ML20073B540
| ML20073B540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  (DPR-44-A-195, DPR-56-A-199) |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1994 |
| From: | Thadani M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20073B542 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9409220091 | |
| Download: ML20073B540 (30) | |
Text
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
o,- *a paucuy ye t.
UNITED STATES
^
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2056lM001
%...../
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY f
I DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY-ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-277 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
)
Amendment No. 195 License No. DPR-44 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, et al.
(the licensee) dated May 10, 1994, and supplemented by letters dated l
i August 19, 1994 and September 13, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR 1
Chapter 1.
1 B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment wiil not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health or safety of the public; and -
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have.been.-
satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9409220091 940916 PDR ADOCK 05000277 P
9 4
. (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications containea in Appendices A and B,_as revised through Amendment No. 195, are hereby incorporated in the license.
PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
t FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[1 s-Mohan C. Thad i, Acting Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications 2
Date of Issuance:
September 16, 1994 W
i
4 6
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 195 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-44 DOCKET NO. 50-277 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Remove Insert i
i 125 125 126 126 127 127 132 132 132a 134 134 139 139 5
141 141 141a 141a t
141b 141b 165 165
o Unit ~2 PBAPS TABLE OF CONTENTS Paam No.
1.0 DEFINITIONS.
1 LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY 2.1 9
1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY
- 2. 2' 29' SURVE1LLhNCE, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REOUIREMENTS 3.0 APPLICABILITY 34 l
l 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 35 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 57 3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL 4.3 99 A.
Reactivity Limitations A
99 B.
101 C.
Scram Insertion Times C
103 D.
Reactivity Anomalies D
105 3.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM 4.4 115 A.
Normal System Availability A
115 i
B.
Normal System Requirements B
116 C.
Operation with Inoperable Components 118 l
-3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5 114 A.
Core Spray and LPCI Subsystems A
124 B.
Containment. Cooling System (HPSW, B.
127 l
Torus cooling, Drywell Spray, and Torus Spray)
C. - HPCI Subsystem
-C 128b D.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling D
130 (RCIC) Subsystem E. Automatic Depressurization System E
131 (ADS)
F.
Minimum Low Pressure Cooling F
132-Availability G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge _ Pipe G
133 H.
Engineered Safeguards Compartments H
133 Cooling and Ventilation l
I.
Average Planar IJIGR I
133a J.
Local LHGR J
133a K.
Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)
K 133b l
-i-Amendment No.'IN, 195
a Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core-Sorav &
4.5.A Core Sorav &
LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
LPCI~ Subsystem (cont'd)
Both CSS shall be operable 11.22 Freauency whenever irradiated fuel
'is in the vessel and prior (d)
Pump Flow. Rate Once/3 months 1
to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown condition Each pump in each loop shall except as specified in deliver at least 3125 gpm-l 3.5 A.2 and 3.5.F below:
against a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 105 psig.
(e)
Core Spray Header AP. Instrumentation
..1 Check.
Once/ day Calibrate Once/3 months' -
(f)
DELETED 1
2.
From and after the date 2.
DELETED that one of the core spray subsystems is made or found to be i
l inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding.seven days provided that during such seven days al1~ active components of the other core spray subsystem and active components of the LPCI subsystem are operable.
3.
LPCI Subsystem Testing shall 1
be as follows:
1133 Frecuency (a)
Simulated Automatic-Once/ operating-Actuation Test
. Cycle j
'(b)
Pump operability Once/1 month i
-125-Amendment No. 25, 47, 62, 87, I60, 195 l
~
l
,s 1
o Unit 2
~
PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
Subsystem (cont'd)
'3. Two independent Low Pressure Coolant its Freauency Injection (LPCI) subsystems will be operable with each subsystem (c)
Motor Operated Once/ month e
comprised of:
valve operability a.
(Two 33-1/3%) capacity pumps, (d)
Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months b.
An operable flow path Each LPCI pump shall deliver 10,900 capable of taking suction from the gpm against a system head suppression pool and transferring corresponding to a vessel pressure the water to the reactor pressure of 20 psig based on individual pump vessel, and tests.
c.
During power operation the LPCI system cross-tie valve closed and the associated valve motor (e)
DELETED operator circuit breaker locked in the off position.
i Both.LPCI subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, and prior to reactor startup from the Cold Shutdown Condition, except as l below.specified in 3.5.A.4, 3.5.A.5, and 3.5.F
- 4. From and after the date that one 4.
