire propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.
Fire Brigade - the team of plant personnel assigned to firefighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting of fires.
Fire Detectors - a device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system and other appropriate action (see NFPA 72E,
" Automatic Fire Detectors").
Some typical fire detectors are classified as follows:
Heat Detector - a device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature or rate of temperature rise.
Smoke Detector - a device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustion.
Flame Detector - a device that detects the infrared, ultraviolet, or visible radiation produced by a fire.
Line-Type Detector - a device in which detection is continuous along a path, e.g., fixed-temperature, heat-sensitive cable and rate-of-rise pneumatic tubing detectors.
Fire Protection Program - the integrated effort involving components, procedures, and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection.
It includes system and facility design, fire prevention, fire detection, annuncia-tion, confinement, suppression, administrative controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing.
Fire Resistance Rating - The time that materials or assemblies have withstood a fire exposure as established in accordance with the test procedures of
" Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials" (NFPA 251).
Fire Suppression - control and extinguishing of fires (firefighting).
Manual fire suppression is the use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually-actuated fixed systems by plant personnel.
Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated fixed systems such as water, Halon, or carbon dioxide systems.
Fire Zones - the subdivisions of fire areas in which the fire suppression systems are designed to combat particular types of fires.
Noncombustible Material 1
a.
A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable
{
vapors when s.iojected to fire or heat.
9.5.1-13 Rev. 2 - July 1981
c of the position and who has available staff personnel knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety.
(2) The fire protection program should extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in-fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives.
1 to prevent fires from starting; to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that-do occur; 7
to provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
3 (3) Responsibility for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a person who has management control over all organizations involved in fire protection activities.
Formulation and assurance of program implemen-tation may be delegated to a staff composed of personnel prepared by train-ing and experience in fire protection and personnel prepared by training and experience in nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection program for the nuclear power plant.
The staff should be responsible for:
(a) Fire protection program requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, with knowledge j
of building layout and systems design.
(b) Post'-fire shutdown capability.
(c) Design, maintenance, surveillance, and quality assurance of all fire protection features (e.g., detection systems, suppression systems, barriers, dampers, doors, penetration seals, and fire brigade equipment).
(d) Fire prevention activities (administrative controls and training).
(e) Fire brigade organization and training.
(f) Prefire planning.
(4) The organizational responsibilities and lines of communication pertaining to fire protection should be defined between the various positions through the use of organizational charts and functional descriptions _ of each posi-tion's responsibilities.
The following positions / organizations should be designated:
(a)
The upper level offsite managment position which has management responsibility for the formulation, implemen.ation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the nuclear plant fire protection program.
(b) The offsite r.anagement position (s) directly responsible for formu-lating, implementing,andperiodicallyassessingtheeffectiveness of the fire protection program for the licensee s nuclear power plant 9.5.1-15 Rev. 2 - July 1981
ii.
The responsibilities of each fire brigade position should correspond with the actions required by the fire fighting procedures.
iii.
The responsibilities of the fire brigade members under normal plant conditions should not conflict with their responsibilities during a f1re emergency.
iv.
.The minimum number of trained fire brigade members available onsite for each operating shift should be consistent with the activities required to combat the most significant fire.
The size of the fire.
l brigade should be based upon the functions required to fight fires with adequate allowance for injuries.
The recommendations for organization,. training, and equipment of.
v.
Private Fire Brigades" as specified in NFPA No. 27-1975, including I
the applicable NFPA publications listed in the' appendix to NFPA No. 27, are considered appropriate criteria for-organizing, training, and l
operating a plant fire brigade.
(5) Personrti Qualifications (a) The position responsible for formulation and implementation of'the fire protection program should have within.his organization or as a consultant a fire protection engineer who is a graduate of an engineering curriculum of accepted standing and shall have completed not less-than 6 years of engineering attainment indicative of growth in engineering competency and achievement, 3 years of which shall have been in responsible charge of-1 fire protection engineering work.
