ML20069D142
| ML20069D142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1993 |
| From: | UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069D139 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9406020302 | |
| Download: ML20069D142 (51) | |
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I 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Summary Report for Callaway Nuclear Plant Union Electric Company 05/17/94 9406020302 94o51s DR ADOCK 05000483 PDR
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Reference Key MP#
Modification Package (Design Change)
CMP #
Ca!!away Modification Package EMP#
Exempt Modification Package RMP#
Restricted Modification Package CN#
FSAR Change Notice ETP # Engineering Test Procedure OL#
Technical Specification Change (Operating License)
OTO # Off-Normal Operating Procedure OTS # Special Operating Procedure RFR # Request For Resolution TM # Temporary Modification Note:
FS AR and Technical Specification changes are also reported under 10 CFR 50.71 and 10 CFR 50.90 as applicable.
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10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION
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CMP 881025 Retire in Place Waste Gas Flowmeter Retire in place waste gas flowmeter (llAFT1094) from VCT to waste gas compressor skid.
Flowmeter monitors off-gassing during load reduction prior to an outage. Modification retires in place equipment not used for years. Alternate methods are used to off-gas VCT and RCS prior to outage or load reduction. Modification simply removes electrical power to flowmeter and does not affect or interface with any safety-related equipment.
No piping analysis is affected by modification since equipment is left in place. Flowmeter and associated equipment is not used in any accident analysis and does not interface with any safety-related equipment, either electrically or mechanically.
CMP 88-1051 Modify Computers, Remove Old ERFIS, BOP, RRIS, NSSS, SPDS Replace the IlOP, NSSS, RRIS, SPDS, AND ERFIS computers with a single system. Electrical and physical isolation between new computer equipment and monitored equipment meets or exceeds replaced equipment. Fiber optic cable will proviac additional electrical isolation. The new system decreases overall electrical and heat loading.
There is no adverse impact on the calculations performed by the current computer system. The new system will not have any adverse effect on the ability of operators to obtain required data.
Computer points dealing with Tech Spec surveillance activities will be verified operational prior to use on new system. Seismic II/I requirements are met.
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CMP 88-2010 Condenser Water Box Vent Add 3" pipe cap to condenser water box vent valves that are used during drain and fill evolution of-the water boxes. The condenser water box vent valve is used when the water box is isolated and drained for maintenance or inspection. Vent valves are opened to ensure complete draining and filling of the water box occurs prior to opening up for maintenance or restoring to service. Water box vent valves are manually operated valves. Since the pipe cap is located 6" from the valve, the equipment operator knows to remove the pipe cap prior to opening the vent valve.
The modest increase in mass due to the 2-1/2 pound pipe cap does not increase the stress on the weld joint between the vent pipe and watcr box above the yield point. The circulating water system has no safety design basis nor serves any safety-related equipment.
CMP 88-2016 Nitrogen Sparge System on CST Install nitrogen sparge system on condensate storage tank (CST) to facilitate oxygen removal and replace temporary sparging line. Materials and equipment are compatible with nitrogen. Auxiliary boiler room is well ventilated and will not become an oxygen deficient atmosphere in event of nitrogen leak. CST vent and vacuum breaker will not allow any pressure buildup inside tank which could result in either false level indication or overpressurization of tank. Distance from nitrogen inlet to CST and auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP) suction nozzle is suflicient to prevent nitrogen entrainment and gas binding of AFPs even if pressure regulator fails. Condensate Storage and Transfer System and Service Gas System are not safety-related and have no safety functions.
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CMP 88-2022 Installation of Flanges on AF System Piping Install slip-on flanges on three spool pieces of AF system piping to allow access to check valves. AF system is Feedwater Heater Extraction, Drains, and Vents System. Check valves provide isolation to terminate heater drain tank from backing up into moisture separator. AF system is nonsafety-related. Stress levels due to increased weight on line has been evaluated. Stress levels have been verified. IIanger loading is acceptable.
CMP 88-3005 Upgrade Potable Water and Fire Protection Pipe Upgrade to permanent plant status temporary pipeline for potable water and fire protection services to the Stores No. 2 facility. Also provide fire alarm annunciation at guardhouse. Function of pipeline is unchanged by this modification. Modification requires trenching. Final Environmental Evaluation indicates there are no environmental concerns. Modifications originated by this change are outside the "special scope" portion of the fire protection system.
CMP 89-1004 Add Local Indication to Diesel Generator Crankcase Oil Temperature Switches This modification changes the temperature switches on the diesel generator crankcase oil system to temperature indicating switches with localindicators on the front of each diesel. Previously, the operators had no way of knowing if the Lube Oil Keep Warm loop was operating correctly.
The temperature switches provide no safety related function. They do not control the keep warm heater, but merely supply an annunciator.
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CMP 89-1025 Permanent Reactor Cavity Scal / Neutron Shield Install permanent reactor cavity scal / neutron shield. Replace foamglass insulation with nukon blankets and stainless steel support panels. Install " neutron shielding cans" to eliminate streaming.
Installation is allowed under GDC-4. Seal / shield design basis includes consideration ofmaterials, neutron attenuation, dimensions, environmental conditions, and loadings. Specification also requires scismic Category I design including hydrodynamic loading, fuel assembly drop calculation, AISC requirements for material stress allowables, polished surface finish to ease decontamination, CMTRs for all material. Seismic Category I design requirements bound II/I criteria. Eight access hatches are double O-ringed for redundant sealing. Leak tight sealing was verified in shop mock-up testing.
Dimensional tolerances in original removable seal ring design calculations are not exceeded. Safety factor calculated for uninflated seal remains valid. Number of seal supports is increased.
CMP 89-1033 Remove Dry Waste Compactor from Containment Compactor performs no function related to safe shutdown of the plant, and its failure does not adversely afTect any safety-related system or component.
CMP 89-1039 CCW Supply Check Valves to RCP Thermal Barrier Install second check valve on component cooling water (CCW) supply to the thermal barriers of cach of the four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) to correct design deficiency that could allow an intersystem LOCA outside containment in event of rupture of thermal barrier and failure of upstream isolation valve. Check valves have an active safety function to isolate any reactor coolant that might enter the CCW system in the event of a thermal barrier rupture. New check valves constructed in accordance with 1986 ASME code within guidelines of ASME XIIWA-7210. Maximum loading the valves must withstand is same as the originalinstallation. Second valve is installed in series with the first. Line size of check valves is reduced to allow more reliable operation of the valves.
Suflicient range in downstream throttle valve exists to compensate for increased line resistance.
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CMP 90-1002 Vent on RHR Cross Connect Line to CCP Discharge Install manually operated high point vent line and associated vent valve on residual heat removal (RHR) "A" train cross connect line to centrifugal charging pump (CCP) discharge header. Permits venting of hydrogen gas in ECCS piping to preclude possibility ofgas binding of CCPs. Installation meets requirements of ASME III, Section ND,1974.
CMP 90-1030 Add Velocity Pick-Ups to ESW Pump Motors Install two velocity pick-ups on top of each essential service water (ESW) pump motor to allow velocity and displacement measurements required by ASME Code Section XI. ESW pumps supply cooling water for plant components which require cooling for safe shutdown of the plant and provide emergency makeup water to spent fuel pool and component cooling water systems. Pick-ups installation ensures no metal particles fall into the motor. There is no adverse seismic effects due to insignificant added weight of probes. Electrical conduit is installed using II/I installation details. ESW vibration monitoring system has no safety design basis.
CMP 90-1042 FCN-01 Concrete Staging Area for Non-compacted, Low Level, Dry Radioactive Waste Install a concrete slab with an enclosed fence on the Plant West side of the Radwaste Building. The purpose of this area is to provide a permanent access-controlled outside area for assemblage oflow-level radioactive waste within SeaLand Containers (cargo boxes) prior to its shipment to an offsite radwaste treatment, processing, or disposal facility. Radwaste articles may be put into the SeaLands or removed from them as shipment needs require.
There will be no free standing liquid allowed to be stored outside within the SeaLand Containers.