DELETED of the four LPCI pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days the i
remaining active components of the LPCI subsystems, and all active components of both core spray subsystems are operable.
- 5. From and after the date that one 5.
DELETED LPCI~ subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7' days all active components of both core spray subsystems and i
the remaining LPCI subsystem are operable.
-126-Amendment No. 28, 47, IM.195
l
- o:
Unit 2.
PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
Subsystem (cont'd)
- 6. All recirculation pump' discharge
- 6. All recirculation pump discharge.
valves shall be' operable prior to valves shall be tested for oper.
i reactor startup (or closed if ability during any period of.
permitted elsewhere in these reactor cold shutdown exceeding.
{
specifications).
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability. tests have not been performed during the preceding 31 days.
- 7. If the requirements of 3.5.A cannot be 3
met, an orderly shutdown of the J
reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
B. Containment Coolina System B. Containment Coolina System (HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drywell Soray.
(HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drvwell Sorav.
and Torus Soravi and Torus Sorav)
- 1. Except as specified in 3.5.B.2,
- 1. Containment Cooling System components 3.5.B.3, 3.5.8.4, 3.5.8.5, and 3.5.B.6 shall be tested as follows:
below, the containment cooling system shall be operable whenever irradiated ling Freauency fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater (a) Each HPSW Pump Once/ month than 212 degrees F, and prior to Operability.
reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown Condition.
(b) Each HPSW motor operated Once/ month.
valve operability.
(c) HPSW Pump Capacity After pump Test. Each HPSW maintenance pump shall and every deliver 4500 3 months.
gpm at 233 psig.
4 (d) Each Torus Cooling Once/ month motor operated i
valve operability.
(e) Each Drywell Spray Once/ month j
motor operated valve operability.
(f) Each Torus Spray Once/ month motor operated
. valve operability.
(g) Air test on-Once/5 years drywell and torus headers and nozzles.
-127-Amendment No. 23, 32, 47, 55.,
Ida,195 9
Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availability Coolina Availability
- 1. The following low pressure ECCS
- 1. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify subsystems shall be OPERABLE when for each required Low Pressure irradiated fuel is in the reactor Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem vessel and the reactor is in the Cold that the suppression pool water Condition except when the reactor level is at least 11.0 feet, vessel head is removed, the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, water
- 2. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify level is at least 458 inches above for each required Core Spray (CS) reactor pressure vessel instrument zero subsystem:
and no work is being done with the potential for draining the reactor (a)
Suppression pool water level vessel:
is at least 11.0 feet, or
- a. Two Core Spray (CS) subsystems with (b)
Condensate storage tank water each subsystem comprised of:
level is at least 17.3 feet.*
(1)
Two OPERABLE motor driven
- 3. At least once per month, verify for pumps, and each required CS and LPCI subsystem that the piping is filled with water (2)
Piping and valves capable of from the pump discharge valve to the taking suction from the injection valve.
required water source and transferring the water through
- 4. At least once per month, verify for a spray sparger above the core each required CS and LPCI subsystem to the reactor vessel.
manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path OR that is not locked, sealed, o.r otherwise secured in position, is in
- b. One CS subsystem comprised of the the correct position.**
equipment specified in 3.5.F.1.a above, and one Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem comprised of:
(1)
One OPERABLE motor driven pump, and (2)
Piping and valves capable of taking suction from the required water source and
)
transferring the water to the reactor vessel.
Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.
-132-Amendment No. H8, Z73,195
o Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availabi' ity (Cont.)
Coolina Availability (Cont.)
- 2. With one of the subsystems
- 5. At least once )er 92 days, verify each required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable,"
required CS su) system pump and LPCI restore the required subsystem subsystem pump develops the flow rate to OPERABLE status within 4 specified below against a system head hours or immediately initiate corresponding to the specified reactor action to suspend operations pressure.
with a potential for draining SYSTEM HEAD the reactor vessel.
CORRESPONDING NUMBER TO A REACTOR
- 3. With two of the subsystems SYSTEM FLOW RATE OF PUMPS PRESSURE OF required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, immediately initiate action to CS 2 3,125 gpm 1
2 105 psig suspend operations with a LPCI 2 10,900 gpm 1
2 20 psig c
potential for draining the reactor vessel and restore at-
- 6. At least once per operating cycle, verify least one subsystem to OPERABLE each required CS and LPCI subsystem status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or actuates on an actual or simulated imediately initiate action to automatic initiation signal.***
establish Secondary Containment Integrity.
- Vessel injection / spray may be excluded.