These requirements are the eligibility requirements as a Member in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
(b) The fire brigade members' qualifications should include satisfactory completion of a physical examination for performing strenuous activity, and of the fire brigade training described in Position C.3.d.
(c) The personnel responsible for the maintenance and testing of the fire protection systems should be qualified by training and experience for such work.
(d) The personnel responsible for the training of t'he fire brigade should be qualified by training and experience for such work.
(6) The following NFPA publications should be used for guidance to develop the fire protection program:
No. 4
" Organization for Fire Services" No. 4A
" Organization of a Fire Department" No. 6
" Industrial Fire Loss Prevention" No. 7
" Management of Fire Emergencies" No. 8
" Management Responsibilities for Effects of Fire on Operations" No. 27
" Private Fire Brigades" (7) On sites where there is an operating reactor and construction or modification of other units is underw y, the superir.tendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.
9.5.1-17 Rev. 2 - July 1981 p
r
'w-y,
--. e y--
The fire hazards analysis should separately identify hazards and provide appropriate protection in locations where safety-related losses can occur as a result of:
(1) Cnncentrations of combustible centents, including transient fire loads dt2 to combustibles expected to be used in normal operations such as refueling, maintenance, and modifications; (2) Continuity of combustible contents, furnishings, building materials, or combinations thereof in configurations conducive to fire spread; (3) Exposure fire, heat, smoke, or water exposure, including those that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown; (4) Fire in contrni rooms or other locations having critical safety related functions; (5) Lack of adequate access or smoke removal facilities that impede fire extinguishment in safety related areas; (6) Lack of explosion prevention measures; (7) Loss of electric power or control circuits; (8) Inadvertent operation of fire suppression rystems.
The fire hazards analysis should verify that the NRC fire protection program guidelines have been met.
The analysis should list applicable alements of the program, with explanatory statemen'.s as needed to identify location, type of system, and design criteria.
The analysis should identify and justify any deviations from the regulatory guidelines.
Justification for deviations from the regulatory guidelines should show that an equivalent level of protection will be achieved.
Deletion of a protective feature without compensating alter-native protection measures will not be acceptable, urless it is clearly demonstrated that the protective measure is not needed because of the design and arrangement of the particular plant.
c.
Fire Suppression System Design Basis (1) Total reliance should not be placed on a single fire suppression system.
Appropriate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.
(2) A single active failure or a crack in a moderate-energy line (pipe) in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability.
For example, neither the failure of a fire pump, its power supply or controls, nor a crack in a moderate energy line in the fitt suppression system, should result in loss of function of both sprinkler and hose standpipe systems in an area protected by such primary and backup systems.
(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water te manual hose stat:ons located within hose reach-of aren containing
eouipment required for safe plant shutdown following the s'afe shutdown eartnquake (SSE).
Ic areas of high seismic activity, the staff will 9.5.1-19 Rev. 2 - July 1981
b 4
' particulate air and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins, or other
'a
. combustible supplies in safety-related areas.
Govern the handling of and limit transient fire loads such as combustible c.
and flammable liquids, wood and plastic products, or other combustible materials in buildings containing safety-related systems or equipment during all phases of operating, and especially during maintenance, modification, l
or refueling operations.
l d.
Designate the onsite staff members responsible for the inplant fire protec-tion review of proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire hazards and specify required additional fire protection in the work i
activity procedure.
e.
Govern the use of ignition sources by use of a flame permit system to i
control welding, flame cutting, brazing, or soldering operations.
A j
separate permit should be issued for each area where work is to be done.
If work continues over more than one shift, the permit should be valid i
for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the plant is operating or for the duration of a particular job during plant shutdown.
j f.
Control the removal from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediately following 3
completion of the activity, or at the end of eac work shift, whichever i
comes first.
j g.
Govern leak testing; similar procedures such as airflow determination should use one of the commercially available techniques.
