ML20082M999

Control of Heavy Loads C-10,RE Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20082M999
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/02/1983
From:	Bomberger C, Vosbury F FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Chan T, Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML17255A611	List: ML20082M999
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07992, TAC-7992, TER-C5506-357, NUDOCS 8312060347
Download: ML20082M999 (30)

Text

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC. CORPORATION ,

ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCDCCKETNO. 50-244 FRC PRCJECT C5506 NRCTACNO. 07991 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CCNTRACTNO. NRC 03-81 130 FRCTASK 357 l

Prepared by Franklin Research Center - Author:  ?. W. Vosbury, C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia.,PA 19133 FRC Group loader: I. H. Sa,rgent l Prepared for NuclearRegulatory Commissiert Washington. D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh, T. Chan December 2,1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the Urdted States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or imolled, or assumes any legal liability or l responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by sucn third party would not infringe privattriy owned rights.

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e e TECHNICAL' EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I

NRC DOCKfiT NO. 50-244 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRCTAC NO. 07992 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC 03-81-130 FPC TASK 357 Preparedby Franklin Research Center - Author: F. W. Vosbury, C. Bot:tberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh, T. Chan December 2, 1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Govemment. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party wouid not infringe privately owned rtgnts.

P'repared by: . Reviewed by: Approved by:

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l L' Ans s' Principal Audor N GJoup Le)Lder Department Dirfctor,/

Date r J /' M i Date: '2l' 3 U Date: i2-2 'd 4

. 0. Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Jnstitute The Beryamin Freren Parnwey. PMa Pa 19I03 (21514461000

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e TER-C5503-357 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . ,1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 19 3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.1 General Provisions for Load. Handling . . . _. . . 23 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 24 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

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TER-C5506-357 l

FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support ,of NIC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conductM in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

Mr. F. W. Vosbury, C. Bomberger, and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the

( technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

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TER-C5506-357

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and peccedures at the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's (RGaE) Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (1] ,

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuc1* ear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NBC staff on May 17, 1978 (2I to all power reactor licensees, requesting information co'ncerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Tack A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at ranklin Research Center A Osamen J The Fw insamme

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1 nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which

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i they are employed. 'Ihe second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas wnere their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to. those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the 1 potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof l

crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate j that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach wac used to develop use. staf f guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that the ir probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the followings o define safe load travel paths, through procedures and operator training, so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shuidown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0 612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 reconunended that a program be initiated l

I to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

l 1.2 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND

[

On Decentar 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to RG&E, the Licensee for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for the handling and control of heavy loads so as to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small, evaluate these provisions with respect to I

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e TER-C5506-357 the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidel.'.nes. On February 1, 1982 [4], RG&E provided its initial response to this request. A draft Technical Evaluation Report (TER) was prepared, informally transmitted, and discussed with the Licensee [5]. Following this discussion, RG&E provided supplemental responses on March 2, 1983 [6] And October 12, 1983 [7],

addressing unresolved issues identified in the draft TER. This final TER is based on information provided in References 4, 6, and 7.

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2. EVALUATION This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant with respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both i

' the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines that must be met in order, to provide the defense-in-depth appropriate for the safe handling of , ,

heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612: .

Guideline 1 - Safe Ioad Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lif ting Devices .

Guideline' 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

I Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

I These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling l

systems.and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.

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a TER-C5506-357 2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems

a. Sununary of Licensee Statements and conclusions ,

The Licensee initially identified all overhead handling systems in the plant. Specific cranes were then excluded from compliance with NOREG-0612

. based on one of the following criteria o No safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel is located in close ,

proximity or sufficient separation exists.

o The handling systems are sole-purpose systems.and are used only when the equipment is out of service.

o Heavy loads are not carried by the handling system.