-132a-Amendment No.195 a
Unit'2 PBAPS 3. 5.A S M i lt Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystems Core Sorav Subsystem (CSS)
The CSS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled
-I following a loss-of ~ coolant
- accident. Two redundant loops each provide adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes from 0.2 ft* up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).
The CSS specifications are applicable whenever irradiated ~ fuel is in the core because the CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized.
With one CSS inoperable, the verified operability (see.4.5 Bases) of the redundant full capacity CSS and the full capacity Low Pressure Coolant Injection system provides assurance of adequate core cooling and justifies and specified 7 days out-of-service period.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown._ The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
Low Pressure Coolant In_iection System (LPCIS) i The LPCIS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two loops each with two provide adequate core flooding for-all break sizes ~ from 0.2 ft' pumps up 1
to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.
The LPCIS specifications are applicable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel because LPCIS-is a primary source of water J
for flooding the core after the _ reactor vessel is depressurized.
With one LPCIS pump inoperable, or one LPCIS loop inoperable, adequate core flooding is assured by the verified operability._(see 4.5 Bases) of the redundant-LPCIS pumps or loop, and both' CSS loops. The reduced redundancy justifies the specified 7. day:out-of-service period.
]
-The surveillance _ requirements provide adequate' assurance-that the LPCI will be operable when required.. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation,.a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained _ full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest
~
moment.
-134 Amendn.ent No. 23, 160,-195-
c Unit 2 PBAPS 3.5.E BASES (Cont'd.)
With one-ADS valve known to be incapable of automatic operation, four valves remain operaole to perform their ADS function. However, since the ECCS Loss-of-Coolant Accident analysis for small line breaks assumed that all five ADS valves were operable, reactor operation with one ADS valve inoperable is only allowed to continue for seven (7) days provided that the HPCI system is verified to be operable and that the actuation logic for the (remaining) four ADS valves is verified to be operable (see 4.5 Bases).
F.
Minimum low Pressure Coolino Availability The purpose of Specification F is to assure that adequate core cooling capability is available while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. The long term cooling analyses following a design basis LOCA demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS subsystem is required, post-LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown.
It is therefore reasonablo to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.
To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed, the water level maintained at least 458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and no work is being done with the potential for draining the reactor vessel. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.
G.
Maintenance of Filled Discharce Pioe If the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI subsystem, HPCI, and RCIC are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started.
If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design function. However, to minimize damage to the discharge piping and to ensure added margin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specification requires the discharge lines to be filled whenever the system is in an operable condition.
-139-Amendment No. 65, 160, 195
~.
Unit 2-PBAPS 4.5 ESE1 Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Frecuencies The performance of individual emergency core cooling systems (HPCI, LPCI, Core Spray and ADS) and the integrated performance of the emergency core cooling systems are described in analyses referenced in Section 6.5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Periodic surveillance of pumps and valves is performed in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, to the extent described in the Inservice Testing Plan, to verify that the systems will provide the flow rates required by the respective analyses. HPCI and RCIC flow tests are performed at two pressures so that the systems' capability to provide rated flow over their operating range is verified. To avoid damaging Core Spray system valves during Core Spray pump flow testing, throttling -
is not normally performed to obtain a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of it 105 psig. Pump curves are used to determine equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure for the Core Spray pumps in order.to meet the Surveillance Requirements. - HPSW flow tests verify that rated flow can be delivered to the RHR heat' exchangers.
The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on industry practice, sound engineering judgment and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, in the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.
Complete ADS testing during power operation causes an undesirable loss-of-coolant inventory. To increase the availability of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system; i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valves, etc., are tested frequently. The pumps and motor operated-injection valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. A simulated automatic actuation test once each cycle combined with frequent tests of the pumps and injection valves is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.
The flow path piping of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air.
Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI system, Core Spray system, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the reactor -
pressure vessel upon demand. -This will also prevent a water hamer following an ECCS initiation-signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines'are full is to vent ~at the high points. An acceptable method of ensuring the LPCI and Core Spray system discharge lines are full is to verify the absence of the associated
" keep fill" system accumulator alarms.
While the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. :To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition.
-141-Amendment No, IH, 195
lv I
Unit 2 l
PBAPS 4.5 M Sfl (Cont'd.)
Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freauencies However, one LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and '-
considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually-realigned (remote or local) to the.LPCI mode and is not otherwise i
inoperable. RHR valves'that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. A note allows one
'a LPCI subsystem of the RHR system to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if.all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manurlly realigned (reute or local) to allow injection into the reactor vessel, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. Manual realignment to allow injection into the reactor vessel in the LPCI mode may also include opening the drag valve to establish the.
required LPCI subsystem flow rate. This will ensure adequate core.
cooling if an inadvertent reactor vessel'draindown should occur.
Sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. Only one required Core Spray subsystem may take credit for the condensate storage tank supply option during. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel as stated in the note to
- l Surveillance Requirement 4.5.F.2(b). Durin potential for draining the reactor vessel, g operations with a -
the volume in the condensate storage tank may not provide adequate makeup if the reactor vessel were completely drained. Therefore, only one Core Spray subsystem is allowed to use the condensate storage tank as'a source of water.. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.
When components and subsystems are out-of-service, overall core and.
containment cooling reliability is maintained by verifying the-i operability of the remaining redundant cooling systems that the Limiting Conditions for Operation require to be operable during the allowable out-of-service time period. Verifying operability in this context means to administrative 1y ensure that the remaining required systems or subsystems are not known to be inoperable (for example:
confirming that equipment necessary for the systems or subsystems to perform their safety functions are not blocked out of service for -
maintenance, checking the status of selected surveillances on the remaining required systems or subsystems-and checking that selected valves are in the correct position as indicated on the control room-4 i
panels). Performance of operability tests is not required.
4 4.5 I&J Surveillance Reauirements Bases Averaae and Local ~LHGR The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.
-141a-Amendment No. 23, 154. 192 195
-n
- ~,
.l Unit'2-
'PBAPS 4.5.K
' Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) -- Surveillance Reauirement -
At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%,. the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the.
l moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control. rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience. indicated that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by' a considerable margin... With this low void content, any inadvertent core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative mode relative to MCPR. During initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at 25% thermal power level with minimum recirculation pump speed.
1 The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future MCPR evaluation below this power level will be'shown to be unnecessary.
The daily requirement for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.
i The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a-change in power or power shape (regardless of magnitude) that could place operation at a thermal limit.
4.5.L MCPR Limits for Core Flows Other Than Rated A flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is necessary to assure that the
=j safety limit MCPR is not violated during recirculation flow increase events. The design basis flow increase event is a slow-power increase event which is not terminated by' scram, but which stabilizes at a new core power corresponding to the maximum possible core flow.
Flow runout events are analyzed along a constant xenon flow control line assuming a quasi steady state heat balance.
The flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is provided in the CORE-OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The MCPR(F) is independent of the rated-i flow limit provided. in Specification 3.5.K.2 and 3.5.K.3.
.To verify applicability of this curve to PBAPS recirculation flow runout events were analyzed with a PBAPS specific model at a ' typical mid -
cycle exposure condition. These flow runout events were simulated along the Maximum Extended Load Line Limit rod line to the maximum core flow runout value of 105%. The results of_the analyses indicated that application of the MCPR(F) curve will preclude a 1
violation of the MCPR safety limit in the event of a recirculation 1
flow runout. The MCPR(F) curve is cycle independent.
]
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-141b-Amendment No. 16, 48, 154, 192. 19!l
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4 Unit 2 i
'l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Anolicabilityr' Aeolicability:
Apples to the operating Applies to the primary and status of the primary and secondary containment secondary containment integrity.
systems.
obiectiver obiective:
To verify the integrity of To assure the integrity of
-the primary and secondary the primary and secondary containment.
containment system.
Soecification:
Soecification:
l.
The suppression chamber t
A.
Primary Containment water level and temperature shall be checked once per 1.
Whenever the nuclear day.
system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure
- 2. Whenever there is in-or work is being done dication of relief valve which has the potential operation (except when to drain the vessel, the reactor is being the pressure suppression shutdown and torus pool water volume and cooling is being es-temperature shall be tablished) or testing maintained within the which adds heat to the following limits except suppression pool, the as specified by 3.7.A.2, pool temperature shall or when inoperability be continually monitored of the core spray systems, and also observed and the LPCI and containment logged every 5 minutes cooling subsystems is until the heat addition permissible as provided is terminated.
J l
for.in 3.5.F:
1
- 3. - Whenever there is indication a.
Minimum water. volume-of relief valve operation i
3 122,900 ft with the local suppression pool temperature reaching 200*F b.
Maximum water volume-or more, an external visual 3
127,300 ft examination of the suppression:
chamber shall be conducted be-fore resuming power operation.
4.
A visual: inspection of the sup-pression chamber interior, in-cluding water line regions shall be made at each major refueling outage.
