ML20039A555
| ML20039A555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1981 |
| From: | Haroldsen R, Mays S EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Scholl R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6425, TASK-05-11.A, TASK-5-11.A, TASK-RR EGG-EA-5642, NUDOCS 8112180097 | |
| Download: ML20039A555 (10) | |
Text
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EGG-EA-5642 NOVEMBER 1981 f0k SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM, TOPIC V-ll.A, A
s> Sit ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR g yf6 ISOLATION OF HICJi AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS, R. E. GINNA N
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This is an Informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document 1
Prepated for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 Q
FIN No. A6425 66EOldaho 8112180097 811130 PDR RES PDR
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sNTERIM REPORT Accession No.
Report No. EGG-EA-5642 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)
Subject of this Document:
Systematic Evaluation Program, Topic V-11.A, Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Features for Isolation of High and Low Pressure Systeras, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Str. tion, Docket No. 50-244 Type of Document:
Informal Report Author (s):
R. O. Haroldsen S. E. Mays Dale of Document:
November 1981 d
Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Division:
R. F. Scholl, Jr., Division of Licensing This document was prepared primarily for preliminary orinternal use. it has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be e,onsidered final.
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761D01570 NHC FIN No. A6425 i
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lNTERIM REPORT 1
0130J SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC V-ll.A ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR STATION Docket No. 50-244 November 1981 R. O. Haroldsen S. E. Mays EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Y 10-28-81
ABSTRACT This SEP technical evaluation, for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station, reviews the electrical, instrumentation and control features used to isolate low pressure systems from the reactor coolant primary system.
FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the " Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)"
being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing by EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
Reliability & Statistics Branch.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization B&R 20-10-02-05, FIN A6425.
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CONTENTS 1.0 I N TR O D UC T I O N....................................................
I 2.0 CRITERIA........................................................
1 2.1 Re s idual He at Removal (RHR ). System........................
1 2.2 Emergency Core Cooling System.............................
2 2.3 Other Systems.............................................
2
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3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION.......................................
. 2 3.1 Res idual Heat Removal ( RHR) Sys tem........................
3 3.2 Safety Injection System...................................
3-3.3 Chemical and Volume Control System........................
4 4.0
SUMMARY
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5.0 REFERENCES
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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC V-ll.A ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL FEATURES FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR STATION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of tnis review is to determine if the electrical, instru-mentation, and control (El&C) features used to isolate systems with a lower pressure rating than the reactor coolant primary system are in compliance with current licensing criteria as outlined in SEP Topic V-ll.A.
Current guidance for isolation of high and low pressure systems is contained in Branch Technical Position (BTP) EICSB-3, BTP RSB-5-1, and the Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 6.3.
2.0 CRITERIA 2.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems. Isolation criteria for RHR systems contained in BTP RSB-5-1 are:
1.
The suction side must be provided with the following isolation features:
a.
Two power-operated valves in series, with position indicated in the control room, b.
The valves aust have independent and diverse interlocks to prevent opening if the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure is above the design pressure of the RHR system.
c.
The valves must have independent and diverse interlocks to ensure at least one valve closes upon an increase in RCS pressure above the design pressure of the RHR system.
2.
The discharge side must be provided with one of the following features:
a.
The valves, position indicators, and interlocks described in (1)(a) through (1)(c) above.
b.
One or more check valves in series with a normally-closed power-operated valve which has its position indicated in the control room.
If this valve is used for an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) function, the valve must open upon receipt of a safety injection signal 1
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(SIS) when RCS pressure has decreased below RHR system design pressure.
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c.
Three check valves in series.
d.
Two check valves in series, provided that both i
may be periodically checked for leak tightness and are checked at least annually.
l 2.? Emergency Core Cooling System.
Isolation criteria for ECCS are l
contained in SRP 6.3.
Isolation of ECCS to prevent overpressurization must l
meet one of the following features:
1.
One or more check valves in series with a normally-closed motor-operated valve (MOV) which is to be opened upon receipt of a SIS when RCS pressure is less than the ECCS design pressure 2.
Three check valves in series 3.
Two check valves in series, provided that both may be periodically checked for leak tightness and are checked at least annually.
2.3 Other Systems. All other low pressure systems interfacing with l
the RCS must meet the following isolation criteria from BTP EICSB-3:
1.
At least two valves in series must be provided.to isolate the system when RCS pressere is above th'e system design pressure and valve position should be provided in-the control room 2.
For systems with two MOVs, each MOV should have independent and diverse. interlocks to prevent open--
ing until RCS pressure.is below the system design j
pressure and should automatically close when RCS l
pi' essure' increases above system design pressure 3.
For systems with one check valve'and a M0V, the MOV should be interlocked to prevent opening if RCS pressure is above system design pressure and should automatically close whenever RCS pressure exceeds system design pressure.
l 3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION l
There are three systems at R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station which have a i
direct: interface with the RCS pressure boundary and have a design pressure rating of all or part of the system which is less than that of the RCS.
These systems are the Chemical and -Volume Control System (CVCS), the Safety Injection System (SIS), and the Residual Heat' Removal ~
(RHR) system.