The Licensee determined the following handling systems to be subject te l

NUREG-0612:

Handling System Iocation 100/20-ton ove hecd crane containment

, 3-ton jib Containment 1.5-ton fuel manipulator bridge Containment 10-ton jib containment 2-ton jib Containment 40/5-ton overhead crane Auxiliary 2-ton spent fuel crane Auxiliary monorail (basement) Auxiliary 7.5-ton screenhouse Screenhouse 3-ton monorail - upper level Intermediate

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The Licensee's conclusions concerning load handling systems subject to NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 are consistent with the objectives of NUREG-0612.

2.1.2 Safe Idad Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1M

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vescel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow. to the extent practical, structural ficor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths renidin Research Center A Desume af The Femen enemme

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should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly arcked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that, for all monorail and jib overhead handling systems, safe load paths are limited by tne physical capabilities of the system itself. For the 100/20-ton containment crane, the 40/5-ton auxiliary building crane, and the 7.5-ton screenhouse crane, the Licensee will (1) define specific . heavy load safe load paths, (2) define generic heavy load safe load paths, (3) incorporate safe load paths into Load Handling Procedure A-1305, (4) establish a procedure to control deviations from safe load paths, and (5) provide suitable visual aids to assist crane operators in properly handling heavy loads where practical. The Licensee stated that these peccedures will be implemented by September 1, 1983.

b. Evaluation The Licensee's response regarding monorails and jib cranes is satis.-

factory, since rhese devices are limited by the physical capabilities of tse respective systems. The Licensee's intent to implement safe load paths, incorporate the safe load paths into procedures, establish a procedure for controlling deviations from safe load paths, and provide visual aids to the crane operators to mark safe load paths meets the intent of Guideline 1.

c. Conclusion When implemented, safe load paths at the Ginna plant will be consistent with Guideline 1.

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(2)1

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment:

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m TER-C5506-357 inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe paths and other special precautions."

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that load handling procedures will be developed for the 10 load handling systems within the scope of NUREG-0612. The program will identify specific and generic lifts and will ensure that the proper equipment is used for the lif t and that the load is handled properly. This development of load handling procedures will be done in administrative Procedure A-1305 accompanied by a rigger qualification program.

The Licensee stated that these procedures will be in place by December 31, 1983.

b. Evaluation and conclusion The Licensee's commitment to establish procedures in accordance with NUREG-0612 is consistent with Guideline 2.

f 2.1.4 Crane operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)1 "Or;ane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [8]."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that operators are trained and qualified in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976 without exception.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Operator training and qualification is consistent with Guideline 3.

2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 4 uu0uer.nuiinn earch C ni.,

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TER-C5506-357 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' (9]. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in ares = as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in

'the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.l(4)]."

a. Summary of Licensee statements and conclusions The Licensee stated that a comparison analysis for the special lifting devices used at the Ginna plant to determine compliance with NUREG-0612 has been completed by Westinghouse Corp. This analysis encompasses the following special lifting devices: the reactor head lifting rig, the upper and lower internals lifting assembly, and the reactor coolant pump motor sling. The evaluation shows that the stress *1imit criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 associated - -

with certain stress design factors for tensile and shear stresses are adequately satisfied.

The following information has been provided by the Licensee:

1. The load of concern for the internals lif t rig is the upper internals, which weigh 26 tons. The lift rig has lifted the lower internals, which weigh 100 tons. This satisfies the ANSI load test i requirement of 150%. s

2. For the reactor coolant pump motor sling, information has been provided detailing the material properties, weld examinations that were performed, and stress result summaries. The device is a very simple lifting assembly consisting of a triangular spreader bar. The stress design margins are, in general, substantially in excess of the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978. All welds originally underwent nondestructive examination (NDE) during fabrication and have been subsequently reexamined. Therefore, based upon the simplicity of the device, documentation of weld quality, substantial stress margins, and lifts of 100% of rated load, the Licensee believes a load test to 1504 to be unnecessary.

3. For the head lift rig, information has also been supplied detailing material properties, weld examinations, and stress result summaries.