4
-165-Amendment No. 65, H.-195
a O
p aatauq.It UNITED STATES yw
).ZLI NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINoToN. D.C. 2055H1001 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-278 PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNIT NO. 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.199 License No. DPR-56 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, et al.
t (the licensee) dated May 10, 1994, and supplemented by letters dated August 19, 1994 and September 13, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I.
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commi ssion;-
C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities-will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations-i D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health or safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of-the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment-to this license amendment,
.and paragraph 2.C(2)~of Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.199, are hereby incorporated in the license.
PECO shall operate the facility in accordance with the l
Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION bl hk Mohan C. Thadani, Acting, {irector ProjectDirectorate1-2}
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
September 16, 1994 I
i 1
e ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 199 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-56 DOCKET N0. 50-278 i
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Remove Insert i
i 125 125 126 126 127 127 132 132 132a 134 134 139 139 i
141 141 i
141a 141a 141b 141b 165 165 l
I
J co Unit 3 PBAPS TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace No.
1.O DEFINITIONS.
1 LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY 2.1 9
1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY 2.2 29 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REOUIREMENTS 3.0 APPLICABILITY 34 l
3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 35 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 57 3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL 4.3 99 A.
Reactivity Limitations A
99 B.
101 C.
Scram Insertion Times C
103 D.
Reactivity Anomalies D
105 i
3.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM 4.4 115 A.
Normal System Availability A
115 B.
Normal System Requirements B
116 C.' Operation with Inoperable Components 118 j
3.5 CORE AND. CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5 114 A.
Core Spray and LPCI Subsystems A
124 B.
Containment Cooling System (HPSW, B
127 i
Torus cooling, Drywell Spray, and Torus Spray)
C.
HPCI Subsystem C
128b D. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling D
130" (RCIC) Subsystem E. Automatic Depressurization System E
131 (ADS)
F.
Minimum Low Pressure Cooling F
132 l
Availability G. Maintenance of-Filled Discharge Pipe
'G 133 H.
Engineered Safeguards Compartments H
133-Cooling and Ventilation I.
Average Planar LHGR
-I 133a
~J.
Local LHGR J
133a K. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)
K 133b l Amendment No. H, 108, 199
Unit 3 e
PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav'&
4.5.A core Sorav &
LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
LPCI Subsystem (cont'd) i Both CSS shall be operable E.tB Freauency whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel and prior (d)
Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months.-
-to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown condition Each pump in each' loop shall except as specified in deliver at.least 3125 gpm l
3.5. A.2 and 3.5.F below:
against a system head corresponding _to a reactor vessel pressure of 105 psig.
(e)
Core Spray Header AP Instrumentation Check Once/ day Calibrate Once/3 months (f)
DELETED 2.
.From and after the date 2.
DELETED that one of the core spray subsystems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days'all active components of the other core spray subsystem and active components of the LPCI subsystem are operable.
3.
LPCI Subsystem Testing shall
-be as follows:
R33 Freauency-(a)
Simulated Automatic Once/ operating Actuation Test Cycle (b)
Pump operability
.Once/1 month-i
.)
-125-Amendment No. 27, 47, 87, I62, c
199 R
1
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Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
Subsystem (cont'd)
- 3. Two independent Low Pressure Coolant Egg Freauency Injection (LPCI) subsystems will be operable with each subsystem (c)
Motor Operated Once/nonth.
comprised of:
valve operability a.
(Two 33-1/3%) capacity pumps, (d)
Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months b.
An operable flow path Each 'LPCI pump shall deliver 10,900 capable of taking suction from the gpm against a. system head suppression pool and transferring corresponding to a vessel pressure the water. to the reactor pressure of. 20 psig based on individual pump vessel, and tests.
c.
During power operation the LPCI system cross-tie valve closed and the associated valve motor (e)
DELETED operator circuit breaker locked in the off position.
Both LPCI subsystems shall be operable I
whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, and prior to reactor startup from the Cold Shutdown Condition, except as
. I specified in 3.5. A.4, 3.5. A.5, and 3.5.F below.
l
- 4. From and after the date that one 4.
DELETED of the four LPCI pumps is made or 4
found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during.the succeeding-seven days provided that during such seven days the remaining active components of the LPCI subsystems, and all active components of both core l
spray subsystems'are operable.
- 5. From and after the date that one 5.
DELETED LPCI subsystem is made or found to be' inoperable for any reason,
. continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7' days all active components of both core spray subsystems and i
the remaining LPCI subsystem are operable.
