ML20070D998

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 21 to License NPF-8

ML20070D998
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/02/1982
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20070D996	List: ML20070D992 ML20070D998 ML20070E002
References
TAC-42861, TAC-43966, NUDOCS 8212160581
Download: ML20070D998 (3)

Text

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8 UNITED STATES d'

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- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

\\.... }5 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0. 21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT N0. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Introduction and Background Our Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 80-11 dated May 8,1980 advised all licensees of problems relating to potential failures of masonry walls which might affect safety-related equipment. We recommended a re-evaluation of all such masonry walls. Although Joseph M. Farley Unit No. 2 was not licensed until March 31, 1981, for full power operation, Alabama Power Company (APCo) by letter dated December 12, 1980, committed to re-evaluate masonry walls on Unit 2.

In addition, Office of IE Report No. 80-26/37 dated October 16, 1980, paragraph 9, for Unit 2 identified " Inadequate Procedure for Preparation of Unit 2 Masonry Wall As-Built Drawings" as Infraction Item 364/80-37-01. APCo subsequently reported (via Licensee Event Report 80-003, letter dated December 23, 1980) their plans to perform a review and to implement corrective action on Unit 2.

Subsequently, APCo performed a design review and made modifications where required as described in letters dated January 15, May 12 and 22, 1981, and April 22, July 8 and August 26, 1982. These letters reported progress and responded to NRC staff concerns relating to the masonry wall repairs and the design criteria used by Bechtel (APCo's design organization).

In a July 26, 1982 letter APCo stated that the requirements of Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(16), relating to masonry walls, have been satisfied. We met with APCo and Bechtel representatives on October 5 and November 1,1982, to review their design analysis techniques.

Discussion and Evaluation On October 19, 1982, APCo requested that Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(16) be deleted.

However, after the November 1,1982 meeting with our staff, APCo revised the October 19, 1982 request by letter dated November 19, 1982.

In this letter APCo proposed a revision to License Condition 2.C.(16). The APCo proposa1'would extend until prior to startup after the second refueling (scheduled in December 1983) modifications to one masonry wall (2 CBW-34) not now meeting NRC's interim criteria. The proposal was conditioned such that modifications would not be made if the NRC staff accepted use of the energy balance technique prior to the modifications being made.

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. By letter dated December 1,1982, APCo responded to our concerns relating to a postulated failure of masonry wall, 2 CBW-34. This wall supports cabling for power to the 600 volt motor control center bus 1F. This bus provides control power to portions of control room train A air conditioning.

If the wall failed to the extent that power was lost to bus 1F, control room air conditioning would be supplied from train B.

If, further, train B were lost, alternate power.

to the train A bus could be supplied from Unit 1.

During the time this transfer takes place, control room habitability would not be of concern because of the relatively short time involved (estimated as a maximum of two hours) and because some cooling could be provided by the independent air conditioning system in the adjacent Technical Support Center communicating with the control room.

Sufficient breathing air bottles are also available for two hours.

Finally, the units could be brought to hot standby conditions from the hot shutdown panels located in the auxiliary building outside the control room.

Based on these considerations APCo considers that the failure of all 2 CBW-34 would not impede the safe shutdown of the Farley units.

Safety Summary We have reviewed the licensee's submittals relating to IE Bulletin 80-11. We have met with the licensee on October 5 and November 1,1982 and discussed the Farley Unit 2 masonry walls in detail. We also reviewed the associated License Condition 2.C.(16) imposed during the licensing of Unit 2 as noted in our Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 5, March 1981, Section 3.11.

Based on our review, we conclude that the licensee has met the staff's acceptance criteria, except fur one masonry wall (2 CBW-34). This wall supports wiring for part of only one train of control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning as discussed above. The unit can be brought to hot standby or cold safe shutdown without reliance on this wall. This masonry wall has been shown to have significant seismic resistance capability (in excess of that required to withstand the OBE) using conservative techniques approved by the staff.

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In addition, the licensee has agreed to additionally reinforce this one l

wall during the next refueling outage unless the NRC staff approves the energy balance technique for qualifying masonry walls.

If this technique is approved by the staff, this wall has already been demonstrated to be acceptable.

We agree with the licensee's request for an extension of one fuel cycle.

There-fore, License Condition 2.C.(16) has been modified accordingly.

Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in i

any significant environmental impact.

Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4),

that an environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with l

the issuance of this amendnent.

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. Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant i.icrease in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possi-bility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

i Date:

December 2, 1982 Primary Contributors:

E. A. Reeves N. Choskshi

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