ML20072H510
| ML20072H510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000447 |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1983 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072H495 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306290504 | |
| Download: ML20072H510 (27) | |
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UNITED STATES 0F AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0MMISSION In the matter of )
General Electric Company ) Docket No. STN 50-447 Standard Plant )
AMENDMENT NO. 16 TO APPLICATION FOR REVIEW 0F 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (GESSAR II)
General Electric Company, applicant in the above captioned prsteeding, hereby files Amendment No. 16 to the 238 Nuclear Island General Electric Standard Safety Analysis Report (GESSAR II).
Amendment No.16 further amends GESSAR II by providing an assessment of design features which reduce sabotage risk. Rather than quantifying the sabotage risk in probabilistic terms, the assessment identifies features which plant operators have available to inhibit or mitigate postulated acts of sabotage. The assessment addresses the balanced reached in the GESSAR II design between protecting against sabotage and not interfering with normal and emergency plant operations. The assessment concludes
"% that the design provides protection against sabotage which is compatible
) with overall safety goals and is consistent with existing design and operational requirements.
Respectfully submitted, General Electric Company By: s/ Joseph F. Quirk Joseph F. Quirk, Manager BWR Systems Licensing STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ss:
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA )
On this 15th day of June in the year 1983, before me, Karen S. Vogelhuber, Notary Public, personally appeared Joseph F. Quirk, personally proved to me on the basis of satisfaction evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument and acknowledged that he executed it.
By: s/ Karen S. Vogelhuber Notary Public - California Santa Clara County My Commission Expires December 21, 1984 O
V 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 B306290504 830615 DR ADOCK 05000 JFQ:hmm/006142-2
! GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 1
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING AMENDMENT NO.16 For uniformity, a new tab for Appendix IE is provided. A tab is also included for Appendix 1F.
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Remove and insert the pages listed below. Dashes (----) in the remove or insert column indicate no action required.
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Insert Remove Appendix 1F
Insert new Appendix 1F Chapter 13 I 13.6-1 through 13.6-14 13.6-1/13.6-2 and
- 13.6-3 through 13.6-14 1
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0 Amendment 16 June 15, 1983
GESSAR II 22A7007 230 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 O
APPENDIX 1F DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS REDUCING SABOTAGE RISK O
O 104302*-1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rsv. 16 APPENDIX 1F CONTENTS Section Title Page 1F.0 INTRODUCTION 1F.0-1 1F.1 BWR SABOTAGE INHIBITORS 1F.1-1 1F.1.1 Multiplicity or Redundancy of Safety IF.1-4 Systems 1F.1.1.1 Shutdown Mechanisms (Reactivity Control) 1F.1-5 1F.1.1.1.1 Control Rods 1F.1-5 1F.1.1.1.2 Standby Liquirl Control System 1F,1-5 1F.1.1.1.3 Moderator Control 1F.1-5 i
1F.1.1.2 Water Supplies IF.1-6
()
l 1F.1.1.2.1 Feedwater 1F.1-6
( 1F.1.1.2.2 Condensate 1F.1-6 1F.1.1.2.3 High Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-7 l 1F.1.1.2.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 1F.1-7 1F.1.1.2.5 Control Rod Drive System 1F.1-8 1F.1.1.2.6 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Function 1F.1-8 1F.1.1.2.7 Low Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-8 1F.1.1.2.8 Essential Service Water System 1F.1-9 1F.1.1.2.9 Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup System 1F.1-9 1F.1.1.2.10 Fire Pumps 1F.1-9 1F.1.1.3 Decay Heat Removal 1F.1-10 1F.1.1.3.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel 1F.1-10 1F.1.1.3.1.1 Main Condenser 1F.1-10
~s 1F-i IO4302*-2
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rsv. 16 CONTENTS (Continued) i Section Title Page 1F.1.1.3.1.2 Steam Condensing Function 1F.1-ll 1F.1.1.3.1.3 Shutdown Cooling Function 1F.1-11 .