Staging of the low-level radwaste poses no additional adverse radiological impacts. No permanent plant piping, tanks, etc. is added by this change.
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CMP 90-1053 Replace Refueling Pool Cavity Gate Valve Replace gate valve EC7129 with full ported plug valve to reduce potential for crud accumulation thereby reducing personnel exposure. Valve EC7129 serves as a pressure boundary for integrity of the lower refueling pool cavity. Qualifications of plug valve are equal to or greater than requirements of original gate valve. Valve is designed and purchased to requirements of ASME Section Hi, class 3. Change in valve style has no affect on the possible consequences from any accident.
CMP 91-1002 RV Head Vent Valve Scaling Configuration Replace Conax Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) with Namco Quick Disconnects (QD) on reactor vessel (RV) head vent valves. Namco QD provide equivalent environmental seal with advantage of quick determination /retermination during outages. No additional seismic stresses result from use of Namco QD due to its similar weight and configuration to Conax ECSA. No excessive seismic stress is induced on conduit orjunction boxes installed in these configurations.
Namco QD environmental evaluation approves use of Namco QD for use throughout plant including inside containment. Added junction box and conduit have no environmental impact.
CMP 91-1008 Revise SG Level Trip Logic Interlock Environmental Allowance Modifier (EAM) and Trip Time Delay (TTD) to bypass steam generator (SG) low level trip time delay when adverse containment condition exists. By bypassing the timers the existing adverse setpoint remains bounded by current analysis. Modification does not change any seismic analysis or separation criterion already established for any of the EAM/TTD system.
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CMP 91-1014 Enlargement of ESW Flow Orifices Enlarge essential service water (ESW) flow orifices upstream of manual butterfly valves EFV0108 and EFV0117 to account for pipe fouling. These orifices maintain pressure in containment coolers above saturation pressure at design LOCA temperatures. Backpressure is maintained by throttling ofdownstream manual valves in conjunction with enlarged orifice. Valves are placed in locked throttle position. Downstream butterfly valves in conjunction with enlarged orifices are capable of maintaining suflicient back pressure on containment coolers during a LOCA. With valves in locked throttled position, failure of valves is same type of passive failure as assumed for orifices.
CMP 91-1016 Reroute Reactor Vessel Head Vent Reroute reactor vessel head vent system piping downstream of second isolation valve in each path to remove concern for overstressing pipe due to thermal expansion if only one vent path were opened.
Stress analysis was performed on pipe connections to reactor vessel head, CRDM support platform, cooling shroud and lif1 lug. Modified routing creates a second discharge path perpendicular to the existing path and 12" away. Modified routing has no impact on closest equipment, cables going to control rod drive mechanism, including effect of dischargejet. Revised piping configuration has been verified to meet all Code allowable stresses under all potential loading conditions. Pipe supports prevent pipe from whipping into other equipment when the system is used. Dualisolation valves are still in place and continue to function as designed. Fluidjet impingement forces have been reviewed and will not impact any equipment important to safety.
CMP 91-1017 Reroute RCS Low Flow Protection System Tubing Reroute reactor coolant loop flow transmitter tubing to remove hazard to personnel access through the area and reduce potential for damage to tubes. All stresses are below Code allowable limits.
Flow transmitters will continue to function as originally designed. Modifications to tubing routing do not affect any functions (e.g., response time, otpoint, accuracy) of the transmitters.
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CMP 91 1020 Removal of ESW and SW Radiation Monitors Permanent removal of process radiation monitors in Service Water (SW) and Essential Service Water (ESW) systems. Radiation monitors detect inleakage from potentially radioactive systems and components served by the SW/ESW systems. Monitors are removed due to redundant purpose of the monitors, maintenance problems, and inability of the monitors to detect leakage from a potentially radioactive system. If the entire volume of Component Cooling Water (CCW) was contaminated to the alarm setpoint of the CCW system and leaked into the ESW/SW system, the SW or ESW radiation monitors' minimum detectable level would not be reached. There are no safety design bases associated with the SW or ESW radiation monitors. The monitors do not perform automatic termination of the SW/ESW flow to or from components.
CMP 91-1022A Install New Fuel Assembly Gripper On Refueling Machine The Refueling Machine is a nonsafety-related seismic category II/I component. The modifications to the gripper assembly will not reduce or change its classification. The new parts will be designed to the same requirements as the original. Failure of the gripper resulting in a dropped fuel assembly accident has already been analyzed in the FSAR. Since this modification will not cause a reduction in safety or any unanalyzed event, no unreviewed safety question exists.
CMP 91-1023 Modifications to Support SG Shot Peening Modify three existing spare pipe penetrations to support steam generator (SG) shot peening by providing access for routing of air and control lines into the containment building. Penetrations i
consist of closed blind flanges inside and outside containment during modes 1-4 and midloop operations. Air line penetrations consist of modified blind flanges with air line connections and isolation valves during modes 5-6 and core alterations. Electrical penetrations are sealed with foam to ensure leaktight condition. Modified penetrations provide access for control cables and air lines during modes 5-6 and core alterations. During modes 1-4 the penetrations are sealed with blind flanges and meet all requirements to serve as containment is. ion barrier.
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CMP 91-1032 Modification for Pressurizer Pressure Control System The PORV circuit for BBPCV0455A will be modified to provide the input to BBPB0455E from input to BBPC0455A. This will allow the bistable to actuate independently, preventing the PORV inoperability and false pressure actuation from the controller. This instrument is part of the pressurizer pressure control system.
The pressurizer pressure control system is not requirea for safety.
CMP 91-1054 Retire Existing Capillary Sensing Elements This modification retires (in place) the current two temperature indicating switches near the Letdown IIcat Exchanger and the Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger. Both of these sensors are located in high radiation areas and periodic recalibration involves significant exposure. Instead, nearby existing RTDs will be utilized to provide the same ftmetions as the originals.
The only safety function associated with any of the instruments mentioned is to ensure that the thermowells used by the various sensors maintain the required pressure boundary. There will be no adverse effect on this function.
CMP 91-1059 Removal of Main Control Board Recorders Remove and retire various recorders from main control board (MCB). Recorders record 8 ion chamber signals from excore detectors, flux signals for each power range channel during overpower excursions, control rod bank measured position, and low-low insertion limit alarm setpoint for each four control banks.
Deleted recorders have no safety design basis. Recorders are nonsafety-related and do not interact with any safety-related equipment except physica!!y through attachment to MCB and electrically through iselation amplifiers. Wiring to recorders is nonsafety-related.
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CMP 92-10025 Modification to Refueling Machine Minor modification to refueling (RF) machine to remove tips of auxiliary hoist trolley beam, relocating cable support, and relocating last 10 fl. of two conduit runs. Ends of trolley beam are outboard of the beam supports; therefore, the capacity of the beam is not afTected. The beam and electrical changes remove interferences with the CRDM ductwork.
RF machine will receive functional test afler the modification as stated in the Testing Requirement Determination Record. RF machine is not safety-related, but is designed to seismic II/I criteria.
Modification has no affect on the structural capacity of the machine.
CMP 92-1003 Modifications to Various MOVs i
This modification adds larger operators to valves EM-HV-8807 A/B, EM-HV-8923 A/B and EG-I IIV-0062. It was desired to add excess margin to these operators. Additionally, power is removed from EM-IIV-8924. The Code design report for the valves has been updated to reflect the new operators. The existing piping and supports have also been verified to be acceptable with the sdded weight. The existing power cable will provide adequate power to the operators, and the breakers and overload heaters were replaced to allow them to perform their safety function.
CMP 92-1009 Add Isolation Relays to Allow Trip of Main Feedwater Pump from MFIS This chany @re for the trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps (turbine driven) on a feedwater isolation sy;d TW will only trip the MFPs a few seconds earlier than would normally occur when the Main Feedwater isolation Valves close.
It will not alter the consequences of accidents previously evaluated since it will not decrease the feedwater temperature nor will it increase the feedwater flow. The MFPs and their controllers are not safety related.
