ML20082J717

Proposed Tech Spec Change to Allow Plant Operation W/O Forced Recirculation Flow

ML20082J717
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/28/1983
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082J710	List: ML20082J708 ML20082J717
References
TAC-53306, TAC-53307, NUDOCS 8312020288
Download: ML20082J717 (9)

Text

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ATTACHMENT 1 MIC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1

. REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE ALLOWING PLANT OPERATION WITHOUT FORCED RECIRCULATION The proposed changes to Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Opoerating License DPR-57) would be incorporated as folicws:

Remove Page Insert Page 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-22 3.6-22 8312020288 831128 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P PDR

4 LIMITING C0tOITIONS FOR OPERATION SLRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.I. Jet Pumps (Continued)

2. The indicated value of core flow rate varies from the value derived from loop flow treasurements by more than 10%.

3. The diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure reading on any individual jet pump varies from the mean of all jet pump differential pressures by more than 10%.

3.6.J. Recirculation Pump Speeds 4.6.J. Recirculation Pump Speeds

1. Core thermal power shall Recirculation pump speeds not exceed 1% of rated shall be recorded at least thermal power without forced once per day.

recirculation for greater than 30 minutes. If forced recirculation cannot be restored within 30 minutes, place the reector mode switch in the shutdown position.

2. Operation with a single recirculation pump is permitted for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless-the recirculation pump is sooner made operable. If the pump cannot be made operable, the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. Following one pump operation the discharge valve of the low speed pump may not be opened unless the speed of the faster pump is less than 50% of its rated speed.

K. Structural Integrity of Primary K. Structural Integrity of Primary System Boundary System Boundary The structural integrity of the A preservice inspection of primary system boundary shall be accessible components listed in maintained at the level required Table 4.6-1 will be conducted

> to assure safe operation through- before initical fuel loading to out the life of the unit. The establish a preservice base for reactor shall be maintained in a later inspections. The non-Cold Shutdown Condition until destructive inspections listed each indication of a defect has in Table 4.6-1 shall be been investigated and evaluated. performed as specified. The results obtained from compliance with this specification will be evaluated after 5 years and the conclusions of this evaluation

, will be reviewed with the NRC.

3.6-10

BASES FOR LIMITING C0tOITIONS FOR OPERATING AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6.I Jet Pumps (Continued)

A nozzle-riser system failure could also generate the coincident failure of a jet pump body; however,the converse is not true. The lack of any substantial stress in the jet pump body makes failure impossible without an initial nozzle-riser cystoin failure.

3.6.J_ Recirculation Pump Speeds An evaluation was not provided for ECCS performance during reactor operation with one recirculation loop out-of-service. Therefore, continuous reactor operation under such conditions should not be permitted until the necessary analyses have been performed, evaluated and determined acceptable. The reactor may, however, operate for periods up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with one recirculation loop out-of-service.

This short time period permits corrective action to be taken and minimizes unnecessary shutdowns which is consistent with other Technical Specifications. During this period of time the reactor will be operated within the restrictions of the thermal analysis and will be protected from fuel damage resulting from anticipated 4

transients.ta)

An evaluation has been provided regarding reactor operations above 1%

pow 9r with both recirculation loops out of service.(a) This analysis shows that all operational accidents and transients for the natural circulation mode are bounded by the current FSAR analyses.

Power operations without forced recirculation are restricted to 30 minute intervals to preclude the possibilty of thermal stratification in the lower plenum of the reactor pressure vessel. This time interval is of sufficient duration to allow for an attempted restart of one or both recirculation pumps following a trip of both pumps.

(a) General Electric " Power Operation of the Hatch 1 and 2 Reactors Without Forced Recirculation," NED0-30059 3.6-22

ATTACHMENT 2 MlC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING. LICENSE NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE ALLOWING PLANT OPERATION WITHOUT FORCED RECIRCULATION The proposed changes to Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License NPF-5) would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 4-1 3/4 4-1 B 3/4 4-1 B 3/4 4-1

4 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 -RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

^

RECIRCULATION LOOPS m ,

I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.1 Two reactor coolant recirculation loops shall be in operation with each recirculation pump operating and the pump discharge valves OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

. ACTION:

a.- With one recirculation loop not in operation, operation may continue; restore both loops to operation within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT '

SHJTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. l With no recirculation loops in operation for a period exceeding 30 1 minutes, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

T

. SLRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.1.1 .Each pump ' discharge valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by cycling

- each valve through at.least one complete cycle of full travel:

.; a. Each 'startup* prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 25% of RATED THERMAL l POWER, and

b. During eadi COLD SHUTDOWN which exceeds 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />,* l

- *If not performed within the previous.31 days.

HATCH-UNIT 2 3/4 4-1 4

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i 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

l BASES l

3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM  !

Operation ' for longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with a reactor core coolant recirculation loop inoperable is prohibited until an evaluation of the performance of the ECCS during one loop operation has been performed, evaluated, and determined to be acceptable. An evaluation has been performed for reactor gpgrations in Conditions 1 and 2 with both recirculation loops out of . service.tal This analysis shows that all operational accidents and transients 'for the natural circulation mode are bounded by the current FSAR analyses. Power operations without forced recirculation are restricted to 30 minute intervals ~ to preclude the possibility of thermal stratification in the lower plenum of the reactor pressure vessel. This time interval is of sufficient duration to allow for an attempted restart of one or both recirculation pumps following a trip of both pumps.

