ML20082J215

Proposed Tech Specs Rev & Bases Pages 3/4 9-8 & B 3/4 9-2 Re Shutdown Cooling & Coolant Circulation

ML20082J215
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	08/19/1991
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082J209	List: ML20082J205 ML20082J215
References
NUDOCS 9108270240
Download: ML20082J215 (8)

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3.9.3.1 At less: :ne snu: S n ::o;ing ':co s:Ali :e in ::e-::1:n.-

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.A_F DL I CA B I L I'Y : l'COE 5 at all eactor eater levels.

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Wi.h less : nan :ne snu:::wn :: cling

in ::ert: dan', sus: enc i

-all operstions involving sn increase in :ne react:r decay 9es:

load or a reduction i

eron cenena:-st%n of :ns teac :e Coolant 5 ss tam anc, s;ec t /1:311y, the' nar;3 ng :t.m:s sna il te de-energi: ec and the charging f

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all containment ;enetrati:ns ;r:vidin; :f re:: 4::ess fr:m :ne

-l cont.tinment timosonere to :ne outside at Os;r.ere e'

?in a n:grs.

j The snutdown C0 cling ; umps may be de-er.ergi:ed during the ;ime t

interval required for 10:31 l es. rate :es.ing of ::niai-ent s

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penetration num0er :1 :arsuan to :ne re:uirements :f 5;e:f#fca-

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ti:n 4.5.1.2,d and/or to permit maintenance en ' alves loca ted i

in the commen shu:6n ::o'ing suction line, tr:vided (1).a0

--o o e.r_a ti o ns._a r e _ e rmi t t ed wn i :5 c :ul d_:! u s e d i.l. u

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.r et e :c r c oo l a n t s vs t em.co ro n c o nc en r,,,a t i o n a nd, 5 ;ec i f i c a l l.v,

the charging pumos snall de ce.energi:ec and tne :harging fl:w paths shall :e closed, (2) all CDP.E '.LTERAT!GNS ere sus:e ded, (3) all ::ntair. ment :ene:ra:i:ns :roviding :i e::

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the :en :inment a:mos:nere :: :ne v site at s:nere art.ai..

l tained : aset, anc (4) :he.n :er level a::ve : e ::: :f :se j

irradiatec fuel 1: greater than 23 feet, b.

The pr:visi:ns of 5;e ificati:n 3.0.2 are 9:: 4;oit:a:;e.

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.9.3.1 A snu:::wn ::o 9; 1:r.:: snali ta ca:arminec :: :e in ::e-1:i:n an:

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circulating react.:r eccian; at a fice ra te f 1 ' '" - -

3 : leas: :nce ;er l

4 a hours,

/500 y,3*

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• The shutdown cooling loop may be removed fr:m coers tion for ao

'.o i hour per 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> period during the cerformance of CORI ALTERAT 0fts in the vicini:/ of :ne reactor _ pressure vessel hot legs.

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[".11500 gpa wnen :he Ree.c:or Coolant system is drained :o a leve! te'ow yic;1ane of the not leg..

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CALVERT CLIFFS.- UNIT 1 3/2 9-3 Avencmen: ';c. 2 3, ii. "

9108270240 910019

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MEES 3/8.9.C REfUIUfj.Q MACHISLOl'ERABillli l

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refualing machine ensure that:

(1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of CCAs and fuel assemblics, (2) the refueling machine has suffictent load capacity to l

lif t a CEA or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure j

vsssel are protected from excessive lif ting force in the ev'ent they are uadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

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2lij,7 CRAlLTRAVEL1HSJJ.ELEIAPAQLMDUG The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly and CEA over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event thir. load is dropped (1) the activity release t

will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any i

possible cistortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array.

This assumption is consistent with the activity release essumed in the accident analyses.

l 2LiJ.J CO.01BILCl!(MLA.URS I

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in nperation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove degay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel

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below 140 f as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient

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coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize t

the effects of a boton dilution incident and prevent boron -

stratification.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling loops OPERAELE when j

there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability.

With the reactor vessel l

head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling 1001, adequate time is provided to initiate

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$$E J/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PRRGE VALE,,JJEAT10!Lly.11LU l

i The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation

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levels-within the containment.

The OPERABILITY of this system is-required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the i

containment atmosphere to the environment.

