ML17256B196

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10),Rochester Gas & Electric Corp,Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Draft Technical Evaluation Rept

ML17256B196
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/10/1982
From:	Hofkin T FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Clemenson F NRC
Shared Package
ML17256B195	List: ML17256B196
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C5257-444, TER-C5257-444-DRFT, NUDOCS 8208240344
Download: ML17256B196 (39)

Text

(DRAFT)

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS ic-lo)

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ROBERT E, GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCDOCKETNO. 50-244 FRC PROJECT C5257 NRC TAC NO. 07992 FRC ASSIGNMENT 3 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC43-79-118 FRC TASK 444 Prepared by T. Boffin Author:

Franklin Research Center 20th and Race Street FRC Group Leader: X. sazgent Philadelphia, PA 19103 Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D,C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: P Clemenson al August 10, 1982 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

ljII Franklin Research Center A'Division of The Frankiin Institute

'nre Benjamin Franklin Parkway. Phila.. Pa. l 9103 (2)5) 448- l 000 8208240344 820819 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P , PDR

e I

\

l ~ f a

,I TER-C525 7-4 4 4 CONTENTS Section Title Pacae 1 ZN TROD UCT ZON 1.1 Purpose of Review 1 1.2 Generic Background ~ 1 1.3 Plant-Specif ic Background 2 2 EVALUATZON AND RECOMMENDATZONS ~ 4 2.1 General Guidelines ~ ~ ~ 4

'C 2.2 Znterim Protection Measures. 17

,t e J

K 3 CONCLUDZNG

SUMMARY

20 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 20 3.2 Znterim Protection . 23 3.3 Summary. 24 REFERENCES 25

~

J'.':

Jii FranMin Research Center A c&nsian or Tbe Franl4n Institute he ' e ~ w p' ' ~, lh h>> ~ ~ "vt ~ t>>)~h >>e>> ~lh >>her>>>> r7 . I'ep h ~~ >> ~ p

~ ~ ~ ~ b TERM5257-44 4 r ~

Nllllltet Title Pacae 3.1 Ginna Nuclear Power Plant/NUREG-0612 Compliance Matrix . . . . . . . . . 21 iV jb"l~

j FranMin Research J".IJ

~

Center A Divisibbn oi The Frbbnklin insetbbte

S I > ~

TER-C5257.-44 4 FOREWORD Tnis Tecnnical.Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The techn'ical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

Mr. T. Hofkin and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with NESTEC Services, Inc.

~'".IllJ Franklin Research Center A Division of The Fsenefin Insesute

S y

I ~

~

~

~ I TER-C5257-444 I g

1. INTRODUCTION 1..1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load-handling policy and procedures at the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's (RGaE) Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation was performed witn the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1),

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

. The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective< achieved through a set of general guidelines identifiea in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling

., iJ.")~J Franklin Research Center A Onisw ol The Franklin Insotute

TER-C5257-444 systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their proba-rsility or failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in whicn they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences,'ither (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate tnat tne potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense-in-depth, and the intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

1. provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system

2. define safe load travel paths, through procedures and operator training, so that, to tne extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment

3. provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5

, of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 PLANT-SPECXPIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter (3] to RGaE, the Licensee for'. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at the Ginna plant, evaluate

'."'t Franklin Research Center A Ontston ol The Frenk!in tnstrttrte

TER-C5257-44 4 these provisions with respect to "the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On February 1, 1982, RG6E responded

[4] to this request.

v \

AAf

~J00'ranklin l

Research Center A Divison of The Frrrnkfin Insrrnrre

'ERM5257-444

~

~

2~ EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The evaluation of load handling at the Ginna plant is divided into two categories. These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1 and the recommended interim measures of Section 5.3 of NUREG-0612.

Applicable guidelines are referenced in each category. Conclusions and recommen-dations are provided in tne summary for each guideline.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-inMepth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

, o Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) o 'Guideline 6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be .satisfied by all overhead handling systems and procedures used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damag~afe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guiaelines have been satisfied, and evaluation of this verification, are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.1 Overhead Hea Load Handlin S stems

a. 'ummar 'of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated in the review of overhead handling systems that all cranes, jibs; and monorails are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612, .with the exception of those excluded from compliance by the existence of a redundant system and administrative procedures.