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CMP 92-1015 Add a Third RCS Mid-Loop Level Indication This change adds a third RCS mid-loop level indicating channel in the control room. It also re-spans all three channels to the same range and replaces the existing narrow range mid-loop meters with wide range digital meters.
The modification provides assurances that RCS pressure integrity is maintained. The control room level indication enhancements are improvements over the original modification (CMP 88-1040) for complying with Generic Letter 88-17.
CMP 92-1033 A keplace Feedwater Flow Venturis This modification involves the replacement of the main feedwater fic elements with similar units fabricated entirely from stainless steel. The existing flow elements have experienced flow induced erosion damage to the carbon steel piping which contains the venturi flow element. The replacements have been evaluated to provide equal or better performance with no adverse impact to the plant.
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CMP 92-1040A Install Manual Bypass Switch on Refueling Machine Install a manual bypass switch on the refueling machine control console to allow the operator to bypass the hoist speed interlocks when in open water in the core area. Also change the hoist speed selector circuitry such that the gripper will move in creep speed when the bottom nozzle of the fuel is in the vertical region encompassed by the core plus 10" above the top of the core and the open water bypass circuit is not being used.
The fuel will move slower in the core than it has in previous core alterations. Over open water, the fuel may be raised and lowered at a faster rate than is otherwise possible, so the time required to perform refueling operations will be reduced. Administrative controls will be implemented to prevent the use of this switch when the fuel being moved is not in open water. When in open water, the fuel is well away from any adjacent fuel assemblics or core bafile walls.- Therefore, there is no possibility of adjacent fuel assembly grids interacting with each other.
i CMP 93-1053 A L
Change of BDMS Flux Multiplication Setpoint l
This represents a change to the flux multiplication setpoint of the Boron Dilution Mitigation System.
This system aids in performing mitigating functions associated with the Inadvenent Boron Dilution
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A review and evaluation of all information on the BDMS flux multiplication setpoint has determined what is believed to be reasonable and bounding estimates for the instrument uncertainties. Callaway specific Cycle 5 Inverse Count-Rate Ratio data has also been incorporated into the analysis.
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CN 91-13 Change Requirement for Shutting Down RCP on Low Oil Level Alann This change deletes the requirement to shut down a Reactor Coolant Pump in the event of a low oil level alaan. There is only one level instrument per oil rese:voir. Therefore, a faulty level switch in the lower oil reservoir or a faulty level transmitter in the upper reservoir would now require shutting down the RCP. This allows the operator to monitor additional parameters to verify that an oil problem exists prior to shutting down the pump.
A trip of an RCP motor due to a faulty level switch would also cause an immediate reactor trip if the plant was above 48% power. This change merely calls for validation of the alarm to eliminate an unnecessary transient on the plant.
CN 91-56 Changes Requirements for RCS Overpressure Event Consideration This FSAR change adds a paragraph to ensure that any plant change which may affect RCS overpressure events consider the presence of the loop seal on the pressurizer safety valve.
There is no change to the plant. This does not impact safety, but simply incorporates a manufacturer recommendation.
I CN 92-05 Change in Enrichment vs. IFBA curve i
This changes the enrichment vs. Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) curve contained in the FSAR. Callaway's second reload core (Cycle 3) introduced the Westinghouse Vantage 5 Fuel (V5) option, with IFBAs, as a mix with the Westinghouse Standard Fuel Assemblies (STD) and Optimized Fuel Assemblies (OFA). Beginning with cycle 6, Ca'!away will utilize IFBAs with increased B-10 loadings and enriched boron. The within-assembly IFBA patterns for V5 fuel have also been revised.
Supplemental analyses were performed to support storage of the V5 fuel with the new IFBA design.
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CN 92-19 Spent Fuel Cask Loading Procedure This changes the description of the spent fuel shipping cask loading procedure to indicate that the cask is " sealed" vs. " capped" in the loading pool before removal for decontamination. It partially rescinds a previous FS AR change which substituted the word " capped" for " sealed".
This brings the FSAR back into accord with the existing design basis cask handling accident. By requiring that the shipping cask be scaled in the cask loading pool prior to removal for decontamination, radiological releases are precluded.
CN 92-32 Adds Compensatory Measures for Inoperable Fire Barriers This change adds compensatory measures for inoperable fire barriers / radiant energy heat shields inside Containment and provides the basis for those measures. The existing requirements of an hourly or continuous fire watch cannot be carried out inside Containment during power operations.
This change also adds compensatory measures for inoperable fire barriers inside various rooms in the Auxiliary and Control Buildings.
CN 92-42 Use 100% Cation Resin in Upstream Steam Generator Blowdown Demins This change will allow plant Chemistry and Radwaste the flexibility to utilize the most effective types ofion exchange material available to improve secondary plant chemistry and to minimize the generation of radwaste.
Specifically, this revision will allow for the use of cation resin in the upstream beds. When this resin becomes exhausted, the resin can be removed, regenerated and reloaded, which will significantly extend the service life of the upstream beds and the downstream mixed-beds, therefore reducing the quantity and costs associated with radwaste resin disposal.
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l CN 92-45 l
Radwaste Treatment System Changes Along with FS AR change notices 92-38 and 92-43, this change notice revises the FSAR to reflect the actual mode of operation for the Radwaste Treatment Systems. These changes better describe the operation of the radwaste systems and also provide the Radwaste Department with the flexibility to determine the most economical method to process the liquid waste water and solid waste generated by the plant.
None of the changes cause the revised systems to exceed the analyzed accidents of FSAR Chapter
- 15. The failure of these systems will not compromise any safety related equipment.
CN 92-48 Circulating Water System This change allows more flexibility in the chemical treatment of the Circulating Water System.
Chemicals other than sodium hypochlorite and organic phosphonates may be used to control copper corrosion, pH, scale, and organic growth. Plant operating concentrations and feed rates of products are controlled by the plant National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
CN 92-55 Additional Combustible Loadings in the Control Building This change installs carpeting in the Health Physics Access Area and installs metal cabinets in the Count Room. The combustible loading additions as a result of the carpeting and cabinets have been evaluated and determined to not exceed the fire protection provisions in the area with sufficient safety margin. The ability of the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire has not been adversely afreded.
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CN 92-59 Work Permit Survey for Fire Watch Personnel This change allows any hot work fire watch personnel, in addition to the responsible foreman or supervisor, to perform the survey of the work area.
The trainiog received by foremen and supervisors that qualiSes them to perform surveys of the work area is also received by all hot work fire watch personnel.
k CN 92-64 Incorporates Revised 10 CFR 20 This was submitted primarily to address the implementation of the revised 10CFR20. Specific references to 10CFR20.1-20.601 were deleted. References to existing and new regulatory guides were also modified as necessary to address the commitments for the new regulation. The posting and entry requirements for Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA) were revised to be in compliance
. with the new defmition of VHRA. Setpoints for the Control Room ventilation monitors and Fuel Building ventilation monitors were revised using the methodology incorporated in the revised 10CFR20.
Other editorial changes include deletion of redundancy between Chapters 12 and 13 in the area of health physics personnel respcasibilities. Tables 12.3-2,12.5-1 and 12.5-2 were updated to reflect current use of health physics instrumentation.
CN 93-01 Implement Periodic Fire Damper Drop testing in Lieu of Visual Inspections Performance of a periodic fire damper drop test and lubrication surveillance in lieu of the existing visual inspection surveillance will provide functional verification requirements, and will not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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CN 93-05 ESW System Revisions This revises the FSAR to make it consistent with design basis calculations and plant operating procedures. The changes deal with Ultimate Ileat Sink levels, heat loading, temperatures, and volumes. These changes have been verified by analysis and do not involve an unreviewed safety question.
CN 93-11 Changes Responsibility of Superintendent, Instrument and Controls Currently, FSAR-SA paragraph 9.5.1.7.7 places the Superintendent, I&C responsible for
" developing and implementing fire protection instrument and controls preventive maintenance and calibration procedures." Since fire protection instrument and control procedures do not exist and are not needed, the Superintendent has no responsibility to develop or implement this type of document. The Superintendent does, however, have the responsibility to maintain and supply measuring and test equipment required for the performance of Fire Protection surveillances, and for implementing preventive maintenance on selected fire protection systems.. Since no actual change in responsibilities is taking place, no impact to safety exists.
