ML20072F549

Forwards Draft Revised Responses to NRC Questions 410.05, 410.10,410.37,410.52,410.85 & 410.89,per Telcon W/Auxiliary Sys Branch.Responses Will Be Incorporated in FSAR Scheduled for Jul 1983

ML20072F549
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	06/23/1983
From:	Bradley E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8306270459
Download: ML20072F549 (20)

Text

i g-J' PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 7,,,",^,,",'""'

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E2ist e41-4ooo amo esNERAL COUNSEk CUGENE J. BR ADLEY

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ASSOceATE eENEmAL COUNSEb DON ALD BLANKEN RUDOLPH A. CHILLEMI E. C. KI R K H A LL T. H. M AMER CORNELL PAUL AUERBACH June 23 1983 ASSISTANT eENEmAL COUNSEb CDW ARD J. CULLEN. JR.

THOM AS H. MILLER. JR.

IREN E A. MCKENN A ASS 5Sf ANT CCUNSEb Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing 3 ratch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Kucleer Regulator / Commission Washington, DC 20555 Subj ect:

Lincrick Geacrating St'itioit, Units 1 6 2 Infernation for Auxiliary System: Branch (ASB)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Attached are draft revised responses to NRC Questions 410.05, 410.10, 410.37, 410.52, 410.85, and 410.89, resulting from telephone discussions with Mr. John Ridgely of the Auxiliary Systems Branch.

The information contained in these draft FSAR page changes will be incorporated into the FSAR exactly as it appears on the attachments in the revision scheduled for July,1983.

Sincerely, Euge e J Bradicy SAJ/cmv/B9 Attachment 1

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t Copy to:

See Attached Service List B306270459 830623 PDR ADOCK 05000352 A

PDR

D pc cc:

Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosurs)

Judge Richard F. Cole Judge Peter A. Morris Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.

Mr. Frank R. Romano Mr. Robert L. Anthony Mr'. Marvin I. Lewis Judith A. Dorsey, Esq.

Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg Thomas Y. Au, Esq.

Mr. Thomas Gerusky Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Steven P. Hershey Charles W. Elliott, Esq.

Donald S. Bronstein, Esq.

Ifr. Joseph H. White, III David Wersan, Esq.

Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.

Martha W. Bush, Esq.

Atomic Safety and ~ Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Lice ising Beard Panel Docl:et and Service Section Spence W. Perry, Esq.

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OUESTION 410.5 (Section 3.4.1)

For those non-seismic Category I vessels, pipes and tanks located outside of buildings, discuss the effect of failure of these items end any potential flooding of safety related structures, systems and components.

Provide a similar discussion for non-tornado protected vessels, tanks and piping,

RESPONSE

The failure of non-seismic Category I and non-tornado protected tanks, vessels, and major pipes located outside buildings (Table 410.5-1) will not adversely affect safety-related structures, systems, and components as discussed below.

' tank J, ail ures The location of tanks in the yard area is shown in Figure 3.8-58.

Failure of the tanks on the west ar.d south sides of the power plant complex (Table 410.5-1, items 1 through 5) will not ccuse l

poter.tial floodi.ng of. saf ety-related structures, systems, 'and l

components.

Any flooding due to a, failure of these tanks will-ba l

contained within seismic Category I!A earth dikes, which will l

retrain stable under botn static and dynamic conditions.

Tre design of the earth dikes is discessed in the responses lo OJestions 240.4 and 241.14.

The tanks on the north side of the power plant complex (Table 410.5-1, items 6 through 9) do not have seismically designed containments around them.

Failure of these tanks could cause local flooding.

This flooding would not adversely affect safety-related facilities for the following reasons:

a.

Surface drainage in this area will drain water towards the Schuylkill River and Possom Hollow Run before it can reach the power plant complex.

b.

Seismic Category I electrical cable and duct banks I

located in the vicinity of these tanks are adequate, as discussed in the response to Question 410.6.

ailure of Coolino Tower Basin Wall (Table 410.5-1, items 10 &

11)

The power plant complex is protected from flooding due to a break of the cooling tower basin wall by a seismic Category IIA earth dike, which will remain stable under both static and dynamic conditions.

In addition, the dike has been determined to be

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adequate for the design tornado effects.

This dike will be Nfob k//$tthb fMf.5-1 v

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constructed to El. 264.0 ft, which is 1.25 feet higher than the normal water elevation in the basin.

This protective dike extends from the west-east centerline of the cooling tower and along the southern boundary as shown in Figures 2.4-5 and 2.4-6.

The runoff pattern of water from the cooling tower basin will be similar to that caused by intense storm precipitation as shown in Figures 2.4-4 and 2.4-5.

The flood water from the cooling tower basin will run west towards the Schuylkill River without reaching the power plant complex.