J'.Ill. Franklin Research Center h Dition el The Ffanklin Insatute

TERM5257-44 4 b., Evaluation I

As discussed. in Section 1.2, the NRC objective is to achieve a defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads, which is to be accomplished in two distinct phases:

cranes and lifting devices, as well as establishment of safe travel pa'ths which avoid irradiated fuel and safe shutdown equipment, as means to assure reliable operation of handling systems.

single-failure-proof crane criteria; or installation of mechanical or electrical interlocks; or performance of analyses that substantiate the Licensee's contention that damage to irradiated fuel will not exceed limits for criticality or release of radioactivity, or that damage to dual safe shutdown systems will not result in a loss of required safety functions.

~

The intent of the first phase of NUREG-0612 implementation is to ensure that all handling devices operating with heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated

. fuel or safe, shutdown equipment meet the requirements of the general guidelines, including satisfying the criteria for lifting device and crane design, operation, and maintenance, and development of safe load pathways. Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 provides general guidelines for safe load handling to 'reduce the potential for load drops. These guidelines must be satisfied even if a single-failure-proof crane is provided or evaluations show that the consequences of

'postulated load 'drops are within established limits. In addition, these guidelines must be satisfied for the load-handling systems identified by the Licensee regardless of the fact that detailed structural analyses, interlocks,

,operating procedures, technical specifications, or physical separation of redundant equipment may indicate that a system safety function could continue following a load-handling accident. The only load-handling systems that can be excluded from the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 are those for which it can be deraonstrated that (1) adequate physical separation is provided between the load path and safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel; (2) the capacity of the crane is not sufficient to lift a NUREG-0612- defined heavy load and thus the crane could not be used to lift a heavy load; or (3) the handling device has a sole-purpose lift function and a load drop would damage only the lifted equipment.

JL'III~ Franklin Research Center A CHnsion ot ihe Ftsnkhn Institute

I TER-C5257-444

c. Conclusions and Recommendations The Licensee should identify overhead handling systems excluded from compliance with NUREG-0612 and verify that such exclusion was based on one or more of the following:

l. No safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel is located in close proximity or sufficient physical separation exists.

2. The systems are sole-purpose systems and are used only when the equipment is out of service.

3. Heavy loads are not carried by the excluded system.

2.1.2 Safe Load'aths Guideline 1 NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 1 "Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.-

Deviations from defined load patns.should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that, for all monorail and jib overhead handling systems, safe load paths are limited by the physical capabilities of the system itself. For the 100/20-ton containment crane, the 40/5-ton auxiliary building crane, and the 7.5-ton screenhouse crane, plant operating procedure

, A-3.305 addresses safe lifting procedures. In addition, the Licensee stated

. that some systems are eliminated from the scope of Guideline 1 by the existence of one or more redundant safety trains.

b. Evaluation

~

The Licensee's response regarding monorails and jib cranes is satisfactory, since these devices are limited by the physical capabilities of the respective Jf.~L'ranklin Research Center A On<sion of The Frenkhn Insonne

TER-C5257-44 4 systems. Elimination of handling systems due to redundant safety trains, however, does not meet the intent of Guideline 1.

Review of operating procedure A-1305 indicates that safe load paths have not been marked on the floors, although some paths have been sketched on equipment layout drawings and several are defined in procedures. In lieu of permanent markings on the floor, the Licensee may consider alternatives which meet the intent of NRC criteria by providing suitable visual aids, such as tape, temporary stanchions or inarkers, or other equivalent ineasures to assist the operator.

No information has been provided by the Licensee to verify that deviations from established load paths require written alternatives that must be approved ay the plant safety review committee.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations The Licensee partially complies with Guideline 1 for the Ginna plant.. "In order to comply fully with the criteria of this guideline, the Licensee should perform the following:

1. Provide suitable visual aids to assist the crane operator in the areas where loads are handled by all equipment that is not excluded from compliance with'NUREG-0612, as specified in 2.l.l.c.

2. Define all safe load paths in procedures.

'. Incorporate safe load paths into equipment layout drawings.

4.'erify that deviations from established load paths require written alternatives to.be approved oy the plant safety review committee.

