ML20070K759

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Forwards Addl Replacement Page Changes to EAL Submitted in Util .Changes Are Result of Commitments from Review of Final Version of EALs
ML20070K759
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek 
Issue date: 07/21/1994
From: Johannes R
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CO-94-0007, CO-94-7, NUDOCS 9407270158
Download: ML20070K759 (13)
v • d • e


Text

r l

I W@LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Richard N Johannes July 21, 1994 i

Chief Admnstrative Omcer 1

CO 94-0007 U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commissio2.

ATTN:

Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.

C.

20555

References:

Letter WO 94-0075, dated June 20, 1994, from O. L. Maynard, WCNOC, to U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482:

Requested Changes to Final Emergency Action Levels Gentlemen:

This letter submits additional replacement page changes to the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) submitted in the Reference.

These changes are a result of commitments from the review of the final version of the EALs.

These change were discussed with Mr.

W.

D.

Reckley and Mr.

S.

A.

Boynton, NRC on July 7, 1994 and with Mr.

W.

D. Reckley on July 11, 1994.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact me at (316) 364-8831, extension 4001 or Mr. Richard D.

Flannigan at extension 4500.

Very truly yours, I

fj i f/h$

Richard N. Johannes RNJ/jra Attachments cc:

L.

J. Callan (NRC)

M.

A.

Miller (NRC)

B.

Murray (NRC)

G. A. Pick (imC)

W.

D.

Reckley (NRC) 1 i

(

9407270150 940721 7 Box 411/ Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone- (316) 364-8831 PDR ADOCK 05000392 An Equat opportunity Empcryer M FMC/ VET F

PDR l

(page tof 13)

Radioactive Effluent Release RER1 RER2 RER3 RER4 Unplamedreleaseof automeor M of the fonoung mordors M of the loaowing mormors M bcreasing readmgs or Hi HI liquid Nity > 200 times the exceed EmR listed 215 mn" exceed EmA Ested115 min" h on any of the foGowng Process Hi Hi Setpoint of the fosowing GT RE 218 (Chamel 213)

GT RE 218 (Chamel213)

Rad Mormors Process Rad Monitors a 15 21.9E+06 uCi/see 11.9E+07 uCvsec GT RE 21 A or B (Channel 211-213) minutes" GH RE 10B (Channel 103)

GH RE 10B (Chamel103)

GH RE 10 A or B (Channel 101-103)

-Yesa GT RE 21 A or B (Chamel 211-213)

E 1.9E +06 uCi/see 11.9E+07 uCifsec BM RE 52 (CW 526)

GH RE 10A or B (Channel 101-103)

GT RE 21 A (Channel 212)

GT RE 21 A (Chamel212)

LE RE 59 (Chamel 596)

BM RE 52 (Channel 526)

-Yes9 a 5.7E433 uCnni 15.7E-02 uCM HF RE 45 (Channel 456)

LE RE 59 (Channel 596)

GH RE 10A (Chamel102)

-YeS*

GH RE10A (Channd 102)

-Yes H8 R h

HF RE 45 (Channel 456) 12.9E-02 uCMnl 12_9E-01 uCl/mi gp HB RE 18 (Channel 186)

M M

HF RE 95 (Chamei 956)

Field team results Indicate dose Field team results indicate dose No Og rate at sRe boundary >100 mrhr rate at sRe boundary >1R,hr TEDE As indicated by Chemistry Sample TEDE or 500 rmhr thyroid or 5 R/hr thyroid analysts M

M Valid dose assessment bdicates Valid dose assessment bdicates RERS l

y a dose >100mr TEDE a dose > 1 REM TEDE No Control Room Area Rad or 500 MR thyroid or 5 REM thyoid Monitor Valid reading l

(S 33)

Unptanned or unexplained Area Rad Montor a:M...

f.. -

Qg ALERT

  • g increases by a factor of 1000 over normal
  • levels No
  • NOTE: Normal levels can be considered as the hghest readirg in the past 24 hr excluding the current value. Readings obtained from NPIS.

