ML20059K883

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 57 to License NPF-43

ML20059K883
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/13/1990
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K881	List: ML20059K883
References
NUDOCS 9009250035
Download: ML20059K883 (5)

Text

.h..~ i _._ -

44-

]

.?

4 UNITED STATES p

m g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

4j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20665 y\\

. /

i

• ...+

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATEDTOAMENDMENTNO.5))OFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSENO.NPF-43

}

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI-2 DOCKET NO._5,0_-341 a

11.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 27, 1989, the Detroit Edison Company (Deco,or the

'l licensee) requested an amendnent to the Technical Specifications (TS) appendeo a

to Facility Optrating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi-2.

The proposed amendment would revise the TS by adding a remote-manual primary containment. isolation valve associated with the installation of enhanced primary containment water level instrumentation to the valves listed in TS Table 3.6.3-1, Primary

. Containment Isolation Valves.

1 DECO was required to perform a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) cm the Ferni-2 control room in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, 7

Supplement I as specified by License Condition 2.C.(17), Attachment 2, Item 1.

j The DCRDR Summary Report identified-a number of Human Engineering Discrepancies i

(HED). Of particular concern to this TS change is HED 462 which identified that i

primary containment water level indication up to 108 feet is not available. To i

resolve MED 462 modifications to the plant will be required.

.l

i Primary Containment water level indication will be accomplished with the ir.sta11ttico of two new pressure instrumentation loops.

One loop will measure torus _ pressure off'of the existing wet leg tap for the torus water level tr ansn.it t er. The other loop will measure drywell pressure et elevation-650 feet 4

utilizing spare penetration X-27f.

Penetration X-27f currently. consists of a one inch schedulf; 160,. seamless, steinless steel pipe which is capped outside-contaireent approximately three inches from the penetration radiation _ shielding i

n aterial.- In order to facilitate the installation of the new drywell pressure i

. sensing-diaphragm. a one inch sensing line will be connected to existing _

9"

. penetration X-27f. The sensingxline will consist of one manual globe volve, a remote nanual solenoid operated globe valve, two test connection valves and a blind flange assembly which houses the transmitter sensing diaphragm. All of 1

-the piping and valves will be classified QA Level I, Seismic Category I.

The piping up to, and including, the remote manual isolation valve and second test connecticn valve will be designed, fabricated, and installed per ASME Code Section Ill, Class 2, as'this section of piping is considered to be part of the

. dryull pressure boundary. The piping after the remote nanual isoldtion valve up to, and including, the blind flange assembly and the piping after the second test connection valve will be designed, fabricated and installed per ANSI B31.1, Power Piping Code. ' Control and indication for the remote raanual valve will be

'9009250035 900913 m-gDR. ADOCK 05000341 POC

}

s.

s

.m 2

ly provided in the main control room. The valve will not be interlocked with any-conteinntnt-isolation signal.

In the September 27, 1989 application the licensee proposed that the valve position be normally opened because it is used

-in er instrunient line for instrumentation that is required during emergency operation of-the plant.

-A change'to the Fermi-2 TS Table 3.6.3-1 is required since the modification will require the installation of a remote manual primary containinent isolation valve on the drywell pressure sensing line which is to be installed on spare penetration X-27f.

2.0 EVALUATION

'The configuration of the proposed installation of the new instrumentation line through penetration X-27f meets the requiren'ents of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix-A, General Dtsign Criteria (GDC) 54 for Piping Systems Penetrating Primary Containrsent; GDC 56 for Primary Containment Isolation; and Regulatory Guide 1.11 for Instrur, tent Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment.

To neet the requirements of GDC 54, the licensee has attached the sensing line to penetration X-27f with one manual and one manual remote containment isolation valves, two test connection valves and a blind flange assembly located outside prin ary containn'ent. Monitoring of the remote-manual isolation valve perforn:ance will be part of the Fermi-2 In-Service Testing (IST) program.

GDC 56 addresses prir..ary containment isolation and requires that lines which ccnnect directly to the primary containne t atmosphere must have two isolation valycs unless it can-be demonstrated that the containment isolation for a specific class of lines such as instrunent lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis. NUREG-0800, Section 6.2.4, Part II, Containment Isolation System Acceptance Criteria, recognizes Regulatory Guide 1.11 as an acceptable alternate basis-fcr containment isolation of instruroent lines.

The new sensing line attached to penetration X-27f has been designed and will be instelled in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.11.

The sensing line is a one inch, seamless, stainless steel pipe.

It is a static line that is not connected to the, reactor coolant boundary. -In the event of a postulated failure of the piping, reactor coolent leakage will not occur. Failure.of the penetration during normal operation will have no effect upon the integrity or functional perforr..ance of the Secondary Conteinment and Standby Gas Treatment System since the fission product inventory is contained within the reactor coolant system.

The potential off-site exposure due to any failure of the-penetration would be below 10 CFR Part 100 lin,its.