2.1.3 Load Handlin Procedures Guideline 2 NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 2 "Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should include: identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

t

'll FranMin Research Center

" A DiViJJOn Ol The FJJJnkiin InSJ1tJJte

'ERM5257-444

~

I

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A detailed list of loads and procedures governing the handling of each load, as well as a list of the required equipment for each load movement, has been supplied by the Licensee.

b. Evaluation The procedures supplied by the Licensee are very general and do not include the necessary information specified by this guideline, such as inspection and acceptance criteria required before movement of a load, the steps and proper .sequence to be followed in handling the load, and a full.

description of the safe load path.

c. Conclusion and Recommendation The Ginna plant does not comply with Guideline 2. Load-handling procedures should clearly identify inspection and acceptance criteria, steps,

~ and proper sequence, and clearly define the safe load paths for the various heavy loads listed.

2.1.4 ~ Crane 0 erator Trainin Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 3 )

"Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance witn Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 830.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'5]."

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Tne Licensee stated that operators are trained and qualified in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976 without exception.

b. Evaluation

'Since the Licensee will train operators in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3, it can be expected that they will conduct operations in accordance with the requirements of that chapter.

~J's~J Franklin Research Center A Division of The Fsenkfin Insofufe

TER-C5257-444 l ~ 'I t ion

~

c. Conc lus ion and Recommenda i

RGaE complies with this guideline.

2.1.5 S ecial Liftin Devices Guideline 4 NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 4 "Special lifting devices should satisfy. the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

'Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'6]. Tnis standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on cnaracteristics of the crane which will be used. This is stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and.of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4)] " ~

J

~ ~

4

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that special lifting devices are to undergo a comparison analysis to determine the extent of compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978.

b. Evaluation Insufficient information has been provided by RG&E to determine compliance with Guideline 4. Since it is difficult to strictly interpret compliance of existing special lifting device design with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, the information in the succeeding paragraphs is provided to assist the Licensee in detemining the extent of compliance.

Since several sections of ANSI 14.6-1978 do not contain requirements concerning load-handling reliability, it is necessary to address only those sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 that are directly related to load-handling reliability .of the lifting devices. Therefore, the following sections need not be addressed by the Licensee: Scope (Section 1), Definitions (2),. Design Consiaerations to Minimize Decontamination Efforts (3.4), Coatings (3.5),

Lubrication (3.6), Inspector's Responsibilities (4.2), and Fabrication Considerations (4.3) .

i'JIJ Fran}din Research Center A Dnision oi The Fi asklin Insoiutc

TERM5257-444

c. Conclusion and Recommendation RG&E complies with this guideline.

2.1.5 S ecial Liftin Devices Guideline 4 NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 4 "Special lifting devices should satisfy. the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978,

'Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'6]. Tnis standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.3..1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on cnaracteristics of the crane which will be used. This is stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the inte'rvening components of the special handling deVice (NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4) ] ~"

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that special lifting devices are to undergo a comparison analysis to determine the extent of compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978.

b. Evaluation f

Insufficient information has been provided by RGaE to determine compliance with Guideline 4. Since it is difficult to strictly interpret compliance of existing special lifting device design with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, the information in the succeeding paragraphs is provided to assist the Licensee in detemining the extent of compliance.

Since several sections of ANSI 14.6-1978 do not contain requirements concerning load-handling reliability, it is necessary to address only those sections of ANSI N14.6-1978 that are directly related to load-handling reliability of the lifting devices. Therefore, the following sections need not be addressed by the Licensee: Scope (Section 1), Definitions (2) Design g Consiaerations to Minimize Decontamination Efforts (3.4), Coatings (3.5),

Lubrication (3.6), Inspector's Responsibilities (4.2), and Fabrication Considerations (4.3).

~J'~0 Frankiin Research Center A Diction ot The Ftank5n Institute h

'I C'ER-C5257-444

~ ~ ~ ~

I Other sections, however, identify important information that should be readily available or requirements to which the Licensee should adhere in ordex to adequately substantiate the load-handling reliability of the special lifting devices. Although this standard did not exist when lifting devices were designed and manufactured, it is not anticipated that obtaining information or complying with the standard's requirements will create undue hardship, since the criteria s

of the standard are akin to established industry practices; this standaxd merely coaifies such practices for special lifting devices. These special lifting devices are used for infrequent lifts of the plant's largest components, generally in the direct vicinity of irradiated fuel; this makes the reliability of design, fabrication, and continued testing of those special lifting devices a relatively sensitive concern for both the Licensee and the NRC.