RER6 y

Unplanned release of airborne or liquid

    • NOTE If the rnonitor reading (s)is sustaired for longer than the time radioactivity > 2 times the H1 HI setpcint allowed and the required assensnents cannot be completed of the foGowing process rad monRors g within this period then the declarabon must be made based 60 min."

on the Wd reading GT RE 21 A or B (Channel 211-213)

GH RE 10A or B (Chamel101-103)

+ = - -

r--

BM RE 52 (Channel 526)

Yes LE RE 59 (Chamel 596)

',.__ J REM m e nte.nnra HF RE 45 (Channel 456)

=

HB RE 18 (Channel 186) l HF RE 95 (Chamet 956)

M As indicated by chemistry sample analysis No l

1 (page 2 of 13)

Loss of Reactor Coolant Boundary NOTE-TNs chart shall not be used if Steam Generator Ttte Rupture Failure is the enty event. Go to

LRCB1 LRCB2 LRCB3 LRCB4 Faded fues.s rw2cated by Both trains of CtSA or CtSB Urddentified or Pressure boundary RCS break is indicated by g

leakage > 10 GPM E

of te fonowing-g E

d '* 'N CORE COOUNG ORANGE PATH iderened leakage > 25 GPM

-Yesp RCS leak > capacAy of one ccp m'^ "~ '~^ Red Path OR (OFN BB-007)

WW to WchargN CORE COOUNG RED PATH Core Cooling R Path >15 min HEAT SINK R D PATH

-Yes*

-Yes p E

HEAT StNK RED ATH a

INTEGRITY RED PATH

>300 cp D N

Beth CTMT Atmos MonRors Indcadons of LOCA outside

-Yesi GT RE 59 or 60 reading CTMT(EMG C-12) increase df see high 3

+03 M (GT RE 31 and 32) g CTMT H214%

No E

l LRCBS CTMT pressure >27 psig and No

< ne m Cw SI now required AND total

-Yes depressunzauan, equipment ECCS flow < 225 gpm avaaabte i

No l

No E

LRCB7 u

LRCB6 GT RE 59 or 60 reading

-Yes-

>2.8E+04 R/HR Both trains of CISA or CISB incomplete

  • E l

Cu a.ae-a Red Path No E

An unexplained Contairunent pressure

-Yes decrease 08 Indications of LOCA outside CTMT (EMG C-12)

No

mjgy +st w

!pn ' ALERT W O

+~pp;mg w e m warnimux^

._ f __ A 0N_

N $?N r

1.v--

+

s,y,.

...<,3

  • NOTE: Unable to set proper Emergency Alignment per ESF Status Panels (CISA or CISB) on hAe, # MMW same Containment Penetration

" NOTE: One train CTMT depressurization is defined as one train CTMT Spray AND one train CTMT Coolers (page 3 of 13)

Steam Generator Tube Failure

~

SGTF1 SGTF2 SGTF3 SGTF4 Unisolable**

l SG faut es Fa:'ed fuel is indicated by SG tube rupture

-Yese SG faut

-Yes on SG wth

-Yes m

> capacay of one outside CTMT SGTF9 SGTR of the foi!owing CCP discharg:ng to s+

Core Cooling Orange Path the ramat charging i

Both trains of CISA or CISB incomplete * @

g s

header No Containment Red Path OR No Core Cooling Red PathM5 min OR-h SGTFlo Cere Cochng Red Path (EMG E-3) lir SGTF8 g

SG faut S'

l

-YeSe GT RE 59 or 60 Heat Sok Red Pam

'"Sd* C T Cmr s2 > 4% M

,,33,ng

.yes-m go

> 300 CVgm DEI CTMT pressure > 27 psg and < one train

~>2.8E+04 R!HR l

No CTMT depressur2aten *** equipment No avstab!e No No

,r SGTF5 SGTFS SGTF7 Yf w Iauns

-Yes h ig * -

j-SG Tube leakage >500 Unisotable*.SG

- Yes on SG GPD in any one SG or

-Yes+

3 p",

~ ' - -

l fauR outsde CTMT SGTF12 web 1 GPM total l

Both trains of CISA or CISB incompkte

  • OR_

SGTR No No Containment Red Path @

No 3lr 1IP SGTF11 Ccre Coohng Red Path > 15 min @

l

-Yes, Unexptained Containment press decrease OR-

-YesJ SG fauft Go to chart for MSL ir. side CTMT CmT H2 > 4% M Break or Fuel Fadure CTMT pressure > 27 psig and< one train CTMT depressunzation*** equipment available No SGTF13 ALERT

,r SGTF15 SG tube rupture > capacey of SGTF14

,j G

Yes a

3a g

-Yes e

ng

-Yes g,

(EMG E-3)

