ML20069D206

Proposed Tech Specs Relocating Specific Boron Concentration Values to Core Operating Limits Rept

ML20069D206
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire
Issue date:	05/24/1994
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20069D204	List: ML20069D197 ML20069D206
References
NUDOCS 9406030010
Download: ML20069D206 (15)

Text

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.. 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4,9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION <

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met:

a. Either a K,,, of 0.95 or less, or 6 IN S@onou co&cpfMTt

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to-2000 p .

SPmpe w g i APPLICABILITY: H0DE 6*, with the reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully Gofy Off///@[

tensioned or with the head removed. _

' ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to ,7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K,,, is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the. boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to

-f900gpar whichever is the more restrictive.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHERTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to: -

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

[

b. Withdrawal of any full ~1ength control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron coneefftT5ffEn of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

4.9.1.3 NV 250 shall be verified closed under administrative control at least once per 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s: or. NV-131, NV 140. NV 176. NV 468, NV 808, and either NV-132 or NV 1026 shall be verified closed under administrative control'at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when necessary to makeup to the RWST during refueling operations.

9406030010 940524

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ADOCK 05000369 PDR

• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

/

McGUIRE l 3/4 9-1 UNIT5 1AA b2 Amendment No. 1 (Unit 1) l Amendment No. 1 (Unit 2)

. _ - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ __ . - ._ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

UNIT 2 ONLY 3/4.9 REFUEllNG OPERATIONS 3/4.9.) BORON CONCENTRATION M .

LIMITING C DITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The bor concentration of all filled portions of e Reactor Coolant System and the refueling ca a' shall be maintained uniform and suff ient to ensure that the more restrictive of th following reactivity conditions is  :

a. Either a , of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron conc tration of greater than or e al to 2175 ppm.

[

APPLICABILITY: H0DE 6*, ith the reactor vessel he closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the hea removed.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the ab ve specificatio not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERAT ONS or positi e reactivity changes and initiate and continue baration at greater than r equal to 0 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or 'ts equiva nt until K,,, is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentra ion is r stored to greater than or equal to 2175 ppm, whichever is the more restr tive.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the ab ve tw reactivity conditions shall be-determined prior to: .

a. Removing or unbolting the r actor vesse head, and

b. Withdrawal of any full le h control rod excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within he reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration f the Reactor Coolant stem and the refueling canal  ;

shall be determined by chemical alysis at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, i 4.9.1.3 NV 250 shall be verif d closed under administrative control at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; or, NV 131. NV 140 V-176, NV 468, NV 808, and eith NV-132 or NV-1026 shall be verified closed under adm' istrative control at least once pe 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when necessary to makeup to the ST during refueling operations.

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• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel wit i the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

/

McGUIRE UNIT 2 3/4 9 la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1 Amendment No.120 l (Unit 2)

1 1

f NLY

" REFUELING OPERATIONS w x I 3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 Fuel is to be stored in the spent storage pool with:

a. The boron concentratica in the spent fuel pool maintained at greater than or equal to 200fhpp;n: mid rt

b. Storage in Region 2 restricted to irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days and one of the following:

1) fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.91; or

2) Fuel which has been qualified by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure with a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that kerr is no greater than 0.95 including all uncertainties: or

3) Unqualified fuel' stored in a checkerboard configuration. In the event-checkerboard storage is used, one row between normal storage locations and checkerboard storage locations will be vacant.

APPLICABILITY:

During storage of fuel in, the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

'T a. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if

) it is determined a fuel assembly has been placed in the incorrect Region until such time as the correct storage location is determined. . Hove the assembly to.

its ' correct location before resumption of.any other fuel movement.

b. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined the pool boron concentration is less than 2000 ppm, until such time as the boron concentration is increased to or greater.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.12a. Verify all fuel assemblies to be placed in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool are within the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.91 or that k,,, s 0.95 by checking the assemblies

• design and burnup documentation or the assemblies

• qualifying analysis documentation respectively.

b. Verify at least once per 31 days that the spent fuel pool boron concentration is greater than 2000 ppm-