Open flames or i
combustion generated smoke should not be permitted.
i h.
Maintain the periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure continued compli-3 ance with these administrative controls.
i.
Control the use of specific combustibles in safety-related areas.
All wood used in safety-related areas during maintenance, modification, or refueling operation (such as lay-down b ocks or scaffolding) should be treated with a flame retardant.
Equipment or supplies (such as-new fuel) shipped in untreated combu 'ible packing t:ontainers may be unpacked in I
safety-related areas if ruhm ed for valid operating reasons.
- However, all combustible materials A uld be removed from the area immediately following unpacking.
Such transient combustible material, unless stored
)
in approved containers, should not be left unattended during lunch breaks, shift changes, or other similar periods.
Loose combustible packing material such as wood or paper excelsior, or polyethylene sheeting should be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing metal covers.
i j.
Disarming of fire detection or fire suppression systems should be controlled by a permit system.
Fire watches should be established in areas where systems are so disarmed.
j k.
Successful fire protection requires testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment and the emergency lighting and communication.
A test niant: that lists the individuals and their responsibilities in connectN with routine tests and inspecticris of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed.
The test plan should contain the types, frequency, and detailed procedures for testing.
Procedures should also
)
9.5.1-21 Rev. 2 - July 1981
)
to the fire, co:mnunication with the control room, and coordination
~'
with outside fire departments.
(7) Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.
(8) Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribu-tion when the ventilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing operation.
(9) Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.
(10) Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.
3.
Fire Brigade The need for good organization, training, and equipping of fire brigades a.
at nuclear power plant sites requires that cffective measures be implemented to ensure pro er discharge of these funccions.
The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, p' Emergency Plartaing for Nuclear Power Plants," should be followed as applicable.
b.
A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire fighting should be estab-lished to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or components important to safety. The fire brigade should be at least five members on each shift.
The brigade leader and at least two brigade members should have' sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.
The qualification of fire brigade members should include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous fire fighting activities.
The shift supervisor should not be a member of the fire brigade.
The brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety conse-quences of a fire and advise control room personnel.
Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of an operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems.
The minimum equipment provided for the brigade should consist of personal c.
protective equipment such at turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable extinguishers.
Self-contained breathing apparatus using full-face positive pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National Insti-tute for Occupational Safety and Health--approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel.
At least 10 masks shall be available for fire brigade personnel.
Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical.
Service or rated operating life shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.
At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathig. unit.
In addition, an oniite 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> supply of reserve air should be prcvided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenish-ment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.
If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing 9.5.1-23 Rev. 2 - July 1981
+. -
i Note:
Items (i) and (j) may be deleted from the training of no more than two of the nonoperations personnel who may be assigned to'the fire brigade.
(2) The instruction should be provided by qualified individuals who are knowledgeable, experienced, and suitably trained in fighting the types of fires that could occur in the plant and in using the types of equipment available in the nuclear power plant.
(3)
Instruction should be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.
(4) Regular planned meetings should be held at least every 3 mor.ths for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessary.
(5) Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held tc repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a 2-year period.
These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.
(6) Practice (a) Practice sessions should be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power plant.
These sessions shall provide brigade members with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting.
(b) These practice sessions should be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.
(7) Drills (a) Fire brigade drills should be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team.
(b) Drills should be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade.
Each fire brigade member should partici-pate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year.
A sufficient number of these drills, but not less than one for each shift fire brigade per year, should be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment.
Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill should ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it is begun.
Unannounccd drills should not be scheduled closer than 4 weeks.
At least one drill per year should be performed on a "ba.ck shift" for each shift fire brigade.
9.5.1-25 Rev. 2 - July 1981
)
(9) Guidance Documents NFPA 27, " Private Fire Brigade," should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills.
This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equipment.
Among the standards referenced in this document, NFPA 197, " Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks," should be utilized as applicable.
NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed in NFPA 27 may be used as appifcable for training references.
In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression that are recognized or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.
4.
Quality Assurance Program The quality assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors should ensure-that the guidelines for design, procurement, installation, and testing and the aninistrative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied.
The QA program should be under the management control of the QA organization.
This control consists of (1) form'ilating a fire protection QA program that incorporates suitable requirements and'is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection or verifying that the program incor-porates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible l
for fire protection, and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, and audits.
Performance of other i
QA program functions for meeting the fire protection program requirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization.
The QA program for fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program.
It should satisfy the specific criteria listed below.
a.
Design and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to ensure that,the guidelines of the regulatory position of this guide are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.
b.
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills, and training that govern the fire protection program should be. prescribed by documented instruc-tions, procedures, or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.
t Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services c.
Measures should be established to ensure that purchased material, equipment, f
and services conform to the procurement documents.
d.
Inspection A program for independent inspetion of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.
i 9.5.1-27 Rev. 2 - July 19,81
components or high concentrations of. safety-related cables within that division.
(3) Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself.
Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration.
Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material to prevent the passage of smoke and hot gases.
Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions.
Penetration designs should utilize only noncombustible materials and should be qualified by tests.
The penetration qualification tests should use the time-temperature expostre curve specified by ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials." The acceptance criteria for the test should require that:
(a) The fire barrier penetration has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier.
(b) The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature does not exceed 325'F.
(c) The fire barrier penetration remains intact and does not allow projec-tion of water beyond the unexposed surface during /2-inch nozzle set the. hose stream test.
The stream shall be delivered through a 1-1 at a discharge angle of 30% with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 1-1/2-inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 15% with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 2-1/2 ' inch national standard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8-inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 ft from the exposed face.
(4) Penetration openings for ventilation systems should be protected by fire dampers having a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier (see NFPA-90A, " Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems").
Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter systems should be noncombustible.
(5) Door openings in fire barriers should be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nation-ally recognized laboratory.
Such doors should be self closing or provided with closing mechanisms and should be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable.
(See NFPA 80, " Fire Doors and Winoows.')
One of the followino measures snould be providad to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:
9.5.1-29 Rev. 2 - July 1981
(10) Metal deck roof construction should be noncombustible and listed as
" acceptable for fire" in the UL Building Materials Directory, or listed as Class I in the Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
(11) Suspended ceiling and their supports should be of noncombustible construction.
Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles except as noted in Position C.6.b.
(12) Transformers installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with noncombustible liquid.
Transformers filled with combustible fluid that are located indoors should be enclosed in a transformer vault (see Section 450(c) of NFPA 70, " National Elettrical Code").
(13) Outdoor oil-filled transformers should have oil spill confinement features or drainage away from the buildings.
Such transformers should be located at least 50 feet distant from the building, or by ensuring that such build-ing walls within 50 feet of oil-filled transformers are without openings and have a fire resistance rating of at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
(14) Floor drains sized to remove expected firefighting waterflow without flood-ing safety-related equipment should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire suppression systens are installed.
Floor drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire-fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment in the area (see NFPA-92, " Waterproofing and Draining of Floors"). Where gas suppression systems are installed, the drains should be provided with adequate seals or the gas suppression system should be sized to compensate for the loss of the suppression agent through the drains.
Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisicas for preventing the backflow of combustible ifquids to safety-related areas through the inter-connected drain systems.
Water drainage from areas that may contain radio-activity should be collected, sampled, and analyzed before discharge to the environment.
b.
Safe Shutdown Capability (1) Fire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.
These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
(a) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage; and (b) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
(2) To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be provided:
(a)
Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundar.t trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.
Structural steel 9.5.1-31 Rev. 2 - July 1981
y-The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may be unique for each (3) such area, or it may be one unique combination of systems for all such areas.. In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area (s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Procedures shall be in effect to implement l
this capability.
l (4) _If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be avail-able because of fire damage, the equipment and systems comprising the means to achfeve and maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions until cnid shutdown can be achieved.
