ML20081A888
| ML20081A888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1984 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20081A879 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM GL-83-37, NUDOCS 8403060368 | |
| Download: ML20081A888 (9) | |
Text
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TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION sim o
gg f.'INIMUM M
u TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPL.lCABLE d
9 FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE-MODES ACTION s
8o ou r
- g 2
o
- 2 um 1.
1 1
1, 2 and
- 8 rn 9*O M
gu 2.
Nuclear Overpower 4
2 3
1, 2 2#
igh3 3.
RCS Outlet Tempe ature - High 4
2 3
1, 2 3#
g*
q 4.
Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS w
Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE 4
2(a) 3 1, 2 2#
5.
RCS Pressure - Low 4
2(a) 3 1, 2 3#
6.
RCS Pressure - High 4
2 3
1, 2 3#
7.
Variable Low RCS Pressure 4
2(a) 3 1, 2 3#
8.
Reactor Containment Pressure - High 4
2 3
1, 2 3#
M 9.
Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux
[
and Rate 2
0 2
1, 2 and
- 4 IN 10.
Source Range, Neutron Flux and Rate A.
Startup 2
0 2
2## and
- 5 B.
Shutdown 2
0 1
3, 4 and 5 6
11.
Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers 2 per trip 1 per trip 2 per -
1, 2 and
- 7#
system system trip system 12.
Reactor Trip Module 2 per trip 1 per trip 2 per 1, 2 and
- 7#
system system trip system 13.
Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure - High 4
2 3
2**,3**,
6#
4**,5**
14.
Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors 2 per pump 1 from 2 2 per pump 1, 2 25 or more pumps (a) l
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION With the control rod drive trip breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
High voltage to detector may be deenergized above 10-10 amps on both Intermediate Range channels.
(a)
Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure 1 1720 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:
(1)
The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is S 5% of RATED THERMAL
- POWER, (2)
The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure-High Trip Setpoint of 51720 psig is imposed, and (3)
The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS pressure > 1800 psig.
I ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the irioperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the control rod drive trip breakers.
ACTION 2 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or FOWER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one a.
hour.
b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.
l l
1 j
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/43-3
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The borated water storage tank (BWST) shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
A contained borated water volume of at least 415,200 gallons, l
b.
Between 2270 and 2450 ppm of boron, and c.
A minimum water temperature of 40 F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The BWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by:
- 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank,
- 2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the water temperature when outside air temperature < 40 F.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/45-7 l
l III.
REACTOR COOLANT HIGH POINT VENTS Proposed Change Add Technical Specification 3.4.11 and the Bases for this specification to Appendix A.
This change specifies operability and surveillance requirements for the recently installed High Point Vent System.
This system includes two solenoid controlled valves and one manual block valve on the pressurizer and each high point of reactor coolant loops A and B.
During operation, one solenoid valve will function as a block valve and the other solenoid valve will function as the vent valve. The manually operated block valve is inaccessable during normal operations.
Reasons for the Proposed Change This specification is being added in response to NUREG-0737, Item II.B.l. This system is expected to be operable prior to restart for Cycle V.
This system will provide the capability to vent noncondensible gases from the Reactor Coolant System which may inhibit core cooling during natural circulation.
Safety Analysis Generic Letter 83-37, dated November 1,
1983, established preliminary guidelines for developing a specification for the High Pcint Vent System. The Technical Specification proposed herein does not include operability requirements for a reactor vessel head vent as proposed by the draft. Crystal River Unit 3 has not installed this vent path, which will be addressed separately at a later date. To avoid putting Reactor Coolant System water into the containment during operation two of the surveillance requirements proposed by Generic Letter 83-37, 4.4.11.1 and 4.4.11.2.3, have been deleted.
Performance of surveillance requirement 4.4.11.1 could lead to a small break loss-of-coolant-accident if one of the vent valves failed open during testing.
With one vent valve even partially ooen, the other vent valve would vent the RCS upon cycling. This same situation arises during the flow test required by 4.4.11.2.3.
This flow test would also require that the RCS be pressurized to verify correct flow during operation.