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The lift rig has been load tested to 100% of rated load. The device

, is of a relatively simple design with maximum use of mechanical pinned joints. Critical welds were originally examined by ND3 and are being subsequently reexamined for continuing compliance. Stress levels for lif t rig comp nents are also, in general, substantially in ,

excess of the ANSI criteria. Therefore, the Licensee is of the 4 opinion that a 150% load test of the head lifting rig is also not necessary.

The dynamic loading of each of the'e s lifting devices was determined to be less than an additional 2% of rated load and therefore need not be included in the design stresses.

In addition, the Licensee stated that an inspection, testing, and maintenance program has been implemented to ensure continued compliance with

, ANSI N14.6-1978. This program will require visual inspections annually (not to exceed 15 months, consistent with permissible extensions for Technical Specification sutveillance) . Nondestructive examination of critical welds will also be done every 10 years.

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b. Evaluation Information provided by the Licensee indicates that the design and l fabrication of these special lifting devices will provide a degree of load I handling reliability equivalent to that expected from an initial design'in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978. A complete stress analysis has been performed for these devices which demonstrates that actual factors of safety on material yield and ultimate stress substantially exceed those specified in ,

-ANSI N14.6-1978. Furthermore, the manufacturing controls implemented by the manufacturer are expected to provide a degree of quality assurance equivalent to that inherent in ANSI N14.6-1978. Although no specific 150% overload tests have been conducted on the reactor vessel head lift rig and the reactor coolant pump motor si'.ng, it can be concluded that the proof of workmanship expected to be demonst. rated by such testing can be otherwise determined.

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TER-C5506-357 I

handling the upper internals. It should be noted in this case that only the lift of the upper internals is of interest with respect to NUREG-0612 since the plant conditions required prior to lif ting the lower intervals eliminates this lift from the jurisdiction of NUREG-0612.

In the case of the reactor coolant pump motor sling and the reactor vessel head lift rig, a review of design and stress analyses indicates that additional load tests are not necessary to provide the high degree of assurance of freedom from errors in fabrication or inadequate material properties expected to be demonstrated by such tests. The devices are of fairly simple design. There is little use of welded connections. Almost all load bearing connections are lugs and clevi4es with large diameter pins.

In summary, both lifting devices are of simple design and have large material safety margins so that it is highly unlikely th=L wrcors of fabrication or inadequate material properites will render them incapable of lifting 150% of their design load.

The Licensee's commitment to a continuing inspection and examination program is consistent with ANSI N14.6-1978.

c.. Conclusion and Recommendations The special lifting devices subject to NUREG-0612 at the Ginna plant will provide a degree of mechanical reliability consistent with that inherent in Guideline 4.

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(511

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and l

.used in accotdance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' l [10]. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

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TER-C5506-357

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that a rigger qualification program will be implemented by December 31, 1983 to ensure that slings are selected and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. The Licensee stated that sling selection and use is currently the responsiblity of each rigger. The " Handbook for Riggers" by W. G. Newberry is currently used and believed to be equivalent to ANSI B30.9-1971. The Licensee stated that all slings at the Ginna plant are marked with their load ratings.

With regard to dynamic loading, the Licensee stated that adding factors to consider dynamic loads above the 5:1 safety factors already considered for slings is impractical and provides no justifiable cushion of safety. Dynamic loads are negligible and only static loads are considered.

b. Evaluation The Qinna plant substantially satisfies the criteria ' based on the Licensee's intent to establish a rigger qualification program to ensure that slings are selected esd used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. Further, information. supplied by the Licensee in References 4 and 6 indicates that no hoist has a speed greater than 30 feet per minute (fpm); therefore, an additional allowance for dynamic loads may be disregarded since they can be expected to be a reasonably small percentage of the overall static load.

c. Conclusion when the riggwe program has been implemented, selection and use of slings will be performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 5.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(6)1

• The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g. , the polar crane OLb4 ce====

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TER-C5506-J57 inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power opera- l tion. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that procedures for inspection, testing, and maintenance of certain jibs and cranes meet the intent of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, with the exception of (1) operational testing, (2) rated load test and documentation, (3) written maintenance procedures, and (4) written procedures for adjustments and repairs. The Licensee has stated that procedures will be developed and incorporated into the inspection, testing, and maintenance programs to satisfy ANSI B30.2-1976 for exceptions 1, 3, and 4.