-126-Amendment No. 27, 47, fl.162,199
Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Soray and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)
Subsystem (cont'd)
- 6. All recirculation pump discharge
- 6. All recirculation pump discharge valves shall be operable prior to valves shall be tested for oper-reactor startup (or closed if ability during any period of-permitted elsewhere in these reactor cold shutdown exceeding specifications).
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have not been performed during the prec2 ding 31 days.
- 7. If the requirements of 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
B. Containment Coolino System B. Containment Coolino System (HPSW. Torus Coolino. Drywell Soray.
(HPSW. Torus Coolino. Drywell Soray.
.ittd Torus Sorav) and Torus Sortv)
- 1. Except as specified in 3.5.B.2,
- 1. Containment Cooling System components 3.5.8.3, 3.5.B.4, 3.5.B.5, and 3.5.B.6 shall be tested as follows:
below, the containment cooling system shall be operable whenever irradiated J.t.ts Frecuency fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater (a) Each HPSW Pump Once/ month than 212 degrees F, and prior to Operability.
reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown Condition.
(b) Each HPSW motor operated Once/ month valve operability.
(c) HPSW Pump Capacity After pump Test.
Each HPSW maintenance pump shall and every l
deliver 4500 3 months.
gpm at 233 psig.
(d) Each Torus Cooling Once/ month i
motor operated valve operability.
(e) Each Drywell Spray Once/ month motor operated valve operability.
(f) Each Torus Spray Once/nonth motor operated valve operability.
(g) Air test on Once/5 years drywell and torus headers 1
and nozzles.
-127-Amendment No. 27, 31, 47, 55, I5I, 199
Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availability Coolino Availability
- 1. The following low pressure ECCS
- 1. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify subsystems shall be OPERABLE when for each required Low Pressure irradiated fuel is in the reactor Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem vessel and the reactor is in the Cold that the suppression pool water Condition except when the reactor level is at least 11.0 feet.
vessel head is removed, the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, water
- 2. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify level is at least 458 inches above for each required Core Spray (CS) reactor pressure vessel instrument zero subsystem:
and no work is being done with the potential for draining the reactor (a)
Suppression pool water level vessel:
is at least 11.0 feet, or
- a. Two Core Spray (CS) subsystems with (b)
Condensate storage tank water each subsystem comprised of:
level is at least 17.3 feet.*
(1)
Two OPERABLE motor driven
- 3. At least once per month, verify for pumps, and each required CS and LPCI subsystem that the piping is filled with water (2)
Piping and valves capable of from the pump discharge valve to the taking suction from the injection valve.
required water source and transferring the water through
- 4. At least once per month, verify for a spray sparger above the core each required CS and LPCI subsystem to the reactor vessel.
manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path OR that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in
- b. One CS subsystem comprised of the the correct position.**
equipment specified in 3.5.F.1.a above, and one Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem comprised of:
(1)
One OPERABLE motor driven pump, and (2)
Piping and valves capable of taking suction from the required water source and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.
l Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperabic.
-132-Anendment No. Z72,176,199
Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availability (Cont.)
CoolinoAvailability(Cont.)
- 2. With one of the subsystems
- 5. At least once per 92 days, verify each required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable,,
required CS subsystem pump and LPCI restore the required subsystem subsystem pump develops the flow rate to OPERABLE status within 4 specified below against a system head hours or immediately initiate corresponding to the specified reactor action to suspend operations pressure.
with a potential for draining SYSTEM HEAD the reactor vessel.
CORRESPONDING NUMBER TO A REACTOR
- 3. With two of the subsystems SYSTEM FLOW RATE OF PUMPS PRESSURE OF required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, immediately initiate action to CS 2 3,125 gpm 1
2 105 psig
~
suspend operations with a LPCI 2 10,900 gpm 1
2 20 psig potential for draining the reactor vessel and restore at
- 6. At least once per operating cycle, verify least one subsystem to OPERABLE each required CS and LPCI subsystem status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or actuates on an actual or simulated immediately initiat'e action to automatic initiation signal.***
establish Secondary Containment Integrity.
- Vessel injection / spray may be excluded.
t t
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-132a-Amendment No. 199
e i
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Unit 3 i
PBAPS 3.5.A BASES Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystems Core Sorav Subsystem (CSS)
The CSS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled j
following' a loss-of-coolant accident. Two redundant loops each provide adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes from 0.2 ft' up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the Automatic I
Depressurization System (ADS).
j
.The CSS specifications are applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in ths *. ore because the CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after t.5 reactor vessel is depressurized.