A determination of compliance with Guideline 4 requires that the following specific sections of ANSI N14.6 be addressed:

Section 3.1:

a~ limitations on the use of the lifting cievices (3.1.1)

b. identification of critical components and definition of critical characteristics (3.1.2) c~ signed stress analyses which demonstrate appropriate margins of safety,(3.1.3)

d. indication of permissible repair procedures (3.1.4)

I' Section ~ 2~

a~ use of stress design factors of 3 for minimum yield strength and 5 for ultimate strength (3.2.1)

b. similar stress design factors for load bearing pins, links, and .adapters (3.2.4) c~ slings used comply with ANSI B30.9-1971 (3.2.5) h s d. subjecting materials to dead weight testing or Charpy impact, testing (3. 2. 6)

Section '3.3:

a. consideration of problems related to possible lamellar tearing (3.3.1)

b. design shall assure even distribution of the load (3.3.4)

c. retainers fitted for load carrying components which may become inadvertently disengaged (3.3.5)

d. verification that remote actuating mechanisms securely engage or disengage (3.3.6)

>LUO Franklin Research Center A Divison ol The FsenMin Insonne

~

TERM5257-.444

~

Section 4.1:

ao verify selection and use of material (4.1.3)

b. compliance with fabrication practices (4.1.4) c~ qualification of welders, procedures, and operators (4.1.5) d~ provisions for a quality assurance program (4.1.6)

e. provisions for identification and certification of equipment (4.1.7),

verification that materials or services are produced under appropriate controls and qualifications (4.1.9).

Section 5.1:

a ~ implementation of a periodic testing schedule and a system to indicate the date of expiration (5.1.3) bo provisions for establishing operating procedures (5.1.4) c ~ identification of subassemblies which may be exchanged (5.1.5) de suitable markings (5.1.6)

e. maintaining a full record of history (5.1.7)

f. conditions for removal from service (5.1.8)

~

Section 5.2:

a. load test to 150% and appropriate inspections prior to initial use (5.2.1)

b. qualification of replacement parts (5.2.2)

Section 5.3:

a~ satisfying annual load test or inspection requirements (5.3.1)

b. testing following major maintenance (5.3.2) c~ testing after application of substantial stresses (5.3.4) d~ inspections by operating (5.3.6) and non-operating or maintenance personnel (5.3.7).

c. Conclusion and Recommendation A conclusion regarding compliance with this guideline must be deferred until the Licensee completes the analysis of their special lifting devices.

However, this analysis should address the specific items identified in this independent evaluation.

2.1.6 'Liftin Devices Not S eciall Desi ned Gui'deline 5 NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.1 5 "Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and usea 'in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, 'Slings'7].

However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum

. of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling shouid be in terms of the 'static load'hat produces the maximum static and dynamic load, Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings snould be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

~J'ij." Franklin Research Center A Dinnon or The Fsangin Insotute

s TERW5257-444

a. Summar of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Tne Licensee stated that inspection of wire rope and nylon slings is governect by RG&E operating procedure MHE-1000-1. This procedure defines proper sling use and the inspection requirements which determine when slings are to be removed from service.

b. Evaluation Insufficient information has been provided by RG&E to determine compliance-with Guideline 5. No information has been provided to verify that sling use will comply with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971. No information is available to determine whether dynamic loads have been considered as noted in the guideline.

II

c. Conclusion and Recommendations Determination of compliance with Guideline 6 must be deferred until RGaE provides specific information concerning:

l. Installation and use of slings (in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971)

2. Selection of slings. (based upon the sum of the static and maximum dynamic loads)

3. Sling marking and sling restrictions," where appropriate.

2.1.7 Cranes Ins ection Testin and Maintenance Guideline 6 NUREG-0612

'Section 5.1.1 6)

"The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'ith the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PNR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and. is generally not accessible during power opera-tion. ANSII B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed aaily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

J~.lf Franklin Research Center A Dunstan af The Ftenttbts tnsatute

~ s I

~ ~

~ ~

TER-C5257-444

a. Summa of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that procedures for inspection, testing, and maintenance of certain jibs and cranes meet the intent of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, with the exception of 1) operational testing, 2) rated load test and documentation, 3) written maintenance procedures, and 4) written procedures for adjustments and repairs. The Licensee has stated that procedures will be developed and incorporated into the inspection, testing, and maintenance programs to satisfy ANSI B30.2-1976 for exceptions 1, 3, and 4.