CN 93-32 Changes Requirements for Postulated Iligh Energy Line Breaks This removes the requirement to postulate arbitrary intermediate high energy line break locations for Class 2 and 3 piping.
NRC Branch Technical Paper MEB 3-1, Revision 2 issued in 1987 removed the requirement to j
postulate arbitrary intermediate break locations. The Callaway FSAR was written using the criteria in the original MEB 3-1 as its basis for selecting break locations. As given in NRC Generic Letter 87-11, licensees may climinate the requirement to postulate arbitrary intermediate break locations without prior NRC approval.
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CN 93-37 Install Breakaway Locks for KC Isolation and System Control Valves Replace all locks on the isolation and control valves of the KC (fire protection) control and isolation valves with breakaway locks. The breakaway locks will allow emergency operation of these valves when a key is not readily available.
The locks will be periodically inspected for damage or defects. Due to the fact that the locks are protecting only KC system valves, which are non-safety, the proposed modification will not affect the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The only physical parameter that is being changed is that the hasp will be able to be disabled in an emergency situation.
EMP 89-3022 Heater Drain Tenk Level Sight Glass Replace the heater drain tank level gauge with more reliable model using a float with magnetic flags instead of a glass covered chamber. Nes sight glass reduces steam leaks associated with this component. If the float is damaged, the debris will not enter feedwater system because there is insullicient flow out of the chamber to carry debris into the heater drain tank. Debris would be trapped at bottom of the sight gauge. Feedwater heater drains system is non safety-related and serves no safety function.
EMP 90-3020 Add Pressure Regulators to Bulk Chemical Air Unloading Stations This change add pressure regulators to two separate locations to aid in the unloading of bulk chemicals. The cuirent system pressure of 125 psig is too high for unloading purposes.
Both the plant air system and the demineralizer air system, which are affected by this change, are non-safety related. No safety related components are afTected.
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4 ETP-AE-03001, REV 0 Steam Generator Pressure Pulse Cleaning This establishes pressure pulse cleaning (PPC) as acceptable method of cleaning the secondary side of the steam generators without using chemical soaks. The PPC system uses high pressure nitrogen to induce a pressure pulse in the water on the secondary side of the S/G. This tends to break up and remove deposits on the tube bundle assembly internals and crevices.
The mechanical stresses placed on the tubes and other S/G components by the PPC was evaluated.
This evaluation demonstrates that the integrity of the tube bundle will be maintained following PPC.
ETP-AQ-ST003, REV 0 Ethanolamine Test Program This procedure tests the effectiveness of ethanolamine (ETA) over ammonia for reduction ofiron transport to the steam generators. New EPRI guidelines for iron transport limits iron transport to less than 5 ppb. Current program only reduces iron transport to 6-7 ppb.
The evaluation of the compatibility of ETA with secondary-side materials is based on available information from laboratory corrosion studies and limited plant experience. To date, a synergistic efTect from ETA has not been observed other than its contribution towards the achievement of target pH levels to control corrosion.
ETP-ZZ-ST008, REV 0 RCS pil Transient Test This procedure varies Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pH in an attempt to remove crud from the fuel clad surface. RCS pH will be changed by the removal and addition oflithium by normal operating procedures using the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).
l The issues evaluated included the effect of a crud burst on RCS and CVCS components and core reactivity, Axial Offset, and Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
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ETP-ZZ-ST009, REV 0 Load Swing Test The only difference between this test and any other planned load reduction is that AFD will be allowed to swing in a positive direction during the early phases of the test without moving control rods. However, the accumulated time during which the core is allowed to deviate from the HFP target axial power distribution will be small enough such that unacceptable transients are avoided.
The plant will be operated in full compliance with the Technical Specifications throughout the entire test. In particular, core axial flux difference (AFD) will be maintained within the applicable RAOC bands Furthermore, a power reduction strategy will be followed that minimizes oscillations and provides for a stable, easily-controlled return-to-power. Such strategy is based on detailed 3D reactor physics calculations using Nuclear Fuel models that account for the AFD anomaly.
MP 90-6736 Condenser Vacuum Pump HX Relief Valve Exhaust Modification of condenser vacuum pump heat exchanger relief valve exhaust pipe to facilitate drainage and prevent water buildup downstream of the reliefvalve by drilling a 1/4" drain hole.
Modification will bring reliefvalve installation in compliance with ASME Section VIII Div.1 Part UG-135(3). Modification does not affect relieving capacity of the reliefvalve or reduce the structural integrity of the exhaust line. Drainage of water from the exhaust line during relief valve actuation or seat leakage will not create any equipment or personnel safety hazards due to the location of the relief valves and floor drains in the immediate area. Condenser vacuum system serves no rafety ftmetion and has no safety design basis.
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MP 91-10022 Install Splice Fitting on Unistrut Hanger Hanger item has been previously cut and rewelded in previous refuelings to allow movement of tool boxes and equipment to lower SG elevations without interference. This minor modification provides a splice fitting to avoid cutting and rewelding in the future. Han8er functions to provide support to a wide and narrow range level instrument tubing line adjacent to SG C. Cutting of hanger and installation of the splice does not affect the overall configuration nor the manner in which the tubing fastens to the hanger. Splice fitting is structurally equivalent to the original unistrut prior to cutting.
All components of the splice assembly are qualified as safety-related stock inventory items.
Structural integrity is maintained without altering the hanger support configuration.
MP 91-8942 1/2-Ton Jib Crane in Turbine Building Minor modification installs a 1/2-tonjib crane in Turbine Building. No nuclear safety-related systems, components, or st'ructures are impacted by this modification.
MP 91-9023 Removal of Rotor Temperature Trip on CWP Rotor temperature trip device removed to prevent inadvertent trip of Circulating Water Pump (CWP) motor. Device detects rotor excess temperature. Circulating water system (CWS) serves no safety related function. CWS is assumed not to be available or in operation during any design basis event. A CWP trip runs the turbine back to 70% load, turbine runbacks have occurred in the past with no affect on any safety or safety-related system, function or component. Removal increases the reliability of the CWPs due to the unreliability of the rotor temperature detectors and the possibility of a false trip for the units. Removal is also recommended by the motor manufacturer.
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MP 91-9343 Modify Ion Track Explosive Detectors Modification ofion track explosive detectors to use Pump Part No. 350-002 in place of Pump 420-001. Gas flow path is revised to accommodate pump 350-002. Filter media is added to the primary air flow to aid in cleanliness. These enhancements increase the reliability of explosive detectors.
Explosive detectors provide no safety function. Failure of explosive detectors do not affect safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown.
MP 91-9416 Camera for RF Machine Holst Elevation Display Add camera to refueling (RF) machine to display the tape readout for hoist elevation to enhance operations of the RF machine while engaging and disengaging fuel assemblies. A 2-way switch is installed to select between display of bridge index marks and hoist elevation. Providing both displays at control console increases operator awareness and response to abnormal load and hoist elevation conditions.
Modification makes no changes to existing loads that will be lifled by the RF machine, nor does it add any loads for the RF machine to lift Modification does not affect ability of RF machine to remain intact following any postulated hazards of fire, internal missiles, or pipe breaks. Camera is mounted Seismic II/I to prevent droppage. Modification reduces probability of a fuel handling accident and will not create the possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated.
MP 92-10024 Modify Duct Supports Change a welded connection to a bolted connection on deadweight supports for a nonsafety-related 1
l portion of the CRDM cooling system. Components and work are not safety-related and not seismic ll/I. Bolted joint will provide adequate strength to support the duct weight.
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MP 92-10031 Equipment Hatch Breaker Replacement Install larger breaker (15A to 30A) in the motor control center (MCC) for the reactor building equipment hatch hoists. MCC breaker supplies power to the equipment hatch hoists and protects hoist and associated power circuit from damage if an equipment malfunction should occur. Existing power circuit are protected by the 30A breaker. 30A breaker allows the equipment hatch hoist to function as required without nuisance tripping during operation. Holst, MCC and associated circuitry are not safety-related. MCC and hoists are located inside containment so no electrical penetration through the containment boundary exists. The larger load on the MCC does not affect existing MCC bus coordination.