1F.1.1.3.1.4 Alternate Shutdown Cooling 1F.1-11 1F.1.1.3.1.5 Reactor Water Cleanup System 1F.1-12 1F.1.1.3.1.6 Fuel Fool Cooling and Cleanup System 1F.1-12 1F.1.1.3.2 RPV/ Containment or Suppression Pool 1F.1-13 1F.1.1.3.2.1 Passive Heat Absorption 1F.1-13 1F.1.1.3.2.2 Suppression Pool Cooling and 1F.1-13 Containment Spray IF.1.1.3.2.3 Alternate Shutdown Cooling 1F.1-14 1F.1.1.3.2.4 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 1F.1-14 1F.1.1.3.2.5 Feed and Bleed to Radwaste 1F.1-14 1F.1.1.3.3 Spent Fuel 1F.1-14 O
1F.1.2 Location of Equipment 1F.1-15 1F.1.2.1 Shutdown Mechanisms (Reactivity Control) 1F.1-15 1F.1.2.1.1 Control Rods IF.1-15 1F.1.2.1.2 Standby Liquid Control System 1F.1-16 1F.1.2.1.3 Moderator Control 1F.1-16 1F.1.2.2 Water Supplies 1F.1-16 1F.1.2.2.1 Feedwater 1F.1-17 1F.1.2.2.2 Condensate 1F.1-17 1F.1.2.2.3 High Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-17 1F.1.2.2.4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 1F.1-18 1F.1.2.2.5 Control Rod Drive System 1F.1-19 O
1F-ii 104302*-3
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page 1F.1.2.2.6 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Function 1F.1-19 1F.1.2.2.7 Low Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-20 1F.1.2.2.8 Essential Service Water System 1F.1-21 1F.1.2.2.9 Fire Pumps IF.1-22 1F.1.2.2.10 Pipe Chases 1F.1-22 1F.1.2.3 Decay Heat Removal 1F.1-22 1F.1.2.3.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel 1F.1-22 1F.1.2.3.1.1 Main Condenser 1F.1-23 1F.1.2.3.1.2 Steam condensing Function 1F.1-23 1F.1.2.3.1.3 Shutdown Cooling Function 1F.1-24 1F.1.2.3.1.4 Alternate Shutdown Cooling 1F.1-24
() 1F.1.2.3.1.5 1F.1.2.3.1.6 Reactor Water Cleanup System Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 1F.1-25 1F.1-25 1F.1.2.3.2 RPV/ Containment or Suppression Pool 1F.1-26 1F.1.2.3.2.1 Passive Heat Absorption 1F.1-26 1F.1.2.3.2.2 Suppression Pool Cooling and 1F.1-26 Containment Spray IF.1.2.3.2.3 Alternate Shutdown Cooling 1F.1-27 1F.1.2.3.2.4 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 1F.1-27 1F.1.2.3.2.5 Feed and Bleed to Radwaste 1F.1-27
, 1F.1.2.3.3 Spent Fuel 1F.1-28 1F.1.2.4 Electrical Power Separation 1F.1-28 1F.1.2.4.1 Electrical Divisions IF.1-29 l 1F.1.2.4.2 Battery Rooms 1F.1-30 l
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1F-iii 104302*-4
CESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page O
1F.1.3 Access Control 1F.1-30 1F.1.3.1 Plant Site Protected Area 1F.1-30 1F.1.3.1.1 Conformance with 10CFR73.55 1F.1-31 1F.1.3.2 Site Facilities IF.1-31 1F.1.3.2.1 Reactor Building 1F.1-31 1F.1.3.2.2 Shield Building 1F.1-31 '
1F.1.3.2.3 Containment 1F.1-31 1F.1.3.2.3.1 Subcompartments 1F.1-32 1F.1.3.2.4 Auxiliary Building 1F.1-32 1F.1.3.2.4.1 Individual Pump Rooms IF.1-32 1F.1.3.2.5 Drywell 1F.1-33 1F.1.3.2.6 Control Room 1F.1-33 1F.1.3.2.7 Fuel Building 1F.1-34 1F.1.3.2.8 Radwaste Building 1F.1-34 1F.1.3.2.9 Diesel-Generator Buildings IF.1-34 l
l l 1F.1.4 Self-Test System and Status Monitoring 1F.1-35 1F.1.4.1 Self-Test System Design Considerations IF.1-35 l
1F.1.4.2 Self-Test System Operational 1F.1-36 Considerations IF.1.4.3 Status Monitoring Design Considerations IF.1-37 1F.1.4.4 Status Monitoring Operational 1F.1-38 Considerations IF.1.4.5 Conclusions on Self-Test System and 1F.1-38 Status Monitoring O