Regarding exception 2 (rate load tests and documentation), the Licensee stated that the auxiliary building crane was not load-tested prior to initial use. It was, however, load-tested prior to a spent fuel cask lift in 1973.

This crane has not been significantly altered or repaired.

The containment crane was significantly altered during construction.

After the modifications were complete, the crane was tested; however, no documentation of this test is available. The crane has safely lifted the lower internals (approximately 98 tons) .

b. Evaluation The requirements of this guideline will be substantially satisfied at the Ginna plant when operational tests, written maintenance procedures, and a written procedure for adjustments and repairs are developed and incorporated into plant procedures to coraply with criteria of ANSI 830.2-1976, Chapter 2-2'or all equipment that was not excluded zrom compliance with NUREG-0612.

It is noted \

that a rated load test is not required by ANSI B30.2-1976, although it is recommended. In the case of the containment crane, the fact

'that it has been used to lift 'I the lower internals provides a degree of assurance equivalent to 'that provided by the rated load test for the routine lifts 'of less than 40 tons. The. upper internals lift can be considered, on the basis of frequency, to be similar to a special lift as outlined in ANSI B30.2-1776, Section"'2-3.2.1.1, for which a rated load test is not required.

In the case of the auxiliary building crane, a rated load test has been JM Franklin Research Center.

A Dnnsion or The Franklin Insntute

~ ~

TERM5257-44 4 y ~

conducted although the Licensee has not specified the test load or the relationsnip of the current rating to that test load. Considering the foregoing, no further action is considered necessary with respect to rated load testing.

c. Conclusion and Recommendations The Ginna plant will comply with Guideline 6 upon implementation of proposed revisions to inspection, testing, and maintenance programs.

2.1.8 Crane Desi n Guideline 7 NUREG-0612 Section.5.1.1 7 "Tne crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes, 'nd of CMAA-70, 'Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes'8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI 830.2 or CMKA-70

. may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a. Surrma of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that both the containment building and the auxiliary

', builcting cranes were designed and built prior to the issuance of Ci~-70. Both cranes have undergone a mecnanical and structural design comparison between

'eir original'design specification, EOC1-61, and CMAA-70. The results of this comparison, performed by the Whiting Corporation, identified the following as the only items associated with the containment .building crane that are not in compliance with @RA-70:

1. Tne sheave material is currently ASTM Grade A48-41 Class 35 cast iron, while CMAA-70 requires that sheaves be made of steel or ASTM grade A48-64 Class 40 cast iron.

2. Tne extra reduction gear durability rating is exceeded by 30%.

3. The auxiliary hoist motor horsepower and torque rating is exceeded by 4.3%.

4. The allowable wheel load is exceeded. by 1%.

5. The longj.tudinal stiffener is not properly located and does not meet moment of inertia requirement.

'- ~Jll(l FranMin Research Center A Daision ot Tbe Fiaol4n insoiuie

1 TER-C525 7-4 4 4 "i

r 6. The bridge end truck drop due to axle failure is 1.875 inches while the maximum drop allowed by CMAA-70 is 1 inch.

r Regarding the auxiliary building crane, the Whiting comparison stated t.t 7 that, in general, the crane meets the present CMAA-70 specifications, with the following exceptions:

1. The platform requires reinforcement of the toe plate to satisfy CMAA-70.

~ I r

shaft couplings are made of'lass

~

2. The sheaves and 30 cast iron, while CMAA-70 requires use of Class 40 cast. iron.

Tn addition, .several other discrepancies were noted between the require-ments of ANSI B30.2-1976 and the actual design of the auxiliary building crane,

,~

'I including lubricating points, footwalks,'learances, resistors, hooks, and warning devices.

r'I I

b.. Evaluation gh The cranes at the Ginna plant substantially satisfy the criteria of this guideline on the basis that they were procured to EOCZ-61 speci'fications, and a subsequent comparison with requirements of CMAA-70 has identified few

~

s discrepancies.