MP 92-10059 Removal of Grout Adjacent to UHS Bypass Valves Remove grout at Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) wall penetration to permit removal of valve EFHV0066. Grout provides a " seal" against outside air and to prevent possible bird habitation.
Annular penetration area from which the grout is removed is not a numbered penetration nor is it shown on any design drawing. Its removal has no affect on piping stress concerns, Grout only provides a " weather seal" from the adjoining room. Seal is maintained by re-filling the space with silicone RTV foam. There is no safety-related equipment nor II/I concerns if the seal were to " fail" for any reason.
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MP 92-10063 Replacement of Snubber with Rigid Stmt Replace snubber EJ03-013/11I with rigid strut. Snubber experienced two failures due to water hammer in RHR system. Restraint prevents overstress of RHR pump miniflow line during a dynamic event (seismic event or operational transient). Thermal movement of snubber is less than 1/8", and its movement is less than the installation tolerance of the system restraints.
A rigid strut may be installed without a reanalysis of the system thermal loads. New strut is designed in accordance with ASME III, Subsection NF to resist calculated transient forces.
Operational transient forces will govern over any seismic forces which could occur. New strut meets all requirements and is classified as an approved ASME XI replacement component.
MP 92-10099 CRDM Microphone System Terminal Box Minor modification to trim small portion (approx.1") of terminal box (TVSF06) support to provide clearance to the rigging port. Rigging access port provides access for installation of the vessel head guide pins. The access port is not absolutely required for rigging access, but does make the rigging easier and could save man-hours and prevent possible cross threading of the guide pins. Support to be trimmed provides a seismic II/I support to hold the terminal box in place. Junction box is not required to perform any safety-related function or interface with any safety-related equipment. Box support is scismic II/I. Trimming of the end of the support tube steel does not affect any load supporting portion of the support. Modification requires that the cut does not interfere with the existing welds on the support.
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MP 92-10120 Remove CRDM Monitoring System Remove Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) microphone monitoring system. System has not been used since startup testing. Junction boxes (TVSF05 and 06) have interfered with installation of the reactor seal ring, bladder, and the reactor head litling rig guide pins. There is no longer a need for the system. CRDM microphone system is not required to perform any safety-related functinn.
System does not interface with any safety-related equipment. There are no power or safety bases listed in the FSAR or Tech Specs for this system.
MP 92-10166 Fuel Transfer Tube Leak Detection Change leak detection connection on the fuel transfer tube to Swagelok compatible fitting to minimize amount of time spent in the pool to perform the LLRT. Current flange does not provide needed surface for good LLRT on penetration 17, i.e., transfer tube 0-rings. This minor modification removes existing piping in its entirety and replaces it with a single fitting. Swagelok fitting allows ability to connect directly to the connection with LLRT rig. Rating and design of fitting exceeds the design requirements of the existing piping for temperature and pressure.
Compression fittings used in the application meet the requirements ASME Section III, NC-3600.
Installation of single fitting minimizes local stresses on the transfer tube since LLRT piping is no longer cantilevered ofTa 1/4" pipe. Compression fitting weighs significantly less than existing piping thereby reducing those loads from other than seismic conditions. Seismic loading is also reduced since the fitting is rigid by inspection and does not contain a cantilever arm which is more easily influenced by seismic loading.
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MP 92-10204 Circulating Water Line Vent Vent lines on the circulating water supply line to the condenser are leaking. Weld plate to inside of vent lines to blank off the vent line to terminate leak. Circulating water system is nonsafety-related, serves no safety-related function, and has no safety design basis. Circulating water system is not associated with any accident analysis. Elimination of the downstream circulating water supply line.
vent by the installation of a welded plug will not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR because no failures of this system were previously evaluated.
MP 92-9740 Lead Shielding on SJ Sample Drain Line Minor modification to install permanent lead shielding on SJ sample drain line between sample sink and drain system. Lines are nonsafety-related. Stress analysis insures requirements of ANSI B31.1 are satisfied, and all stresses are below code maximum limits.
MP 92-9835 UHS Cooling Tower Monorail Install rigging monorail for temporary hoist to remove and reinstall valves in UHS cooling tower.
Valves are not affected by installation of rigging beams. Design loads for rigging beam are not exceeded. Loads applied during hoisting, removing and installing valves is far greater than what the rail will receive as a result of a seismic event; therefore, no seismic II/I concemis created. Rigging monorail is not safety-related.
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OL 1068 Revised 1.CO and Surveillance Requirement in Tech Spec 3,0 and 4.0 Revised LCO and surveillance requirements in sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Tech Specs. The revisions addressed problem areas in Generic Letter 87-09. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 78, 02/25/93.
OL 1089 Containment Integrity and Containment Leakage Revise Technical Specifications 3/4.6.1.1,3/4.6.1.2,3/4.6.3, and Bases 3/4.6.1.2 which address containtnent integrity, containment leakage, and containment isolation valves.
Changes maintain consistency with existing Technical Specifications by providing an action statement for containment leak rate testing in modes 1 through 4. No design change is made that would create possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment. Approved by NRC via Amendment 75,12/16/92.
OL 1108 Revise LCOs for PORVs Revise TS 3/4.4.4 and 3.4.9.3 to address the recommendations of Generic Letter 90-06 that were committed to by UE. Approved by the NRC via Amendmer t 83,08/05/93.
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OL 1117 Maximum Room Temperature for Electrical Penetration Rooms Revise Technical Specifications (" Tech Specs") to increase maximum room temperature for Electrical Penetration Rooms in Table 3.7-4 from 104 deg F to 106 deg F.
Area temperature limits ensure safety-related equipment will not be exposed to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Calculations show that raising the normal maximum temperature of the Electrical Penetration Rooms will have a negligible effect on the surrounding rooms. Increased heat loads are insignificant (<2% increase). Post-accident cooling loads are only increased by 0.2%. Weighted average room temperature should not exceed 104 deg F; however, the EQ life for the equipment will be re-evaluated to a weighted average room temperature of 106 deg F. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 70,06/18/92.
OL 1118 Pressureffemperature Limits Modify the plant heatup and cooldown curves and the cold overpressure protection, as found in Tech Spec figures 3.4-2,3.4-3, and 3.4-4. Additionally, remove the reactor vessel surveillance capsule removal schedule from the Tech Specs. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 76, 12/24/92.
OL 1119 ESFAS Instrumentation Trip Setpoints Revise the trip setpoint, allowable value, total allowance, sensor error, and "z" value of the "4 kv Undervo:tage - Grid Degraded Voltage" protection function in Tech Spec Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit 8.b, to agree with the required design values. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 74, 12/16/92.
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OL 1120 Relaxed Axial Offset Control Revise Tech Specs and associated Bases in order to implement relaxed axial offset control (RAOC) for Cycle 6 at Callaway. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 72,08/05/92.
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OL 1121 Minimum Shift Crew Composition Revise Tech Specs to permit an individual with a valid Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license and who is qualified as a Shill Technical Advisor (STA) to assume the control room command function during any absence of the Shift Supervisor (SS) from the control room. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 71,07/17/92.
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OL 1128 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Facility Allows the fuel pool transfer gates to travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool for refueling activities, fuel handling system maintenance, and transfer gate seal replacement.
Approved by the NRC via Amendment 81,06/29/93.
OL 1129 l
Containment Leakage Requests a one-time schedular exemption to Tech Spec 4.6.1.2.a, that requires three Type A tests (Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test or CILRT) be performed at 40 +/- 10 month intervals during each 10 year service period. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 77,02/22/93.
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OL 1132 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage Revise Figure 3.9-1 of Tech Spec Section 3/4.9.12 to reflect a maximum initial enrichment of 4.45 w/o U-235 for fuel storage in Region 2 of the Callaway spent fuel pool. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 82,07/07/93.