The requirement to shutdown if one vent path is inoperable for more than 30 days has also been deleted. Deletion of this requirement will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident.
In the event of an accident requiring an inoperable vent to release noncondensible gases, a safe plant cooldown is possible using the other ventable coolant loop. If two of the vents are inoperable, the plant h required to begin shutdown within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
The addition of this new vent system can help to reduce the probability and effects of an accident. The operability and surveillance requirements for the l
Reactor Coolant System Vents assure that gases which may innibit core cooling during natural circulation may be vented from the Reactor Coolant System. This new Technical Specification will not decrease plant safety.
I
C REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 At least one reactor coolant system vent path consisting of one vent valve and one block valve capable of being powered from emergency buses shall be OPERABLE and closed at each of the following locations:
a.
Pressurizer Steam Space b.
Reactor Coolant Loop A High Point c.
Reacter Coolant Loop B High Point APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,2, 3 and 4 ACTION:
With one of the three reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable, STARTUP a.
and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuator of the vent valve and block valve in the inoperable vent path.
b.
With two or more of the three reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable; maintain the inoperab' vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves and block valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least two of three of the vent paths to OPERABLE status with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cr be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11.
Each reactor coolant system vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per Refueling Cycle by:
1.
Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position.
2.
Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the Control Room.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-33
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (continued)
BASES 3/4.4.11 Reactor Coolant System Vents The operability and surveillance requirements for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Vents ensure that gases which could inhibit core cooling during natural circulation may be vented from the RCS. This system was installed as a result of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.I.
1 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-14
O VI.
CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITORS Proposed Changes Change the Specification 3.6.4.1 to require "two irdependent containment hydrogen monitors." The existing specification is more specific and requires one analyzer and a gas chromatograph. Recent plant modifications have installed two hydrogen analyzers on the waste sampling system.
Also, revise the Action Statement to state the action required when both hydrogen monitors are inoperable.
Reasons for the Proposed Change This change is being made to reflect the addition of two independent, in-place hydrogen monitors and in resprase to NUREG 0737, item II.F.1, Attachment 6.
The r.ew in-place hydrogen monhor were operable by December 31,1983.
Safety Analysis The change to the Hydrogen Monitor Specification will not degrade plant safety.
The actior.s suggested will ensure that the hydrogen concentration can be monitored during an accident.
With the two installed monitors inoperable, a portable unalyzing unit, which serves as the current in line hydrogen monitor, can be utilized to defer or avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown.
The surveillance requirements will ensure that these monitors will be available when needed.
Because these monitors are isolated during plant operation, a CHANNEL CHECK is not required.
A CHANNEL CALIBRATION will be performed periodically using one or more of four possible hydrogen sample concentrations (0.0 V/o, 2.5 V/o, 4.99 V/o, and 9.56 v/o).
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION will verify that the monitors meet the 12% accuracy design specification. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION will not be performed every 92 days on a staggered basis as recommended by Generic Letter 83-37. As stated in the letter to the Commission, dated December 31,1981, these monitors are normally isolated from the containment atmosphere by locked closed isolation valves. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION performed on the recommended frequency would require additional approval to operate the locked closed isolation valves and vent combustible gas to the Reactor Building during POWER OPERATION.
I be
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL ltYDROGEN MONITORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY:
MODES I and 2 ACTION:
a.
With either installed hydrogen monitor inoperable, either:
1.
Verify the availability of a preplanned alternative method of monitoring the hydrogen concentration within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or 2.
Restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
With both installed hydrogen monitors inoperable, restore at least one monitor to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
c.
The provisions of 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performar.ce of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and at least once per Refueling Cycle by verifying monitor accuracy to 12% of full scale using sample gas containing between 1 and 10 volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 6-22
i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment i
atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the contain..ent atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.
Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment ano systems required for the detection and contro:
of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditior.s.
The purge system is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.
In addition to the two inplace hydrogen monitors, there are two portable hydrogen analyzing units. In the event that one hydrogen monitor is inoperable, one of the portable units may be used to monitor the hydrogen concentration in the Reactor Building.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B3/46-4' k