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) 10 W6 GaRc ofe&m 4 LimTS REPcKT McGUIRE - UNIT 3 1 A/Vb t 3/4 9-16 AmendmentNo.Id (Unit 1)

(Unit 2) l AmendmentNo.)-

,, REFUELING OPERATIONS

_ UNI I . 2 ONLY f/,6b l 3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE . SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL 7ih5 fpbb '

)LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.9 12 Fuel is to be stored in the spent storage pool with:

The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool mai ained at greater than or equal to 2175 ppm; and l

b. torage in Region 2 restricted to irradiated fue which has decayed at least days and one of the following:

1) fuel which has been qualified in accorda e with Table 3.9 1: or

2) Fttel which has been qualified by means f an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure with a 95 perce probability at a 95 percent conhdence level that k,,, is no great.r than 0.95 including all uncert inties: or

3) Unqualifted fuel stored in a chec rboard configuration. In the event checkerboaYd storage is used, on row between normal storage locations and checker ard storage locati s will be vacant.

APPLICABILITY:

During storage of fuel in the s t fuel po 1.

ACTION:

T a. Suspend all actions involvin he movement of fueisin the spent fuel pool if . '

/ it is determined a fuel asse Ty has been placed in the incorrect Region until

• such time as the correct st rag location is determined. Hove the assembly to .

its correct location befor resum tion of any other fuel movement.

b. Suspend all actions invo ving the mo .ement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if itisdeterminedthepo1boronconce$rationislessthan2175 ppm.until such time as the boron concentration is increased to 2175 ppm or greater.

c. The provisions of Sp cification 3.0.3 are ot applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REGUIREMENTS 4.9.12a. Verify all fue assemblies to be placed in Regio of the spent fuel pool are within the en chment and burnup limits of Table 3.91 or that k ,, s 0.95 by checking the assemblies' design and burnup documentah on or the , assemblies' qualifying nalysis documentation respectively,

b. Verify at least once per 31 days that the spent fuel poo boron concentration  ;

is great r than 2175 ppm. l '

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4 McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 9 16a Ameddment No.138 ( it 1)

Amendment No.120 (U it 2) l  !

M ~

NLY

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I 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9,1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial con-ditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K Similarly. thegbor,o,n, includes avalue concentration 1% delta k/k cf 2000 ppeconservative allowance or greater includes for uncertainties.

a conservative -

uncertainty alt ance of 50 ppm boron. sfvC/fg //# fRE Co/M CPFJ2/lI)Mf 4 Mut%tAA M 4(T5 The Reactor Hakeup. Water Supply to the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System is/lclb([f normally isolated during refueling to prevent diluting the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration. Isolation is.normally accomplished by closing valve NV 250. However.

. isolation may be accomplished by closing valves NV-131. NV 140. NV 176. NV-468. NV 808 and either NV 132 or NV 1026, when it is necessary to makeup water to the Refueling Water Storage Tank during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Honitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the Core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

) fuel The

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minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient tim the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINHENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on.contain[nent building penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environnent or filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY.and closure restrictichs are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

Operation of the Reactor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis. The methyl iodide penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70t under normal cperating conditions.

)

McGUIRE UNIT6 1 Alb L B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 1 (Unit 2)

4

_ UNIT 2 ONLY

.3/4.9 UELING OPERATIONS

. BASES N/$

3/4.9.1 BOR0 ONCENTRATION The.limitati s on reactivity conditions during REFUELIN ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, an (2) a uniform boron concentration is mai ained for reactivity control in the ter volume having direct access to the reactor essel. These limitations are cons' tent with the initial con-ditions assumed for th oron dilution incident in the a ident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K,,, inc ydes a la delta k/k conservati allowance for uncertainties.

Similarly, the boron conc 60tration value of 2175 ppm o greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 5 pm boron. l The Reactor Hakeup Water Supp' to the Chemical an Volume Control (NV) System is normally isolated during refuel' g to prevent dil ing the Reactor Coolant System baron concentration. Isolation is nor lly accomplish d by closing valve NV 250. However, isolation may be accomplished by c(osing valve NV 131. NV 14U. NV 176. NV 468. NV 808, and either NV 132 or NV-1026 when it is nece ary to makeup water to the Refueling Water Storage Tank during refueling operatio s.