Regarding exception 2 (rated load tests and documentation), the Licensee statsd that the auxiliary building crane was not load-tested prior to initial use. It was, however, load-tested to 40 tons prior to a spent fuel cask lift in 1973. This crane has not been significantly altered or repaired.

The containment crane was significantly altered during construction.

After the modifications were complete, the crane was tested; however, no documentation of this test is available. The crane has safely lif ted the lower internals (approximately 98 tons) .

b. Evaluation

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The requirements of this guideline will be substantially satisfied at the Ginna plant when operational tests, written maintenance procedures, and a written peccedure for adjustments and repairs are developed and incorporated into plant procedures to comply with criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2 for,all equipment that was not excluded from compliance with NUREG-0612.

l It is noted that a rated load test is not required by ANSI B30.2-1976, although it is recommended. In the case of the containment crane, the fact that it has been used to lif t the lower internals provides a degree of l

l assurance equivalent to that provided by the rated load test for the routine hu Franklin a cm Resear.c.h Center

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lifts of.less than 78.4 tons. The lower internals lift can be considered, on the basis of frequency, to be similar to a special lif t as outlined in ANSI B30.2-1976, Section 2-3.2.1.1, for which a rated load test is not required.

In the case of the auxiliary building crane, a cated load test of 40 tons ,has been conducted and provides a degree of assurance for conducting routine lifts of 32 tons or less.

c. Conclusion The Ginna plant will satisfy the requirements of Guideline 6 upon irslementation of proposed revisions to inspection, testing, and maintenance programs.

2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7))

"The crane should be designed co meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of OtAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes' (11]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or C.W -70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the ,

specification is satisfied."  ;

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that both the containmen't building and the auxiliary building cranes were designed and built prior to the issuance of CMAA-70.

Both cranes have undergone a mechanical and structural design comparison i

between their original design specification, EOCl-61 (11], and CMAA-70. The results of this comparison, performed by the Whiting Corporation, identified the following as the only items associated with the containment building crane that are not in compliance with CMAA-70:

1. The sheave material is currently ASTM Grade.A48-41 Class 35 cast iron, whereas OtAA-70 requires that sheaves be made of steel or ASTM grade A48-64 Class 40 cast iron.

2. The extra reduction gear durability rating is exceeded by 30%.

3. The auxiliary hoist motor horsepower and torque rating is exceeded by 4.3%.

4. Tts allowable wheel load is exceeded by it.

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5. The longitudinal stiffener is not properly located and does not meet moment of inertia requirement.

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6. The bridg4 end truck drop due to axle failure is 1.875 inches while I the maximum drop allowed by CMAA-70 is 1 inch. l l

Regarding the auxiliary building crane, the Whiting comparison stated i that, in general, the crane meets the present CMAA-70 specifications, with the following exceptions:

1. The platform requires reinforcement of the tct plate to satisfy CMAA-70.

2. The sheaves and shaft couplings are made of Class 30 cast iron, while CMAA-70 requires use of Class 40 cast iron.

In addition, several other discrepancies were noted between the require-ments of ANSI B30.2-1976 and the actual design of the auxiliary building crane, including lubricating points, footwalks, clearances, resistors, books, and warning devices.

b. Evaluation The cranes at the Ginna plant substantially satisfy the criteria of this guideline on the basis that they were procured to EOCI-61 specifications, and a subsequent comparison with requirements of CMAA-70 has identified few discrepancies.