If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided.
The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such equipment and systems shall be onsite at all times.
(5) Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; 3r the fire damage to such equipment and systems should be limited so that the systems can be l
i Materials for made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
such repairs shall be readily available onsite and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.
If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system should be provided.
Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.
Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire shutdown capability need (6) not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis accident criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g., because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.
(7) The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area should be known to be isolated from associated circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment.
The separation and barriers between trays and conduits containing associated circuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or safe shutdown cables from the redundant division, or the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, should be such that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.
d.
Control of Combustibles (1) Safety-related systems should be isolated or separated from combustible materials.
When this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special protection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function.
Such protec-tica may invcive a combination of automatic fire suppressien, and construc-tion capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present.
Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:
I 9.5.1-33 Rev. 2 - July 1981 L -
.c.
- a. _,,.
~.n>w-
-. ~
s
.y
^
l
- l
. I
.and are normally accessible for manual firefighting should be protected I
.from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
Automatic area protection, where provided, should consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas th:t could present an exposure hazard to the cable system.
Manual hose standpipe systems may be relied upon to provide the primary fire suppression (in,11eu of automatic water suppression systems) for safety-related cable trays of a single division that are separated from redundant safety divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and are normally acces-sible for manual firefighting if all of the following conditions are met:
i (a) The number of equivalent
- standard 24-inch-wide cable trays' (both-l safety-related and nonsafety-reitted) in a given fire area is six or 1ess; t
(b) The cabling does not provide instrumentation, control or power to systems required to achieve and maintair hot shutdown; and l
(c) Smoke detectors are provided in the area of these cable routings, and continuous line-type heat detectors are provide in the cable trays.
l Safety-related cable trays that are not accessible for manual fire fighting i
should be protected by a zoned automatic water system with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray.
Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression-in the area where such a fire could occur.
In other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary for reasons of nuclear safety to separate -
redundant safety-related cable systems by 3-hour-rated fire barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with open-head deluge l
or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage l
is provided for each cable tray.
Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where'such a fire could occur.
The capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown considering the effects of a fire involving fixed and potential transient combustibles should be evaluated I
with and without actuation of the automatic suppression system and should be justified on a suitably defined basis.
l J
(3) Electric cable construction should, as a minimuu, pass the flame test in i
the current IEEE Std 383.
(This does not imply that cables passing this i
test will not require fire protection.)
l (4) Cable raceways should be used only for cables.
l (5) Miscellaneous storage and piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases should not create a potential exposure hazard to safety related j
L systems.
i
" Trays exceeding 24 inenes should be counted as two trays; trays exceeding l
48 inches should be counted as three trays, regardless of tray fill.
j 9.5.1-35 Rev. 2 - July 1981 1
l
l and egress routes to and from all fire areas.
Safe shutdown areas incJude those required to be manned if the control room must be evacuated.
(2) Suitable sealed-beam battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.
1 (3) Fixed emergency communications independent of the normal plant communication i
system should be installed at preselected stations.
j (4) A purtable radio communications system should be provided for use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.
This system should not interfere with the communications capa-bilities of the plant security force.
Fixed repeaters installed to permit i
use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure i
fire damage.
Preoperational and periodic testing should demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio communication will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
6.
Fire Detection and Suppression a.
Fire Detection (1) Detection systems should be provided for all areas that contain or present a fire exposure to safety-related equipment.
(2) Fire detection systems should comply with the requirements of Class A l
systems as defined in NFPA 72D, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems," and Class I circuits as defined in NFPA 70, " National Electrical Code."
(3) Fire detectors should be selected and installed in accordance with NFPA 72E,
" Automatic Fire Detectors." Preoperational and periodic testing of pulsed line-type heat detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays in other plant systems.
l (4) Fire detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annuncia-tion in the control room.