The seismic Category I electrical cables and duct banks located in the vicinity of the cooling tower basin are adequate, as discussed in the response to Question 410.6.

l failure;of Circulatinc__ Water Conduit (Table 410.5-1, item 12) i' Feilure of the conduit within the yard area between the cooling tower busin and tue turbino enclosure will cause flooding of this ares.

Water from the dan.ageo conduit will erode the soil. cover and flood the yard,

'"he runoff pattern will be similar to that shown in Figure 2.4-4.

The seismic Cstegory I electrical cable and duct banks and valve pits, Iccated in this area are adequate, as discussed in the l

respense to Question 410.6.

In the most severe case, all the water from the cooling tower basia could drain through the damaged conduit into the yard area between the cooling water pumphouse and turbine enclosure and cause flooding of the condenser pit.

However, safety-related systems and components would not be damaged, as discussed in Section 10.4.1.3.3.

See also tne response to Question 410.92.

1 Failure of Maior Yard Pipino Failure of any of the pipes identified in Table 410.5-1, items 13 through 17, may cause local flooding.

However, the intensity and volume of water discharge from any of the pipes is less than that of the cooling water conduit failure discussed above and would not cause damage to any safety-related facilities.

Soil erosion caused by failure of these pipes is discussed in the response to Question 410.47.

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QpESTION 410.10 (Section 3.5.1)

Provide a discussion of an analysis for each rotating component which verifies that if an internally generated missile were generated; the casing would be capable of retaining the missile.

For each rotating component whose casing cannot retain the internally generated missile and the missile could damage safety-related equipment, provide (1) a discussion of the methods used to protect the safety-related train and its redundant train and other safety-related structure, systems and components in the path of the missile and (2) a drawing showing the component, missile paths, means of protection for other equipment, and the redundant safety-related train.

This applies to both inside and outside containment.

I 1.

Verify that no secondary missiles will be generated from I

any internally generated missile.

2.

Verify that any internally generated missile from l

safety-related equipment will not affect the redendant safety-related train.

i 3.

Provide the bt31s for cencluding that "...other rctating components..., such as fcos, do not have rufficient l-energy ts (he)... considered E;issilo nazards. "

RESPONSE

I 1.

The bases for considering it unlikely for rotating components, other than those identified in Section 3.5.1, to break through their casings and adversely impact safety-related equipment are the following:

l

%sM Areviewofeventreportsonfileat[theNuclearSafety Information Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, concerning failures of fans.and missile generat on indicated that no fan failures have resulted in generation f missiles in safety-related areas of a nuclear facility.

/ ump failures resulting in generation of missiles, vi. 6 d aM Ure n 1 5 t M i C n 5wsile. 2.5.b are considered more improbable than fan failures resulting in generation of missiles because pump casings are generally thicker than fan casings and pump speeds are generally lower than fan speeds.

Even in the unlikely event that a rotating component does break through its casing, much cf the component's kinetic energy would be dissipated in moving through the casing, thereby decreasing the probability of the component adversely damaging.a safety-410.10-1 Rev.

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related component.

Therefore, generation of secondary l.

missiles from the internally generated missiles described above is not considered credible.

It is an even lower j

probability that a rotating component would adversely affect redundant safety-related systems because redundant equipment l

1s generally located in different areas or separated by l

barriers.

Medm hot-orr%d Mdeks bm hipt ret:in tiie pbm?' h 7tm:0 a t: tin? _c penent: 3.;;; ;;;in; :;nn_

ietecn;11j generated ris;i k a discussed in Section 3.5.1.

Potential missile sources identified outside primary containment are the residual heat removal and core spray pumps whose impeller sections are surrounded by concrete, and the HPCI and RCIC turbines whose missiles would be contained by their concrete compartment walls.

These compartment walls t

would also retain any secondary generated missiles Failure i

of the reef rculation pur'p or motor (located inside containment) would not result in da.r. age to the containment er il vi al equipment, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.2.

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rotating components inside containment are unlikely to.

'l produce missiles capable of penetrating their casing.

l 2.

As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the Internally generated l

missiles described above will not affect the redundent safety-related train.

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3.

The bases for concluding that "... other rotating components..., such as fans, do not have sufficient energy to (be) considered missile hazards," are the reasons discussed in Item 1 above.Am d o 6 c o<. A J W y,

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l OUESTION 410.37-(Section 9.1.2, 9.1.4)

Verify that the maximum potential kinetic energy resulting from dropping each object of less weight than a spent fuel assembly

'l and its handling tool, which will be handled over spent fuel, will not exceed the effects of the fuel handling accidentProvide a list of all described in Section 15.7.4 of the FSAR.

l objects considered and a discussion of the analysis, i

RESPONSE

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90E3719N_410.52 (Section 9.2.2)

The Standard Review Plan specifles the use of automatically operated isolation valves to separate essential (seismic Category I) from non-essential (non-seismic Category I) piping.