For the sheaves and shaft couplings of both cranes, CMAA-70 specifies that the material should be steel or AS'rade A48-64 or later, Class 40 cast iron or its equivalent. The specification in CMAA-70 of a later, higher

'ss tensile strength material for the sheaves and coupling is similar to the r

rr specification of AS'-36 in lieu of A-7 structural material and represents

'.I

\' recognition of industrial progress in the area of material properties. The use of a similar but lower tensile strength material, of composition based on ASTM standards and with appropriate properties used for design calculations, is judged to result in crane components or structures with overall factors-of-safety and consequent load-handling reliability equivalent to that produced with highe'r tensile strength material.

s

~

s

. Current design of the containment building crane's auxiliary hoist motor, and allowable wheel loading meet the intent of this guideline since variations t FranMin Research Center JJll A Dhsson of The Ftenstffn Insetute

TERM5257-44 4 t ~ ~

associated with these items are nominal. In addition, present design of the bridge end truck raeets the intent of- CMAA-70 and EOCl-61 to prevent an excessive drop of the crane, thereby minimizing the effects of a drop due to axle failure.

Although not in verbatira corapliance with CMAA-70 requirements concerning location and moraent of inertia, the use of longitudinal stiffeners in the containraent building crane is judged to meet the intent of this guideline.

Longitudinal stiffeners are used, in conjunction with transverse stiffeners or diaphragms, to allow the use of thin web plates (i.e., web plates with large n/t ratios where h ~ web depth, and t = web thickness.) CMAA-70 allows for h/t ratios of up to 188 for girders with no longitudinal stiffener, and of up to 376 for girders with a single longitudinal stiffener. Here such a single stiffener used in the Ginna containraent crane, a raoment of inertia about the web face of approximately 1.8 in would be required. The Ginna design eraploys two longitudinal stiffeners, each with a moment of inertia of approximately 0.46 in about the web face, in conjunction with a web h/t ratio of 236. Although judged to meet the intent of this guideline, the Licensee should provide suitable docuraentation to justify the location and moment of inertia of the installed stiffeners.

In the case of the reduction gear durability rating, it appears that, although identified as a deficiency by the Licensee, the requirements of CMAA-70 may also be satisfied. As noted in the Licensee's. submittal, the current gear durability is rated at 37.3 hp. Informal discussions conducted with th'e Licensee indicate that the main hoist motor has been replaced with a 5-hp raotor. According to'2&A-70, Section 4.5.3, the actual horsepower imposed 'on the gearing should be considered to be the rated horsepower of the hoist motor (5-hp) multiplied by a factor of 0.75 (assuming Service Class A-1) . This value (3.75-hp) is considerably less than the allowed durability calculated by the Licensee (37.3-hp) and therefore satisfies the requirements of this guideline.

The auxiliary building crane satisfies the criteria of this guideline on the basis of the satisfactory comparison by Hhiting Corporation. Discrepan-IJ'tic Franklin Research Center h Ohtston of The Ftanktin Institute

s TER-C5257-444

~ ~ I cies noted with ANSI B30.2-1976 are not of consequence to the load-handling

-'s n

I reliability of this crane.

s ~

)

ri

c. Conclusion e

The Ginna auxiliary building crane complies with Guideline 7. The reactor C

') building crane substantially complies with this guideline; however, the n)

.'s Licensee should be ready to provide suitable documentation to justify the

'I'l location and moment of inertia of the actual longitudinal stiffeners.

~ y s

2~ 2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented s

at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy s

loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of .the six interim measures of the report consist of 1

Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline s

3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1; Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

s Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

\

,1 2.2.1 Technical S ecifications'nterim Protection Measure 1. NUREG-0612 "Licenses for all operating reactors not having, a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

'Crane Travel Spent Fuel Storage Building,'or PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, 'Crane Travel<'or BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of

'NUREG-0612].,"

!llltl Franklin Research Center A Onssion o( The Fsenjesn Insotuse

'wpapw v uv+ " n ', s' ss Wt PMn fl. Ph . ~ ~ 8 '

le% ~ Lilt

~ I f 6 I ~ ) 'Bd5% \v TER-C5257-44 4

a. Evalua tion A review of the Licensee's technical specifications indicates that two specifications currently restrict movements of loads and handling systems over the spent fuel pool. Technical Specification 3.11.3 prohibits movement of the auxiliary building crane trolley over spent fuel in the spent fuel pool storage racks. Technical Specification 3.11.6 prohibits movement of the spent fuel ~

shipping cask by the auxiliary building crane pending completion of the spent fuel cask drop analysis and a review of crane design to determine single-failure-proofness. Although it appears that these specifications prohibit the movement of loads over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool, the Licensee should verify this fact or modify the current specifications to prohibit movement of all heavy loads over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel area.

b. Conclusion and Recommendations Insufficient information has been provided to clearly determine compliance'ith this interim measure. The Licensee should review and determine whether current technical specifications meet the intent of this guideline.