M/f,9.2 INSTRUMENTATION De OPERABILITY of the Source Rang N tron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to - ac changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for actor suberitica ity prior to movement of irradiated

) fuel assemblies in the reactor v ssel ensures that s fficient time has elapsed to the radioactive decay of the sh rt lived fission prod ts. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in t,,e accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENTBUILDINIPENETRATIONS The requirements on ntainment building penetration el sure and OPERABILITY of the Reactor Building Cc.itaine nt Purge Exhaust System HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containme t will be restricted from leakage to the environm nt or filtered through the HEPA filters nd charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to e atmosphere. The OPERABILITY and closur restrictions are sufficient to restric radioactive material release from a fuel e ment rupture based upon the lack of con ainment pressurization potential while in the EFUELING H0DE.

Operation of the Re tor Building Containment Purge Exhaust System H A filters and charcoal adsorbers nd the resulting iodine removal capacity are cons (tent with the assumptions of th accident analysis. The methyl 1odide penetration teqt criteria for the carbon sampi have been made more restrictive than required for the removal in the cident analysis because the humidity to be seen by thec\arcoal assumed iodine adsorbers may a greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

)

e McGUIRE UNIT 2 B 3/4 9 la Amendment No.138 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.120 (Unit 2) l l

l

tBi=twne_ \

BASES 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE P0OL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consisteat with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.11 FUEL HANDLING VENTILAMON EXHAUST SYSTEM The limitations on the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. ANSI N510 1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. The methyl iodide penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the humidity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater than 70% under normal operating conditions.

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P0OL The requirements for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool on 3.9.12 (a) and (b) ensure that: (1) the spent fuel pool will remain subcritical during fuel storage: and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained in the water volume in the spent fuel pool for reactivity control. The value of 0.95 or less for Keff which includes all uncertainties at the 95/95 probability / confidence level as described in Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR is the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool. Table 3.91 is con-

-)- servatively enced indeveloped Section in accordance 5.6 of thewithTechr.ical the acceptance criteria and' methodology refer-Specifications.

Storage in a checkerboard con-figuration in Region 2 meets all the acceptance criteria referenced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications and is . verified in a semi annual basis after initial verification through administrative controls.

The Action Statement a plicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that: Mith/Y (1) the spent fuel poo is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern thaff could result in a critical array during the movement of fuel: and (2) therooron concen-tration is maintained at-20007pm.during all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool. -gps wyf g i g 1N-fllf Q(g ggAfjj/fLIH)f3 kD6#

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The Surveillance Requirements applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that: (1) fuel stored in Region 2 meets the enrichment and burnup limits of Table 3.91 or the K ,, s 0.95 acceptance criteria of an analysis using NRC approved methodology; and (2) the boron concentra. tion meets the40035Qm limit.

dlHIMUlk jy TW 00f5 0hVYb l

$P[C.lkl OMITS SYY .

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McGUIRE - UNITr,1 Akh 2 B 3/4 9 3 Amendment No. 1 6 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.1 0 (Unit 2) l

,. ,' UNil 2 ONLY ggh l BASES

-nll6 Y g .

/ 3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL /

\

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that suffici t water depth is avaibable to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity r leased from the rupture .

of an \rradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is co istent with the assumptiqns of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.11 FbtHANDLINGVENTILATIONEXHAUSTSYSTEM The limit ons on the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System ensure that all radioactive mate ial released from an irradiated fuel /ssembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to disc)farge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITYofthiskystemandtheresultingiodinefemovalcapacityareconsistentwith theassumptionsoftheNccidentanalyses.ANSIN5191975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance t'eqting. The methyl iodidy penetration test criteria for the carbon samples have been made more restrictive than required for the assumed iodine removal in the accident analysis because the h idity to be seen by the charcoal adsorbers may be greater thanN 0% under norma poperating conditions.