Where zoned detection systems are used in a given fire area, local means should be provided to identify which detector zone has actuated.
Local audible alarms should sound in the fire area.
(5) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique so they will not be confused with any other plant system alarms.
(6) Primary and secondary power supplies should be provided for the fire detec-tion system and for electrically operated control valves for automatic suppression systems.
Such primary and secondary power supplies should satisfy provisions of Section 2220 of NFPA 720.
This can be accomplished by using normal offsite power as the primary supply with a 4-hour battery supply as secondary supply; and by providing capability for manual connec-tion to the Class 1E emergency power bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss of offsite power.
Such connection should follow the applicable guidelines in Regula-tory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75.
9.5.1-37 Rev. 2 - July 1981
'(7) - Outside manual ~ hose installation should be sufficient to provide an effec-tive hose stream +n any onsite location where fixed or transient combustibles could leopardiz(
'ety-related equipment.
Hydrants should be installed approx <mately et 250 ft on the yard main system.
A hose house equipped with hose and comoination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection," should be provided as needed, but at least every 1,000 ft.
Alternatively, mobile means of providing hose and associated equipment, such as hose carts or trucks, may be used. When provided, such mobile equipment should be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose houses.
(8) Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers.
(9) Two separate, reliable freshwater supplies should be provided.
Saltwater or brackish water should not be used unless all freshwater supplies have been exhausted.
If tanks are used, two 1005 (minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed.
They should be so inter-connected that pumps can take suction from either or both.
However, a failure in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain.
Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or less.
(10) Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage.
When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by passive means, for example, use of a vertical standpipe for other water services.
Administrative controls, including locks for tank outlet valves, are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume.
(11) The fire water supply should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a >eriod of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, but not less than 300,000 gallons.
This flow rate should be sased (conservatively) on 500 gpa for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sprinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with NFPA 13 or NFPA 15.
The fire water supply-should be capable of delivering this design demand over the longest route of the water supply system.
(12) Freshwater lakes or ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection but require separate redundant suctions in one or more intake structures.
These supplies should be separated so that a failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other supply.
(13) When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:
(a) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity, and (b) Failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.
(14) Other water systems that may be used as one of the,two fire water supplies i
should be permanently connected to the fire main systen and should be capable of automatic alignment to the fire main system.
Pumps, controls, and power supplies in these systems should satisfy the requirements for l
9.5.1-39 Rev. 2 - July 1981
l f
" Power Piping." The water supply for this condition may be obtained by l
manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe j
[
header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential service water system.
The cross connection should be (a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the l
seismic Category I water system.
l l
I f
(5) The proper type of hose nozzle to be supplied to each area should be based l
on the fire hazard analysis.
The usual combination spray / straight-stream
/
l nozzle should not be uced in areas where the straight stream can cause l
unacceptable mechanical damage. Fixed fog nozzles should be provided at i
locations where high-voltage shock hazards exist.
All hose nozzles should have shutoff capability.
(Guidance on safe distances for water application to live electrical equipment may be found in the "NFPA Fire Protection i
Handbook.")
J l
(6) Fire hose should be hydrostatically tested in accordance with the recom-mendations of NFPA 1962, " Fire Hose - Care, Use, Maintenance." Hose stored l
in outside hose houses should be tested annually.
Interior standpipe hose j
should be tested every 3 years.
l (7) Certain fires, such as those involving flammable liquids, respond well to I
foam suopression.
Consideration should be given to use of mechanical I
low-expansion foam systems, high-expansion foam generators, or aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) systems, including the AFFF deluge system.
These systems should comply with the requirements of NFPA 11, NFPA 11A, NFPA 11B, and NFPA 16, as applicable, i
d.
Halon Suppression Systems Halon fire extinguishing systems should comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and NFPA 128, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211." Only UL-listed or FM-approved agents should be used.
Provisions for locally disarming automatic Halon systems should be key locked and under strict administrative control.