OL 1134 Emergency Change to Surveillance This change proposes a one time extension to the surveillance interval specified for Tech Spec Surveillance 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 1 (Manual Trip). The surveillance of the manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring for the shunt trip and undervoltage trip circuits would be deferred until the next entry into Mode 3. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 73,08/21/92.
OL 1137 AC Sources - Diesel Fuel Oil System Test This deletes the requirement for a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel. oil system that are designed to Section III, Subsection ND of the ASME Code. This is covered by another existing Tech Spec which imposes the equivalent surveillance requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 80, 06/21/93.
OL i139 Snubber Surveillance Extension i
Revise Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.d to allow a one-time schedule extension for the snubber transient event inspection. Approved by the NRC via Amendment 79,04/27/93.
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OL 1141 Revise OTDT AFD Penalty Function Change Tech Spec Tables 2,2-1 and 4.3-1 and the associated Bases to revise the Axial Flux Difference (AFD) penalty function fl (Delta-I) for the Overtemperature Delta-T reactor trip function. This change will be accommodated by the use of available DNBR margin and by a reduction in the recalibration tolerance for the incore vs. excore AFD comparison surveillances.
Approved by the NRC via Amendment 84,11/08/93.
OTO-EA-00001, REV 1 Loss of All Service Water Loss of flow through the Service Water system may occur if all the service water pumps trip. This would lead to a plant trip. This procedure provides for starting the ESW pumps to supply cooling water through the service water system.
This alignment will only last until SW flow can be restcced, which is expected to be less than one hour. Tech Specs are unchanged, which will ensure that the UHS level does not go below its minimum level. An SI signal or operator manual intervention can restore the ESW system to its safety lineup.
OTS AE-00004, REV 0 Feed Pump Turbine Speed Control Testing (also RMP 92-2007a)
This modification revises the MFP speed control circuitry to allow operators to automatically control delta-P between the feedwater and steam headers at low power.
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OTS-BB-00002, REV 1 Draining Steam Generator U-Tubes Using Nitrogen Injection Performing steam generator u-tube draining using nitrogen injection will be allowed while fuel is in the core during Modes 5 or 6. Because the RCS is vented to atmosphere at this time, no possibility of overpressurization exists. Nitrogen is injected at a point which prevents it from entering the RHR suction and eliminates the potential for gas entrainment of the RHR pumps.
RFR 05471C Install Permanent Racks on Top of Containment Coolers for Storage of Lower CRDM Add permanent racks on top of Containment Coolers SGN01 A and SGN01C. These racks allow for the storage of CRDM ductwork sections that have been removed from around the reactor vessel during a refueling outage. These racks are not loaded during normal plant operations and Calculation ZZ-86 analyzed the effect of these racks on the coolers. The evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
l RFR 08653G Outside Interim Storage of Mixed Radwaste Construct a storage area adjacent to the Plant Southwest side of the Radwaste Building, between the building and the Diccharge Monitoring Tank facility. The storage area generally consists of a fenced-in concrete pad with access gates. This is an interim storage area for storage of hazardous radioactive (mixed) wastes from a radiological and environmental standpoint. Mixed waste will be stored in drums, overpacks, and bin boxes.
Onsite transport, transfer, and storage of mixed waste poses no increased risks, or significant radiation exposure hazards to plant workers or members of the general public. The Solid Radwaste System itself performs no functions related to the safe shutdown of the plant, and a failure of a drum would not adversely afTect any safety-related system of component. The use of the additional concrete slab on which the binboxes are to reside poses no significant increases in risk to any safety-related structure, system, or component.
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RFR 08971B Storage of Clean Oil and Grease in the Radwaste Tunnel Additional combustible materials in the form of clean oil and grease are to be added to the Radwaste Tunnel (Room 7133) to improve the processing of clean oil and grease within the RCA. The oil and grease will cach be stored in approved, metal, combustible liquid storage cabinets.
The area contains no safe shutdown or safety related equipment and there are no seismic II/I concerns.
RFR 09082B Relocate Service Air connection for KAV0110 MMOD 91-4016 Change the physical routing of the connection point for service air that is isolated by KAV0110 to circumvent the obstruction created by a thermostat in the service building.
The P&lD that is to be modified is included in the FSAR and thus constitutes a proposed change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Ilowever, the non-safety related system improvements do not I
affect or increase the probability of occurrences or consequences of an incident as evaluated by the I
FSAR.
RFR 09204B Retire in Place the Local Level Indicator for the Condensate Storage Tank The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) has no safety function and has no safety design basis.
Local level indication is not utilized in operations involving the CST. Redundant indication of compliance to Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 (required minimum CST water volume) exists through other means.
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PSR 09220C Install an Above Ground Diesel Fuel Storage Tank Install a new 1000 gallon diesel fuel storage tank plant west of the Stores building. This fuelis for operating plant vehicles and m.iscellaneous non-plant equipment.
This tank is located at least 100 feet from any building and near a larger fuel oil tank. The accident discussed in the FSAR is associated with a 300,000 gallon fuel oil tank, so the new tank will have no impact on safety.
RFR 09616C Lift Alarm Jumpers for Valves KJ11V-1,2,101,102 This minor modification will lift alarm jumpers in the motor control centers of the subject valves.
This will disable the loss of power alarms associated with these valves so they can be closed and powered down. These valves are not needed in the system.
An ESF signal causes these valves to run to the closed position. The valves will be left inoperable in the closed position until their removal from the system.
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RFR 09757A Cycle 6 Documentation, Reload, Burnup Extension Revision A of this RFR documents the cycle 6 reload design for Callaway Plant, and includes the Reload Safety Evaluation (RSE) which establishes the acceptability of the design. This RFR also includes a safety evaluation for the reuse of reconstituted fuel assembly G87.
Revision 11 provides changes to the Nuclear Design Report (NDR) and PCNDR to increase the available end of cycle 6 shutdown margin.
Revision K documents the extension of the maximum cycle 6 burnup from 20,700 MWD /MTU to 21,000 MWD /MTU, and is supported by a Westinghouse revision to the RSE.
Revision L documents the impact of the increased isotopic inventories of the cycle 6 burnup extensions and their impact on the core ofiload, specifically the fuel handling accident.
RFR 09780C Doors Between Aux and Fuel Bldg with Negative Pressure With the Auxiliary Building Supply Unit, SLG01, and the Fuel / Auxiliary Building Normal Exhaust Fans, CGLO3 A/B, in OFF, Doors 11194,14081 and 15071 may remain open between the Fuel Building and the Auxiliary Building provided the latest results of OSP-GG-00005 using the most limiting Emergency Exhaust Train is at least.40 IWG negative pressure and the latest results of OTS-GL-00001 using the most limiting train of Emergency Exhaust is at least.50 IWG negative pressure.
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RFR 09846A Oil Sample Storage in Room 3102 Additional combustible materials in the form of oil are to be stored on the 1974' elevation of the Communication Corridor Room 3102 to allow oil samples to radioactively decay. This oil will be stored in an approved, metal, combustible liquid storage cabinet constructed in accordance with NFPA 30.
The area contains no safe shutdown or safety related equipment and there are no seismic II/I concerns.
RFR 09873B Add Chain Operator on FV0681 This modification adds an external chain operator to the hand wheel of the valve. The modification does not alter the location or orientation of the valve or make changes to the system. The type of valve design precludes any adverse impact from stresses of the chain operator, All new stresses from using the operator will be transmitted through the yoke of the valve body and not the valve stem. The valve is only used during start up to vent the Heater Drain Tank. The system and associated components are all non safety related and not used or implied in any safety analysis.
RFR 09893A Storage of 20 Sets of Fire Brigade Gear in the Comm Corridor This evaluation addresses the addition of 20 sets of fire brigade clothing to be stored on a shelfin a stairway landing in the Communications Corridor. This will result in a slight increase in the combustible loading in that room.
The overall combustible loading in the area is still very low. Room 3103 is not a safety related area and contains no safe shutdown or safety related equipment. There are no seismic II/I concerns.