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE SPENT F STORAGEz 00L The requirements for fuel storage i the nt fuel pool on 3.9.12 (a) and (b) ensure that: (1) the spent fuel pool will re 'n subcritical during fuel storage: and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintai in the water volume in the spent fuel' pool for reactivity control. The value of 0.9 rNess for Keff which includes all uncertainties at the 95/95 probability / confidence level is described in Section 9.1.2.3.1 of the FSAR

, is the acceptance criteria for fuel torage it) the spent fuel pool. Table 3.9 1 is con-

) servatively developed in accordan with the a'eceptance criteria and methodology refer-enced in Section 5.6 of the Techpfcal SpecificatNons. Storage -in a checkerboard con-figuration in Region-2 meets al the acceptance cyteria referenced in Section 5.6 of the Technical Specifications a d is verified in a semi annual basis after initial verification through adminis ative controls. \

The Action Statement a pli able to fuel storage in the pent fuel pool ensures that:

(1) the spent fuel poo i protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that could result in a criticfl array during the movement of fuel: and (2) the boron concen-tration is maintained t 2175 ppm during all actions involvf g movement of fuel in the l spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Re uirements applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that: (1) fuel stdred in Region 2 meets the enrichment and burnupxlimits of Table 3.91 or the K,,, s 0.95/ acceptance criteria of an analysis using NRC appr6 d methodology; and (2) the boron co6 centration meets the 2175 ppm limit. l

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) l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9 3a Amen $ ment No.138 (Unit 1) l Amendment No.120 (Unit 2)

. . . . = _

Attachment Ib Marked-up Technical Specification Paces Catawba

i I

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the individual cell voltage is greater than or equal to 1.36 volts on float charge, and

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1) The batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

2) The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.

4.7.13.3 The Standby Makeup Pump water supply shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying at least once per 7 days:

1) That the requirements of Specification 3.9.10 are met and the boron concentration in the storage pool i geeste-than-on equal tc 2000 ppe, or g ggjaggg p ofz cRAMO 96 frigin .SPseuRGb IA

2) Thatacontginedbaratedwatervolumeofatleast112, gallons q with d r,i n., boron concentration of 2 0 7 is available and capable of being aligned to the Standby Makeup Pump.

b. Verifying at least once per 92 days that the Standby Makeup Pump L//1TP develops a flow of greater than or equal to 26 gpm at a pressure #Efol&T greater than or equal to 2488 psig.

v 4.7.13.4 The Standby Shutdown System 250/125-Volt Battery Bank and its associated charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying:

1) That the electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates, and

2) The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 258/129 volts on float charge.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the specific gravity is appropric;e for continued service of the battery, and

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1) The batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indications of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

2) The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are cler.n, tight, free of corrosion and coated with anti-corrosion material.

CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-41 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2) .

3/4.9 REFVELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION J LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant )

System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to  !

ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met i either:

a. A K,,, of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to il7 ;;r [

APPLICABillTY: MODE 6.* (Unit 1)

OTHE N/U)N g .7/jg ACTION: C AT/M5S#1l8 With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equi :

valent until K,,, is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron con-centration is restored to greater than or equal to h whichever is the

more restrictive. (

SURVEIttANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The baron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the >

refueling canal shall be' determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with

/ the head removed.

CATAWBA - UNITS 1 AAt 7 - Amendment No. tQ k' 3/4[9-1

bezrs fHs Mm

.)

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 ' BORON CONCENTRATION l NITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9. The baron concentration of all filled portions. the Reactor Coolant 1 Syste and the refueling canal shall be maintained un orm and sufficient to  :

ensure hat the more restrictive of the following re tivity conditions is met  !

either: '

l

a. A ,,, of 0.95 or less, or

b. Ab on concentration of greater than r equal to 2000 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.* (Unit 2) l l

ACTION:

With the requireme s of the above specif cation not satisfied, immediately i i

suspend all operatio s involving CORE A ERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate nd continue bara on at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containi greater than r equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equi-valent until K.,, is red ed to less an or equal to 0.95 or the boron con-centration is. restored t greater t in or equal to 2000 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS \

4.9.1.1 The more restrictiv o the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or un ting the actor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal o any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully i erted position wi hin the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boro / concentration of the R actor Coolant System and the refueling canal all be determined by che ical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

i l

The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fue is in the reactor. l vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than full tensioned or with the head removed.