1F-iv 104302*-5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page 1F.1.5 Passive Core Cooling Capability IF.1-38 1F.1.5.1 Suppression Pool 1F.1-39 1F.1.5.2 Condensate Storage Tanks 1F.1-40 1F.1.5.3 Natural Circulation 1F.1-40 1
1F.2 BWR SABOTAGE MITIGATORS (DAMAGE CONTROL) 1F.2-1 1F.2.1 Symptom-Oriented Emergency Procedure 1F.2-1 Guidelines 1F.2.1.1 Reactor Shutdown 1F.2-1 1F.2.1.1.1 Normal Shutdown 1F.2-2 1F.2.1.1.2 Reactor Scram 1F.2-2 1F.2.1.1.3 Back-Up Reactivity Control 1F.2-2
() 1F.2.1.1.3.1 1F.2.1.1.3.2 Moderator Control Standby Liquid Control System 1F.2-2 1F.2-3 1F.2.1.2 Water Inventory Control 1F.2-3 1F.2.1.2.1 Direct Indication of Water Level in 1F.2-4 the RPV and the Suppression Pool 1F.2.1.3 Containment Control 1F.2-4 l
1F.2.2 Fission Product Retention 1F.2-5 1F.2.2.1 Retention in Water 1F.2-7 1F.2.2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel 1F.2-7 f 1F.2.2.1.2 Suppression Pool 1F.2-8 j 1F.2.2.1.3 Containment Spray IF.2-8 l
1F.2.2.2 Containment Retention by Plateout 1F.2-8 1F.2.2.3 Retention on Filters IF.2-8
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page 1F.2.2.3.1 Off-Gas System 1F.2-9 1F.2.2.3.2 Standby Gas Treatment System 1F.2-9 1F.3 ASSESSMENT AGAINST NRC SABOTAGE STUDIES 1F.3-1 1F.3.1 Purpose 1F.3-1 IF.3.2 Assessment Studies IF.3-1 1F.3.3 Study Descriptions 1F.3-2 1F.3.4 Study Results IF.3-5 1F.3.5 238 Nuclear Island Assessment versus 1F.3-7 NRC Study Results IF.4 BALANCING SAFETY AND SABOTAGE 1F.4-1 CONSIDERATIONS 1F.4.1 Physical Protection 1F.4-1 1F.4.2 Damage Control 1F.4-1 1F.4.3 Plant Design Features IF.4-2 1F.5 CONCLUSIONS 1F.5-1 O
1F-vi 104302*-7
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 TABLES Table Title Page 1F.1-1 Electrical System Separation 1F.1-41 1F.1-2 Equipment Locations - Support Systems IF.1-43 IF.1-3 Security System and Access Control 1F.1-44 1F.1-4 Major Equipment Inside Containment 1F.1-45 1F.2-1 Equipment Locations - Systems Available 1F.2-ll to Supply Water to Reactor k
1F.2-2 Coolant Sources to Reactor 1F.2-12 0 1F.2-3 Sources for Inventory Makeup to 1F.2-13 Suppression Pool 1F.2-4 Inventory Makeup Sources for Suppression 1F.2-14 Pool O
1F-vii/lF-viii 104302*-8
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 FIGURES Figure Title Page 1F.1-1 Typical Feedwater System 1F.1-47 1F.1-2 High Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-48 1F.1-3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 1F.1-49 1F.1-4 Residual Heat Removal System, Low 1F.1-50 Pressure Coolant Injection Function 1F.1-5 Low Pressure Core Spray System 1F.1-51 1F.1-6 Essential Service Water Supply System 1F.1-52 (Typical)
() 1F.1-7 Residual Heat Removal System, Steam Condensing Function 1F.1-53 1F.1-8 Residual Heat Removal System, Shutdown 1F.1-54 Cooling Function 1F.1-9 Residual Heat Removal System, Suppres- 1F.1-55 sion Pool Cooling Function 1F.1-10 Reactor Water Cleanup System 1F.1-56 1F.1-11 Fuel Building and Containment Pools 1F.1-57 Cooling and Cleanup System 1F.1-12 GESSAR II Passive Heat Sink Capacity 1F.1-58 4
1F-ix 104302*-9
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 FIGURES (Continued)
Figure Title Page 1F.1-13 Plan at Elevation (-) 6 ft. 10 in. 1F.1-59 1F.1-14 Typical GESSAR II Plant 1F.1-60 1F.1-15 ECCS, CRD and FPC Pump Locations in 1F.1-61 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings at EL (-) 32 ft. O in.