An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does present a hazard in case of a design basis accident by increasing the blowdown area and eliminating the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable.

In order - to prevent undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region .the. recirculation loop temperatures 7 shall , be within 500F of. each other ' prior to istartup of- an idle loop. Since the coolant in the bottom of the vessel is at a lower temperature than the water in upper regions of the core, undue stress on the vessel would result if the temperature difference were s greater than 1450F. The loop temperature must _ be within 500F of .the reactor pressure: vessel coolant temperature to , prevent ' thermal shock to the recirculation pump and recirculation nozzles.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES The reactor coolant system safety valve function of the safety-relief valves operate to prevent the system from being pressurized above the Safety Limit ~of 1325 psig. The system is designed to meet the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, for the pressure vessel, and ANSI B31.1, 1975 Code, for the reactor coolant system piping. The capacity of the safety-relief valves is based on the full MSIV closure transient 'with failed trip scram position switches, as described in Supplement

5. A of the FSAR, Section 5. A.6.-

Demonstration of toe safety-relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

(a) General Electric " Power Operation of the Hatch 1 and 2 Reactors Without Forced Recirculation," NEDO-30059 HATCH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 4-1.

~

ATTAChW NT 3 WC DOCKET'50-321, 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2 ,

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE ALLOWING PLANT OPERATION WITHOUT FORCED RECIRCULATION Pursuant to 10 . CFR 170.22,_ Georgia Power Company has evaluated the attached proposed amendment 'to Operating License DPR-57 and NPF-5, and has determined that:

-a. The proposed amendment does not require evaluation of a new Safety Analysis Report and rewrite of the facility license;

b. The proposed amendment does not require evaluation of several complex issues, involve ACRS review, or require an environmental impact statement;

c. The proposed-amendment does' not involve a complex issue or more than one environmental or _ safety issue;

d. The proposed amendment does involve a single safety issue,. namely that at power operations without . forced recirculation be allowed for up to 30 minutes.

e. The proposed amendment is therefore a Class III amendment for one unit and a Class I amendment for the other unit.

i l

l i

i.

ATTAGEENT 4 NRC DOOTT 50-321 OPEPATItG LICENSE DPR-57 EIMIN I. HA'IQI NLCLEAR PLANP UNIT 1 REQUEST MR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OIAIGE AIIfMItG PLANT OPERATION WI'IHOUP NRCED RECIRCULATION

1. Add "... for greater than 30 minutes. If forced recirculation cannot be restored within 30 minutes, place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position." to Section 3.6.J.1:

BASIS; An allowance for 30 minutes of operation without forced recirculation during which a recirculation pump restart might be attempted, could prevent an exposure of the plant systems to an unnecessary shutdown transient. This change would not result in any increase in the probability or consequences of a postulated accident, or a decrease in the margin of safety. This charge would not result in any new type of unanalyzed accident. Furthermore, this change is clearly within all acceptable criteria. Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (vi) of the " Examples of Amendments that are considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

2. Change the Bases to reflect the above change:

BASIS:

An allowance for 30 minutes of operation without forced recirculation during which a recirculation pump restart might be attempted, could prevent an exposure of the plant systems to an unnecessary shutdown transient. Wis change would not result in any increase in the probability or consequences of a postulated accident, or a decrease in the margin of safety. This charge would not result in any new type of unanalyzed accident. Furthermore, this change is clearly within all acceptable criteria. Therefore, this change is consistent with Item (vi) of the " Examples of Amendments that are considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

i. ATTAC!fENT 5 NRC DOCKER 50-366 OPERATIKi LICENSE NPF-5 EININ I. HA'ICH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

REQUESP POR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHAICE ALIOWIPO PLANT OPERATION WITHOUP FORCED RECIRCULATION E

! 1. Add "...for a period exceeding 30 minutes.. ." to Section 3.4.1.1 ACTION 6.

BASIS:

An allowance for 30 minutes of operation without forced recirculation during which a recirculation punp restart might be attenpted, could prevent an exposure of the plant systems to an unnecessary shutdown transient.. Wis change would not result in any increase in the probability or consequences of a postulated accident, or a decrease in the margin .of safety. This :bange would not result in any new type of unanalyzed accident. Furthermore, this change is clearly within all

,, acceptable criteria. Werefore, this change is consistent with Item (vi) i of- the " Examples of Amendments that are considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

I

2. Remove "* See Special Test Exception 3.10.4." and change each "**" to "*"

in Section 3/4.4.1.1:

BASIS:

This change constitutes a more restrictive operational limitation. This change does not result in any adverse effects to the probability or consequences of previously postulated accidents, does not create any new i . type of unanalyzed accident, and does increase the margin of safety.

Therefore, this change -is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Exanples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,1983, issue of the Federal Register.

3. Change the Bases to reflect the changes in Item 1 above:

, BASIS:

l An allowance for 30 minutes of operation without forced recirculation during which a recirculation punp restart might be attenpted, could prevent an exposure of the plant systems to an unnecessary shutdown transient. Wis change would not result in any increase in the probability or consequences of a postulated accident, or a. decrease in the l margin of safety. his change would not result in any new type of unanalyzed accident. Furthermore, this change is clearly within all acceptable criteria. Werefore, this change is consistent with Item (vi) of the "Exanples of Amendments that are considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6,

( 1983, issue of the Federal Register.