2.2;2 Administrative Controls Znterim Protection Measures 2 3 4 and 5 NUREG-0612 Sections 5.3 2 -5.3 5 "Pzocedural or administrative measures [including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of 'evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0612]."

a. 'valuation Tne. specific requirements for load-handling administrative controls are contained in. NUREG-0612, Section 5. 1. 1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The Licensee's compliance witn these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

~JL'l1ll FranMin Research Center A Divison ol The FtlnMin Insecure

ER-C525 7<<44 4 r ~ ~ I

b. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance with these administrative controls are contained in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this report.

2.2.3 Special Review for Hea Loads Handled Over the Core Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612 Section 5.3 6

"...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual ~

inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar .with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."

'a. Evaluation Conclusion and Recommendations The Licensee has made no statements or conclusions regarding this interim protection measure. The Licensee should report the completion of the special review identified 'in this interim measure.

III!(IJ Franklin Research Center A Division ol The Franklin insatute

~ ~ \ ~

v t

TER-C5257-44 4 3~ CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

This summary is provided to consolidate the conclusions and recommenda-tions of Section 2 and to document the overall evaluation of the nandling of heavy loads at the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. It is divided into two sections, one dealing witn general provisions for load handling at nuclear power plants (NUBEG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and the other with staff recommen-dations for interim protection, pending complete implementation of the guidelines of NUHEG-0612 (NUREG>>0612, Section 5.3) . In each case, recommen-dations are made for additional Licensee action and, where appropriate, for additional NRC staff action.

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING Tne NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage safe shutdown systems. Compliance with these guidelines is necessary to ensure that load-handling system design, administrative controls, and operator training and qualification are such that the possibility of a load drop is appropriately small for the critical functions and potential consequences of failures of cranes at nuclear power plants. These guidelines are partially

'satisfied at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This conclusion is presented in 0

tat>ular form as Table 3.1. Specific recommendations for achieving full compliance with these guidelines are provided as follows:

'Guideline Recommendations

a. Clearly mark safe load paths using suitable visual aids.

b. Define safe load paths in procedures.

c. Clearly show safe load paths on equipment layout drawings.

d~ Verify that deviations from established load paths require written alternatives that are approved by the plant safety review committee.

~A

'IU( Franklin Research Center A Division of The Ftenttfin Institute

Table 3.1 Glnna Nuclear Pover Plant/NUREG-0612 Cospilance Hatrlx Weight Inter i>a Inter la or Guideline I Cuidellne 2 Culdel inc 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Culdellne 6 Cubdel Inc I Heasure I Heasure 6 n A 0 ra I d Capacity

~t Safe P

IA>ad tl P d Crane Operator

~TI I Special LI f ting P I * ~PIP Crane

~dl Test tt ~OI Technical

~IIII tt Special dtt tt n 0> 1 CIHT Bu I ld lng fr> Jib 10 n

PER Hatch p n>

Covers and PP n> Sling asseebly 4.8 P N 2 CIHT Bu I ld lng Crane 100/20 C RCP Parts and Sling Rssesbly 1.1 N N I Upper Intervals and Llfting VI Fixture 215 P APV Head and l.iftlng Fixture 37 ~ 5 N N Ix>ver Internals and I.ifttng Fixture gl 5 N N Floor Sections and Sling Asses>>ly 9.8 P N RCP Hotoi and I.I t ting Fixture 30 N C ~ Licensee actions cosply>>tth HURtG-0612 Guidelines.

N ~ Licensee actions do not cosply>>tth NUREG-0612 Guidelines.

H t.lcensee has proposed revisions/s>odlflcatlons designed to conpiy>>>tth HUREG-0612 Guidelines.