1F.1-16 ECCS Pumps and RHR Heat Exchangers in 1F.1-62 Auxiliary Building, Section D-D 1F.1-17 RHR and FPC Heat Exchangers and RWCU 1F.1-63 Pumps in Reactor, Auxiliary, and Fuel Buildings at EL (-) 6 ft. 10 in.
1F.1-18 RHR and RWCU Pumps in Section A-A of 1F.1-64 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Arrangement
- 1F.1-19 Schematic Representation of AC Power 1F.1-65 l Supplies I
1F.1-20 Battery Rooms and RHR Heat Exchangers IF.1-66 in Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings I at EL 11 ft. O in.
1F.1-21 Separation of Divisions IF.1-67 Diesel Generator Buildings at EL(-) 6 ft. 10 in.
1F-x O
104302*-10
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16
() FIGURES (Continued)
Figure Title Page 1F.1-22 Compartments and Components in Reactor 1F.1-68
! Building, Section B-B (See also Figure 1.2-10) 1F.1-23 NSPS Self-Test System Arrangement 1F.1-69 1 1F.1-24 NSPS Automatic Test Sequence 1F.1-70 1F.1-25 Drywell and Pool Fission Product 1F.1-71 Barriers IF.1-26 Decay Heat Removal via Natural 1F.1-72
() Circulation 1F.2-1 Boiling Water Reactor Water Level 1F.2-15 Measurement l
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- O 1F-xi/1F-xii 104302*-11
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 (D
\-) APPENDIX 1F DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS REDUCING SABOTAGE RISK 1F.0 INTRODUCTION This appendix provides General Electric's description of the 238 Nuclear Island design features that reduce the risk from postulated acts of sabotage. Features are described which both inhibit sabotage and mitigate or lessen the effects on the public health and safety should the saboteur disable safety systems or initiate an event.
l The basic required plant safety functions for either transient or sabotage initiated events are those to shut down the reactor, maintain core cooling and remove the decay heat. It
~> will be shown that there are multiple and diverse means to accomplish each of these functions and that component locations are in separated compartments with multiple restrictions on access.
Postulated acts of sabotage will be thwarted by these design features used in conjunction with the Applicant's active systems to satisfy 10CFR Section 73.55.
The Applicant will provide additional equipment and procedures to control access to the plant and designated plant systems to further inhibit radiological sabotage in compliance with Section 73.55 of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations.
These provisions are in addition to the description herein and will be documented by the Applicant.
O 1F.0-1 RDH:hmm/D02085*
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 l
l 1F.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued) ;
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Reducing sabotage risk has been a long-standing and continuing l objective for energy-producing as well as other industries.
Radiological sabotage, as defined in 10CFR73.2, is the major concern addressed by this appendix. Radiological sabotage is differentiated from war-related or subversive-type sabotage principally by the degree of damage that may be inflicted, i.e., rocket or armored vehicle attacks or damage from high level explosives are sabotage initiators beyond the scope of this appendix.
This appendix considers acts of sabotage which may be postulated to be the work of a single individual or a group of individuals and may be committed by a person on the power plant staff (insider) and/or by other individuals (outsider). Both the insider and outsiders are assumed to be well trained, capable and determined to accomplish their goal within limitations of ll l
the design-basis threat as defined in 10CFR73(a)(1).
For those few events where the saboteur is postulated to succeed in disabling one or more components or systems, the I
1 symptom-oriented Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) would aid the operator in achieving the shutdown, core cocling and decay heat removal functions. The combination of the symptom-l oriented EPGs and the Nuclenet Control Room, including the l Self-Test System, Status Monitoring and the Emergency Response Information System (ERIS), assures that the operator receives clear instructions to restore necessary functions. This is done without any delay in trying to determine which equipment has been sabotaged.
O' 1F.0-2 RDH:hmm/D02085*
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 1F.0 INTRODUCTION (Continued)
Additional margin for protecting the public health and safety by having the capability to mitigate the effects of sabotage comes in the Boiling Water Reactor's inherent fission product retention capability. For the scenarios where sabotage is postulated to interrupt core cooling causing the release of fission products, fission product retention mechanisms, such as pool scrubbing and plateout, would act to minimize the transport of fission products beyond the containment barrier.
The 238 Nuclear Island achieves a balance between having adequate access to expeditiously accomplish all normal and emergency actions while also restricting access to lessen the probability of sabotage. In this manner, the potentially conflicting design objectives between safety and sabotage
) considerations are addressed.
