ML20065E334

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Recommends ACRS Action on Recent LERs Re HPCI Failure to Auto Start After MSIV Failure & Single Cooling Supply Line on RHR Pump Motors
ML20065E334
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Hatch
Issue date: 06/13/1980
From: Boehnert P
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To: Kerr W
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML082180533 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-82-261 NUDOCS 8210010083
Download: ML20065E334 (1)


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I' MEMORANDUM FOR:

W. Kerr, Chairman Hatch Plant Subcomittee

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FROM:

P. Boehnert, Reactor Enginee

SUBJECT:

ACTION ON RECENT LICENSEE E 'NTS AT PLANT HATCH Reports recently submitted by the licensee of Hatch Units I & II (Georgi ~a Power) appeared to warrent irtvestigation, particularly for potential generic safety implications. Hatch Units I & II are BWR/4 plants producing 2436 MW(t).

I spoke to members of HRC I&E's Technical Program Group concerning the below

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8 noted events. This group is charged with review of LERs and other reports to determine if potentially significant' safety deficiencies exist.

I Attachment I is an LER that describes the failure of the high-pressure coolant injection system ( HPCI) to auto-start on Unit 1 after closure of the MSIVs.

The system had isolated due to a spurious HPCI steam line flow signal.

The cause of the isolation is still pnder investigation. However, it is suspected that the isolation was caused by a pressure spike in the steam flow instrumen-tation line similar to a previous problem experienced with the RCIC system (see attachment discussed. below).

This event is significant in light of a past series of failures of the HPCI systems at both Units to function on demand. NRC investigated the situation following an inquiry from Commissioner Kennedy. Attachment II is a copy of my report to you on the results of the Kennedy inquiry.

I&E will continue follow-up on this item.

Attachment III is a Georgia Power report of a substantial safety hazard for Unit I.

The residual heat removal pump motors have a single cooling water supply line - violating the single failure criterion.

All RHR cooling could be lost upon failure of this one cooling line. Preliminary investigation by the Technical Programs Group has not revealed any generic concern, but I&E will continue to persue this item.

In light of the above actions by I&E,I recommend no ACRS action at this time.

I will keep you posted as the I&E investigations continue.

cc: ACRS Members ACRS Technical Staff 5

ACRS Fellows

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Teicphcne 912 357 7781 912 537 9444 h-zza Georgia Power Edwin i.Hetch Nuclear Plani the sourhcrn cuire systern May 19, 1980 PM-80-552 PLANT E.

I. HATCH Licensee Event. Report Docket No. 50-321 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 ATTENTION:

Mr. James P. 0;Reilly Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.8.e of Hatch Unit II Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-321/80-049.

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60 6s COCMET NUM0f R EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h 8

hinhl n iaj lWhile perf orming HNP-1-3119 HSIV exercise the MSIV's auto closed on e

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Oi3,1steamline flow and this Caused Rx scram and HPCI I

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HPCI did not auto start due to a spurious HPCI hich

.Oisjisteam line flow isolation signal.

There were no effects upon public I

I lO gilhealth and safety due to this event.

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JJ Je 3b 36 37 40 el 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANo CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 121011 The cause of this spurious sional is not yet known and evaluation is co I m Intinuing.

The HPCI system was proved coerable by oorforminn a manual "I

rTT':r1 1 Full flow test" and an auto "Ouick start test without receivino a hia I

The delta press switches were checked and found to 1 g i steam flow signal.

J m i e operable and ir. calibration.

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May 19, 1980 LER #50-321/80-49 NARRATIVE REPORT On 5-13-80 at 1641 while performing HNP-1-3119 MSIV exercise test, the "D" MSIV was closed too far causing high flow in the other. 3 lines.

This caused an auto closure of the MSIV's and a resultant' Rx scram and low water level initiation of HPCI.

The HPCI system did not auto start. because it had isolated on a spurious HPCI steam line high flow.

The HPCI system was manually started for Rx vessel makeup and performed satisfactorily.

Prior to Rx startup a manual " Full flow test and an auto " Quick.

start test were performed satisfactorily.

The Delta P switcher were checked ar.d.found operable and in calibration.

The cause of this spurious HP.CI high steam line flow isolation is not yet known and is still being investigated.

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