B th trains of CISA or CISB incomplete

  • g

^^^

No M

w SGTF16 No l

Cuiwuum Red Path SG faun M No

-YeSD CTMT Unexplained Containment pressure decrease

-YeS-E CTMT pressure > 27 psig and < one train CmT depressunzation*** equipment avadabie No i

No

,r ALERtj 7

  • NOTE: Unable to set proper Emergency Alignment per ESF Status Panels (CISA or CISB) q@ MCE*PM@
    • NOTE: Unisolable means that the steam release from faulted SIG can not be stopped until the SIG has blown dry
  • NOTE: One train CTMT depressurization is defined as one train CTMT Spray AND one train CTMT Coolers (page 4 of 13)

Main Steam Line Break MSLB1 MSLB2 MSLB3 MSLB4 Faded fuel es inecated by UnescLLN, e**

SGTR on faulted SG

' *# SI'** ""

> capacay of one CCP

-Yes*

MI

-Yes' So fault

-Yes (EMG E-2) of the fonowng dschargng to normal

-Yes-Core Cooling Oange Path chargmg OR l

(EMG E-3)

Core Cooling Red Path No MSLB10

.No OB Both trains of CISA or CISB incomplete No Heat S!nk Red Path og 08 Cm sa.1 Red Path

> 300uCi/gm dei Og Core Cookng Red Path >15 min y M.;,LB9 og g

No SG fau:t An unexplaned Containment pressure

-Yes-insee

-Yes.

decrease CTMT OB CTMT H2 3 4% _

g OR o

CTMT pressure >27 pssg and < one train Go to chart for SGTR or Fuel Element Fadure No

, MSLB11 MsLB12 SGTR on faulted SG v

>capacdy of one CCP GTRE 59 or 60 vMSLB5 discharging to normat Yes--+

readmg

-Yes-Unisolable chargog 2 2.8E+04 R/HR SG fault outside

-Yes (EMG E-3) l CTMT I

No MSLB8 No i

No Both trains of C!SA or CISB MSLB6

, MSLB7 SGTR on fauned SG

> capacty of one CCP g

-Yes-*

Containment Red ath

-Yes" escha ononnal

-Yesh

,f N;g 9.8 (EMG E-3)

'~'

~^' I^M An unexplained Containment pressure decrease No MSLB13 I

LALERTL y

No I

Main Steam Une OR No Feed Water break in

""* f""

N b

o

-Yes

  • NOTE: Unable to get proper alignment per ESF STATUS Panels (CISA or CISB)

%[^

Aus on same Containment penetration.

o

    • NOTE: Unisolable means that the steam release from the faulted S/G cannot be stopped until the SIG has blown dry.
      • NOTE: One train CTMT depressurization is defined as one train CTMT Spray AND one train CTMT Coolers

. (page 5 of 13)

Fuel Element Failure FEF1 FEF2 FEF3 Both trains of CISA or CIS8 incomple+e

  • dW E

of the fo80 wang of thefoi!cvnng

    • "..= = Red Path Core Coahng Orange Path RCS leak > capacey of one CCP B

98 eschargn; to normal chavng Core Cochng Red Path ertsts >15 rnin Core Cochng Red Path GR gg Heat Snk Red Phh-

-Yes+

oB

-Yes, An uneM Cun-wo.n= a pressure decrease OR Heat Sink Red Path EB 98 Integnty Red Path I'&tu n f LOCA outsxle CTMT (EMG C-12)

> 300 pCilgm DEI QB E8 GT RE 59 or 60 reading CTMT H2 > 4%

l

>2.8E+03RMR EB No CTMT pressure > 27 psig and < one train CTMT depressunzabon*** equprnent avagabte i

No No e

FEF5 GTRE 59 or 60 read:ng Yes FEF4

>2.8E+04RMR Both trains of CISA or CISB incornpiete

  • No gg Core Cootng Red Path exists YCS B
  • C

$TEsk hhfi[

pg An unexplained Cuia. u = a pressure decrease i

0 FEF6 ir

=

RCS Actntf > Tech Spec 3.48 "

anaIs"d I

[

f an

  • "S* "63 *9m
  • NOTE: Unable to get proper Emergency Alignment per ESF Status panels (CISA

~ ' ' ~ ~'

smss actmty (OFN BB-006)

Or CISB seCitons) on same Conh.nment penetration i

i l

" NOTE: When DEI exceeds limit for >48 hr during one continuous interval OR exceeds the limit line on l