I ~ Insuf tlclent Intornatton provided by'the Licensee.

P ~ Licensee Infurnatlon Indicates partial coepllance.

-- ~ Nut applicable.

Ln I

a ~ ~ 1 d

'J C~

C Table 3.1 iCont.)

Melght Inter la inter la or Guideline" 1 Guldel lne 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 6 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guldel lne 7 Heasure 1 Measure 6

~ rD

~P lh rs Capacity

~tons Safe Load P tt P d Crane Operator

~PI I Special Litting S I ~dll Crane - Test

~dl tl C~IS I Technical

~S* Ill tl'tt*tl Special

3. Auxiliary 0ui idling Crane r0/5 C oh S rs PS D rD allR Pusps and Sling Assenbly 2.3 P N Cosponent Cooling Pusps and Sling As scab 1y 1~2 P N Menovable Ploor and I Sl lng Assenbly 2.i P N hJ Nev Puel I

Shipping Cask and Sling Assesbly 325 P N N Transfer Canal Gate and Sling Assesbly 0.9 P N N Screenhouse Crane 7.5 C Service Mater 2 ' N Pusp SW Puup Hotor 1 2 N Pire Pusp Hotor 1.2 N N SWP Check 1.3 N Valves SWP isolation 0 5 N Valves

TER-C5257-444

<>c e< n ~

Guideline Recommendations Verify compliance with guideline requirements.

(The Ginna plant complies with this guideline.)

a. Review actual design and faorication of all special lifting devices and evaluate all differences with respect to the

'f requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and the stress design factor this guideline.

b. Verify the existence of programs that satisfy the requirements of Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 for all special lifting devices.

a. Verify that slings are installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971.

b. Verify that selection of slings includes consideration of the a maximum dynamic loads, including suitable markings; slings g~

restricted to use on only certain cranes should be marked to so indicate.

The Ginna plant will comply with this guideline when appropriate revisions have been implemented.

(The Ginna plant complies with this guideline.)

3 2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures that should be .initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of neavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specific

=-measures include: the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2; 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section S.l.l; a review of load-handling'rocedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. Evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that 09I) Franklin Research Center

~ A Division of The Frenk5n fnsosofe a ~ e s>> e~ w <<T I I+ J ~ t h r w ~ 8 w 8- rw ~

~ ~

< ~

TER-C5257-44 4

~ l ~ <, P the following actions are necessary to ensure that the staff's measures for interim protection at the Ginna plant are taken:

Interim Measure Recommendation Verify that plant technical specifications prohibit movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool or implement the technical specification identified in the interim protection measure.

2,3,5 Implement the recommendations concerning Guidelines 1, 2, and 6 identified in Section 3.1.

(The Ginna plant complies with this interim protection measure.)

Complete the special review of procedures, equipment, and personnel qualifications for the handling of heavy loads over the core.

3. 3 SUiiRL The NRC's general guidelines and interim protection measures established in NUREG-0612 have not been fully satisfied at RG&E's Ginna plant. The Licensee's response indicates compliance with crane operator training and requirements, and crane design. Guidelines for safe load paths, "'ualification and crane inspection, testing and maintenance require few items to be resolved for. full compliance. Several items, however, must be resolved before compliance can be determined for load-handling procedures, and for special and

~"

non-special lifting devices. Licensee action is also required for compliance with the interim protection measures.

<'. i hFranMin Research Dmson ot The Center Ftoni5n Insstute

~a ~

TER-C5257-444

~ ~I ~~ s ~

4~ REFERENCES

1. NRC "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 ~

N OREG-0 612

2. V. Stello, Jr. '(NRC)

Letter to all Licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel 17 May 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to all operating reactors.

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads 22 December 1980

4. Report on Control of Heavy Loads (RG&E) 1 February 1982

5. American National Standards Institute

'Overhead. and Gantry Cranes" ANSI B30.2-1976

6. American National Standards Institute "Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978 7~ American National Standards Institute "Slings" ANSI B30 9-1971

8. ~

Crane Manufacturers Association of America "Specifications for Electric Overhead TraVelling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CAELA-70

9. Electric Overhead Crane Institute "Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes" EOCI-61

<fill>>

auuuf FranMin Research Center

'  %+son of The Frenkhn Inse(use

~F 1

~ I +0 ~ I)