In addition to the considerations of Regulatory Guide 1.11, the staff examined the potential effects'of failure of the proposed instruraent line during accident conditions. The worst case isLa line failure without isolation during prir,ary containtient pressurization following a Loss-of-CoolrntAccident(LOCA). This event would challenge the secondary containment with a greater rate of radiological'exfiltration from the primary containment than wculd otherwise occur. A similar event is evaluated in the Fermi-2 i

.h

,l

@ Nf

$1 4

=:2 y 'l

.l'pdated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

In this event, an instrument line connected directly to the Reactor Coolant Pressure boundary fails outside lontainment without isolation. The UFSAR described event provides a much more severe. challenge to the secondary containinent systerns performance since the E

reactor coolant system depressurizes from approximately 1000 osi pressure f

directly into the secondary containment. The evaluation of the instrument line failure shows that the functional performance of the secondary containment and standby gas tr, atment system are not impaired by this event, and the calculated I

)otential offsite exposures are substantially)below the guidelines of 10 CFR

? art 100 (UFSAR Sections 6.2.4.2.5 and 15.6.2. On this basis, the potential f ailure of the proposed installation for the drywell level instrument line was determined not to pose an undue risk to the public health and safety.

r Section 6.2.4 of-the Fermi-2 SER, NUREG-0798, reviewed several similar situations where a single remote-rr.anual valve with a manual valve used for l

containment isolation purposes on a one inch line.

The criteria used was Section 6.2.4, Item II of NUREG-0800.

'l The sin:ilar situations are:

Function Penetrations Fails

- Containnent Atniosphere X-27 a, b, c, d, e Closed 1

Sen pling X-48 a, b, c, d, e j

RPS Instrumentation X-47 a, 5, e As is Tcrus Pressure and Level X-206 a, b As is Instrun.entation UFUR Table 6.2-2 give details on each penetration.

It shculd be noted that penetration X-27f was configured like penetrations X-27 a-e at the time of licensing of Fermi-2. The modifications to the Fermi-2 Containnent Atniosphere Sampling Systems for environmentalLqualification purposes nade_this penetration.a spare.

Position 1.c of Regulatory Guide 1.11 requires the sensing line be provided with -

an isoletien valve capable of automatic cperation or remote operation from the control room, and located in the line outside the containment as close'to the containment as practical. A remote manual. solenoid operated. valve will be installed in the sensing line as close as possible to the outside surface of.

the primary containment shield wall.

Yalve control and position will be pro-vided in the control room. The valve will be classified =QA Level 1, Seismit Category I', ASME Code,Section III, Class 2.

l The valve limit switches and solenoids will be Class 1E. The valve and Josition indicating lights will be powered by a Class 1E 130V DC power supply. T1ese 1

- design parameters will provide for a high degree of assurance that the valve can be closed from the control room if the sensing line integrity'outside-1 f

^

A

' ?

d containr.ent is lost under accident ccnditions and can be reopened under the conditioris that would prevail when the valve reopening is appropriate. -The valve will be normally closed and will have fail as-is logic.

Position 1.d of Regulatory Guide 1.11 requires that components ep to and including the isolation valve should be designed and installed to the quality at least equivaltnt to the

- ccntainnient. The sensing line piping and valves up to and including the remote manual isolaticn valve and second test connection valve will be designed, fatricated end installed per ASME Code,Section III, Class 2.

The remainder of the sensing line will be installed in an accessible area approximately eight feet abo % the Reector Building third floor which will provide for visual itspect %n and testing. The piping assembly will be installed to preclude any J

failure cf one_line inducing failure of another.

Position 1.e of Regulatory 4

Guide 1.11 requires that instruirent lines penetrating pririary containment should not be so restricted by components in the line. The in-line components of the proposed sensing line will be selected to ininimize the restriction presented to-the trenstission of drywell pressure to the transmitter diaphragm.

7 The installation of the new sensing line.at penetration X-27f will be conducted in two phases. The first phase was con.pleted during the recent refueling cutage l

(December 1989)whichirstelledthemanualin-linevalveandthe'testconnection and asscciated valves. A qualified welded cap was used to seal closed the line Utere the remote ianual valve will be installed later. The penetration, it.cluding the in-11r4 n.anual valve, was leak tested per the requirenents of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J prior to unit restart.

The second installation phase will tale place with the unit in power operation. The welded cap will be nr.oved and remaining installation of the remote tranual valve, associated wiring and the blind flange assembly for the pinsure transmitter sensing diaphragm, will be cortpleted. When the welded cap is removed from the penetration for phase two of the installation, the licensee wC1 enter into the Action Statement

e. 3 of TS Section 3.6.3.

The Action Staterrent allows continued operation-of the plant with the one locked closed tranual containnient isolation valve until the plar.t is shut dcwn.

Following the installation, the penetration will be leak tested'per the requiren.ents of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, the remote-trar.ual valve operation will be tested, and the new TS requirements will be irrplemented.

Pased on the above evaluation the staff finds the nodifications to the plant to resolve EED 462 are accepteble and the addition of the new manual-remote containner.t isolation valve to Section 3/4.6.3, Table 3.6.3-1 is acceptable.

1

-3.0 ENVIR0t{ ENTAL C,0ESJp,E,RA,TJpp This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility

-coirponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillarce requirements. We have determined that this amendn.ent involves n.o-significent increase in the anounts, and no significant change in the type.s of any effluents which may be released offsite, and that there is no sigt.ificant increase in individual or curruletive occupational radiation exposure.

The Cotrmissien has previously issued a proposed finding that this an:endnent involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public i

1

}

I

.. e this amendment nwets the eligibility cortaentonsuchfinding.-Accordingly,forthin10.CFR51.22(c)(9).

criterit fcr. categorical exclusion set Pursuant t

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental in> pact statement or environn.tntal a~ssessnent need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this anwndment.

4.0 - C,0!{CLUS10N The Commission made a proposed determination that the o endoent involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (55 FR 5523) on February 15 -1090 and consulted with the State of Michigan.

i Nc public contents were received and the State of Michigan did not have any comments. We beve concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the-public will nct be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's.

regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendnient will nct be inimical to the corocn defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

J. Stang Date: _ September 13, 1990 b

k i

J 1

1

. i

i...

.