Figure 3.4-1 of TS 3.4.8 OR gross activity >100/E BAR

  • " NOTE: One train CTMT depressurization is defined as one train CTMT Spray AND one train CTMT Coolers l

l a

. (page 6 or 13)

Loss of Electrical Power / Assessment Capability LEP/AC1 LEP/A.C2 LEP/AC3 LEP/AC4 Loss of all offsite pewer to Loss or projected loss M of the fonowing txd5 NB transformers of a8 AC power Yes H in Modes 1 - 4

-Yes->

Loss or projected loss of all AC power > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (XNB01 ANDXNB02)

-Yes-*

to NB01 AND NB02 OR es for > 15 min-

>15 mm Core Coohng Orange Pap g

( EMG C-0)

No E

Loss of both DIGS Core Coohng Red Path (KKJ01 A and KKJ018)

, LEP/ ACs g;'. gngp:w:w.y ;

T N'*'Y,

.... -.3 for >15 min go a

g.

'?.?C D Onhr one NB Buss

-Yes

=

No energized.

gj g u g

, LEP/AC6

{ggy gg,3g)

Loss of ALL Class IE DC power l

. ALERT.:

5

  • NOTE: Energized NB buss has only one power source (Nx01rn4) g, Yes

,, JD5 d avaliable, either its DIG OR transformer (reOTIFICAM ~

g, g,,

> 15 min Ii @

(in rnodes 1-4)

Y 'M41Nb s

$0 LEP/AC7 i $33[f@

{Y%%"'[dM Unplanned less of all n

Abcguy R 9 tin REQU! RED Class (E DC power (NK01/3 OR NKD2/4)

Yes

$ 05 vde as indicated on 1

RLO16 > 15 min (In modes 5 & 6) 3 LEP/AC8 LEP/ACC Unplanned loss of > 75% of MCB annunciators A maior transent in or indicaton > 15 minutes **

pmgress causog a major

-Yes+

NPts is inoperable Yes g

Temp ancor Press change (OFN 00 023) in the RCS Unplannedloss of PK01 or PKD2 > 15 Yes minutes E

No No v LEP/AC11 increased monitonng of system operabon l

required (see bases)

NPIs is inoperable Yes 1 ALERT :-

(OFN 00 023) i

", LEP/AC12 I

Unplanned No 1(tt0TIFIC&TION

,r

+

Complete loss of a5 Onsite OR UNO3G4k%

Yes-Offsite Commun! cation captMy (see bases) gi$ggi as%s e ; : :, : -

No 3.yp ;ey.; _ _ _

' g,936f7 i '

    • NOTE: If a major transient is in progress the 15 min time limit is not applicable.

" ' " - ~ " "

(page 12 of 13)

Natural Plenomena

~

NP1 NP2 Earthquake fet h pied l OBE Limits exceeded as hdicated rc3 m mx 3cy- - ~-

96E

  • seismic Recorder Yes EXCEEDED"

^

' {fli9f{ g y g _s M

by 98C *R SPECTRUM OBE

_y 3 m

ggi 3 - - - - ss'*0 ins Orr in alarin OB

+ - - - -

' i l 9BD *OBE IN ALARM

  • g No l

No NP3

" " *' E "

YeS MPH I

No NP5 Visible or other ireplant indication of damagetoMof the followng

-Reactor Building

-Control BuGding

' gp4

-Fuel But.1ing N

N Report of

-Diesel Generat r Building Te AM

-Yes-*

-Diesel FOST Access Vauts

-YeS

-Turbine Buading (Structund Protected Area form Integrey) i

-Communicahon Corridor No (Structurat form antegray)

-ESW Pumphouse

-ESW ElectricalManholes

-ESW Valve House

-ESW Access Vaults No

ATTACHMENT 3 EXPLANATIONS / BASES FOR EALS (Page 7 of 28)

EXPLANATIONS / BASES CHART - LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY LRCB 4 - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation : His EAL is for using Critical Function Status Tree (CSFST) monitoring and functional recovery procedures. RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function derived from appropriate instrument readings and/or sampling results, and thus represents a potential loss of containment. Conditions Icading to a containment RED path result from RCS barrier and /or Fuel Clad Barrier Loss. Thus, this EAL is primarily a discriminator between Site Area Emergency and General Emergency representing a potential loss of the third barrier.

In this EAL, the function restoration procedures are those emergency operating procedures that address the recovery of the core cooling critical safety functions.