Automatic Halon extinguishing systems should l
not be disarmed unless controls as described in Position C.2.c. are provided.
f In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 128, preventive maintenance and testing of the systems, including check-weighing of the Halon cylinders, should be done at least quarterly.
Particular consideration should also be given to:
(1) Minimum required Halon concentration, distribution, soak time, and ventila-tion control; (2) Toxicity of Halon; (3) Toxicity and corrosive characteristics of the thermal decomposition products of Halon; and (4) Location and selec?.lon of the activating detectors.
9.5.1-41 Rev. 2 - July 1981
(;..
(b) Inside noninerted containment one of the fire protection means stated in Positions C.5.b.1 and C.5.b.2 or the following fire protection i
L means should be provided:
separation of cables and equipment and
[
associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a noncombustible radiant energy shield having a minimum fire rating of one-half hour.
(c) In primary containment, fire detection systems should be provided-for each fire hazard.
The type of detection used and the location of the detectors should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard identified by the fire hazard analysis.
A general area fire detection capability should be provided in the primary containment as backup for the above described hazard detection.
To accomplish this, suitabla smoke or heat detectors compatible with the radiation environment should be installed.
L (d) Standpipe and hose stations should be inside PWR containments and
. Standpipe'and hose stations BWR containments that are not inerted.
inside containment may be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent extending the fire main supply inside containment.
For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose stations should be placed outside the drywell with adequate lengths of hose, no longer than 100 ft, to reach any location inside the drywell with an effective hose stream.
The containment penetration of the standpipe system'should meet the isolation requirements of General Design Criterion 56 and should be seismic Category I and Quality Group 8.
(e) The reactor coolant pumps should be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation.
The oil collection system should be so designed, engineered, and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.
Such collection systems should be capabl.e of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.
Leakage should be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire Tube oil system inventory.
A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback.
Leakage points to be protected should include lift pump and piping overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps.
The drain line should be large enough to accommodate the largest potential ofi leak.
For secondary containment areas, cable fire hazards that could affect (f) safety should be protected as described in Position C.5.e(2).
The type of detection system for other fire hazards identified by the fire hazards analysis should.be the mest suitable for the carticular type of fire hazard.
9.5.1-43 Rev. 2 - July 1981
Venting of smoke produced by fire in the control room by means of the normal ventilation system is acceptable; however, provision should be made to permit isolation of the recirculating portion of the normal ventilation system.
Manually operated venting of the control room should be available to the operators.
All cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control room.
That is, no cabling should be routed through the control room from one area to another.
Cables in underfloor and ceiling spaces should meet the separation criteria necessary for fire protection.
Air-handling functions should be ducted separately from cable runs in such spaces; i.e., if cables are routed in underfloor or ceiling spaces, these spaces should not be used as air plenums for ventilation of the control room.
Fully enclosed electrical raceways located in such underfloor and ceiling spaces, if over 1 square foot in cross-sectional area, should have automatic fire suppression inside.
Area automatic fire suppression should be provided for underfloor and ceiling spaces if used for cable runs unless all cable is run in 4-inch or smaller steel conduit or the cables are in fully enclosed raceways internally protected by automatic fire suppression.
There should be no carpeting in the control room.
c.
Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as closed-head sprinklers, open-head deluge system, or open directional water spray system.
Deluge and open spray systems should have l
provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation.
Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present exposure hazards to the cable system.
Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with water supplied by the fire suppression system without electrical faulting.
Open-head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned.
The use of foam is acceptable.
Cable spreading rooms should have:
(1) At least two remote and separate entrances for access by fire brigade personnel; (2) An aisle separation between tray stacks at least 3 feet wide and 8 feet high; (3) Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed immediately outside the room; (4) Area smoke detection; and Continuous line-type heat detectors for cable trays inside the cab 1'e' ~
(5) spreading room.
9.5.1-45 Rev. 2 - July 1981
~
should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room.