CATAWBA - UNIT 2 3/4 B9-1 Amendment No.106 ,

f

3/4.9 REFUELIFG OPERATIONS-

)

BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION-The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

(1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water 3 volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitation's are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K,,, includes a 1% ak/k conservatiye allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value 'i75 pp- fu Wt i r,d--2000 p;=D "Hi 2 or greater includes' a l conserva ve uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron, 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

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_- pb N 'T]/f T S W W # g C.0RE OPCRKi/HG Uf1g gg/Q) '

The OPERABILITY of the Boron Dilution Mitigation System ensures that monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived' fission J products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the Reactor Building Containment Purge System ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from-leakage to the environment or filtered through the HEPA filters and activated  ;

carbon adsorbers prior to release to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release

~

from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Operation of the Reactor Building Con-tainment Purge System and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent  ;

with the assumption of the safety analysis. Operation of the system with the  :

heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at lea.st 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

l l

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l CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No.112 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.106 (Unit 2)

Attachment II Justification and Safety Analysis ProDosed Chance to Technical Specification 3.9.1. Boron Concentration in the RCS and Refuelina Canal in Mode 6 The limits on boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal are verified each cycle to ensure that adequate margin to criticality exists during core alterations, and to ensure that a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limits are evaluated using the methodology presented in DPC-NE-2010A (Reference). Km will be maintained at or below .95, including a 1% ak/k conservative allowance for penalties.

l Proposed Chance to Technical Specification 3.9.12. Boron i

Concentration in the Spent Fuel Storace Pool The limits on boron concentration in the Spent Fuel Pool verified each cycle to ensure that adequate subcriticality margin exists during fuel storage, and to ensure that a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limits are evaluated using the methodology presented in DPC-NE-2010A (Reference 1). K ,will be maintained at or below .95, including all uncertainties at a 95/95 probability / confidence level for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool.

Acceptability of Removal of Limits from Technical Specifications Cycle-specific parameters, including boron concentration, are generated using NRC-approved methodologies. These methodologies are listed in Technical Specification 6.9.1.9 for each McGuire and Catawba. Through issuance of Generic Letter 88-16, the NRC has determined that such cycle-specific variables may be removed

, from Technical Specifications and placed in a licensee-controlled l

Core Operating Limits Report; thus obviating the need for NRC review to facilitate changes. Boron concentrations, specifically, have been approved for removal frua Technical Specifications for Catawba Nuclear Station by amendment numbers I 115 (Unit 1) and 109 (Unit 2) to the station's Facility Operating l License.

t Reference l

l DPC-NE-2010A, " Nuclear Physics Methodology for Reload Design",

! June, 1985.

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ATTACHMENT III Analysis to SuoDort the Conclusion of No Sianificant Hazard The following analysis, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, shows that the proposed amendment will not create a significant hazards i consideration as defined by the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92. j 1

1. This amendment will not significantly increase the probability or consequence of any accident previously evaluated.

No component modification, system realignment, or change in operating procedure will occur which could at:fect the probability of any accident or transient. The relocation of boron concentration values to the COLR is an adminstrative change which will have no effect on the probability or probability or consequences of any previously-analyzed ,

accident. The required values of boron concentration will l continue to be determined through use of approved 3 methodologies. )

2. This amendment will not create the possibility of any new or different accidents not previously evaluated.

No component modification or system realignment will occur which could create the possibility of a new event not previously considered. The administrative change of relocating parameters to the COLR, in this case boron concentration, cannot create the probability of an accident.

3. This amendment will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Required boron concentrations will remain appropriate for each cycle, and will continue to be calculated using approved methodologies. There is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.