.l
]
With one CSS ir. operable, the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of
~
the redundant full capacity CSS and the full capacity Low Pressure Coolant Injection system provides assurance of adequate core cooling and justifies and specified 7 days out-of-service period.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be operable when required. - Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest-moment.
low pressure Coolant Iniection System (LPCIS)
The LPCIS is provided to assure that the core is. adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two loops'each with two j
provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes from 0.2 ft* pumps' up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for. small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.
t
-The LPCIS specifications are applicable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel because LPCIS is a primary source ~of water for flooding the core after the reactor vessel is depressurized.
With one LPCIS pump inoperable, or one LPCIS loop inoperable, adequate core flooding is assured by the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of
.the redundant LPCIS pumps or loop, and both CSS loops. The reduced redundancy Justifies the specified 7 day out-of-service period.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI l
will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor '
' shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained' full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest t
moment.
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-134-Amendment No. 27, 162. 199
~h.
m s.
l.
Unit 3 PBAPS 3.5.E BASES (Cont'd.)
With one' ADS valve known to be incapable of automatic operation, four valves remain operable to perform their ADS function. However, since the ECCS Loss-of-Coolant Accident analysis for small line breaks assumed that all five ADS valves were operable, reactor operation with one ADS valve inoperable is only allowed to continue for seven (7) days provided that the HPCI system is verified to be operable and that the actuation logic for the (remaining) four ADS valves is verified to be operable (see 4.5 Bases).
F.
Minimum low Pressure Coolina Availability l
The purpose of Specification F is to assure that adequate core cooling capability is available while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. The long term cooling analyses following a design basis LOCA demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS subsystem is required, post-LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown.
It is therefore reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE while the reactor is in the Cold Condition.
ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed, the water level maintained at least 458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero, and no work is being done with the potential for draining the reactor vessel. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.
G.
Maintenance of Filled Discharae Pioe If the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI subsystem, HPCI, and RCIC are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started.
If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design function. However, to minimize damage to the discharge piping and to ensure added margin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specification requires the discharge lines to be filled whenever the system is in an operable condition.
i
-139-Amendment No. H, I62,199
Unit 3 PBAPS j
. 4.5 BAS 11 l
Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freauencies
.i The performance of individual emergency core cooling systems (HPCI, LPCI,. Core Spray and ADS) and the integrated performance of the-emergency core cooling systems are described in analyses referenced in Section 6.5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.~ Periodic i
surveillance of pumps and valves is performed in accordance with ASME-1 Code,Section XI, to the extent described in the Inservice-Testing l
Plan, to verify that the systems will provide the flow rates' required 2
by the respective analyses. HPCI and RCIC flow tests are performed
'l at two pressures so that the systems' capability to provide rated
-l flow over their operating range is verified. To avoid damaging Core
~
Spray system valves during Core Spray pump flow testing, throttling
}
is not normally performed to obtain-a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 2105 psig. Pump curves are used to determine equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure for the Core Spray 1
pumps in order to meet the Surveillance Requirements. HPSW flow tests verify that rated flow can be delivered to the RHR heat exchangers.
The testing' interval for the core and containment cooling systems is.
based on industry practice, sound engineering judgment and i
practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, in the case:of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is_ not desirable.
1 Complete ADS testing during power operation causes an undesirable loss-of-coolant inventory. To increase the availability of the core-and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the j
system; i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valves,.etc., are tested-i frequently. The pumps and motor operated injection valves are also i
tested each month to assure their operability. ~ A simulated automatic j
actuation test once each cycle combined with frequent tests of the pumps and injection valves.is deemed.to be adequate testing of these systems.
.j The flow path piping of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air.
l Maintaining the pump discharge lines' of the HPCI system, Core Spray i
system, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will j
perform properly, injecting its fullL capacity into'the reactor '
i pressure vessel upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of.
ensuring that the lines are full.is to vent at the high points.-lAn acceptable method of ensuring the LPCI and Core Spray system discharge lines are full is to verify the absence of the associated
" keep fill" system accumulator alarms.
l 1
While the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS j
subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To-provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are 3
required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition.
l
-141-Amendment No. Id, 162, 199 l
v i
j.
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4.5 ESEE(Cont'd.)
Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freauencies However, one LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and
~
considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually realig~ned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned'for decay heat removal. A note allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR system to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the reactor vessel, and the system is not othenvise inoperable. Manual realignment to allow injection into the reactor vessel in the LPCI i
mode may also include opening the drag valve to establish the required LPCI subsystem flow rate. This will~ ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent reactor vessel draindown should occur...