For the sheaves and shaft couplings of both cranes, CMAA-70 specifies that the material should be steel or AS1M Grade Ad8-64 or later, Class 40 cast iron or its equivalent. The specification in CMAA-70 of a later, higher tensile strength material for the sheaves and coupling is similar to the specification of ASTM A-36 in lieu of A-7 structural material and represents recognition of industrial progress in the area of material properties. The use of a similar but lower tensile strength material, of composition based on ASTM standards and with appropriate properties used for design calculations, is judged to result in crane components or structures with overall factors-of-safety and consequent load handling reliability equivalent to that produced

.with higher tensile strength material.

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TER-C5506-357 Current design of the containment building crane's auxiliary hoist motor and allowable wheel loading meet the intent of this guideline since variations associated with these items are nominal. In addition, present design of the bridge end truck meets the intent of CMAA-70 and EOCl-61 to prevent an excessive drop of the crane, thereby minimizing the effects of a drop due to axle failure.

Although not in verbatim compliance with E-70 requirements concerning location and moment of inertia, the use of longitudinal stiffeners in the containment building crane is judged to meet the intent of this guideline.

Longitudinal stiffeners are used, in conjunction with transverse stiffeners or diaphragas, to allow the use of thin web plates (i.e., web plates with large h/t ratios, where h = web depth and t = web thickness.) For the design employed by the Ginna containment building crane, CHAA-70 allows h/t ratios of up to 564 for girders with two longitudinal stiffeners, and requires a moment 4

of inertia about the web face of approximately 2.1 in . The Ginna design l employs two longitudinal stiffeners, each with a moment of inertia of approximately 0.46 in about the web face, in conjunction with a web h/t ratio of 236. This design is judged to meet the intent of this guideline based on the documentation provided by the Licensee.

Although identified as a deficiency by the Licensee, the reduction gear durability rating may satisfy the requirements of CMAA-70. As noted in the Licensee's submittal, the current gear durability is rated at 37.3 hp. Tne Licensee stated that the main hoist motor has been replaced with a 5-hp motor. According to CMAA-70, Section 4.5.3, the actual horsepower imposed on the gearing should be considered to be the rated horsepower of the hoist motor (5 hp) multiplied by a factor of 0.75 (assuming Service Class A-1) . This actual horsepower value (3.75 hp) is considerably less than the al.'. owed durability calculated by the Licensee (37.3 hp) and therefore satisfies the requirements of this guideline.

The auxiliary building crane satisfies the criteria of this guideline on the basis of the satisfactory comparison by Whiting Corporation. Discrepan-cies noted with ANSI B30.2-1976 are not of consequence to the load handling reliability of this crane.

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c. Conclusion i Design of cranes at the Ginna plant is consistent with Guideline 7. I 2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES l

The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to 1:tpact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of .

Guideline 1, Safe Load Pathat Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two re:naining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(111

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revis.d to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of NUREG-0612)."

a. Evaluation A review of the Licensee's technical specifications indicates that two specifications currently restrict movements of loads and handling systems over the spent fuel pool. Technical Specification 3.11.3 prohibits movement of the auxiliary building crane trolley over spent fuel in the spent fuel pool storage racks. Technical Specification 3.11.6 prohibits movement of the spent 4dU FrankAn Research Center A Osamen of The Pvusedue huanne

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fuel shipping cask by the auxiliary building crane pending completion of the spent fuel cask drop analysis and a review of crane design to determine single-failure-proofness. No other overhead handling system can physically move over the spent fuel area.

b. Conclusion The Ginna plant complies with Interim Protection Measure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5. 3 ( 2)-5. 3 ( 5) 1

" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handli~; procedures, cesne operator training, and crane inspection] ...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to catisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of NUREG-Odl2) ."

a. Evaluation The specific requirements for load-handling administrative controls are contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

b. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance  ;

with these administrative controls are contained in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this report.