Design considerations to inhibit and mitigate postulated acts of sabotage to the 238 Nuclear Island are described and presented in the following sections. The combination of these multiple features with the Applicant's security system will assure the public health and safety against postulated acts of radiological sabotage.
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i GESSAR II 22A7007 j 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 i
1F.1 BWR SABOTAGE INHIBITORS i
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i GE PROPRIETARY - provided under separate cover i =
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1F.1-1 through 1F.1-72 l l
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GESSAR II 22A7007 j 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 lO i i
1F.2 BWR SABOTAGE MITIGATORS (DAMAGE CONTROL) i i
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GE PROPRIETARY - provided under separate cover l
1F.2-1 through 1F.2-15/1F.2-16 RDH:hmm/D05126*
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1F.3 ASSESSMENT AGAINST NRC SABOTAGE STUDIES GE PROPRIETARY - provided under separate cover O
1F.3-1 through 1F.3-9/1F.3-10 RDH:hmm/D05126*
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 J
1F.4 BALANCING SAFETY AND SABOTAGE CONSIDERATIONS 4
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1F.4-1 through 1F.4-4 l
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 1F.5
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS t
O This appendix has provided a description of the 238 Nuclear Island design features that inhibit and mitigate postulated acts of sabotage. The inhibiting aspects of the multiple redundancies in shutdown mechanisms, water supplies and decay heat removal methods are presented. The redundant systems capable of performing these functions are located in separate compartments at several elevations and in'different buildings with individual pipe chases for important water supply systems. This physical separation further inhibits postulated acts of sabotage.
There are four separate electrical divisions with off-site power available from three separate sources. Each division has its own batteries for DC power, and three divisions have individual diesel / generators located in two separate buildings to supply emergency on-site AC power. Division cable routing
(')
v includes separated raceways, cable tunnels plus separated cable rooms in the Control Building.
Access control to important features begins at the protected area boundary, and continues throughout the individual compartments.
The Applicants compliance with 10CFR73.55 is aided by the Nuclear Island's provision of key-locked doors, electric-locked doors, vestibules and mounting boxes for access control devices.
The 238 Nuclear Island includes passive features which provide added assurance of protecting the public against postulated acts of sabotage. These passive features include natural circulation within the RPV plus the heat sink and scrubbing capability of the suppression pool. Since these features do not require active components, they are not Ch (l
RDH:hmm/D042911* 1F.5-1 6/14/83
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 1F.5
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued)
O subject to postulated acts of sabotage. Their inhibiting and mitigating capabilities to provide adequate core cooling, accommodate decay heat and retain fission products can be assured for sabotage as well as transient initiated events.
Directions for mitigating postulted acts of sabotage are provided to the operators via the EPGs. These symptom-oriented procedures specify actions for achieving safe shutdown using normal or alternate reactivity controls and water supplies.
These damage control type activities are aided by design features of direct water level indications for both the RPV and the suppression pool and by the ERIS and Nuclenet Control Room. Other important features are multiple control locations, multiple power supplies and the capability to manually intertie divisional power supplies and water supply systems.
Further mitigation of extremely severe (and highly unlikely) postulated sabotage scenarios is provided by the fission product retention features of the 238 Nuclear Island. These features include the Condenser offgas System, the suppression pool, the Containment Spray System and the Standby Gas Treatment System.
Radiological sabotage studies by NRC contractors have concluded that structural changes to a plant similar to the 238 Nuclear Island design would not significantly enhance or provide additiona) protection against postulated acts of sabotage.
Their basis for this conclusion is that current designs include sufficient compartmentalization. The contractor conclusions regarding upgraded security computers and other security matters are the responsibility of the Applicant.
Another contractor conclusion is that damage control can be O
RDH:hmm/D042911* 1F.5-2 6/14/83
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 1F.5
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued)
C%
V effective in sabotage mitigation provided it uses installed systems and components. The EPGs specify damage control type activities and use installed systems and components.
1 This appendix has provided sufficient information to conclude that the design features of the 238 Nuclear Island plus the Applicant's programs for compliance with 10CFR73.55 will assure the public health and safety against postulated acts of radiological sabotage.
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GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 16 i
13.6 INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
,' 13.6.1 Preliminary Planning Not required for an FSAR.
i 13,6.2 Security Plan l To be provided by Applicant i
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