FSAR Figure 9.2-2 does not show these valves and their control systems.

Commit to providing these valves and show them on a revised FSAR Figure 9.2-2.

RESP 9NSE The response to Question 410.53 describes the provisions for automatic isolation of the essential (emergency _ service water) from non-essential (service water) piping.

FSAR Figure 9.2-2 shows these valves.

7ke c1cck valves 8;lI2ecI I $ 8fd. Infor[ Aces will be ver;$;ed To be Megahle u d So have. less M Io y IeMay as W OS N lSE hsaulce. 5sfectw Q w,

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Describe the means provided to assure transfer of essential heat loads from the nonsafety related Service Water System to the Essential Service Water System under accident conditions.

RESPONSE

Essential heat loads normally cooled by the service water system are automatically transferred to the emergency service water (ESW) system under accident conditions.

This transfer is accomplished by the following automatic valve realignments:

The normally open check valve in each service water a) supply line closes as a result of the trip of the service water pumps and the start of the ESW pumps.

The normally closed check valve in each ESW supply line b) opens as a result of the start of the ESW pumps.

The normally open isolation valves installed in series c) in each service water discharge line close on an ESW

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pump start signal, The normally closed isolation valves installed in d) parallel in each ESW discharge line open on an ESW pump start signal.

The above valves are shown on Figure 9.2-2, sheets 2 and 3.

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OUESTION 410.85 (Section 9.4.6, 9.4.7)

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(a) Assuming the outside air temperature is at its maximum value of 106*F, verify that diesel generators will not fail at full load.

Specify the maximum temperature in the diesel generator cell.

l (b) Assuming the outside air temperature is at its maximum value l

of 1060F verify that no emergency or reeliual heat removal service water pump will fail.

Specify the maximum temperature in the spray pond pump room.

RESPONSE

The design basis for the outdoor air temperature used in designing the HYAC systems for the spray pond pumphouse and for the diesel generator enclosure is in accordance with the 1977 ASHRAE Fundamentals, Volume 1, Chapter 23.

The use of ASHRAE is consistent with the practices used by other plants in the nuclear p industry.

Table 1ofChapter23ofthe1977ASHRAEFundamentalsrh5##p' shows that the highest 1% design dry-bulb temperature for the

[2 areas around Limerick is 940F, A design outside air temperature

/7 of 950F was conservatively used for Limerick futi;h ::rr;:e:h?:

N;sres.JI4 4* a maximum internal room temperature of 1150F for both items a) and b) above.

The diesel generators and emergency and residual heat removal service water pumps were qualified to operate at this design room temperature throughout their normal operating liv 6s and any accident conditions.

The 1% design dry-bulb temperatures provided in ASHRAE represent l

values that have been equalled or exceeded for 1% of the total JTufgr7' hours during the summer months of June through September.

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\\Mwever, be few hours a year in which the room temperature mighjfenceed 1150F due to an outside air temperature between 95 and(1060F would not adversely affect the operation of the safety-related equipment in the diesel compartments or the spray pond pumphouse.

The higher room temperatures would not cause a prompt failure of.

4he safety-related equipment in these compartments. groom 410.85-1 Rev. 21, 06/83

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l Rev. 21, 06/83 410.85-2

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,e LGS FSAR DRAFT Ol'ESTION 410. 89 (Section 10.3)

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verify that the structure which contains the main steam piping up to the main stop valves, is seismic Category I.

Furthermore, verify that no non-seismic Category I piping or appurtenances are l

located above the main steam piping and associated valves which could damage the main steam piping and appurtenances during a I

safe shutdown earthquake.

RESPONSE

The main steam piping is seismic Category I up to the main stop valves.

The main steam lines, up to and including the second isolation valves, are located in a seismic Category I structure.

The remainder of the main steam piping, up to the stop valves, is located in the turbine enclosure, which is seismic Category II.

However, as described in Sections 3.8.4.1.8 and 10.3.3, those portions of the turbine enclosure that support the main steam lines are designed so that the main steam linesfand their supports maintain their integrity under the seis mic loading resulting from the SSE.

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y gg In addition, all nonseismic Category I systems and components in the vicinity of the main steam lines are designed as seismic Category IIA as discussed in Section 3.2.1 for a safe shutdown earthquake condition.

Therefore no nonseismic Category I structures, systems, or components in the vicinity of the main steam lines will damage the main steam line during a safe shutdown earthquake.

l 410.89-1 Rev. 20, 05/83 l