2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Ioads Handled Over the Core (Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (6)1

". ..special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that suf ficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting d renadin Research Center A Onnmen af The Pommen insamme

. TER-C5506-357 devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to f ailure of the i components (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components;  !

I and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."

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a. Evaluation Interim Protection Measure 6 requires a special review of four issues for the handling of heavy loads over the core:

1. Review of procedures to ensure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise

a. for installation of rigging or lifting devices

b. for movement of the load.

2. Visual inspections of load-bearing components to identify : laws or i

deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component

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a. for cranes '

b. for slings

c. for special lifting devices.

5 3. Appropriate repair and replacement of defective components

a. of cranes

b. of slings

c. of'special lifting devices. t

4. Verification regarding crane operators

a. of proper training

b. of familiarity with specific procedurez used in handling loads.

Section 2.1.1 of this report describes the definition of safe load paths, and Section 2.1.2 describes procedures for the handling of loads by the reactor building crane. These measures fulfill the requirements for review of procedures for movement of heavy loads over the core.

The Licensee stated that the reactor building crane is inspected in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976 as noted in Section 2.1.7. Section 2.1.6 notes the Licensee's commitment to select and use slings in. accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. In Section 2.1.5, the Licensee committed to perform annual visual inspections of special lifting devices. These three statements

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indicate that the procedures for visual inspection for load-bearing components of cranes, slingt., and special lirting devices have been reviewed. ,

Sec' tion 2.1.7 of this report confirms that RG&E's program for maintenance of cranes fulfills Guideline 6. In Section 2.1.5, the Licensee stated that a mainte' nance program has been implemented to ensure continuing compliance in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978. In Section 2.1.6, KG&E indicated that inspection, maintenance, and repair or replacement of all other lifting devices will be performed as required by ANSI B30.9-1971. These three statements fulfill the requirements of Interim Protection Measure 6 for appropriate repair and replacement of defective components.

In Section 2.1.4, the Licensee stated that crane operators are trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976. This

- constitutes a special review of crane operator training.

b. Conclusion ,

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The Licensee's ' review of procedures, equipment, and personnel for the reactor crane fulfills all critecia of Interim Protection Measure 6.

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3. CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommen-dations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load droo could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intant of these guidelines is twpfold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. An detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at the Ginna plant can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

In addition, although RG&E is in compliance with a majority of the general guidelines, it should oe recognized that this technical evaluation has only reviewed proposed Licensee actions which are currently under development or being implemented for General Guidelines 1, 2, 5, and 6. Substantial action remains to be completed by the Licensee to fully comply with NUREG-0612, although proposed actions are reasonable and consistent with NUREG-0612 if implemented in the manner specified by the Licensee.

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l TER-C5506-357 3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) that certain sensures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of

• heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implemer.tation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is completa. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load hacdling precedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. An evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that measures have been properly implemented which ensure compliance with the staff's measures for interim protection at the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Pcwer Plant.

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4. REFERENC2S

1. NRC

" Control of Heavy Ioads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980

- NUREG-0612

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all Licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Lnads Near Spent Fuel May 17, 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to all operating reactors.

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads December 22, 1980

4. Report on Control of Heavy Imads (RG&E)

February 1, 1982

5. Telephone conversation between I. H. Sargent (FRC) and J. McCreedy (RG&E), T. West (RG&E), and M. Fitzsimmons (RG&E)

November 17, 1982

6. J. E. Maier (RG&E)

Letter to D. M. Crutchfield (NRR, ORB No. 5)

Subject:

Supplemental Report Addressing Technical Evaluation Report, dated August 19, 1982 March 2, 1983

7. J. E. Maier (RG&E)

Letter to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Icads October 12, 1983

8. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" ANSI B30.2-1976

9. American National Standards Institute

" Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978

10. American National Standards Institute

" Slings" ANSI B30.9-3971 nkun Resear

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11. Crane Manufacturers Ascociation of America

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70

12. Electric Overhead Crane Institute

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes" EOCI-61 e

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