The procedure is considered effective if the temperature is decreasing or if the vessel level is increasing.

He conditions in this potential loss EAL represent imminent melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the core exit thermocouple EALs in the Fuel and RCS barrier columns, this EAL would result in the declaration of a General Emergency - loss of two barriers and the potential loss of a third. If the function restoration procedures are ineffective, there is no " success" path.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG-1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a a

significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. He Duty Emergency Director / Duty Emergency Manager should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective. The reactor vessel level chosen should be consistent with the emergency response guides applicable to the Snv.

Existence of an explosive mixture means an H2 Concentration greater than 4% and the potential for an explosive and possible damage to Containment exists.

A loss of one train of Containment Depressurization System is a potential loss of Containment in that the heat removal /depressurization system (i.e.

Containment Spray and Containment Coolers) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner, as indicated by Containment pressure greater than 27 PSIG (setpoint at which the equipment was suppose to operate). The Depressurization Systems do not need to be on the same train.

LRCB 5 - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 His IC used to determine if any ECCS System is capable of delivering sufficient volume of water to the core. 225 gpm was chosen because it is conservatively larger then Tech Spec delta P requirement of =210 gpm at 2400 PSID.

l LRCB 6 - MODES: 1 TIIROUGH 4 See LRCB 4, l

LRCB 7 - MODES: 1 TH ROUGH 4 His reading is a value which indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS Barriers. As stated in Section 3.8 of Reference 5.11, a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure of fuel cladding allows radioactive material to be released from the core into the reactor coolant. Regardless of whether Containment is challenged, this amount of activity in Containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of Containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted. NUREG-1228, " Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents," indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20% Reading was taken from EPP 01-2.4," Fuel Damage Assessment Methodology" Attachment 1.0.

EPP 01-2.1 Rev.13 Page 31 of 52

ATTACIBiENT 3 EXPLANATIONS / BASES FOR EALS (Page 8 of 28)

EXPLANATIONS / BASES CHART - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SGTF t - MODES: 1 TIIROl'Gil.1 L This EAL is for using Critical Safety Function Status Tree (CSFST) monitoring and functional recovery procedures. RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function. ORANGE path indicates a severe challenge to the safety function.

Core Cooling-ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink-RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge and thus these two items indicate potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

Core Cooling-RED indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate loss of the Fuct Clad Barrier.

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level: The 300 pCi/cc DEI assessment by the NUMARK EAL Task Force indicates that this amount of coolant actisity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad heating and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

SGTF 2.- MODES: 1 TilROUGli 4 RCS Leak Rate EAL is based on the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System w hich is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header.

SGTF 3. - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 A check for S/G fault is made to determine if the next fission product boundary is under challenge or lost. The release path looked for is either a faulted, ruptured S/G or a faulted S/G to a challenged Containment. Unisolable means that the steam release from the faulted S/G cannot be stopped until the S/G has blown dry.

l SGTF 4. - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 Once a faulted S/G has been determined, a release path via a faul ed, ruptured S/G is checked.

l t

SGTF 5. - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 SG Tube leakage in excess of Tech Spec limits (Tech Spec 3.4.6.2)

SGTF 6. - MODES: 1 THROUGH 4 See SGTF 3 l

l EPP 01-2.1 Rev.13 l

Page 32 of 52 L -

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ATTACHAENT3 EXPLANATIONS / BASES FOR EALS

~

(Page 27 of 28)

EXPLANATIONS / BASES CHART - NATURAL PHENOMENA NP 1. - MODES: ALL NP 1 was developed on WCGS basis. Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not alTect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instnunentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored " Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a " felt earthquake" is: An earthquake of sufficicnt intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an carthquake based on a consensus of Control Room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic suitches of the plant are activated. At Wolf Creek these seismic switches are set at an acceteration of 0.Olg.

l NP 2. - MODES: ALL NP 2 based on WCGS USAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

l l NP 3. - MODES: ALL NP 5 is based on WCGS USAR Section 3.3.1.1. Wind loads of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

l NP 4. - MO DES: ALL NP 6 is based on the ass imption that a tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially danuged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications.

the event may be escalated to Alert.

NP 5. - MODES: ALL This EAL specifies structure containing systems and functions required for a safe shutdown of the plant. This list was obtained from WCGS USAR Table 3.3-t.

EPP 01-2.1 Rev.13 Page 51 of 52

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