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' 3.1 Residual Heat Removal Systein. The RHR system takes 4a suction on the RCSrloop A hot leg, circulates the water through the RHR system heat exchanger a nd discharges-to the RCS loop B cold leg.-
Two motor-operated valves yn' series provide isolation capabilities in both the suction and disch'arge lines. Each of.these MOVS has position indication in the control
. room. The inboard (closest'to the RCSJ valves are interlocked,tn prevent opening if.RCS pressure ~is above RHR system design pressure. However, both valves use the-same pressure switch and relay to provide this interlock.
Tie outboard valves have na pres:urd' interlocks but all four vahes are designed such that they physically'are ugable to open against' a' diffe'r-ential pressure of. greater'than 500 psi.' ' None of the valves will auto-matically close if RCS. pre'ssure increases above RHR system design pressure j
. durfiqRHRsystemoperation.,
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The RHR system is not' in compliance with the current licensing criteria of BTP RSB-5-1 sinci none of the isolation valves will automatically'btion close if RCS pressure exceeds RHR design pressure. Also, the outboard iso t
valves have no interlocks to prevent RHR overpressurization, and the inboard N
valve interlocks are neither diverse nor independent.
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3.2 Safety Injection System. One SIS subsystem consists of two
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accumulators pressurized wiui nitrogen with each accumulator isolated from' the RCS by a pair cf check valves. Ibere are connections upstream of each check valve that can allow them to be leak tested. A normally-open motor-operated isolation. valve upstream ~of the check valves for each accumulator has position indication in tha control. room. Each MOV is opened automati-cally, if closed, upon receipt of'a safety. injection signal.
The second SIS subsystem, consists of two loops, each supplied by a safety injection pump. Each pump discharges to the hot and cold legs of one RCS loop.
Isolation is provided by two check valves in series for each branch of the safety injection locp.- The cold leg check valves have pro-visions for-leak testing. The check valves in the lines supplying'the RCS hot leg for each SIS loop do not have provisions for leak testing. How-ever, the M0V in each hot leg is locked shut with power removed, and is not required for accident mitigation. A motor-operated isolation valve with position indication in the control room is provided in each branch of the cold let discharge lines. These valves open upon receipt of a safety injection signal, but have no interlocks preventing opening when RCS pres-sure is above SIS design pressure.
The third SIS subsystem uses the RHR system to provide low pressure water from the refueling water storage tank to the reactor vessel head (core deluge).
Isolation is provided by a M0V in series with a check valve in each of two branches. The MOVs open upon receipt of a safety l injection signal but have no interlocks to prevent opening when RCS pressure is above SIS design pressure.
The SIS is not in compliance with the current licensing criteria of a
SRP 6.3 since the MOVs for the low pressure injection lines have no inter-locks to prevent opening when RCS pressure exceeds SIS design pressure.
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3.3 Chemical and Volume Control System.
The CVCS takes water from the RCS and passes it through a regenerative heat exchanger, an orifice to reduce its pressure, and a nonregenerative heat exchanger before reducing its pressure further by the use of a pressure control valve. After filter-ing and cleanup, the water may be returned to the RCS by the use of the charging pumps, which increase the water pressure and pass it through the regenerative heat exchanger to either the hot or cold legs of the RCS or to the pressurizer auxiliary spray line.
The CVCS suction line isolation is provided by a manually-operated solenoid valve in series with three parallel solenoid-operated valves.
Each of these valves is operated from the control room and has valve posi-tion indicated. None of the valves has interlocks to prevent opening or to cutomatically close if the pressure exceeds the design rating of the low pressure portions of the system.
The CVCS discharge line isolation is provided by a common discharge line check valve and a branch check valve in each of the taree branches downstream of the common check valve. Drain fittings on the discharge line upstream of each check valve can allow the valves to be leak tested. There is no position indication available in the control room for the check valves. There are solenoid isolation valves in each discharge line branch which have position indication in the control room, but these valves have no interlocks to prevent system overpressurization.
The CVCS is not in compliance with current licensing criteria for isolation of high and low pressure systems contained in BTP EICSB-3 since the suction line solenoid-operated valves have no interlocks to prevent system overpressurization, and the discharge line check valves have no position indication available in the control room.
4.0
SUMMARY
l The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station has three systems, with a lower design pressure rating than the RCS, which are directly connected to the RCS. The i
CVCS, SIS, and RHR system do not meet current licensing criteria for isola-l tion of high and low pressure systems as specified below.
l.
The CVCS solenoid-operated valves have no pressure-related interlocks, and the discharge line check valves have no position indication available in the control room as required by BTP EICSB-3 2.
The MOVs in the low pressure SIS lines have no pressure-related interlocks required by SRP 6.3 3.
None of the RHR system isolation valves automati-cally close if RCS pressure increases above RHR system design pressure during RHR system operation, and the outboard isolation valves have no pressure-related interlocks as required by BTP RSB-5-1.
The
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interlocks for the inboard isolation valves are neither diverse nor independent.
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5.0 REFERENCES
1.
NUREG-0800, Branch Technical Positions EICSB-3, RSB-5-1: Standard Review Plan 6.3.
2.
Updated Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1.
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RG&E drawings 33013-422, -424, -425, -426, -427, -428, -432, -433, i
-434, -435, and -436.
4.
RG&E drawings 10905-280, -285, -287, -295, -296, -300, and -301.
5.
i.etter, Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. (Maier) to NRR (Crutchfield),
dated June 23, 1981.
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