Combustible meterials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation.
Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be readily available in the general area.
g.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms Safety-related battery rooms should be protected against fires and explosions.
Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> inclusive of all penetrations and openings.
DC switchgear and inverters should not be located in these battery Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in rooms.
the control room and alarr locally.
Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol-%.
Loss of ventilation should be alarmed in the control room.
Standpipe and hose and portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the room.
h.
Turbine Building The turbine building should be separated from adjacent structures containing safety-related equipment by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The fire barriers should be designed so as to maintain structural integrity even in the event of a complete collapse of the turbine structure.
Openings and penetrations in the fire barrier should be minimized and should not be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct fire exposure hazard to the barrier.
Considering the severity of the fire hazards, defense in depth may dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integrity.
i.
Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and from other areas of i
the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
j f
Automatic fire suppression should be installed to combat any diesel generater or lubricating oil fires; such systems should be designed for operation when the diesel is running without affecting the diesel.
Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally.
Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the area.
Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.
Day tanks with total capacity up to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under the following conditions:
(1) The day tank is located in a separate enclosure with a minimum fire resist-ante rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, including doors or penetrations.
These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks and should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system, or (2) The day tank is located inside the diesel generator room in a diked enclo-sure that has sufficient capacity to hold 110% of the contents of the day tank or is drained to.a safe locatinn.
9.5.1-47 Rev. 2 - July 1981
o.
Safety-Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protedted from the effects of an exposure fire.
Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks.
p.
Records Storage Areas Records storage areas should be so located and protected that a fire in these areas does not expose safety-related systems or equipment (see Regulatory Guide 1.88, " Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Quality Assurance Records").
q.
Cooling Towers Cooling towers should be of noncombustible construction or so located and protected that a fire will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment.
Cooling towers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply.
r.
Miscellaneous Areas Miscellaneous areas such as shops, warehouses, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuel oil tanks, and flammable and combustible liquid storage tanks should be so I
located and protected that a fire or effects of a fire, including smoke, will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment.
8.
Special Protection Guidelines a.
Storage of Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gases Gas cylinder storage locations should not be in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment or the fire protection systems that serve those safety-related areas.
A permit system should be required to use this equipment in safety-related areas of the plant (also see Position C.2).
b.
Storage Areas for Ion Exchange Resins Unused ion exchange resins should not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
c.
Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals shou!d not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
d.
Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles.
These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.
Cont,ideration should be given to requirements for removal of decay heat from entrained radioactive materiais.
9.5.1-49 Rev. 2 - July 1981 f
I.*
NFPA 80-1975, " Fire Doors and Windows."
NFPA 92M-1972, " Waterproofing and Draining of Floors."
NFPA 197-1966, " Initial Fire Attack, Training, Standard On."
NFPA 204-1968, " Smoke and Heat Venting Guide."
NFPA 220-1975, " Types of Building Construction."
NFPA 251-1975, " Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials."
NFPA 259-1976, " Test Method for Potential Heat of Building Materials."
NFPA 802-1974, " Recommended Fire Protection Practice for Nuclear Reactors."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents NUREG-0050, " Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," Report by Special Review Group, February 1976.
An Assessment of Accident WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), " Reactor Safety Study ctober 1975.
Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, O
NUREG-75/087, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection Program."
Section 3.6.1, " Plant Design for Protection Ag"ainst Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment.
Section 6.4, " Habitability Systems."
Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50,
" Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," General Design Criterion 3,
" Fire Protection."
Regulatory Guide 1.6, "Indeperdence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems."
Regulatory Guide 1.32, " Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.39, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units
)
of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems."
9.5.1-51 Rev. 2 - July 1981
APPENDIX A TO BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1
" GUIDELINES FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 00CKETED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1976" (August 23,1976)
(The guidelines of this appendix have been incorporated into BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and therefore this appendix has been deleted.)
e i
i 1
9.5.1-53 Rev. 2 - July 1981