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CALVERT Cliffs 4 UNIT 1 B 3/4 9 2 Amendment No. ji5, f

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INSEl(T for 11ASES 3/4.9.8,'COOI ANT ClllCUI ATION" in Mode 6 shutdown cooling flow must provide sufficient heat removal to match core decay heat generation rates and maintain the core exit temperature within the Mode limit. %us, as decay heat production is reduced with time, shutdown cooling flow may be proportionally reduced. Pursuant to i

NI(C Generic letter 8817, flow reduction is neccuary for operations near the mid. point of the hot 2

e leg piping to ?revent vortex formation at the shutdown cooling suction noule. Pievention of vortex formation ret uces the potential for a loss of r.hutdown cooling due to air binding of the low pressure i

safety injection (LPSI), ump (s) opera ing to provide shutdown cooling flow. In accordance with the recommendations of N (C Generic Letter 8844," Safety Itclated Pump Loss," a minimum now rate requirement of 1500 gpm is imposed. This protects the vendor. recommended minimum continuous i

duty now rate of 1340 gpm for the LPSI pumps. The 1500 gpm minimum Dow rate is also more than f

adequate to preclude a baron dilution event in Mode 6 operation and in no way restricts the ability to

' increase Dow as necessary to remove decay heat, j

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St[3CilMENT (1.0 j

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Unit 2 reilsni Technical Spulflention i

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i Ilattimore Uns um! Electric Company t

i 1)ocket Nos. 50 317 & $0 318 t

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REPJELING 03EATIONS j

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SHUTDOWN COOLING iNO COOLANT CIRCULATION a

1 LIM! TING CON 0! TION 05 ODEoATIC1 3.9.8.1 At least one shutdown c:oling loop shall Win ~~opWition.*

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APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 at all reacto'r water levels, i

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ACTION:

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With less than one shutdown tooling loop in operation *,.sussend j

all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay-heat I

load or a reduction in boren concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and, specifically, the enarging pumps snaT1 de ce-energizee and the' charging flow paths shall be closed.

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all containment penetrations providing. direct access frcm the -

containment atmosphere to the outside at.mosphere.within a hours.

The shutdewn conling pumps may be de-energized during the time h

intervals required for lecti leak rate testing of containment c,,

penetration number 41 pursuant to the requirements of Specifica-tion 4.6.1.2.d and/or to permit maintenance on valves located in the common shutdown cooling suction line, provided (1).n_o_

oeera tions___are cermitted whf eh could_ cause ' dilution of the reactor coc_lant system deren cencentration and, specifically, tne charging pumps snail os de-energt:ec and the cherging flow w..

paths shall be closed. (2) all CORE ALTERATIONS are suspended, (3) all containment. penetrations providing direct ac:ess fr:m the. containment atm: sphere to the outside atmosphere are main-

.ained closed, and (4) the water levei. atuxcthectp; phthen -

irradiated fuel is greater than 23 feet, b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not appit:able.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3

4.9.8.1-A shutdown cooling loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant a t a flow rate of >

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'a t least once per

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'4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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• The s* nut'down coolin'g fo'co inay be removed fr$m ' operation for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period during the pert;r ance of CORE ALTEMTIONS' in trie vicinity of the-reactor pressure vessel hot -legs.

G*> '1!IO0 gpm wiien _ thelenctor Coolant System is drained to a level below the}

midplane of the hot leg.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2

3/4 9-3 Amendment No. 37. 33,- 11

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BEFUEtING R [E.Alj MS

!41 A&LLEfMfLMLtiAJHMLOPERABillTY The OPf.RABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that:

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(1) the refueling machhe will be used for movement of CEAs and fuel assemblies (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load rapacity to J

lift a CEA or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressere vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

1197 CPJ![ lMYEL. SP.@LIVEL 5TORAGEJMMS The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly and CEA over othnr fuel assemblies in the storage pool i

ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any r

possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a U critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analy es.

1/4dd_@LML C1 ACUt AT104 The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop t.e in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay hnat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel 0

below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minir'ize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron

+

stratification.

The requirement to have two shrtdown cool,ag loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop wM1 not rei; ult in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability.

With the coactor vessel head remaved and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a f ailure of the operating shutdown couling 100), adequate time is provided to initiate to cool tie core emergency $f[N6[ procedure OM NAMT NANS A i

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E 9.9 CONTAINMff11EAGE VALVE ISOLATIM 515. IIB The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment.

Tne OPERABILITY of this system is t

required to restrict the release of radioactive traterial from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

1,:"! Q:S B 3/4 9-2 M - P- ' "r E '"

CAVLERT Ct.lffS UNIT 2 AmendmentNo.7S,[

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INSERT for BASES 3/4.9.8,

• COOLANT CIRCULATION" In hiode 6, shutdown cooling flow m at provide sufficient hu. v moval to match core decay heat generation rates and maintain the core exit temperature within the Mode limit. Thus, as decay heat production is reduced with time, shutdown cooling Dow may be proportlonally reduced. Pursuant to NRC Generic letter 88-17, flow reduction is necessary for operations near the mid point of the hot leg piping to prevent voitex formation at the shutdown cooling suction noule. Prevention of vortex formation reduces the potential for a loss of shutdown cooling due to air hinding of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump (s) operating to provide shutdown cooling flow. In accordance with the recommendations of NRC Generic Letter 88-04,

• Safety Relatec Pump less," a minimurn now rate requirement of 1500 gpm is imposed. This protects the vendor recommended minimum continuous duty Gow rate of 1340 ppm for the LPSI pumps. The 1500 gpm minimum flow rate is also more than adequate to preclude a baron dilution event in hiode 6 operatbn and in no way restricts the ability to increase flow as necessary 'o reinove decay heat.

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