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Subject of safety evaluation is the time from actual flux doubling until the automatic signal to isolate and reborate is generated in the Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS). Current licensing basis boron dilution event analysis assumes this time is instantaneous whereas the actual equipment has a finite delay due to the 1-minute intervals used in the algorithm. Also, current safety analyses assume continuous monitoring of the core flux and an immediate signal upon reaching a flux multiplication condition. Microprocessor does not respond this way, and an additional time delay must ht assumed prior to the automatic actuation of the BDMS.
An increase in the total response time deiay and changes to the RCS boron concentration limits 1) pose no change to the initiating event mechanism for this transient nor 2) affect the function of any equipmeni icportant to safety nor 3) alter the analysis assumption of this event or any other licensing basis event presented in the FS AR. 'Ihere is sufficient time for operation of the BDMS to prevent a loss of plant shutdown margin; thus, the minimum DNBR remains well above the safety analysis limit values. The analyses of this transient, assuming an increase in the total time delay and changes to the RCS boron concentration Emits, result in the applicable response time acceptance criteria being satisfied.
RFR 10036A Permanent Storage of Frisker Shields This allows for the permanent storage of three 400 pound reinforced concrete frisker shields to be stored in the Reactor Building. Two will be stored near stairways on the 2000'(ground) elevation and one will be on the 2047' elevation.
The shields are secured such that they will not be displaced during a seismic event. The shields do not introduce flammable materials in the area.
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l RFR 10060A i
Determine Maximum Component Cooling Water Temperature Post LOCA This RFR provides the maximum supply temperature that the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system will reach after a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the associated minimum required ESW flowrate to the CCW heat exchangers. The maximum temperature is 131 degrees F as opposed to 126 degrees F previously.
The effect of the new maximum temperature was evaluated for the effect on each of the loads on the CCW system. In each case, operation at the higher temperature is acceptable.
RFR 10263B l
Snubber Reduction Program Low movement snubbers at Callaway will be replaced with rigid struts. The function of a snubber is to provide system flexibility for thermal growth, and rigidity for a seismic or a transient event, Callaway has developed a conservative methodology to replace low movement snubbers with rigid struts. The justification for replacing low thermal deflection snubbers (<0.066") with rigid restraints is that a typical support assembly (pipe clamp, pin connections, end bracket and 1/16" over size bushing hole in the strut paddle) will have 1/16" positive gap for the thermal growth, thus 4
minimizing the impact due to thermal growth. Snubbers with small thermal movements, if replaced with rigid restraints, will have minimal impact on the pipe stresses and support loads because of inherent pipmg flexibility and free play in the restraint hardware.
The replacement oflow n.ovement snubbers with rigid struts does not impact or invalidate existing stress runs or support calculations. The original design parameters for the piping system are not impacted in any form or shape by the replacement of snubbers with stmts, therefore replacing snubbers with rigid struts does not create an unreviewed safety question or concern.
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RFR 10416A j
Change the Plant Building Siding and Fastener Requirements This RFR changes the plant building siding and fastener requirements since the ESWS pumphouse inlet openings have been recently modified with additional barriers for security reasons.
Previously, potential blockage of the ESWS pumphouse forebay inlets resulted in restrictions to plant building siding and fasteners. With the new inlet barriers, no restrictions are necessary. Each ESWS bay can undergo 80% blockage and still maintain pump operability.
RFR 10557B Install Chain Operators on IIEV0048 and HEV0058 The Boron Recycle System serves no safety function and the failure of the BRS does not result in the release of radioactivity in excess of established guidelines or prevent the reactor from being shut down in the event of a design basis accident. The failure of the BRS does not compromise the capability of any safety-related feature to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.
RFR 10598B Change Valves From Globe to Ball Change Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Sampic Valves JEV0057 & 58 from globe valves to ball valves. Tech Spec 4.8.1.1.2.E states that the sample should be taken in accordance with ASTM Standard 2276 - 1978 which requires the sample valves be either a ball or plug type.
The valves are approximately equal in size and weight and exceed the design pressure and temperature limits of the piping. The valves are stainless steel and are equivalent to the globe valves which were used for the application.
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RFR 10786A Operability of SWGR #3 and Batt #3 This evaluation demonstrates the operability of'A' train Vital Batteries and DC Switchgear without design cooling flow to the equipment rooms. The rooms' temperatures have been evaluated and determi ied to stay within a suitable range for equipment operation during a design basis accident with design summer conditions.
RFR 10805B Allow Removal of Heat Trace and Insulation This allows the removal (without reinstallation) of heat trace tape and associated insulation from the safety injection "EM" system piping associated with the Boron Injection Tank (BIT). The removal creates no unreviewed safety questions since the final detailed design of the plant (as discussed in FSAR section 6.3.2.2) determined that the boron concentration of the RWST is suflicient for plant safety considerations and the heat tracing provisions would not be operated.
RFR 13176A SGG04B-Determine Proper Sheave Size for 3500 CFM The motor sheave for SGG04B can be changed to a sheave with an approximate outside diameter of 7.25 inches to achieve the design flow rate of the air handling unit of 3500 cfm without exceeding the design brake horsepower, critical fan speed or seismic qualification. Suflicient conservation has been used to assure operability of the associated room equipment. There is no change to the design basis and no unreviewed safety question exists.
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RFR 13177B Installation of Access Door Panels in HVAC Ductwork Access doors will be installed in Power Block and UHS /ESW HVAC ductwork in order to obtain access to fire dampers and other components.
Access doors are of the same material construction and configuration as those supplied and installed originally for component access. The doors are designed for various system pressure ratings.
HVAC system flow and pressurization requirements will not be affected by this change.
RFR 13528A Evaluate Storage of Equipment in Auxiliary Bldg.
Permanent storage of non-plant items to support normal plant operations, in locations designated within the Auxiliary Bldg., will not adversely affect the Fire Protection Program.
RFR 13696A Evaluate Storage of Equipment in Fuel Bldg.
Permanent storage of requested non-plant equipment in designated location in the Fuel Bldg. is a!'a ved. This change will not adversely affect the Fire Protection Program nor will it result in a seismic II/I concern.
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RFR 13775A Provide Temporary Storage of Dry Active Radioactive Waste South of Radwaste Bldg The Interim Storage Yard, south of the Radwaste Building, will be approved for temporary storage of Dry Active Radioactive Waste (DAW)in either SeaLand boxes or LSA boxes. This would provide better access control to the materials and would also allow material to be stored outside the RCA to allow for decay of short-lived isotopes and subsequent material release.
i This yard has been evaluated for storage of much higher levels of radioactivity (in spent resins and filters) as well as for storage of mixed wastes.
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RFR 13785A 1
Evaluate On-Line Freeze Seal i
A freeze seal will be used to facilitate repair of valve ECV0001. The seal will be placed between the spent fuel pool and the valve. Of concern is the malfunction which could cause a freeze seal failure, and subsequent loss of spent fuel pool level.
Pressure at the freeze seal will be <7.5 psig. No fuel movement will be allowed while the freeze seal is installed. Personnel in attendance at the seal will constantly monitor the temperature of the seal and control room operators will be ready to mitigate the consequences of a seal failure should it occur.
RFR 13795A l
Install Coat Rack / Allow Storage of Lab Coats at the Aux. Bldg. Sample Sink Provide coat racks for storage oflab coats in room 1311 of the Aux Bldg. The rack may contain up to 40 pounds oflab coats (combustible material).
This change will not adversely affect the Fire Protection Program and no seismic II/I concern will result due to permanent storage of the coats. The coat rack will be anchored to the wall.
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RFR 13836A Install Steam Suit Locker Outside Area Five Permanent storage of requested non-plant equipment in designated location in the Auxiliary Building is allowed. This change will not adversely affect the Fire Protection Program nor will it result in a seismic II/I concern.
RFR 13860A Clay Blanket Classification and Backfill Requirement The two foot thick clay blanket underground is considered non-safety and is therefore not subject to the compaction requirements of the Category I Cohesive Backfill.