Sufficient time will be available to manually align and' initiate LPCI-subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel i
uncovery. Only one required Core' Spray. subsystem may take credit for the condensate storage tank supply option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel as stated in the note to e
i Surveillance' Requirement 4.5.F.2(b). During operations with a potential-for draining the reactor vessel, the volume in the condensate storage tank may.not provide adequate. makeup if the reactor vessel were completely drained. Therefore, only one Core Spray subsystem is allowed to use the condensate storage tank as a source of water. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.
I When components and subsystems are out-of-service, overall. core and i
containment cooling reliability is maintained by verifying the l
operability of the remaining redundant cooling systems that the Limiting Conditions for Operation require to be operable during the j
allowable out-of-service time period. Verifying operability in this context means to administrative 1y ensure that the remaining required systems or subsystems areinot known to be inoperable (for example:
i confirming that equipment necessary for the systems or. subsystems to-perform their safety functions are not blocked out of service'for i
maintenance, checking the status of selected surveillances on the remaining required systems or subsystems and checking that selected valves are in the correct position as indicated on the control room-1 panels). Performance of operability tests is not required.
4.5 I&J igngD1ance Reauirements Bases Averaae and Local LHGR The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a' few control rods are moved
' daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.
-141a-Amendment No. 18, 33, Z55, 184, _j 199
1 Unit 3 J
- PBAPS i.>
l 4.5.K Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - Surveillance Reauirement At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the j
moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating I
plant experience indicated that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. With this low void content, any inadvertent. core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative mode relative to MCPR. During-initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at 25% thermal power level with minimum recirculation pump speed.
j The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future MCPR evaluation below this power level will be shown to be unnecessary.
The daily requirement for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.
I The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a change in power or power shape (regardless of magnitude) that could place operation at a thermal limit.
4.5.L MCPR Limits for Core Flows Other Than Rated A flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is necessary to assure that the safety limit MCPR is not violated during recirculation flow increase events. The design basis flow increase event is a slow-power increase event which is not terminated by scram, but which stabilizes I
at a new core power corresponding to the maximum possible core flow.
Flow runout events are analyzed along a constant xenon flow control line assuming a quasi steady state heat balance.
The flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The MCPR(F) is independent'of. the rated flow limit provided in Specification 3.5.K.2 and 3.5.K.3.
To verify applicability of this curve to PBAPS, recirculation" flow runout events were analyzed with a PBAPS specific model at a typical mid cycle exposure condition. These flow runout events were simulated along the Maximum Extended Lotd Line Limit rod line to the maximum core flow runout value of 10M. The results of the analyses indicated that application of the MCPR(F) curve will preclude a violation of the MCPR safety limit in the event of a recirculation flow runout. The MCPR(F) curve is cycle independent.
I
-141b-Amendment No. Z8, dI,155, Z84,199-
Unit 3' PBAPS l
l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I
3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Aonlicability;-
Aeolicability:
Apples to the operating Applies to the primary and status of the primary and secondary containment secondary containment integrity.
systems.
obiective:
obiective:
To verify the integrity of To assure the integrity of the primary and secondary the primary and secondary containment.
containment system.
Soecification:
)
Snacification:
i 1.
The suppression chamber i
A.
Primary Containment water level and temperature shall be checked.once per d
1.
Whenever the nuclear day.
i system is pressurized l
above atmospheric pressure 2.
Whenever there is~in-or work is being done dication of relief valve-which has the potential operation (except when l
to drain the vessel, the reactor is being the. pressure suppression shutdown and torus pool water volume and cooling-is being es-temperature shall be tablished) or testing maintained within the.
which adds heat to the, following limits except suppression pool, the a
as specified by 3.7.A.2, pool temperature shall or when inoperability be continually monitored of the core spray systems, and also observed and the LPCI and containment logged every 5 minutes cooling subsystems is until the heat addition permissible as provided is terminated.
l for in 3.5.F:
- 3. Whenever there is indication a.
Minimum water volume-of relief valve operation 3
122,900 ft with the local' suppression j
pool temperature reaching 200*F 1
b.
Maximum water volume-or more, an external visual 3
127,300 ft examination of the suppression chamber shall be conducted be-fore resuming power operation.
4.
A visual inspection of the sup-l pression chamber interior, in-cluding water line regions shall-be made.at each major refueling outage.
-165-Amendment No. 64, 95, 199
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