The purpose of the clay blanket is to limit seepage of surface water into ground water which existed prior to any construction. Due to the nature of the underlying geology, groundwater is very slow to migrate down-gradient, therefore it is desirable to limit the amount of surface water entering the groundwater. The plant structures are designed for a saturated condition with the ground water at elevation 1999'-6", therefore even if the clay blanket were not in place allowing the groundwater to rise to elevation 1999'-6" it would not create the possibility of an accident difTerent than already evaluated.
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RFR 13908A Determine the Maximum Acceptable Letdown Flow Rate Determine the maximum allowable letdown flow rate from the RCS in order to facilitate clean up of the RCS because of high Dose Equivalent Iodine readings.
A maximum letdown flow rate change from 120 gpm to 130 gpm for a short period of time was approved. The increased flow rate was evaluated for: 1) the ability of the letdown and charging subsystems to maintain a constant pressurizer level,2) the exposures associated with a letdown line break outside of the containment building,3) the ability of the charging pumps to maintain pressurizer level should the line break at the elevated flow rates, and 4) an inadvertent dilution of the RCS during Modes 1,2,3,4,5 or 6 of operation. All evaluations found that no unreviewed safety question exists for this method of operation.
RFR 13915A, B, C Documentation of Cycle 7 Reload Design These safety evaluations apply to the Cycle 7 reload design, and includes operation through Mode 1.
The Cycle 7 reload design satisfies all of the applicable safety parameter limits and acceptance criteria, and has been evaluated using standard reload design and approved fuel rod design models and methods.
RFR 13922A CO2 Decon Facility During Refuel 6 This allows the use of pelletized CO2 to provide the method of decontaminating tools and other hardware during Refuel 6.
The radiological inventory of the CO2 pellet cleaning facility is small. Usually this inventory consists of bagged tools and other hardware awaiting cleaning and the IIEPA filters and prefilters that trap the radioactive particulates removed from the components during cleaning. The activity in the trailers will not exceed the levels evaluated in the FSAR. This facility has no interface with any other safety related equipment.
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RFR 14132A Evaluate Storage of Equipment in Hot Machine Shop Permanent storage of requested non-plant equipment in designated location in the Hot Machine Shop is allowed. This change will not adversely affect the Fire Protection Program nor willit result in a seismic II/I concern.
RFR 14154A Storage of Spray Additive Tank Recirc Pump Allow permanent storage of the Spray Additive Tank Recirc Pump between the encapsulation valve covers on the plant east side of the 2000' level of the Aux Bldg. This will result in an increase in combustible loadings in the area (Corridor 1314).
The additional loadings were analyzed and documented through the Combustible / Electrical Fire llazards Analysis Program and are not considered significant. As the pump will be secured properly, no seismic II/I concern exists.
RFR 14251 A NES Nozzle Dams Usage in Steam Generators During Refuel 6, nozzle dams may be placed in both the hot and cold legs of the steam generators to isolate them from the reactor with the refueling cavity filled.
The dams consist of two inflatable seals and one passive seal. They have been evaluated for radiation exposure levels and have been hydrostatically tested. The worst case leakage rate is 5 gpm, which is far less than the available makeup.
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RFR 14514A Evaluate Nuclear Power Range Detector 44 During initial startup afler Refuel 6, it was discovered that both NIS channel N44 detectors were reading approximately twice as high as the other three channels. After extensive equipment testing, it was determined that the probable cause was water in the vicinity of the detector well, which provided additional moderation and increased the thermal flux in the vicinity of the detector resulting in increased detector currents. It is likely that the cause will clear itself slowly as the water evaporates.
It was determined that the equipment was operating correctly and that no unreviewed safety question exists provided that the channel responds normally to changes in flux.
mMP 90-2005 Auto-Start of Standby RMW Transfer Pump Remove standby reactor makeup water (RMW) transfer pump auto-start feature of RMW control system when dilution water is needed at the CVCS blending tee. Change time delays for auto-starting standby kMW transfer pump due to low discharge pressure to reduce starts due to momentary pressure signals. RMW system performs no safety function. Modification involves no safety-related components. Slight change in availability of dilution water at the boric acid blending tee would not increase severity of consequences of boron dilution accident.
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RMP 90-2007 DP Indicator on Main Control Board Install differential pressure (DP) indicator on control panel RLOO5 to display DP between feedwater header and main steam header. Indicator is installed in location previously occupied by feedwater header pressure indicator. Control room displays are nonsafety-related and are not associated with any safety ftmetions. Reconfiguration of the displays does not create any adverse concern with the control circuits with which they interface. Human factors review concludes the reconfiguration achieves an overall improvement, and there is no loss of existing displays to the operator.
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RMP 90-2017 Add Air Conditioning to Count Room Add air conditioning to count room to maintain room temperature and humidity within acceptable range. New air conditioning equipment installed in the count room is a stand-alone system and independent of existing cooling equipment. All equipment is located in non-II/I area which precludes adverse impact on plant safety systems. Circuits added are in nonsafety-related separation group 6. Combustible loading is negligible.
RMP 91-2004 Install Breathing Air Stations in Fuel Building Install breathing air hose stations in Fuel Bldg. Breathing air system provides dedicated source of respirable air for use during maintenance operations and during abnormal entry into areas having potentially high concentrations of airborne radioactive contaminants. Breathing air system is nonsafety-related and has no safety function except for containtnent isolation which is unafrected by this modification. Penetration seals specified on design drawings ensure that the new holes in the auxiliary and fuel building exterior wall will not leak during an accident. Failure of new piping during a seismic event will not damage any safety-related equipment nor initiate any accident addressed in FSAR.
RMP 91-2012 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Modification Add resistance temperature detector (RTD) to drain lir<e from each of the twelve low pressure (LP) feedwater (FW) heaters. Add sightglass to LP heaters for visual indication oflevel and as a reference so that controller measuring level from the normal level tap in heater controls normal level control valve. Iligh level controller measures level from high level tap and controls high level dump valve. Create new computer points on BOP computer to calculate heater levels at east end of beaters. Include new setpoint data for calibration oflevel transmitters and high-high level switches.
AP components installed and/or affected by this modification are non-safety. There is no functional inange to LP heaters.
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RMP 92-2007 Main Feed Pump Speed Control Change Change the Main Feed Pump Speed Control Circuitry to allow operators to automatically control differential pressure between the feedwater and steam headers at low power.
The MFP speed control circuitry is non-safety related and does not adversely affect any safety design bases.
RMP 93-2012A Install Isolation Valve on Drain Lines from Air Compressors CKJ01 A,B,C,& D This modification will allow one train of the air compressor skid for the Diesel Generator Air Start System to be taken out for maintenance without taking both trains out. Failure of the new valves would not result in the failure of any safety related equipment nor would it prevent the Air Start System from performing its design function.
TM 93-M007 UHS Pumpdown System The instaliation of a temporary pumpdown system in the UHS will have no effect on the ability of the UllS or ESW systems to perform their safety design functions. Operation of the temporary pumpdown system will decrease the operation of the safety related ESW pumps for UHS level control.
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TM 93-M008 l
Install Blank Flanges on Inlet and Outlet of One Coil of Contain. Cooler SGN01C Based upon the conclusion of RFR 4398G, up to 15% reduction per cooler is allowable. This is equivalent to plugging 50 passes per cooler. Installing the blank flanges on the third from the bottom, plant west coil, will be the equivalent of plugging 32 passes which is below the 15% margin.
The design cooling capacity, the seismic qualification and environmental qualification of the cooler is maintained, and the code pressure boundary is maintained.
TM 93-M012 Open Ductwork Access Cover to Prevent Accumulation of Noble Gasses TemporarUy open the access cover to a section of the Fuel / Auxiliary Bldg. suction ducting to mitigate the spread of noble gasses from a leaking valve stem.
Based upon the fact that this section of ducting will be isolated from safety related ductwork by closing darnpers upon the receipt of an SIS or FBIS and based upon the results of the data when the access cover was fully opened, the access cover may be fully opened without affecting any functional requirements. The negative pressure in the Fuel Building will be maintained during normal power operations as well as Emergency lineups following a FBIS or SIS. The ventilation opening will be covered by a screen to prevent the entry of foreign materials into the ducting.
Records printed: 135
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